Taguba Report Annex 23: Army Field Manual FM 34-52: Intelligence Interrogation

Field Manual FM 34-52 sets forth the basic principles of interrogation doctrine and establishes procedures and techniques applicable to Army intelligence interrogations.

Friday, May 8, 1987
Monday, October 18, 2004

FM 34-52
Washington, DC, 8 May 1987

FM 34-52

Table of Contents















This manual sets forth the basic principles of interrogation doctrine and
establishes procedures and techniques applicable to Army intelligence
interrogations, applies to the doctrine contained in FM 34-1, and follows
operational procedures outlined in FM 105. It provides general guidance for
commanders, staff officers, and other personnel in the use of interrogation
elements of Army intelligence units. It outlines procedures for the handling of
the sources of interrogations, the exploitation and processing of documents, and
the reporting of intelligence gained through interrogation. It covers directing
and supervising interrogation operations, conflict scenarios and their impact on
interrogation operations, and peacetime interrogation operations.
These principles, procedures, and techniques apply to operations in low-, mid-,
and high-intensity conflicts;to the use of electronic warfare (EW) or nuclear,
biological, or chemical (NBC) weapons;to the CI operations contained in FMs
34-Eland A (S/NOFORN);and to the psychological operations (PSYOP) contained
in FM 33-1.
The provisions of this publication are the subject of international agreements
189(National Distinguishing Letters for Use by NATO Forces), 203

(Interrogation of Prisoners of War), 204 (Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners
of War), and 28 (Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and
These principles and techniques of interrogation are to be used within the
constraints established by FM 27-1Q the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
Sources for tactical interrogations may be civilian internees, insurgents, enemy
prisoners of war (EPWs), defectors, refugees, displaced persons, and agents or
suspected agents. Sources in strategic debriefings are emigres, refugees,
resettlers, and selected US sources.
Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and
women are included..

• - • -

The proponent of this publication is HQTRADOC. Submit changes for improving
this publication on DA Form 228(Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank
Forms) and forward it to Commander, United States Army Intelligence Center and
School, ATTN:ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 8E3-70 Unless this

publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer
exclusively to men.

Chapter 1
Interrogation and the Interrogator
Interrogation is the art of questioning and examining a source to obtain the
maximum amount of usable information. The goal of any interrogation is to obtain
usable and reliable information, in a lawful manner and in the least amount of
time, which meets intelligence requirements of any echelon of command. Sources
may be civilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defectors, refugees, displaced
persons, and agents or suspected agents. A successful interrogation produces
needed information which is timely, complete, clear, and accurate. An
interrogation involves the interaction of two personalities: the source and the
interrogator. Each contact between these two differs to some degree because of
their individual characteristics and capabilities, and because the circumstances
of each contact and the physical environment vary.
Intelligence interrogations are of many types, such as the interview,
debriefing, and elicitation. However, the principles of objective, initiative,
accuracy, prohibitions against the use of force, and security apply to all
The objective of any interrogation is to obtain the maximun amount of usable
information possible in the least amount of time. Each interrogation has a
definite purpose?to obtain information to satisfy the assigned requirement which
contributes to the successful accomplishment of the supported unit's mission.
The interrogator must keep this purpose firmly in mind as he obtains the
information. The objective may be specific, establishing the exact location of a
minefield, or it may be general, seeking order of battle (OB) information about
a specific echelon of the enemy forces. In either case, the interrogator uses
the objective as a basis for planning and conducting the interrogation. He
should not concentrate on the objective to the extent that he overlooks or fails
to recognize and exploit other valuable information extracted from the source.
For example, during an interrogation, he learns of an unknown, highly
destructive weapon. Although this information may not be in line with his
specific objective, he develops this lead to obtain all possible information
concerning this weapon. It is then obvious that the objective of an
interrogation can be changed as necessary or desired.

Achieving and maintaining the initiative is essential to a successful

interrogation just as the offense is the key to success in combat operations.

The interrogator must remain in charge throughout the interrogation. He has

certain advantages at the beginning of an interrogation, such as the

psychological shock the source receives when becoming a prisoner of war, which
enable him to grasp the initiative and assist him in maintaining it. An
interrogator may lose control during the interrogation by allowing the source to

take control of the interrogation. If this occurs, he must postpone the
interrogation and reassess the situation. To resume the interrogation, a
different interrogator should conduct the interrogation. In addition, the
interrogator must identify and exploit leads developed during the interrogation.

The interrogator makes every effort to obtain accurate information from the
source. He assesses the source correctly by repeating questions at varying

intervals. The interrogator, however, is not the final analyst and should not
reject or degrade information because it conflicts with previously obtained
information. The interrogator's primary mission is the collection of
information, not evaluation. Conversely, the interrogator should not accept all
information as the truth; he views all information obtained with a degree of

doubt. If possible, and when time permits, he should attempt to confirm
information received and annotate less credible or unproven information. It is
of great importance to report accurate information to the using elements. The
interrogator checks his notes against the finished report to ensure that the
report contains and identifies the information as heard, seen, or assumed by the

The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant
and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by law and is neither
authorized nor. condoned by the US Government. Experience indicates that the use
of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation.
Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields unreliable
results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source to
say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear. However, the use of force
is not to be confused with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other
nonviolent and noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning
hesitant or uncooperative sources.
The psychological techniques and principles outlined should neither be confused
with, nor construed to be synonymous with, unauthorized techniques such as
brainwashing, mental torture, or any other form of mental coercion to include
drugs. These techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in
obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of threats in
interrogation is intentional, as.their enforcement and use normally constitute
violations of international law and may result in prosecution under the UCMJ.
Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or force renders
an interrogator ineffective should the source challenge the threat.
Consequently, from both legal and moral viewpoints, the restrictions established
by international law, agreements, and customs render threats of force, violence,
and deprivation useless as interrogation techniques.
The interrogator, by virtue of his position, possesses a great deal of
classified information. He is aware constantly that his job is to obtain
information, not impart it to the source. He safeguards military information at
all times as well as the source of information. This becomes very clear when one
considers that among those persons with whom the interrogator has contact, there
are those attempting to collect information for the enemy. The interrogator is
alert to detect any attempt made by the source to elicit information.
The interrogator is concerned primarily with two sources of information in his
intelligence collection effort: human sources and material sources (mainly
captured enemy documents (CEDs)). The senior interrogator, depending on the
supported commander's priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and information
requirements (IR), decides which of these sources will be more effective in the
intelligence collection effort.
The interrogator encounters many sources who vary greatly in personality, social
class, civilian occupation, military specialty, and political and religious
beliefs. Their physical conditions may range from near death to perfect health,
their intelligence levels may range from well below average to well above
average, and their security consciousness may range from the lowest to the
highest. Sources may be civilian internees, insurgents, EPWs, defectors,
refugees, displaced persons, and agents or suspected agents. Because of these

variations, the interrogator makes a careful study of every source to evaluate
his mental, emotional, and physical state and uses it as a basis for
interrogation. He deals mainly with three categories of sources: cooperative and
friendly, neutral and nonpartisan, and hostile and antagonistic.
Cooperative and Friendly

A cooperative and friendly source offers little resistance to the interrogation
and normally speaks freely on almost any topic introduced, other than that which
will tend to incriminate or degrade him personally. To obtain the maximum amount
of information from cooperative and friendly sources, the interrogator takes
care to establish and to preserve a friendly and cooperative atmosphere by not
inquiring into those private affairs which are beyond the scope of the
interrogation. At the same time, he must avoid becoming overly friendly and
losing control of the interrogation.
Neutral and Nonpartisan
A neutral and nonpartisan source is cooperative to a limited degree. He normally
takes the position of answering questions asked directly, but seldom volunteers
information. In some cases, he may be afraid to answer for fear of reprisals by
the enemy. This often is the case in low-intensity conflict (LIC) where the
people may be fearful of insurgent reprisals. With the neutral and nonpartisan
source, the interrogator may have to ask many specific questions to obtain the
information required.
Hostile and Antagonistic
A hostile and antagonistic source is most difficult to interrogate. In many
cases, he refuses to talk at all and offers a real challenge to the
interrogator. An interrogator must have self?control, patience, and tact when
dealing with him. As a rule, at lower echelons, it is considered unprofitable to
expend excessive time and effort in interrogating hostile and antagonistic
sources. When time is available and the source appears to be an excellent target
for exploitation, he should be isolated and repeatedly interrogated to obtain
his cooperation. A more concentrated interrogation effort can be accomplished at
higher levels, such as corps or echelons above corps (EAC), where more time is
available to exploit hostile and antagonistic sources.
CEDs include any piece of recorded information which has been in the possession
of a foreign nation and comes into US possession. This includes US documents
which the foreign nation may have possessed. There are numerous ways to acquire
a document, some of the most common ways are: found in the possession of human
sources, on enemy dead, or on the battlefield. There are two types of documents:

(1) official (government or military) documents such as overlays, field orders,
maps, and codes; (2) personal (private or commercial) documents such as letters,
diaries, newspapers, and books.

An interrogator should possess an interest in human nature and have a
personality which will enable him to gain the cooperation of a source. Ideally,
these and other personal qualities would be inherent in an interrogator;
however, in most cases, an interrogator can correct some deficiencies in these
qualities if he has the desire and is willing to devote time to study and
practice. Some desirable personal qualities in an interrogator are motivation,
alertness, patience and tact, credibility, objectivity, self?control,
adaptability, perseverence, and personal appearance and demeanor.

An interrogator may be motivated by several factors, for example, an interest in
human relations, a desire to react to the challenge of personal interplay, an
enthusiasm for the collection of information, or just a profound interest in
foreign languages and cultures. Whatever the motivation, it is the most
significant factor used by an interrogator to achieve success. Without
motivation, other qualities lose their significance. The stronger the
motivation, the more successful the interrogator.
The interrogator must be constantly aware of the shifting attitudes which
normally characterize a source's reaction to interrogation. He notes the
source's every gesture, word, and voice inflection. He determines why the source

is in a certain mood or why his mood suddenly changed. It is from the source's
mood and actions that the interrogator determines how to best proceed with the
interrogation. He watches for any indication that the source is withholding
information. He must watch for a tendency to resist further questioning, for
diminishing resistance, for contradictions, or other tendencies, to include
The interrogator must have patience and tact in creating and maintaining rapport
between himself and the source, thereby, enhancing the success of the
interrogation. Additionally, the validity of the source's statements and the
motives behind these statements may be obtainable only through the exercise of
tact and patience. Displaying impatience encourages the difficult source to
think that if he remains unresponsive for a little longer, the interrogator will
stop his questioning. The display of impatience may cause the source to lose
respect for the interrogator, thereby, reducing his effectiveness. An
interrogator, with patience and tact, is able to terminate an interrogation and
later continue further interrogation without arousing apprehension or
The interrogator must maintain credibility with the source and friendly forces.
Failure to produce material rewards when promised may adversely affect future
interrogations. The importance of accurate reporting cannot be overstressed,
since interrogation reports are often the basis for tactical decisions and
The interrogator must maintain an objective and a dispassionate attitude,
regardless of the emotional reactions he may actually experience, or which he
may simulate during the interrogation. Without this required objectivity, he may
unconsciously distort the information acquired. He may also be unable to vary
his interrogation techniques effectively.
The interrogator must have an exceptional degree of self-control to avoid
displays of genuine anger, irritation, sympathy, or weariness which may cause
him to lose the initiative during the interrogation. Self-control is especially
important when employing interrogation techniques which require the display of
simulated emotions or attitudes.

An interrogator must adapt himself to the many and varied personalities which he
will encounter. He should try to imagine himself in the source's position. By
being able to adapt, he can smoothly shift his techniques and approaches during
interrogations. He must also adapt himself to the operational environment. In
many cases, he has to conduct interrogations under a variety of unfavorable
physical conditions.
A tenacity of purpose, in many cases, will make the difference between an
interrogator who is merely good and one who is superior. An interrogator who
becomes easily discouraged by opposition, non-cooperation, or other difficulties
will neither aggressively pursue the objective to a successful conclusion nor
seek leads to other valuable information.
The interrogator's personal appearance may greatly influence the conduct of the
interrogation and the attitude of the source toward the interrogator. Usually a
neat, organized, and professional appearance will favorably influence the
source. A firm, deliberate, and businesslike manner of speech and attitude may
create a proper environment for a successful interrogation. If the
interrogator's personal manner reflects fairness, strength, and efficiency, the
source may prove cooperative and more receptive to questioning. However,

depending on the approach techniques, the interrogator can decide to portray a
different (for example, casual, sloven) appearance and demeanor to obtain the
willing cooperation of the source.
The interrogator must be knowledgeable and qualified to efficiently and
effectively exploit human and material sources which are of potential
intelligence interest. He is trained in the techniques and proficiency necessary
to exploit human and material sources. His initial training is in foreign
language, and his entry?level training is in the exploitation of documents and
human sources. The interrogator must possess, or acquire through training and .
experience, special skills and knowledge.
The most essential part of the interrogator's intelligence collection effort is
reporting the information obtained. Hence, he must prepare and present both
written and oral reports in a clear, complete, concise, and accurate manner. He
must possess a good voice and speak English and a foreign language idiomatically
and without objectionable accent or impediment.
Knowledge of a foreign language is necessary since interrogators work primarily
with non?English speaking people. Language ability should include a knowledge of
military terms, foreign idioms, abbreviations, colloquial and slang usages, and
local dialects. Although a trained interrogator who lacks a foreign language
skill can interrogate successfully through an interpreter, the results obtained
by the linguistically proficient interrogator will be more timely and
comprehensive. Language labs, tapes, or instructors should be made available
wherever possible to provide refresher and enhancement training for interrogator
Interrogation operations contribute to the accomplishment of the supported
commander's mission. The interrogator must have a working knowledge of the US
Army's missions, organizations, weapons and equipment, and methods of operation.
This knowledge enables him to judge the relative significance of the information
he extracts from the source.
Every interrogator should be knowledgeable about his unit's target country, such
as armed forces uniforms and insignia, OB information, and country familiarity.
Armed Forces Uniforms and Insignia
Through his knowledge of uniforms, insignia, decorations, and other distinctive
devices, the interrogator may be able to determine the rank, branch of service,
type of unit, and military experience of a military or paramilitary source.
During the planning and preparation and the approach phases, later discussed in
this manual, the identification of uniforms and insignia is very helpful to the
Order of Battle Information
OB is defined as the identification, strength, command structure, and
disposition of personnel, units, and equipment of any military force. OB
elements are separate categories by which detailed information is maintained.

They are composition, disposition, strength, training, combat effectiveness,
tactics, logistics, electronic technical data, and miscellaneous data. During
the questioning phase, OB elements assist the interrogator in verifying the
accuracy of the information obtained and can be used as an effective tool to
gain new information. Aids which may be used to identify units are names of
units, names of commanders, home station identifications, code designations and
numbers, uniforms, insignia, guidons, documents, military postal system data,
and equipment and vehicle markings.
Country Familiarity
The interrogator should be familiar with the social, political, and economic
institutions; geography; history; and culture of the target country. Since many

sources will readily discuss nonmilitary topics, the interrogator may induce
reluctant prisoners to talk by discussing the geography, economics, or politics
of the target country. He may, then, gradually introduce significant topics into
the discussion to gain important insight concerning the conditions and attitudes
in the target country. He should keep abreast of major events as they occur in
the target country. By knowing the current events affecting the target country,
the interrogator will better understand the general situation in the target
country, as well as the causes and repercussions.
Interrogators must be proficient in all common soldier skills. However, map
reading and enemy material and equipment are keys to the performance of
interrogator duties.
Map Reading
Interrogators must read maps well enough to map track using source information
obtained about locations of enemy activities. Through the use of his map
tracking skills, the interrogator can obtain information on the locations of
enemy activities from sources who can read a map. Furthermore, his map reading
skills are essential to translate information into map terminology from sources
who cannot read a map. Map reading procedures are outlined in FM 21-26.
Enemy Material and Equipment
The interrogator should be familiar with the capabilities, limitations, and
employment of standard weapons and equipment so that he may recognize and
identify changes, revisions, and innovations. Some of the more common subjects
of interest to the interrogator include small arms, infantry support weapons,
artillery, aircraft, vehicles, communications equipment, and NBC defense. FM
100-2-3 provides information on enemy material and equipment.
Specialized Training
The interrogator requires specialized training in international regulations,
security, and neurolinguistics.
International Agreements
The interrogator should know international regulations on the treatment of
prisoners of war and the general principles of the Law of Land Warfare and The
Hague and Geneva Conventions.
Interrogators must know how to identify, mark, handle, and control sensitive
material according to AR 380-5. He should have received special training on
Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the Army (SAEDA).

Neurolinguistics is a behavioral communications model and a set of procedures
that improve communication skills. The interrogator should read and react to
nonverbal communications. An interrogator can best adapt himself to the source's
personality and control his own reactions when he has an understanding of basic
psychological factors, traits, attitudes, drives, motivations, and inhibitions.

Chapter 2
The Role of the Interrogator
An interrogation element does not operate on its own. It conducts operations in
response to an assigned collection mission and reports the information it
collects back into the system to help support combat commanders in fighting the
air?land battle. The intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process
is the framework in which intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) operations
take place. Interrogation assets operate within that framework to support the
All combat commanders have the same basic responsibility. They must destroy the
enemy's capability to conduct further operations within their assigned areas of
operation. To accomplish this mission, commanders must locate, identify, engage,
and defeat enemy units. A commander can only engage the enemy after that enemy
has entered the commander's area of operations. The depth of this area is
determined by the maximum range of the weapon systems controlled by the
commander. High technology battlefields of the future will be characterized by
high mobility, devastating firepower, and tactics which take maximum advantage
of both. On such battlefields, a commander whose sole interest is his area of
operations is a commander who has lost the initiative. Losing the initiative on
a battlefield means losing the battle. Air-land battle doctrine projects a way
for commanders to preserve the initiative. It requires commanders to expand
their outlook on the battlefield to another area, the area of interest. This
area contains those enemy elements which may be close enough to effect the
outcome of combat operations in the immediate future. If commanders can locate,
identify, and accurately predict the intentions of enemy units while they are in
the area of interest, it may be possible to inhibit or destroy their ability to
conduct future combat operations. In combat operations against the enemy,
air-land battle doctrine concentrates on deep, close, and rear operations.
Air-land battle doctrine requires all commanders to have a mental and emotional
commitment to the offensive. They must set primary and secondary objectives in
terms of enemy formations, not terrain features. They must attack units and
areas critical to coherent enemy operations, not just the enemy's lead
formations. Commanders must possess the spirit of offensive determination. They
must direct powerful initial blows against the enemy, placing him at an
immediate disadvantage. These initial blows must be rapidly followed by
additional strikes to keep the enemy off balance. To successfully implement the
air-land battle doctrine, commanders must-

Hold the initiative
Operate across the entire width and depth of the battlefield.
React rapidly to changes in the enemy's intentions.
Synchronize the operations of their subordinates.

The air-land battle doctrine places an extremely heavy burden on all commanders.
However, these burdens must be borne, if commanders expect to win against heavy
odds on the battlefield of the future.
Like all other intelligence assets, interrogators serve the commander.
Interrogation operations are of no value unless they contribute to the
accomplishment of the supported commander's mission. To understand the
interrogator's role in mission accomplishment, the overall contribution made by
military intelligence must be understood. Military intelligence is responsible
for providing commanders with an accurate and timely estimate of the enemy's
capabilities and probable courses of action. This estimate must consider the
terrain features in the area of operations, the number and type of enemy units
in this area, and the prevailing weather conditions. Intelligence assets collect
and analyze information to develop this estimate, then, give the estimate to
commanders in sufficient time for use in their decision making.

Commanders request the information they need. These information requests are
translated into collection requirements. The collection requirements are
consolidated into collection missions and assigned to specific collection
assets. Collection assets conduct operations to obtain information that
satisfies their assigned collection missions. As collection assets gather
information, they report it. The.reported information is consolidated and
analyzed to determine its reliability and validity. Valid information is
collated and used to produce intelligence, which is then provided to the
commanders, and simultaneously to collection assets to provide immediate
feedback to assist in collection operations. This process is continuous, since
commanders must react to a constantly changing battlefield. The following
illustration shows the overall process followed by intelligence personnel in
producing this estimate.

Analysis is the heart or ce•ter of the intelligence process. The collection
effort is driven by an analysis of the commander's mission and the information
needs this analysis identifies. The information collected is analyzed to
determine how well it fills the commander's needs. IPB is the initial step in
performing this analysis. IPB integrates enemy doctrine with the weather and
terrain as they relate to a specific battlefield environment. This integration
allows enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action to be
determined and evaluated. On the battlefield, IPS is dynamic. It produces
graphic estimates that portray the enemy probable courses of action in the
immediate situation. Commanders and their staff elements use IPB products to
help them determine how to achieve decisive results with limited resources.
IEW operations are conducted to satisfy the aggregate intelligence,
counterintelligence (CI), and EW requirements of the commander. IEW operations
include both situation and target development activities. They are collectively
oriented on the collection, processing, analysis, and reporting of all
information regarding the enemy, weather, and terrain. IEW operations generate
combat information, direct targeting data, all?source intelligence, and
correlated targeting information. CI supports OPSEC, deception, rear operations,
and EW. CI support to OPSEC and deception protects friendly, command, control,
and communications (C3) programs. These are integral to IEW operations performed
in support of the commander's combat objectives.
Situation development requires the collection of information that accurately
describes the enemy, weather, and terrain within the supported commander's area
of interest. The following questions exemplify the types of information

How will the terrain features and current weather affect the enemy's men and
equipment? How will these effects change his operational timetables?
What tactics will the enemy employ to achieve his objectives? What equipment
will he employ? How will he organize his forces?
Where will the enemy fight? What are his current unit locations? What are the
strengths and weaknesses of those dispositions?
What are the enemy's intentions? Where will he move next? What will he do when
he gets there? Will he attack, defend, or withdraw? Where, When, How?
Who, exactly, is the enemy? What are the capabilities, limitations, and
operational patterns of specific enemy units and their commanders?
Where is the enemy vulnerable? What are his technical, operational, and human


Target.development requires the collection of combat information, targeting
data, and correlated targeting information. Its objective is to accurately
predict where and when the enemy will establish dispositions that will yield the

most decisive results when struck by a minimum of firepower. The following

questions exemplify the types of information required.
Where, exactly, are the high value targets? Where are the locations of enemy
weapons systems, units, and activities that may impact on combat operations?
What, exactly, is at these locations? How much equipment? How many personnel?
To what units do they belong?
How long will these locations be targets? When did the units, equipment, and
personnel arrive? Where will they locate?

Specific Information Requirements
Tactical intelligence operations begin with the commander. He conveys his
information needs to the intelligence staff who converts them into PIR and IR
for the commander's approval or modification. The intelligence officer
translates PIR and IR into specific collection missions for subordinate,
attached, and supporting units and requests information from the next higher
echelon. He receives and evaluates information From all sources, develops and
nominates high-payoff targets (HPTs), and reports intelligence results to
higher, lower, and adjacent units.
Battalion Specific Information Requirements
Battalion commanders need specific information and accurate intelligence from
the brigade and higher headquarters to plan their operations. They need timely
combat information and targeting data from subordinate, adjacent, and supporting
units to refine their plan and to win their offensive and defensive battles.
Their specific information requirements (SIR) for attacking and defending are
consolidated, due to the speed with which they must react on the extremely
dynamic and volatile air-land battlefield. They must know-

Location, direction, and speed of platoon and company?sized elements within
the enemy's first-echelon battalions.
Location, direction, and speed of enemy second-echelon battalions which
indicate the first-echelon regiment's main effort.
Disposition and strength of enemy de fensive positions and fortifications.
Location of anti-tank positions, crew-served weapons, individual vehicle
positions, and dismounted infantry.
Locations of barriers, obstacles, minefields, and bypass routes.
Effects of terrain and prevailing weather conditions throughout the course of
combat operations.
Capability of enemy to employ air assets.
Availability and probability of use of enemy radio electronic combat (REC)
assets to disrupt friendly C3.
Possibility of special weapons.
Probability of enemy use of NBC weapons.

Brigade Specific Information Requirements
Brigade commanders need and use specific information to plan, direct,
coordinate, and support the operations of the division against enemy
first-echelon regiments, their battalions, companies, and combat support units
the sustainers. They also need accurate intelligence about enemy second-echelon
regiments within first-echelon divisions and any follow-on forces which can
close on their area of operation before the current engagement can be decisively

Brigades strive to attack enemy firstechelon forces while they are on the move
and before they can deploy into combat formations. The brigade commander needs

specific information about-
Composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of advancing enemy forces.
Location, direction, and speed of enemy first-echelon battalions and their

subordinate companies.
Locations and activities of enemy second and follow?on echelons capable of
reinforcing their first?echelon forces in the operations area.
Location of enemy indirect fire weapon systems and units.

Locations of gaps, assailable flanks, and other tactical weaknesses in the

enemy's OB and operations security (OPSEC) posture.

Air threat.

Enemy use of NBC.

Effects of weather and terrain on current and projected operations.

Anticipated timetable or event schedule associated with the enemy's most

likely courses of action.

Should the enemy succeed in establishing his defensive positions, then, brigade
commanders' SIR increase. They must then know the specific types, locations, and
organization of enemy first- and second-echelon defensive positions and
fortifications. These include-

Barriers, obstacles, fire sacks, and antitank strong points.

Locations of antiaircraft and missile artillery units.

Locations of surface?to?air missile units.

Location of REC units.

Location of reserve maneuver forces.

Enemy ability to conduct deep attack into friendly rear area.

