Taguba Report Annex 8: 15-6 Investigation on Riot and Shootings at Abu Ghraib Prison, November 2003

15-6 Investigation on
Riot and Shootings at
Abu Ghurayb on
(24 November 2003)

Enclosed:
15-6 Narrative (Findings)
Memo from MG Wojdakowski
16th MP Brigade Corrective Actions Plan
This AR 15-6 investigation covers two incidents that are independent but very closely related in time a location. They also share numerous root causes. For purposes of understanding the evolution of these two events, and for clarity, independent narrative summaries are provided, each dealing with one incident.
I. Narrative Summary of Riot at Abu Ghuravb Prison (BaEhdad Correctional
Facility)

On 24 NOV 2003, the U.S. Military Police Guard Force at Abu Ghurayb Prison/Baghdad Correctional Facility, (BCF), shot and killed 4 (four) detainees that were aggressively contributing to a prison riot. The prisoners failed to comply with commands from guards to stop and disburse, and appeared to be preparing to affect a breach of the
containment perimeter.
Prior to the incident, several intelligence reports had been distributed to the facility. BCF personnel were aware that a distracting disturbance might take place several days prior to or several days after the Ramadan holiday. The disturbance was allegedly to have been started by a signal from an outside force to create a distracting action so the outside forces could break in and free High Value Detainees (HVD). The signal was to have been the sounding of vehicle horns or a non-standard call to prayer. It should be noted that HVDs are not being detained at the BCF.
At approximately 1300, 24 NOV 2003, detainees in Compound 4 at Camp Ganci initiated a demonstration, protesting circumstances of their capture, judicial procedures, and prisoner release conditions. The detainees rallied by yelling, chanting and inciting other compounds to become non-compliant with institutional standards. The prisoners were marching and yelling "Down with Bush," and "Bush is Bad" and other slogans to that effect. After several minutes, the detainees became violent and started throwingrocks at the guards; both in the towers and at the rovers along the wire. This instigated the adjacent detainee compounds to begin rioting, also. Many of the guards in the tower stated that "the sky was black with rocks" and "I feared for my life and was afraid of a mass breakout." Several of the guards were injured by thrown objects.
In compliance with standard operating procedures governing rules of engagement, less-than-lethal (LTL) force was initially employed against the rioters. Several Ln. M203 crowd control and 12 GA shotgun rounds were fired. At this time, detainees in all 8 (eight) of the compounds at Camp Ganci were engaged in violent and aggressive behavior toward the guard force. The perception the situation indicated that a mass prison break was imminent and U.S. forces were in grave danger due to the ineffectiveness and depletion of LTL ammunition. After repeated attempts to bring the rioting under control, authorization was granted to fire lethal rounds into the compound. In accordance with
P and ROE, permission had to be granted by the Command Post. LTC , 320th Battalion Commander authorized the use of deadly force to bring the situation under control and restore order and discipline within the compounds.
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At approximately 1335, 24 NOV 2003, deadly force was applied at Compound 4
of Camp Ganci. The most immediate threats were identified and engaged with several
aimed shots, which resulted in the death of one detainee and several others wounded.
Guards at Compound 7 were the next to apply deadly force, which resulted in the death
of one detainee. No other wounded were reported in this compound. Guards in
Compound 1 and 3 also fired lethal rounds into the compounds resulting in the death of
two more detainees.

The use of deadly force defused and quelled the rioting in all of the compounds
and order was restored at approximately 1345, 24 NOV 2003. Medical personnel then
reacted to the injured and ammunition re-supply was completed. All detainees were
accounted for and contained in specific areas of the compounds while compounds were
secured and searched.

All KIA detainees were evacuated to the 28 th CSH in Baghdad. WIA detainees
were treated by US medical personnel at the scene or evacuated to the 28 th CSH. Unit
medical personnel treated all U.S. WIA at the scene.

Follow-on interviews and general discussions with detainees indicated that the
riot was not part of a larger "mass break" plan. The detainees were protesting the
conditions in which they live, meals, conditions of capture and subsequent incarceration,
judicial system, etc.

2. Narrative Summary of Cellblock Shooting at Abu Ghnravb Prison (Baghdad
Correctional Facilitvl

On or about 1830, 24 NOV 2003, Military Police personnel received credible
information of the possibility of a detainee being in possession of a gun and several
knives in a cell. This information was obtained from another detainee. Military
Intelligence personnel have identified this individual as an informant who has provided
valuable information in the past. The informant stated that an IZ guard had smuggled the
items into the prison complex. The unknown IZ Guard wrapped the gun and knives in a
bed sheet and from outside threw them up to the window of cell #35 in tier IA.

The informant was removed from his cell and transported to a shower room in the
cellblock area to further question him. Mili .Police and Mili.Intelli ence ersonnel
assembled a search team consisting of LTG SSG SSG d SGT

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Neither the Company Command Post nor the Battalion TOC was non ed prior conducting this operation. There was no SOP that required the search team to do so. The search team viewed this as a routine cell search.
Several other individuals were in the area, including MI personnel, assisting with
the lockdown of the remainder of the prisoners. Prisoners were requested to come to the
door of their cell and slide their hands through the cell door to be handcuffed. This is

