This First Annex to Major General Antonio M. Taguba's Report in to the allegations of abuses at Abu Ghraib prison focuses on the psychological factors contributing to the abuse of detainees at the prison. The assessment cites a number of potential factors including the immersion of soldiers into Islamic culture, which many were encountering for the first time; the lack of proper training and supervision and the failure to respond to recommendations of corrective actions, failure of leaders to accept responsibility; and the pervasive nature of detainee abuse. The assessment notes three abuse incidents on August 23, 2003, October 28-29, 2003 and November 8 and 24, 2003.
AR 15-6 investigation-- Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib
Psychological Assessment
Certain factors can interact and contribute to horrific outcomes, such as the Iraqi
detainee abuse at the end of 2003 at Abu Ghraib (also known as the Baghdad Central
Correctional Facility [BCCF]). This is clearly an example of aberrant behavior.
Firs:. Soldiers were immersed in the Islamic culture, a culture that many were
encountering for a first time. Clearly there are major differences in worship and beliefs,
and there is the association of Muslims with terrorism. All these causes exaggerate
differences and create misperceptions that can lead to fear or devaluation of a people.
Second. quality of life at Abu Ghraib was poor, and lacking most amenities present in
other camps in Iraq. The population at BCCF was disparate, consisting of hardened Iraqi
criminals watched by corrupt Iraqi prison guards, as well as the varying types of
detainees: males. females, juveniles, criminals, terrorists, and mentally ill. BCCF is a
closed environment, an environment that would wear on its occupants (MPs, Ml
personnel, and detainees) over a prolonged period of time. Third, all present at Abu
Ghraih were irtilv in personal danger. Daily mortar attacks from without and sporadic
prisoner riots from within led to several deaths and numerous injuries of both Soldiers
and detainees alike.
Fourth. command factors were a key player at the BCCF. There was not only a
lack of interaction but also friction between the MP and MI command elements. A lack
of proper training and supervision was present. There was a failure to respond to
recommendations of corrective actions contained in several AARs, 15-6s, and even the
recommendations highlighted in MGs Miller and Ryder assessment reports. Leaders
DODD0A-000309
were unwilling to accept responsibility. Discipline, when taken, was lenient, leading to
the realization that the BDE or BN chains of command would essentially do nothing. thus
contributinu to a mentality that "I can get away with thi s."
Specifically, there were several commanders and NCOs who were ineffective
leaders. Take. for instance, BG Karpinski, Cdr 800th MP BDE. On the bases of her
Cour- hour interview and our examination of the interviews and sworn statements of
others, we concluded that she was unable to delegate taskings and did many taskings on
her own. Though with good intentions, she lessened or dismissed punishments
recommended by her staff. She was painfully aware of several problems in the 800 th MP
13DE. including personnel, logistics, administration, and supplies, but she was not capable
oldemanding solutions from her chain of command. She felt herself a victim, and she
nropaizatcd a negativity that permeated throughout the BDE.
Given this atmosphere of danger, promiscuity, and negativity, the worst human
qualities and behaviors came to the fore and a perversive dominance came to prevail,
especially at Abu Ghraib. Inadequate and immoral men and women desiring dominance
ma y he drawn to fields such as corrections and interrogation, where they can be in
IIIPh
iii
absolute control over others. CP ad a civilian prison job. SSG was
also in corrections. Through our investigation, we identified them as ringleaders of the
abuse, but note carefully that they collaborated with other MP Soldiers and several
unknown MI personnel, to include Soldiers as well as their U.S. civilian contract
interrogators and interpreters. Witnesses report pairs of civilian interrogators and
interpreters carrying out detainee abuse, as well as an interpreter raping a male juvenile
detainee. In fact. the MI unit seemed to be operating in a conspiracy of silence. Still, it is
DOIDD0A-000310
important to remember that dominance in and of itself is not improper. in fact,
interrogators knowingly dominate their subjects, and sometimes even intimidate, in order
to obtain intelligence. But clearly the behavior at BCCF crossed the line. The sadistic
and psychopathic behavior was appalling and shocking.
In CPM and SS area of responsibility at tier lAllB of the ir 1111111 r
Hard - Site. ii was commonplace for detainees to be abused. MP dog handlers cooperated
with M1 interrogators under the MPs' watch to use dogs to frighten, intimidate, and even
hits detainees. 1 LTillip platoon leader and acting company commander of 372nd
MP Company, was openly hostile and allowed his guards to carry illegal weapons. MP
do.: handler SGIN F as disrespectful and racist (he said, "After working at the prison
(or so lon. the dogs came not to like Iraqi detainees. They didn't like the Iraqi culture,
smell. sound, skin tone, hair color, or anything about them."). Detainee abuse was
common knowledge among the enlisted Soldiers at Abu Ghraib. Abuse with sexual
themes (se: below) occurred and was witnessed, condoned, and photographed, but never
reported. [yen officers witnessed abuse on several occasions or had knowledge of abuse
•
at the BCCF.