Brigade commanders given defensive missions, or forced to defend given sectors,
require specific information about assaulting enemy companies, battalions;
regiments, and divisions?generally, their strength, composition, and direction
of attack. The same information is required about enemy follow?on units that can
affect brigade combat operations. Of specific concern are the locations, size,
activities, direction, and speed of enemy air?assault, heliborne, and tactical
air units capable of dealing lethal and decisive blows to brigade units and
which could potentially be used to thwart any counterattack.
Specific information about enemy firstand second?echelon regimental C3
facilities is of paramount concern to the brigade commander, whether on the
offense or defense. He must know the specific locations of enemy-

Division forward and main command posts (CPs).

Regimental and battalion CPs.

Fire direction control centers.

Command observation posts.

Radio and radar reconnaissance sites.

REC sites.

Target acquisition sites.

The suppression, neutralization, and destruction of enemy C3 systems and
facilities are critical to the success of close operations. Brigade commanders,
in concert with supporting division and corps IEW, and maneuver and fire support
units use all available means to identify, locate, disrupt, and destroy these
extremely HPTs. Their objective is to neutralize the enemy commanders ­capability to command troops and control weapon and combat support systems.
Thus, to degrade or deny the ability of the enemy commander to conduct his
attack as planned, this is done by systematically attacking key nodes and
information links in the enemy commanders' command and control (C2) system,
which supports their decision?making process. This form of C2 warfare is founded
upon the basic tenets of command, control, and communications countermeasures

(C3CM) strategy and is defined as-
The integrated use of OPSEC, military deception, jamming, and physical
destruction, supported by INTELLIGENCE, to deny information, influence, degrade,
or destroy enemy C3 capabilities and to protect friendly C3.
The protection of friendly C3-protect C3-is the number one priority under C3CM
strategy. Intelligence supports the protection of friendly C3 primarily through
CI support to OPSEC and deception.
The mission of CI is to detect, evaluate, counteract, or prevent hostile
intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, and international terrorism
conducted by or on behalf of any foreign power, organization, or person

operating to the detriment of the US Army. CI personnel identify the hostile
intelligence collection threat. They, together with operations personnel,
develop friendly force profiles, identify vulnerabilities, and make
recommendations to reduce those vulnerabilities. CI operations support OPSEC,
deception, and rear operations.
CI support to OPSEC is the principal role of CI at echelons division and below.
It includes-

The identification and analysis of enemy reconnaissance, surveillance, and
target acquisition (RSTA) capabilities, personnel, units, and activities.
The identification and analysis of enemy REC units, locations, and activities.

Assisting in the development of friendly force profiles.
Determining friendly vulnerabilities to enemy RSTA and REC activities.
Recommending and evaluating appropriate OPSEC and deception measures.

Military deception operations are planned, controlled, directed, and conducted
by commanders at echelons above division. They are designed to mislead enemy
senior military and political leaders regarding our true military objectives,
our combat capabilities and limitations, and the composition and disposition of
our combat forces. Battlefield deception is deliberate action to achieve
surprise on the air-land battlefield. Its purpose is to mislead enemy ground
force commanders as to our true combat objectives; tactical OB; major axis of
advance; and the disposition of our reserve and combat support units, defensive
positions, fortifications, and C3 facilities.
CI support to rear operations includes identifying and analyzing the enemy
threat to brigade trains and both division support command (DISCOM) and corps
support command (COSCOM) operations. CI personnel recommend steps to neutralize
enemy agents, saboteurs, terrorists, sympathizers, and special purpose forces.
Brigade and battalion commanders, their staffs, and all subordinate personnel
must be trained and prepared to identify and report enemy units or activities
which may pose a threat to brigade trains, DISCOM, and COSCOM operations. The
potential impact on close operations from the rear cannot be overlooked.
Black, gray, and white lists identify personnel of CI interest. CI teams conduct
operations that provide data used to compile these lists. Black lists contain
the names of persons who are hostile to US interests and whose capture or
nullification of their effectiveness are of prime importance. Gray lists contain
names of persons whose inclinations or attitudes toward US interests are
certain. White lists contain names of persons who are favorably inclined toward
US interests and need to be protected from enemy targeting.
Interrogation and CI personnel must interact to defeat the enemy's collection
effort and the threat posed to our rear areas. The interrogator must work in
close coordination with CI personnel to keep abreast of CI targets in the event
he encounters a source that possesses information of CI interest. The following
questions exemplify the types of information required by CI:

What specific intelligence collection operations are being conducted by the

What aspects of the enemy's plans have been successfully concealed from our
collection efforts?

What aspects of friendly plans have been discovered by the enemy, and how were

they discovered?
Does the enemy plan to conduct sabotage operations?
Does the enemy plan to conduct sub versive operations?
How effective are our OPSEC measures?

How effective are our attempts at military deception?

EW is an essential element of combat power. It can provide commanders both a
passive and an active means to protect their C3 systems and a passive and an
active means to attack the enemy commanders' C3 systems as well. Protecting C3
is the number one priority for EW in accordance with C3CM strategy. Action taken
to deny, influence, and degrade or destroy enemy C3 capabilities and counter-C3
is equally important. EW, like other elements of combat power on the air-land
battlefield, is waged by employing a combination of both offensive and defensive
operations, tactics, and procedures. Air-land battle doctrine and the spirit of
the offense are the overriding considerations in planning and conducting EW
operations (see FM 34-1).
The following questions exemplify types of information that the interrogator
provides to EW operations:

Will the enemy employ jammers?
Will the enemy augment heavy elec tron:;c equipment?
What specific means of C3 are being used by the enemy?
What problem has the enemy experienced when using each of these means?
What has been the effect of our attempts to influence, degrade, or destroy
these means of C3?

Interrogators are trained as linguists to question sources and to exploit CEDs.
They collect and report information that pertains to the IEW tasks. Reportable
information is determined by comparing the information obtained to the PIR and
IR contained in the interrogation element's collection, mission. Interrogators
collect information on political, economic, and a wide range of military topics.
In doing this, they organize their collection effort according to the OB
elements used by the intelligence analyst. However, at the tactical level,
commanders and intelligence staff will generate requests for specific
intelligence and combat information PIR and IR that will allow them to better
conduct the war. Therefore, the collection effort should be limited to obtaining
information that responds to the PIR and IR:

Missions. Information that describes, the present, future, or past missions of
specific enemy units. Each unit for which mission information was obtained is
Compositions. Information that identifies specific enemy units. This
identification should include the type of unit (artillery, transportation,
armor, and so forth) and a description of the unit's organizational chain of
Strength. Information that describes the size of enemy units in terms of
personnel, weapons, and equipment. A unit identification must accompany each
Dispositions. Information that establishes locations occupied by the enemy
units or activities. The information will identify the military significance
of the disposition, other enemy units there, and any security measures.
Tactics. Information that describes the tactics in use, or planned for use, by
specific enemy units. The doctrine governing the employment of these tactics
will be included in the description.
Training. Information that identifies and describes the types of individual
and collective training being conducted by the enemy. The description will
include all information on the thoroughness, degree, and quality of the
Combat effectiveness. Information that describes the ability and fighting
quality of specific enemy units. The description will provide unit
identification and information about personnel and equipment losses and
replacements, reinforcements, morale, and combat experiences of its members.
Logistics. Information that describes the means by which the enemy moves and
sustains his forces. This includes any information on the types and amounts of

supply required, procured, stored, and distributed by enemy units in support

of current and future operations.

Electronic technical data. Information that describes the operational

parameters of specific enemy electronic equipment. This includes both

communications and noncommunications systems.

Miscellaneous data. Information that supports the development of any of the

other OB elements. Examples are personalities, passwords, unit histories,

radio call signs, radio frequencies, unit or vehicle identification numbers,

and PSYOP.

The degree of success achieved by interrogation operations is limited by the
environment in which the operations are performed. Interrogators depend on the
IEW process to give direction to their collection efforts. They rely on the
conduct of combat operations to provide them with collection targets: sources
and CED.
Interrogation operations are: also limited by the very nature of human
intelligence (HUMINT) collection. The source or CED must actually have the
desired information before the interrogators can collect it. With respect to
sources, there is always the possibility that knowledgeable individuals may
refuse to cooperate. The Geneva and Hague Conventions and the UCMJ set definite
limits on the measures which can be used to gain the willing cooperation of
prisoners of war.

Chapter 3
Interrogation Process
The interrogation process involves the screening and selection of sources for
interrogation and the use of interrogation techniques and procedures. Both
screening and interrogation involve complex interpersonal skills, and many
aspects of their performance are extremely subjective. Each screening and
interrogation is unique because of the interaction of the interrogator with the
source. There are five interrogation phases: planning and preparation, approach,
questioning, termination, and reporting.
Screening is the selection of sources for interrogation. It must be conducted at
every echelon to determine the cooperativeness and the knowledgeability of
sources and to determine which sources can best satisfy the commander's PIR and
IR in a timely manner.
Observe the Source
Screeners should personally observe the source. During this observation, the
screener should first examine the EPW captive tag (Appendix D). The EPW captive
tag will provide the screener information regarding the source's circumstances
of capture (when, where, how, by whom, and so forth). This information can
assist the interrogator in the conduct of the screening and most importantly can
show immediately if the source has the potential of possessing information which
could answer the supported commander's PIR and IR. The screeners should pay
particular attention to rank insignia, condition of uniforms and equipment, and
behavior demonstrated by the source. Screeners should look for things like
attempts to talk to the guards, intentionally joining placement in the wrong
segregation group, or any signs of nervousness, anxiety, or fear. Any source
whose appearance or behavior indicates that he is willing to talk should be
noted by the screeners. During the observation, the screener should look for
signs (such as the source's branch insignia or other identifiable features) to
indicate that the source could have knowledge of information related to the
supported commander's PIR and IR.
Question Guards
Screeners should question guards about the source. Since the guards are in
constant contact with the source, they can provide the information on the
source's behavior. The guards can provide information on how the source has
responded to orders, what requests have been made by the source, what behavior
has been demonstrated by the source, and so forth. In addition, the guards can
help screeners with specific items of interest to identify sources who might
answer the supported commander's PIR and IR.
Examine Documents
Screeners should examine the documents captured with the source and any
documents pertaining to the source. Documents captured with the source

(identification card, letters, map sections, and so forth) can provide
information that identifies the source, his organization, his mission, and other
personal background (family, knowledge, experience, and so forth). Available
documents pertaining to the source (screening reports, interrogation reports,
and administrative documents, such as detainee personnel record (see Appendix
B)) prepared by the military police, can help the screener by providing
information on the source's physical and emotional status, knowledge,
experience, and other background information. This information can be used to
verify information from documents captured with the source and further assess
his willingness to cooperate. When examining documents, screeners should look
for items that will indicate whether the source is cooperative or willing to
cooperate based on any specific personal interest. In addition, the screener
should examine the documents to determine if the source has information which
answers the supported commander's PIR and IR.

If the source has information pertaining to new foreign material, contact the
technical intelligence element, and if the source has information of target
exploitation interest, contact the target exploitation element.
Before initiating the interrogation and screening process, the interrogator
establishes close liaison with the supporting CI agents. The CI element provides
PIR of CI interest. During the interrogation and screening process,
interrogators identify sources of CI interest. After these sources have been
interrogated for any information of immediate tactical value, (as needed) they
are turned over to CI personnel as quickly as possible. For example, CI is
interested in sources that the following conditions apply:
Have no identification documents.
Have excessive identification documents.
Have modified identification documents.
Possess unusually large amounts of cash or valuables.
Possess knowledge of critical interest (for example, nuclear power plant
operations, chemical plant operations, weapons test and development, and so
Are illegal border crossers.
Attempt to avoid checkpoints.
Are on the black, gray, or white list.
Request to see CI or US Army intelligence.
Have family in the denied area.
Screeners should always consider cooperative, knowledgeable sources first. These
sources are identified through the screeners' review of documents, questioning
of the guards, and their own personal observations. Based on their notes, the
screeners establish the order in which these sources will be screened. The
guards are then told to bring these sources, in a specified sequence, to the
screening site one at a time.
Screeners ask each source about the circumstances of his capture, his personal
background, his military job, and his unit of assignment. The goal is to get the
source to talk. Once the source is talking, the screeners try to identify any
strong emotions and the reasons for them. This will indicate how susceptible the
source may be to interrogation and may identify the approach techniques which
have the greatest chance of success. Screeners also inject questions designed to
identify those topical areas in which the source possesses pertinent
A screener must record information as it is obtained from the source on a
screening report form. An example of this form is shown in Appendix F. All of
the information shown is rarely obtained from any one source. The blocks are
there to save the screeners as much additional writing as possible. If size,
activity, location, unit, time and equipment (SALUTE) reportable information is
obtained during the screening, it must be exploited fully and reported as soon
as possible.

The screening of a source ends when the screener is sure that he can make an
accurate assessment of the source's potential cooperation and pertinent
knowledge. At this time, the source is returned to the control of the guards,

and the screener records his assessment on the screening report form. The
assessment is recorded by means of a screening code. The screening code is a
number-letter designation which reflects the level of cooperation to be expected
from the source and the level of knowledgeability the source may possess. The
number "1" represents a source who responds to direct questions. The number " 2"
represents a source who responds hesitantly to questioning. The number "3"
represents a source who does not respond to questioning. The letter "A"
represents a source who is very likely to possess information pertinent to the

supported commander's PIR. The letter "B" represents a source who might have
information pertinent to the supported commander's IR. The letter "C" represents
a source who does not appear to have pertinent information.
Those sources who have been assigned to the same category may be interrogated in
any order deemed appropriate by the senior interrogator. Category lA sources
should normally be the first to be interrogated. Category 113 sources are next,
followed by those assigned to categories 2A, 1C, 2B, 3A, 2C, and 313. Category
3C sources are normally interrogated last. This order of priorities ensures the
highest probability of obtaining the greatest amount of pertinent information
within the time available for interrogations. Screening codes may change with
the echelon. The higher the echelon, the more time is available to conduct an
approach. The following illustration depicts the order in which sources will be
NOTE: The term "screening category" should not be confused with EPW- or
source-assigned category that is assigned according to their intelligence value

(see Appendix A).

Once the senior interrogator has assigned specific sources to his subordinates,
the interrogators develop a plan for their interrogations. These plans reflect
the current situation and the supported commanders' PIR and IR. If they do not,
the subsequent interrogations will not help the element to satisfy its assigned
collection mission, and information needed by the supported unit will be missed.
Each interrogator, where feasible, begins his preparation by examining the
situation map (SITMAP), the OB data base, and pertinent information contained in
the interrogation element's files.
Interrelation of Planning and Preparation and Approach
The planning and preparation phase and the approach phase are interrelated. In
the planning and preparation phase, the interrogator gathers information on the
source's circumstances of capture, comments from others who have been with the
source, information on the source's observed behavior, and information on some
of the source's personal traits and peculiarities from the screening sheet. This
information helps the interrogator develop a picture of the source and enables
him to select approaches most likely to work. There are four primary factors
that must be taken into consideration in selecting tentative approaches:

The source's mental and physical state. Is the source injured, angry, crying,
arrogant, cocky, or frightened? If so, how can this state be best exploited in
the interrogation effort.
The source's background. What is the source's age and level of military or
civilian experience.
The objective of the interrogation. How much time is available for the
interrogation? Is the commander interested only in specific areas (PIR and
IR)? Is this source knowledgeable enough to require a full OB interrogation?
The interrogator himself. What abilities does he have that can be brought into
play? What weaknesses does he have that may interfere with the interrogation
of the source? Can his personality adapt to the personality of the source?

Questioning Guards
Interrogators should question guards as part of their preparations. The guards
are in constant contact with the sources and may be able to provide the

following types of information:
Physical condition.
Demonstrated attitude and behavior.
Contact made with other guards or sources.
How the source has been handled since his capture.
Hearsay information from others who have handled the source.
Confirmation of capture data, especially the circumstances under which the

source was captured.
Each interrogator will unobtrusively observe the source to personally confirm
his identity and to check his personal appearance and behavior.
Analyze Information
After the interrogator has collected all information available about his
assigned source, he analyzes it. He looks for indicators of any psychological or
physical weakness that might make the source susceptible to one or more approach
techniques. The interrogator formulates a strategy to conduct his analysis. He
also uses the information he collected to identify the type and level of
knowledge possessed by the source that is pertinent to the element's collection .

Modify Sequences of Questioning
The interrogator uses his estimate of the type and extent of knowledge possessed
by the source to modify the basic topical sequence of questioning. He selects
only tl-ose topics in which he believes the source has pertinent knowledge. In
this way, the interrogator refines his element's overall objective into a set of
specific topics for his interrogation. The major topics that can be covered in
an interrogation are shown below in their normal sequence. The interrogator is,
however, free to modify this sequence as he deems necessary.

Personnel strength.
Weapons and equipment strength.
Combat effectiveness.
Electronic technical data.

Finalize Interrogation Plan
As a result of the planning and preparation phase, the interrogator develops a
plan for conducting his assigned interrogation. He must review this plan with
the senior interrogator when possible. Whether written or oral, the
interrogation plan must contain at least the following items of information:

Identity of the source.
Interrogation serial number.
Topics, in sequence, that will be covered.
Reasons why the interrogator selected only specific topics from the basic
questioning sequence.
Approach strategy selected.
Means selected for recording the information obtained.

The senior interrogator reviews each plan and makes any changes that he feels
necessary based on the commander's PIR and IR. After the plan is approved, the
holding compound is notified to have a guard bring the source to the
interrogation site. The interrogator collects all available interrogation aids
needed (maps, charts, writing tools, reference materials, and so forth) and
proceeds to the interrogation site.


The approach phase actually begins when the interrogator first comes in contact
with the source and continues until the prisoner begins answering questions
pertinent to the objective of the interrogation effort. Interrogators do not

"run" an approach by following a set pattern or routine. Each interrogation is
different, but all approaches in interrogations have the following purposes in

Establish and maintain control over the source and the interrogation.
Establish and maintain rapport between the interrogator and the source.

Manipulate the source's emotions and weaknesses to gain his willing

The successful application of approach techniques eventually induces the source
to willingly provide accurate intelligence information to the interrogator. The
term "willingly" refers to the source answering the interrogator's questions,
not necessarily his cooperation. The source may or may not be aware that he is
actually providing the interrogator with information about enemy forces. Some
approaches may be complete when the source begins to answer questions. Others
may have to be constantly maintained or reinforced throughout the interrogation.
The techniques used in an approach can best be defined as a series of events,
not just verbal conversation between the interrogator and the source. The
exploitation of the source's emotion can be either harsh or gentle in
application (hand and body movements, actual physical contact such as a hand on
the shoulder for reassurance, or even silence are all useful techniques that the
interrogator may have to bring into play).
Basic Concepts of Approaches
The manipulative techniques within each approach are different, but there are
some factors common to all approaches which affect the success or failure of the
approach itself. The interrogator should establish and maintain control,
establish and develop rapport, assess the source, make smooth transitions,
appear sincere, be convincing, and recognize the breaking point.
Establish and Maintain Control. The interrogator should appear to be the one who
controls all aspects of the interrogation to include the lighting, heating, and
configuration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, shelter, and
clothing given to the source. The interrogator must always be in control, he
must act quickly and firmly. However, everything that he says and does must be
within the limits of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, as well as the standards
of conduct outlined in the UCMJ.
Establish and Develop Rapport. Rapport between the interrogator and the source
is really nothing more than a two?way flow of communication. It can involve
showing kindness and humanity in an otherwise harsh situation, or it can mean
badgering the source. Rapport is established when the source reacts to the
interrogator's statement. Rapport must be maintained throughout the
interrogation, not only just in the approach phase. If the interrogator has
established good rapport initially and then abandons the effort, the source
would rightfully assume that the interrogator cares less and less about him as
the information is being obtained. If this occurs, rapport is lost and the
source may cease answering questions. Rapport may be developed by-
Asking about the circumstances of capture. By asking about the source's
circumstances of capture, the interrogator can gain insight into the prisoner's
actual state of mind and more importantly, he can ascertain his possible
breaking points.

Asking background questions. After asking about the source's circumstances of
capture, the interrogator can further gain rapport by asking questions about his
background. Apparent interest can be built by asking about his family, civilian
life, friends, likes, dislikes, and so forth. The main point in asking about the
source's background is to develop rapport, but nonpertinent questions may open
new avenues for the approach and help determine whether or not the tentative
approaches chosen in the planning and preparation phase will be effective. If
nonpertinent questions show that the tentative approaches chosen will not be
effective, a flexible interrogator can easily shift the direction of his
approach without the source being aware of the change.
Depending on the situation, circumstances, and any requests the source may have
made, the following can also be used to develop rapport:

Offering realistic incentives: such as immediate (coffee, cigarettes, and so
forth), short?term (a meal, shower, send a letter home, and so forth), and
long?term (repatriation, political asylum, and so forth).

Feigning experience similar to those of the source.
Showing concern for the prisoner through the use of voice vitality and body
Helping the source to rationalize his guilt.
Showing kindness and understanding toward the source's predicament.
Exonerating the source from guilt.
Flattering the source.

Assess the Source. After having established control of the source and having
established rapport, the interrogator continually assesses the prisoner to see
if the approaches, and later the questioning techniques, chosen in the planning
and preparation phase will indeed work. Remember that the approaches chosen in
planning and preparation are only tentative and are based on the sometimes
scanty information available from documents, the guards, and personal
observation. This may lead the interrogator to select approaches which may be
totally incorrect for obtaining this source's w:lling cooperation. A careful
assessment of the source is absolutely necessary to avoid wasting valuable time
in the approach phase. Make assessment by asking background and nonpertinent
questions which will indicate whether or not the approaches chosen will be
effective. The questions can be mixed or they can be separate. If, for example,
the interrogator had chosen a love of comrades approach, he should ask the
source questions like "How did you get along with your fellow squad members?" If
the source answers that they were all very close and worked well as a team, then
the interrogator can go right into his love of comrades approach and be
reasonably sure of its success. However, if the source answers, "They all hated
my guts and I couldn't stand any of them!," then the interrogator should abandon
that approach and ask some quick nonpertinent questions to give himself some
time to work out a new approach.
Male Smooth Transitions. The interrogator must guide the conversation smoothly
and logically, especially if he needs to move from one approach technique to
another. "Poking and hoping" in the approach may alert the prisoner of ploys and
will make the job more difficult. Tie?ins to another approach can be made
logically and smoothly by using transitional phrases. Logical tie?ins can be
made by the inclusion of simple sentences which connect the previously used
approach with the basis for the next cne. Transitions can also be smoothly
covered by leaving the unsuccessful approach and going back to nonpertinent
questions. By using nonpertinent conversation, the interrogator can more easily
move the conversation in the desired direction, and as previously stated,
sometimes obtain leads and hints as to source's stresses or weaknesses or other
approach strategies that may be more successful.
Be Sincere and Convincing. All professional interrogators must be convincing and
appear sincere in working their approaches. If an interrogator is using argument
and reason to get the source to cooperate, he must be convincing and appear
sincere. All inferences of promises, situations, and arguments, or other
invented material must be believable. What a source may or may not believe
depends on his level of knowledge, experience, and training. A good assessment
of the source is the basis for the approach and is vital to the success of the
interrogation effort.
Recognize the Breaking Point. Every source has a breaking point, but an
interrogator never knows what it is until it has been reached. There are,

however, some good indicators that the source is near his breaking point or has
already reached it. For example, if during the approach, the source leans
forward with his facial expression indicating an interest in the proposal or is
more hesitant in his argument, he is probably nearing the breaking point. The
interrogator must be alert and observant to recognize these signs in the
approach phase. Once the interrogator determines that the source is breaking, he
should interject a question pertinent to the objective of the interrogation. If
the source answers it, the interrogator can move into the questioning phase. If

the source does not answer or balks at answering it, the interrogator must
realize that the source was not as close to the breaking point as was thought.
In this case, the interrogator must continue with his approach or switch to an
alternate approach or questioning technique and continue to work until he again
feels that the source is near breaking. The interrogator can tell if the source
has broken only by interjecting pertinent questions. This process must be
followed until the prisoner begins to answer pertinent questions. It is entirely
possible that the prisoner may cooperate for a while and then balk at answering
further questions. If this occurs, the interrogator can either reinforce the
approaches that initially gained the source's cooperation or move into a
different approach before returning to the questioning phase of the
interrogation. At this point, it is important to note that the amount of time
that is spent with a particular source is dependent on several factors, that is,
the battlefield situation, the expediency with which the supported commander's
PIR and IR requirements need to be answered, and so forth.
Approach Techniques
Interrogation approach techniques are usually performed by one interrogator
working alone. However, sometimes interrogators work together. He must also
remember that the tactical situation is very fluid and that the commander needs
information in the shortest period of time. This means that the tactical
interrogator has little time to waste, especially during the approach phase.
Obviously, the more complicated an approach technique is, the more preparation
time is required for it and its. successful use. For this reason, the approach
techniques discussed are those that take the least amount of time to produce the
most usable information possible.
The number of approaches used is limited only by the interrogator's imagination
and skill. Almost any ruse or deception is usable as long as the provisions of
the Geneva Conventions are not violated. The Geneva Conventions do not permit an
interrogator to pass himself off as a medic, chaplain, or as a member of the Red
Cross (Red Crescent or Red Lion). To every approach technique, there are
literally hundreds of possible variations, each of which can be developed for a
specific situation or source. The variations are limited only by the
interrogator's personality, experience, ingenuity, and imagination.
With the exception of the direct approach, no other approach is effective by
itself. Interrogators use different approach techniques or combine them into a
cohesive, logical technique. Smooth transitions, logic, sincerity, and
conviction can almost always make a strategy work. The lack of will undoubtedly
dooms it to failure. Some examples of combinations are-

Direct/futility/love of comrades.
Direct/fear up (mild)/incentive.