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procedure I .rmoving a detainee m the cell prior to movement orsearch. As the above listed personnel approached cell #35, the detainee in that cell was ordered to place his hands through the bars to be handcuffed. At this time the detainee stated he "had no gun." It should be noted that no mention of a gun was made within earshot of the detainee previously.
The detainee then made a sudden move toward the upper bunk in his cell and produced a pistol. He fired a round through the cell door, which impacted across the walkway on the south side of the tier. The search team then fired 2 rounds of less-than­lethal pellets from a 12 GA shotgun, which had no effect. The detainee responded by firing five to six additional rounds at the team. The search team then engaged the detainee with lethal rounds from the 12 GA shotgun. The detainee was struck several times in the legs with 00Buckshot. The detainee relinquished his weapon only after he expended all of his ammunition. He slid the pistol under the cell door and surendtred. The team entered the cell and subdued the detainee.
The cell was searched and 2 bayonet type knives were discovered in the same area where the pistol was; under the mattress of the upper bunk. Medical attention was administered to the detainee and he was then evacuated to the 28 th CSH. BIAP, Baghdad.
With in 24 hrs of the above incident, MI personnel detained and questioned 43 1Z guards. All but three were released following intense questioning. These three are being detained for further processing. A fourth did not report for work the next day and is still at large. MI personnel are making attempts to locate this individual. The IZ guard detainees admitted smuggling the weapons into the facility hiding them in an inner tube
of a tire. Several of the IZ guards in question have been identified as Fedayeen trainers and members. It is not clear if this action was part of a larger plan to free High Value Detainees (HVD). In addition, this incident does not appear to be related to the prison riot earlier in the day.
It appears that this entire event was simply a plan to kill Americans and possibly escape. It should be noted that it is believed that the weapons had been in tier IA for possibly 2 days and had been in more than one cell. The informant that originally passed the information had stated that he had possession of the weapons at one time but gave them back for fear of discovery. He is removed from his cell regularly for interrogation because he is considered a good source. He admitted passing the weapons back to the detainee in cell #35 while on cleaning detail.
Findings:
1. Standard Operating Procedures -The Standard Operating Procedures in use by this unit are not adequate. This finding applies to both the riot incident as well the cellblock shooting. It lacks detail and there is no evidence of reviews or periodic retraining on the policies. These findings are supported by Exhibits 36, 39, 51-56).
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2.
Rules of Enzagement/Rules on Vse of Force
-The Rules of Engagement in place at the time of both incidents, were
ineffective due to the need for repeated levels of authorization to use lethal
force. Following these incidents but prior to the initiation of this AR 15-6
investigation, the ROE/RUF has been modified to allow more discretion at the
guard post level in the proper use of force required. It is likely that this issue
will be mitigated in the future by the implementation of these modifications.
This finding is supported by exhibits (Exhibits 21-26, 50-56).

3.
Training
-Overall, the training of MP's at this facility is barely adequate and not
properly documented. There was no evidence that showed retraining occurred.
Combat Support MPs were cross-leveled and were not sufficiently trained in
detainee operations. This finding is supported by exhibits (Exhibits51-56)

4.
Impact of Rumors in Detainee Population -There is no evidence substantiating the belief that rumors concerning early release for Ramadan, or any other external issue, was related to the riot at the prison. All evidence indicates that the detainees were simply protesting the deplorable food and living conditions. This finding is supported by exhibits (app D)

5.
Civil Affairs Assets -Civil Affairs assets are not adequate to support the requirements of such an expansive detainee population. In fact they have no dedicated assets to the facility due to their transfer out. The Civil affairs team assigned to that AO is not dedicated to the facility and they are currently tasked to the 82" d Airborne Division and dealing with other priority tactical issues. This is supported by exhibits (Exhibits 35, 36, 37, 39)

6.
Adequacey of Non lethal/less than Lethal Equipment

-All of the available less than lethal rounds were employed to no apparent
effect on the detainees. Several factors including numerous layers of clothing,
the distance from which they were fired, and the volume of LTL ammunition
employed were all significant to this failure. It was also observed that they did
not have a complete set of Ln., and no have a plan for re-supply. This finding
is supported by exhibits ( Exhibits 1-7, 21-26,36,37,39 )

7.
Weapon Smuggling Issue -The weapons were smuggled in by an Iraqi prison guard, in a spare tire inner tube located in a civilian vehicle. The suspect was identified as ( See CID

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Investigatiori for Cellbloc shoo. , I an. the weapon MIS transfeired .10 the prisoner in the cell by wrapping it in a bed sheet and tossing it in the cell window. This finding is supported by exhibits (See CII) Investigation for Cellblock Shooting)

ExecutivF,Stunn2ary of Celiblock Shooting Incident
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-''‘ 6 r On 24 NOV2003,'While performing duties in the Hardstand section of Abu Ghurayb Prison, Baghdad Correctional Facility (BCF), US Military Police guard force shot and wounded a detainee in the isolation area.
On or about 1830, 24 NOV 2003, Military Police personnel received information of the
possibility of a detainee being in possession of a gun and several knives in a cell. This
information was obtained from another detainee. Military Intelligence personnel have
identified this individual as an informant who has provided valuable information in the
past. The informant stated that an IZ guard had smuggled the items into the prison
complex. The unknown IZ Guard wrapped the gun and knives in a bed sheet and threw
them up to the window of cell #35 in tier 1A.
The informant was removed from his cell and transported to a shower room in the cellblock area to furtherquestion him. Militigice ence personnel
assembled a search team consisting of LTC SSG SSG and SGT
Neither the Company Command Post nor the Battalion TOC was notified prior
to the conduct of this operation. There was no SOP that required the search team to do so.
The search team viewed this as a routine cell search.
Several other individuals were in the area, including MI personnel, assisting with the lockdown of the remainder of the prisoners. Prisoners were requested to come to the door of the cell and slide their hands through the cell door to be handcuffed. This is standard procedure when removing a detainee from the cell prior to movement or search. As the above listed personnel approached cell #35, the detainee in that cell was ordered to place his hands through the bars to be handcuffed. At this time the detainee stated he "had no gun." It should be noted that no mention of a gun was made within earshot of the detainee previously. The detainee then made a sudden move toward the upper bunk in his cell and produced a pistol. He then fired a round through the cell door, which impacted across the walkway on the south side of the tier. The search team then fired 2 rounds of less-than­lethal pellets from a 12 GA shotgun, which had no effect. The detainee then responded by firing five to six additional rounds at the team. The search team then engaged the detainee with lethal rounds from the 12 GA shotgun. The detainee was struck several times in the legs with 00Bucicshot. The detainee relinquished his weapon only after he expended all of his ammunition. He slid the pistol under the cell door and surrendered. The team entered the cell and subdued the detainee.
The cell was searched and 2 bayonet type knives were discovered in the same area where the pistol was; under the mattress of the upper bunk. Medical attention was administered to the detainee and he was then evacuated to the 28 th CSH, BIAP, Baghdad.
Following the above incident, MI personnel detained and questioned 43 IZ guards. All but three were released following intense questioning. These three are being detained for further processing. A fourth did not report for work the next day and is still at large. MI personnel are making attempts to locate this individual. The IZ guard detainees admitted smuggling the weapons into the facility hiding them in an inner tube of a tire. Several of the IZ guards in question have been identified as Fedayeen trainers and members. It is not
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c ear if this a on part o a • er • addition, this incident does not appear to be relaied to the prison' riot'earlier in the day. On the surface it appears that this was simply a plan to kill Americans and escape. It should be noted that it is believed that the weapons had been in tier IA for possibly 2 days and had been in more than one cell. The informant that originally passed the information had stated that he had possession of the weapons at one time but gave them back for fear of discovery. He is removed from his cell regularly for interrogation because he is considered a good source. He admitted passing the weapons back to the detainee in cell #35 while on cleaning detail.
Page 2 of 2

