<p>Battalion Commander's letter re: actions and inactions at AG, which led to prisoner abuse. Acknowledged responsibility for all actions taken by soldiers assigned to the 320th MP BN, discussed that "egregious acts were committed in wing 1A of the Hard Site." Quoted as saying: "When [redacted] returned to Camp Bucca shortly before midnight, she took vigilante justice against EPW that she believed had raped [redacted]. [redacted] 4 out of the 10 320th MP BN soldiers abused some of the EPWs; a clear indication that the abuse was the responsibility of those individuals acting alone and was not condoned by myself or any leader at Camp Bucca." On Jan. 13, 2004, a person turned over a CD of photographs over to CID. .</p>
ATTENTION OF
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
320 th MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
APO AE 09432
12 April 04
MEMORANDUM THR tiff Judge Advocate, III Corp
F°411111111111111111 CG, III Corps
SUBJECT: Rebuttal of AR 15-6 foMIIIIIIIIIIP320 th MP Battalion
1. I acknowledge responsibility for al actions taken by soldiers assigned to the 320 th Military
Police (MP) Battalion (BN). I have been thoroughly embarrassed and humiliated by being
suspended from my duties while the 320 th MP BN has returned home. I acknowledge the failure
to implement all corrective security measures as ordered byBG Karpinski;and documented in
GOMOR dated 10 November 2003. 1 acknowledge failing to have all soldiers assigned to the
320th MP BN trained in Internment/Resettlement (UR) Operations and knowledgeable in the
protections afforded detainees in the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of Prisoners of
War. I acknowledge failing to properly supervise soldiers working and "visiting" Tier 1 of the
Hard-Site at Abu Ghraib understanding that proper supervision would have prevented prisoner
abuse.
2. I offer the following information in deciding on administrative actions to be taken against me.
I assumed command of the 320th MP BN in June 2002. I was selected for promotion in
November 2002. In accordance with Army Reserve policy, I found an 0-6 position and
requested a transfer of units in January 2003 to obtain my promotion. My request was denied
because activation of the 320 th MP BN was expected. The battalion was called to active duty on
10 February 2003. After packing unit equipment to operate a 4000 man Theater Internment
Facility (TIF), the 320 th MP BN began the mobilization validation process at Fort Dix on 19
February 2003. At Fort Dix, the 320 th MP BN received training on the Geneva Convention, Law
of War, and Arab cultural awareness. On 12 March 2003, the 320 th MP BN departed Fort Dix
for Kuwait. The battalion was able to validate in only three weeks when other units exceeded
five weeks at Fort Dix at that time because of demonstrated expertise in UR operations. First
Army and the 78th Training Division used the tactical SOP of the 320 th MP BN to validate the
mobilization readiness exercise of all other I/R battalions. In 2000 and 2001, the 320 th MP BN
performed its wartime mission in South Korea extremely effectively. The 320 th MP BN had
served as a test bed for various versions of the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) so
that personnel were well prepared to process and account for EPW. The competence of the
battalion and an aggressiVe training schedule enabled the 320 th MP BN to arrive at Fort Dix
weeks after the 310 th MP BN and 744th MP BN and depart weeks ahead of those battalions.
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3. The 320th MP BN arrived in Kuwait on 13 March 2003. While waiting at Camp Arian, at
my request the 320 th MP BN received another cultural awareness class from the Free Iraqi Force
(FIF) which included a mock prison scenario involving female MPs .vin orders to Iraqi EPW.
On 22 March 2003, the 320th MP BN operations staff to includ
and several other NCOs entered Iraq as part of the advance party for e Brigade
MP Brigade staff was slow to appear at the TIF near Umm Qasr, Iraq.) By 29 March 2003, I had
moved the HHC of the 320 th MP BN and two recently arrived MP Guard Companies to the TIF
by commercial 20 ton dump trucks, SSTs used to empty porta-lavatories, and commercial busses.
My units were committed to action while vehicles and containers of MTOE equipment were
aboard ship. (Vehicles and equipment arrived in Kuwait in late April through late May.) On l
April 2003,1 assumed command of Camp Freddy from a British Air Defense Artillery unit.