The actual number of combinations is limited only by the interrogator's
imagination and skill. Great care must be exercised by the interrogator in
choosing the approach strategy in the planning and preparation phase of
interrogation and in listening carefully to what the source is saying (verbally
or nonverbally) for leads that the strategy chosen will not work. When this
occurs, the interrogator must adapt himself to approaches that he now believes

will work in gaining the source's cooperation.

Although there is no fixed point at which the approach phase ends and the
questioning phase begins, generally the questioning phase commences when the
source begins to answer questions pertinent to the specific objectives of the

interrogation. Questions should be comprehensive enough to ensure that the topic
of interest is thoroughly explored. Answers should establish the who, what,

when, where, how, and when possible why. Questions should be presented in a
logical sequence to be certain that significant topics are not neglected. A
series of questions following a chronological sequence of events is frequently

employed, but this is by no means the only logical method of asking questions.
Adherence to a sequence should not deter the interrogator from exploiting
informational leads as they are obtained. The interrogator must consider the
probable response of the source to a particular question or line of questioning
and should not, if at all possible, ask direct questions likely to evoke a
refusal to answer or to antagonize the source. Experience has shown that in most
tactical interrogations, the source is cooperative. In such instances, the
interrogator should proceed with direct questions.
Questioning Techniques
Use good questioning techniques throughout the questioning phase. An
interrogator must know when to use the different types of questions. With good
questioning techniques, the interrogator can extract the most information in the
shortest amount of time. There are many types of questioning techniques.

Uses only properly formed, direct questions.
Properly uses follow?up questions for complete information.
Properly uses repeated, controlled, prepared, and nonpertinent questions to
control interrogation and assess source.
Avoids confusing, ambiguous, and time?consuming questions.
Uses a proper, logical sequence of top ics or questions.

Characteristics of direct questions are?
Basic interrogatives (who, what, when, where, and how, plus qualifier).
Brief, concise, simply?worded, and address the looked?for information.
Asks for a narrative response (cannot be answered by just yes or no).
Produces the maximum amount of usable information and gives a greater number
of leads to new avenues of questioning.

Follow-up questions are used to exploit a topic of interest. Questions usually
flow one-from-another based on the answer to previous questions. Interrogators
ask a basic question and then based on the answer from the source, use follow-up
questions to completely exploit all available information about the topic.
Follow-up questions are also used to fully exploit a lead given by the source in
his response.
Nonpertinent questions are used to conceal the interrogation's objectives or to
strengthen rapport with the source. They may also be used to break the source's
concentration, particularly, if the interrogator suspects that the source is
lying. It is hard for a source to be a convincing liar if his concentration is
frequently interrupted.
Repeated questions ask the source for the same information obtained in response
to earlier questions. They may be exact repetitions of the previous question, or
the previous question may be rephrased or otherwise disguised. Repeated
questions maybe used to check the consistency of the source's previous
responses. They may also be used to ensure the accuracy of important details
such as place names, dates, and component parts of technical equipment. The use
of repeated questions may develop a topic that the source had refused to talk
about earlier.
They may also be used as a means of returning to a topical area for further
Control questions are developed from information which the interrogator believes
to be true. Control questions are based on information which has been recently
confirmed and which is not likely to have changed. They are used to check the
truthfulness of the source's responses and should be mixed in with other
questions throughout the interrogation.
Prepared questions are developed in advance of an interrogation to gain precise
wording or the most desirable questioning sequence. They are used primarily for
interrogations which are technical in nature, require legal precision, or cover
a number of specific topics. Interrogators must not allow the use of prepared
questions to restrict the scope and flexibility of their interrogations.
Leading questions may prompt the source to answer with the response he believes

the interrogator wishes to hear. As a result, the response may be inaccurate or
incomplete. Leading questions are generally avoided during interrogations, but
they can be used by experienced interrogators to verify information. This is
especially true during map tracking.
Avoid vague questions as they do not have enough information for the source to
understand exactly what is being asked by the interrogator. They may be
incomplete, "blanket" or otherwise nonspecific, and create doubt in the source's
mind. Vague questions tend to confuse the source, waste time, are easily evaded,
and result in answers that may confuse or mislead the interrogator.
The interrogator must use the different types of questions effectively. Active
listening and maximum eye-to-eye contact with the source will provide excellent
indicators for when to use follow-up, repeated, control, and nonpertinent
questions. The interrogator uses direct and follow-up questions to fully exploit
subjects pertinent to his interrogation objectives. He periodically includes
control, repeated, and nonpertinent questions to check the sincerity and
consistency of the source's responses and to strengthen rapport. A response
which is inconsistent with earlier responses or the interrogator's available
data is not necessarily a lie. When such a response is obtained, the
interrogator reveals the inconsistency to the source and asks for an
explanation. The source's truthfulness should, then, be evaluated based on the
plausibility of his explanation.
There are two types of questions that an interrogator should not use. These are
compound and negative questions. Compound questions are questions which ask for
at least two different pieces of information. They are, in effect, two or more
questions combined as one. They require the source to supply a separate answer
to each portion of the question. Compound questions should not be used during
interrogations because they allow the source to evade a part of the question or
to give an incomplete answer. They may confuse the source or cause the
interrogator to misunderstand the response. Negative questions are questions
which are constructed with words like "no," "none," or "not." They should be
avoided because they may confuse the source and produce misleading or false
information. They usually require additional questions to clarify the source's

SALUTE Reportable Information
SALUTE reportable information is any information that is critical to the
successful accomplishment of friendly courses of action. SALUTE reportable
information is reported by the interrogator in a SALUTE report format, written
or oral (see Appendix E for an example). Information may be SALUTE reportable
even when an interrogator cannot determine its immediate intelligence value.
SALUTE reportable information is always time sensitive and answers the
supported, higher, or adjacent unit's PIR and IR. SALUTE reportable information

is identified by its potential value. If the information indicates a change in
the enemy's capabilities or intentions, it is SALUTE reportable. If an
interrogator cannot decide whether or not a piece of information is SALUTE
reportable, he should act as though it is. This means that he should exploit it
fully and record all pertinent information. The interrogator should then consult
the senior interrogator for a final determination of the information's value.
Hot and Cold Leads
Leads are signs which tell an interrogator that the source has additional
pertinent information that can be obtained through further questioning. Leads
are provided by a source's response to the interrogator's questions. There are
two types of leads that concern interrogators?not and cold. A hot lead, when
exploited, may obtain information that is SALUTE reportable. A cold lead, when
exploited, may obtain information that is not SALUTE reportable but is still of
intelligence value. The use of follow?up questions to fully exploit hot and cold
leads may require an interrogator to cover topics that he did not list in his
interrogation plan. An interrogator must exploit hot leads as soon as he

identifies them. Once the interrogator is sure that he has obtained and recorded
all the details known to the source, he issues a SALUTE report. The interrogator
then resumes his questioning of the source at the same point where the hot lead
was obtained. An interrogator should note cold leads as they are obtained and
exploit them fully during his questioning on the topics to which the cold leads
apply. Cold leads may expand the scope of the interrogation because they may
indicate that the source possesses pertinent information in areas not previously
selected for questioning. If the interrogator does not fully exploit all of the
cold leads he obtains, he must include information on all the leads he did not
exploit in his interrogation report.
Hearsay Information
Hearsay information must include the most precise information possible of its
source. This will include the name, duty position, full unit designation of the
person who provided the information, and the date time group of when the source
obtained the information.
Questioning Sequence
An interrogator begins his questioning phase with the first topic in the
sequence he tentatively established as part of his interrogation plan. He
obtains all of the source's pertinent knowledge in this topical area before
moving on to the next topic in his sequence. He maintains his established
sequence of questioning to ensure that no topics are missed. The only exception
is to exploit a hot lead immediately. Even then, however, he must resume his
questioning at the same point in the same area at which the hot lead was first
Map Tracking
The interrogator obtains information concerning the location of enemy activities
through the use of map tracking. Map tracking is performed in the order in which
they are described. By following the sequence below, an interrogator ensures
that all required details are obtained for each disposition known to the source:

Establish an initial common point of reference (ICPR). The first location the
interrogator should try to establish as the ICPR is the source's point of
capture (POC), because it is the mos': recent in his memory.
Establish a destination common point of reference (DCPR). The DCPR can be the
reference point furthest back in time, distance, or higher echelon. This could

be forward or to the rear of the ICPR. In any case, you must establish a route
using the procedures, in the sequence shown, in the following illustration.

Obtain the direction in which the source would travel when leaving the ICPR,
Obtain a description of the surface on which the source would be traveling.
Obtain the distance the source would travel in this direction.
Obtain a description of the prOminent terrain features the source would
remember while traveling in this direction.
Repeat the questions and plot the responses until the entire route between the
ICPR and the DCPR has been plotted.
The interrogator can follow the same sequence when establishing the route

actually traveled by the source by beginning with the DCPR. Each sequence
establishes a CPR.
Exploit the DCPR. Upon determining the DCPR, the interrogator must obtain the
exact location and decription of each enemy disposition the source knew about
at the DCPR. Methods of obtaining this information are shown in the following

illustration. Until he obtains all dispositions known by the source in the
vicinity of the DCPR, the interrogator must repeat these questions and plot or
record the information as it is provided by the source.
Segment and exploit the route segments. The interrogator begins exploiting the
source's route with the segment closest to either the ICPR or the DCPR. The
preferred segment is the segment closest to the DCPR, but either can be used.

The interrogator will exploit each segment of the route by asking the question
"From (description of common point of reference (CPR)) to (description of next
CPR) back along your route of travel, what of military significance do you
know or have seen or heard?" The interrogator will continue from segment to
segment, fully exploiting each, until he has exploited the entire route
Exploit dispositions not on route. If the interrogator obtains a disposition
which is not located on the established route, he must establish the route the
source would have taken to that disposition. The interrogator then treats this
new route the same way he does any other route segment; exploiting it fully
before moving on to the next segment of the original route.

The sequence, above, organizes map tracking so that information obtained from
the source can be plotted and recorded accurately. Correct performance of this
task results in the map used by the interrogator. The description of each
disposition must be recorded preferably near the site of the disposition on the

Identify and describe items of military significance belonging to his forces
which are located at each disposition. e Provide the full unit designation of
the enemy units to which these items belong.
Describe the security measures deployed at each identified disposition.
Identify the source of his information.
Provide the date and time when he obtained his information.
Provide the name, rank, duty position and full unit designation of each person
who provided hearsay information to the source.

Recording Information
There are several reasons for recording information obtained during
interrogations. The most important of these is to ensure that all information
can be reported completely and accurately. Recorded information may also be used

Refresh the interrogator's memory on a topic covered earlier, such as when
returning to a topic after exploiting a hot lead.
Check responses to repeated questions.
Point out inconsistencies to the source.
Gain the cooperation of other sources.
Compare with information received from other sources.

There are several methods of recording information that can be used during
interrogations. Two are listed below and their advantages and disadvantages are
described. These methods may be used separately or in combination with each

Taking Notes. The interrogator's own notes are the primary method of recording
information. When the interrogator takes his own notes, he has a ready reference

to verify responses to repeated questions or to refresh his memory. They also
provide him with the means to record cold leads for later exploitation.
Using his own notes expedites the interrogator's accurate transferral of
information into a report format. When taking his own notes, however, he cannot
observe the source continually. This may cause him to miss leads or fail to
detect losses in rapport or control that are detectable only through clues

provided by the source's behavior.
It is possible to lose control and the source's willing cooperation by devoting
too much of his concentration to note taking. The interrogator must avoid
distracting the source while taking notes. Notes should be taken in such a way
that the maximum amount of eye?to?eye contact with the source is maintained.
The interrogator will not have enough time to record every word that the source
says. He must be able to condense or summarize information into a few words. He
must use his past experiences to decide which items of information should be

recorded. He should organize his materials to avoid having to flip back and

forth between references.
The only information that should be recorded during the approach phase is that
required by part 1 of the interrogation report (format is shown in Appendix G).
All other information should not be recorded until after the source's
cooperation has been obtained.
Using a Sound Recorder. The use of a sound recorder allows the interrogator to
continually observe the source. When compared with note taking, this method
allows more information to be obtained in less time. However, more time is
required for report writing because the entire tape must be replayed to transfer
information to the report. Place names, numbers, and other pertinent, detailed
information may be unclear on the recording. Sound recorders cannot provide a
ready reference that can be used to compare answers to a repeated question, and
the equipment may malfunction.
Although the termination phase is only the fourth phase of the five phases, it
is the last phase in which the interrogator will actually deal with the source.
The interrogator must leave the source ready to continue answering questions in
the future if necessary. The termination of the interrogation must be conducted
properly. If the interrogator mishandles the termination phase and he later
finds that the source has lied or he needs to question the source further, he
must start again from scratch.
Need to Terminate
A number of circumstances can cause an interrogation to be terminated. An
interrogator must be able to identify such circumstances as soon as they occur.
Some circumstances that require an interrogation to be terminated are-

The source remains uncooperative throughout the approach phase.
Either the source or the interrogator becomes physically or mentally unable to
All pertinent information has been obtained from the source.
The source possesses too much pertinent information for all of it to be
exploited during the interrogation session.
Information possessed by the source is of such value that his immediate
evacuation to the next echelon is required.
The interrogator's presence is required elsewhere.
The interrogator loses control of the interrogation and cannot recover it.

Termination Procedures
Whatever the reason for terminating the interrogation, the interrogator must
remember that there is a possibility that someone may want to question the
source at a later date. For that reason, he should terminate the interrogation
without any loss of rapport whenever possible. The interrogator reinforces his
successful approach techniques to facilitate future interrogations. He tells the
source that he may be talked to again. When appropriate, he tells the source

that the information he provided will be checked for truthfulness and accuracy.
He offers the opportunity for the source to change or add to any information he
has given.
During termination, the interrogator must make proper disposition of any
documents captured with the source. A source's military identity document must
be returned to him. If a source does not hold an identity card issued by his
government, the source will be issued a completed DA Form 2662-R (see Appendix
C) by the military police. The identity card will be in the possession of the
source at all times. Some captured documents will contain information that must

be exploited at higher echelons. Any such documents may be impounded by the
interrogator and evacuated through intelligence channels. The interrogator must
issue a receipt to the source for any personal documents he decides to impound.
He must comply with the accounting procedures established for captured documents

by the military police, according to AR 190-8. The accounting procedures
required for impounding documents captured with a source are time-consuming but

necessary. The interrogator can save time by preparing receipts and document
tags during the planning and preparation phase. He completes the termination
phase by instructing the escort guard to return the source to the holding
compound and to keep him away from any sources who have not yet been
Reports are submitted on all information of intelligence value that is obtained.
Initial reports are submitted electronically whenever possible to ensure that
the information reaches the intelligence analysts in the least amount of time.
Written reports are prepared to document electronic reports. They are used as
the initial means of reporting only when electronic reporting is impossible. Any
information of intelligence value that will diminish with the passage of time
must be SALUTE reported. Electronic SALUTE reports are formatted and submitted
according to the procedures established during the senior interrogator's initial
coordination. Written SALUTE reports are prepared according to the format in
Appendix E. Information that is not SALUTE reportable is electronically reported
with a lower priority. The aim of any interrogation is to obtain information
which will help satisfy a commander's intelligence requirements. Since these
requirements will differ in scope at each level, when conducting PIR or IR
interrogations, nonapplicable paragraphs may be deleted. Part 1 must always be
included and distribution made according to STANAG 2033 (see Appendix A).
Interrogating through an interpreter is more time consuming because the
interpreter must repeat everything said by both the interrogator and the source,
and the interpreter must be briefed by the interrogator before the interrogation
can begin. An interrogation with an interpreter will go through all five phases
of the interrogation process. After the interrogation is over, the interrogator
will evaluate the interpreter.
Methods of Interpretation
During the planning and preparation phase, the interrogator selects a method of
interpretation. There are two methods: the simultaneous and the alternate. The
interrogator obtains information about his interpreter from the senior
interrogator. He analyzes this information and talks to the interpreter before
deciding which method to use. With the simultaneous method, the interpreter
listens and translates at the same time as the person for whom he is
interpreting, usually just a phrase or a few words behind. With the alternate

method, the interpreter listens to an entire phrase, sentence, or paragraph. He
then translates it during natural pauses in the interrogation. The simultaneous
method should only be selected if all of the following criteria are met:

The sentence structure of the target language is parallel to English.
The interpreter can understand and speak both English and the target language
with ease.
The interpreter has any required special vocabulary skills for the topics to
be covered.
The interpreter can easily imitate the interrogator's tone of voice and
attitude for the approaches selected.
Neither the interrogator nor the interpreter tends to get confused when using
the simultaneous method of interpretation.
If any of the criteria listed above cannot be met, the interrogator must use
the alternate method. The alternate method should also be used whenever a high

degree of precision is required.
Interpreter Briefing
Once the interrogator has chosen a method of interpretation, he must brief his
interpreter. This briefing must cover the-

Current tactical situation.
Background information obtained on the source.
Specific interrogation objectives.

Method of interpretation to be used.
Conduct of the interrogation in that statements made by the interpreter and
the source should be interpreted in the first person, using the same content,
tone of voice, inflection, and intent. The interpreter must not inject any of
his own personality, ideas, or questions into the interrogation.
Selected approach techniques and how they are to be applied.
Conduct of interrogation in that the interpreter should inform the
interrogator if there are any inconsistencies in the language used by the
source. The interrogator will use this information in his assessment of the
source. One example is a source who claims to be an officer but who uses
excessive slang and profanity.
Physical arrangements of the interrogation site. The best layout is to have
the interrogator and the source facing each other with the interpreter behind
the source. This enhances the interrogator's control by allowing him to
simul::.aneously observe the source and the interpreter.
Need for the interpreter to assist with report preparation.

Throughout the briefing, the interrogator must answer all questions that the
interpreter may have as fully and clearly as possible. This helps ensure that
the interpreter completely understands his role in the interrogation.
Conduct the Interrogation
During the interrogation, the interrogator corrects the interpreter if he
violates any of the standards on which he was briefed. For example, if the

interpreter injects his own ideas into the interrogation, he must be corrected.
Corrections should be made in a low?key manner. At no time should the
interrogator rebuke his interpreter sternly or loudly while they are with the
source. The interrogator should never argue with the interpreter in the presence
of the source. If a major correction must be made, and only when it is
necessary, the interrogator and interpreter should leave the interrogation site
When initial contact is made with the source, the interpreter must instruct him
to maintain eye contact with the interrogator. Since both rapport and control
must be established, the interpreter's ability to closely imitate the attitude,
behavior, and tone of voice used by both the interrogator and the source is
especially important. The questioning phase is conducted in the same way that it
would be if no interpreter was used.
During the termination phase, the interpreter's ability to closely imitate the
interrogator and the source is again very important. The approaches used are
reinforced here, and the necessary sincerity and conviction must be conveyed to
the source.
The interpreter assists the interrogator in preparing reports. He may be able to
fill in gaps and unclear areas in the interroaator's notes. He may also assist
in transliterating, translating, and explaining foreign terms.
Following the submission of all reports, the interrogator evaluates the
performance of his interpreter. The evaluation must cover the same points of
information that the interrogator received from the senior interrogator. The
interrogator submits the results of his evaluation to the senior interrogator.
The senior interrogator uses this evaluation to update the information he has
about the interpreter. This evaluation may also be used in developing training
programs for interpreters.

Chapter 4
Processing Captured Enemy Documents
The information contained in CEDs can prove to be of intelligence value to
commanders at all levels. CEDs are important because they can provide
information directly from the enemy. Only on rare occasions will a single
document or group of documents provide vitally important information. Usually,
each document provides a small bit of a larger body of information. Each CED,
much like a single piece of a puzzle, contributes to the whole. In addition to
their tactical intelligence value, technical data and political indicators can
be extracted from CEDs that are important to strategic and national-level
agencies. CEDs can also be helpful in exploiting sources.
STANAG 2084 defines a document as any piece of recorded information, regardless
of form, obtained from the enemy and that subsequently comes into the hands of a
friendly force. CEDs can be US or allied documents that were once in the hands
of the enemy. Types of CEDs are typed, handwritten, printed, painted, engraved
or drawn materials; sound or voice recordings; imagery such as videotapes,
movies, or photographs; computer storage media including, but not limited to
floppy disks; and reproductions of any of the items listed above.
CEDs are mainly acquired two ways. Some are taken from sources. Most documents,
however, are captured on the battlefield from former enemy locations and from
enemy dead.
Generally, CEDs are of two types: official and personal. Official documents are
of government or military origin. Examples of official documents are, but are
not limited to, overlays, field orders, maps, codes, field manuals,
identification cards, reports, sketches, photographs, log books, maintenance
records, shipping and packing slips, war and field diaries, and written
communications between commands. Personal documents are of a private or
nongovernment origin. Examples of personal documents are letters, personal
diaries, newspapers, photographs, books, magazines, union dues payment books,
and political party dues payment books.
Interrogators are, from time-to-time, required to handle and translate a wide
variety of nonmission-related documents. Some include identity and other
documents associated with working and residing in a foreign country.
The accountability phase begins at the time the document is captured. Documents
must be clearly tagged. The capturing unit attaches a captured document tag to
each document. The capture data is always written on a captured document tag

(see the following illustration of a captured document tag). When a captured tag
is not available, the same information recorded on any piece of paper is
acceptable. Nothing is to be written directly on the CED. The captured document
tag should be assigned a sequential number at the first formal exploitation
point, showing the nationality of the capturing force by national letters
prescribed in STANAG 1059. Furthermore, the capturing unit will report the
following information:

Time the document was captured, recorded as a date-time group (DTG).
Place the document was captured, including the six- or eight-digit coordinate
and a description of the location of capture.
Identity of the source from whom the document was taken, if applicable.
Summary of the circumstances under which the document was found.
Identity of the capturing unit.

At each echelon, starting with the capturing unit, steps are taken to ensure
that CED accountability is maintained during document evacuation. To establish
accountability, the responsible element inventories all incoming CEDs. Thorough
accountability procedures at each echelon ensure that CEDs are not lost. To
record each processing step as it occurs helps correct mistakes in CED

processing. Accountability is accomplished by anyone who captures, evacuates,
processes, or handles CEDs. All CEDs should have captured document tags, and all
captured document tags should be completely filled out. An incoming batch of
documents includes a transmittal document (see the illustration 4-2) When a
batch is received without a transmittal, the interrogation element contacts the
forwarding unit and obtains a list of document serial numbers. The interrogation
element records all trace actions in its journal. Accountability includes
inventorying the CEDs as they arrive, initiating any necessary trace actions,
and maintaining the captured document log. Whenever intelligence derived from a
CED is included in a unit or information intelligence reports, the
identification letters and number of the document concerned are quoted to avoid
false confirmation. All CEDs are shipped with any associated documents.
An inventory of incoming CEDs is conducted initially by comparing the CED to the
captured document tag and to accompanying transmittal documents. This comparison
identifies any-

Transmittals that list missing CEDs.
Document tags not attached to CEDs.
CEDs not attached to document tags.
CEDs not listed on the accompanying transmittal documents.

Trace Actions
When necessary, the receiving unit initiates a CED trace action. Trace actions
are initiated on all missing CEDs, captured document tags, and on all
information missing from the captured document tag. Trace actions are initiated
by first contacting the element from which the documents were received. This
corrective action can be completed swiftly if that unit's captured document log
was filled out completely. If necessary the trace action continues to other
elements that have handled the document. If a captured document tag is
unavailable from elements that have previously handled the CED, the document
examiner fills out a captured document tag for the document using whatever
information is available. Attempts to obtain missing CEDs are critical because
of the information those CEDs might contain.

The captured document log is a record of what an element knows about a CED (see
the following illustration of a captured document log). After trace actions are
initiated, the CEDs are entered in the captured document log. The captured
document log, in general, must contain the entries listed below:

File number (a sequential number to identify the order of entry).
DTG the CED was received at this element.
Document serial number of the captured document tag.
Identification number of the transmittal document accompanying the CED.
Full designation of the unit that forwarded the CED.
Name and rank of individual that received the CED.
DTG and place of capture (as listed on the captured document tag).
Identity of the capturing units (as listed on the captured document tag).
Document category (after screening).
Description of the CED (at a minimum the description includes the original
language; number of pages; type of document such as map, letter, photograph,
and so forth; and the enemy's identification number for the CED, if
Destination and identification number of the outgoing transmittal.
Remarks (other information that can assist the unit in identifying the CED to
include processing codes. These are set up by local SOP to denote all actions
taken with the document while at the element, including SALUTE reports,
translations, reproductions, or return of the CED to the source from whom it
was taken).

Accountability for the CED should be established at each echelon once the

actions described above have been accomplished.

Technical Documents
A technical document (TECHDOC) is a document that pertains to equipment of any
type. A captured TECHDOC should be evacuated with the equipment with which it
was captured. If this is not possible, a cover sheet should be attached, with
the word "TECHDOC" written in large letters across the top. The capture data is
listed the same as other CEDs, and the TECHDOC cover sheet should contain a
detailed description of the equipment captured with the document. If possible,
photographs of the equipment should be taken, including a measurement guide, and
evacuated with the TECHDOC.
Communications and Cryptographic Documents
CEDs containing communications or cryptographic information are handled as
secret material and are evacuated through secure channels to the tecl..nical
control and analysis element (TCAE).
As incoming CEDs are accounted for, the exploitation phase for intelligence
information begins. Exploitation includes-

CED screening to determine potential intelligence value.
Extracting pertinent information from the CED.
Reporting the extracted information.