Executive Summary of Prison Riot incident
• " -
" On 24 NOV 2003, the U.S. Military Police Guard Force at Abu Ghurayb Prison/Baghdad Correctional Facility, (BCF), shot and killed 4 (four) detainees that were aggressively contributing to a prison riot. The prisoners would not comply with ordered commands from guard force personnel to cease and desist, and were threatening to affect a breach of the containment perimeter.
Prior to the incident, several intelligence reports had been distributed to the facility. BCF
personnel were aware that a distracting disturbance might take place several days prior to
or several days after the Ramadan holiday. The disturbance was allegedly to have been
started by a signal from an outside force. The purpose was to create a distracting action
so outside forces could break in and free High Value Detainees (HVD). The signal was to
have been sounding of vehicle horns or a non-standard call to prayer. It should be noted
that HVDE are not being detained at the BCF.
At approximately 1300, 24 NOV 2003, detainees in Compound 4 at Camp Ganci initiated a demonstration, protesting circumstances of their capture, judicial procedures, and prisoner release conditions. The detainees rallied by yelling, chanting and inciting other compounds to become non-compliant with institutional standards. The prisoners were marching and yelling "Down with Bush," and "Bush is Bad" and other slogans to that effect. After several minutes , the detainees became violent and started throwing rocks at the guards; both in the towers and at the rovers along the wire. This instigated the adjacent detainee compounds to begin rioting, also. Many of the guards in the towers had stated that "the sky was black with rocks" and "I feared for my life and was afraid of a mass breakout." Several of the guards were injured by thrown objects. In compliance with standard operating procedures governing rules of engagement, less-than-lethal (LTL) force was initially employed against the rioters. Several LTL M203 crowd control and 12 GA shotgun rounds were fired. At this time, detainees in all 8 (eight) of the compounds at Camp Ganci were engaged in violent and aggressive behavior toward the guard force. An assessment of the situation indicated that a mass prison break was
imminent and U.S. forces were in grave danger due to the ineffectiveness and depletion of LTL ammunition. After repeated attempts to bring the rioting under control, authorization was granted to fire lethal rounds into the compound. In accordance with SOP and ROE, permission had to be granted by the Command Post. LTC Gerry Phillabaum, 320 th Battalion Commander authorized the use of deadly force to bring the situation under control and restore order and discipline within the compounds.
At approximately 1335, 24 NOV 2003, deadly force action was applied at Compound 4 of Camp Ganci. The most immediate threats were identified and engaged with several aimed shots, which resulted in the death of one detainee and several others wounded. Guards at Compound 7 were the next to apply deadly force, which resulted in the death of one detainee. No other wounded were reported in this'compound. Guards in Compound 1 and 3 also fired lethal rounds into the compounds resulting in the death of two more detainees.
The use of deadly force defused and quelled the rioting in all of the compounds and order was restored at approximately 1345, 24 NOV 2003. Medical personnel then reacted to the
a-7; ammumtion re-supply was comp were accotm for 63niiiried in specific areas of the compounds while cOmpotaidiwere secured and searched.
All KIA detainees were evacuated to the 28 th CSH in Baghdad. WIA detainees were treated by US medical personnel at the scene or evacuated to the 28 th CSH. Unit medical personnel treated all U.S. WIA at the scene.
Follow-on interviews and general discussions with detainees indicated that the riot was not part of a larger "mass break" plan. The detainees were protesting the conditions in which they live, meals, conditions of capture and subsequent incarceration, judicial system, etc.
Page 2 of 2
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN BAINDAD, !RAO ...Z..".•."
CJTF7-DCG
.