Camp Freddy was not designed to TIF standards in that compounds were small and located very
close to one another with a total design capacity of about 2500. By 13 April 2003, the
population of Camp Freddy exceeded 7200. All soldiers under my command were working a
scheduled twelve hour shift (routinely working 14-16 hour shifts) without any days off. I
typically worked 18-19 hours daily. During April, I recall two meetings that I held with officers
and NCOs regarding the review of proper treatment of detainees following alleged events that
were investigated and subsequently found to be groundless . By mid-May, engineers had
completed the TIF named Camp Bucca, Holding Area Freddy was closed, and the 320 th MP.BN
executive officer had been REFRAD. (The battalion CSM was held at Fort Dix for medical
problems until December 2003.) We continued to provide security for in-processing, the
medical clinic, Tribunal screening, and the Joint Forces Interrogation Facility. The 320 th MP BN
assumed so e escort missions from the 223w MP CO. On the afternoon of 12 May 200311.
as assigned on the first escort mission along with 9 other soldiers to take an empty
us to TSP Whitford at Tallil, pick up prisoners, and return to Camp Bucca for processing. Prior
to departure, a mission briefing was held which included a review of the Rules of Engagement.
At this briefing, I emphasized treating the EPWs firmly, but with respect and emphasized
utilizing the 223'd MP CO personnel to rcsol . ' tions (223 14 MP CO was
providing the left seat/right seat ride.) Whe turned to Camp Bucca shortl
lou
b .cinight, she took vigilante justice against EPW that she believed had rape
4 out of the 10 320th MP BN soldiers abused some of the EPWs; a clear indication that
e abuse was the responsibility of those individuals acting alone and was not condoned by .
myself or any leader at Camp Bucca.
4. Between April and June 2003, four different MP Guard Companies were assigned to the 320 th
transition MP BN for varying lengths of time. This resulted in a very dynamic mision with
being the norm. In June 2003, the 800 th MP Brigade made me the Commandant of Camp Bucca
when they relocated to Victory Camp. During June and July 2003, I was responsible for a
population of about 3000 prisoners and 1500 soldiers (320 th MP BN, 530th MP BN, and 724th MP
BN). On 17 July 2003, the 320th MP BN was ordered to relocate to FOB Abu Ghraib and
assume command and control of the prison complex to include Camp Vigilant, Camp Ganci, and
the renovated prison facility. I was assigned the missions to construct Camp Ganci, improve
Camp Vigilant, and be prepared to operate the renovated, existing prison complex. I was told by
the Deputy Commander of the 800 th MP Brigade,-that the 320 th MP BN was selected
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over the 530th MP BN and 724 th MP BN because the 320th MP BN had demonstrated a greater
ability to accomplish this assignment than other battalions.
5. I arrived at Abu Ghraib with the main body on 24 July 2003 without the battalion S-4 who
was evacuated to Walter Reed Hospital for knee surgery. (The escapes and shootings at Camp
Vigilant on 4 June and 13 June attributed to the 320 MP BN on report pages 27 and 28 occurred
while the 400 th MP BN was responsible for Camp Vigilant.) Within ten days, all the concertina
wire for all eight Camp Ganci compounds had been laid. Simultaneously, we were receiving
prisoners from Operation Victory Bounty into Camp Vigilant and Iraqi criminals into compound
1 of Camp Ganci. We immediately assisted the Military Intelligence (MI) unit with intelligence
collection effort by isolating detainees as much as possible and by executing sleep management.
asked the battalion S- at least daily if there were any prisoner accountability
(Annex A) Accountin . at all times was an extremely high priority for me. I
•problems. It was a very rare event when there was a lapse in prisoner' ccountability. I visited
the processing area and the compounds daily and asked about compound manifests. I found the
compound manifests to be accurate with a few minor changes required. These changes to NDRS
were worked behind the priority of physically accepting detainees, transferring detainees to
another detention facility, or releasing detainees. Inaccurate NDRS information does not
constitute an inability for me to account for detainees. Whenever there was an escape, a timely
report identifying the escaped detainee was filed. I believe that_as quoted on report
page 24, to be in error. I believe that the escapes he identified are recorded as e. on report page
28 and p. on report page 31. I find confusion understandable as he was the platoon .
leader ' escorts an as in charge of the Hard-Site until December 2003
whe was REF
6. At the end of July 2003, seven PR&Cs were submitted for logistical support that gilt
800th MP Brigade S-4, combined into a single PR&C only to realize its impracticality o
the PR&C process and was subsequently forced to divide the one huge PR&C into several
PR&Cs. The net effect was that support requested in July 2003 was not received until October
2003. Since arriving at FOB Abu Ghraib, there was a continuous expansion of facilities and of
number of personnel working there. My schedule at Abu Ghraib consisted of 18-19 hour days
without any days off. This schedule enabled me to visit many soldiers and observe operations. I
reviewed all statements from soldiers assigned to the 320 th MP BN (Report Annex 59, 60, 62, 63,
64, 68, 71, 73, 76, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 101, 105, and 106) and conclude that I was seen
frequently while BG Karpinski was rarely seen which contradicts in part paragraph 19 on report
page 43. .