CEDs are processed and exploited as soon as possible within the constraints of
the unit's mission. The main mission of some units is the exploitation of human
sources rather than the translation of CEDs; therefore, manpower constraints may
limit the time that can be devoted to translation. However, the translation of
CEDs is necessary at any echelon where interrogators and translators are
assigned. It is important, therefore, that interrogation elements possess
qualified personnel to provide the translation support required. Intelligence
units ensure that there is no delay in the exploitation of CEDs. Qualified
personnel or document copying facilities should be available to handle CEDs, and
personnel should be available to exploit the volume or type of documents
concerned. If not, the documents are forwarded immediately to the next higher
echelon. Copying availability is determined by the echelon in question, as well
as mission and mobility considerations.
Document exploitation begins when personnel are available for document
exploitation operations. CEDs are screened for information of immediate
intelligence interest; and as each document is screened, it is assigned one of
the four following category designations. The category assigned determines the
document's priority for exploitation and evacuation.
Document Categories
Category A. Category A documents contain SALUTE-reportable information, are time
sensitive, contain significant intelligence information, and may be critical to
the successful accomplishment of friendly courses of action. Significant
intelligence topics include the enemy's OB, new weapons or equipment on the

battlefield, and may contain information that indicates a significant change in
the enemy's capabilities or intentions. When a document is identified as
category A, the document examiner immediately ceases screening operations and
submits a SALUTE report of the critical information. from the document. The
examiner then resumes screening operations.
Category B. Category B documents contain information pertaining to enemy
cryptographic or communications systems. Once a document is identified as
category B, it is considered to be classified secret. This is done to limit the
number of people having knowledge of either the capture or its contents. A
category B document may contain SALUTE-reportable information, thereby requiring
immediate exploitation.

In every case, category B documents will be transferred through secure channels
to the TCAE as soon as possible.
Category C. Category C documents contain no SALUTE-reportable or timesensitive
information but do contain information that is of general intelligence value
that does not indicate significant changes in the enemy's capabilities or
intentions. A category C document may be of interest or of value to other
agencies. When identified as category C, it requires exploitation, regardless of
the content.
Category D. Category D documents appear to contain only information that is of
no intelligence value. Documents are not identified as category D until after a
thorough examination by document translation specialists at the highest command
interested. This is accomplished at EAC. Category D documents are to be disposed
of as directed by the appropriate authority.
Special Document Handling
Technical Documents. TECHDOCs, containing information associated with specific
items of enemy equipment, are given special handling to expedite their
exploitation and evacuation. TECHDOCs are handled as category A CEDs until
screened by technical intelligence personnel. Generally, TECHDOCs accompany the
captured equipment until the intelligence exploitation is completed. TECHDOCs
include maintenance handbooks, operational manuals, and drawings.
Air Force-Related Documents. Documents of any category that are captured from
crashed enemy aircraft, particularly if they are related to enemy antiaircraft
defense or enemy air control and reporting systems, are transmitted to the
nearest Air Force headquarters without delay.
Maps and Charts of Enemy Forces. Captured maps and charts, containing any
operational graphics, are evacuated immediately to the supporting all-source
analysis center. Captured maps and charts without graphics may be transmitted to
the topographical intelligence section attached to corps.
Navy-Related Documents. Documents taken from ships (code books, call signs,
frequency tables, identification symbols, and so forth) are forwarded without
delay to the nearest Navy headquarters.
Recording Document Category
The category assigned to each CED is recorded as part of the captured document
log entry for that CED. The entry includes a brief description of the CED. This

Identifies the CED by type (sound recording, written material, painting,
engraving, imagery, and so forth).
Identifies the language used in the CED.
Specifies the physical construction of the CED (typed, printed, handwritten,
tape cassette, photographs, film, and so forth).
Gives some indication of the size (number of pages, rolls of film, cassette,
and so forth).

Screening at Higher Echelons
CEDs can be recategorized during screening conducted at higher echelons. The
information may have become outdated, or the echelon currently exploiting the
document may have different intelligence requirements.
Once a CED has been screened, the document must be exploited. The translator
must be able to translate the document. For anyone else to gain benefit from the
document translation, it must be clearly and accurately written (typed or
handwritten). Also, as part of interrogation duties, the interrogator may have
previously translated a document by sight to help gain a source's cooperation.
Types of Translations
Full Translation. A full translation ls one in which the entire document is
translated. It is very manpower- and time-intensive, especially for lengthy or
technical documents. It is unlikely that many full translations will be
performed at corps or below. Even when dealing with category A documents, it may

not be necessary to translate the entire document to gain the information it
Extract Translation. An extract translation is one in which only a portion of
the document is translated. For instance, a technical intelligence analyst may
decide that a few paragraphs in the middle of a 600-page helicopter maintenance
manual merit translation and a full translation of the manual is not necessary.
Therefore, he would request an extract translation of the portion of the text in
which he has an interest.
Summary Translation. A translator begins a summary translation by reading the
entire document. The translator then summarizes the main points of information
instead of rendering a full translation or an extract translation. This type of
translation requires that a translator have more analytical abilities. The
translator must balance the need for complete exploitation of the document
against the time available in combat operations. A summary translation may also
be used by translators working in languages in which they have not been formally
trained. For instance, a Russian linguist may not be able to accurately deliver
a full translation of a Bulgarian language document. However, he can probably
render a usable summary of the information it contains.
Translation Reports
Except for SALUTE reports, all information resulting from document exploitation
activities will be reported in a translation report (see the following
illustration for a sample translation report). After all required SALUTE reports
have been submitted, the translator will prepare any required translation
reports. CEDs that contain information of intelligence value that was not SALUTE
reported are the subject of translation reports. Translation reports are
prepared on all category C CEDs and include portions of category A, TECHDOCs,
and category B CEDs not SALUTE reported.

Priorities. The priority for the preparation of translation reports is-

Category A.


Category B.

Category C.
Format. A translation report should contain the following information:
Destination. The element to which the report will be forwarded.
Originator. The element which prepared the report.
Date of preparation.
Report number as designated by local SOP
Document number taken from the captured document tag.
Document description including number of pages, type of document, and enemy
identification number.
Original language of the CED.
DTG document was received at the element preparing the report.
DTG document was captured.
Place document was captured.
Circumstances under which the document was captured.
Identity of capturing unit.
Rank and full name of the translator
Remarks for clarification or explanation, including the identification of the
portions of the document translated in an extract translation.
Classification and downgrading instructions, according to AR 3805.

Dissemination and Records -
Recording in Captured Document Log. The translator records each exploitation
step taken in the captured document log. Transmission of SALUTE and translation
reports is entered in the element's journal.
Reports Dissemination and Records. At least two copies are prepared for each
SALUTE and translation report. One copy is placed in the interrogation element's

files. The other accompanies the CED when it is evacuated. When the CED cannot
be fully exploited, a copy of the CED should be made and retained. The original
CED is forwarded through evacuation channels. Even when copies of an unexploited
CED cannot be made, the original CED is still forwarded through evacuation
channels without delay.
For friendly forces to benefit from a document to the greatest extent possible,
send CEDs to the element most qualified to exploit them as quickly as possible.
Information gained from a CED is frequently time sensitive. If a document is not
sent to the element most capable of exploiting it, time will be lost. Any time.
lost in exploiting the document may reduce or even negate the value of the
information. The CED evacuation procedures in use at any element must ensure
that documents are shipped to their proper destinations in a timely manner.
CEDs are normally evacuated from echelon to echelon through the intelligence
organizational chain. The capturing unit evacuates the CEDs to the first
intelligence section, usually the battalion. S2. The battalion evacuates them to
brigade, brigade to division, division to corps, and then, to EAC. Depending on
the type of documents they may, then, be evacuated to the National Center for
Document Exploitation. Take care to protect the document from weather, soil, and
wear. Interrogators and translators can exploit CEDs at every echelon and will
make an attempt to exploit CEDs within their expertise and technical support
Some CEDs are evacuated to different elements based upon the information
contained and the type of document concerned. Direct evacuation to an element
outside the chain of command takes place at the lowest practical echelon. The
previous guidelines, discussed in evacuation procedures, are followed when
dealing with documents requiring special handling.
When transportation assets are limited, CEDs are evacuated according to
priority. The priority is the category assigned to the CED. All category A CEDs
will be evacuated first, TECHDOCs will be considered category A CEDs until
examined by the captured material exploitation center (CMEC), followed in order
by categories B, C, and D.
Category B documents are evacuated to the TCAE, which maintains a signals
intelligence (SIGINT) and EW data base. Category B documents, pertaining to
communications equipment, are duplicated if possible, and the duplicate
documents are sent to the CMEC.
CEDs that are not evacuated are held until the next transportation arrives.
These remaining CEDs are combined with any other CEDs of the same category that
have arrived and have been processed in the meantime. When determining
evacuation priorities, interrogators consider all CEDs that are ready for
evacuation. Lower priority CEDs, no matter how old, are never evacuated ahead of
those with higher priority. A package of documents contains documents of only
one category. All unscreened CEDs are handled as category C documents, but they
are not packaged with screened category C documents. CEDs in a single package
must have the same destination.
When CEDs are evacuated from any echelon, a document transmittal is used (see
the following illustration for a sample CED transmittal). A separate document
transmittal is prepared for each group of CEDs to be evacuated. When second
copies of category B CEDs are being sent to a technical intelligence element, a
separate document transmittal is required. The transmittal identification number
is recorded in the captured document log as part of the entry for each CED. The
exact format for a document transmittal is a matter of local SOP, but it should

contain the information listed below:

The identity of the element to which the CEDs are to be evacuated.
The identity of the unit forwarding the CEDs.
Whether or not the CEDs in the package have been screened and the screening
category. (If not screened, NA is circled.)
Whether or not the CEDs in the package have been screened and the screening
category. (If not screened, NA is circled.)
A list of the document serial numbers of the CEDs in the package.


All CEDs being evacuated must be accompanied with the appropriate-
TECHDOC cover sheet.
SECRET cover sheet on category B documents.
Translation reports and hard-copy SALUTE reports accompanying translated
Translation reports and hard-copy SALUTE repots accompanying translated

The preparations for further CED evacuation begin with verifying the document
serial numbers by comparing the entry in the captured document log with the
entry on the captured document tag attached to each CED. Once all CEDs are
present, copies of all reports derived from the CEDs are assembled. A copy of
all SALUTE and translation reports is placed with the CEDs that were the sources
of those reports. Whenever possible, all category B CEDs and their captured
document tags should be copied.
CEDs are first grouped according to their assigned screening code. Personnel
must be careful when sorting the CEDs to ensure that no CED is separated from
its associated documents. These large groupings can then be broken down into
smaller groups. Each of these smaller groupings consists of CEDs that were-

Captured by the same unit.
Captured in the same place.
Captured on the same day at the same time.
Received at the interrogation element at the same time.

The documents captured with a source play a very important role in the
interrogation process and can contain reportable information the same as with a
CED obtained on the battlefield. During source screening operations, for
instance, documents can indicate that a specific source may have information
pertaining to the commander's intelligence requirements. The interrogator uses
various pieces of information in forming his interrogation plan. Documents
captured with the source may provide the key to the approach necessary to gain,
the source's cooperation.
Guidelines for the disposition of the source's documents and valuables are set
by international agreement and discussed in more detail in AR 190-8 and FM
19-40. Additionally, one way the source's trust and continued cooperation can be
gained is through fair and equitable handling of his personal possessions. In
some instances, such treatment can make it more likely that the source will
cooperate during interrogation questicning. Furthermore, fair treatment by the
interrogator and the holding area personnel can ease tensions in the confinement
Guidelines for the disposition of the source's documents and valuables are set
by international agreement and discussed in more detail in AR 190?8 and FM
19-40. Additionally, one way the source's trust and continued cooperation can be
gained is through fair and equitable handling of his personal possessions. In
some instances, such treatment can make it more likely that the source will
cooperate during interrogation questioning. Furthermore, fair treatment by the
interrogator and the holding area personnel can ease tensions in the confinement

The disposition of documents captured with a source is normally a function of
the military police and other holding area personnel. Because of their language
capabilities, the interrogators at the compound will probably be required to
provide assistance and guidance, The military police sign for all documents
taken from sources; and to ensure proper handling and most expeditious
disposition of these documents, the interrogation element should sign for any
documents captured with a source. When the interrogation element assumes control
of documents, they process them according to established procedures.
When documents are captured with a source, the immediate reaction is to take
them away from him so that he cannot destroy them. In general, this is good, but
there is one major exception. Under no circumstances is a source's
identification card to be taken from him.
When documents are taken from a source, it is necessary to ensure tha source
from whom they were taken can be identified. The easiest way to accomplish this
is with the source's captive tag (see standardized captive tag in Appendix D).
The bottom portion of the tag is designed to be used for marking equipment or
documents. Three possible actions may be taken with documents captured with a
source. The documents may be confiscated, impounded, or returned to the source.
Documents confiscated from a source are taken away with no intention of
returning them. Official documents, except identification documents, are
confiscated and appropriately evacuated. The intelligence value of the document
should be weighed against the document's support in the interrogation of the
source. Category A documents require exploitation and should be copied. One copy
should be translated and exploited separately, and the other copy should be
evacuated with the source. If copying facilities are not available, a decision
should be made on whether to evacuate the document with the source or evacuate
it separately. Category B CEDs should be evacuated to the TCAE for appropriate
exploitation. Category C official documents can best be used in the
interrogation of the source. Therefore, these LEDs and category D official
documents should be evacuated with the source.
Impounded CEDs are taken away with the intention of returning them at a later
time. When a document is impounded, the source must be given a receipt. The
receipt must contain a list of the items impounded and the legible name, rank,
and unit of the person issuing the receipt. All personal effects, including

monies and other valuables, will be safeguarded. An inventory of personal
effects that have been impounded will be entered on DA Form 4237-R (Appendix B).
Also, DA Form 1132 will be completed and signed by the officer in charge or
authorized representative. A copy will be provided the source. Further
procedures for the handling of personal effects are provided in AR 190-8.
Returned CEDs are usually personal in nature, taken only for inspection and
information of interest, and immediately given back to the source. Personal
documents belonging to a source will be returned to the source after examination
in accordance with the Geneva Convention. Copies of such papers may be made and
forwarded if considered appropriate. An identification document must be returned

to the source.
In a fast-moving tactical situation, it is possible that documents captured with
sources will not be handled expediously. Final disposition of these documents
may not be made until the source is evacuated at least as far as the corps
holding area. Some documents captured with a source will aid in the .
interrogation of the source. Others, particularly category A documents, should
be copied and evacuated separately. One copy can then remain with the source to

aid in the interrogation, and the other can be translated and exploited
separately. This makes it particularly important for the capturing unit to
correctly identify the documents captured with the source. This is more easily
done when the interrogation element rather than the military police element
signs for the documents captured with sources element rather than the military
police element signs for the documents captured with sources.
For more efficient exploitation of CEDs and sources, documents captured with a
source are normally evacuated with the source. A document of great significance
may be evacuated ahead of the source, but a reproduction should be made and kept
with the source. If reproduction is not possible, the captured document tags
should be annotated as to where the document was sent. Significant documents
such as category A documents and TECHDOCs, Category B documents, maps, charts,
and Air Force- and Navy-related documents are evacuated directly.
The evacuation of documents captured with a source follows the same
accountability procedures as with documents found on the battlefield. The
capturing unit prepares a captive tag listing details pertaining to the source
and the place and circumstances of capture. The bottom portion is used to list
documents captured with the source.
Documents captured with a source are subject to the same screening and
exploitation procedures as those found on the battlefield. These documents are
categorized as category A, B, C, or D. Category A documents have SALUTE
reportable information extracted and are copied, if possible. A copy can then be
used to aid in the exploitation of the source, and the other copy is sent
forward for prompt exploitation and translation. Category B documents should be
treated as secret and evacuated to the TCAE. Category C documents are exploited.
A category C document may also require copying and evacuation. Official
documents should be evacuated through document evacuation channels. If they
would aid in the interrogation cf a source, personal documents may require
similar copying.

Chapter 5
Direct and Supervise Interrogation Operations
The direction and supervision of interro- gation operations are critical to the
success ful performance of the interrogation ele ment's mission. Direction and
supervision are the responsibility of the senior interro gator. These

. responsibilities fall into three categories: Advising, coordinating, and
directing actual interrogation operations. FM 34-80 provides guidance for
brigade and battalion IEW operations, and FM 34-25 provides guidance for corps
IEW opera tions. The supervisory duties discussed in this chapter are-

Advice and assistance.
Prepare and move to deployment site.
Establish a site for interrogation operations.
Supervise the interrogation process.
Supervise the CED exploitation cycle.
Supervise administrative tasks.

The senior interrogator coordinates and provides input to both the parent MI
unit's S2 and S3 and the supported echelon's intel ligence staff. This includes
reviewing source evacuation plans and estimates, as well as advising on the
capabilities and limitations of the interrogation element. He must be able to
discuss and provide advice on the interrogation element's deployment in order to
most effectively support the intelligence collection effort. To accomplish this,
the senior interrogator must be familiar with the intelligence annex to the
supported echelon's operations order (OPORD). In addition, the senior
interrogator must con stantly coordinate with the division or corps G2, the
interrogation teams, and the intelligence staffs of supported echelons. This is
done preferably through liaison visits to these elements. This coordination is
critical to ensure that information and information updates are passed to the
inter rogation teams and, in turn, are passed to OB personnel in an orderly,
accurate, and timely manner. This ensures access to important information which
may become available between liaison visits.
The intelligence annex of the supported unit's OPORD indicates the exact
location of the holding area. Once this is known, the senior interrogator
ensures the interrogation team moves to that location. Interrogation elements
deploy with little more than their personal weapons and equipment. Assigned
vehicles and radios may not be sufficient to move the entire element;
especially, when the element is deploying to more than one site. The senior
interrogator makes arrangements for transportation and determines when it will
be provided. Interrogation elements are not equipped for small unit movements.
Unaccompanied deployment is a dangerous procedure and should be avoided. When
this cannot be done, the following steps must be considered to minimize danger
during movement:

Confirm the element's exact destination.
Obtain a safe route from the supported command, if this is not possible, then,
select the rouge offering the best protective terrain.
Identify checkpoint locations along the route. If checkpoints are not
available, radio contact on a periodic basis should be established with the
parent MI unit.
Obtain current call signs, frequencies, and passwords for unit areas that will
be crossed during the movement.
Coordinate with all affected units. The safest method for deploying the
interrogation element is to have them accompany one or more of the supported
echelon's subordinate units as they deploy. This method should be used
whenever possible. When it is used, the senior interrogator must determine
exactly when the element must arrive at the assembly area, the element's
position within the march order, and what call signs, frequencies, and

passwords will be used during the movement.
Once the interrogation element has arrived at the designated holding area, the
senior interrogator establishes a site for interrogation operations. The senior
interrogator coordinates with the military police to ensure that the site is set
up to enable operations between the interrogation operations and the holding
area. He also contacts the commander responsible for the operational area. This
commander authorizes a specific location close to the holding area and within
its secure perimeter as the site for interrogation operations. The interrogation
element's mission does not include performing its own perimeter security. The
senior interrogator also contacts the officer in charge of the holding area and
coordinates the following:

Screening site. A specific site for screening sources must be selected and
agreed upon. The site must enable the screener to observe the sources while
they are inprocessed ani segregated. The site, however, must be shielded from
the direct view of, and far enough away from the sources so they cannot see,
hear, or overhear screening conversations.
Medical support. Procedures must be established to verify that any sick or
wounded personnel have been treated and released by authorized medical
personnel for interrogation.
Guards. Arrangements must be made for guards to escort each source selected
for interrogation. The guard should accompany the source throughout the
interrogation process.
Movement. Routes and procedures for movement must be arranged for
transportation of the source from the holding area to the interrogation
operations area.
Evacuation. Evacuation procedures should have been previously established.
These procedures should be discussed so that all concerned are familiar with
time constraints and procedures of exactly when and who should be evacuated.
Communications. Arrangements for receiving and transmitting message traffic
must be made with the C-E officer. These arrangements must provide for primary
and alternate electrical and courier channels.
Site preparation. An interrogation element must contain as a minimum, an
operations and administrative area as well as specific areas to conduct
interrogations. If the element will be exploiting CEDs, an area must also be
designated for this activity.

The area, for the conduct of individual interrogations, is established in such a
way as to ensure that interrogations taking place in one area cannot be heard by
personnel in another area. At a minimum, the interrogations area, whether a tent
or a building, must have enough space to accommodate the interrogator, source,
guard, and an interpreter, if needed. Each area should have a table and at least
three chairs. A light is required for night operations. Field expedient
replacements for this equipment are used as necessary.
The senior interrogator ensures that the interrogation process is started
immediately upon receipt of the source. This process is continuous and can
become confused if the senior interrogator does not closely supervise the timely
and orderly conduct of each step in the process. The three steps in the process
are screening, interrogation, and reporting.
Screening determines who will be interrogated on a priority basis and in many
cases how many times a source will be interrogated. For this reason, the
successful accomplishment of the intelligence collection effort depends on
qualified screeners. The senior interrogator designates his most qualified
interrogators as screeners. He should not assign himself to screening
operations. This cannot always be avoided, however, but must be kept to a

minimum. He is required to supervise all steps of the interrogation process.

The senior interrogator ensures that sources are assigned for interrogation
according to the screening results. This method of assigning assures that the
highest probability of obtaining the maximum amount of pertinent information
within the time available is chosen.
The senior interrogator, then, assigns his subordinates to interrogate screened
sources. He does this by comparing information gained during the screening
process to the abilities (linguistic skills, technical expertise, and special
knowledge) of his subordinate interrogators. He then selects the interrogator
best suited to conduct the interrogation of a particular source.
At times, a situation will occur in which none of the available interrogators
speaks the target language well enough to conduct an interrogation. When this
occurs the senior interrogator coordinates with S1/G1 for procurement of native
interpreters. The senior interrogator maintains a list of available
interpreters. He compares this list with the qaalifications of his subordinate
interrogators and the information listed on the screening report. Based on this
comparison, the senior interrogator can then assign the best qualified
interpreter and interrogator. Interrogators must monitor interpreters
periodically to ensure their performance is according to the standards
established by the senior interrogator.
The senior interrogator ensures that all reports are prepared and submitted in
an accurate and timely manner. SALUTE reports must be generated immediately upon
identification of information which satisfies an intelligence requirement. Other
reports which are generated by an interrogation must be correctly and accurately
prepared and submitted upon completion of the interrogation.
The senior interrogator ensures that all reports generated in the interrogation
process are transmitted within established time frames. Transmission procedures
and time frames should have already been discussed and verified with the site
communications officer upon arrival to the holding area.
The senior interrogator ensures that the three steps of CED processing:
accountability, exploitation, and evacuation are correctly and rapidly conducted

(see Chapter 4).
The senior interrogator ensures that three major functions are accurate and kept
updated. These are maintaining the =MAP, updating the collection mission, and
maintaining the Army files.
He ensures that the SITMAP is kept updated by posting all known enemy units and
activities within the supported unit's area of operations, according to the
intelligence summary (INTSUM), intelligence report (INTREP), periodic
intelligence report (PERINTREP), and other intelligence reports. In addition, he
ensures any 'dispositions obtained through interrogations are posted to the
SITMAP as accurately as the information will allow.
Through previously discussed liaison visits and established communications, he
ensures that all subordinate interrogators are kept abreast of any changes to

the collection mission.
He ensures that files haVe been estab lished for any documents, reference
materials, and blank forms that the interrogation element has in its possession.
The same files must be generated for any documents, reference materials, and
blank forms that may be acquired or generated during day-to-day interrogation
operations. He ensures that these files are established, maintained, and
disposed of according to AR 25-400-2.

Chapter 6

Operational Environment

Interrogation operations are conducted within the context of the supported

unit's day-to-day combat operations: This chapter will describe the interaction

of interrogation elements with the echelons they support.


Interrogation assets are not organic to echelons below division except armored

cavalry regiments (ACRs) and separate brigades. At every echelon, division and

higher, interrogators are assigned to the MI unit supporting that echelon. MI

unit commanders are responsible for these assets and should become personally

involved in two key decisions affecting interrogators:

Which collection target, sources, or CEDs will be given command priority.

Where interrogators will be deployed within the area of operations.
As previously noted, interrogators are trained to exploit sources avid CEDs. This
allows the all-source collection manager three exploitation options for the
interrogation assets. They may exploit sources alone, CED alone, or attempt to
exploit both simultaneously. In the past it was assumed that interrogators could
accomplish the dual collection mission no matter what type of combat operations
were being supported. This may no longer be true. Unit manning, coupled with the
amount of CEDs and sources, may prevent exploitation of both sources and CEDs
Combat since World War II indicates that the volume of CEDs alone will overwhelm
an interrogation element the size of that being projected for a heavy division.
A flow of CEDs similar to that encountered in Grenada will supply enough targets
to keep a light division's interrogators busy around-the-clock just screening
and categorizing the CEDs. Any attempt to conduct deeper exploitation would
result in a tremendous evacuation delay and the end of timely reporting.
Experience indicates that a division involved in a high intensity conflict may
have to process between 525 and 5,300 sources per week. While these figures are
estimates, they demonstrate the inability of a division's own interrogators to
simultaneously exploit both sources and CEDs. Divisions may receive additional
interrogation assets from corps, depending on their mission. Prior planning must
be conducted to establish the availability of these assets, and their deployment
within the division.
The density of interrogation assets and command emphasis on the collection
effort determines mission requirements. The feasibility of a dual collection
mission may also be the result of initial IPE by the commander's intelligence
staff. If an echelon cannot conduct a dual collection effort, interrogation of
sources has traditionally received the priority for two important reasons:

The greater intelligence potential of a source.