MEMORANDUM FOR
Provost Marshal, CJTF-7, Victory Base Camp, Iraq Commander, 16 Military Police Brigade, Victory Base Camp, Iraq Commander, 504th Military Intelligence Brigade, Victory Base Camp, Iraq
SUBJECT: Corrective Actions Required After Riots and Shootings at Abu Ghraib Prison on 24 November 2003
I . On 24 November there were two shooting incidents at the Ahu Ghraib Prison. In an AR l5.6
investigation, the Investigating Officer identified numerous deficiencies that require improvement in the administration of the Prison. These deficiencies, including inadequate SOP: and an inadequate system of training were contributing factors in the two incidents.
2. Attached is a copy of the Report of Investigation with findings and recommendations. The Provost Marshal and Commander, 16 1h MP BDE, with the support of the Commander, 504 thMI BDE, are directed to evaluate each of the eight recommendations made by the Investigating Officer, including those specific recommendations incorporated at Appendices A through D, and to develop a plan of action for each. To the extent that any specific corrective action has already been taken, you will reflect such action in your report.
3. You will submit to the Deputy Commanding General, C.JTF-7, a copy of your plan of action NLT 15 February 2004.
Encl WALTER VOUTDAKOWSKI as Major General, USA Deputy Commanding General
CF:
CJTF-7 SJA
UNCI ASSIFIED/iFta Official Um- i

Recommendations (cont from DA 1574)
Per the direction in the AR 15-6 appointment Memo, the following specific recommendations are provided:
1. Standard Operating Procedures
a.
Periodic review and modifications of operational SOP document.
SOP must include sufficient detail to cover all common and complicated situations
anticipated.

b.
Less than Lethal rounds must always be in a designated weapon, clearly marked as
such, and separated from weapons loaded with lethal ammunition. Colored barrels and
stocks on LTL weapons are common methods of accomplishing this.

c.
The SOP must be reproduced and readily available, in numerous locations, to all soldiers on duty as a quick reference source.

d.
Other recommendations affecting multiple areas are included in appendix A.

2. ROE/RUF
a. The soldier in the tower should be the decision-making authority on the necessary use of deadly force. This has already been implemented following a review of the ROE/RUF
.
b.
ROE/RUF review and training must be a continual process, reviewed at least once a month.

c.
ROE/RUF guidelines must be clearly posted at each guard post.

d.
Other recommendations affecting multiple areas are included in appendix A.

3. Training
a.
Concurrent training plan must be developed and implemented at Company level to ensure complete understanding of ROE/RUF, common tasks for the various positions. and other perishable skills.

b.
Guard mounts must be conducted prior to every shift to enhance commonality of information flow; perform pre-combat checks of guard force personnel, and conduct hip pocket training.

c.
After Action Reviews (AAR's) must be conducted following all significant events. This will ensure that procedures used are sufficient and appropriate and that any deficiencies in the SOPs and other procedures are identified and corrected.

d.
Other recommendations affecting multiple areas are included in appendix A.

4. Impact of Rumors/Communications on the Behavior of the Detainees
a.
Compound to compound communications must be restricted as much as possible. Understanding that under operational conditions this is very difficult. Additional monitoring of prisoners to ensure that verbal and visual signals are not exchanged between compounds can effect this.

b.
Mandate that accurate and timely information flow concerning subjects such as early prison release is maintained with compound leaders.

c.
Educate detainees on the proper and acceptable methods to air grievances.

d.
Other recommendations affecting multiple areas are included in appendix A.

5. Civil Affairs Involvement at Abu Ghurayb
a.
Task Civil affairs units directly to the facility.

b.
Civil Affairs assets should concentrate on improving prisoner communications with relatives and their respective communities.

c.
Civil affairs Assets should also be used as source of intelligence as a result of their relationships with local civilians.

6. Improvement Of Less than Lethal Capabilities
a.
Additional less than lethal weapons must be obtained. This would enable segregation of the less than lethal from the lethal ammunition. TASER guns should be obtained. which would enhance the ability to subdue prisoners in a less than lethal manner.

b.
Sufficient stockpiles of less than lethal ammunition, to include rubber shot shells, bean bags, and stun grenades (flash-bangs) must be maintained at each guard post that has less than lethal capability.

c.
A detailed plan must be developed for the re-supply of both lethal and LTL ammunition in the event of an incident.

d.
At least one complete "Less than Lethal set" be obtained and placed at the facility for future use.

e.
Obtain permission to use chemical agents such as OC Pepper Spray to subdue unruly detainees.

f.
Other recommendations affecting multiple areas are included in appendix A.

7. Prevention of the Introduction of Illegal Weapons into the facility
a.
ISP Guards must be better vetted prior to employment and complete searches of all guards prior to allowing them to enter the prison complex. Currently there are known employees with connections to the Republican guard and Saddam Fedaheen.

b.
Non-military vehicles should not be allowed inside the walls of the facility. However, if non-military vehicles are allowed to continue to enter the facility parking area, a sterile area away from the building itself must be established. Before a person can leave this sterile area and come into the building, they should be subjected to a complete search. This system will apply to employees and contractors working at Abu Ghuryb.

c.
Additional supervision of IZ Guards must be provided to ensure that their work ethic is up to acceptable standards.

e.
Other recommendations affecting multiple areas are included in appendix A.

8. Appendix A, of this document, includes significant recommendations impacting on multiple areas including but not limited to the above seven specific areas.
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SOP and Training Observations and Recommendations
• SOPs and Standing Orders are available and there is evidence that the soldiers are
familiar with most of them.
• There is evidence in the form of training records for MOST soldiers that SOP. Rules of Engagement, and Less than Lethal (LTL) force training was conducted. Several of the soldiers involved with the cellblock shooting and the compound riot are not included on the training rosters made available to me. Constant and thorough reviews of training records must be conducted to ensure that all soldiers have been trained in the Rules of Engagement and conduct of SOPs. Follow-on training and familiarization must be accomplished so execution of them is second nature.
• Some SOPs are lacking the detail to ensure all potential situations are covered. The SOPs for cell searches and cell extractions are in place but some soldiers were not aware of their existence. SOPs should be briefed at every shift change as part of guard mount. At least one SOP per shift change should be briefed and discussed.
• There is no evidence of formal Guard Mounts being conducted prior to shift changes. Most interviewees stated that the NCOICs would have a meeting and then they would go to the posts and relay information. This is inefficient and can lead to confusion as all guards may not get the same information and may have questions that others may not have thought about. Guard Mounts should also be used for the conduct of Pre-Combat Checks where NCOICs perform inspections to ensure each soldier has the required equipment to perform the mission.
• There is no evidence of concurrent training being conducted during off shift periods. Although difficult to accomplish, concurrent training must be conducted to ensure understanding of SOPs and individual skills. Many military Police skills are perishable and refresher training is necessary for maintenance of these skills.
• There is no evidence of periodic review of SOPs and Standing Orders. SOPs are working documents and should be constantly reviewed for completeness and accuracy. As an example, there is no SOP that addresses the possibility of a weapon in a cell. This is Serious Incident Report (SIR) subject matter and should be very explicit. The SOP for cell searches could have been used for this incident but lacks the detail and communications aspect required to be complete. In the Cell 435 shooting incident, there was no communications with Company or Battalion level chains of command. This is a serious incident that I think would require additional guidance from the chain of command. If the TOC had been notified, the IRF would probably have been deployed. They have specialized equipment, such as flash-bang grenades and would have been helpful in this situation.
• Many SOPs are complicated in nature, such as cell extractions, and should rehearsed periodically. There is no evidence that this has taken place. be
• SOPs are in a binder maintained at the Battalion TOC. A duplicate binder should be at every NCOIC office in the facility. There are copies of some of the SOPs at various posts but only the SOPs that apply to that post. There could be instances that may require the examination of SOPs from other posts. In addition many copies of the SOPs are incomplete.

