Taguba report Annex 59: Testimony of Major David W. DiNenna, 320th Military Police Battalion

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Testimony of Major David W. DiNenna, 320th Military Police Battalion. Major DiNenna stated his job was "I'm essentially responsible for accomplishing the mission according to the commander's intent". As for the treatment of prisoners under his control the Major stated "there's nothing that has ever been put out in black and white, from JAG channels, as to the differences that Geneva may apply, or may not apply, to EPW's, security detainees, displaced civilians, civilian criminals, which is a whole different area, etc..." He also added "I know for a fact, that if I were to tell my soldiers, to hit someone in the head with a baseball bat, they wouldn't do it". When discussing his experience in the field he stated "I never witnessed any physical abuse. I wouldn't tolerate it. I'm very sensitive to how prisoners are handcuffed. Our soldiers are more very sensitive, because of what our soldiers went through. I won't even allow profanity, though they [Iraqis] don't understand what you're saying, and it's culturally insensitive... It's uncalled for, because they don't even know what you're saying. No, Sir. At no time, did I witness any prisoner abuse".

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Transcript
Doc_date: 
Monday, February 9, 2004
Doc_rel_date: 
Monday, October 18, 2004
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On 9 February 2004, a team of officers, directed by Major General Antonio Taguba, conducted the following interview. Major General Taguba was appointed as an Investigating Officer under the provisions of Army Regulation 15-6. by Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan, Commanding General of the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC), to look into allegations of maltreatment of detainees. detainee escapes and accountability lapses, at Abu Gharib, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement Facility (BCCF). The panel also inquired into training, standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies, concerning the detainees held at Abu Gharib prison. Finally, the panel looked into the command climate and the command and supervisory presence
The following persons were present:
COL , MP, CFCC — PMO, Interviewer
LTC A CFLCC — SJA, Interviewer
LTC 705th MP Battalion, Interviewer
320th MP Battalion, Respondent
SSG , 27D30, CFLCC — SJA, Recorder