The rate at which people forget detailed information.
An individual's value system is easier to bypass immediately after undergoing a
significant traumatic experience. Capture, and the circumstances surrounding it,
is significantly traumatic for most sources. Many former Vietnam prisoners of
war indicated that a period of extreme disorientation occurred immediately after
capture. Capture thrust them into a totally foreign environment over which they
had no control. The standards of behavior and conduct which they had previously
accepted and lived by were of no use to them during this period. Most of them
survived this initial period by clinging to very basic values (love of family
and loyalty to friends or comrades). Human beings are very adaptable, however,
and this initial vulnerability passes rather quickly. An individual's
established values begin to assert themselves again within a day or two. When
this happens, much of an individual's susceptibility to interrogation is gone.
Memory stores information in two areas: The five senses constantly transmit
information to the brain's short-term memory. This data is stored there
temporarily and then shifted to the brain's long-term memory. The time at which

this transfer takes place varies widely, but research shows that a great amount
of detail is lost during that transfer. Studies conducted on classroom learning
indicate that even though students know information stressed in class is
important, by the next day most of the information is forgotten. The percentage
of information lost beyond recall varies from study to study, but a 70-percent
figure is a conservative estimate. Much of the information of value to the
interrogator is information that the source is not even aware he has. Although
no research data is available in this area, it is reasonable to assume that this
type of information will be lost even faster than classroom learning.
CEDs, while not affected by memory loss, are often time sensitive and are
screened for possible exploitation as quickly as possible. Interrogators were
given the CED exploitation mission because of their linguistic ability. This
makes printed and typed material readily exploitable, but many handwritten
documents are illegible. Information contained in undeveloped imagery and
recordings is inaccessible to most interrogation elements. The intelligence
value of painted, drawn, or engraved material cannot be exploited by many
elements unless it is accomplished by explanatory information in writing. An
example of this would be an overlay prepared without map data, registration
points, or identifying terrain features. In spite of these limitations, an
estimated 90 percent of all the information contained in CEDs can be exploited.
The following illustration shows a comparison along a time line of the amounts
of information available to the interrogator from the two collection targets.
The comparison assumes that the CEDs and the sources initially had the same
amount of information, and that it was of equal intelligence value. Bear in mind
that the figures used are conservative estimates, and that the time between the
two target types might be even greater between 24 and 72 hours. The percentage
of information available from sources drops sharply during the first 24 hours
after capture. This represents the rapid loss of what sources would consider to
be insignificant details. A slower drop in the percentage begins at 48 hours to
represent the resurgence of established value systems. This resurgence makes it
harder for interrogators to obtain what information the source still remembers.
The supported echelon's intelligence officer determines the guidelines for
priority of exploitation. The commander's intelligence needs and the G2's or
S2's estimate of the enemy's intentions dictate the extent to which these
guidelines can be applied. Exploitation priorities are reviewed and changed when

Interrogation assets are not mobile enough tc be quickly shifted in response to
new developments. The initial deployment of these assets are guided by the
exploitation priority established by the commander. Operations are conducted at
an echelon that will allow interrogators the best opportunity to satisfy their
assigned collection mission. When making the deployment decision, the following

should also be considered:
Number of interrogators available.
Type and intensity of anticipated combat operations.
Support available at subordinate units.

The number of interrogators available limit the number of deployment sites that
can be used. MI commanders at corps consider how many interrogators will be
available for interrogation operations after augmentation has been provided to
subordinate divisions. The number of interrogators also plays a key role in
deciding the level of intense or sustained collection operations they can

Intense collection employs all available interrogators with little or no
provision for them to rest. The major disadvantage of intense collection is that

these interrogators become exhausted quickly. Interrogations amount to prolonged
conversations under extreme stress. Once the available interrogators are

exhausted, collection stops until they recover or additional assets arrive. A

severe decrease in interrogation effectiveness can be expected to begin between

12 and 18 hours after the onset of intense collection. Eighteen hours should be

considered the maximum period possible for intense collection. This kind of

all-out effort can be justified when critical information must be obtained or

confirmed quickly to forestall a major disaster. Similar problems can be

expected during intense CED exploitation. Sustained operations can be maintained

for indefinite periods of time. They also allow the commander some rested

interrogators to use on a contingency basis in a different location. The

disadvantage of sustained collection is that operations are slower, exploiting

fewer sources over a given period of time.

The last important factor that should be considered in making deployment

decisions is the area in which operations are to be conducted. This area must be

capable of providing the support required by the interrogation element. This

suppor,:. includes-

Priority access to reliable means of secure communications.

Adequate shelter and security.

A flow of CEDs and sources to exploit.


The MI unit commander retains overall responsibility for the interrogators

assigned to his unit. The manner in which these interrogators are tasked depends

on how the MI unit is task organized for combat. If interrogators are deployed

in general support (GS) of the division, the MI battalion commander tasks them

through his S3 and the battalion tactical operations center (TOC). If

interrogators are deployed in direct support (DS) of a division's subordinate

units, they are tasked by the commander of that unit through his S2. If attached

to an IEW company, team tasking is directed through the team commander. The

officers responsible for tasking interrogation elements ensure that the

following steps are accomplished:

Collection missions that reflect the capabilities and limitations of

interrogators are assigned.

Interrogation reports are integrated with information provided by other

collectors during the IPB process.

Copies of the INTSUM, INTREP, PERINTREP, daily intelligence summary (DISUM),

and supplementary intelligence report (SUPINTREP) are disseminated to the

interrogation element as they are published.

Close contact is maintained with the interrogation element.

Once the IPB process has produced initial results, all identified intelligence
gaps are addressed by detailed collection requirements. Any PIR and IR
requesting information that interrogators can collect are identified. The PIR
and IR are then consolidated into a collection mission and assigned to the
interrogation element. The assigned collection mission is tailored according to
the capabilities and limitations of interrogators (see Chapter 2). Tailoring
collection missions ensures that all intelligence gaps are covered and avoids

unnecessary duplication.
Collection missions are tailored and assigned by the collection management and

dissemination (CM&D) section subordinate to the G2 at corps and division. The
same functions are performed at brigade and battalion by the battlefield
information control center (BICC). These elements ensure that the assigned

collection mission is passed by secure means, through established channels, to
the interrogation element. In addition to PIR and IR, the assigned collection

mission includes-

Specific events about which information is required. ,

Time frames during which the events must have occurred to be of value.

The date on which the information will no longer be of value.

Channels to be used to report the information collected.

Higher, lower, and adjacent units authorized to receive copies of reported

The CM&D section or the BICC must ensure that information reported by the
interrogation element is integrated with information collected by other
intelligence disciplines during the IPB process. One major value of
interrogation operations is that information obtained can cue other collection
systems. Mission statements obtained from sources often identify general
locations that imagery intelligence (IMINT) or SIGINT collectors can further
exploit to produce targeting data.
Intelligence is used by interrogators as a source of prepared and control
questions (see Chapter 3). The CM&D section or BICC ensures that current copies
of the INTSUM, INTREP, PERINTREP, SUPINTREP, DISUM, and any other intelligence
reports are provided to the interrogation element. Intelligerce is also used to
revise and refine the objectives of interrogation operations, to update the
element's OB data base, and to keep the elements threat SITMAP current.
The CM&D section (through the MI battalion TOC) or the BICC maintains close
contact with the interrogation element. This contact allows a two-way flow of
communication. The CM&D section or BICC needs the contact to accomplish the
collection mission, IPB interrogation, and intelligence dissemination. They also
use the contact to revise the interrogation element's collection mission as
required. The interrogation element requires the contact to ensure that it
receives current guidance, direction, and assistance in solving collection
Successful interrogation operations require support from a number of elements
within their echelon of assignment, including all of the major staff
organizations. These elements are collectively responsible for the planning that
creates the overall environment for interrogators. The intelligence staff's (G2
or S2) direct contribution to interrogation operations has already been
discussed. Its general responsibilities are outlined below, along with those of
other staff and support elements.
The G1 and S1 are responsible for: supervising the medical support furnished to
sources, maintaining a list (by language and proficiency) of qualified linguists
within their command, and coordinating with the G5 for procurement and payment
of other interpreters and translators needed to perform both intelligence and
nonintelligence duties. The G1 and S1 ensure that the echelon's operations plan
contains complete provisions for source handling and evacuation. This plan must
satisfy the interests of all other staff officers, as well as STANAG 2044 (see
Appendix A for an extract). Its provisions must cover the following principles:

Humane treatment of all sources.
Prompt evacuation from the combat zone.
Opportunities to interrogate sources.
Integration of procedures for the evacuation, control, and administration of
sources with other combat support and combat service support (CSS) operations

(through the provost marshal).
Training for all troops on the provisions of international agreements and
regulations relating to sources.

The G2 and S2 are responsible for supervising appropriate censorship activities

relating to sources. They are also responsible for
Projecting source cature flows.
Determining the number of interpreters and translators needed to perform

intelligence duties.
Controlling the procedures used to process and grant clearances to the

interpreters and translators who need them.
The G3 and S3 are responsible for operations, plans, organization, and training.
Where military police assets are not available, or not sufficient, they are
responsible for obtaining, organizing, and supervising the employment of
additional personnel as guards. It is also responsible for

Training of military police and guard personnel.
Providing G2 and S2 with details of planned operations.
Planning and supervising all PSYOP activities in support of tactical
Evaluating, in coordination with the G2 and the G5, enemy PYSOP efforts and
the effectiveness of friendly PSYOP on target groups.

The G4 and S4 are responsible for the storage and maintenance of supplies and
equipment needed by subordinate units to conduct source handling operations.
They are responsible for delivering supplies and equipment to subordinate units
as they are needed. They also supervise-

Acquisition of real estate and the construction of source holding area
facilities in the communications zone (COMMZ).
Collection and distribution of captured enemy supplies. This is coordinated
with the intelligence and operations staffs.
Procurement and distribution of rations to source holding areas. Captured
enemy rations will be used to the greatest extent possible.
Determination of requirements for use of source labor for the logistical
support needed in source handling operations.
Provide logistical support to interpreter personnel.

The G5 and S5 are responsible for civil affairs (CA). They are also responsible

Advising, assisting, and making recommendations that relate to civil-military
operations (CMO) and CA aspects of current or proposed operations.
Preparing estimates and conducting studies and analyses for CMO activities.
Preparing the portions of operations, administrative, and logistics plans and
orders concerning CMO activities.
Determining the requirements for resources to accomplish the CMO activities of
the command, including CA units and personnel.
Maintaining a list of native linguists for interpreter support.
Coordinating with local US Government representatives and host-nation armed
forces for the procurement of native linguists for interpreter support.
Recommending command policy concerning obligations between civil and military
authorities and policy concerning the population of the area of operations and
its works and activities arising from treaties, agreements, international law,
and US policy.

Providing civil support for tactical and CSS operations and for preventing
civilian interference with these operations.
Coordinating military support of populace and resource control programs.
Providing technical advice and assistance in the reorientation of sources and
enemy defectors.
Coordinating the MI aspects of CMO activities with the G2 or S2.

Besides the major staff elements, an interrogation element requires support from
several other elements in order to conduct operations. These elements include-

Communications. Secure, reliable communications must be available at or near
the interrogation element's deployment site. Priority access to these
communications must be arranged to support contact with collection management.

Staff judge advocate. This element can provide legal support and advice on the

interpretation and application of international regulations and agreements
concerning handling of sources. It is also a channel for reporting known or
suspected war crimes.
Health service support. This element must clear all sick and wounded sources
before they can be interrogated. Seriously sick and wounded sources are
evacuated through medical channels. If adequate facilities are not available
in EPW hospitals, EPWs are admitted to military or civilian medical facilities
where the required treatment can be obtained. Medical inspections are made and
the weight of each EPW is recorded at least once a month. Provisions are made
for the isolation of communicable cases, for disinfection, and for
inoculations. Retained medical personnel and EPWs with medical training are
used to the fullest extent in caring for their own sick and wounded. FM 8-2
and FM 8-10 provide guidance for health service support.
NBC protection. All EPWs will be provided NBC protection. EPWs should be
allowed to use their own NBC protection equipment or if not feasible, the
detaining forces will exchange the EPWs' equipment for proper NBC gear. If
EPWs do not have their own NBC protection equipment, the detaining forces must
provide them with proper NBC gear.
Chaplain support. The unit ministry team, chaplain, and chaplain assistant
provide for religious support. Coordination is made with the S5 and G5 for
religious support for refugees, displaced persons, and indigenous civilians.
The unit ministry team provides for services for EPWs or assists by supporting
detained clergy of enemy forces, supporting other detained clergy and
providing for burial rites (combatants are granted, where possible, the right
to be buried according to the rites of their religion). Religious preference
of EPWs will be obtained from their detainee personnel record form (see
Appendix B).
Inspector general. This element is a channel for reporting known or suspected
war crimes.

Commanders and supervisors must take a deep interest in the quality and quantity
of training given to the interrogators assigned to their units. Commanders
cannot wait for the start of hostilities to begin a comprehensive training
program. Interrogators require a high degree of proficiency in several complex
skills that are difficult to master. These skills fade rapidly if not practiced.
The value and versatility of a commander's interrogation assets can be
continually enhanced by a training program within his unit. An individual
interrogator's contributions to the unit's overall collection effort are
directly dependent on the degree of exposure he has had to-

Language training that emphasizes continuous improvement in military and
technical vocabulary, dialects spoken in the target countries, and slang or
idiomatic expressions.
Area studies of the target countries that emphasize the inhabitants and the
economic, social, religious, and political systems which shape the behavior of
those inhabitants.
Principles of human behavior that emphasize the social and cultural
characteristics of behavior considered acceptable in the target countries. As
often as possible, training in these areas should be integrated with
individual and collective training. This gives the unit the best return for
the training time expended and gives the individual interrogator the most
realistic training possible.

Innovative training methods are devised and implemented in garrison as part of
the scheduled training cycle. This training is based on the results of periodic
evaluations of individual and collective performance. Army Training and
Evaluating Programs are being developed which set the standards for collective
performance by interrogation elements of various sizes.

Chapter 7
Strategic Debriefing
Strategic debriefing is the art of interviewing an individual in a strategic
environment, that is, voluntary sources of information to obtain usable
information in response to command and national-level intelligence needs.
Strategic intelligence provides support to national-level planners and
operational commanders across the entire spectrum of conflict and is especially
useful for long-range planning purposes. Strategic intelligence is collected in
peacetime as well as wartime and often fills intelligence gaps on extremely
sensitive topics or from sensitive areas.
The objective of the strategic debriefing process is to obtain information of
the highest degree of credibility to satisfy outstanding intelligence
requirements. This avoids surprises of strategic nature and consequences.
Strategic debriefing operations will be discussed further in FM 34-5 (S). The
types of sources encountered in strategic debriefing are emigres, refugees,
resettlers, and selected US sources. While there are other types, these
represent the vast majority. Doctrine for strategic debriefing is provided in
DIAM 58-13.
Due to the diverse nature of the various operations using debriefers, both
outside the continental United States (OCONUS) and within the continental United
States (CONUS), specific duties and responsibilities peculiar to a particular
operation will be detailed in unit SOPS. However, there are certain duties and
responsibilities to debriefers regardless of assignment.
Proper response to notification of the availability of a source will depend upon
unit operations. The debriefer may have to respond spontaneously as in the case
of walk-in sources. He may have the luxury of advance notice as in the case of
an invitational interview.
Planning and preparation for the -strategic debriefer are similar to that process
already described in Chapter 3 with the following considerations peculiar to the
strategic environment:

Prior intelligence reports pertaining to a particular source may not be
readily available and the source's area of knowledgeability, personality
traits, and potential intelligence value should be determined by the
Pertinent intelligence requirements should be reviewed in an attempt to assess
the source's potential to answer them.
Necessary maps, technical reference manuals, city plans, photographs,
handbooks, and so forth should be assembled and organized in the anticipated
sequence of the interview.
An appropriate debriefing site may need to be selected with considerations
given to legal agreements with host countries or particular directives within
unit SOPs.

In the approach and initial contact, basically the same process is used as
described before except that the sources for strategic debriefing are in a
different legal status than EPWs.
The debriefer uses good questioning techniques and rapport and effective
follow-up leads to ensure the answering of specific requirements.
Comprehensive and logical note taking is translated into comprehensible,
logical, and objective reporting within the parameters of the intelligence
report procedures outlined in DIAM 58-13.

An interview is terminated in a manner which enables any debriefer to recontact
a source at a later date and resume the debriefing process. The debriefer
ensures that the source receives all promised incentives. It is often necessary
to provide transportation and lodging for sources. Such considerations demand
that the debriefer be familiar with the procedures for use of Intelligence
Contingency Fund monies.
There is an obvious need for OPSEC before, during, and after any debriefing.
Source confidentiality and the handling of classified materials demand constant .

and special attention.
Maintaining a language proficiency is a basic requirement, and improvement of
dialects, slang, and technical terminology is a must.
A debriefer may have the added responsibility of maintaining local liaison with
host-government agencies while OCONUS. Unit SOPS usually dictate the necessary
and proper procedures.
The debriefer keeps up with new scientific and technical development of target
countries. Intelligence agencies publish numerous reports and summaries which
are readily available to the strategic debriefer.
Information gathered as strategic intelligence may be categorized into eight
components. An easy way to remember these components is through the use of the
acronym BEST MAPS:

B--biographic intelligence
E--economic intelligence.
S--sociological intelligence
T--transportation and telecommunications intelligence
M--military geographical intelligence.
A--armed forces intelligence.
P--political intelligence.
S--scientific and technical intelligence.

Each of these components can further be divided into a number of subcomponents.
These components and subcomponents are not all-encompassing nor mutually
exclusive. This approach is merely a means to enhance familiarization with the
types of information included in strategic intelligence.
Biographic intelligence is the study of individuals of actual or potential
importance through knowledge of their personalities and backgrounds. This
component can be divided into a number of subcomponents:

Educational and occupational history-including civilian and military
backgrounds of individuals.
Individual accomplishment-notable accomplishments of an individual in
professional or private life
Idiosyncrasies and habits-including mannerisms and unusual life styles.
Position, influence, and potentialpresent and future positions of power or
Attitudes and hobbies-significant interests that may affect an individual's

Such biographic information is reported by preparing a message intelligence
report in accordance with the format in DIAM 58-13.
Economic intelligence studies the economic strengths and weaknesses of a
country.. Its subcomponents are-

Economic warfare-information on the diplomatic or financial steps a country

may take to induce neutral countries to cease trading with its enemies.
Economic vulnerabilities-the degree to which a country's military would be
hampered by the loss of materials or facilities.
Manufacturing-information on manufacturing processes, facilities, logistics,
and so forth.
Source of economic capability-any means a country has to sustain its economy.

Sociological intelligence deals with people, customs, behaviors, and
institutions. The subcomponents are-

Population-rates of increase, decrease, or migrations.
Social characteristics-customs, mores, and values.
Manpower-divisions and distribution within the workforce.
Health, education, and welfare.
Public information-information services within the country.

Transportation and telecommunications intelligence studies the role of
transportation and telecommunications systems during military emergencies and
during peacetime. The subcomponents of this topic are too varied and numerous to
Military geographic intelligence studies all geographic factors (physical and
Armed forces intelligence is the integrated study of the ground, sea, and air
forces of a country-often referred to as OB. It is concerned with-

Strategy-military alternatives in terms of position, terrain, economics,
politics, and so forth.
Tactics-military deployments and operations doctrine.
OB-location, organization, weapons, strengths.
Equipment-analysis of all military materiel.
Logistics-procurement, storage, and distribution.
Training-as carried out at all echelons to support doctrine.
Organization-detailed analysis of command structures.
Manpower-available resources and their conditioning.

Political intelligence studies all political aspects which may affect military
operations. Its subcomponents are-

Government structure-organization of departments and ministries.
National policies-government actions and decisions.
Political dynamics-government views and reactions to events.
Propaganda- information and disinformation programs.
Policy and intelligence services- organizations and functions.
Subversion-subversive acts sponsored by the government.

Scientific and technical intelligence studies the country's potential and
capability to support objectives through development of new processes,
equipment, weapons systems, and so forth. The subcomponents are-

Weapons and weapon systems.
Missile and space program.
Nuclear energy and weapons technology.
NBC developments.
Basic applied science.
Research and development systems.

Equally important to the components of strategic intelligence is an awareness of
the strategic intelligence cycle and the debriefer's role within that cycle. The
first step is the identification of intelligence gaps. Analysts translate these

gaps into intelligence requirements-the second step. In the third step, the
strategic debriefer fulfills those requirements. The fourth step involves
preparation of an intelligence report. The fifth and last step is the
preparation of an intelligence report evaluation by the originator of the
requirement. These evaluations measure the quality of the information as well as
the quality of the report writing.

Chapter 8
Joint Interrogation Facilities
A conceptual void exists concerning the formation and use of a joint
interrogation facility (JIF). This chapter provides general guidance to an EAC
interrogation and exploitation (I&E) battalion commander on how to form a JIF

(information on the organization of an EAC I&E battalion can be found in FC
34-124). STANAG 2033 provides the authority for the use of a JIF.
Many contingencies exist worldwide under which the use of US forces could become
necessary. These procedures are in general terms and allow the I&E battalion
commander the latitude necessary to form a JIF under those contingencies.
The JIF is not a TOE organization, but it is formed to meet specific
requirements. It is task organized using I&E battalion assets. The personnel
provided by other services and agencies will depend upon theater requirements.
Combined interrogation centers (CICs) are interrogation facilities which are
manned by more than one nation and are not addressed. CICs, in the European
theater, are established according to STANAG 2033. The operation of a CIC is
determined by international agreement.
In the constantly changing environment of today's world, our military forces
could be called upon to enter into armed conflict in any level of intensity,
anywhere on the globe. Unified and specified commands are totally prepared and
react as necessary to multilevel.threats of combat involvement. An intelligence
collection facility is required to provide support to these joint commands.
The JIF provides support to joint commands for collection, analysis, and
reporting of intelligence information. The JIF provides this support through the
interrogation of category A sources and exploitation of CEDs based on theater
and national level intelligence requirements.
The intelligence collection facility is comprised of interrogators, CI
personnel, and analysts from the US Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and
from various other US national agencies as required. They are established under
one commander to operate as a JIF in the exploitation of documents and

personnel. The JIF is a field activity of the joint command organized to meet
theater requirements during crises or contingency deployments.
The organization of a JIF is tailored to meet the specific requirements of
crises, contingency deployments, or military assistance operations to host
nations. The Army component commander is designated as the executive agent for
the establishment, organization, and functioning of the JIF. The EAC MI brigade
commander, associated with the theater in question, will exercise command and

control of the JIF.
The JIF, in meeting the specific requirements of crises, contingency deployment,
or military assistance operations to host nations, is responsible for the
following functions:

Develop guidance and operational procedures for the conduct and management of

all JIF functions.
Coordinate with participating agencies and units to develop personnel
selection criteria and assignment procedures necessary for partial or complete
activation of the JIF.

Organize, direct, manage, and control resources assigned to or included within

the JIF.
Supervise and direct full or partial activation of the JIF for the conduct of
screenings and interrogation of sources, translation and exploitation of CEDs,
and debriefing of captured or detained US personnel released or escaped from
enemy control.

