Taguba Annex 45: Article 15-6 Investigation Interview of Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski re: Detainee Operations at Abu Ghraib Prison

<p>This document is the transcript of the sworn interview of Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski conducted by Major General Antonio M. Taguba, Deputy Commanding General of the Coalition Land Forces Component Command, conducted at Camp Doha, Kuwait, on 15 February 2004. The interview was conduced under the authority of an AR 15-6 Investigation. The investigation was to gather all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of maltreatment of detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison, also known as the Baghdad Central Confinement [sic] Facility. As well as detainee escapes and accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7. The investigation further looked into the training, the standards, employment, command policies, and internal policies concerning the detainees held at the Abu Ghraib Prison. And finally, to assess the command climate, the supervisory presence of the 800th Military Police Brigade chain of command. General Karpinski was the commanding General for the facility at the time relevant to the accusations.</p>

Investigative File
Sunday, February 15, 2004
Monday, October 18, 2004

1 ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW 2 3 At Camp Doha, Kuwait, on 15 February 2004: 4 MAJOR GENERAL ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, U.S. Army, CFLCC Deputy Commanding 5 General deposing. 6 MASTER SERGEANTUU.S. Army, CFLCC-SJA, Senior Court 7 Reporter, has been detailed reporter for this interview and has been 8 previously sworn. 9 BRIGADIER GENERAL JANIS L. KARPINSKI, U.S. Army, was sworn, and 10 interviewed as follows: 11 Has anybody mentioned to you the context of the Q. 12 investigation, or scope of anything in that nature? 13 A. No. As a matter of fact I was kind of frustrated because I 14 tried to aet something from General Diamond and General Kratzer, and 15 nobody would tell me. 16 Q. Okay. Well, rightly so, I think because of the sensitivity 17 of the investigation---- 18 Yes, sir. A. 19 Q. ----and based on some allegations that were made, but let 20 me go ahead then and start off and go to the proceedings here, some 21 administrative requirements. I'm Major General Taguba. I'm The 22 Deputy Commanding General of the Coalition Land Forces Component 23 Command, as you know headquartered here at Camp Doha. The Commanding 1 %•3".1/e-'1. yK DODD0A-002057 1 General, Lieutenant General David McKiernan, has appointed me as the 2 Investigating Officer under the provisions of AR 15-6. Also, at the 3 direction of General John Abizaid who is the Commander of CENTCOM. 4 Our investigation is to gather all facts-- relevant facts and • 5 circumstances surrounding recent allegations of maltreatment of 6 detainees at the Abu Ghraib Prison also known as the Baghdad Central 7 Confinement [sic] Facility. As well as detainee escapes and 8 accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7. Our investigation is to 9 further look into the training, the standards, employment, command 10 policies, and internal policies concerning the detainees held at the 11 Abu Ghraib Prison. And finally, we were directed to assess the 12 command climate, the supervisory presence of the 800 th Military Police 13 Brigade chain of command. That includes everybody that's organic to 14 you, to your unit, and those that were tasked organized to you-- your i 15 Brigade during the period of time when you were in command. You've 16 already met the members of the investigation team. I want to advise 17 you that you have been sworn in by Lieutenant Colonel All of IIII. 18 our comments and your responses will be recorded for accuracy. Of 19 course you'll get a chance to look at them before once again that you 20 sign any of the statements. So before we begin I ask you if you have 21 any questions on the scope or nature of this inquiry? A. An aggressive undertaking and-- but I don't have any 23 questions, sir. 2 1 Q. Okay, wonderful. For the record would you please state 2 your name, your rank, social security number, and duty position? 3 A. My name is Janis Lee Karpinski. I'm a Brigadier General, 4 and the Commander of the 800th MP Brigade, and my social security 5 number is: 6 Q. Thank you. And you're currently the Commanding General of 7 the 800th MP Brigade? 8 A. Yes, sir. 9 Q. Okay, good. The allegations were-- related to events that 10 happened roughly between October, December timeframe, since that's 11 still under investigation by the CID, when would-- when were you 12 first made aware of those circumstances and the events that happened 13 there at Tier lA at the hard site at Abu Ghraib? 14 A. I was up at Ashraf at the MEK compound and I received an 15 email from the commander of the CID, and he said, "I 16 just want you to be aware I'm getting ready to go in and brief 17 General Sanchez. I want you to be aware that there have been-- that 18 we're doing an investigation at Abu Ghraib Prison for detainee abuse 19 involved," uh-- I don't even remember if there was two or three 20 sentences. And that was about January 24th , 21 Q. Thereabouts? 22 A. Thereabouts. 3 1 Q. What action did you take after that, upon that 2 notification? 3 A. I sent an email back to him, I said, "I don't know what to 4 say." There wasn't enough specifics in that statement. I called 5 him. I left a message for him. I was down in-- the next morning I 6 was down in-- at Victory, and two days later came 7 over to see me, and told me that he was briefing General Wojdakowski 8 in an-- I think it was an interim briefing, and he wanted me to see 9 what they had accumulated thus far. 10 Q. Sure. 11 A. Showed me some of the pictures. 12 Q. Sure. 13 Q. And I still didn't know what to say to him. It was I 14 called out to-- it was worse than I had-- could ever imagine. It's 15 still too difficult for me to think that soldiers would have done 16 some of things that were photographed. 17 Q. Okay. 18 A. I called out to He'd been over the 19 same day that I got the email from 20 called me up at Ashraf and he said----21 Q. Your XO? 22 A. My XO. And he said, "I have Colonel and Colonel 23 in the office, I'm afraid this isn't good news. There's been 1 some-- there's an investigation going on at Baghdad Central." I 2 said, "I'm aware of it, and it's an investigation so I don't want you 3 to talk about it on the phone, but what's say? 4 So, he said he didn't know anything about it. It wasn't that he was 5 not giving you information, but it's-- as far as what he could tell 6 me it's really bad and I'said okay I got an email from 7 the CID commander so I know that it's still an open 8 investigation." 9 Q. Did General Sanchez call you, or did you call him? 10 A. He did not. 11 Q. He did not. Did you inform General Diamond of this events? 12 A. I did not. 13 Q. You did not? 14 A. And I did not because 1111111111111111111 made it very clear 15 that it was an open investigation and that General Sanchez was 16 briefed about it and General Wojdakowski was briefed about it. _ J . 17 Q. Who directed you or if you toot the initiative of 18 suspending and 19 A. General Sanchez called me into his office that afternoon. 20 I saw outside and he said General Sanchez is really 21 upset about the investigation. And he said, "I don't really know 22 what action he's going to take." And I said, "Well I was scheduled 23 to go out there, so I'll just hold off until he tells me what he 5 1 wants me to do." So, when I went in to see him he said, "I want you 2 to do an assessment of their leadership abilities and make a 3 determination if they're able to hold leadership positions." And and 4 I-- I said, "I can go out to Baghdad Central first thing in the 5 morning. I can spend the day out there, or three days out there. As 6 you know sir, you're FRAGO sent my up to Ashraf and I don't know if 7 General Surgeon has any plans for any kind of activities up there I 8 don't' want to throw anything off track inadvertently." And he said, 9 "Do you want me to tell you what your priorities are?" And I said, 10 "No, sir. I understand priorities, but I didn't want to disrupt any 11 of those-- since that-- that direction is coming from the SECDEF's 12 office, I didn't want to disrupt any of those plans." 13 Q. Sure. 14 A. So he said, "No, there's nothing scheduled. Just go out to 15 Baghdad Central." So, I did. Spent the day out there and the next 16 morning out there, and spoke to the people that were running the 17 cellblock then-- and I've been out there many times and we discussed 18 some of our concerns. Sat down and discussed with Colonel Pappas in 19 November and about some of the concerns and the procedures and the 20 manpower drain of running the interrogation cells the way he wanted 21 them run. 22 Q. Sure. 1 A. And the reason I remember it very specifically was because 2 we sat down and spoke. It was his deputy; one of the 3 captains, - there was two Captains, Colonel Pappas, and 4 I had maybe my Operations Officer with me and two are three people. 5 And he wanted to speak to me about the four people that the MI 6 Brigade was being tasked to provide to cover a tower for force 7 protection. 8 Q. Okay. 9 A. And he said, "Those four people will have a tremendous 10 impact on the interrogation operation." And I said, "Well, it's not 11 like you're running through this thing rapid speed anyway, so-- I 12 mean slowing it down you're gonna stop it." He said, "Exactly," and 13 I said, "This is a tower that affects your soldiers. It's for 14 soldiers. I mean I've got more than 85 that are involved in internal 15 security." He said, "It's very difficult to provide those four 16 soldiers," and I said, "I'll think about it." But----17 Q. Those were four MI soldiers? 18 A. Four-- it didn't have to be MI soldiers, no sir. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. It could be four soldiers. Could be clerks, cooks, 21 drivers, whatever. 