The interview is summarized as follows:
Sr., 04, AGR, 320th Military Police Battalion. As an S3, I'm responsible or opera ions and training within the 320th, to include subordinate companies. I'm essentially responsible for accomplishing the mission according to the commander's intent. We've had a variety of missions, since March, to include running the facility at Camp Freddy at Umm Qasr, to running half of the facility at Camp Bucca, as well as the Bucca TOC for the Base Ops, and moving up north to Abu Gharib prison, to run 3 facilities, there, my role is to ensure that each facility operates according to standards, tne Geneva Convention. To ensure, despite extremely limited resources, we are able to complete the mission, which ranges from providing escorts, to guarding, feeding, housing, giving water, providing basic human supplies for prisoners, and I do that through taskings to subordinate units.
I know that the Geneva Convention, 1949, differs with EPW's versus Security Detainees and Civilian Criminals. It gives the guidelines to how facilities should be established, and what should be provided to the prisoner. We know the basics of what is to be provided, such as food, water, housing, medical care. Well, UR Battalions are not designed, nor were they trained to handle foreign civilian criminals. Part of an UR mission is U.S. Confinement. It's been a little confusing, as to whether Geneva 4 applies to Security Detainees versus EPW's. Sir, I can tell you that I don't fully understand, because I've had several discussions, with several different JAG officers, and brigade personnel, Sl's, and I really think there is a big problem. We originally had civilian criminals at Gancy. We also had, in other compounds, at Gancy, security detainees. So, civilian criminal, at first, we understood Geneva 4 didn't apply to them. Then, someone said it does, because they're under U.S. control, but they're civilian criminals. These were JAG officers at brigade. I remember, one time, COLIIMIlwas having a
Pt v. ...It.s 9
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conversation with someone maybe at the Magistrate Cell, explaining that Geneva does
apply to security detainees, because they're CI's. So, there's nothing that has ever been
put out in black and white, from JAG channels, as to the differences that Geneva may
apply, or may not apply, to EPW's, security detainees, displaced civilians, civilian
criminals, which is a whole different area, etc...
Nothing at our MOB Station was taught, in regards to YR Operations. The training plan
we submitted, which we had to work between the extremely changing MOB Station
training plan, was one of compound operations, and processing, how to go through the
processing line. They were the 2 focuses. And of course, daily, were the Rules of
Engagement. Rules of Interaction, which are both contained in the Battalion SOP.
Scenarios? The total lack of support we know we're not going to have, when we get
there, which has been the case for the 12 months. And then of course, weapons
qualifications, react to indirect fire, briefings on smallpox, medical briefings, that sort of
thing. That's all from Fort Dix I can recall right now.
When we closed Camp Freddy, and the prisoners went into the Bucca facility, we were
escorts for 2 weeks, so we did refresher re-training on escorts, which was simply
following the bus up, following the bus back, to simplify their role. Upon completion of
the escorts, we were given 7 days to move a battalion and a company from Umm Qasr to
Baghdad. Upon arrival at Abu Gharib, in between setting up the facility in conjunction
with the engineers, which we set up the facility in a week, which is unheard of, then,
making the place livable for soldiers, there was refresher training on compound
operations, processing, and basic UR Operations tasks.
As I see it, Sir, it's ultimately the commander's responsibility, to provide that training,
and then it's my responsibility, and, as it goes down, it's the sergeant major's
responsibility and the platoon sergeant's responsibility. In conjunction, though, it's also
the HHC Commander's, and the First Sergeant's responsibility. So, the 3 and the HHC
work very close together, to accomplish his needs, requirements, training, and the
battalion's overall mission. Actually, it's E5 to 05 responsibility.
When a training plan is set up, there is an Observer/Evaluator, someone who assesses the training. All training is AAR'd. We base the training on Battalion SOP, 3-3.19-40, which is Internment/Resettlement Operations, and parts of AR 190-8. So, basically, Sir, we use the FM's, AR's, and SOP's, to accomplish the mission, then you pull the training tasks that are required to do that mission. The entire chain of command has eyes on the training.
All of my cooks are in the compounds. Mechanics, we have 3, which only leave to for HHC. Admin, each... If I could back up, nothing has been doctrine, since the day we hit the ground. We have 4 UR control teams, however, at Camp Freddy, we were running 16 compounds. The math doesn't work. There are not enough UR control teams, which have the specialized training, to run a compound. You then have to take your guard companies, or they may be combat support companies, train them OJT, because there's no time to have a day of training. That hasn't existed, since we took the facilities. Then,
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you have to fill in the holes. We have assumed a tremendous, outrageous, criminal
amount of soldier safety risks in running these facilities. I have never seen anything... It
is absurd, if I may be so blunt.
To run a compound, a 500-man compound, there're 14 MP's in an UR control team. There are 2 E7's, 2 E6's, and 2 E5's, per 12 hour shifts. You should have almost 7 MP's on a compound, not counting the MP's.in the 3 towers. We are tremendously low, due to of REFRAD's. Our battalion HHC is authorized 56 UR Control Team MP's. They run the compounds. I have, now, 33. That's it. I run 8 compounds. So, on one compound, you should have, at least, 4 MP's per shift, on the gate, on the ground. I'm lucky, if I have 3, so I usually have 2 MP's. Each compound is authorized a 71L, who does all the paperwork. files, etc, and they're also authorized a supply person, who gets all the supplies for that individual compound. Due to the fact, that we've also been running Base Ops. at the BCF, all of our supply people have to go take care of that. So, that leaves your MP's and your 71L on shift in the compound. So, during the day, you may have 2 — 3 MP's and a 71L, or 2 MP's and a cook, or supply, or an electrician. Most of the soldiers, doing that now at the BCCF, also had to do it at Camp Freddy. They've been, for lack of a better term, "running" prisoners, since April.
It's a resource issue, Sir. Currently we are at a C3 rating. Here's the problem with USR
— we could have people in medical, in Landstuhl, and they are still on our books. We still count them. I have 112 soldiers on the ground, and I'm authorized 148. The reason we are down to 112, is REFRAD's. Some are medical, some emergency leaves turned hardship discharges. And, in the reserves, you don't get those back. Your TDA gets locked upon mobilization. Even when the 10 from the Camp Bucca incident were pulled out of the unit, they still counted against our unit as available soldiers.
The service support personnel will never work the compound, without the presence of a military police person, there. They go through the Rules of Engagement, Rules of Interaction, handcuffing, less than lethal training, how the compound operates, which is more of an SOP thing, than a formal training, searches, and the basic MP functions at a compound.
When the second version of the ROE came out, it identified the steps, to prevent an escape, and treating all with dignity and respect, and the steps for the levels of force that are utilized. It defines hostile intent, one's inherent right to defend himself, halt in the native language, show your weapon. At first, warning shots were authorized, now they're authorized. Which changes, and it is briefed daily. The regulation does not authorize warning shots.
The ROI are the Rules of Interaction, i.e. fraternization, how you talk to them, cultural sensitivity, not giving, or accepting gifts, you day to day contact with them. New soldiers are briefed. They read it, and walk through scenarios. It's posted in every tower, every compound tent, and every control area. It's posted on the wall. The Geneva Convention is not posted. Soldiers should know it only to a degree. I don't know every article that applies to prisoners or detainees. We've had the training.
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After support personnel have had training, they will observe an MP, before being allowed to perform a task. None of them work in Tier IA and 1B. The hard site should be MP pure.
After the incident came out, one soldier was identified as being a mechanic, and one soldier was a 71L. I don't know if they had been through the training.
I know for a fact, that if I were to tell my soldiers, to hit someone in the head with a baseball bat, they wouldn't do it. I believe one of the soldiers involved had a past criminal history, which, if it had been indicated, would have prevented him from working with prisoners. They saw interrogations, and how newly brought in prisoners were broken by MI. I think, they were criminal individuals, who took the opportunity to do something they knew was wrong, after they're senior leaders departed the area.
It's common for NCOs to work all day, get a couple hours of sleep, and then go back and do their rounds at night. It's very common, due to the fact that there's a lack of personnel. The way UR battalions are MTOE'd they are not designed to run 3 different facilities. In my S3 section there's an 04, an E9, and a couple of E6's.
The panel stopped, to discuss MAIM statements.
Finished with their discussion, the panel gave list of items, to be addressed, and brought back on a Sworn Statement.
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On 10 February 2004, MAJ_returned, to provide a sworn statement, and
documents, outlining the program of training for support personnel transferred into
military police functions. He also presented documents outlining his unit's request for
logistical support.
MAJIIIIIthen made the following statements:
Sir, on the CD are all the Situation Reports (SITREPs) from August to present, which
went up from the 320th to the 800th, which I know were then wrote up, and sent to CJTF­
7. Also contained on the CD are Troops to Tasks, I couldn't find all of them. Also, I printed out several SITREPs, in case you wanted to view them right away. There also emails on logistical support.
COL IN. reads a sworn statement made by SGT_and MAMIE responds as follows:
We were attacked, and there were suspects, I believe a woman and her son. They brought to them to the site, directly inside the ECP inside the walls. We responded. I went down, and the IRF was called to secure them. The MI folks later pulled up. They approached the 2 individuals that were on the ground, and there was yelling. Then, when they took the individuals, and moved them back, I recall IL_coming up to me, while I was on the radio with the TOC. I heard him say some _to me. I didn't understand him. He said something like, "I'm not going to let them continue." I told him to stand by. I went with him to the other side of the vehicle. I saw one of the MI soldiers push the male Iraqi from the back of the truck. 1L1111111 was already there. I came up, told them to stop, got all of their names, instructed the IRF to do statements. We went to SF_who is the 1SG of the 519 th MI Company, advised him of the situation, and told him was making statements. He informed me that 2 of the soldiers that went out there, he shouldn't have sent them, because their friend was killed. He asked me if I saw any physical abuse whatsoever, and I said, "No, but I could see that their emotions were above being able to handle the situation in a calm manner." After 1 LT
intervened, I told the one soldier that he was to have no contact, called over his
, as a matter of fact, and told him, to put that soldier in the front of the truck, and he was to have no contact with the 2 people in the back. The NCOIC was then required to ride with the Iraqi female and male up to the holding area, where they could then screen them, to see if they had anything to do with the attacks. Come to find out, they supposedly were doing their water irrigation, at night, as many of the farmers do.
I never witnessed any physical abuse. I wouldn't tolerate it. I'm very sensitive to how prisoners are handcuffed. Our soldiers are more very sensitive, because of what our soldiers went through. I won't even allow profanity, though they don't understand what you're saying, and it's culturally insensitive. I heard the yelling and screaming, and profanity, which I addressed, when I went to the back of the truck. It's uncalled for, because they don't even know what you're saying. No, Sir. At no time, did I witness any prisoner abuse. This incident was immediately handled by the MI chain of command, Sir.
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The interview complete, MAJIIIIIII was dismissed.
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On 12 February 2004, mAimp returned for a follow up interview, and to provide
the 320th MP Battalion's SOP, regarding the use of dogs. The interview is summarized
as follows:
The SOP was prepared 10 December. CPT _prepared it. I proofread it, and LTC signed it._ produced the work schedule. He was the NCOIC
o t e dogs, because he was the senior handler. DAM would review and sign it, and then I would sign it. This was briefed to the Commander. We originally received two Army dogs, then, three Navy dogs. The two Army dogs are patrol/narcotics. The three Navy dogs are patrol/bomb. We originally set it up, where all the do s would rotate through the ECP, Entry Control Point. I think that's the one LTC _originally signed off on. When I came back from leave, I thought it was best to strictly use the Navy dogs at the ECP, and keep the Army dogs in the compounds. As far as I know, the dogs are all certified, and we also allow time for their training. I believe it's a mandatory 4 — 6 hours a week.
Initially, there was a little bit of we — they," when we put the two services together. The Navy dogs fell right into place, but there was some concerns about the Army dogs. Understandably, they didn't want to work the ECP, because they're not bomb dogs. There was a strong personality problem with the Army folks, whereas the Navy folks were here to help. They came from Sicily, I think, and they're here to work for you. So, I had gathered together the 5 dog handlers, my Operations Sergeant Major, CPT Hampton, and, I think, one of my Operations NCOs. I had a meeting right outside the TOC, and said, "By virtue of military rank you're on this installation, therefore you work for the battalion. So, this is how the schedule will be set up. This is what the objective of the schedule is, what dogs will work where, who will focus on what. Whoever has a problem with it, we'll be more than happy to call your chain of command, and you can pack your bags and leave." I didn't have any problems after that conversation.
I don't know the politics of it, but lA was given to MI for higher value detainees. Then, CPA came to me, and said we had to clear out I B. That was a problem, because I had all these juveniles, some criminal, some security detainees, and females in 1B, because I had no place to put them. So, we moved them out within two days.
It wasn't an easy transition. First, I had to gather the resources to do it. Then, transfer the paperwork and disks with all their information down to that facility. Then hopefully, they have the capability to open up the disk. But, getting the resources to do everything was a strain, every time we moved somewhere.
We moved them out. It sat vacant for at least a week. I was getting females and juveniles, and I had to put them somewhere, because I wasn't allowed to turn away prisoners. So, I put them in 1B. Then, the MI and CPA came to me, and asked, "How come there's people in 1B?" I said, "Because you all have me handcuffed. You've tied
my hands. You told me to empty this facility. There's no place to put females and juveniles. I can't mix them with the adult male population, obviously. This is the only place I have to put them." So, they finally agreed that they had me handcuffed, and I had
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no choice. I had to accept them, put them in IB, and get beat on by CPA and MI. Then,
turn around and get the resources together, to move them down to Clark or Mustafa. So.
it was always double work. That was the biggest issue I had.
I'm the S3, and I have my hands in everything. As I tell my section, we are the heartbeat of the mission. I'm also AGR, so I'm full time. I don't know, Sir. I like to make things happen. If there's a problem, I'll fix it. If there's an issue with a soldier, I'll help them. Sometimes, I go to far into people's sections, but it's always for good reasons.
LT articulates the priorities for the Battalion, at times, in front of the
Battalion an in staff meetings. We have a staff meeting, and a force protection meeting
everyday. There, he puts out guidance, taskings, and goals.
The entire release program is broke. I'll start by that. The Conditional Release Program is gaining more visibility, than the regular Security Detainee Review Board. We get a list. If it's for Security Detainees, the list comes from Brigade or the Magistrate. They would be the results of the Security Detainee Review Board, which determined who should be released. Once we received that list, we would find out who was where. Then, our SI folks would go to MI, to ensure that this individual is not MI Hold, or not on CID Hold, as well. They would check it with the Magistrate, CID, and MI. Then, we'd set up a release date, which was usually two days later, sometimes later. We'd take the list to the compound, and they would verify if those people are on their compound. Once that's done, we'd set up a plan, to have them pulled out of the compounds, taken up to the holding area for outprocessing, put them on vehicles, and take them to eight different locations in Baghdad, to release them.
At home station, we have UR Companies that are War Traced to us. They are not the same as our Peace Traced. The 305th MP Company is in our War Trace, as well as our Peace Trace, so we approved their METL. We did identify Battle Tasks - Establish an UR Facility, Provide Logistics in Support of an UR Facility, Accountability of all EPWs, and Force Protection. When we went to Abu, we identified UR and Guard Companies. Some were Combat Support Companies that were dwindled down to a Guard Company and given Guard Company equipment, and some Guard Company training. The training that we gave them consisted of right seat rides for 4 -7 days, depending on their Company Commander's assessment of their ability to do the mission. All the tasks were very similar - searches, handcuffing... The only real difference is the towers. My battalion doesn't have individual tasks for towers. Geneva Hague Convention training is done twice a year. It's mandatory twice a year. 1 can't think of anything related to Geneva Hague in our METL. Before we left home station, we had all Ts in our METL Assessment, except Force Protection, which was a P.
The interview complete, MAJMIll was released.
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SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45: the proponent agency is ODCSOPS
LOCATION DATE TIME FILE NUMBER
Baghdad Correctional Facility, Abu Ghraib, Iraq 9 FEB 2004 2015hrs
I GRADE!Sit•TUT