SOP and Training Observations and Recommendations
•
Rules of Engagement are not posted in every guard tower, nor are standing orders for all posts. This is paramount to ensure that every soldier standing guard has a full understanding of duties and responsibilities pertaining to that post. One soldier had a copy of the ROE in his pocket and could recite the ROE word for word. All soldiers should be this familiar with the ROE.

•
Current adaptation of rules dictates that less than lethal ammunition is mixed in the same weapon as lethal ammunition. Many soldiers could not identify what type of ammunition was currently loaded in some weapons. This is most predominantly the case with shotguns. In most cases, two Ln, rounds are carried up front followed by five rounds of 00 buckshot. This not a good practice as sometimes in the "heat of battle" a soldier may lose count and forget what the next round in the chamber is. This can be deadly for both the soldier and subject. The soldier may intend to fire a lethal round in an application of deadly force as he is being attacked and fire a LTL round that may allow the attacker to continue his actions. By the same token, a soldier may not have a deadly force situation, but fire a lethal round by mistake. LTL rounds must always be in a designated weapon clearly marked as such and separated from weapons loaded with lethal ammunition. I have seen markings such as barrels being painted a bright color, LTL marked on the stock, etc.

•
After Action Reviews (AARs) are not being conducted consistently following incidents. These should be conducted as soon as practicable following an incident while information is still fresh in the minds of the participants. These also lead to enhanced SOPs.

•
There is evidence of "Scenario" training. Vignettes have been reproduced and are available to the soldiers outlining real world possibilities. These are outstanding and full use should be made of them.

•
There is much evidence of "hesitation to shoot" among the soldiers. Most feel that every time someone pulls a trigger or "sticks" a prisoner, someone will be made the fall guy. Some soldiers feel that their training level is high enough to enable them to do the right thing. This hesitation could have disastrous results in some situations.

•
Post-mobilization training was inadequate for most deploying units to prepare them for the assigned mission. A thorough review of the commander's training priorities must be conducted prior to mobilization to ensure that concentration is applied to areas requiring additional training. It should be noted that several of the MP companies performing EPW/IR/Prison duties are Combat Support companies that were converted at the mobilization site. This is not desirable as a substantial amount of additional training is required. The complex training was not provided at the mobilization sites.

Hardstand Prison Observations and Recommendations
•
ISP Guards have questionable work ethic and possess cultural differences on how things should be handled. They have a tendency to be very lax in performance of duties and do not pay close attention to task at hand; hence some prisoners are not properly supervised at all times. If possible, additional U.S guards should be assigned to supervise the ISP guards. In one instance, prisoners were able to knock the concrete window grating from a window using the bunk bed in the cell. This act and the associated noise went unnoticed by Iraqi guards and 2 prisoners were allowed to escape.

•
Many ISP Guards are very corrupt and are known former intelligence officers and Fedaheen members. They are ripe for bribery as the pay is low and they supplement their incomes by extortion or favors.

•
Contractor personnel are not properly supervised within the facility an have too much free reign in prisoner areas. This makes it easy to engage in contact with prisoners and perpetuates the possibility of the smuggling of contraband.

•
1SP Guards do not have uniforms, which makes it difficult to distinguish them from prisoners. They must be clearly identified as guards so prisoners cannot mix in with them should a disturbance arise. They do have picture identification badges but are often covered by layers of clothing.

•
Many of the prisoners do not have distinguishing bright colored jumpsuits to distinguish them as such. They could easily mix in with non-uniformed guards or contractor personnel.

•
Corridor gates and doors are often left open and unattended by IZ guards while prisoners are in the general area. Additional training and supervision is required to ensure this is monitored.

•
Additional ISP Guards will be required when construction is completed, to man the new wings when additional prisoners are placed there. There are currently several hundred Iraqi criminals being held at Camp Ganci waiting to be placed in the new facility. When they are moved to the new facility, the overcrowding issue at Camp Ganci may be resolved.

•
The tier and wing areas are extremely dirty and very unsanitary. Prisoners are allowed to keep food in cell areas if they don't eat it at that particular meal. This breeds disease and complicates cleanliness issues. Stringent work details are not enforced. Prisoners should be organized into work parties and clean up the mess in the cellblock areas. This would also lead to occupying prisoners' time as opposed to and instill a work ethic.

•
Full and complete searches of contractor personnel and ISP Guards are being conducted as they enter the facility. ISP Guards and some contractor POVs are being allowed onto the facility and parked too close to the hardstand prison area. All POVs should be parked outside the facility or, if allowed inside, parked a safer distance from the hardstand prison site. All POVs allowed inside the facility should be parked in a controlled area with restricted access to the vehicles.

