Taguba Report Annex 78: Testimony of Command Sergeant Major Timonth L. Woodcock, 310th Military Police Battalion

On 15 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6, by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees, detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence
The following persons we'e present:
COL MP, CFLCC — PMO, Interviewer
LTC A, CFLCC — SJA, Interviewer
LTC 705th MP Battalion, Interviewer
CSM , 3101 MP Battalion, Interviewee
SSG 7D30, CFLCC — SJA, Recorder

The interview is summarized as follows:
My name i My social security number i swum*. I am the Battalion Command Sergeant Major with the 310 th Military Police Battalion. I am Reserve.
I was assigned as the Battalion Command Sergeant Major on 8 July 2002. Before this assignment I was detachment Master Sergeant for the 98 th Division. I was the reserve liaison between Connecticut National Guard and the Army Reserve for NCOES.
My role as the Battalion CSM mainly is the senior enlisted advisor to the Battalion Commander on all enlisted matters. I assist the Battalion Commander in any official function that he requests my presence at, ceremonies things of that nature. I monitor troop morale, ensure NCOER's are processed correctly, mentor and counsel senior enlisted to make sure they are taking care of their troops, uniformity, and all other aspects of enlisted needs.
I have seen several problems with the command, but it is nothing that can't be fixed. The relationship between officers and noncommissioned officer, I think more emphasis on the NCO's be allowed to do their job. Some Officers should give the NCO's a little bit more authority to do their job. The morale problem with soldiers thinking they were going home didn't help the situation either.
An example would be a senior NCO's trying to mentor a young soldiers by assigning a task and then an officer undermined the senior NCO, by telling the junior enlisted they didn't have to complete the task.
A-NJ NitY-7
I try to talk to the officers and the colonel the best way possible on the roles officers and
enlisted are suppose to play, and try to monitor and reemphasis it. The individuals have
to be reminded to follow the chain of command. But, it continues to happen because the
officers continue to allow it.
We arrived here 16 December 2003 and we relieved the 724 th MP Battalion, we were at D1 e before that. We spent 49 days assigned to the 1 st MEF, and then we were reassigned to the 800th and stayed there until 16 December 2003.
We are an IR unit, we were specifically trained for the mission that we have here. We
were probably at about 52% strength when we received our orders. We were cross­
leveled and we received personnel 812 th MP Company from New York. We arrived in
country on April 12th . We spent 32 or 33 days in Arifjan, and then we moved to Dle
with Is' MEF.
The I' MEF took care of us. In my 21yrs in the military that was the best that a unit 1 served with had been taken care of. We actually had more support from them than anyone else. The difference in leadership between the 1' MEF and our unit was an extreme difference. The marines followed their rules and regulations; they used common sense, and allowed leeway in regards to UCMJ actions. They gave warning, then counseling, and then on to the next step. They always used the chain of command when it would only reach their staff sergeant level. As for the Army problems would make it up to the Battalion Commander before the issue got resolved.
The standards fell once the marines left DIE. Discipline, uniformity, and work ethic are some of the standards that fell. We immediately attempted to resolve the falling of the soldiers standards any lower, and it's still an ongoing issue. I think it improved because soldiers are fully employed here, and also the efforts of the senior NCOs and myself to keep morale high. There is no saluting on the compound.
The units that are assigned to the compound are 310 th Military Police Battalion, 977th
th Military Police Company, 998 th Quartermaster, 151 mMilitary Police Company, 988
th Postal Company, and 2 dog handlers Signal Battalion, 161' Medical Company, 806 whose units I can't remember right now.
When Gen Karpinski arrived she basically stated she was the new commander, and briefed us on the basic commanders guidance. Some topics covered were getting everyone home safe, and keeping morale up.
We haven't had an issue with NCOER's because about 99% of them aren't due, until they redeployed. There are some that we had to submit; they were kicked back, but only for some minor mistakes. All of our ARCOM's have been completed, the were some bronze stars that were submitted and were kicked back three times, the last time I had to get involved. I had to speak to LTIMIlk to find out exactly what they needed.
We have had I escape since we took control of the prison, it happened during extreme