22 Q. Anybody, okay. 7 1 A. So, umm, and I-- I actually said that to him, you know, 2 "Give us your cooks," and he said, "Well then the mess hall won't 3 operate as well." So, I left and when I came back not only was 4 Colonel Pappas the FOB Commander, but somehow all of these assets for 5 him to operate Abu Ghraib prison as an FOB fell from the sky. He had 6 a LRS Battalion, he had two Infantry Platoons, he had an Engineer 7 Company minus one platoon, and I saw him out there maybe four days 8 after I came back and he said and I said, "Gee it seems like those 9 four weren't a problem after all." And I said, "But you're going to 10 get a request from us to be exempted from the internal taskings, 11 because I counted and I got 83." And he said, "Ma'am, I counted and 12 I got a 121." And I said, "That's a whole MP company doing nothing 13 but force protection, and escorting contractors around so, we're 14 gonna have to get out of the business of doing some of the other 15 things for your interrogation operation specifically." 16 And he wrote a memo up in December that said, "I'm very 17 concerned about the security posture out here the MP's have-- are no 18 longer escorting detainees going through the interrogation process. 19 We've had to take that on. We tried to implement all the measures to 20 make cellblock 1A, and 1B specifically an MI operation." Those kind 21 of things. And it really was a memorandum for record as much as it 22 was a request for additional help out there at Abu Ghraib. So when-- 23 when this whole situation came to light consistently out at Baghdad 8 1 Central I was hearing, "Well we couldn't by and check that cellblock 2 anymore because the MI people said that it wasn't "our" operation." glimmillip had exclusive rights of escorting us if we wanted to 4 go in. We had to take permission from it was 5 consistent with an incident that occurred in November, I believe when 6 a handgun found its way into the cellblock, and as soon as it 7 happened and we heard about it I called out to out at 8 the 320th and I said, "Get us an SIR. Get us one immediately while 9 the information is fresh." And he said, "Ma'am, has 10 issued a "gag" order for the MP's. They can't even give me a 11 statement." And I said, "Bullcrap that's not-- I mean there still my 12 MP's. Get a statement so we can publish an SIR. This is a serious 13 infraction." So called me back and said, "Ma'am, I 14 just want to make sure." I said, "MP's don't operate that way. I 15 want the information. I want the facts, and you don't have any right 16 to impose a "gag" order." And he said to me, "Well they're-- they're 17 TACON to us so, we really own the MP's." And I said, "I'm not 18 debating now but I'm going to get the SIR if I have to come out there 19 and get it myself." So they sent an SIR shortly after that, but it 20 gave very broad statements. Very generic because they weren't 21 certain on actually how it happened. And then when I was out there 22 the next day specifically looked for me and told me 23 his version of what happened. And I'm not questioning"... 9 1 111111111 honestly or validity or anything. I'm sure what he was 2 doing at that time was something that he was either being told to do, 3 or thought was the right thing to do. But the version that he gave 4 me was when he said, "I was there when it happened, so I know this, 5 this, and this took place," was not exactly what the CID 6 investigation eventually showed. So, there was disparity between the 7 two reports. 8 Q. Now that-- that happened sometime in November, and I 9 believe Colonel Pappas had received a FRAGO appointing him as the 10 Forward Operating Base Commander. 11 A. Right. 12 Q. And I believe the specific instruction was that all tenant 13 units would be TACON to him for security detainees and force 1. protection. Was that conveyed to you previously, or did you---- 15 A. No, sir. 16 Q. Your S-3 mentions that to you-- so you had no knowledge of 17 that particular directive or fragmentary order from CJTF-7? 18 A. No, sir. 19 Q. Had no warning. 20 Q. Okay. So when you found that out did you go back to 21 General Wojdakowski or General Miller to question that FRAGO? 22 A. I did, and General Wojdakowski was on Emergency Leave at 23 the time. I believe his father was either in the hospital, or had 1 passed away at that point, and I went to General Miller. General 2 Miller was not there for two days, and I don't know why I don't 3 really recall, but somebody said, "General Fast is the one who had 4 that FRAGO cut. You might want to go and talk to her." So I did. 5 And I said, "Ma'am you have a second? I just want to know about 6 the-- Colonel Pappas being appointed as the FOB Commander." She 7 said, "It's done." And that was as far as the conversation went. 8 Q. Did you go back to General Sanchez to seek clarification on 9 anything that constrained-- or limits of TACON, because as you know 10 TACON doctrinally says that the gaining unit, being that of the 205 th 11 MI Brigade, will establish priorities over all of the tenet units 12 that associated with that? 13 A. I went to Colonel Pappas first to get clarification. I 14 still at that point had not seen the FRAGO. 15 Q. Okay. 16 A. That is what I asked for when I went to General Miller's 17 office. 18 Q. Okay. 19 A. And they didn't have a copy of it. Wasn't that they were 20 unaware of it they heard something about. I don't know if its been 21 published yet. It still might be in draft, and they had it. I 22 believe that 1111111111111Vicked it up off of her desk. She picked a 23 piece of paper up and I don't know if it was the FRAGO or not. 1 Q. Do you have any knowledge of what might have precipitated 2 that? 3 A. Have no idea. 4 Q. Okay. Could have been that when General Sanchez had 5 visited the facility; I think with you back October sometime that he 6 might have discussed with you about the force protection posture at 7 the facility? 8 A. No sir, he did not. He-- what he said to me then during 9 the briefing he said, "Where's the Civil Affairs in this?" And I 10 said, "Sir, the Civil Affairs commander told me himself that his guys 11 where not going outside the wall." "Why not?" He said, "It's to 12 dangerous." He said, "Who's the Civil Affairs commander?" I said, 13 "That's " And he said to his aide, "Get him on the 14 phone." And he left the briefing when 11111111111111111 was on the 15 phone and he walked out of the room went to the phone and we could 16 hear him. And he was saying, "Do you understand? You have this-- is 17 this clear? You get your Civil Affairs out-- you're supposed to be 18 working in the community this is a Civil Affairs function." And we 19 all heard his side of the conversation. But I saw 20 that night at the CJTF-7 Headquarters and he said, "We're not going." 21 Q. Okay. 22 A. And he-- he-- he had made-- had his aide make two-phone 23 calls. One was to the Civil Affairs commander, and the other one was 12 1 to General West who was the C-4. And he said, "What the hell is 2 going on out here? Why haven't you given any support? Why aren't 3 you-- have you been out here? I want you to get out here as soon as 4 you can." And I saw General West either that night, or very early 5 the next day, and he said that they were going to go out there and 6 that they were going-- and that was delayed because General 7 Wojdakowski formed that-- like a "Task Force." 8 Q. Okay. 9 A. And had the Engineer-- the C-4, the C-3, everybody in there 10 from the staff and said, and he told me-- and he said in front of 11 them, "As I've told you before we can't give you anything because 12 you're TACON." 13 Q. Okay. 14 A. "But we're going to change all that. We're going to make 15 Abu Ghraib an enduring camp, and we're going-- that'll open up the 16 doors." So after that meeting General West said to me, "We'll be 17 able to do-- I mean there's going to be more activity out there than 18 you can imagine. There's going to be contractors who are going to 19 do-- get a DFAC out there. We're going to go out there-- if your S-4 20 can give me a call, we'll set up a time when we can go out there, and 21 we'll walk the ground." And they did. 22 Q Prior to-- prior to that-- that mission was given to the 23 800th MP then relegated to the 320th MP Battalion to conduct operations 13 1 I believe after you assumed command of the Brigade on or about July. 2 What was the intent then that you understood of why you were provided 3 that mission set at the Abu Ghraib prison site? 4 A. We needed a location to build another internment facility, 5 a north internment facility because at that time it was no longer an 6 EPW, Third Country National, IR mission, Internment Resettlement 7 Operation. It was a Iraqi Civilian Criminal Confinement mission. 8 So, the original idea was that they would relocate the remaining 9 several hundred prisoners up to Baghdad because they were General 10 Officers, and Freedom-- Foreign Fighters, and Third Country 11 Nationals, and there was really only about 300 of them. And the idea 12 was that they would relocated north because that was the focus of the 13 operation at the time. And Bucca was 12 hours away at its earliest. 14 We were using Bucca almost at that point almost primarily as a place 15 to push detainees from Cropper because Cropper was overcrowded, but 16 Baghdad Central was intended and discussed and approved as an interim 17 facility only for many reasons. It was extremely controversial 18 because of the hanging, and the torture chambers that were there. It 19 was well known for its horrible procedures for its overcrowding 20 conditions, and of course for, you know, reports of---- 21 Q. Sure. 1 A. ----60,000 people being hung there. It was very heavily 2 looted. The only place that really was untouched unfortunately was 3 the hanging chamber, and the torture facilities. The rest of it 4 was--the infrastructure was pulled out. There was ruble that was 5 literally knee deep. Concrete, glass, wire, rubble, re-barb, 6 everything. And the 72na MP Company, which is a Las Vegas National 7 Guard Company, moved into that facility at the direction of the 18 th 8 MP Brigade who was their headquarters at the time. When we got there 9 in July, I saw a Company Commander and his First Sergeant who 10 relieved to see somebody come to visit them. Come to tell them, 11 "We're going to take care of you." Because up until that time they 12 hadn't seen the 18th MP Brigade Commander, and there only recollection 13 of seeing the Command Sergeant Major was when he stopped by and 14 managed to tell a soldier that his sleeves were too short on his 15 uniform. 