Hardstand Prison Observations and Recommendations
•
CPA must take complete ownership of facility. They should have a full time representative present at the facility to supervise projects and assist with logistic issues. In 9 days at the facility, I observed CPA representatives in the area only three times. It was related to me by MP personnel that this was more than they had been there in some time.

•
Clear-cut chain of command does not exist in the prison. It is difficult to understand whom the Military Police work for, particularly in the MI hold area. The MPs must work for and answer to their own chain of command and not answer to the Ml community. The MI contingent is not familiar with SOPs and Standing Orders concerning MP operations and may present conflicts.

•
Towers on the outer wall of the prison facility are not manned 100%. All towers should be manned 24/7. Exterior towers being manned also play a role in the observation of the compound and hardstand areas.

C

Camp Ganci Observations and Recommendations
•
There are too many compounds in the facility. The space allotted should only contain 6 compounds, at most. The facility contains 8 compounds that are smaller than standard. The compounds are designed to hold 500 prisoners. The current capacity averages approximately 575 — 600 prisoners per compound. This is causing security and sanitation issues within each compound. The compounds should hold only 500 prisoners.

•
Compounds are too close together. The distance between compounds averages 30 feet. This distance should be 150 feet or greater. This is a result of placing too many compounds in the facility. The closeness of the compounds facilitates communication between prisoners of different areas. Verbal, hand signal and actual notes are all methods of intra-compound communications that are currently being employed

.
•
Guard towers are not placed properly and are ineffective. They are too close to the wire of the compound and forces the tower guard to lean over the edge to see if any prisoners are directly below him. A half -moon wire exclusion area should be emplaced to keep prisoners back.

•
Compound corners are squared off, which facilitates blind spots. Corners should be rounded to alleviate the blind spots.

•
Engineer support is desperately required in order to complete projects in compound area. External secondary fences are not complete. The entire area requires grading to enhance proper drainage. Area is covered with mud and many prisoner tents are close to being under water.

•
Cages of chain link fence material must be constructed around the upper part of guard towers to prevent thrown objects from hitting guards. This was a major problem during the riot of 24 NOV.

•
Current lighting arrangement is not effective in the compounds. Many dead spots were observed during hours of darkness. Additional lighting is required, as rearrangement will not solve the issue. Hand held spotlights are also needed in the towers so guards have some form of point lighting to identify prisoners and specific areas of concern. These have been ordered and currently out for bid.

•
Kevlar helmets and flak vests are not required until 1700 daily. Many of the rovers and NCOICs had grounded their equipment when reporting for duty and got caught elsewhere when riot started. They did not have the proper level of protection when trouble started. All the tower guards had the necessary protective equipment. Tower guards had their protective equipment in the towers and were able to "suit up" quickly.

•
Prior to the riot, guards required permission to fire lethal rounds into compound. This permission took over 25 minutes to obtain as the BN Cdr had to arrive on the scene and observe situation prior to authorization. There were repeated requests for permission to engage targets with lethal ammunition as several of the guards clearly felt their life was in danger and were also in fear of the prisoners conducting a breakout and overrunning their positions. These were precious minutes that could have been lethal for soldiers on duty. Clear lines of communication must be part of

Camp Ganci Observations and Recommendations Camp Ganci Observations and Recommendations
the SOP so that OIC or BN Cdr can remotely authorize and save time. The ROE has changed since the riot to allow the guards more flexibility in the decision to engage targets with lethal ammunition. The new ROE seems to be effective .
• Operation "Golden Spike" is a plan to regain control of prison in the event of mass rioting and/or breakout. Very few soldiers have seen this plan and know their role in the operation. The plan has not been rehearsed. However it has been briefed to leadership and a rock drill was conducted. Soldiers cannot be expected to carry out a plan that they have never seen. This plan must be completely briefed and rehearsed by all soldiers to ensure complete understanding and identify shortfalls in the plan.
• Communications in towers is less than adequate. TA-312 telephones are the primary means of communications and are unreliable. The wired network requires constant maintenance and rt.-wiring as the wires are constantly cut and broken. Some towers and rovers have non-standard handheld radios. This has caused many soldiers to purchase their own handheld Motorola style radios to communicate with one another and the NCOIC. Additional standardized handheld radios and other communication
devices have been ordered but contracts are slow to be issued and purchases made.
• Insufficient LTL ammunition is placed in towers. Some towers had only two LTL M203 rounds or two 12 GA shotgun rounds. Some towers have no LTL ammunition. In some shotguns, the magazine has only LTL rounds in it. On other posts, there is a mix. Plans for standard issue of lethal and um ammunition must be developed. There are no plans for re-supply of LTL ammunition during an incident and an SOP for this must also be developed.
• Contract meals at the facility are not served on time. I observed the 1100 meal not arrive until 1500 and then the 1600 meal not be delivered until 2030. This situation
contributes to prisoner unrest. This is a systemic problem with contracting. A contract officer should be posted at the facility to deal with breach of contract issues and take necessary actions to prevent this from happening. At the very least, contracting officers should visit the facility several times a week to ensure the Government is not being mislead and defrauded by local contractors.
• Most detainees do not have prison jumpsuits to clearly identify them as such. This may cause a problem if a break were to occur. The civilian attire would create an identification issue, as the similarity in attire would allow the detainees to easily mix in with contractors in the area.
• Compounds are unsightly and strewn with litter and garbage. Detainees are also allowed to horde food. This breeds unsanitary conditions. Prisoners should be organized into work parties and clean up their areas. This would aid in controlling disease and enhance sanitation. It would also lead to keeping detainees occupied and controlled as opposed to wandering the compounds.
• The issue of compound overcrowding cannot be alleviated with additional tents in the compounds. The compounds themselves are overcrowded. The release and transfer of detainees must be affected to fix this problem. Additional magistrate personnel are required to initiate additional review boards. The circumstances of incarceration must also be reviewed. Oftentimes when raids are conducted, everyone in the building is

taken into custody and sent to a facility and identified as a security detainee. In some cases, these people are completely innocent and it can take months to rectify. More accurate reports should be submitted by capturing units to identify the circumstances. This would make it easier to identify potential releases earlier.
A
• hel A .1)

Intellicence Observations and Recommendations
•
There is evidence that all intelligence products sent to Abu Ghurayb were received

•
Evidence exists that all info was acted upon by briefing interior and exterior guards. COL Pappas and LTC Phillabaum ensured the information was passed during the daily force protection meetings.