7. Expansion of operational compounds in Camp Ganci was very painful because of the lack of
support. Water, food, poria-lavatories, light sets, and sufficient personnel were issues that took
significant effort to overcome to open additional compounds to meet the growing prisoner
population. On 25 August 2003, the first three wings and the medical clinic of the Hard-Site
opened while the remainder of the prison remained under renovation. No CPA representative
was assigned on-site. The Iraqi correction officers assigned by the Ministry of Justice were
supervised by MPs.
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8. Force protection was a major issue from day one of arrival. FOB Abu Ghraib is routinely
subjected to small arms, rocket propelled grenade, mortar, and rocket attack. An internal threat
arises from local labor used to renovate the Hard-Site. The 320 th MP BN provided all perimeter
security and force protection until A CO of the 1/504 PLR arrived at the end of September 2003
and until the . 165'h MI BN arrived in December 2003 to assume the northern perimeter and assist
at the entry control point. On the night of 16 August 2003, 59 prisoners were injured (43
required Medevac) and 6 prisoners were killed when a mortar round impacted in Compound B of
Camp Vigilant and Compound 2 of Camp Ganci. On 23 September 2003, two MI soldiers were
amp Vigilant. At this time, I requested a Combat Stress team visit.
Combat Stress team periodically returned because of the high
ace o • len at FOB Abu Ghraib. This contradicts in part the conclusion
reached in paragraph 20 on page 43 of the report.
9. The CJFT-7 IG, inspected FOB Abu Ghraib in late September 2003 and exited
with the observation ou arc the forgotten. and that we were doing the
best job possible wi e resources given, but wer eiving woefully inadequate support. On
30 September 2003, inspected FOB Abu Ghraib. He made FOB Abu Ghraib an
enduring base. He also uuuated efforts to correct deficiencies. My early October 2003 was
spent escorting primary CJTF-7 staff officers on inspections of FOB Abu Ghraib, integrating
four new MP companies into confinement operations, providing information to an engineer team
with FOB Abu Ghraib. BG Kaminski
aster plan, and familiarizing01111111116acti as the 320th MP BN CSM)
reassigne from serving
u Ghraib. (I strong y recommended to
BG Karpinski that she provide a staff fo but a staff never arrived.) On 15
October 2003, the 372" MP CO relieved the _ MP CO of operation of Camp Vigilant and the
Hard-Site. On the morning of 18 October 2003. BG Karpinski reassigned me to the 800 th MP
Brigade staff. She said that wanted a new face and new ideas. She wanted me to work with
CPA on detention facilities. ould be the interim 320 th MP BN commander for two
weeks until someone else could be found. She had x ected the mayor of FOB Abu Ghraib
and not me to bricf.and escort during his inspection the previous day.
e wanted CITF-7 to provide a mayor. Finall suggested that I go to Camp
Arian to meet with the 99 th C Conunande during her visit. I did go to Camp
Arifjan, met with and returned to the 800 MP Brigade on 22 October 2003.
(Annex B) When I t met with BG Karpinski upon my return, she informed me
intended to reassign me to duties as 320 th MP BN commander at thecompletion o
two weeks. In talking with he told me that he reported to BG Karpinski that the
mission at FOB Abu Ghraib was overwhelming and that there were no major problems with the
320th MP BN. On 31 October 2003, I returned to FOB Abu Ghraib. During the time that I was
assigned to the 800' MP Brigade staff, 85% of the egregious acts were committed in wing IA of
the Hard-Site. Some acts also occurred in early November 2003 while I was commander. The
egregious acts of abuse did not occur every night from late October through early November
2003; rather, the.acts occurred on 3 isolated nights. My oversight of operations eliminated the
abuse after mid-November.