16 Q. Okay. 17 A. And we walked through that facility and I said, "There's no 18 way that you can make this into a prison. And he said, "Ma'am, if 19 you'll give us support, come back in two weeks and you'll see what 20 the soldiers have done. We already have a plan." So I said, "I'll 21 give you all the support you need, but I'm not even sure we're going 22 to be able to use this facility." And I think at that time they were 23 holding a few of the Division 1 st AD, or-- I think it was 1 st AD that 15 1 was there at the time, or maybe 3 rd ID, a few of their soldiers, not 2 more than 20-- uh prisoners, not more than 20. So, what they did was 3 clean up a couple of the cells, and they were holding them there. I 4 went down to CPA, met with the subject matter experts down there at 5 CPA, and I said, "What is the plan?" And 111111111.11111.11111111111.1 6 was the senior guy there at the time, was one American, 7 and was the other one. And they said, "Well, we're 8 probably not going to be able to use it because of that "Hanging 9 Chamber," and the reputation." And I said, "Well who's going to make 10 a decision because I have an MP Company out there and another 11 battalion coming up. 12 Q. Was the 72nd assigned to you at that time? They were still- 13 - they were assigned to the 18 th? 14 A. They were assigned to the 18th, yes sir, and so was the 400th 15 MP Battalion. 16 Q. Okay. 17 A. And then at the TOA when we moved up to Baghdad they were 18 reassigned under the 18 th-- 800th MP Brigade. So, we worked through 19 this process through this CPA and it was like I said it was extremely 20 controversial, and at one point the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 21 Wolfowitz, said, "I can't be convinced," and Secretary Rumsfeld said 22 the same thing, "Find another place. And this isn't going to work." 23 And what did was go to Ambassador Bremer and I was in the DODD0A-002072 1 briefing when he provided it to Ambassador Bremer and he said, "It's 2 only an interim facility. It is the only maximum security facility 3 we have in Iraq, and really we can't even consider it a maximum 4 security prison, but it's the only place we have to hold large number 5 of people until we get the new building built." And he said-- 6 Ambassador Bremer said, "When do you plan to build a new one?" And 7 he said, "We already have the location it's Kenbodesatt and we might 8 be able to save some of that building that's over there on those 9 grounds, but there's squatters there now huma, huma, we have to take 10 care of that." And he said, "Wel1 11111111.iliwas from the MOJ 11 wasn't-- he was on board but he wasn't-- he was still kind of sitting 12 on the fence because he wasn't sure how the-- the tide of approval 13 was going to go. So, they--and I believe 14 imp and 1111.1111111.111111111, or 15 from-- USAID. Actually she works for State Department, but she does 16 humane programs and things. They went out there because a press 17 conference was scheduled for whatever day it was-- and it was 18 scheduled for Wednesday. They went out there on-- they were planning 19 to go out there Tuesday afternoon because she was never convinced-- 20 she was adamantly opposed to it, and she was holding a key vote. So, 21 they said, "The last time you saw it it really looked horrible. It 22 looked like everything you would imagine a torture chamber to look 23 like, but it's better now. And there's an MP unit out there, and 17 1 just come back out and take a look." And we-- one of the 2 requirements that they, she and here group of people had was that it 3 would somehow be isolated from the rest of the prison before they 4 would even go out there and discuss using Abu Ghraib as a facility. 5 So, we had this wall constructed that was cinderblock and it was 20 6 feet it covered the other sides of this torture chamber location and 7 sectioned it off. It is almost like a small museum area. The didn't 8 go out on Tuesday afternoon, they went out on the morning of the 9 press conference, and she took one look at it and she said, 10 "Absolutely not. I do not want to be painted with the same brush as 11 all you." And she left, so they all left. So came 12 back and he said, "We're going to have the press conference, and 13 we're going to go ahead and use the facility, but it is an interim 14 facility. Not more than three years. We've got to get-- we've go to 15 break ground, and we have to get under way with the new facility at 16 Kenbodesatt, or wherever else it's going to be." So I said, "What 17 happened?" and he told me that story. So, he said, "But we're still 18 going to have the press conference and I don't think Sandy is going 19 to come, but you're going to sit next to me." And I mean-- and-- and 20 there was a-- an Australian SJA that was there also because he 21 understood the circumstances. They did this-- he-- 22 did most of the talking. They-- he said, "We're going to use it as 23 an interim facility. We have the approval from Ambassador Bremer, 1 and you know, all the way up to the State Department." And that was 2 the end of the press conference. So-- and 3 MUM and =NM anytime they talked about Baghdad Central- 4 - Abu Ghraib, because it was still Abu Ghraib at the time, it was the 5 interim facility at Abu Ghraib. 6 Q. With that-- based on that circumstances then, fast 7 forwarding here, did you receive and order then from CJTF-7 to 8 establish your presence at Baghdad Central by tasking the 320 th MP 9 Battalion to assume command and control of that facility? 10 A. No, sir. What we got was a TOA Order that said the 800 th MP 11 Brigade will come to Baghdad and relocate to Baghdad and be 12 responsible for confinement and corrections operations for Iraq. 13 Q. How did-- how did the 320 th come about assuming the mission 14 there at Baghdad Central? 15 A. They were-- that was a decision that was made before I even 16 took command when they were talking because General Hill knew that 17 the unit-- the 800th was going to become responsible for the 18 corrections mission. 19 Q. Okay. 20 A. So they put a plan together on which battalions would move 21 north; one to secure the MEK, one to go up to Mosul, one to go up to 22 Baghdad, etcetera. At the facilities that we knew existed at the 23 time. 19 1 Q. Those were already determined prior to your arrival to take 2 command? 3 A. Yes, sir. 4 Q. Okay. Then given that-- those circumstances again, were 5 there any specific instructions given to you by CJTF-7 to assume 6 command and control, and start building that into a an interim, as 7 you say, facility that would-- could handle additional detainees? 8 A. No sir, but what they said was they wanted-- General 9 Wojdakowski said what he wanted was a confinement and internment 10 facility. Concertina wire. And if Baghdad Central provided a "wall" 11 and a place where we could do that that was fine. "How much can you 12 get?" So, who was my Deputy at the time, he went 13 out there and uh, you know, said that we could probably get about 14 4000, and it would require---- 15 Q. Four thousand what-- 4000 detainees? 16 A. Four thousand detainees, in the regular blueprint if you 17 will, of a design for an internment resettlement camp. So, that 18 meant we had to get engineer support. We had to get building 19 equipment. We had to get all those things. And it was originally-- 20 I wasn't here for this, but I heard all of the stories of how long it 21 took to get those building materials to Bucca. So, now we were going 22 even farther north and rails were-- CONEX's on rail were being 23 looted. Transportation was a problem. All of those things, as 1 you're well aware. So, was at Abu Ghraib and managing 2 that project, but I had a different opinion on what 3 should be doing at an internment resettlement operation. He was 4 running Camp Bucca, and he-- he was going-- it was doctrine according 5 to So the processing line, which should have been part 6 of the battalion's responsibility, was not. They-- I mean he was the 7 Battalion Commander because that was a comfort zone apparently for 8 him. So, when he came up to Baghdad Central-- when he came up to 9 Baghdad, I sat down with him and I told him, "You're going to be the 10 Deputy. That means you do logistics. You do coordination. I want 11 you involved with the staff. I do not want you to camp out at 12 Baghdad Central because the 320th MP Battalion is going to be in 13 charge." But-- but-- I mean I heard all of the arguments from him 14 and he continued. And every time I saw him trying to drift back to 15 taking control of that operation I'd pull him back into the TOC and 16 remind him again what his responsibilities were. Then he said he 17 thought that he could do a lot of good down at CPA working with 18 reconstruction of the jails and the prisons. So I said, "We can talk 19 about that because that's a good idea." And I said, "Because 20 Tasferat Rusafa nobody has power. Nobody has plumbing. Nobody has 21 the logistical supplies, and you do all of those things well. So, 22 occasionally you can go by and check on how progress is coming along 23 at Baghdad Central." So, that worked out well, and if 21 1 was going to fault him for anything during that time it was that he 2 probably campaigning for a civilian job with the Prisons Department 3 down there, but not the distraction of what he doing. So, I'd have 4 to say that he was out on the road at 7:30 every morning, and he 5 usually didn't' come back until 1700 or so, and they were full days. 6 And I made him give me a status report. And I made him give me an 7 update, so I knew that he was out there doing the things that he was 8 supposed to be doing or at least he was reporting the things that he 9 was doing that he was supposed to be doing. And-- and-- and 10 11111 I had too-- I really had to kind of keep him in a narrow 11 corridor because soldiers were-- their morale was not effective 12 positively by him. Early on he told everybody that-- you know he was 13 going to stay as long as he could and so they might as well get used 14 to fact that they might be here longer than a year. And "I been at 15 this for a year already, and this is my second year and if I can turn 16 in." You know, those are the kind of things are the kind of things 17 he said and it scared soldiers, and I know that because everywhere I 18 went, soldiers told me they were scared by that prospect. 