heavy fired when we had to have detainees low crawl out of the compound. We account
for detainees by an ISN/picture count, and a headcount which we do both twice a day.
The count is verified by a manifest.
The compound is responsible for collecting the counts for both Abu Ghraib and here, and submitting a consolidated report to higher. We had MAJ ddoing the camp counts before she left.
My understanding of comments made by the 724 th MP Battalion is they attempted to take
over MAJdfunction as a Battalion function. She was left here to continue to
handle that job. nder normal circumstances an S -I shop would handle thzt task and an
E-7 would be in charge of it.
The 310th is a Military Police Battalion. It is also an IR battalion. The uniform authorized here are DCU's, BDU's and PT Uniforms. Flip-flops are authorized to and from the shower. There are deviances for the National Guard soldiers that weren't issued the new PT uniforms. Anyone that was in close contact with detainees was required to wear the interceptor body Armour, and Kevlar helmet. Weapons could be secured if soldiers had to come in close contact with detainees.
The Battalions soldier individual task under the Battalions METL have been identified, its an ongoing leadership duty from team leader on up the chain. Our METL had changed upon our arrival here, but now it has changed back to the original plan. Most of our training to was OJT. The individual tasks were working an interior tower; employ non-lethal weapons, basic use of force, and escort of detainees. It was the responsibility of the S-I to make sure the Geneva Conventions training was distributed and preformed.
The soldiers' standards that were lacking were in the common soldier task area.
Specifically the standards lacking are discipline, customs and courtesies, and the basics that would allow the soldier to perform at their best. If everyone is not enforcing the standards it's like shoveling sand against a tire.
Sir, I have no problems being honest, but I'm a little thrown off by the scope of this interview. I can give you more detail, whether 1 feel comfortable about it is another story. Like 1 said before, the support of the officer's plays a big part in the role of an NCO. The NCO can work his hardest, but if the support from the officer is not there the NCO loses his credibility. Where I came from before that is not allowed to happen, so that is why l try may hardest to not that let that happen here, but you always have one or
TWO.
Recently we had an E-7 flat out disobey a tasking given out by an E-8. The statement the E-7 made was; he was not doing it, do what you want to me, a counseling statement, Article 15. Letter of Reprimand, I don't care. There were 2 or 3 officers within an earshot of the conversation. Statements were prepared, an Article 15 was recommended. The Article 15 went up to the Battalion Commander. I gave input to the Commander on
what 1 think the disposition of the Article 15 should be. The E-7 only received a letter of
reprimand. I was told prior to the disposition of the Article 15 that it would be a letter of reprimand, and I voiced my disagreement and it still took place anyway. The E-7 is SFC Mat and the E-8 is MSGIMINIP SFC rater is CPTH SFC1111101 was
clearly disrespectful towards MSG
We are very extremely short on personnel. We only have one individual who is the
movement control NCO who resides back at Camp Arian. We have been making our
personnel shortage well known since we knew we would be losing bodies.
When we arrived here the 724 th MP Battalion had a no salute policy. We discussed the
policy, and decided to keep it the way it was because we had EPW security detainees in
the area. That was a mutual agreement between the Battalion Commander and myself.
MG Karpinski's battalion priorities were to keep soldier's safe, get everyone back home
safe, get the job done, keep morale up, and focus on leadership. It was the standard
speech a commander would give to his command.
There were reports of detainee abuse by soldiers of the 310 th MP Battalion. There were
two reports that I know of. The first soldier received an Article 15, which was finalized
today. It was a Battalion level Article 15. I was not present, because the soldier
requested MSG Lombardo be present.
****(Remaining portion of interview not captured on recording due to technical
difficulties)
Tape 2 begins.
AR I 90-8 covers the treatment of detainees, what you are allowed and not allowed to do.
The detainee count is reported to the Battalion TOC and the S-1. The count is then
verified to the camp manifest. There have been discrepancies in the detainee count.
When discrepancies are found there is an immediate recount. The only times the recount
didn't match with the camp manifest is when there were escapes.
The battalion submits a USR, shortages of personnel was presented in the USR.
****(Remaining portion of interviewed not captured on recording due to technical
difficulties)

SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form. see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
AUTHORITY:dTitle 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSNi
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:TTo provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately ioentifieo
ROUTINE USES:dYour social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing ano retrieval
DISCLOSUREdDisclosure of your social security number is voluntary.
I. LOCATION 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 3 TIME 4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Bucca, Iraq 2004/02/17 1522
5. LAST NAME. FIRS AME, MIDDLE NAME 6. SSN 7. GRADE/STATUS

4411111111111P E-9/USAR
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
310th Military Police Battalion, Camp Bucca, Iraq 09375

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OM H

I. SIMMiliffir
On 17 February 2004, at approximately 1300, I was interviewed by C0111111M, LTC 111111•111.111Pand LTC gillipregard. an ongoing investigation into the 800th Military Police Brigade. At the completion, of the interview, I was instructed by LTC Ma toprepare a Sworn Statement, (DA FORM 2823), and to answer the following questions in my statement.
1. Describe the differences that the unit experienced between the 1st MEF and the 800th MP BDE. For example, UCMJ actions
taken, uniform standards and policy, and the no salute policy?

ANSWER: The differences that I noticed regarding UCMJ actions were that the majority of the issues encountered by the Marineswere handled at the NCO level, only the necessary. issues were accordingly dealt with at the higher level. In my opinion this wasdue to the fact that the Marine Command structure allowed their NCO's to do their job, and supported the NCO's by enforcing the"chain of command". The Marines were not prone to a lot of UCMJ action because the NCO's had the respect and authority oftheir troops, and this came from the support of the Officer's within. This was visible in the actions and performance of the variousMarine units. As far as the 800th, more specifically the 310th, this respect and authority is not there to the level that it should be.This is due to several reasons, the Officers keeping the NCO's out of the loop, Officers not backing the NCO's on various decisions, Officers allowing Enlisted Soldier's to go directly to them with issues, and Officers reversing an NCO's decisionwithout ever informing, or discussing, the circumstance with the NCO. Regarding the uniform standards and policy there is notmuch difference in our current policy as there was when we were with the Marines. The enforcement of this area is a basic NCO responsibility, and was enforced at all times. The no salute policy was in effect for the Camp, by the Marines in Ad Diwaniyah.When we arrived at Camp Bucca, the 724th MP BN bad the same policy in effect for this Camp. Upon Transfer of Authority tothe 310th MP BN. the Command staff decided to keep that policy in effect due to the presence of EPW's/Security Detainees.
2. Describe the accountability process for detainees and escapes?
ANSWER: The accountability process for detainees is to conduct two "Roll Call" counts each day, one at morning meal, and oneprior to curfew. Roll call counts are conducted by verifying the ISN with the corresponding detainee, then with the manifest. There are also two "Head Counts" conducted each day, "Head Counts" are done by counting the total number of EPW's/detaineesin each compound, then verifying the total with the manifest. One "Head Count will be conducted at the evening meal, and thesecond one at random during the 24 hour period. If a "Head Count" is interrupted for any reason, a "Roll Call" count will be
conducted immediately.
When there is an escape, or suspected escape, the facility is immediately "locked down".dAll compounds conduct an immediate"Head Count' and forward this count to BN Operations. BN Operations consolidates the counts from all compounds and verify'sthe total count. After security is established and maintained in the compound's, a "Roll Call" count is also conducted by eachcompound.
3. Describe the Battalion process to bring Companies up to METL standards for GPW?
ANSWER: This process started on 09 Jan 2004 with the arrival of the 977th Military Police Company, and the 988th MilitaryPolice Company at Camp Bucca. Both Companies were briefed by the 724th Military Police Battalion, and the 310th MilitaryPolice Battalion on 10 Jan 2004. The initial briefing consisted of a welcome brief by both Battalion Commanders, and an overviewof the mission at Camp Bucca. Over the next 2 days, both Companies were given guidance on their new mission as a GuardCompany, in support of an EPW Camp. The Companies were provided copies of the Geneva Convention regarding GPW, AR
190-8, and FM 3-19-40. On 12 Jan 2004, both Companies started their RIP with the units that they were replacing and continued
10. EXHIBIT 11 INITIALS AKING STATEMENT
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING 'STATEMENT OF TAKEN ATTDATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.
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DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE U SAPA VI.00
USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.
TAKEN AT Camp Bucca, Iraq dDATED 2004/02/17
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to receive information in an On The Job Training status, (OJT). Training was conducted, and information was presented daily
coverinf the duties and responsibilities of a MP Guard Company, and GPW. Daily Staff Briefings were held with continued
emphasis on the Geneva Convention regarding GPW, to include examples of violations of GPW. In early January 2004 the 310th
MP BN requested the 800th MP BDE to provide training on "Use of Force", and "Rules of Engagement". Major Prieto of the
800th MP BDE provided this training to us twice, once in the beginning of January 2004, and again towards the end of January
2004. Battalion and Company leadership were directed to make on the spot corrections to ensure continued improvement in all
aspects of EPW operations. The Battalion efforts to bring the Companies up to METL standards is continuous, but challenging.
due to the rapid turnover, the OPTEMPO, and limited manpower available within the Battalion.

