This memo describes Captain Ray's on-site investigation of Abu Ghraib prison. The memo highlights that "Nearly every soldier had a different method in which they made [head] counts of detainees" as well as the lack of Standard Operating Procedures and other non-uniform procedures at the prison.
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COALITION FORCES LAND COMPONENT COMMAND
HEADQUARTERS THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES CENTRAL COMMAND
APO AE 09304
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:
AFRD-JA 9 March 2004
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Investigative Observations and Interviews
1.
0n-or ;.bout. 7 February 2004, I talked to several members of the 320 th MP Battalion at Abu Gharib (BCCF), Iraq regarding accountability and detainee processing at that facility.
2.
During a tour of the Hard-Site, I visited the MP Guard orderly room located within the Hard-Site. I spoke with the NCOIC of that particular shift who verbally walked me through the "rollcall," and "call-up" procedures practiced within the Hard-Site. Of particular note was his concerns about the way ISN counts were done and reconciled with the manifests they were provided by the Battalion S-1, CPT 1111111111111111 He explained that the Hard-Site, and the other holding areas receive a detainee manifest that lists every detainee they should have in their respective areas. However, they are NEVER accurate. He further added that the manifest is usually off by at least 4 or 5 detainees, but often has a dozen or more inaccuracies. When asked why he thought this was happening, he told me that he believed that the Battalion S-1 shop was always "way behind in processing the change sheets" that are handed into them every day. He explained that a change sheet is the form used to document the movement of a detainee from one location to another (i.e. a different holding area, hospital, court, etc...). Thus, if the manifest is not updated in a timely manner, the manifest will not be accurate and makes his job very confusing and frustrating.
3.
As a follow-up to the discussion detailed in paragraph 2 above, I discussed the issue with the Battalion S-1, CPTIMIN and the Battalion S-3, Major.They confirmed that the manifests were not accurate due to a delay, in many cases 4 or more days, in processing the change sheets. They further informed me that they needed at least 12 additional Soldiers dedicated to the processing of change sheets if they were to have accurate manifests/counts.
4.
I also talked to several junior enlisted MPs while at Abu Gharib (BCCF) about how they conduct head counts of the detainees. Nearly every soldier had a different method in which they made these counts. Depending on what tent and compound you were in and who your NCOIC was at any particular time, the counts could be moving all the detainees to one end of the tent and counting them as they moved to the other end, lining the detainees up in row of 10 and physically counting the rows, removing them from the tent and having them stand along the fence, or walking them from one compound to another and counting them as they enter the second compound. There was no SOP being enforced when doing physical counts.
ttrvm&i. q
DODD0A-003250
AFRD-JA SUBJECT: Investigative Observations and Interviews
5. During the week of March 7 th through the 13 th 2004iialur
ce with BG Janis Karpinski on the phone regarding reprimands she may have given SGM .800th MP Brigade. She informed me that she had given him two written Letters of Admonishment and several verbal reprimands.
6. POC for this memorandum for record is the undersigned at DSN 318-438-8018.
//original signed//
UIIIIIIIIIINIIIP
CPT, JA
Chief of Military Justice (CFLCC)
DODD0A-003251