Coordinate through the Army component with the theater J2 to ensure compatibility of other service components' plans and actions pertinent to the establishment and operation of the JIF. Coordinate through the Army component with the theater J2 the selection of suitable JIF operational sites. Coordinate with the provost marshal for all site operations. Coordinate and satisfy the intelligence collection requirements of theater and service components from available sources Perform liaison to theater, service components, and other agencies and organizations as deemed appropriate As directed, provide personnel as replacement, backup, or augmentation for service component interrogation organizations destroyed or depleted. Develop contingency,plans for the evacuation of the JIF and the destruction of classified material. Selected sources, documents, and equipment will be evacuated with US forces.
USE During crisis, contingency deployments, or military assistance to host nations, components will forward collection requirements to the theater command J2. The J2 serves as the requirements control authority and is responsible for the registration, validation, and establishment of priorities for JIF collection requirements. The J2 exercises staff cognizance over JIF operations. The JIF deploys mobile interrogation teams (MIT) to identify, screen, and interrogate category A sources to satisfy theater collection requirements and support service component interrogation operations. MIT interrogation reports are forwarded to the JIF, theater J2, and service components. In response to these interrogation reports, the theater J2 prioritizes and forwards additional collection requirements for specific sources to the JIF. The JIF directs the MIT to conduct further interrogations or coordinate evacuation of the source to the JIF for further interrogation. Vital information derived by MIT through interrogation of sources or exploitation of CEDs is reported via secure communications to JIF and theater
Based on collection requirements and MIT screening reports and interrogations, the JIF identifies EPWs for priority evacuation to the theater camp for JIF exploitation. The JIF prepares and dissseminates source knowledgeability briefs
(KB) to theater and national-level agencies. The JIF continually reviews the requirement to exploit these selected sources. MIT assist lower echelon interrogators and intelligence specialists in the examination and categorization of CEDs for evacuation to the JIF. Reports are submitted on all information of intelligence value. Initial reports are submitted electronically whenever possible to ensure that the information reaches the analysts in the least amount of time. Written reports are prepared according to the format contained in Appendix G. Copies of SALUTE and interrogation reports pertaining to specific category A sources accompany them when they are evacuated to the JIF. In situations where time-critical data is involved, secure voice SALUTE reports to the theater J2 may be used to supplement procedures. Initial MIT reporting includes the interrogator's assessment of the category A source intelligence value. This assessment addresses the category A source's intelligence, experience, cooperation, and reliability. Any areas of special knowledge possessed by the category A source is also identified. Effective coordination between the JIF and numerous component, theater, and national and host-government assets is necessary to ensure the success of JIF operations. Theater J2 and service components' intelligence staffs require interface and coordination with the JIF to ensure collection requirements are satisfied accurately and in a timely manner. The success of JIF operations depends in part
upon the screening, interrogation, and debriefing operations of division and corps interrogation and CI elements. The JIF establishes and maintains working relationships with service component HUMINT collection managers and interrogation and document exploitation units at all echelons. Service component members attached to the JIF facilitate this interface. Interface and coordination with component security and military police elements are required to ensure the timely evacuation and proper safeguarding and exploitation of sources. The JIF is located in the immediate vicinity of the theater EPW camp. The location of the EPW camp is the responsibility of the military police EPW camp commander. Army component G2s and provost marshal staffs coordinate all EPW planning about location. Security arrangements for the EPW camp and planning for the segregation and safeguarding of JIF sources are the responsibility of the EPW camp commander. Source3 are identified, classified, and segregated according to their status, sex, nationality, languages, and intelligence category. JIF sources are segregated and safeguarded from other sources. Security of the JIF and control over the sources within the JIF are under the direction of the JIF commander. Component security and military police units are responsible for the evacuation, safeguarding, and control of sources. JIF MIT at lower echelons coordinate with these units for access to a source and the source's subsequent evacuation to the
JIF coordination and interface with theater and service component CI elements are necessary at all times. CI teams located at the JIF and with the MIT facilitate this interface and coordination. The JIF and MIT assist CI elements in the identification and exploitation of all sources of CI interest. JIF coordination and interface with PSYOP and CA units are facilitated by direct access to members of these units conducting operations in support of military police EPW camps. PSYOP analysis concerning motivational and cultural factors of sources is of direct benefit to JIF operations. JIF coordination and interface with legal, medical, and chaplain activities and authorities supporting EPw camps are required to ensure compliance with the Geneva Convention concerning the treatment and care of sources. National agency access and participation in debriefings and interrogations conducted by the JIF are coordinated in advance through the theater J2. National agencies may establish liaison officers at the JIF. Access to or knowledge of JIF operations and activities by host governments is coordinated through the theater J2. COMMUNICATIONS To effect required interface and coordination, the JIF requires secure communications with the theater J2, service components, and the MIT. Secure record and voice communications circuits and telephone switchboard trunks are used. Interface and compatibility with service component interrogation and CI team communications are required.
Chapter 9
Low-Intensity Conflict
This chapter provides concepts and doctrine concerning interrogation assets in
LIC operations. Before discussing the use of interrogation assets in a LIC, we
must understand the terminology and the US Army operational concept for LIC
LIC is a limited politico-military struggle to achieve political, social,
economic, military, or psychological objectives. It is often protracted and
ranges from diplomatic, economic, and psycho-social pressures through terrorism
and insurgency. LIC is generally confined to a geographic area and is often
characterized by constraints on the weaponry, tactics, and level of violence.
The definitions of mid- and high-intensity conflict limit their use to war
between nations. These terms, defined here, will not be further discussed.

Mid-intensity conflict -- war between two or more nations and their respective
allies, if any, in which the belligerents employ the most modern technology
and all resources in intelligence; mobility; firepower (excluding nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons); command, control, and communications; and
service support for limited objectives under definitive policy limitations as
to the extent of destructive power that can be employed or the extent of
geographic area that might be involved.
High-intensity conflict -- war between two or more nations and their
respective allies, if any, in which the belligerents employ the most modern
technology and all resources in intelligence; mobility; firepower (including
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons); command, control and
communications; and service support.

LIC involves the actual or contemplated use of military capabilities up to, but
not including, sustained combat between regular forces.
The factors which lead to LIC are complex and, in many cases, cannot be resolved
by short-term actions. Success in this environment is dependent upon the
effective application of all elements of national power and clearly defined
goals and objectives. Political objectives establish the limits and constraints
for military operations, as well as other social, political, and economic
programs. The difference between military operations in LIC and the war, as
found in mid- or high-intensity levels, lies in the measure of military success.
In the latter, military success is measured in terms of winning campaigns and
battles. In LIC, however, success will consist of achieving US national
objectives without the protracted commitment of US forces in a combat role. It
must be noted that, should military intervention be necessary, a premature
commitment of US soldiers to combat in a low-intensity situation may result in
the loss of strategic initiative. Political, economic, social, and psychological
initiatives are necessary to achieve lasting success in the LIC arena.
The US Army's mission in. LIC can be divided into four general categories:
peacekeeping operations, foreign internal defense (FID), peacetime contingency
operations, and terrorism counteraction.
Increasing world tension, continuing conflicts, scarce resources, and general
distrust have created environments in which a military force may be employed to
achieve, restore, or maintain peace. A peacekeeping mission may present
situations that are often ambiguous and may require forces to deal with extreme
tension and violence in the form of terrorism, sabotage, and minor military
conflicts from known and unknown belligerents.
Given the worldwide nature of US national interests, it is vital to US security
to maintain not only the capability to employ force, but also the ability to
assist in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. US Army participation in

peacekeeping operations may be multinational in nature or may be conducted
Multinational peacekeeping operations are military operations conducted for the

purpose of restoring or maintaining peace. They may be undertaken in response to
a request for assistance made to either a multinational organization or to the
US directly. Historically, the United Nations has been the most frequent sponsor
of multinational peacekeeping operations, though regional organizations have
acted in a similar fashion to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their
respective regions.
Although unilateral peacekeeping operations are possible, they are inherently
sensitive and require tacit international approval. Unilateral peacekeeping
operations conducted by the US require clear humanitarian justifications.
The two common missions in peacekeeping operations are cease fire supervision
and law and order maintenance.
Cease Fire Supervision
Peacekeeping forces can be deployed to observe and report on compliance with
diplomatically arranged cease fires. The force will require the capability for
rapid deployment to perform its peacekeeping function and must be initially
selfsufficient, have self-defense capability, and possess effective internal and
external communications. The terms of the cease fire agreement may call for the
peacekeeping force to supervise the withdrawals and disengagements of the
belligerents, supervise the exchange of prisoners of war, or monitor
Law and Order Maintenance
Peacekeeping operations also include restoration or maintenance of law and
order. Traditional civilian law enforcement functions are generally not
performed by US military personnel. However, situations may arise which require
limited support to duly authorized law enforcement authorities of a receiving
FID encompasses those actions taken by civilian and military agencies of one
government in any program taken by another government to preclude or defeat
insurgency. Insurgencies cannot be overcome by military measures alone but by
military support to national programs.
US Army forces operate in concert with other services, both US and host nation
and with other US Government agencies. Operations are conducted in support of
plans developed by the host nation and the US Government.
US forces involved in FID must have an appreciation of the culture into which
they are employed and should be selected, educated, and prepared to ensure that
US involvement and goals are understood and complied with. Language capabilities
are important and must be developed to the maximum extent possible. Units should
be prepared for the FID mission prior to deployment and arrive in the host
country established as an effective, cohesive group, prepared to begin
operations immediately.
US Army forces can assume various relationships with the host nation's military
forces in FID operations. They can serve as advisors or instructors at all
levels. Special forces units are specifically trained for this mission. Combat
support of CSS units may augment the host nation's efforts and serve to prepare
the battlefield for US combat forces, if required. US forces must assume an
unobtrusive support role tc maintain credibility of the host government.

The manner in which US combat forces are employed will vary with the situation.
Because of their familiarity with local communities and population, it is
generally better to use indigenous military assets in more populated areas and
to employ US combat assets in remote areas.
When US Army combat troops are required for FID operations, planning for their
withdrawal begins at the time of deployment. The withdrawal of Army units
depends on the capability of the host nation forces to regain and maintain

In certain environments, peacetime contingency operations become necessary when

diplomatic initiatives have been, or are expected to be, ineffective in
achieving extremely time-sensitive, high-value objectives. Failure to influence
a belligerent nation or activity through diplomatic means may necessitate the
use of military forces to protect US national interests, rescue US citizens, or
defend US assets.
Intelligence is a particularly critical part of.all peacetime contingency
operations. The rapid and tightly controlled introduction of US combat forces is
a part of contingency operations which requires precision planning. Accurate,
detailed, and timely intelligence determines the success or failure of these
operations. Time for planning and execution is typically short, and intelligence
assets must be able to anticipate requirements and provide comprehensive
products on extremely short notice. City plans with complete detail of
utilities, personality profiles of local officials, and details of specific
ports, airports, roads, and bridges are examples of information which must be
made readily available. Intelligence gathering missions into sensitive areas are
also conducted as required.
Terrorism, employed worldwide, may be sponsored by political or other terrorist
groups within a nation, sponsored by an external source, or employed as a tactic
of insurgents. It is clearly a dimension of warfare which pays high dividends
with minimum risk. Population areas, public transport conveyances, industrial
facilities, and individuals are high-probability targets for terrorist
activities. Terrorist groups increasingly threaten US interests throughout the
Terrorism counteraction consists of those actions taken to counter the terrorist
threat. Antiterrorism refers to defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability
to terrorist attack. Counterterrorism refers to offensive measures taken against
terrorists. Specially trained US Army forces are the main element used in
counterterrorism operations.
Intelligence is essential to implementing effective antiterrorism and
counterterrorism measures. Its purpose in terrorism counteraction is to identify
and quantify the threat and provide timely threat intelligence. This includes
the evaluation of terrorist capabilities, tactics, targets, and the
dissemination of this information.
Terrorism counteraction varies according to the type of terrorist organization
involved. Autonomous terrorist groups, for example, are vulnerable to
intelligence and police-type operations. In a different arena, the actions of
state-supported and statedirected groups would certainly be sensitive to
measures taken against the supporting states.
The principles and techniques of interrogation discussed elsewhere in this
manual apply with equal validity to interrogations conducted in LIC operations.
Specifc applications of the general principles and techniques must be varied to
meet local peculiarities. However, because of these peculiarities of LIC
operations, this chapter provides additional guidelines for the conduct of
interrogations in support of such operations. Intelligence interrogations play a
significant role in ascertaining the development of an insurgency in the latent
or initial stage; the intentions, attitudes, capabilities, and limitations of
the insurgents; their underground organizations; and their support systems. In
addition to the traditional military concepts of intelligence concerning the
enemy, terrain, and weather, LIC operations have added a new dimension-the
population. The major aim of both the threatened government and the insurgents
is to influence the population favorably and win its support.
US military or civilian participation in intelligence interrogations during LIC
operations is generally limited to that permitted by the host government
concerned. This limitation places certain restrictions on US military and

civilian personnel engaged in such operations. The degree of participation will,
therefore, be determined by combined US and host-country policies. Normally, the
interrogator is asked to advise, assist, and train host-country personnel who
are members of the armed forces, paramilitary forces, police, and other security
agencies (FM 100-20). The interrogator may also provide intelligence
interrogation support to committed US or allied forces during LIC operations.
This will require effective, close coordination of the combined effort with
host-country agencies. In this respect, coordination problems can be avoided by
conducting a combined interrogation effort with interrogators of the host
country. Further advantages of such a measure are the language capability and
the intimate knowledge of the area personalities, customs, ethnic differences
and geography-possessed by the host country's interrogation personnel.
LIC operations intelligence requirements demand detailed familiarity with the
military, political, and front organizations of the insurgent enemy and the
environment in which he operates.
The interrogator's familiarity with the areas of operations must include an
understanding and appreciation of the insurgency, its objectives, history,
successes, and failures. This understanding and appreciation is required not
only on a general countrywide basis, but also on an expanded basis within the
interrogator's particular area of operation. Therefore, it is essential that the
intelligence interrogator fully grasps the importance that the insurgent
organization places on the accomplishment of political objectives as opposed to
military successes.
One measure of the interrogator's effectiveness is his ability to apply the
appropriate interrogation techniques to the personality of the source.
Interrogations associated with LIC operations dictate the need for skill in the
full range of interrogation techniques so that the interrogator can conduct the
many types of interrogations demanded.
In some instances, US Army interrogators are assigned to a host country to
assist in developing interrogation capabilities of host-country forces. FM
100-20 contains detailed information on advisor duties, techniques, and
procedures. However, the operations and relationship of the advisor to
host-country interrogators require special mention and are discussed below.
Advisor Qualifications
The advisor must be a qualified, experienced interrogator with an extensive
intelligence background. He requires area orientation and must have language
ability, and a personality favorable for working with indigenous peoples. The
following are normal functions of an interrogation advisor:

Establish a working relationship with his counterparts through development of

mutual respect and confidence.
Provide advice for effective collection through interrogation.
Assist in establishing combined interrogation centers.
Provide on-the-job training for indigenous interrogators.
Assist in the establishment of necessary file systems to support interrogation

Conduct appropriate liaison with all units participating in the combined

interrogation center.
Keep the senior Army intelligence advisor informed on operations and
activities within his area.

Provide the financial support, as authorized, for interrogation operations to
his counterpart.
Conduct appropriate coordination with other US intelligence advisors.

Counterpart Relationship
The advisor's accomplishments depend upon the relationship established with his
counterpart. This relationship is influenced by the personalities of each.

Ideally, this relationship should develop as the counterpart's knowledge of the
area combines with the professional knowledge of the advisor. Before he provides
advice to his counterpart, the advisor should observe the operation of the unit
and become familiar with the area and the local situation. For convenience, his
office should be adjacent to that of his counterpart. However, the advisor
should not interfere with the routine administrative duties that must be
accomplished by his counterpart.
Above all, the advisor must remember that his is an advisory role and not that
of a supervisor or commander. He advises the counterpart rather than individuals
within the unit. This is important, for advising individuals could result in
advice which would be contrary to the orders of the counterpart. In reality,
advice is totally accepted only when the counterpart is convinced that the
advice is sound and appropriate of the situation.
In cases where the advisor may observe brutal methods in handling and
interrogating captives and other detainees, he must not participate in these
acts and, further, should remove himself and any other US personnel for whom he
is responsible from the scene. Local theater policies and directives normally
assign other specified actions for the advisor in a situation of this sort. Such
policies and directives may include advising the counterpart of the
undesirability of such action and the reporting of the incident through US
channels. The advisor must comply with any such theater (or other command)
policies and directives.
Advisor Operations
The advisor must emphasize that development of a combined interrogation effort
is of the utmost importance to successful operations. This combined capability
is achieved by uniting the interrogation resources of all intelligence forces

(except tactical) within a specific geographic area of responsibility (that is,
national, province, district). Most likely, the advisor will find that in many
host countries, interrogation responsibilities will be assigned as follows:

Civilian police-suspects and insur gent political cadre.

Military interrogators-captured military insurgents and those military

insurgents who have rallied to the legally constituted government.

Indigenous military counterintelligence-insurgent infiltrators and deserters

from host-country forces.

The advisor must stress the integration of all interrogator resources to achieve

economy of force and unity of effort. Often this task will be complicated by
personalities of the host country, military, and civilian officials. But if
harmonious working relationships are established with the key personalities

involved, the advisor can succeed in integrating all available resources.
The interrogator (advisor) should establish liaison with US advisors working
with host-country tactical forces operating within his area. From these advisors
he can be constantly informed of insurgents captured by these tactical forces.
The interrogator (advisor) and tactical unit advisor, working together with
their respective counterparts, can ensure effective interrogation of these
captured insurgents. Further, the advisors can assist in achieving the required
coordination between hostcountry tactical units and area forces to improve
handling and exploiting interrogation sources.
The status of insurgents in LIC operations differs from that of recognized
belligerents; the field of interrogation will encompass a wider variety of
sources involved in operations.
EPW interrogations are conducted in support of wartime military operations and
are governed by the guidelines and limitations provided by the Geneva
Conventions and FM 27-10. However, insurgent subversive underground elements who
are seeking to overthrow an established government in an insurgency do not hold
legal status as belligerents (see DA Pam 27-161-1). Since these subversive

activities are clandestine or covert in nature, individuals operating in this
context seek to avoid open involvement with host-government police and military
security forces. Hence, any insurgent taken into custody by host-government
security forces may not be protected by the Geneva Conventions beyond the basic
protections in Article 3. The insurgent will be subject to the internal security
laws of the country concerning subversion and lawlessness. Action of US forces,
however, will be governed by existing agreements with the host country and by
the provisions of Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.
LIC operations place the population in the position of a prime target.
Therefore, the population becomes a principal source of intelligence. The
population with which the interrogator will have to deal may be composed of
friendly, hostile, or completely indifferent elements. In dealing with these
population elements, as well as with the insurgents, the desires of the host
country must be considered. There is a need to gain the support of tae
population to deprive the insurgents of their primary sources of support. Such a
need places a burden upon the interrogator to learn more about the people -­their customs and taboos (be ethnic groups, if appropriate), distrust and fear
of foreigners, fear of insurgent reprisal, philosophy or outlook on life, and
other facets of their political, economic, and social institutions. Since CI
elements are tasked with the mission of countersubversion, the primary
responsibility of identifying insurgent operations within the population is
placed upop CI personnel. Therefore, it is essential that the intelligence
interrogator maintain close and continuous coordination with CI personnel to
ensure complete exploitation of the population.
The individual insurgent may lack many of the conventional psychological
supports which are helpful in resisting interrogation. Often he is in conflict
with his own people, perhaps of the same ethnic group, religion, environment, or
even, in some cases, his family. Further, the insurgent has no legal status as
an EPW and, therefore, realizes he may be considered a common criminal. The
insurgent often expects to receive harsh and brutal treatment after capture. If
he does not receive this harsh treatment, the psychological effect may make him
amenable to the interrogator. In addition, the shock effect normally induced by
capture will further increase his susceptibility to interrogation. Therefore,
the individual insurgent may rationalize cooperation with the interrogator as
the best course of action for his survival.
Although the insurgent often lacks conventional psychological support, as
previously discussed, the interrogator should realize that other support may
have been furnished him through intensive political and psychological
indoctrination and training to resist interrogation. Indoctrination sessions
using such techniques as self and group criticism can give insurgents a strong
group identification and fanatical belief in the insurgent cause.
The entire range of insurgent activity is vulnerable to mass interrogation of
the populace. Since the insurgent's operations are often contingent on the
support of the populace, members of the populace inevitably learn the identities
and activities of the insurgent. With large numbers of people knowing him, the
insurgent is vulnerable to mass screening and interrogation programs. Success of
such programs may be enhanced by the insurgent's previously committed acts of
terror, tax collection, and forced recruitment, which will have alienated some

members of the population.
Insurgency is identified as a condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection
against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. It is not
usually a conflict of international character, and it is not a recognized
belligerency. Therefore, insurgent captives are not guaranteed full protection
under the articles of the Geneva Conventions relative to the handling of EPWs.

However, Article 3 of the Conventions requires that insurgent captives be
humanely treated and forbids violence to life and person -- in particular
murder, mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture. It further forbids commitment
of outrages upon personal dignity, taking of hostages, passing of sentences, and
execution without prior judgment by .a regularly constituted court.
Humane treatment of insurgent captives should extend far beyond compliance with
Article 3, if for no other reason than to render them more suceptible to
interrogation. The insurgent is trained to expect brutal treatment upon capture.
If, contrary to what he has been led to believe, this mistreatment is not
forthcoming, he is apt to become psychologically softened for interrogation.
Furthermore, brutality by either capturing troops or friendly interrogators will
reduce defections and serve as grist for the insurgent's propaganda mill.
Special care must be taken in handling insurgent suspects, for their degree of
sympathy with the insurgency usualjy is not readily apparent. Improper handling
of such persons may foster sympathies for the insurgency or induce them to
remain passive at a time when the host country requires active support from its
Recognizing vulnerability to interrogation, the insurgent counters by taking any
of the following actions:

Keeps his forces ignorant of future operations, unit designations, and true
names of leaders.
Assigns multiple designations to units, frequently changes them, and uses
aliases for names of leaders.
Hires informants to watch and report on the people and commits reprisals
against those who provide information to the government
Instructs his forces to remain silent upon capture for a given period of time.
This lapse in time tends to decrease the value of the information which is
ultimately revealed to hostile interrogators.
Provides plausible cover stories to hide true information.
Indoctrinates his forces with ideological training.
Publicizes cases where captives have been killed or mistreated by capturing
Screens his recruits carefully.
Uses cellular structure to restrrt -knowledge of personnel and operations.—

The characteristics and knowledge of interrogation sources vary widely, based
upon the position, status, and mission of the insurgent within his organization.
The interrogator's appraisal of these factors, coupled with his own knowledge of
the source and the organization to which he belongs, will assist in quickly
evaluating the informational potential of each source. Interrogation sources
vary and include the combatant, terrorist, propagandist, courier, political
cadre, and intelligence agent. They may be young or old, male or female,
educated or illiterate. General characteristics and knowledgeability of the more
common types are discussed below.
Main and Local Forces
The main force combatant is the best indoctrinated, trained, led, disciplined,
and equipped of all insurgent forces. He will know more, but may be inclined to
reveal less than a local force insurgent or a member of the village militia.
When properly interrogated, however, he can be expected to be a fruitful source
of information on his unit and its personnel; current and past military
operations; supply and base areas; status of training and morale; some
information of higher, lower, and adjacent units; routes of infiltration and
exfiltration; tactics and general information on his area of operations. In
short, he may be likened to the moFe conventional prisoner of war and will be
knowledgeable on topics akin to that type of 'individual. He will differ,
however, in that his knowledge of units other than his own will be far less than

that of the conventional prisoner of war. Generally speaking, the local force
insurgent soldier (the second component of the insurgent regular armed forces)
will be almost as valuable as a main force soldier for interrogation purposes.
His knowledge will depend primarily upon the methods of operation used by the
insurgent movement in the employment of its regular armed forces.
Compared to the main and local force insurgent, the local village militia member
is often poorly trained, disciplined, and equipped. While he is not likely to be
a profitable source of information on regular force units, his native
familiarity with the area in which he operates makes him a most valuable source .

on local terrain, insuraent infrastructure, food and weapons caches, lines of
communications and logistics, intelligence operations, and OB information on his
own militia unit. When cooperative, he, likewise, can be used to identify local
insurgent sympathizers within his area.
Political Cadre
This individual is a profitable interrogation source for obtaining information
on the composition and operation of the insurgent's political structure. At the
lowest level (hamlet and village) he normally wears "two hats," one as the
political leader, the other as the commander of the militia. At higher levels
the individual is more political in orientation and can provide information on
cell members, front organizations, sympathizers, and nets. He is also
knowledgeable on the military units within his area, their lines and methods of
communications, and future plans and operations of both the political and
military organizations.
This individual may be a sympathizer in fact or one of circumstance-that is,
through blackmail, terror, or relatives being held hostage. In either event, if
skillfully interrogated, the sympathizer can become the most fruitful source of
information on one of the greatest and most perplexing questions of
insurgency--"How do you tell the difference between friend and foe?" The
sympathizer coerced into assisting the insurgent is, of course, the most useful
type of individual, but care must be taken to protect him after he has revealed
useful information.
These individuals are perhaps the best source of information available during
LIC. They are usually cooperative and easily susceptible to direct approach
interrogation techniques. The most important feature of interrogating defectors
is the capability to exploit physically the individual who voluntarily agrees to
accompany friendly personnel into tactical operations areas. The primary methods
of exploiting defectors are to use them as tactical guides and advisors, as
informants, as aides in interrogation and document analysis, and as advisors on
enemy agent net modus operandi. It should be noted, however, that some of these
techniques involve personal danger for the defector, and for that reason, he
should be provided appropriate protective equipment. Coercion cannot be used to
induce his cooperation. However, when defectors are employed to accomplish
objectives, as discussed in FM 34-60, they will be controlled only by qualified
CI personnel.
The screening of insurgent captives and suspects is the key to productive
interrogation by CI personnel. Screening is a twofold operation conducted to
identify insurgents or their sympathizers in the population and, of these, to
find the most knowledgeable individuals for interrogation. Techniques for
accomplishing these functions are varied and depend mainly upon the imagination
and ingenuity of screener personnel. For this reason, only the most resourceful
interrogators should be selected as screeners. Examples of successful screening
aids and techniques are discussed below.

Local Leader
The local leader, whether a government official, religious personage, teacher or
village elder, is a useful screening assistant. This individual knows the
people, their habits and activities. He knows the legitimate resident from the
stranger and can often point out insurgents and their sympathizers in his area.
However, since the local leader is vulnerable to insurgent terror or reprisals,
his overt use in screening may be sometimes limited. When employed in an overt
capacity, he will always require protection later. The mere fact that a man is a
constituted local leader should never be viewed as prima facie evidence of

loyalty to the host-country government. A leader may be secretly or tacitly
supporting the insurgency or may, for personal political reasons, discredit
political rivals with false accusations.

Insurgent Captive
The insurgent captive can be used as a "finger man" in a police-type line-up, an
excellent means of mass screening. As the entire population of a community files
past, the captive points out those individuals loyal to the insurgency. A police

"mug file" is a useful variant of this technique. Here the captive reviews
photographs taken from family registries.
Agent or Friendly Civilian
The line-up or the "mug file," described above, is most productive when friendly
agents and civilians are used as screening assistants. However, care should be
taken to hide the identity of these individuals by placing them behind a barrier
or covering their faces. An excellent source for employment of this technique is
the individual who has close relatives within the government or its military
Area Cordon
A good method to screen a community is to cordon off the area and restrict the
inhabitants to their homes. All movement thereafter must be strictly controlled
and regulated. With *his accomplishment, each member of the community is
questioned regarding the identities of party members and sympathizers for the
same length of time and with the same questions. If the desired information is
not obtained after completion of all questioning, the process should begin again
and continue until people start to talk. Once information is obtained, the
members of the local insurgent infrastructure are apprehended simultaneously and
removed from the community for intensive, detailed interrogation.
Informant Technique
This technique involves placement of a friendly individual among a group of
suspects or captives. The individual acts out the role of an insurgent
sympathizer to gain the confidence of the group and to learn the identity of the
true insurgents and their leaders.
The interrogation of illiterate sources requires special questioning techniques.
The interrogator is after facts, and eliciting such simple data from illiterates
as "size" or "how many" is often difficult. The interrogator must agree on
common terminology with his source so that he can communicate and obtain the
information he desires. He can use a system of holding up fingers on his hands,
marking on a piece of paper, or using matchsticks, pieces of wood, or other
materials to determine numerical facts. In determining types of weapons, the
interrogator can show actual weapons, photographs, or drawings of weapons from
which the source can make a comparison with what he actually saw. Description of
colors can be made from pieces of materials or color charts. Direction of
movement may be found out by location of the sun, stars, or landmarks familiar
to the source. Time can be determined by the position of the sun, locating a
traveled route and then computing how rapidly the source walked, or finding out
how often he stopped and how many meals he ate. The methods discussed are
examples of common terminology or reference points which an interrogator
employs. Additionally, knowledge of the specific habits of the populace and of

the area allows the interrogator to select a definite term of reference.