•
Intel received was not of a "boiled down" nature and vague in some respects. Most intelligence is received that way, and this is not a new issue.

•
Information gained from interrogations conducted by MI

•
Interviews and discussions with detainees in the compound areas following the riot of 24 DEC indicated that the actions had nothing to do with a coordinated plan to break out HVDs. The detainees were protesting the living conditions, judicial process, terms of capture and release, and food. There is no evidence of rumors being a contributing factor to the prison riot of 24 NOV.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 16Th MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE (AIRBORNE)
Victory Base Camp, Iraq
APO AE 09342

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFZA-AP 14 February 2004
MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-Seven
SUBJECT: Corrective Actions Required After Riots and Shootings at Abu Ghraib Prison on 24 November 2003
1. Enclosed is the corrective action plan for Abu Ghraib Prison, including implemented actions as well as those under review. This plan was reviewed and approved by the CJTF-7 PM and the Commander, 504th MI Brigade.
2. POC is LTC Lennie Upshaw at DNVT 559-1738.
Encl as CO
Commanding
I. Standard Operating Procedures
a.
All SOPs are currently under review by a team of senior NCOs at the brigade and battalion level. This will include changes and updates to include sufficient detail for procedures to be followed. Changes to SOPs are currently briefed during Guard Mounts and will be posted at each functional area. Additional SOPs are implemented as additional missions are added, such as escorts to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) and the Conditional Release Program.

b.
Current manning levels and weapons availability result in the inability to have 2 separate weapons with lethal and less than lethal ammunition at each post. However, each shotgun is loaded with less than lethal rounds and the bearer of that weapon carries lethal rounds on the left sidr of the IBA. The SOP is being refined to ensure that soldiers check, clear and re-load weapons as they are passed from one shift to the next.

c.
All SOPs will be published in sufficient quantities to ensure one is posted at each duty location.

2. ROE/RUF
a.
The recommendation for soldiers to be the decision-maker on the use of deadly force was implemented. Soldiers are briefed on their authority to use deadly force as part of the ROE brief.

b.
ROE is briefed daily at each Guard Mount and Shift Change.

c.
ROE is posted at each post and in the battalion TOC and will be checked periodically.

3. Training
a.
Training plans for ROE and additional MP tasks are being developed and will be distributed to all units. Units will incorporate performance-oriented training for each task.

b.
Formal in-ranks guard mounts have been initiated at each facility to complement the previous practice of shift change briefs to the NCOICs of each compound, who would then brief his/her shift personnel at their respective compounds. Formal guard mount training has been implemented, and is documented on the guard mount training plan.

c.
AARs are currently being conducted at the conclusion of each significant event as well as following all significant training activities.

4. Impact of rumors/communications on the behavior of detainees
a. Communication between compounds is minimized as much as possible considering the close proximity of the compounds to each other as well as the current manning restraints. We are currently working additional projects for screening between the compounds to reduce communications between detainees. Frequent random searches of both detainees and their living
areas are also conducted to confiscate notes, messages and/or other contraband. Military working dogs support this effort.
b.
Each compound has a detainee representative who serves as the spokesperson. Compound representatives are used to provide information to the other detainees in their respective compounds.

c.
Compound NCOICs and the battalion S-3 meet regularly with the compound representatives to discuss issues, concerns, upcoming events and recent trends.

5. Civil Affairs Involvement at Abu Ghraib
a.
A current CA team (-) located at Abu Ghraib is scheduled to depart on or about 15 February 2004 with no scheduled replacement. We are submitting a request for dedicated CA assets through the CJTF-7 C9.

b.
The current CA assets concentrate on improving relations with the community. We recommend CA assets dedicated to Abu Ghraib be placed TACON to 16th MP Bde (Abn) to ensure their use as recommended in the AR 15-6 investigation findings.

c.
The current CA team provides intelligence recovered from local sources as well as that which is collected by Coalition Forces. We anticipate follow-on CA assets will operate similarly.

6. Less than Lethal (LTL) Capability Improvements
a.
The battalion commander appointed a senior NCO on the unit's QRF to identify the needs and procure additional un, weapons of various types, including TASER guns and commercial weapons for point targets and crowd dispersal.

b.
The same NCO is tasked to obtain sufficient ammunition for the various weapons and ensure it is positioned at the required locations.

c.
Class V re-supply continues through submission of DA Forms 581 to the ASP. We are also considering the purchase of additional LTL ammunition through commercial sources.

d.
The 16th MP Bde (Abn) deployed with one complete Non-Lethal Capabilities Set (NLCS.) This NLCS was delivered to Abu Ghraib on 3 February 2004.

e.
FRAGO 929 (ROE Clarification on the Use of Riot Control Means) to CJTF-7 OPORD 03­036 authorizes the use of OC pepper spray. Facility Commanders are designated release authorities for use in detention facilities. OC pepper spray will be obtained and soldiers will be trained on the proper use prior to employment.