As mentioned earlier, everyday life was extremely stressful. And several MP and
Ml Soldiers were especially indifferent and vindictive against detainees involved in any
violence toward Coalition Forces or who exhibited deviant behavior. On 23 August 03,
an MI Soldier kicked and beat a passive, cuffed detainee who was suspected of mortaring
BCCF; this incident was witnessed by officers and NCOs alike. On 28-29 October 03,
('PI rid SS eived three detainees involved in rape of a male
juvenile. MI Soldiers instructed them to "rough them up." CPL Okid SSG
DODD0A-000311
101111acklcd the three together, lying on the floor, simulating gay sex. On 8
November 03. MP Lzuards brought seven hooded detainees to the Hard-Site who had
rioted in Camp Ganci earlier that day. They were stripped, told to get on their hands and
knees. and placed face forward in a pyramid. Other Soldiers stopped by to view. PFC
England said, "Wc would joke around, everyone would laugh at the things we had them
do " On 24 November 03, a detainee shot a MP guard (who was unhurt) with a pistol
—4.
smuggled m to him by the Iraqi Olson guards. He sustained lethal shotgun rounds to his
legs. Then later, after returning from the hospital, CP 111.111. him severely,
including direct blows to his leg wounds.
Clearly some detainees at Abu Ghraib were totally humiliated and degraded. This
is a classic example of the legal formula that "predisposition + opportunity = criminal
behavior." Predisposition included the psychological factors of negativity, anger, hatred,
and desire to dominate and humiliate. And, with an unsupervised workplace in which no
threat of appropriate punishment would be forthcoming, there was opportunity.
Moreover. competent authority needs to expedite the detainee release process so that
• detainees ?vithout intelligence value will be rapidly released. And we can learn from the
program in place at Dover Air Force Base, where the remains of servicemen are received.
Psychiatrists or psychologists are always present. and General Officers have the
opportunit n to observe the entire process of personnel conducting mortuary affairs
operations. and how they cope with conditions of their workplace.
Finally. we must be ever ready to prevent the recurrence of such inhumane
behavior to the best of our ability. But when such behavior occurs, the guilty must face
swift. decisive, and appropriate justice. While justice is being served, an investigation
,ifn#;„
DODD0A-000312
scam needs to analyze the organization and needs to deal with it accordingly. It seems
incomprehensible that such misdeeds could happen in a facility, even in a prison complex
as notorious as Ahu Ghraib. But they did.
But BCCF would be a troublesome arena today even for a well trained MP or MI
unit conducting detainee and interrogation operations. Compare and contrast the
differences between the detention missions of the Soldiers of Desert Storm and Operation
Iraqi Freedom. The Desert Storm Soldiers dealt with male enemy prisoners in a war that
lasted a matter of hours. At war's end, they released and repatriated the prisoners. In
01F-2. the war is ongoing with no end in sight, and the detainees are in fixed and exposed
camp facilities These detainees are male and female, young and old; they may be
innocent. may have high intelligence value, or may be terrorists or criminals. No matter
who they are. if they are at Abu Ghraib, they are remanded in deplorable, dangerous
I v int!. colic' lions. as are the Soldiers. Every day, the Soldiers must deal with extremely
irustrated and hostile detainees who are in total limbo concerning their fate and release;
the Soldiers must always be on their guard. And, depending if they are MP or MI
Soldiers. they are pressured to either prevent escape or obtain intelligence rapidly. Thus,
BCCF has both depressive and anxiety-laden elements that would grind down even the
most mon% ated Soldier and lead to anger and possibly loss of control.
This new "psychological battlefield" requires a new support system for today's
MP guard and MI specialist. Of course they must receive all prerequisite training and be
knowledgeable on international law and information technology. But they should receive
respite away from these detention camps periodically. Physicians and chaplains are
needed for the body and spirit, but mental health providers are needed for the mind. A
DODD0A-000313
psychiatrist or psychologist should be on the lookout for significant
anszerdepressiveianxiety symptoms, and he/she would also provide education and
support to prevent Soldiers from any negative conditioning that could impair job
perfomiancc. Our Soldiers deserve no less.
smen I
CO
USAF Psychiatrist
Member. AR 15 8—th -6 Investigation Team— uu MP Brigade