19 Q. But did you understand though that there was that potential 20 that they were going to be extended anyway? 21 A. At that time we did not. Because I went to General Kratzer 22 and I said-- the first thing I said to General Kratzer after I said, 23 "I'm glad to be here," and everything else, but right after the 22 1 change of command ceremony I went into him and I said, "This is not 2 what the battalion's are set up to do. I mean this is a confinement 3 operation so we're gonna need help." And he said, "I know that this 4 is not what your mission is. It's not your doctrine, but it's closer 5 than anybody else, and the 18th MP Brigade doesn't want anything to do 6 with it, so you guys got it. And we'll give you all the help that we 7 can, but CJTF-7 is gonna-- you know, kinda carry the ball for you." 8 And we talked about a couple of other things. About the length of 9 the deployment, and I heard at that time that the-- the "mark on the 10 wall" was 10 months and 8 days. And it was repeated again you know 11 in so many different locations that, "10 months and 8 days. What's 12 the 8 days? The 8 days is the out processing once you get down-- 13 back to your mobilization station." So, I went to all of the 14 locations and took-- talked to all Df the units and told them. Again 15 I heard from the soldiers, "We were briefed at the mob station it was 16 gonna be six months are less. We didn't come prepared." And I said, 17 "What are-- what do you orders say?" And there was a variety of 18 orders. Some said, "Not to exceed 179 days." Some said, " Not to 19 exceed 365 days." Some said, "Until relieved till-- to come back." 20 Some of the units had been deployed already to Bosnia, or Afghanistan 21 with that count, and I mean my Command Sergeant Major at the time was 22 We were making lots of notes with full intentions of getting 23 answers. And we went to CJTF-7, and 1 came back to Arifjan to get answers to those questions and others, 2 but for clarification on this move to Baghdad. And people kept 3 repeating 10 months, 8 days, 10 months 8 days. No, it will be more 4 than that. And then we heard 365 days, "Boots on the ground. Plan 5 for a year. Will some units have to stay longer? Absolutely." And 6 I would say to them, "There is no unit listed right now to stay past 7 365 days; however, let me make you aware, and case you are not, there 8 is a shortage of military police units in the system. With the 9 deployments to Afghanistan and Bosnia, and over here, they are 10 critically short. So, if units are going to be selected there is a 11 chance, equal to every other unit over here, that you'll be extended 12 past 365 days." People-- soldiers cried. They weren't prepared for 13 this. They-- and-- and I had a-- an NCO at Bucca who stood up and he 14 said, "Ma'am don't worry because it's really only 2 more months than 15 the 10 months we were planning to stay so, if everybody here just 16 keeps that in perspective." And I really wanted to hug him because I 17 said-- and I told him, "You know what, that's a great perspective, 18 and I appreciate that and I'm going to use that when I talk to 19 soldiers because you're right 60 more days is a small chunk compared 20 to what you've already been here for." And I said, "That's really a 21 brilliant perspective." So, what the objective was to talk to all of 22 them. To tell them to put their fears to rest as much as we could. 23 Well, unfortunately the inevitable happened and people discovered the 24 1 medical channels. They discovered that they could go report a back 2 pain and get medivaced to Lungsthul and from there they fell into a 3 black hole. And I remember the report it was on 9 September my 4 surgeon at the time asked for the printout of how many soldiers we 5 had in all of our units that had been-- were removed from the theatre 6 for medical reasons and it was 2 and % pages long on lines that look 7 like one of those messages. I mean there were so many lines on each 8 page and I said, "You have-- I looked at him and I said you have got 9 to be kidding me." And he said, "Well if you go down the whole list 10 you'll find out that three of them came back, but the rest of them 11 are losses. And I said, "This is September I don't know if we can 12 keep doing this." 13 Q. Well I think it's understood though General Karpinski, that 14 there's a war that's going on and I know there's major concerns, but 15 then at the same time the concerns of your soldiers was no-- any 16 different from the concerns of the other soldiers who were here 17 longer. 18 A. Yes, sir. 19 Q. Let me kind of focus a little bit. What instructions did 20 you give with regards to his mission at Abu 21 Ghraib, Detention Operations, improving quality of life facilities, 22 things of that nature, his rights and left limits, did you give him 23 any specific instructions in that regard, and you've also got MI 25 1 units there. This is all prior to Colonel Pappus taking over and how 2 that seemed to be accomplished? . The MI units that were there at the time were really teams. 4 They were interrogation teams and we had the 72 nd MP Company out there 5 and they were living in the warehouse and the 320 th MP Battalion. And 6 was--he was a reluctant participant. He didn't 7 want to move up from Bucca. They were still in the throws of the 8 investigation with the prisoner abuse down there. And I said, "Time 9 is past for that discussion. That is when you were notified that 10 your Battalion was going to move north, so this is what we need to 11 talk about, and when you get there establish the LSA. There's a 12 couple of opportunities there's a room where the warehouse is. 13 There's a separate building. You walked the ground up there do you 14 recall any of this?" And he said, "Well, I'm going to wait until I 15 get up there with the Sergeant Major." And I said, "I'll meet you 16 out there give me a call." He met 17 Q.. Q.. He was still at Camp Bucca at the time? 18 A.. He was at Bucca. 19 So, there was no members of the 220th MP Battalion up at Abu Q.. 20 Ghraib? 21 A.. There was an advance party, and I don't really know who 22 they were sir, but there was about six of them and they went up there . 1 as an advance party. And met with them. Walked to 2 grounds with them. 3 Okay. Q.. . The 72nd MP Company Commander took them around. Got them 5 inside the warehouse. They were setup, and was working 6 on getting not only the building materials, but everything setup for 7 them supply of MRE's, the water, whatever they needed that they could 8 provide. Then the MP Battalion moved north in July, or maybe the 9 first week of August timeframe, and setup at Abu Ghraib, went out 10. 4 A.. there two days after they arrived, came into the 11 TOC as soon as he arrived, and he said---- 12 Your TOC? Q.. 13 Into my TOC. He said---- A.. 14 Q.. At Camp Victory? 15 At Victory. At Gotham Island. I don't believe we're going A.. 16 to move into the warehouse. We're going to use one of those other 17 LSA's. And I said, "You might want to move into the warehouse, and 18 clean up the LSA's." He said, "Soldiers want to be separate and 19 apart from 72nd MP Company." I said, "You know there's no running 20 water anywhere up there for latrines. "We've got it under control. . 21 is going to get latrines on a the leading edge of the 22 ones we're going to need for the compounds anyway." And I said, "I'd 23 like a back brief on where you're gonna put soldiers, where you're 1 gonna setup your TOC," and-- and he did that. I went out to Baghdad 2 Central and he had some chairs setup in the other warehouse, the 3 adjacent warehouse. Have you been up there, sir? . 4 Q. several times. Yes, . 5 A.. So, you know where the 320 th is now and the other warehouse 6 for the 82nd, and it now has the partitions up, that's where the 72nd 7 was at the time. So, in this warehouse just inside the door, he had 8 some chairs setup there, and he did the briefing.. And the schematic 9 that he had of how he was going to lay out the TOC looked really 10 good-- looked-- I mean it looked certainly acceptable. I asked him-- 11 you know-- did they prefer to be inside as opposed to outside, 12 because at that time it was about 140 degrees just in that warehouse. 