10. On 10 November 2003, I received a GOMOR for failing to take corrective security measures
as ordered by BG Karpinski. In my rebuttal to the GOMOR, I pointed out compliance with all
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2S CO
an
the 324 th MP BN to ma
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killed by a mortar im
Thereafter,
stress levels
to d
corrective measures for which adequate resources were provided. I also pointed out corrective
measures which were not complied with involved positioning of light sets to illuminate all dark
areas that could provide an escape route for prisoners within the grid square of FOB Abu Ghraib
and involved the number of personnel to assign to operate Camp Ganci compounds and serve as
an interior FOB Abu Ghraib roving patrol. These corrective security measures could not be
complied with because all available light sets were used to illuminate Camp Vigilant and Camp
Ganci compounds and there was an insufficient amount of soldiers to meet doctrinal
requirements for operating der ntion facilities at
the 800th MP Brigade S-4 d S-3,
h. I made personal contact with
to request additional li t sets
ands Idlers. In December w en the 320 th MP located a vendor for light sets
sent all the light sets to the 530th MP BN. eatedly denied all requests
ufor forces. During mid-Novembe was asst as my acting executive officer.
On 19 November 2003, COL Pappas ecame Abu Ghraib commander.
11. On 24 November 2003, 4500 prisoners rioted in Camp Ganci. While conducting an AAR of
the operation to quell the riot, I was informed of the shooting in the Hard-Site. In early
December 2003 the 165th MI BN arrived to perform duties of overseeing FOB Abu Ghraib
operations. Actual transition of responsibilities was limited because the I65 th MI BN expected to
return to Germany in early February. The 165 th MI BN did not want to transition things twice
within 2 months. All units on FOB Abu Ghraib continued to attend my daily briefings. The
320th MP BN TOC continued to coordinate internal and external force protection. The 165 th MI
BN assumed responsibility for mayoral functions and the management of hundreds of local
contract laborers to fulfill contracts awarded to Improve FOB Abu Ghraib.
12. On the evening of 13 Jan 2004 cd a CD of digital photographs over to
CID. At 2300 hours, came to me showed me the photographs. I agreed to
assist his investigation by utilizing the Quick Reaction Force to secure the crime scenes.
Between 2400 and 0400 on 14 January 2004, I helped secure evidence and take
sworn statements. On 18 January 2004, I was suspended from duties by BG Karpinski. On 16
March 2004 while the 320 th B aced to redeploy home, I received
om duties To this date, I have never see eport,
cport, o Report making it impossible for me p ement their
recommen lions absent di 'on from my higher command. I have recently received
notification tha ill assume command of the 320 th MP BN in early June at a
change of comman • ceremony.
13. In summary, during this entire deployment, I was assigned rrissions without the resources to
accomplish the missions by doctrine. A lack of unit equipment and vehicles existed until May.
Other logistical issues were present throughout the deployment. There was a chronic shortage of
personnel which necessitated 12 hour shifts with few days off. On the 320 th MP BN staff, for the
majority of the deployment I w.as withouian executive officer, S-4, and command sergeant
major. I relied heavily o run the day to day confinement operations so that I
could concentrate on eve e "numerous" witnesses ref ced on report page 39
were statem e b (Annex 64) and Anne who worked
for at confirmed "day to day operations were ran y My
assigned missions were constantly changing, usually growing. Over the course of the
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deployment, I had command and control of ten MP companies not counting the battalion HHC.
At Abu Ghraib, MT companies received training during transitions that failed to include formal,
documented training on the Geneva Convention or UR operations. I accepted missions assigned,
requested support as needed or anized, and corn leted the missions to the best of my
ability. In my opinion, ed acts of abuse in clear violation of any
standard of morality. Training alone would not have prevented these acts of abuse. As battalion
commander, I could not be everywhere at all times and therefore legated authority. If I were
omnipotent, I would have remove om their duties and avoided
the abuse of prisoners and the disgrace to the nation.
14. On the civilian side, I electe at the end of 2002. I
applied for various jobs prior to mobilization. have a federal governmen position held open
for me 1 return home in April.
15. I offer OERs from my previous mobilization where I worked for the V Corps G-5 to my
OER ending in June 2003 to show that I have a history of accepting challenging assignments and
doing well. (Annex C) My OER for the period of December 2001 to December 2002 is not
included because the electronic copy in my OPMS is for a captain unknown to me.
11111111111111111111. LTC, MP
320th Military Police Battalion
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