7. Prevention of the Introduction of Illegal Weapons into the facility.
a. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) controls Iraqi Correctional Officer (ICO) hiring and training. All NonCoalition Forces personnel, to include ICOs and Iraqi Police (IP), are
-
searched prior to entering the facility. Additionally, the windows in Wings 1 A and 1B of the prison complex are now sealed to prevent contraband introduction.
b.
All non-military vehicles are searched before entering Abu Ghraib. Any non-military vehicle that enters the detention facilities is escorted.

c.
Currently, there are no additional MP assets available to assign to the prison complex for ICO supervision. However, CPA has added 4 employees that are beginning to display a presence here. The CPA has plans to put an additional 16 employees here. We are also working with CPA representatives on issues related to training and supervision of ICOs.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 16 Th MIUTARY POLICE BRIGADE (AIRBORNE)
Victory Base Camp, Iraq
APO AE 09342

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

.
AFZA-AP 14 February 2004
MEMORANDUM FOR Deputy Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force-Seven
SUBJECT: Corrective Actions Required After Riots and Shootings at Abu Ghraib Prison on 24 November 2003
1.Enclosed is the corrective action plan for Abu Ghraib Prison, including implemented actions as well as those under review. This plan was reviewed and approved by the CJTF-7 PM and the Commander, 504 th MI Brigade.

2. POC is LTC11111111111111111t DNVT 559-1738.
Encl.
IIIIIIIIIII as. COL, MP
Commanding
1. Standard Operating Procedures
a.
All SOPs are currently under review by a team of senior NCOs at the brigade and battalion level. This will include changes and updates to include sufficient detail for procedures to be followed. Changes to SOPs are currently briefed during Guard Mounts and will be posted at each functional area. Additional SOPs are implemented as additional missions are added, such as escorts to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) and the Conditional Release Program.

b.
Current manning levels and weapons availability result in the inability to have 2 separate weapons with lethal and less than lethal ammunition at each post. However, each shotgun is loaded with less than lethal rounds and the bearer of that weapon carries lethal rounds on the left side of the IBA. The SOP is being refined to ensure that soldiers check, clear and re-load weapons as they are passed from one shift to the next.

c.
All SOPs will be published in sufficient quantities to ensure one is posted at each duty location.

2. ROE/RUF
a.
The recommendation for soldiers to be the decision-maker on the use of deadly force was implemented. Soldiers are briefed on their authority to use deadly force as part of the ROE brief

b.
ROE is briefed daily at each Guard Mount and Shift Change.

c.
ROE is posted at each post and in the battalion TOC and will be checked periodically.

3. Training
a.
Training plans for ROE and additional MP tasks are being developed and will be distributed to all units. Units will incorporate performance-oriented training for each task.

b.
Formal in-ranks guard mounts have been initiated at each facility to complement the previous practice of shift change briefs to the NCOICs of each compound, who would then brief his/her shift personnel at their respective compounds. Formal guard mount training has been implemented, and is documented on the guard mount training plan.

c.
AARs are currently being conducted at the conclusion of each significant event as well as following all significant training activities.

4. Impact of rumors/communications on the behavior of detainees
a. Communication between compounds is minimized as much as possible considering the close proximity of the compounds to each other as well as the current manning restraints. We are currently working additional projects for screening between the compounds to reduce communications between detainees. Frequent random searches of both detainees and their living
areas are also conducted to confiscate notes, messages and/or other contraband. Military working dogs support this effort.
b.
Each compound has a detainee representative who serves as the spokesperson. Compound representatives are used to provide information to the other detainees in their respective compounds.

c.
Compound NCO!Cs and the battalion S-3 meet regularly with the compound representatives to discuss issues, concerns, upcoming events and recent trends.

5. Civil Affairs Involvement at Abu Ghraib
a.
A current CA team (-) located at Abu Ghraib is scheduled to depart on or about 15 February 2004 with no scheduled replacement. We are submitting a request for dedicated CA assets through the CJTF-7 C9.

b.
The current CA assets concentrate on improving relations with the community. We recommend CA assets dedicated to Abu Ghraib be placed TACON to 16 th MP Bde (Abn) to ensure their use as recommended in the AR 15-6 investigation findings.

c.
The current CA team provides intelligence recovered from local sources as well as that which is collected by Coalition Forces. We anticipate follow-on CA assets will operate similarly.

6. Less than Lethal (Ili) Capability Improvements
a.
The battalion commander appointed a senior NCO on the unit's QRF to identify the needs and procure additional Ln, weapons of various types, including TASER guns and commercial weapons for point targets and crowd 6ispersal.

b.
The same NCO is tasked to obtain sufficient ammunition for the various weapons and ensure it is positioned at the required locations.

c.
Class V re-supply continues through submission of DA Forms 581 to the ASP. We arc also considering the purchase of additional LTL ammunition through commercial sources.

d.
The 16'h MP Bde (Abn) deployed with one complete Non-Lethal Capabilities Set (NLCS.) This NLCS was delivered to Abu Ghraib on 3 February 2004.

e.
FRAGO 929 (ROE Clarification on the Use of Riot Control Means) to CJTF-7 OPORD 03­036 authorizes the use of OC pepper spray. Facility Commanders are designated release authorities for use in detention facilities. OC pepper spray will be obtained and soldiers will be trained on the proper use prior to employment.

7. Prevention of the Introduction of Illegal Weapons into the facility.
r
a.
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) controls Iraqi Correctional Officer (ICO) hiring and training. All Non-Coalition Forces personnel, to include ICOs and Iraqi Police (In are searched prior to entering the facility. Additionally, the windows in Wings IA and I B of the prison complex are now sealed to prevent contraband introduction.

b.
All non-military vehicles are searched before entering Abu Ghraib. Any non-military vehicle that enters the detention facilities is escorted.

c.
Currently, there are no additional MP assets available to assign to the prison complex for ICO supervision. However, CPA has added 4 employees that are beginning to display a presence here. The CPA has plans to put an additional 16 employees here. We arc also working with CPA representatives or issues related to tainitied gn rvision of ICOs.