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
320TH Military Police Battalion (PR)
, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING ST ATEMEN" UNDER OATH
I. 71L/52D at the site of the allegations To the best of my knowledge the female soldier, 711_ and the 52D male solciler were never scheduled to work in the hard site facility, to include Wing IA and 1B, performing the roles of Military Police. From what I have been told and heard was that the female soldier was having a relationship with CPL Graner which could he the reason she was present during the incident. The mechanic was on duty to ensure that the CPA prison generators kept functioning and remained fueled. This was necessary due to the fact that CPA did not provide a 24hr generator mechanic and the generators would constantly go down. The generators operate the water and lights of the prison. That would be the only explanation as to why the mechanic would be at the prison
2.
Training (Home Station. MOB Station, Theater): The 320th Military Police Battalion has conducted exhaustive training in Internment/Resettlement Operations, Military Police Tasks, crowd control. Less then lethal. ROE, ROI. Lail' of land Warfare. Geneva Convention, and MP Combat support missions. Home Station: Training at home station include all of the above which were scheduled intermittently throughout Drill Weekends and Annual Training. In reference to Annual Training the 320th MP BN was selected 4 years in a row bykth Arms to train the 8th MP BDE, Korea, during Operation Foal Eagle. Dunng drill weekends the =it convoyed to Tobvhanna Arms Depot (TYAD) where a mock EPW facility was constructed, through the efforts of the 320th and TYAD This training was conducted quarterly. While at the center for training, the unit focused on Compound operations, the handling of EPWs. ROE. ROI, Use of Force and In-processing, in addition to.the required training, mandatory briefings (SAEDA, Geneva Convention. etc. ) and SRP During the 4 months prior to mobilization, the unit was still slotted for Annual Training in Korea. a rotation in Kosovo, while simultaneously preparing for mobilization and deployment to Iraq. The final decision of which the unit would do was made by FORSCOM in January 2003. The unit was mobilized 10 February 2003 for Operation Iraqi Freedom. While at Home Station, the unit was finalizing its training plans for the MOB station. However, the challenge was the constant changes by MATOPS. Also, I had re-written the BN TACSOP for IR Operations. This SOP was requested h' the NDRC at the Pentagon and distributed to all 17 IR Battalions in the system as well as the 78th Training Division to validate IR units mobilizing through Ft Dix, NJ. I/R training dictated by the MOB station consisted NDRS (Processing). The unit was not required to complete a Mission Readiness Exercise (MRE) for validation as our SOP was used for the validation. In addition to the mandatory training from the MOB Station, the unit had training schedules each day consisting of Compound Operations, SOP review to all members of the BN, ROE, R01, Use of Force, cultural sensitivity and other MP Tasks. After the unit arrived in theater the only IR training given was that conducted by the unit. This consisted of refresher training in compound operations. ROE, ROI, SOP review and in-processing The unit was only at Camp Arifjan for 10 days.

3.
Relationship between MP and MI (WIng IA & 1B): The MP were asked by MI to perform several tasks, which included sleep depravation, music, limit certain prisoners to certain foods (MRE and/or Iraqi food). At first the relationship was awkward. It was confusing as to who was the C2 for the wings. CPA owned the wings yet, they had given the wings to the MI to utilize Another issue was agencies within OGA would frequently bring prisoners to the facility and not want them processed. When this first occurred, I awaited their arrival (0300hrs) and informed them that either the prisoners was to be processed or they would need to leave an agent with the prisoner. 1 received this guidance from the 800th MP BDE and COL Charles Luce, Chief, National Detainee Reporting Center, DAMO, Pentagon. At the beginning of October, the requests were originally verbal. However, the MP on duty, specifically SGIMMIllquestioned this and requested them in writing. The instructions were also placed on the wall next to the cell of the prisoner. As I understood it from the previous 01C, CPT

the tasks were surpervised b himself, or an NCOIC with a member of MI present. I believe that LT Chad a so supervised this as well. C has since REFRAD. The tasks were carried out by the MP on duty Only P were scheduleparticipated to work in 1 an
4. Training Non-MP personnel: Any Non-MP personnel required to work around Detainees or pnsoners re-:mc the tAlowing training ROE, ROI, some MP tasks (hand cuffs, searching). some received Less then Lethal training. These soldiers arc utilized more for additional security versus MP duties "Hip pocket training", ROE, and Use of force are briefed at shift changes and guard mounts. Most of the Non-MP soldiers in the units received MP type training at either then home station or MOB station. I have discussed this with the Company Commanders that have non MP soldiers performing these type task
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STATEMENT (Continued)
5.
Incident - Pictures (what 1 think is happening): Originally I was assigned as the 15-6 Officer by LTC to,

CID had already been notified and had briefed me on the incident m question and had snown me r the alleged incident pictures. Upon viewing the pictures I bad to "take a break" as I was in shock as to what I was viewing It ‘kaN oh\-jous Ina these soldiers had acted independently to commit these inhumane, cnnunal acts. These were obviously the act... (It cruninalc and these individuals should receive the maximum punishment allowed. It is obvious that the leadership did not have ar indication or knowledge that this could happen or was happening. Ine Commander, myself, staff and NCOs tit the 320th Mr' BN would not allow such activity. This Command has "preached" against any type of violations of the ROE. ROI and ha constantly reviewed/ lectured the humane treatment of prisoners. If the command had an inkling that these individuals could have done such acts, these individuals would not have been permitted to be in the presence of pnsoners It the Command had known of these activities. these individuals would have been apprehended immediately. It would be my opinion that passibl . these soldiers had seen similiar, vet, possibly not to this extreme, activity by the MI personnel during interrogations of these prisoners. They then took it upon themselves to conduct such criminal activity I have been a Military Police Officer for !­years. involved in all types of investigations, to include undercover work with the German Police. I was a R A Office, . Reserve Officer and now AGR Officer. A criminal will perform a criminal act if committed to do so, regardless of the amount of "training to do the right thing", lectures and classes on conduct, etc.. They will seize the opportunity of chance to commit such acts