4. Explain what has happened in detainee abuse cases?
ANSWER: I am aware of two incidents that involved physical contact between detainees and U.S. Soldiers. In one incident I
received word from Captains that SPCOMPwas not allowed to return to the Internment Facility due to an incident that
occurred between him and a detainee. When I asked Captain mlIP what had happened, he told me that there was minor physical
contact between SPC gap and a detainee, and the incident was being investigated. I was told that this incident had happened
several days earlier. During a conversation with the Battalion Commander. I informed him of what i knew about this incident.
The other incident occurred during questioning of a detainee and involved SPC dI was informed of this incident by LTC MINN The details as I understand them are that SPC 11Ple was questioning a detainee and that there was also an interpreter present in the tent during this questioning. According to the interpreter's statement, SPC Op struck the detainee in the face I time, he then grabbed the detainee by the shirt and shook him, and also struck the detainee in the back. I was also told that the
detainee had reported this to the ICRC, and they informed LTC mom I understand that there were 3 otAQS. Soldiers in the
area of the tent, but they were outside of the tent. I was told by LTCdthat he had directed Captain dto conduct an
investigation into the matter. At the completion of the investigation, LTC/111111111thowed me the statement that was given by the
interpreter. The statement was in a question and answer format with CaptainflEalasking the interpreter the questions. The interpreter initially stated that he knew nothing about any Soldier beating a detainee, but then supported the accusation. LTC -•l.so told me that he had statements from 3 other Soldiers and they stated that they did not see orjr,u,a.nything. LTC
then informed me that he was going to administer Article 15 proceedings on SPC mop . LTC I¦16stated that he had deet rto reduce the Soldier in rank, take some pay from him, and give him extra duty. LTC dalso said that he was not sure how much rank or pay he was going to take but he would not treat the situation lightly. I was informed later that S accepted his Article 15 and the punishments imposed were, reduction from SPC to PFC, 1/2 months pay for 1 month, 2 weeks oextra duty, and suspension of his Security Clearance for one year.
5. Articulate what the unit did to request the need for additional forces?
ANSWER: The unit has n.quested the need for additional forces on several occasions through the 800th MP BDE. This was done through E-mail correspondence, voice communication, and face to face conversation. These requests came from several different people to include, LTC 211111/1, MSG and 1. At least two different times MSGMIM1111111111and I went to Baghdad tothe 800th MP BDE TOC and spoke to ajordd told him that with our current manpower, we could not safely andeffectively perform this mission. Major stated to me that we would be getting two full strength Combat MP Companiesfor the mission at Camp Bucca and that would be enough to do the mission. At various different times I notified CSM amp and SGM f these same concerns. When we were finally told which Companies we were getting, we found out that one wasclose todstrength, and the other was 52 Soldiers short of full strength. The unit also continuously attempted to acquire theSoldiers that we left behind at Fort Dix due to medical holds. To perform our current mission we had to OPCON 12 Soldiers from the 988th MP CO to fill the manning requirements for the Compound Control Teams. USR Personnel Data continues to be reported to the Brigade on a monthly basis. //////////////////////NOTHING FOLLOWS/M/////////////i//////////////////////////////////
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AFFIDAAT
, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON AGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGETI FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOLT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAVVF • L I
( ignature o.rson ,a ing tatement)
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law toWITNESSES
administer oaths, this Ig-r 3 day of FeA d. 20 r"1 at CT M.e-cv

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (Signature of Person Administering Oath)
me. ring Oath!

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