Appendix H
The direct approach is the questioning of a source without having to use any
type of approach. The direct approach is often called no approach at all, but it
is the most effective of all the.approaches. Statistics tell us that in World
War II, it was 85percent to 9percent effective. In Vietnam, it was 9 percent
to 9percent effective. The direct approach works best on lower enlisted
personnel as they have little or no resistance training and have had minimal
security training. Due to its effectiveness, the direct approach is always to be
tried first. The direct approach usually achieves the maximum cooperation in the
minimum amount of time and enables the interrogator to quickly and completely
exploit the source for the information he possesses. The advantages of this
technique are its simplicity and the fact that it takes little time. For this
reason, it is frequently used at the tactical echelons where time is limited.
The incentive approach is a method of rewarding the source for his cooperation,
but it must reinforce positive behavior. This is done by satisfying the source's
needs. Granting incentives to an uncooperative source leads him to believe that
rewards can be gained whether he cooperates or not. Interrogators may not
withhold a source's rights under the Geneva Conventions, but they can withhold . a
source's privileges. The granting of incentives must not infringe on the Geneva
Conventions, but they can be things to which the source is already entitled to.
This can be effective only if the source is unaware of his rights or privileges.

Incentives must seem to be logical and possible. An interrogator must not
promise anything that cannot be delivered. Interrogators do not make promises,
but usually infer them while still sidestepping guarantees. If an interrogator
made a promise that he could not keep and he or another interrogator had to talk
with the source again, the source would not have any trust and would most
probably not cooperate. Instead of promising unequivocably that a source will
receive a certain thing, such as political asylum, an interrogator will offer to
do what he can to help achieve the source's desired goal;as long as the source


The incentive approach can be broken down into the incentive short term

(received immediately) and incentive long term (received within a period of

time). The determination rests on when the source expects to receive the
incentive offered.
The emotional approach overrides the source's rationale for resisting by using
and manipulating his emotions against him. The main emotions of any source at
the time of capture might be either love or fear. Love or fear for one person
may be exploited or turned into hate for someone else. For example, the person
who caused the source to be in the position in which he now finds himself. The
source's fear can be built upon, or increased so as to override his rational
side. If the situation demands it and the source's fear is so great that he
cannot communicate with the interrogator„ the interrogator may find that he has
to decrease the source's fear in order to effectively collect information from

him. There are two variations of the emotional approaches: Emotional love,
emotional hate.

For the emotional love approach to be successful, the interrogator must focus on
the anxiety felt by the source about the circumstances in which he finds
himself. The interrogator must direct the love the source feels toward the
appropriate object: family, homeland, comrades, and so forth. If the
interrogator can show the source what the source himself can do to alter or
improve his situation, the approach has a chance of success. This approach

usually involves some incentive;such as communication with the source's family,
a quicker end to the war to save his comrades' lives, and so forth. A good
interrogator will usually orchestrate some futility with an emotional love
approach to hasten the source's reaching the breaking point. Sincerity and
conviction are extremely important in a successful attempt at an emotional love
approach as the interrogator must show genuine concern for the source and for
the object to which the interrogator is directing the source's emotion. If the
interrogator ascertains that the source has great love for his unit and fellow
soldiers, he can effectively exploit the situations by explaining to the source
that his providing information may shorten the war or battle in progress, thus
saving many of his comrades' lives. But, his. refusal to talk may cause their
deaths. This places a burden on the source and may motivate him to seek relief
through cooperation with the interrogator.
The emotional hate approach focuses on any genuine hate, or possibly a desire
for revenge, the source may feel. The interrogator must correctly pick up on
exactly what it is that the source may hate so that the emotion can be exploited
to override the source's rational side. The source may have negative feelings
about his country's regime, his immediate superiors, officers in general, or his
fellow soldiers. This approach is usually most effective on a member of racial
or religious minorities who has suffered discrimination in both service and
civilian life. If a source feels that he has been treated unfairly in his unit,
the interrogator can point out that if the source cooperates and divulges the
location of that unit, the unit can be destroyed, thus affording the source an
opportunity for revenge. By using a conspiratorial tone of voice, the
interrogator can enhance the value of this technique. Phrases, such as You owe
them no loyalty for the way they have treated you,"when used appropriately, can
expedite the success of this technique.
One word of caution, do not immediately begin to berate a certain facet of the
source's background or life until your assessment indicates that the source
feels a negative emotion toward it. The emotional hate approach can be much more
effectively used by drawing out the source's negative emotions with questions
that elicit a thought-provoking response. For example, Nhy do you think they
allowed you to be captured?or Nhy do you think they left you to die?Do not


berate the source's farces or homeland unless you are certain of his negative
emotions. Many sources may have great love for their country, but still may hate
the regime in control. The emotional hate approach is most effective with the
immature or timid source who may have no opportunity up to this point for
revenge, or never had the courage tc voice his feelings.
The increased fear up approach is most effective on the yoUnger and more
inexperienced source or on a source who appears nervous or frightened. It is
also effective on a source who appears to be the silent, confident type. Sources
with something to hide, such as the commission of a war crime, or having
surrendered while still having ammunition in his weapon, or breaking his
military oath are particularly easy to break with this technique. There are two
distinct variations of this approach: the fear up (harsh) and the fear up

In the fear up (harsh) approach, the interrogator behaves in a heavy,
overpowering manner with a loud and threatening voice. The interrogator may even
feel the need to throw objects across the room to heighten the source's
implanted feelings of fear. Great care must be taken when doing this so that any
actions taken would not violate the Geneva Conventions. This technique is to
convince the source that he does indeed have something to fear and that he has
no option but to cooperate. A good interrogator will implant in the source's
mind that the interrogator himself is not the object to be feared, but is a

possible way out of the trap. The fear can be directed toward reprisals by
international tribunals, the government of the host country, or the source's own
forces. Shouting can be very effective in this variation of the fear up
The fear up (mild) approach is better suited to the strong, confident type of
interrogator as there is generally no need to raise the voice or resort to
heavy-handed, table banging violence. It is a more correct form of blackmail
when the circumstances indicate that the source does indeed have something to
fear. It may be a result of coincidence;the soldier was caught on the wrong
side of the border before hostilities actually commenced (he was armed, he could
be a terrorist), or a result of his actions (he surrendered contrary to his
military oath and is now a traitor to his country, and his own forces will take
care of the disciplinary action). The fear up (mild) approach must be a credible
distortion of the truth. A distortion that the source will believe. It usually
involves some incentive;the interrogator can intimate that he might be willing
to alter the circumstances of the source's capture, as long as the source
cooperates and answers the questions.
In most cases, shouting is not necessary. The actual fear is increased by
helping the source to realize the unpleasant consequences that the facts may
cause and then presenting an alternative, which of course can be effected by
answering some simple questions. The fear up approach is deadend, and a wise
interrogator may want to keep it in reserve as a trump card. After working to
increase the source's fear, it would be difficult to convince him that
everything will be all right if the approach is not successful.
The decreased fear down approach is used primarily on a source who is already in
a state of fear due to the horrible circumstances of his capture, or on a source
who is in fear for his life. This technique is really nothing more than calming
the source and convincing him that he will be properly and humanely treated, or
that for him the war is mercifully over and he need not go into combat again.
When used with a soothing, calm tone of voice, this often creates rapport and

usually nothing else is needed to get the source to cooperate. While calming the
source, it is a good idea to stay initially with nonpertinent conversation and
to carefully avoid the subject which has caused the source's fear. This works
quickly in developing rapport and communication as the source will readily
respond to kindness.

When using this approach, it is important that the interrogator meets the source
at the source's perspective level and not expect the source to come up to the
interrogator's perspective level. If a prisoner is so frightened that he has
withdrawn into a shell or rearessed back to a less threatening state of mind,
the interrogator must break through to him. This may be effected by the
interrogator putting himself on the same physical level as the source and may
require some physical contact. As the source relaxes somewhat and begins to
respond to the interrogator's kindness, the interrogator can then begin asking

pertinent questions.
This approach technique may backfire if allowed to go too far. After convincing

the source that he has nothing to fear, he may cease to be afraid and may feel
secure enough to resist the interrogator's pertinent questions. If this occurs,
reverting to a harsher approach technique usually will rapidly bring the desired

result to the interrogator.

The pride and ego approach concentrates on tricking the source into revealing
pertinent information by using flattery or abuse. It is effective with a source
who has displayed weaknesses or feelings of inferiority which can be effectively
exploited by the interrogator. There are two techniques in this approach: the
pride and ego up approach and the pride and ego down approach.

A problem with the pride and ego approach techniques is that since both
variations rely on trickery, the source will eventually realize that he has been
tricked and may refuse to cooperate further. If this occurs, the interrogator
can easily move into a fear up approach and convince the source that the
questions he has already answered have committed him, and it would be useless to
resist further. The interrogator can mention that it will be reported to the
source's forces that he has cooperated fully with the enemy, and he or his
family may suffer possible retribution when this becomes known, and the source
has much to fear if he is returned to his forces. This may even offer the
interrogator the option to go into a love-of-family approach in that the source.

protect his family by preventing his forces from learning of his duplicitymust
or collaboration. Telling the source that you will not report the fact that the
prisoner talked or that he was a severe discipline problem is an incentive that
may enhance the effectiveness of the approach.
The pride and ego up approach is most effective on sources with little or no
intelligence or on those who have been looked down upon for a long time. It is
very effective on low ranking enlisted personnel and junior grade officers as it
allows the source to finally show someone that he does indeed have some
brains."The source is constantly flattered into providing certain information
in order to gain credit. The interrogator must take care to use a flattering
somewhat-in-awe tone of voice and to speak highly of the source throughout the
duration of this approach. This quickly engenders positive feelings on the
source's part as he has probably been looking for this type of recognition all
his life. The interrogator may blow things out of proportion using items from
the source's background and making them seen noteworthy or important. As
everyone is eager to hear themselves praised, the source will eventually rise
to the occasionuand in an attempt to solicit more laundatory comments from the
interrogator, reveal pertinent information.
Effective targets for a successful pride and ego up approach are usually the
socially accepted reasons for flattery: appearance, good military bearing, and
so forth. The interrogator should closely watch the source's demeanor for
indications that the approach is getting through to him. Such indications
include, but are not limited to, a raising of the head, a look of pride in the
eyes, a swelling of the chest, or a stiffening of the back.
The pride and ego down approach is based on the interrogator attacking the
source's sense of personal worth. Any source who shows any real or imagined
inferiority or weakness about himself, his loyalty to his organization, or his
capture in embarrassing circumstances can be easily broken with this approach
technique. The objective is for the interrogator to pounce on the source's sense
of pride by attacking his loyalty, intelligence, abilities, leadership
qualities, slovenly appearance, or any other perceived weakness. This will
usually goad the source into becoming defensive, and he will try to convince the
interrogator that he is wrong. In his attempt to redeem his pride, the source
will usually involuntarily provide pertinent information in attempting to
vindicate himself. The source who is susceptible to this approach is also prone
to make excuses and give reasons why he did or did not do a certain thing, often
shifting the blame to others. Possible targets for the pride and ego down
approach are the source's loyalty, technical competence, leadership abilities,
soldierly qualities, or appearance. If the interrogator uses a sarcastic,
caustic tone of voice with appropriate expressions of distaste or disgust, the
source will readily believe him.
One word of caution, the pride and ego down approach is also a dead end in that,
if it is unsuccessful, it is very difficult for the interrogator to recover and
move to another approach and reestablish a different type of rapport without
losing all credibility.

The futility approach is used to make the source believe that it is useless to
resist and to persuade him to cooperate with the interrogator. The futility
approach is most effective when the interrogator can play on doubts that already
exist in the source's mind. There are really many different variations of the
futility approach. There is the futility of the personal situation you are not
finished here until you answer the questions,"futility in that everyone talks
sooner or later,"futility of the battlefield situation, and futility in the
sense that if the source does not mind talking about history, why should he mind
talking about his missions, they are also history.
If the source's unit had run out of supplies (ammunition, food, fuel, and so
forth), it would be relatively easy to convince him that all of his forces are
having the same logistical problems. A soldier who has been ambushed may have
doubts as to how he was attacked so suddenly and the interrogator should be able
to easily talk him into believing that the NATO forces knew where he was all the
The interrogator might describe the source's frightening recollections of seeing
death on the battlefield as an everyday occurrence for his forces all up and
down the lines. Factual or seemingly factual information must be presented by
the interrogator in a persuasive, logical manner and in a matter-of-fact tone of
Making the situation appear hopeless allows the source to rationalize his
actions, especially if that action is cooperating with the interrogator. When
employing this technique, the interrogator must not only be fortified with
factual information, but he should also be aware of, and be able to exploit, the
source's psychological, moral, and sociological weaknesses.
Another way of using the futility approach is to blow things out of proportion.
If the source's unit was low on, or had exhausted, all food supplies, he can be
easily led to believe that all of his forces had run out of food. If the source
is hinging on cooperating, it may aid the interrogation effort if he is told
that all the other source's have already cooperated. A source who may want to
help save his comrades' lives may need to be convinced that the situation on the
battlefield is hopeless, and that they all will die without his assistance. The
futility approach is used to paint a black picture for the prisoner, but it is
not effective in and of itself in gaining the source's cooperation. The futility
approach must be orchestrated with other approach techniques.

The Oe know all"approach convinces the source that we already know everything.
It is a very successful approach for sources who are naive, in a state of shock,
or in a state of fear. The interrogator must organize all available data on the
source including background information, knowleoge about the source's immediate
tactical situation, and all available OB information on the source's unit. Upon
initial contact with the source, the interrogator asks questions, pertinent and
nonpertinent, from his specially prepared list. When the source hesitates,
refuses to answer, provides an incomplete response, or an incorrect response,
the interrogator himself supplies the detailed answer. Through the careful use
of the limited number of known details, the interrogator must convince the
source that all information is already known;therefore, his answers are of no
consequence. It is by repeating this procedure that the interrogator convinces
the source that resistance is useless as everything is already known. When the
source begins to give accurate and complete information to the questions to
which the interrogator has the answers, the interrogator begins interjecting
questions for which he does not have the answers. After gaining the source's
cooperation, the interrogator still tests the extent of that cooperation by
periodically using questions for which he has the answers. This is very
necessary;if the interrogator does not challenge the source when he is lying,
the source will then know that everything is not known, and that he has been

tricked. He may then provide incorrect answers to the interrogator's questions.
There are some inherent problems with the use of the 0e know all"approach. The
interrogator is required to prepare everything in detail which is very time
consuming. He must commit much of the information to memory as working from
notes may show the limits of the information actually known.
The establish your identity"approach was very effective in Viet Nam with the
Viet Cong, and it can be used at tactical echelons. The interrogator must be
aware, however, that if used in conjunction with the file and dossier approach,
it may exceed the tactical interrogator's preparation resources. In this
technique, the interrocator insists that the source has been identified as an
infamous criminal wanted by higher authorities on very serious charges, and he
has finally been caught posing as someone else. In order to clear himself of
these allegations, the source will usually have to supply detailed information
on his unit to establish or substantiate his tree identity. The interrogator
should initially refuse to believe the source and insist that he is the criminal
wanted by the ambiguous higher authorities."This will force the source to give
even more detailed information about his unit in order to convince the
interrogator that he is indeed who he says he is. This approach works well when
combined with the futility or Oe know all"approach.
Repetition is used to induce cooperation from a hostile source. In one variation
of this technique the interrogator listens carefully to a source's answer to a
question, and then repeats both the question and answer several times. He does
this with each succeeding question until the source becomes so thoroughly bored
with the procedure that he answers questions fully and candidly to satisfy the
interrogator and to gain relief from the monotony of his method of questioning.
The repetition technique must be used carefully, as it will generally not work
when employed against introverted sources or those having great self-control. In
fact, it may provide an opportunity for a source to regain his composure and
delay the interrogation. In employing this technique, the use of more than one
interrogator or a tape recorder has proven to be effective.
The file and dossier approach is when the interrogator prepares a dossier
containing all available information obtained from records and documents
concerning the source or his organization. Careful arrangement of the material
within the file may give the illusion that it contains more data than what is
actually there. The ale may be padded with extra paper, if necessary. Index tabs
with titles such as education, employment, criminal record, military service,
and others are particularly effective. The interrogator confronts the source
with the dossiers at the beginning of the interroaation and explains to,him that
intelligence has provided a complete record of every significant happening in
the source's life;therefore, it would be useless to resist interrogation. The
interrogator may read a few selected bits of known data to further impress the
source. If the technique is successful, the source will be impressed with the

voluminous file, conclude that everything is known, and resign himself to
complete cooperation during the interrogation. The success of this technique is
largely dependent on the naivete of the source, the volume of data on the
subject, and the skill of the interrogator in convincing the source.
The Mutt and Jeff"(friend and foe)' approach involves a psychological ploy
which takes advantage of the natural uncertainty and guilt which a source has as
a result of being detained and questioned. Use of this technique necessitates
the employment of two experienced interrogators who are convincing actors.
Basically, the two interrogators will display opposing personalities and
attitudes toward the source. For example, the first interrogator is very formal
and displays an unsympathetic attitude toward the source. He might be strict and

order the source to follow all military courtesies during questioning. The goal
of the technique is to make the source feel cut off from his friends.
At the time the source acts hopeless and alone, the second interrogator appears

(having received his cue by a hidden signal or by listening and observing out of
view of the source), scolds the first interrogator for his harsh behavior, and
orders him from the room. He then apologizes to.soothe the source, perhaps
offering him coffee and a cigarette. He explains that the actions of the first
interrogator were largely the result of an inferior intellect and lack of human
sensitivity. The inference is created that the second interrogator and the
source have, in common, a high degree of intelligence and an awareness of human
sensitivity above and beyond that of the first interrogator.
The source is normally inclined to have a feeling of gratitude toward the second
interrogator, who continues to show a sympathetic attitude toward the source in
an effort to increase the rapport and control the questioning which will follow.
Should the source's cooperation begin to fade, the second interrogator can hint
that since he is of high rank, having many other duties, he cannot afford to
waste time on an uncooperative source. He may broadly infer that the first
interrogator might return to continue his questioning. When used against the
proper source, this trick will normally gain the source's complete cooperation.
The rapid fire approach involves a psychological ploy based upon the principles
that everyone likes to be heard when he speaks, and it is confusing to be
interrupted in midsentence with an unrelated question. This technique may be
used by an individual interrogator or simultaneously by two or more
interrogators in questioning the same source. In employing this technique the
interrogator asks a series of questions in such a manner that the source does
not have time to answer a question completely before the next question is asked.
This tends to confuse the source, and he is apt to contradict himself, as he has
little time to prepare his answers. The interrogator then confronts the source
with the inconsistencies, causing further contradictions. In many instances, the
source will begin to talk freely in an attempt to explain himself and deny the
inconsistencies pointed out by the interrogator. In attempting to explain his
answers, the source is likely to reveal more than he intends, thus creating
additional leads for further interrogation.
The interrogator must have all his questions prepared before approaching the
source, because long pauses between questions allow the source to complete his
answers and render this approach ineffective. Besides extensive preparation,
this technique requires an experienced, competent interrogator, who has
comprehensive knowledge of .his case, and fluency in the language of the source.
This technique is most effective immediately after capture, because of the
confused state of the source.

The silence approach may be successful when employed against either the nervous
or the confident-type source. When employing this technique, the interrogator
says nothing to the source, but looks him squarely in the eye, preferably with a
slight smile on his face. It is important not to look away from the source, but
force him to break eye contact first. The source will become nervous, begin to
shift around in his chair, cross and recross his legs, and look away. He may ask
questions, but the interrogator should not answer until he is ready to break the
silence. The source may blurt out questions such as, Come on now, what do you
want with me?When the interrogator is ready to break the silence, he may do so
with some nonchalant question such as, You planned this operation a long time,
didn't you?Was it your idea?The interrogator must be patient when employing
this technique. It may appear for a while that the technique is not succeeding,
but it• usually will when given a reasonable chance.

Appendix I
Interrogation Guides
Some of the specific topics on which a captured enemy rifleman may be questioned

Identification of source's squad, platoon, company, battalion, regiment, and
Organization, strength, weapons, and disposition of squad, platoon, and
Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.
Location and strength of men and weapons at strongholds, outposts, and
observation posts in the source's immediate area.
Mission of the source immediately before capture as well as mission of
source's squad, platoon, company, and higher echelons.
Location and description of defensive installations, such as missile sites,
antitank ditches and emplacements, minefields, roadblocks, and barbed wire
entanglements in source's area before capture. Description of weapons with
which these locations are covered.
Names and personality information of small unit commanders known to the
Possible identifications of support mortar, artillery, and armored units.
Status of food, ammunition, and other supplies.
Morale of troops.
Defensive and protective items of NBC equipment, status of NBC training and
defensive NBC instructions, and offensive capability of NBC operations.
Status of immunizations; new shots, booster shots more frequently than normal.

Stress on care and maintenance of NBC protective equipment.
Issuance of new or different NBC pro tective equipment.
Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.
Civilian supply.
Health of civilians and availability of medicine.
Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special

Messengers are frequently chosen on the basis of above average intelligence and
the ability to observe well and remember oral messages and instructions.
Messengers, who have an opportunity to travel about wthin the immediate combat
zone, generally, will have a good picture of the current situation and are
excellent prospects for tactical interrogation. The following topics should be
included when questioning a messenger source:

Nature and exact contents of messages he has been carrying over a reasonable
period of time, as well as the names of persons who originated these messages,
and the names of persons tc whom messages were directed. Description of duty
positions of such personalities.
Information as to the extent to which messengers are used in the applicable
enemy unit, routes of messengers, and location of relay posts.
Location of message centers and com munication lines.
Condition of roads, bridges, and alternate routes.
Location of CPs and the names of commanders and staff officers.
Location of artillery, mortars, and armor seen during messenger's movement
through the combat area.
Location of minefields and other de fensive installations.
Location of supply and ammunition dumps.
Description of terrain features behind the enemy's front lines.

NBC weapons, installations, and units.
Morale and esprit de corps of civilians
Relocation or movement of civilians.
Civilian supply.
Health of civilians and availability of medicine.
Use of radio.equipment in applicable enemy units.

Squad and platoon leaders, as well as company commanders, generally will possess
information on a broader level than that discussed up to this point. In addition
to the information possessed by the riflemen, they may be able to furnish
information on the following subjects:

Plans and mission of their respective units.
Organization of their units as well as their regiment and battalion.
Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.
Disp,psition of companies, regiments, and reserves of each.
Identifications and general organization of supporting units such as
artillery, armor, and engineer units.
Location, strength, and mission of heavy weapons units.
Offensive and defensive tactics of small units.
Qality and morale of subordinate troops.
Doctrine for employment of NBC weapons.
Doctrine for defense against NBC weapons.
Status of NBC defense SOP and current NBC training
Communications procedures and communications equipment.
Issuance of NBC detection equipment and detector paints or paper.
Morale of civilians.
Relocation or movement of civilians.
Civilian supply.
Health of civilians and availability of medicine.
Instructions on handling and evacuation of US and allied prisoners.
Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special

Radio and telephone operators, like messengers, are frequently familiar with the
plans and instructions of their-commanders. In general, they can be expected to
know the current military situation even more thoroughly because of the greater
volume of information which they normally transmit. Topics to be covered when
questioning communications personnel are-

Nature and exact contents of messages sent and received during a given
tactical situation.
Code names or numbers of specific enemy units, such as those appearing in
enemy telephone directories, and in other SOI such as unit identification
panel codes.
Major enemy units to your front and their code names.
Units and individuals in radio nets, their call signs, call words, and
operating frequencies.
Names and code names of commanders and their staff officers.
Types, numbers, and basic characteristics of radios and telephone equipment
used at company, regiment, and division level.
Identification and location of units occupying front line positions.
Location of artillery and mortar positions.
Information on enemy codes and ciphers.
Code names given to operations or to specially designated supply points such
as supply points for special weapons.
Names and signals designating various types of alerts.

Qestions directed by the tactical interrogator to captured drivers should

concern the aspects of the enemy situation which the prisoner would know because
of his driving assignments. In dealing with EPW drivers of command and staff
vehicles, supply vehicles, arid vehicles drawing weapons, the following topics
should be examined:

Identification and location of command posts of higher, lower, and supporting
Names and personal character traits of commanders and staff officers.
Plans, instructions, orders, and conversations of commanders and staff
Attitudes of commanders and staff officers toward each other, civilians, units
under their command, and the general military situation.
Routes of communications and their condition.
Tactical doctrines of commanders.
Command and staff organization.
Supply routes and road co.aditions.
Location of supply points and types of military and civilian supplies.
Sufficiency or lack of both civilian and military supplies.
Types, numbers, and condition of military and civilian supply-carrying
Location of artillery and mortar positions
Troop movements and troop assembly areas.
Location of truck parks and motor pools.
Organization of antitank and air defense artillery units, weapons, and
Location of antitank and air defense artillery positions.
Names of commanders of antitank and air defense artillery units.
Mission of antitank and air defense artillery.
Types and status of ammunition.
Voluntary or forced evacuation or movement of civilians.
Morale and health of civilians.