13 Said he did because of the mortars and the RPG's, and small arms W fire. I said, "Okay." And then actually when they got setup, jt was 15 different from how they had originally planned. And several times 16 subsequent to that I said to "You're sitting in 17 the middle of your orderly room. You need a separate office." And 18 he said, "Well, they're working on the area over here and I don't 19 want to disrupt the progress." And I said, "Well the MI folks look 20 like they're making progress over there." And he said, "Well they 21 decided you know-- we were pushing all the re-barb and everything and 22 they decided to clear it all out so, they had really done all the 23 work, that's going to be their area." 1 So, there are two separate elements building up there own-- Q. 2 and-- and you reasonably assume that really nobody was in charge of 3 setting up the base operations there and that your-- the 4 responsibility was just to create a detention facility compound and 5 to include that in the hard site as well? The hard site was not open at the time. 6 A. Okay. 7 Q. it was---- 8 A. 9 Q. That was later? It was much later, sir. 10 A. Okay. 11 Q. There-- there was-- those detainees that they had, the 72nd 13 had a few detainees from the division there weren't even detainees 14 there at this time. 15 Q. 12 A. Okay. 16 So, they were getting setup to be able to execute A. 17 confinement operations when they started. And there was nobody-- 18 there was no work-- I think they may have started cell block 1A, and 19 1B, under contract at the time, but there was no other work going on 20 there. And was really working focusing on the LSA 21 and getting these "huge" mounds of rubble at least pushed out. And 22 practically daily having to escort people that wanted to come out 1 there and see the facility and wanted to see that Hanging Chamber 2 and---- 3 Q. But-- but he was doing detention operations? 4 A. There was no detention operations being conducted. 5 Q. Just cleaning up the mess, okay. When did he assume on or 6 about, detainee operations? 7 A. Well, he was going to be responsible for detainee 8 operations, but they had to build the internment facility so there 9 focus was, "Let's get the building equipment up here so we can build 10 the interment camp. 11 Q. Okay. 12 A. So the engineers got there. They brought all their 13 equipment. They did all the grading and everything, and I think it 14 was the 94th Engineers, and they came out and they had three weeks to 15 do it. We visited the grounds with who's the-- the 16 gentleman in the United Nations who lost his life when that was 17 bombed originally, Ambassador Bremer, General Haun, who is the Chief 18 of Staff at the time, Ambassador Slocumb, and we walked the grounds 19 and they saw what the engineers were doing. They saw what the plan 20 was, and asked when we were going to take the first 21 prisoner, and we told him probably the beginning of October. So, he 22 said, "Fine." He understood how difficult this was out there and 23 everything, and how controversial, but it really was the only 30 1 facility that we could use. Had they started building Kenbodesatt? 2 And I said, "No sir, they haven't because it's really a CPA mission, 3 and they haven't removed the squatters yet." "You still have 4 squatters there?" And I said, "Well they had 300 originally and now 5 I understand there's more than that." So, he said, "Let me see if we 6 can help." 7 Q. Did you understand the mission at Abu Ghraib to be a 8 priority mission for CJTF-7 as directed by CPA? Was that understood 9 by General Sanchez? 10 A. Mister----11 Q. Because what I'm trying to get is you were getting either 12 some direction from CPA, or some direction for CJTF-7, so I'm trying 13 to discern your relation whether you were reporting to CPA, or you 14 we:e reporting to CJTF-7? 15 A. We were getting no instructions from CJTF-7 at that time. 16 Q. Okay. 17 A. We were down at CPA because 18 from the 18th MP Brigade on regular MP patrols, because they were 19 responsible for Baghdad and to 1 st AD, so when they were out doing MP 20 patrols, they would see a building that used to be a prison or a 21 jail, and they would get 22 out there to look at it and they'd say, "This is another facility 1 to the CPA and I could meet the prisons experts down there. Umm, the 2 schedule reversed itself and we went down to CPA first, and... 3 UNE and said, "We're so glad you're here. We need 4 the MP's in our facilities. They have to be running the corrections 5 operations. Ambassador Bremer is depending on you guys to---- 6 Q. Up until that time you had not gotten any instructions? 7 A. No. 8 Q. Don't you think that was rather strange that somebody is 9 welcoming you knowing full well that you've go a command 10 responsibility someplace else as opposed to being either directed or 11 being influenced by prison officials from CPA? 12 A. Umm---- 13 Q. Because remember you belong to a military outfit. 14 A. Correct. 15 Q. And there was an assumption, based on what you mentioned 16 with General Hill meeting with these people, but I'm trying to see if 17 there's any comment that basically says, "Thank you, but I've got to 18 go report to my boss first to see what he want me to do." 19 A. I-- I believe General Hill said to and to 20 that we were scheduled to see General Wojdakowski, 21 and General Sanchez before we came to see them. 22 Q. Okay. 1 A. And I said, "Yes, sir." And he said, "Are you in command 2 yet." And I said, "No, sir, about another week." And he said, 3 "We'll I don't want the answers from you, I want them from him." So, 4 that was, "Okay, I've got it. And there's another five days that we 5 have to go through this process." 6 Q. Okay. 7 A. So after the change of command ceremony the next morning we 8 left and went up to Baghdad and I went over to CJTF-7, and we had a 9 list of the facilities, and I said to General Wojdakowski, "Sir, 10 there's about 30 locations on here, and I don't have the MP's to 11 cover these facilities. Some of them are isolated locations or 12 they're not-- there's no force protection available, and I can't 13 cover force protection." He said, "How many can you cover?" And I 14 said, "I don't know because I haven't been to all of them, but about 15 15 if we take it, an average size." He said---- 16 Q. Would your staff at that time know of this list? Would 17 they make any kind-- any kind of staff estimates between Hill's 18 presence and your presence? Was there any concerted effort that-- 19 you know you're going to get overwhelmed it's just a matter of 20 prioritizing all of that. Was that-- did your staff give you any 21 indication of what your priorities and what your capabilities were? 22 A. Well we hadn't been to the facilities. Nobody had except 23 for Ecke. 36 1 Q. But-- but certainly there was kind of a warning order---- 2 A. There was and as a matter of fact my 3 3 said, "Ma'am we're never going to be able to cover all these 4 facilities, and the force protection piece." And-- and I said, "I 5 understand. But first we have to go out and-- I mean we either have 6 to put them on a map or we have to see where they are and what kind 7 of coverage." And really ended up with 15 facilities that we would 8 be able to occupy and run that weren't out there on the edges of the 9 earth, or anywhere else.. There were--. some of them were in close 10 proximity in Baghdad, but would then-- one of the subject 11 matter experts down in CPA, he would say, "We found another facility 12 and it will hold about 60 people." And I said, "Which one do you 13 want me to close?" And he said, "We're not going to close any of 14 them." And I said, "I can't put MP's in each of those facilities." 15 So, I go back over to CJTF-7, I'd sit down with General Wojdakowski, 16 and I said, "I'm concerned about this because 17 from the 18th MP Brigade is uncovering all these locations, and he's 18 putting them on my shoulders to man. I don't have the resources." 19 Q. I would have said, "Time out. I don't work for you. I 20 work for this guy." And it's a matter of the way you were describing 21 it now is that you now have a set of circumstances where this guy is 22 giving you information, and this guy is asking you for information 23 and your capabilities. At that point in time wouldn't you think that 37 1 you would have taken an action to establish your priorities since 2 you're the commander, to say, "I will get my priorities past that to 3 CJTF7, and I'll get it from CJTF-7," as opposed to going back and - 4 forth to this particular Sergeant Major that was giving you that 5 information? 6 A. Well wasn't dealing with me. 1-1:2 was 7 giving me information to the prisons people and they were making this 8 determination and I said to "I'm not going to cover 9 them. I don't have the MP recourses and nobody is going to give me 10 extra help. I'm not going to cover them." He goes, "Well then 11 you're never going to get out of here." So I said to General 12 Wojdakowski, he asked me point blank, "Did you say 15 facilities, 13 then cover 15 facilities. Figure it out!" 14 Q. This is General Wojdakowski? 15 A. General Wojdakowski. 16 Q. Okay. 17 A. So I said, "Yes, sir." And and he said, "How is the 18 construction coming out at Abu Ghraib?" And I said, "They are still 19 waiting on the basic building materials." He said, "I thought the 20 CONEXES were on their way up?" "They were, they got into BIAP and 21 they disappeared. Somebody broke into them, or stole them." 22 Q. Did you get the feeling that since you are one of two 23 Internment and Resettlement Theatre Brigade-- MP Brigade, the other 38 1 one being at GITMO, that they were relying on your command presence, 2 your command skills, your skill set so to speak, to give them that 3 since the command is in dire straits of building infrastructure to 4 detain and maintain a huge amount of civilian internees, or maybe 5 even EPW's, or all those other detainees. Did you fell overwhelmed 6 at that time? 7 A. No, sir. I didn't feel overwhelmed, but I knew that they 8 were taking their instructions from 9 Q. Okay. Who's 10 A. He was the 18th MP Brigade Commander. 11 Q. Okay. 12 A. And he told me in July, "He didn't want anything to do with 13 confinement operations. As a matter of fact it was time for the 18th 14 MP Brigade to leave because the 800th and the 220th vz.-..6 here and we 15 could take over since we were Reserve and National Guard. We could 16 take over all police operations so they could come back in February." 17 And I said, ' it's the come back part that concerns me, 18 because we can't do the confinement mission and your mission." And 19 he said, "How's school?" And that was at the MP Summit. So, he had 20 the weigh in. He's the Corp. He was the 5 th Corp Provost Marshal, 21 and he had the weigh in. And I told 111.111111111111111.111111111111. 