6.
Spot Checks: Command presence has been a vital role of NCOs and Officers in the Battalion (subordinate compame5 inc.uded) especially with this particular mission. Three confinement facilites, over 6.000 prisoners and extremely limited resources (as seen in the Troop to Tasks). Leaders at all levels randomly go through the facilities at all hours •bi the dao and night, from the BN CDR to Squad leaders. 1 pesonally know thts to be a fact. However, due to the extremely limited kissvu. constant addition of missions, REFRADS, work to be done during the daylight hours (0600-2100), Officers and certain Senior NCOs cannot be at each facility every night. The issue of lack of personnel has gone to the extreme that CO CDRs, Struot• NCOs. BN Staff pull duty at a guard post, escort, or the compounds to give their soldiers a day off: to reduce the chances o1 complacency, stress and misjudgement. Would it be possible to commit such acts if leaders are checking on their soldiers'. , Of course. Again, someone with the obvious frame of mind and intent of these individuals will accomplish their cowardly tasks at their own time and pace. Based on a theory that this should have been prevented, there would have to be an Officer or Senior NCO for each soldier in each unit. This BN ensures that there is an NCOIC for each compound, shift, escort, mission There

exists three facilites, 2 Entry Control points. Force protection points, Holding Area, Processing Line and CPs. Based cm the strengths of the units, they must be split into several locations to accomplish all missions which results inthe utilization of Senior NCOs and Officers to have to pull shifts at times to meet mission.
7. Actions in addition to what the units have been doing to check on their soldiers at all hours, a DA Form-6 has been instituted at the Battalion to have every E7 and above to make nightly sporadic checks at each facility Depsite its effect on daily missions. it has been implemented. ROE. ROI. more detailed guard mounts are ongoing.
8 Since the 320th MP BN assumed the mission of the British Corps Holding Area in March 2003, which had 16 compounds (versus the 4 compounds that an I/R BN doctrinally can operate), to the mission now at BCF, required number of personnel has been a significant issue. Despite this, this unit has accomplished every mission assigned; performing non-doctrinal missions under resourced. forced to create new doctrine. This unit has processed, safeguarded, fed, housed over 25.00() detainees.
AFFIDAVIT
, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE_. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD WITHOU T THREAT Oc PUNISHMENT. AND WITHOUT COERCION. UNLAWFUL I_ a R UN AWFUL IND
a ure a ement
9
Subscribed and sworn to before me. a person authonzed Dy law to
WITNESS S aOrniruster oaths. this I b1-1---day or 11.40 4/
at V
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRES (Signature of Person Administering Oath)
enng Oath!
lAuthoray To Administer Oaths,
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKIN_ T PAGE_Or PAGES
uS•ew: v lc
DODD0A-002587

ITATEMENT (Continued)
The 320th has housed more EPWs, Security Detainees, and prisoners then any other unit in Theater A statement tn.,: Lansupported by the Theater accountability roll ups and reports. We have had 13 escapes in 11 months. with 5 dinerent These escapes in relation to the number of prisoners equals .052%. I was asked by the panel what we could have done differently. Here is what was done to attempt to mitigate Inc shortagepersonnel and resources. after many Requests for Forces cut down the R&R leave from los -, lc 5s. throughout the Battalion. Senior NCOs and Officers would perform their daily missions, rest tor a few hours and thei night shift Officers and Sr NCOs would pull shifts for their soldiers. Fought the opening or new compounds until pi ope• resources were received. in addition, I instructed an NCO in the S3 section to compile all SOPs/MOls tot all difieren: missions, ensured that the Companies created and maintained SOPs for their missions, reviewed and approved h. Inc \ Perhaps a standard training team could have been established to move through out the units. I feel obligated to mention that during mid to end of September. the CJTF-7 IG visited BCF for approximate Dunn_ the outbrief to the BN CDR, BN Staff. Company CDRs and leadership of other tenant units located a: BCF the CO!. endei: Inc outbrief with "There are the poor, weak and the forgotten, you all are definitely the forgotten.' The COL referenced the challenge of being resourced properly, the constant mortar attacks, and the increasing pnsoner population following mat.visit. LTG Sanchez visited BCE Upon completion of his visit, many from the CJTF-7 staff visited BCF and the Base supper began as BCF was declared an Enduring Base. However, no additional resources in the area of mannowei ads received
In summation the 320th MP BN accomplished their mission. and continues to do so. Despite tremendous hurdles. leadership dedication to duty. loyalty and tra:ning persevered. Mistakes were made, yet, corrective action was alwav: immediateN Implemented by the Command. The Battalion Chain of Command was in constant communication within melt and lo the soldiers I had absolutely no information that any type of prisoner abuse in any degree had occured. If I had known. immediate steps would have been taken to ensure that sucn actions ceased and actions against those individuals would nave been initiated
AFFIDAVIT

_ , HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE_I

FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF LACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD WITHO,IT

THREAT OF PUNISHMENT. AND WITHOUT COERCION. UNLAWFUL IN UENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMEN
(Signature of PersodMaking Statement
Subscribed and sworn to before me. a person authorized Dy law to
administer oaths. this _Lan} day of _
10F2V_ at Vi CAD^ e
ION OR ADDRESS 'Signature of Person Administering Oath)
(1 d Name of Person dministerin? at I -
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS_ (Authority To Administer Darn! ,

INITIALS OF PERSON_ MENT PAGE OF_' PAGES
USA PPC VI C
DODD0A-002588

Non-MP Personnel
NAME RANK MOS Duty Position Training 11111.1111.1 SPC 75H Comp Guard I_ TL.ROE,OJT.Search, Handcuff, ROI SPC 92G Comp Guard LTL.R0E,OJT.Search.Handcuff. ROI 11111.111 SPC 92Y Comp Guard LTL,R0E,OJT.Search,Handcuff, ROI °Eft SPC 92G Comp Guard LTL,R0E,OJT,Search,llandcuff, ROI 92G Comp Guard LTL,ROE,OJT,Search,Handcuff, ROI
111111111111/SPC
SPC 92G Comp Guard LTL,R0E,OJT,Search,Handcuff, ROI

111111101111
WINN SPC 75H Comp Guard LTL,ROE.OJT.Search, Handcuff. ROI SPC 51B Comp Guard LTL.R0E,OJT,Search.Handcuff R 01 CPMD SSG 92G GD/Towers ROE, ROI, ROLE OF TOWER GD, OJT CMPD GD/ SGT 92G Towers ROE, ROI, ROLE OF TOWER GD, OJT Towers/Contr 1.1111110SPC 92G of Tent ROE, ROI, Self Defense, LT L, Security Role
NOTE' Non-MP personnel were placed in the compounds to provide additional and required security for the MP on duly TI Also. Non-MP personnel Work with a MP at all times. If they are placed in the lowers, following the above training they right seat ride with a MP for a minirnum of 3 days Also, the Admin personnel are assigned to the compound Control Teams per the MTOE In addition to providing additional security they maintain the files and logs The Non-MP personnel are given this training in the event they need to be utilized, yet again their hands on with prisoners is limited unless required
689Z00-V00000

MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3

MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
From:
Sent: !PP
To:

Cc:
Subject: 00
AL CON,
Have you ever experienced about 80 prisoners standing in line at 2130hrs at night. cola and be no told ma! tie vendors do not have any more food" Well this is becoming a nightly routine, and because was there I :.an tell vou it is very unpleasant experience Why is it so difficult to brino enough food That is what the MP (soldiers, are asiciric even meal, due to the fact that they, not you, or me. have to deal with it every day So I guess my questior is wnc in ine he': c.:3^ fix this so that we can at least give the soldier the basic necessary tools to guard pnsone -s. without them having tc wo'r about a riot. fight or other related problems in the compounds during meal times. Oh by the way. VOL now know whir we have to have MREs on hand every day So please do not question the ordenng of MREs. we need them to feed onsone even though tnere exists a contract for food In the mean time 1 would simply suggest that someone call contracting tne vendor, or perhaps (though that conversation will be filled with promises and not results) and fix this continuing problem Unfortuna e y the asics required to "house" prisoners: food, lights, prisoner supplies is still a serious issue
V/R
320th MP BN S3 DSN: 559-1763

111111.1111111 MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
From:
mber 003 6:57 PM

Sent:
To: P BDE NBC 800 (E -man

Cc: -mat
Subject: (S) Prisoner Meal shortages

Ciassificatio ,-11111.1
ALCON, At the 1600 meal for the prisoners, the caterers were short well over 100 meals SF -4. oave the caterers tne morning count of 3950 meals even though there were roughly 3700 prisoners on ground ti the caterers came up snort over 100 meals This is happening almost on a daily basis
MAJ Sr.
320th MP BN
S3
DSN: 559-1763

DRV FM 123-2
Dated 24 Feb 98
DECL ON X1

Classification...1
IIIIPIIIIIIPMAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
From: 01111111MOMAJ CJTF7 -320 MP BN S3
Friday, November 07 20 " 0:06 AM

Sent:
'JIDC Intg OIC (CPT MAJ (205 MI ICS OPS OIC:To:
MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE-S3 TC CJTF7 -320T-¦ M° Br\
Cc:
CDR (E-mail), Karpinski, Janis G CJTF7-CDR 800 MP BDE
Subject: (S) FW SIR Prisoner riot

MAJulitcpT
know we ad a very serious not last night in Vigilant. Currently there are 689 prisoners In Viplial;' Tri€ compounds. based on the segregation requirements are ousting at the seams I cannot emphasize enough Me need to reduce the population in Compounds A. B. & C This is an unstable situation which is putting the lives of the MP anc
solders at risk I have been to many prisoner riots since March and I can tell you that last night was one that could have turned real bad real Quick The design of Vigilant places the MP in a dangerous situation in the event of a riot with so many prisoners We must reduce the population in Vigilant ASAP The situation last night is simpiv ziuelied for tne time being and could erupt at any time Please forward tris to whomever can expedite the process
As you can see from the below SIR, the issues are that there are many Security Detainees that have been held for long periods of lime and 1) Not interrogated yet or 2) have been questioned months ago and are still being held I understand the process, yet. we MUST increase the speed of the interviews, release boards. etc. In order to maintain some peace last night. I asked the Prisoner compound representatives to provide me a list of prisoners that have not been seen Yes do know that there will be many on the list tnat have been seen. but will put their numbers down hoping it will get them OW I also know that your BDE gives you priorities however that does not maintain peace in the compounds
FYI the prisoner compound reps request that someone of some type of authority meet with them fat)oul 3) to explain the process From last night's events I can tell you that this issue will not go away .
Once again. I cannot emphasize enough the lack of stability in Vigilant and the need to reduce the cooJlation
MAJ
MAJ
320th MP BN
So
. DSN:111111111111
°myna' Message
From:_GIIIIIIIPIPMAJ C)TF7 -320 MP BN S3
Sent:_Thursday, November 06, 2003 4:44 Pm
To:_MP BDE NBC 800 (E-mail), (E-mail)

Subject: SIR Prisoner riot
Classification MEM
1 NA
2 Type of incidenet Prisoner Riot
3 062140LNOV03
4 Baghdad Correctional Facility, Vigilant A. B. C
5 None
6. Personnel involved
Prisoners detained in Vigilant A, B, C
7 A prisoner Riot began when an MP broke up a fight between two prisoners The prisoners were throwing food water
cans. and rocks at the MP's The prisoners indicated that the not began because the MP's broke up the fight anc subduect
the offenders and because they wanted to go home The 320th TOC dispatched the IRF and QRF Shoniv thereafte- the
not was quelled due to diplomacy by the S3 and no intunes occurred. Alarm clocks were requested and issued
Additionally. the prisoners indicated that they have been in the compounds upwards of five months without betno askec
any questions by M I This is why they wanted to qo home The prisoners will provide a list of any prisoner who is similark
situated MAJ.1111111111,will make an inquiry as to why these prisoners have not been questioned with MI He will trier
Inform the compound reps of any information obtained The riot was quelled and there were no reports of any in.unes
8 Remarks
9 Publicity None
10 Command Reporting 320th MP BN
11. POC MSG
12 Downgrading instructions. None
MSG 1111111,11111.
320th MP
S-3, NCOIC

DRV FM 123-2
Dated 24 Feb 98
DECL ON X1

Classification UMW
MAJ David W. DiNenna, Sr. 320th MP BN S3 DSN: 559-1763
(DINetiria David MAJ CJTF7-320th MP BN -S3) DRV FM 123-2 Dated 24 Feb 98 DECL ON Xi
2

11111111111111.111P MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
From:
7, 2003 104 AM

Sent:
MAJ CJTF7-BOOTH MP BDE-S3 724 MP ALOC
To:
Cc:

MAJ CFLCC/3A-FWD-PMO

Subject:
Classification WW1
The situation here t BCF is now critical Las: night we had a significant not in Camp Vigilant IvIVVDs ares mus and we need them asap We currently have 4500 prisoners in three different locations We need the tons VVe have the housing. for the dogs and handlers (the engineers are building kennels) We can support tne personne; f'or some reason this would seem easy simply based on the population at Bucca versus here In addition we are recel).ing tne prisoners from BUCCA that have been there for months and they are causing a great deal of problems nere o.ossioit- to fi ¦ asap', Please advise, I cannot emphasize enough how critical this is now
MAI=
Onoinal Message--
From: 111111111111111./MA.3 OTF7-800TH MP BDE-S3
Sent Wednesday, November 05, 2003 1:22 AM
To: 724MPALOC (E-mail) (E-mail)

Cc:
Subject: MWDs

Classification UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats. NONE

Dale
What is the status of the MWDs there at Camp Bucca" Can we transfer those dogs up to Camp Gana in the next two weeks , I am cc'inci CFLCC to see wnat we need to do to get the dogs up there We need them due tc tne population up there
Classification UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats. NONE
MAJ CJTF7-320th MP BN - S3)
DRV FM 12.)-.:
Dated 24 Feb 98
DECL ON Xi