The degree of patrol activity on the part of the enemy is often a good
indication of enemy plans. Topics for questioning patrol leaders and members of
enemy patrols upon their capture,include-

SDecific mission of the patrol.
Exact routes used and time of departure and return of patrol.
Location of enemy forward edge of the battle area, general outpost, combat
outpost, and outposts.
Location of platoon, company, regi ment, or division headquarters.
Routes of approach and enemy positions.
Enemy strongholds and fields of fire.
Machine gun and mortar positions of the enemy.
Observation posts and listening posts.
Condition of bridges and location of fords.
Description of key terrain features.
Location and description of defensive positions such as antitank weapons,
roadblocks, mines, barbed wire entanglements, gaps in wire and safe lines,
trip flares, booby traps, tank traps, and ambushes.
Other reconnaissance objectives, agencies, and patrols.
Organization and equipment of tactical reconnaissance agencies in regiments
and divisions.
Passwords and counter signs of patrols and line units.
Patrol communication system and range or radios.
Names of commanders, staff officers, and particularly of intelligence officers
of enemy unit.
Coordination of patrol activities with other units such as rifle companies,
mortar units, and artillery units.

Morale and esprit de corps of civilians

Morale and esprit de corps of civilians

Civilian supply.

Health of civilians and availability of medicine.

Members of machine gun and mortar units can be expected to know, on the basis of
their experience or observation, the following:

Location of their own, as well as other, machine gun and mortar positions and

projected alternate positions.

Organization, strength, casualties, and weapons of the source's unit.

Targets for machine guns and mortars.

Names of small unit leaders.

Status of weapons crew training.

Disposition of small rifle units, squads, and platoons.

Supply of ammunition to include type of ammunition in the basic load or on

hand, for example, chemical and biological ammunition.

Location of forward ammunition points.

Characteristics of weapons used.

Food and other supplies.


Effect of our own firepower upon their positions.

Availability of nuclear capability.

Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.
The liaison officer is the commander's agent for accomplishing coordination
among the headquarters of lower, adjacent, and higher units. The liaison officer
also may be called upon to effect coordination between infantry units and
supporting or supported armor and artillery, engineer, and reconnaissance units.
Topics to be covered when questioning a captured liaison officer are as follows:

Contents of field orders, such as composition of attacking forces; location

and direction of attack; missions of individual units; objectives; plans for

attack, defense, or withdrawals; and plans for communication and coordination

among units.

Location of lower, adjacent, higher, and supporting unit CPs as well as

location of supply and communications installations.

Locations of observation posts and outposts.

Assembly areas for troops and supplies.

Disposition of regiments, battalions, and companies of a division.

Identification and disposition of reserves.

Status of supplies of all types.

Civilian social and economic conditions.

Evacuation or movement of civilians.
Topics to be covered when questioning captured armored troops are as follows:

Unit identifications.

Designation and strength of supporting or supported infantry units.

Types and characteristics of tanks employed.

Mechanical and tactical weaknesses of these tanks.

Means of communications between tanks and between tanks and infantry.

Missions and objectives.

Routes of approach.

Armored units in reserve.

Location of tank parks and assembly areas.

Location of impassable terrain features.

Methods of mortar, artillery, and tank coordination.

Location of tank repair depots and POL dumps (to include resupply and

refueling techniques).
Effect of weather on tank operations.
Armored reconnaissance missions.
Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.
Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.
Relocation or movement of civilians.
Civilian supply.
Health of civilians and availability of medicine.
Status of ammunition and POL resupply.
Location of ammunition supply points
Ammunition supply to include type in the basic load or on hand, for example,
chemical ammunition.
Measures for defense against NBC and radiological attack to include type of
NBC defensive equipment installed in the tank.
Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special

Topics to be covered when questioning captured artillerymen are as follows.
Forward Observers
Topics for interrogation of forward observers include-

Location, organization, and number of guns of the battery or battalion whose
fire the source was observing and directing.
Location of front lines, outposts, and observation posts.
Location of alternate observation posts.
Location and probable time of occupation of present or alternate gun
Deployment of artillery.
Characteristics of guns, including caliber and range.
Targets for the various types of fire during different phases of combat.
Nature of the infantry-artillery communications net.
Type and location of artillery fire requested by infantry units.
Identification of corps or other supporting artillery units.
Plan of attack, defense, or withdrawal of enemy units.
Methods of coordinating artillery fire with infantry maneuver.
Mission and objectives of source's unit as well as of supported units.
Routes of approach and their condition. Characteristics of terrain features.
Methods of observing and directing artillery fire, including information such
as types of aircraft employed.
Methods of counterbattery fire and methods of protecting enemy positions from
counterbattery fire.
Use and location of dummy artillery positions.
Types of artillery ammunition used for various targets, new types of
ammunition, and conservation of fires and reasons for conservation.
Location of artillery and infantry unit command posts.
Trafficability of routes appropriate for movement of heavy artillery.
Names of commanders, staff officers, and their attitudes toward each other and
toward infantry commanders.
Number of newly assigned personnel in unit within last 30 days.
Effect of our artillery upon the enemy units.
Location and numbering of defensive concentrations.
Location of ammunition supply points. Radio channels used for fire control

Identification and location of support ing battalions.
Availability of nuclear fire support. Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.

Relocation or movement of civilians. Civilian supply. Health of civilians and
availability of medicine.

Artillery Firing Battery Personnel
Interrogation of a source from a firing battery should cover the following

Measures of defense against friendly artillery fire.
Counterbattery protection for artillery installations.
Effect of friendly counterbattery fire. Location of battery ammunition points.

Disposition of local security weapons.
Direction and elevation of fire.
Instructions concerning the use of ammunition.
Names of battery and other commanders.
Detailed description of artillery weap ons used.
Status of weapons crew training.
Information on food supplies and morale of military and civilians.
Measures for defense against NBC attack.
Types and amount of ammunition, to include chemical and nuclear ammunition, in
the basic load or on hand.
Location of chemical and biological ammunitions.
Location of targets marked for chemi cal and biological fires.

Air Defense Artillerymen

Interrogation of a source from an air defense unit should cover the following:
Location and number of air defense weapons.
Detailed description and characteristics of air defense guns and missiles
Shape, size, and location of ground radars.
Organization of air defense units.
Types of areas defended.
Nuclear capability.
Methods of attack against friendly aircraft, by type of aircraft.
Avenues of approach and altitudes most and least advantageous to enemy air
Methods of identifying unknown aircraft.

Although medical personnel are entitled to special protective measures under the
provisions of international agreements, they can be. and are, interrogated
without infringement of any existing laws or rules of warfare. Topics to be
covered when interrogating enemy medical personnel are as follows:

Number of casualties over a given phase of combat operations.
Weapons accounting for most casualties.
Key personnel who have been casualties.
Conditions of health and sanitation in enemy units
Ratio of dead to wounded.
Commander's tactics in relation to the number of casualties.
Adequacy and efficiency of casualty evacuation.
Weapons most feared by the enemy.
Location and staffing of aid stations and hospitals.
Organization of division, regiment, and battalion medical units.
Status and types of medical supplies.
Use and characteristics of newly devel oped medicine or drugs.
Data on your wounded, sick, or dead in the hands of the enemy.
Skill of enemy medical personnel.
Information on mass sickness or epi demics in the enemy forces.
Types of treatment and medication for NBC casualties.
Supply and availability of materials used in the treatment of NBC casualties.
Special training or treatment of NBC casualties.
New or recent immunizations.
Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.

Relocation or movement of civilians.
Civilian supply.
Health of civilians and availability of medicine.
Location and present condition of civilian hospitals, factories producing
medical supplies, and warehouses and stores containing medical supplies.


Topics for questioning of captured engineer troops are as follows:
Mission of supported unit.
Exact location and pattern of existing minefields, location of bridges,
buildings, airfields, and other installations prepared for demolition, and
types of mines or explosives used.
Doctrine pertaining to the use of mines and booby traps to include types of
mines, characteristics of firing devices, and minefield patterns.
Location of roadblocks and tank traps and how constructed.
Condition of roads, bridges, and streams or rivers for trafficability of
personnel, vehicles, and armor. Weight-carrying capacity of bridges and
location and description of fords.
Location of engineer materials and equipment such as road material, bridge
timber, lumber, steel, explosives, quarries, rock crushers, sawmills, and
machine shops.
Location of dummy vehicles and tank and gun positions.
Location of camouflaged positions and installations.
Water supply and locations of water points.
Organization, strength, and weapons of engineer units.
Presence of other than organic engineer units at the front and mission of such
Number of organic trucks, tractors, and other engineer vehicles.
Location of new or repaired bridges.
Use of demolitions.
Morale and esprit de corps of civilians.
Relocation or movement of civilians.
Civilian supply.
Health of civilians and availability of medicine.
Location and present condition of civilian power plants, water works, and
sewage disposal plants.
Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special


Topics for questioning captured reconnaissance troops are as follows:
The reconnaissance plan, march order, time schedule, and specific missions of
all elements, means of coordination and communication between elements, and
the unit headquarters and higher headquarters.
Nature of orders received from higher headquarters.
Identification, organization, composition, strength, means of transportation,
and weapons of the unit.
Routes of approach used by the unit.
Identification, composition, organization, strength, and disposition of the
main body of troops and reinforcements. Routes to be used.
General quality of troops of the recon naissance unit and of the main body.
Radio communication equipment and frequencies used.
Night maneuvers, rehearsals, unit size, night vision devices, and special


Civilians who have recently left enemy-held areas normally have important
information and often give this information readily. This information is usually
of particular importance to the CA and PSYOP personnel of the unit. The
following topics should be included when questioning local civilians:

Location of enemy front lines and major defensive positions.
Location of artillery positions.
Location and nature of minefields in enemy rear area.
Description of key terrain.
Condition of roads, bridges, and major buildings.
Enemy policy and attitude toward local civilians.
Human and material resources of the area.
Morale and esprit de corps of local civilians.
Data on important civilian personali ties remaining in enemy areas
Health and medical status of local populace.
Effect of friendly operations on civilian populace.
Instructions to prepare for defensive measures against NBC attack.
Recent immunizations.

Personnel recently acquireo through combat operations and who are identified as
being involved with political and PSYOP should be questioned. As a minimum, the
following topics should be included:

Policy, plans, and objectives.
Organization and training.
Current and past activities, to include themes of any propaganda programs.
Enemy analysis of our weaknesses and strengths.
Target audiences for propaganda, including priorities.
Effects of friendly PSYOP.
Analysis of enemy weaknesses and strengths.
Enemy counterpropaganda activities.


Topics for interrogation of captured guerrilla personnel are as follows:
Area of activities.
Nature of activities.

External direction or support.


Some specific questions for information on NBC operations are as follows:
What items of NBC protective equipment have been issued to enemy troops?Is
there any differentiation in issue of items for particular areas?If so, what
items for what areas?
Are there any new or recent immunizations indicated by sources during
What immunizations have enemy troop units received, as indicated in captured
immunization records?
Are enemy troops equipped with protective masks?Is the individual required to
carry the mask on his person?Are there any sectors where the mask is not
required equipment for the individual?What accessory equipment is issued with
the mask?
Is protective clothing issued to enemy troops?If so, what type of clothing or
articles?If special clothing is used, is it for any particular geographic
Have enemy troop units constructed NBC protective shelters?If so, what type?
Are enemy fortifications, individual and collective, provided with overhead
Are enemy troops issued any protective footwear or other means to provide
protection against penetration by liquid agents?

Are enemy tanks or armored vehicles provided with specially installed
protective equipment to protect the crew in case of chemical attack?
Are enemy troops issued any type of individual protective items, including
antidotes or protective ointment, for first aid?
Are there any areas for which additional or unusual NBC safety precautions
have been established?
What is the size and composition of enemy NBC specialist troop units?Where
are they located?Why?
Have enemy troops been issued any special precautionary instructions
concerning consumption of food and water or handling of livestock in areas
that may be overrun by enemy forces?
What training, if any, have enemy troops received in the use of
incapacitating-type aaents and their dissemination?
What items of chemical detection equipment have been issued to enemy troops?
Are the items operated constantly, irregularll, or not at all?Is there any
differentiation made regarding their use in certain areas?
What type of radiation-measuring instruments are issued to enemy troop units
and what is their range or limit?How are they distributed?
How many hours of training with radiation measuring instruments have enemy
monitoring and survey personnel received?
How many hours of NBC training have enemy troops received?How many hours
training are devoted individually to chemical, biological, and radiological
operations?Have enemy troops received any special or accelerated training as
opposed to what is considered routine?.
How many hours of NBC training have enemy troops received?How many hours
training are devoted individually to chemical, biological, and radiological
operations?Have enemy troops received any special or accelerated training as
opposed to what is considered routine?.
Have sources observed decontamination stations or installations established in
enemy areas?If so, what is their location and composition?
Are enemy troop units issued biological sampling kits or devices?If so, what
is their type and composition?
Have sources observed any cylinders or containers which might contain bulk
chemical agents?
Have sources observed any tactical aircraft equipped with accessory tanks
which indicate a spray capability?Are sources aware of location of dumps of
chemical-filled ammunition, bombs, clusters, and bulk chemical agents?
Do enemy artillery, mortar, or rocket units have chemical ammunition on hand?
At what radiological exposure or dose are troops required to relocate?

Are there any problem areas or shortcomings in NBC material?
The following PIR and IR are applicable for internal defense operations in

appropriate theaters of operations?
What types of tunnels and caves and modification are used in defense against
riot control agents and explosive gases?
What defensive material and instructions are issued for defense against riot

control agents?
What defensive measures are taken against defoliation and anticrop agents?

Appendix J
1949 Geneva Conventions

The United States is a party to the following Geneva Conventions of 1949:
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GWS.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of 12 August 1949, cited herein as
GWS Sea.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August
1949, cited herein as GPW.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War of 12 August 1949, cited herein as GC.

These treaties will be strictly observed and enforced by United States forces
without regard to whether they are legally binding upon this country and its
specific relations with any other specified country. Military commaniers will be
instructed which, if any, of these treaties, or component parts thereof, are not
legally binding in a given situation. On 10 August 1965, the US Secretary of
State notified the International Committee of the Red Cross that the Geneva
Conventions as a whole would apply to the Vietnam conflict. Future armed
conflict involving the United States will most likely be subjected to the same
laws on a unilateral basis.

Those articles of the above-referenced treaties directly applicable to this
manual are quoted below. (See FM 27-10 for full explanation of these treaties.)
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peacetime, the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting
Parties, even if the State of War is not recognized by one of them.
The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of
the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets
with no armed resistance. Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a
party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain
bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the
Convention in relation to the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the
provisions thereof.

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict
shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be
treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, color,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following, acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time
and in any place whatsoever with rspect to the above-mentioned persons:
violence to life and person, in particular, murder of all kinds, mutilation,
cruel treatment and torture;
taking of hostages;
outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading

the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the

judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for. An impartial

humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may

offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of
the Parties to the conflict.

A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of
the enemy:

Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of
militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including
those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict
and operating in.

outside their own territory, even if this territory is
occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such
organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
that of carrying arms openly;
that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of

Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an
authority not recognized by the Detaining Power.
Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof,
such as civilian members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply
contractors, members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare
of the armed forces, provided that they have received authorization from the
armed forces which they accompany, who shall provide them for that purpose with
an identity card similar to the annexed model.
Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices, of the merchant
marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the Parties to the conflict, who do
not benefit by more favorable treatment under any other provisions of

international law.
Inhabitants of a nonoccupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy
spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had
time to form themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms
openly and respect theIaws and customs of war.

B. The following shall likewise be treated as prisoners of war under the present

Persons belonging, or having belonged, to the armed forces of the occupied
country, if the occupying Power considers is necessary by reason of such
allegiance to intern them, even though it has originally liberated them while
hostilities were going on outside the territory it occupies, in particular where
such persons have made an unsuccessful attempt to rejoin the armed forces to
which they belong and which are enaaged in combat, or where they fail to comply
with a summons made to them with a view to internment.
The persons belonging to one of the categories enumerated in the present
Article, who have been received by neutral or nonbelligerent Powers on their
territory and whom these Powers are required to intern under international law,
without prejudice to any more favourable treatment which these Powers may choose
to give and with the exceptions of Article 8, 10, 15, 30, fifth paragraph,
58-67, 92, 126 and, where diplomatic relations exist between the Parties to the
conflict and the neutral or nonbelligerent Power concerned, those Articles
concerning the Protecting Power. Where such diplomatic relations exist, the
Parties to a conflict on whom these persons depend shall be allowed to perform
towards them the functions of a Protecting Power as provided in the present


Convention, without prejudice to the functions which these Parties normally
exercise in conformity with diplomatic and consular usage and treaties.

C. This Article shall in no way affect the status of medical personnel and

chaplains as provided for in Article 33 of the present Convention.
Prisoners of war must at all times be humanely treated. An unlawful act or
omission by the Detaining Power causing death or seriously endangering the
health of a prisoner of war in its custody is prohibited, and will be regarded
as a serious breach of the present Convention. In particular, no prisoner of war
may be subjected to physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments
of any kind which are not justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment
of the prisoner concerned and carried out in his interest.
Likewise, prisoners of war must at all times be protected, particularly against
acts of violence or intimidation and against insults and public curiosity.
Measures of reprisal against prisoners of war are prohibited.

Every prisoner of war, when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his
surname, first names and rank, date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or
serial number, or failing this, equivalent information.
If he willfully infringes this rule, he may render himself liable to a
restriction of the privileges accorded to his rank or status.
Each Party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons under its
jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners of war, with an identity card
showing the owners surname, first names, rank, army, regimental, personal or
serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth. The identity card
may, furthermore, bear the signature or the fingerprints, or both, of the owner,
and may bear, as well, any other information the Party to the conflict may wish
to add concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. As far as possible the
card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. The identity
card shall be shown by the prisoner of war upon demand, but may in no case be
taken away from him.
No physical or mental torture, ncr any other form of coercion, may be inflicted
on prisoners of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever.
Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not be threatened, insulted, or
exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind.
Prisoners of war who, owing to their physical or mental condition, are unable to
state their identity, shall be handed over to the medical service. The identity
of such prisoners shall be established by all possible means, subject to the

provisions of the preceding paragraph.
The questioning of prisoners of war shall be carried out in a language which
they understand.

No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against protected persons, in
particular to obtain inform ation from them or from third parties.


abn airborne

ACR armored cavalry regiment

AF Air Force
AG Adjutant General

AKM designation of a type of Soviet rifle
amph amphibious
amt amount

AOE Army of Excellence
approx approximately
armd armored
at antitank

ATGL antitank grenade launcher

Aug August

B - biographic intelligence
E - economic intelligence
S - sociological intelligence
T - transportation and telecommunications intelligence
M - military geographic intelligence
A - armed forces intelligence
P - political intelligence
S - scientific and technical intelligence

BICC battlefield information control center
BMP designation of a type of Soviet armored personnel carrier
bn battalion
C2 command and control
C3 command, control, and communications
C3CM command, control, communications countermeasures
CA civil affairs
C-E Communication-Electronics
CED captured enemy document
CEE captured enemy equipment
CEWI combat electronic warfare and intelligence
CINCAFMED Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces, Mediterranean
CI counterintelligence
CIC combined interrogation center
CINCENT Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Central Europe
CINCAN Allied Commander in Chief Channel
CINCNORTH Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Northern Europe
CINCSOUTH Commander in Chief, Allied Forces, Southern Europe
CM&D collection management and dissemination
CMEC captured material exploitation center
CMO civil-military operations
co company
COMMZ communications zone
CONUS continental United States
COSCOM corps support command
CP command post
CPR common point of reference
CSS combat service support
DCPR destination common point of reference
decon decontamination
det detachment
DIAM Defense Intelligence Agency Manual
DISCOM division support command
DISUM daily intelligence summary


div division

DOI date of information
DS direct support
dsg designated

DTG date-time group
E east
ea each
EAC echelons above corps
em enlisted man
EPW enemy prisoner of war
evac evacuation
FID foreign internal defense
fl fluent
FM field manual
FNU first name unknown
FRG Federal Republic of Germany
FUD full unit designation
G1 Assistant Chief of Staff, Gl, Personnel
G2 Assistant Chief of Staff, G2, Intelligence
G3 Assistant Chief of Staff, G3, Operations
G4 Assistant Chief of Staff, G4, Logistics
G5 Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, Civil Affairs
GDR German Democratic Republic
GS general support
H/S hearsay
HPT high-payoff target
HD headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence
IAW in accordance with
ID identification
ICPR initial common point of reference

i.e. that is
I&E interrogation and exploitation
IEW intelligence and electronic warfare
IMINT imagery intelligence
intel intelligence
intg interrogation
INTREP intelligence report
INTSUM intelligence summary
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
IPW prisoner of war interrogation
IR information requirements
J2 Intelligence Directorate
JIF joint interrogation facilities
JrLt junior lieutenant
JrSgt junior sergeant
KB knowledgeability briefs
KIA killed in action
ldr leader
LIC low-intensity conflict
MARSTA martial status
mbr member
MHz megahertz
MI military intelligence
MIT mobile interrogation teams
MN/I middle name/initial
MOSC military occupational specialty code

MR motorized rifle

MRC motorized rifle battalion

MRC motorized rifle company

MRD motorized rifle division

MRP motorized rifle platoon

MRR motorized rifle regiment
MRS motorized rifle squad

N north/no

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC nuclear, biological, chemical
no number
OB order of battle
OCONUS outside continental United States
off officer
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
PERINTREP periodic intelligence report
pers personnel

PIR priority intelligence requirements
PKM designation of a type of Soviet weapon
PKT designation of a type of Soviet weapon
plt platoon
PO political officer
POC point of capture
POL petroleum, oil, and lubricants
pos position
PSYOP psychological operations
REC radio electronic combat
recon reconnaissance
regt regiment
RPG-7 designation of a type of Soviet antitank grenade launcher
RSTA reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition
S south
S1 Adjutant (US Army)
S2 Intelligence Officer (US Army)
S3 Operations and Training Officer (US Army)
S4 Supply Officer (US Army)
S5 Civil Affairs Officer (US Army)
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SAEDA Subversion and Espionage Directed Against US Army and Deliberate Security
SALUTE size, activity, location, unit, time, and equipment
SFC sergeant first class
SIGINT signals intelligence
SIR specific information requirements
SITMAP situation map
Sol signal operating instructions
SOP standing operating procedure
sqd squad
sqdrn squadron
SrSgt senior sergeant
STANAG standardization agreement
SUPINTREP supplemental intelligence report
Svc service
SVD designation of a type of Soviet rifle
SW southwest


TCAEtechnical control and analysis element

TECHDOC technical document

TOC tactical operations center

TOE table of organization

UCMJ Uniform Code of Military Justice

UIC unit identification code

UkSSR Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic

U/I unidentified

unk unknown

US United States

USA United States Army

USACGSC United States Army Command and General Staff College

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republic

UTM Universal Transervse Mercator (grid)

W would not answer


Required publications are sources that users must read in order to understand or
to comply with this publication.
Army Regulations
25-400-2 The Modern Army Recordkeeping System
190-8Army Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons
380-5 Department of the Army Information Security Program
Field Manuals (FMs)
19-40 Enemy Prisoners of War, Civilian Internees, and Detained Persons
21-26 Map Reading
27-10The Law of Land Warfare
34-1 Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
34-60 Counterintelligence
Department of Army Pamphlet (DA Pams
34-60A (S/NOFORN) Counterintelligence Operations (U)
100-2-3 The Soviet Army Troops Organization and Equipment
100-5 Operations
100-20 Low Intensity Conflict
Department of Army Pamphlets (DA Pams)
27-161-1 International Law Vol 1
Defense Intelligence Agency Manuals (DIAMs)
58-13 (S) Defense Human Resources Intelligence Collection Procedures (U)
Miscellaneous Publications
The Hague and Geneva Conventions Uniform Code of Military Justice
Department of Army Forms (DA Forms
1132 Prisoners Personal Property List-Personal Deposit Funds
Command publications cannot be obtained through Armywide resupply channels.
Determine availability by contacting the address shown. Field circulars expire
three years from the date of publication unless sooner rescinded.
Field Circulars (FCs)
8-2 Medical Intelligence in the Airland Battle 31 Mar 86. Academy of Health
Sciences, US Army, Fort Houston, Texas 78234-1600
34-124 MI Bn/Co Interrogation and Exploitation (EAC), Oct 85. United States Army
Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Arizona

Projected Publications
Projected publications are sources of additional information that are scheduled
for printing but are not yet available. Upon print, they will be distributed
automatically via pinpoint distribution. They may not be obtained from the USA
AG Publications Center until indexed in. DA Pamphlet 310-1.
Field Manuals
34-S (S) Human Intelligence Operations (U)
34-25 Corps Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations
Related Publications
Related publications are sources of additional information. They are not
required in order to understand this publication.
Field Manuals (FMs)
8-10 Health Service Support in Theater of Operations
33-1 Psychological Operations
34-80 Brigade and Battalion Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations

FP/1 34-52
8 MAY 1987
By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
General, United States Army Chief of Staff
•.firigadier General, United Stares Artny
The Adjutant General

Active Army, USAR, and ARNG: To be distributed in accordance with DA Form 12-11 A, Require­ments for Intelligence Interrogation (Qty rqr block no. 278).
* U.S. GOVERMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1987 726-041/41055