22 down at CPA, and I told because they kept firing off 23 this you know, "We found another facility, we found another 39 1 facility." And I said, "Well unless you found some additional MP's, 2 I'm not covering it, and I don't work for 3 does not work for me, and has no 4 business being in the detention operations unless he's coming to work 5 for me as well. So, I can appreciate him locating all of these 6 places, but let him run them, because we've settled on 15. General 7 Wojdakowski has settled on 15 and that's what we're doing. 8 Q. Okay. Can we move quick-- October thereabouts there was an 9 incident that had caused you to either advise to 10 take leave or to take some sort of time off for whatever reason. 11 Could you explain the circumstances of that? 12 A. There was a-- there was an incident. There was several 13 incidents at Baghdad Central. One was-- one was an escape and it-- 14 it may have been followed immediately by another escape. 15 Q. That was reported through channels to you? 16 A. Right. Right. I mean he reported. It was an SIR. And 17 there-- there was an accidental discharge of a firearm I think. A 18 negligent discharge of a firearm, and my policy was that if-- if 19 there was a negligent discharge, or soldiers were seen or stopped in 20 there vehicles without their Kevlar's or their vests or their shirts 21 on, I mean there was several things, that the entire chain of command 22 was going to get a letter of concern. So, I had 23 and and I believe came over with 40 1 been when the MP's were out with the 82n° and the vehicle went into 2 the canal and one of the MP's, and one of the NCO's from the 82 nc lost 3 their lives, and I saw him the next day and I knew he was in trouble 4 emotionally and mentally. And I told him, "I want to take you out of 5 your position. I'm going to send somebody else over here. The 6 battalion will be in good hands, but if you won t take leave then I'm 7 gonna do this for you." And he said, "I don't have leave to take, I 8 went home for my son's graduation. I'm okay." And I said, "No, your 9 not. Look, this is more for-- then one person can handle if you 10 don't have a support network, and your is not 11 doing you any favors. You don't need to worry about him right now; 12 you need to worry about you. I'm worried about you, so I want you to 13 pick up your stuff and come over to the TOC tomorrow morning and 14 you'll spend a couple,of days there and I'm going to send you down to 15 Arifjan, but you need-- you need a break." 16 Q. Did you notify General Wojdakowski, or Sanchez, or Diamond, 17 or Kratzer that you were doing this? 18 A. I-- well General Kratzer I think by that time was gone. I 19 told General Diamond that, "I was sending down. OM 20 was the Battalion Commander that had the problem at Bucca, 21 and I was you know sending him down for a break. That if he didn't 22 get to go into see the mental hygiene office in Baghdad, then you 1 know I'd-- 1111111111111111. would be making arranaements for him to 2 see somebody down there at Arifjan." 3 Q. Sure. 4 A. Okay. I tell General Wojdakowski at the SUU, the Separate 5 Unit Update, that I took out of his 6 position and he said, "Did you relieve him?" And I said, "No sir, I 7 didn't relieve him, but he needs a break. He needs to be away from 8 that. Now, that might be an eventual outcome, but his not-- he has 9 not been relieved." And the Rider Team was there at the time 10 visiting, assisting us, and the next day, or two days later, 11 somewhere when they were still there, I believe it was their SJA on 12 the team said to me, "Who you gonna replace with? You 13 have any plans?" And I said, "I don't have to replace 14 He said, "Well you relieved him." Lsaid, "I didn't relieve him." 15 And he said, "Well that's not what the rumor is out there." 16 Q. Did you tell the Battalion chain of command that a lot of 17 things had happened? 18 A. Absolutely. I-- I talked to nd I put uh-11111M 19 Imp from the 115th, and he was aware. And I said, "Do you want me to 20 come out and talk to the Battalion?" And he said, "I can take care 21 of it." And when I went out there, I asked soldiers, "You understand 22 about 111111.111111111111P Do you understand that..." and they did, 23 because around and talked to each one of the 1 Companies or talked to them in the towers and got the word out that 2 was just on a break and I had some special work 3 for him to be doing, I think is how he addressed it. 4 Q. Is it common policy or practice or your leadership style to 5 a serving Battalion Commander from one Battalion to assume some level 6 of responsibility to another Battalion without any orders? 7 A. Sir, I didn't have any other options. I had-- I went to 8 CJTF-7 so many times and I asked them for a deputy, I asked them for 9 a replacement command sergeant major. I asked General Diamond, I 10 asked General Speaks. I couldn't get help from anybody. 11 Q. Did you consider putting a senior major in command of that 12 Battalion? 13 A. I did not because it was-- they were troubled. 14 Q. Okay. Troubled in a sense for what? 15 A. The soldiers were still reeling from the death of one of 16 their soldiers, umm-- there was a lot of activity going on. The 17 whole facility was becoming bigger and overwhelming. They saw an 18 extension of their one-year tour looming on the horizon. They were 19 being pushed around. Their LSA that they had built and cleaned up 20 themselves was being affected. What little they had they were being 21 asked all of a sudden to share with uh-- for each soldier to share it 22 with three others. And they felt like every bad mission was going to 23 them. 1 Q. So you had no confidence whatsoever in the stable of 2 available lieutenant colonels or even senior majors in you command, 3 whether to be S-3's or XO's or whatever the case may be to put 4 somebody in command of a troubled battalion. To put a battalion 5 commander who was not in your initial assessment was either not fit 6 to continue to command or in that particular sense? 7 A. No sir. I had tremendous confidence in my majors. 8 Q. Then why did you not put one in there? 9 A. What I did was take a major out of the 324, and 10 I put him in the 400th . 11 To command? 12 A. To command, the Battalion. I took the 400th Commander and 13 put him in as my Deputy. 14 Q. Who was that? 15 A. 111111111111.1111111111111111 promotable, 16 Q. And how long did you have him as your Deputy? 17 A. Uh-- probably two and a half months. 18 Q. Okay. 19 A. I had was the Battalion Commander over at 20 the HVD facility and Cropper, and Cropper portion closed, so it was 21 the HVD facility. And I had a very strong XO over there, and uh--22 was there, who is an active component guy, uh-- and 23 was there, who was a strong operations officer and-- 45 1 and-- and-- he had a deputy. So I took and I put him out 2 at Baghdad Central because I-- I, like I said, I needed somebody that 3 knew the process of commanding a battalion that could get in there 4 and keep that battalion functioning. And-- and he did. He did from 5 the minute he hit the ground, and---- 6 Q. That was for a temporary process? 7 A. It was a temporary process, because at that 8 time, my plan was for him to come back. 9 Q. You say you still had confidence in ability to 10 command, predicted on some background with having to reel back from 11 Bucca, and the fact of the matter was that all these incidents that 12 were building up, escapes, two deaths, things of that nature, an 13 overwhelming mission. So, based on your assessment that-- giving him 14 some-time off would in fact restore his motivation? 15 A. It wasn't just the time off. We reorganized his staff, his 16 operations sergeant major, which was a big problem, was---- 17 Q. This 11111111- 18 A. ----That's - And-- and he was given very specific 19 instructions to remain in his lane; and that his lane was very 20 specific and limited. 21 Q. Was there a command sergeant major at the time? A. At the 320th? No sir, there wasn't. 23 Q. Then, who was the acting command sergeant major? 46 1 A. They didn't have one. And---- 2 Q. So they operated without an X0, they operated without a 3 command sergeant major. They were put in a position of great 4 important to get something done, you've asked for assistance, you've 5 recognized that there are some problems associated with either 6 discipline or lack of uh-- you had some leadership problem. And so, 7 you took the option of placing a Battalion Commander who you thought 8 was not well and putting a temporary Battalion Commander there, and 9 giving him the same mission even though he was a serving Battalion 10 Commander somewhere else. 11 A. But his mission had been reduced. 12 Q. Why didn't you just put him in there and say, "You're now 13 the Commander." and you got a strong XO as you said. Take over 115 th 14 and I'll take care of1111111111,1ater? 15 A. I could have, but I did not. I brought on----16 Q. In retrospect now, would you have? 17 A. Perhaps. But, 1110.11111 was----18 Q. Perhaps? 19 A. ----perhaps because was leaving, he was the 20 first Battalion out. 21 Q Alright. But did you have any indication now with all 22 these allegations that you would have relieved him and perhaps it 23 would have prevented the incidents? 47 1 A. No sir. 2 Q. None of that would have mattered anyway? 3 A. I don't know. 4 Q. Okay. 5 A. I can't speculate, but I do know that [pause] I do know now 6 that one of the main people in this situation with the detainee abuse 7 has a history of this in his civilian job. 8 Q. That's not - was not-- you did not put those 9 people on there. 10 A. He did not know, those Companies, he never worked with 11 those Companies before. He didn't know them. 12 Q. But he's the commander. 13 A. He is. 14 Q. I mean, you've never worked with any of these Battalions 15 before either. 16 A. That's correct. 