Classification.
2

1111111111.1111 MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3

MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
From: Sent: Sunday. November 09. 2003 1:33 AM To: AJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE-S3 'Steiger. Martin CPT CJTF-•800MP BDE
Cc: Karpinski, Janis BG CJTF7-CDR 800 MP BDE. L TC 320TH MP Br; CDR (E-mail)' Subject: RE: (S) BCF Weapons
Ma'am ALCON.
I would ask that this be reconsidered I have removed all M16s from the compounds as we do no nave
adequate weapons racks to secure them If all 9mms are to be removed I would request that all be replaced snotgun=
(non-lethal) That would require the BDE to task other units to provide shotguns as we (BN & COs) would not have
enough. Again, non lethal would be great if the BDE can provide the weapons I can relay many incioents where the
carrying of a weapon has prevented a more senous incident. The compounds are maxed and extremely unstable
Removing weapons from the compounds would place the lives of the MPs in danger.
I believe that this assessment is not one of azcurracy, and is made with a lack of experience operating this type of
internment/prison facility I am extremely concered that this is not based on experience of operating a tacilt , with up to
500 prisoners that are simply held in by wire and not a hard site facility We are on the ground and ha v e been operatind
facilities since March with over 15.000 prisoners
As we all know this is not a doctrinal mission and not that of Desert Strom where many of the prisoners gladly surrendered and "enjoyed' . their stay with food, medical care and clothing. This is not a "by the book" mission and METT. TC has required that traditional doctrine be changed This is not a defensive response, yet one of great concern based on fact I honestly believe that my soldiers lives would be in jeopardy I am at the compounds daily anc nightly I see the personality of the compound and its lack of stability Please do not take offense, but that cannot be seen from anywhere but here Many of the MP approached me when I removed the•M16s as they were not comfortable with the lack of firepower I believe that removing their 9mms will make them even more uncomfortable and extremely concerned Tim MP who questioned the carrying of weapons is from the 372nd, and has not operated such a facility since mobilization and has only been in his position for a couple of weeks Experience is not there We have had 3 riots 3 non-lethal shootings in the past 4 days I cannot emphasize enough the lack of stability within the compounds.
Each compound only has at the most 3 MP on the gate in the event that the pnsoners (100 or soi storm the gate which has occurred, how then would an unarmed MP defend themselves') Keep in mind these tacili:es are built over landfills and the prisoners daily make home made shanks and weapons They would not need to take a weapon from an MP to kill an MP They would bring one with them We remove these types of weapons daily from 'be compounds
SOP Unfortunately this is completely not correct If you question every (17) I/R BN in the system as to wiere the information in tneir SOP was obtained. the reply is that it was given to them. The 320th SOP was requested by the Validation team at Ft Dix and the NDRS folks at the Pentagon to be distributed to all other IR BNs Tne same standard of
operation has been used, again. since March
We are required to transport prisoners to the Medical facility We are not provided with the proper transoorta"on to transport prisoners Additionally, there are 2 MP that transport the prisoner to the medical clinic
I am at the compounds at least 3 hours a day and 5 hours at night On the spot corrections are made as needed It is an issue of manpower. Overwork, lack of days off. as we all know, leads to routine, boredom and complacency with any task This is addressed and reiterated daily.
I would again reiterate that this be reconsidered based on the above. allow for additional training. r that is what is believed to be needed and re-evaluated I strongly request that either the 9mms remain or every MP is armed with a -ion-lethal shotgun. MPs escort the prisoners many times a day outside of the compounds to do trash and other deatails around the compounds They need, require a weapon. Keep m mind again, the prisoners do have weapons in the commands We cannot take the non-lethal shotgun from the front of the compound. If we do the MPs at the gate would not have any typeof weapon at all totally defensive. I would submit another COA to be, securing the 9mm in a lock box in the tent and the
ammunition separate Yet, shotguns would be required We have experienced that weapons are required in the run way The towers cannot safely engage all areas of the compounds
1
The facility is not designed for the MP to have an escape route if the prisoners rush the gate or come over the wire Yes riots of this magnitude happen, as experinced at Camp Freddie in BUCCA Last night we had to call an additioral 70 MR!. from the living areas to quell a riot, where three prisoners were stabbed and several were beaten with tent pctes Tne MPs had weapons which I whole heartedty believe kept the prisoners in the wire.
I have spoken to several of the MP CO CDRs and they have relayed their concerns of placing soldiers in the tac without weapons They also believe that weapons are required in the run way based on the prisoners tne MiD5 securing
I would not continue to empahsize the request to reconsider if I did not believe that weapons are a ne:essit ¦ to orerat= ire compounds
V/R
MAJ11111111
Onc: inal message--
From: Cavallaro, Anthony MA.) OTF7-800T11 MP BDE-S3
Sent: Saturday, November 08, 2003 11.23 PM
To:. (E-mail)
Subject: (U) BCF Weapons
Classification UNCLASSIFIED
Caveats . NONE
Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MUM
The CG haS directed that all 9mm's be removed from the compound areas and walkways around Ganci and Vigilant

File BCF Weapons asses 6 nov doc »
SGM
Classification UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIA_ USE ONLY
Classification. UNCLASSIFIED
4110 MAJ CJTF7-320th MP BN - S2
FM 123-2
Dated 24 Feb 98
DECL ON Xi

ClassificationallOE
2
1111111.11111.MAJ CJTF7.320 MP BN S3
11111111111116MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3 Sent: Thurstia , August 14, 2003 3:35 PM CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS alp (E-mail): L MAJ 800th MP BDE
From:
To:
DE NBC 800 (E-ma,1), MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE-SifINIMPE-mati
Cc:
LTC CJTF7-320TH M Rel...(E-mall`.
Subject: anci Status Report

Ganci Compound Status
14AUG03

Compound 1
Water Tanks: (Tanks leak aggressively at seams)
Porta Johns:
Guard Towers:
Light Sets:

Compound 2
Water Tanks:
Porta Johns: • -
Guard Towers
Light Sets:

Compound 3
Water Tanks: -
Porta Johns: Red (Contains 3 of the required 16)
Guard Towers: r.
Light Sets: Red (Missing 3, 2 that are present need a battery)

Compound 4
Water Tanks: -::•-
Porta Johns: Red (Contains 0, requires 16)
Guard Towers: =•
Light Sets: Red (Needs 4)

Compound 5
Water Tanks: (Contains 1, needs 1 more)
Porta Johns: Red (Contains 0, Needs 16)
Guard Towers: (Needs 1)
Light Sets: Red (Contains 0, needs 6)

Compound 6
Water Tanks:
Porta Johns: Red (Contains 0. Needs 16)
Guard Towers: (Needs 1)
Light Sets: Red (Contains 0, needs 6)

Compound 7
Water Tanks: Red (Needs 2 Tanks)
Porta Johns: Red (Contains 0, Needs 16)
Guard Towers: Red (Needs 3 Towers)

Light Sets: Red (Contains 0, needs 6)
Compound 8
Water Tanks: Red (Needs 2 Tanks)
Porta Johns: Red (Contains 0, Needs 16)
Guard Towers: (Needs 1)
Light Sets' Red (Contains 0, needs 6)

Roll Up
Water Tanks: Need 5 units and 2 need repairs
Porta Johns: Need 93
Guard Towers: Need 4 (2 are shared towers)
Light Sets: Need 28, 2 need batteries

SSG
320th MP BN S3, NCOIC DSN: 559-1763
2

MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3 Sent:
From:
ay, August 24, 2003 11 20 AM To: An CJTF7-800TH MP BDE-S31111111.E-mail) 111111CPT LITF7-80DMP BDE E-mail) Cc: TF7-320TH MP BN CDFUNIP(E-mail, Subject: (U) Requested Assets
ClassthcatiorIIIIIII
Sir .
The following list contains assets requested for Abu Gnraib

1 There is a surgeon en route, however, we are still missing a PA.
2 Civil Affairs.
3 Military Working Dogs,
4 Force Protection,
5 MPI,
6 Interpreters. and
7 JAG.

Thank you in advance for your attention to this matte'

SSG

320th MP BN S3, NCOIC DSN: 559-1763
DRV FM 123-2 Dated 24 Feb 96 DECL ON X
Classification_

11111111111111MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
From: -320 MP BN S3
Sent: 111111111114AJ CJTF7

ursday, September 18. 2003 10.38 AM Antho MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE-S3 dr (E-mail), gio CP7 CAI-FT -80)MP SUE
To: low
(E-mail), 4111101110L J 00th MP BDE
Cc: LTC CJTF7-320TH MP BN CDR (E-mall)IIIIIIIp \Ai
800MP BDE XO/S5
Subject: (S) Prime Power Lighting

Classification SECRETIIX1
AL CON
Last nigt2Lthe prime owerlit up compound 5. GANG', strictly with the pole lights and len on ,.he Generator light sets CPT Mk MSG and myself did a walk around the compound and talked with tne tower guaras The current pole lights do not provide adequate lighting for the compound Therefore, generator light sets (approximately 4-E per compound are required They are going to power up compound 6 with the pole lights but again. we cannot oper 6 unti• we receive more generator light sets (as well as ports johns: not enough to open cmpd 6 to full capac iv
Porta Johns
Need 6 more for cmpd 6
Need 14ea for & 8
Need enough for 2 more MP COs (strength 140 ea) and for other tenant units, MI. CID, Magistrate. Medical
Approximately 330 additional soldiers. Need assistance asap if there is an intention to transfer from Bucca to here anc
place more US forces here .