17 Q. Correct? But you take it upon yourself to get to know 18 them. 19 A. Yes sir. 20 Q. Take charge. And the fact of the matter is that you're the 21 senior trainer, with your experience as a Commander for all these 22 Battalion Commanders. So, in retrospect, would you have just simply 23 ask that he not command anymore and put somebody else strong in 48 1 A. In October. I went back tup to CJTF-7. I went over 2 General Wodjakowski and he was not there for that SUA. I talked to 3 the PMO and I said I need a lieutenant colonel; I need a strong 4 lieutenant colonel. And-- to take command. Of Abu Ghraib? Yes. 5 Not a chance. Umm-- and it was consistent with everything I had 6 tried to get before and we got no support. 7 Q. Did you consider in that 8 equation? 9 A. I did not. I-- I did because he was a lieutenant colonel, 10 but he was not a good fit. He was not. 11 Q. What about 12 A. was down at CPA and uh-- I said to him-- he 13 was an LNO down there and like everything else that 14 did, you know, in fine style. He had the experience and I said to 15 him, "I'd like to put you out at Baghdad Central because there's no 16 XO and you might have to serve as the Commander." And he said, "I 17 serve at the pleasure of the President, tell me where you need me to 18 go. But I'm taking leave." And he said, "My kids are expecting me 19 home for leave. I came in with the early entry module." I said, 20 "You know that the Battalion is struggling out there. I mean, 21 WM hasn't done anybody any favors. 11111111ris, you know, in bed 22 with And he said, "As soon as I get back I'll---- 50 1QQ. So you had no confidence in 'either, the S-3? 2 Essentially you had a troubled Battalion. 3 A.. I did. I talked to Colonel Pappas. I said, "Do you have a 4 lieutenant colonel that you can give me to run the Battalion that's 5 under-- you know, the security detainee operation is in MI. 6QQ. Did you have anybody at the rear detachment beside... . 7 A.. That was the only lieutenant I had 8 colonel I had. . Okay. So all those troubles seemed to percolate---- 10 A. I told. , I said to him, "This is not my 11 first choice, but you are ready to do this." And-- and he said, "You 12 know, if you ask me to go out there, I'll go and take command of the 13 Battalion, but the operations piece will suffer." 14QQ.. 9 Q.. From what I understand, General Karpinski, you were in a 15 dilemma here, but, in other words, are you indicating at least 16 insinuating that you have a bunch of officers that are either not 17 competent, or incompetent, or not qualified, or unwilling to take 18 command? 19 A.. In the---- 20QIn support of the mission---- Q.. 21 A.. In the Battalion---- 22Q----for the Battalion. Q.. 23 A.. ----or overall? 51 Overall. You have all these Battalions, and obviously 2 you're-- you are in dire straits here and you mentioned that nobody 3 was hearing your plea---- 4 A.. 1QQ.. Nobody was. 5Q----for assistance. So that was the last great measure was Q.. 6 to putQin temporary command while 7Qwas recovering from whatever he was struggling 8 with. 9 A.. The stress, whatever, but it was. And it was clear. 10QSo, you put him back in command after he came back. Not Q.. 11 really-- nothing out of the ordinary. Did you talk to him, or at 12 least give him further guidance? 13 A.. Yes, sir, I did. 14QAnd in what respect? Q.. 15 A.. When he came back up, because I had not made a decision, 16 when he came back up from Arifjan. He was like a different person. 17QHe spoke with confidence, he-- we talked about . talked 18 about him taking control of his staff, we talked about-- I told him I 19 would get him a CSM, and I did. We talked about using the people in 20 the Brigade to help him when he was in trouble, like my Sergeant 21 Major. And-- and 22 Q.. Who was also in trouble at the time. 23 A.. At that time, I think he was down at Arifjan,---- 52 1 Q. Was it. that was gone? 2 A.. It was11111111111 right. 3 Q.. Who had another circumstance, of course, which placed 4 5 A.. As the Brigade Command Sergeant Major. 6 Q.. It would appear-- didn't it appear to you then, General 7 Karpinski, that you got all these other tidbits of your command, that 8 you had people that had either a troubled past or didn't know how to 9 lead. And as a Brigade Commander, I would think that identifying all 10 those troubled spots was whether you would have taken the risk of 11 instantaneously removing them, and operating without them, or 12 operating with them, and continue for them to be turbulent. You 13Qmentioned . What was his problem? 14QA.. He's uh-- operating as if he were in the Army 20 years ago. 15 [Pause] He wanted to be a gunslinger. He wanted to be a specialist 16 or a private again. And I used those words to him. And, uh, I 17 wasn't here, but there were incidents down at Bucca with him, and 18 they were reported and nobody did anything. He got up to Baghdad 19 Central and I was out there once the internment camp was set up and 20 it was operational and we couldn't get force protection from anybody. 21 I was out there in the afternoon and here's11111111rup in the tower. 22 And I said, "What are you doing up in the tower?" And he said, "Well 23 it means a soldier doesn't have to be.up here." I said, "Sergeant 53 1 Major, you're the Battalion Senior NCO. You're supposed to be 2 checking on the other soliders." And when I got back down to the 3 ground I said toQ"Why is your Sergeant Major up in the 4 tower?" That's how the conversations went. And I walked with 'him, I 5 sat with him, I talked with him. . 6 Q. This is 11111111M . 7QA. With I-- I spoke to him withillinthere. . 8 And told me, "We're going to take care of it, 9 we're going to keep in his-- I'm gonna keep him under control." And 10 every time I went out there, I would get another indication that he 11 was out of control. 12QDid you sense he was not following your instructions, did Q.. 13 it cross your mind perhaps that disciplinary action was called for at 14 that time, that you were going to take, would you? 15 A.. And he got a letter of---- 16QQ.. Was that about the extent of his disciplinary action? 17 A.. said he did not want to take him out of 18 the position. 19QQ..Okay. 20 A.. He had confidence in him. He----21QQ..Except he can't accept-- he's not accepting your authority 22 based on your instructions to stay in his lane. . Yes, sir. And he wasn't accepting 2 authority either, becauseQwas-- told me that he 3 was giving him instructions and we had a conversation along those 4 lines that he is putting you on the line by disobeying your 5 instructions because those are my instructions. And he said, M. 6 111111111g he said that 1111111=111.1111111 was the full-time 7 support in the unit. The soldiers responded to him. And I said, 8 "But they don't respond in a disciplined fashion. They-- they 9 respond to him because they think this is the wild, wild, west. And 10 uh-- and he said, "If I took him out it would hurt the Battalion." 11 And I said, "Look, I can give him another letter of reprimand, I can 12 take on this responsibility of commanding your Battalion if you want 13 me to. And if you don't want me to. But you need to start getting 14 him under control." And then there was about 30 days, a month, or 45 15 days where he actually was under control. He was in the right 16 uniform. 17QQ.. 1 A.Q He was out of uniform? 18 A.. He was in the BDU, but he wasn't in the DCU. And somebody 19 said to me, and again I wasn't there, but when they were down at 20 Bucca, they said he gave his DCUs to a couple of the EPWs when they 21 were uh-- paroled. And, of course, I asked was there any truth to 22 that. Of course not, he sent them to the laundry and they never came 55 1 back. So he had his BDUs. BDUs were acceptable, but he-- he was a 2 standout from his Battalion. . He was one of the individuals, I believe, that was 3 Q.. 4 suspended from their positions? . That's correct. That's correct. . 5 A.. Was there a written suspension? . 6 Q.. Suspension? Absolutely, yes sir. . 7 A.. 8 Q..So you removed him. Who else was suspended out of there, 9 besides 10Q A. " 11111111 12. Who's 11111111111 Q.. . INNis the First Sergeant for the uh-- the 372 nd MP 14 Company. 15 Q.. 13 A. Why not the S-3? Since he's got daily operational 16 oversight of all the Battalion operations. 17 A.. I don't know, sir. 18QOkay. So those were your choices? Q. . 19. A. They were not. 1111.11111111111111111111.1111.111111., 20 were General Sanchez's choices. 21 Q.. Okay. So basically---- 22. A. I added 11111111.1111.11 56 1QQ Your prerogative. Okay. There were other incidents that .. 2 happened in the time when, it was November I believe it was. The 3 205th MI Brigade Commander has already assumed TACON and had moved in 4 to the facility. And there was a riot, I believe at Camp Ganci, one 5 of the compounds there resulting in injury to both detainees and MPs. 6 And there were the death of six detainees if I'm not mistaken. . 7 A.. Three. 8QThree, Q.Qokay. And there was also, coincidentally enough, an 9 escape attempt somewhere in the hard site. It was either during the 10 same timeframe or the same night, whatever the case may be. What 11 actions did you take immediately after those incidents, and could you 12 described at least if you were present during that time or reports 13 that were being conveyed to you? 14QA. There was a riot, 1111111111111111M called after it was 15 under control. 16QAfter it was under control? Q.. 17 A.. After it was under control. 18QNot during? Q.. 19 A.. No it was not. 20QThere was no report radio wise, nothing? Q.. 21 A.. No, sir. 22QSo you had no knowledge of it---- Q.. 23 A.. No, sir. 57 . ----until after it was under control. 1 Q.. . Until after it was under control. . 2 A.. 3 Q..Okay. Did you kind of find that rather strange? . I did. And they told me that Colonel Pappas said that he 5 wanted the reports coming to him and he would inform me. . 4 A.. Okay. . 6 Q.. And they followed those instructions. . 7 A.. Alright. So you-- the reports went to Pappas. Pappas was 9 supposed to pass it-- pass it to you. Did you hear anything from 10 Colonel Pappas at all? 8 Q.. . I did not. . 11 A.Q 12 Q.. Alright. . 