MA Sr
320t

DSN 559-1763
DRV FM 123-2
Dated 24 Feb 98
DECL ON Xi

Classification 111.111

AJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
From: AJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
. rea • ser 23, 2003 11 35 AM To: MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE SC Subject: ( 1 rom T 1111111
OTITV:M
Sent:
Classification
I need 50 Amida light sets, and the 15 or so lioht sets fixed (the brown light sets) I need a new contracic: -o n' sone food. due to the fact that they are always 100-200 meals snort, and at least 3-4 times a week tne tood an 1 0! t.:0' Server. because it has bugs Today an entire compound 500 prisoners could not be fed due to Dugs and din r Ih •nci:
MAJ 11111111
Onoinal Messa e
From: MAJ OTF7-1300TH MP BDE S4
Sent: Wednesday, October 22, 2003 7:51 PM
To: David MA) CJTF7-320 MP BN 53 Dinenna (E-mail)
Subject: RN (U) From CPT Simms

Classification
Caveats. NO1111111111

FYI
Original m
From: CPT C7TF7- C4 ASST LOG PLANS

Sent: October 22, 2003 5:01 PM
To: A) OTF7-80071-1 MP BDE 5 4
Cc: L. MA) 800th MP BDE

Subject: (U) From CPT Simms
Classification UNCLASSIFIED//F FICIAL USE ONLY
Sir Please find attached the Itinery for BG West's visit to the 800th MP Bde . Thu 23 Oct 03 Please address any queries to the urdersigned
CPT
C4 111.1111
822-1432

CPT
C4 Pians AP Coordinator)
318 822 1436

Classification UNCLASSIFIED//F.17 CIAl
frr711SE ONLY
« File. 800th MP Bde -Abu Ghareb - 231003.doc »

Classification: SECRET
Caveats NONE
MAJ CJTF7-320th MP BN - S3)
DRV FM 123-2
Dated 24 Feb 98
DECL ON xi

Classrfication-
MEWMAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
AJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
From:
naa ct r 24. 2003 1255 AM

Sent: MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP B F
To: MAJ CJTF7-BOOTH MP BDE-S3
Cc:
Subject: anci deficiencies

UNCI.ASSIPIED/IF FE N'
The tollowino is a list of deficiencies in Ganci
CMPD 1
-Grey water arainage problem
-Broken water pump
-Issues with the shower
CMPD 2
-Grey water drainage problem
-Issues with the shower
CMPD 3 .
-Water valve for tank
-240 outlets
-Shower heads and valves
-2 Light sets have setzed motors
-Grey water drainage problem
CMPD 4
-Water pump
-Water tank leaks
-Shower door latches
-Shower heads
-Porta John door broken
-Water pump switch
-Interior gate bent

CMPD 516
-Light sets
CMPD
-Light sets

MAJOR
320th MP!"
S3
DSN: 559-1763

Classification UNCLASSIFIEDHF LY

CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
From:
, er 27. 2003 9 . 49 AM

Sent:
MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE 54; 1111.11 CPT CJTFT -800MP BDE

To:
CJTF7-800TH MP BDE-S3W(E-mail).1.11.111fr
Cc:
0/S5, Karpinski Janis BG _- R 800 M
Subject: (S) RE Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT litnin

Classification MOM
VON
The other day when you and for the past how many months I addressed the light set issue tne repair of the li_the compounds_as we were told was supposed to fix the light sets Now i am being intormec by Mr._BN PBO, that th_as not been a contract awarded so the light sets cannot be fixed unless funded some other way. Is this the case? And if so. why wasn't I informed after the hundreds of ernails. SITREP. requests. etc I hope the above info is not correct Bottom line, the compounds lack the proper lighting to protect soldiers, prisoners aria escapes, all of which is MISSION I am not sure why a greater emphasis for the past couple of months has not been pu? on this above our level We are talking about soldiers safety and prisoner safety and the preventionideterence of escapes Please advise on tne status of the repair of light sets I know that issues are being worked to bring Amtdas from other locations to here. yet the number that I have seen will not fix the problem
While I am addressing basic necessities; Contract Meals. Disaster That is the best way to cescribe this issue
Short hundreds of meals every feeding, bugs and dirt are found in the meals several times a week. and for the past two
days prisoners have been vomitting after they eat That coupled with the fact that their arrival time varies tremendously
This is of great concern as Ramadan has beaun We are now out of MREs for the prisoners and are attempting to let
some today from the 541st. We are just about at 4030 prisoners between three locations, and as each day goes by the
tension within the prisoner population increases. obviously. Yet, simple fixes food. would help tremenoously

I appreciate your immediate assistance with these issues
Ism
--Original Message---
From 4111111M MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4
Sent Sunda Oct ber 26, 2003 9.23 PM
To_ CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Cc._ AJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
Subject RE Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT "" 1"

1
Classification MN
Caveats. NONE
MSG IIIIIII
I will talk to LTC ho will inform me when the train arrives at the Baghdad railyard What I need from you is all the container numbers rid the train number Giver-ita departure time as well Once the train arrives I will get PLS Trucks- I lust need you to provide the escorts once LTC_gives me the arrival time
---0
From: CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Se ctober 26, 2003 4:02 PM
To. MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4,1111111111111AAJ

CJT NERVAINOWI11:10 S3
Cc E-mail)
Subj as er # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT
Classification:
Caveats. NO11111

_
FYI what do we do about the connexes with the light sets in
MSG, USA
800M MP BDE
S-3 Ops NCO
DSVT 302-559-1743

_Original Message--
From 724MPS4 (mailto,724MPS4g93siobde2 army.smil.mil )
Sen_nda 0 tober 26, 2003 3:51 PM
To_ CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Cc 724MPALOC, 724MPXO; 724MPS3
Subject -RE Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT

Classification UM
Caveats. NONE

Martin ,
I spoke wl MSG 11111. in ref. to Baghdad Central needing light sets.
Tuesday I'm going to send out B by railhead it will take 17 hrs to reach
your location Martin as the light sets become available I will send
them forward I will e-mail you the container (connex) numbers as well
as any other info that makes it easier for you to identify this equip.

I hope this helps for the time being .
CPT gip
P S. 8 lightest will come in two to three 20ft containers
_On I_e--
From_ CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS

•[mailto:
Sent' Saturday, Septe_r 27_3 4:40 PM
To 800MP S3FWD,_ T CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Cc 724MPS3; 724MPS4;_ (E-mail)
Subject RE Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT .

Classification IMO
Caveats: NONE

Then I will need 16 radios from the 724th Everybody on track ?
11111111111
MSG, USA
800th MP BDE
S-3 Ops NCO
DSVT 302-559-1743

---Onginal Message--
From 800MP S3FWD [mailto:800MPS3FVVD©93sigbde2.army.smil.mil )
Sen_eptember 27, 2003 4:35 PM
To _ CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS

Cc 724MPS3. 724MPS4
Subject: RE Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT ntttltt
Got it' The 530th MP BN stoned over all but four radios to the 724th We will give up our four We olan to send up 120 detainees on either Tuesday or Weonesday
--On
From_ CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
@c5matn.hq.c5.army.smii mil)
Sent Saturday. September 27, 2003 8:29 AM
To 800MP S3FWD. 724 MP CDR. 724MPALOC
Cc:_ (E-mail)
Sulictaill.2 URGENT URGENT URGENTcer 2 _tit Ott
Classification
Caveats NONE
«Tasker #22 Motarola Hand Held Radio Support.doc
Alcon Tasker #22 need these ASAP l
Classification WM
Caveats NONE
Classification1111111
Caveats NONE
Classificationg111111
Caveats NONE
Caveats NONE
Classification' .1111 Caveats NON
DRV FM 123-2
Dated 24 Feb 98 DECL ON Xi
Classification Min
3
MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
MAJ CJTF7.320 MP BN S3 Sent:_ From:_
October 27, 2003 11.20 AM To:_ MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4 Subject:_ RE (S) RE Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT I'll
Classiticatior• UMW
Food is not lust late. there isn't enough Our MPs. Medics and field surgeon can easily identify bugs KralF ail:: oin 8:17. they did We talk to the people who bring the food and all they say is that they just deliver We suorr•i head even day and strongly suggest a_e as BUCCA does and they agreed to that Instead they are 30$, snort As tor light this long existed before_was even the DEP CDR. As for taking the prisoners word I think we. have peen conc. this a little bit lonoer then most._is full of shit and not tne least bit trustworthy WHy doesn't anyone see that or from Victory
MAJ
.Original Message--
From:.Green, William MAI CTTF7.800Thr MP ODE 54
Sent:.Monday, October 27, 2003 11:09 AM
To:.Dinenna, David MA) C_TTF7-320 MP BN S3
Subject:.RE: (5) RE: Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT 1 9 1 9 11

Classification UM
Caveats NONE

MAIM'
The Brigade Deputy sent an e-mail to you on 22 OCT 03 that 111111111)as to be paid for the services his compari performs The SOW for Baghdad Central is to he awarded on t e 28 Oct. This will give one contractor al. of the services at the site and that includes maintaining the light sets. For food, yes he has been late bu: he can nor control 1 AD road blocks and closed roads for IEDs They are constructing a kitchen facility there on site and this help with the delivery problem. For head count, your unit must submit a timely head count to them. If you get prisoners in after the head count is given to the contractor then they car not deliver food they do not know you need The new kitchen facility on site should also help solve this problem The contractor has people with the food from the kitchen to your site They eat the meals and I would like to know who from your staff is inspecting the food before it goes to the prisoners? Who is making the charges that there is dirt. bugs or what ever in the food? If it is the prisoners I would take that with a grain of salt.
As for your light sets. There are light sets coming from Bucca by rail and from the 744 by air. Moving assets in theater takes time I talked to Mr. Parks about working on the fixed lights and the light sets. Your people told him to do a survey and give them the information before starling work Also, Mr Parks needs a bulb that goes into the fixed lighting system so ne knows what to get
MAIM
« File, RE (S) Meeting with MG Wojdakowski rtf »
_Original Message--
From: 111.1111.11111 MA) CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
Sent:.Mond October 27, 2003 9:50 AM
To:. MA) CJTF7-800Th MP ODE Sa;. CPT CJTF7 -800MP BDE OPS

Cc:.
-BOOTH MP BDE-SW/I/M(E-mail). CJTF7-800MP BDE XD/55, Kgrdiri;kt, Janis BG C7177-CDR 800 MP BDE Subject: (5) RE: Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT 'limit
MAJ.!"
e other day when you were herpfpe past how many months I addressed the light set issue trif. ,
repair of the light sets pounds_as we were told was supposed to fix the light sets Nov, I a--
being informed by Mr._
BN P80, a¦ there has not been a contract awarded so the lignt sets canno7 or
fixed unless funded sorelirilliP'
)er way Is this the case? And if so. why wasn't I informed after the hunareas c' emails, SITREP, requests, etc.. I hope the aoove info is not correct Bottom line. the comoounos lack tne oroo!--lighting to protect soldiers, prisoners and escapes, all of which is MISSION I am not sure why a greater empnasis for the past couple of months has not been put on this above our level We are talking about soldiers safety anc: prisoner safety and the prevention/deterence of escapes. Please advise on the status of the repair of licht sets I know that issues are being worked to bring Amidas from other locations to here, yet the number that I have seer will not fix the problem
While I am addressing basic necessities, Contract Meals Disaster Thai is the best way to oescribe this issue Short hundreds of meals every feeding. bugs and dirt are found in the meals several times a week and for the past two days prisoners have been vomitting after they eat That coupled with the fact that their arrival time yFries tremendously This is of great concern as Ramadan has begun We are now out of MREs for me prisoners and are attempting to get some today from the 541st We are just about at 4000 prisoners between three locations, and as each day goes by the tension within the pnsoner population increases. obviousiy Yet. simple fixes, food, would help tremendously
I appreciate your immediate assistance with these issues
V/R
MAJ
----Ori
From_ MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE S4
Sent_as O tober 26. 2003 9.23 PM
To _ CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Cc._ MAJ CJTF7-320 MP BN S3
Subject RE' Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT irnnn
Classification NO1111111
I will talk to LTC o will inform me when the train arrives at the Bagndad railyard VVhat I need from you is
all the container numbers and the train number Give me the de _ime as well. Once the train arrives I wit
get PLS Trucks- I just need you to provide the escorts once LT_gives me the arrival time

CPT Felix

----Or
From_CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Se_ber 26, 2003 4 .02 PM

To_ MAJ CJTF7-800TH MP BDE Sa.11111111111111.
CJT /-_S3
Cc E-mail)
Subte_
asker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT milli'

Classification
Caveats' NONE

FA _Cpt_what do we do about the connexes with the light sets in
MSG, USA 800th MP BDE S-3 Ops NCO
2
DODD0A-002607

DSVT 302-559-1743
--Original Message—
From 724MPS4 Imailto:724MPS4@93sigbde2 army.smil mill
Sent Sunday, October 26. 2003 3:51 PM

CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Cc r 24MPAL , 724MPXO: 724MPS3,
Subject RE Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT

Classification pa
Caveats NON

1111111
I spoke w/ MSG Moffett in ref. to Baghdad Centra: needing light sets. Tuesday I'm going to send out 8 by railhead it will take 17 hrs to reach your location...pas the lignt sets become available I will send them forward I will e-mail you the container {convex) numbers as well as any otner info that makes it easier for you to identify this equip .
I hope this helps for the time being
CPT
P S . 8 lightest will come in two to three 20ft containers
----Original Message--
From._ CPT CJTF7-800MP EDE OPS
Imailto c5main.hg.c5.army smil mill
Sent Saturday, September 27, 2003 4 . 40 PM
To 800MP S3FWD_ CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS
Cc. 724MPS3. 724MPS4_ E-mail)
Subject RE Tasker # 22 URGENT URG NT URGENT milli'

Classification:Ma
Caveats NONE

Then I will need 16 radios from the 724th Everybody on track 7
AIM
MSG. USA
800th MP BDE
S-3 Ops NCO
DSVT 302-559-1743

----Original Message--From . 800MP S3FWD Imaitto:800MPS3FWD@93siabde2.army smilmil] Sent. Saturda , September 27, 2003 4.35 PM To_ CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS Cc_ PS4 Subject RE• Tasker # 22 URGENT URGENT URGENT 1 0991
Got its The 530th MP BN signed over all but four radios to the 724th.
We will give up our four. We plan to send up 120 detainees on either
Tuesday or Wednesday.

----Onginal Message---
From:.CPT CJTF7-800MP BDE OPS jmailto.c5main.hq.c5.army.smil.mil) Sent Saturoay, ep ember 27, 2003 8:29 AM
To _FWD, 724 MP CDR, 724MPALOC Cc_ (E-mail) Subject as er 2 URGENT URGENT URGENT !!!I ii
Classification -1M
Caveats: NON

«Tasker #22 Motarola Hand Held Radio Supportdoc»
Alcon Tasker #22 need these ASAP I
Classification:11111.
Caveats NON

Classrfication11111
Caveats . NON

ClassificationlIM
Caveats' NONE

Classification:UM
Caveats NONE

Classification NM
Caveats NONE

DRV FM 123-2
Dated. 24 Feb 98
DECL ON X1

Classification MOM
Classification. SECRET NE
J CJTF7-320Th MP BN -S3j
Dated 24 Feb 98 DECL ON Xi
Classification.
4

Doc_nid: 
2555
Doc_type_num: 
79