13 A. I called ColonelOP°QIt was about 2200. No, it 14 was not that late, it was dark, it was probably 2000, 2100, it was 15 late and I said, "Tell me what's going." He said, "Did Colonel 16 Pappas call you?" "No he did not." And before he told me what 17 happened he said Colonel Pappas said that he wanted the report and he 18 would get in touch with you. And I said, "Tell me what happened." 19 He said, "It started in one compound. One compound started throwing 20 rocks," you know the whole story, so. And I said, "When did you-- 21 tell me what actions you took." And he said, "I went down to the 22 facility when it started, uh-- they were using, gave the order to use 23 non-lethal---- . Who gave the order? 2 A.. 1 Q.Q He did. 3. Q. 4 A.. He did, yes. That's what he told me. And uh-- and it made 5 sense that he was in the TOC, went down to the compound, gave the 6 order use non-lethal, engaged. The prisoners since it was the winter 7 time had taken their blankets and put them inside their jackets, and 8 the non-lethal had little effect on them. One compound when it 9 started, and that compound responded and there was only one compound 10 that stayed out of it. 11QQ.. It was a domino effect. 12 A.. It was. And then when it-- according to 1.11111111.111111111, 13 they would get it under control then it would start again. They'd 14 get it under control then it would start again. He said we did that 15 three times and then I gave the order to go to lethal. 16QWas the Rules of Engagement done indicated as such t Q.. 17 what did the Rules of Engagement at that point in time, because they 18 were subsequently changed after that? 19 A.. Yes, sir. The Rules of Engagement at that time were that 20 you would use escalating means up to and including, at the command of 21. the Camp Commander,Qon-lethal. And then, if you 22 were still not able to bring it under control, on order from the Camp 23 Commander, you would go to lethal. And-- and they followed those 1 procedures. They-- they tried to get it under control, uh-- it was 2 getting out of control very rapidly. They went to non-lethal, the 3 non-lethal was ineffective, and then they went to lethal. And they 4 were the Rules of Engagement. Uh-- when I spoke to General Sanchez 5 that night, I told him that they used the established Rules of 6 Engagements. . Whose Rules of Engagement were those? . 7 Q.. They were CJTF-7 Rules of Engagement, they were theater- 9 wide Rules of Engagement, and they were the 800 th MP Brigade Rules of 10 Engagement and they were all a duplication republished. And in their 11 SOP, it was the 320th MP Battalion Rules of Engagement, which was just 12 their repetition of all of the Rules of Engagement that were 13 published. And I had in my hand, the copy of the CJTF-7 Rules of 14 Engagement and the 800 th MP Brigade Rules of Engagement. And Genera'. 15 Sanchez told me that he didn't care what the Rules of Engagement 16 said, that he wanted them to use lethal first and then go to non- 17 lethal when it was under control. 18 Q.. 8 A.. Okay. 19 A.. And I said, "Sir that's a violation of the Rules of 20 Engagement." And he said, "I don't care about your Rules of 21 Engagement." I said, "Sir, these are your Rules of Engagement." And 22 the JAG was sitting there and he said, "Then change them." He turned 23 to me and said, "Don't make any changes until you get the new Rules 1 of Engagement, but you're going to get new Rules of Engagement. Do 2 you understand?" I said, "Yes, sir, I understand." "These are 3 unarmed combatants." He said, "I don't care. They're armed 4 somehow." And General Miller was in there with me, and he said to me 5 out in the hall, "It doesn't make any difference if they're rocks or 6 MREs, just---- 7 Q.. They're armed, somehow. 8 A.. That's his interpretation. Let the SJA people handle it 9 now. 10QThis is the C-3 Miller? Q.. 11 A.. The C-3, General Miller. 12 Q.. Of course, the Rules of Engagement were changed after that. 13QA.. Right. 14QQ.. Because-- let me go back to the TACON relationship that you 15 had. Uh-- TACON happened on the 19th of November. This happened on 16 sometime around-- before Ramadan ended 24, 25th of November. During 17 the span of about five, six days there was still no clarity with 18 regards to your concerns of what TACON meant? 19 A.. No-- no clarification at all. Several attempts I went to 20 Major Williams, who was Colonel Pappas' Deputy, he said uh-- that 21 their-- the interpretation from General Wodjakowski was that TACON 22 meant that Colonel Pappas was in charge of those units. And I said 23 to Major Williams, "If Colonel Pappas is going to take charge of the 1 MP Battalion, I still want them to send me SIRs, I still want them to 2 send me information, I want to know what's going on with my MPs. 3 Because I'm the one that's going to be asked the questions." And he 4 said, "Ma'am I don't think so, I think Colonel Pappas is ready to do 5 this." And-- and I said, "Colonel Pappas and I need to go see 6 General Wodjakowski." . Did you all see General Wodjakowski? . 7 Q.. 8 A.. We did not. . Would the issue have been more resolved if in fact you 10 relinquished TACON to Colonel Pappas? 9 Q.. . No sir, I don't believe so. 12QQ.. 11 A.Q You still were-- your Battalion there was still in charge 13 of detention operations? 14QA.. They were. And they were running all the facility, the 15 hard facility was open at the time. We were housing-- we had two, 16 three, cell block two, three and four open, and five partly open, and 17 one, cell block lA was the isolation cells and that was an MI 18 operation. And then they asked for more capacity because they had 19 females and juveniles that they still needed to put in isolation, so 20 CPA gave them cell block 1B and they said that they would run those 21 facilities. Except for the MPs who would be guarding the prisoners. . So, the instructions you gave, or if any that you gave to . 22 Q.. 23 was, though you are TACON to Colonel Pappas, that 62 1 you were still responsible to report to me with regards to detention 2 operations? . He still had to give us numbers, we're still entering the 4 data on our---- . 3 A.. So was that your expectation then, was that they were going 5 Q.. 6 to do TACON-- I'm sorry, they were going to do detention operations? . In response to Colonel Pappas, yes sir. 8QAlright. But did you know that-- or did it trouble you at 7 A.. Q.. 9 all-- or had any concerns that the gaining unit could establish 10 priorities to that unit as TACON to him? . That may have been a concern, but Colonel Pappas told me 12 that uh-- that he didn't know anything about detention operations so 13 he was going to be relying very heavily on, you know if he had a 14 question or if he had-- and I told him that I wanted 15 11111111111111 to still-- we still needed to report the numbers, and if 16 there was any issues with the soldiers I had asked 17 to make me aware of them. I was still going to be signing REFRADs 18 and those kind of orders. Colonel Pappas said, fine, that was-- I 19 mean, the administrative responsibilities would still rest with the 20 800th MP Brigade. 21QQ..Do you think a memorandum of agreement of understanding 22 would have resolved that and put clarity to that relationship? 23 A.. 11 A.Q Yes, sir. I think it would have given great clarity. 63 1QWas there any thought given to that? Q.Q 2QA.Q There was thought given to it, and we didn't do one. 3 Okay. Alright. Q.Q We were-- it's not an excuse, it certainly is not an 5 excuse, but we were running detention operations all over Iraq. And 6 I was moving personnel around to be able to meet these requirements 7 and these missions and it was a piece of paperwork that in hindsight, 8 certainly could have given clarify, but we didn't do it. 9QQ.Q 4WA.W Let me go back to when you assumed command. Upon 10 assumption of command, when was that? 11QA.Q The 29th or the 30th of June. 12 Q.Q 29th, 30th u of June. Did you establish clear command 13 philosophy guidelines that you wanted each of the Battalions, all the 14 way down to the lowest ranking individual in your Brigade to 15 understand what your objectives were to be and how you want to 16 command and what you wanted to accomplish? 17QA.Q Yes, sir. I had all the Commanders, after the change of 18 command ceremony, I spoke to all of them at the same time. They all 19 had their command sergeant major with them. And-- uh-- I told them 20 that I knew that they were-- the number one question that they were 21 being confronted with by their soldiers was, were we going to be here 22 for, ya know, two years? I told them that I expected to be informed 23 if they were-- I didn't know if there were company grade disciplinary Q 1 actions taking place, but for serious incidents, I wanted to know 2 about them with a phone call immediately. I used the example of the 3 detention. I expected the officers within their Battalions to behave 4 appropriately, and I used the example of the violation of General 5 Order Number One that had already taken place at Bucca. Q 6 Q 1111111•1111111 7 A.Q Yes sir. And-- uh-- I-- I did give them my philosophy, 8 that command was a responsibility, a tremendous responsibility. This 9 was a nation at war; we were a nation at war. This was the 10 battlefield and we were moving up to Baghdad, but we still had lines 11 of responsibility to Bucca, we were going to leave a rear detachment. 12 That we would always be reachable and commanders could pick up the 13 phone and call me at any time. Of course I had to modify that because 14 we didn't have effective corns in Baghdad for the first month and a 15 half that we were there. 16 Q.Q Did you follow this up in writing? 17 A.Q Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I think they were given my 18 command philosophy the day of my change of command. 19 Q.Q Would it surprise you that several of those leaders and 20 commanders that I interviewed said they had never seen your written 21 command philosophy? 22 A.Q That would surprise me. But, I would say that if their 23 confusing my written philosophy with my support form, then I would Q 1 understand that. Because I told them that day, they asked me-- 2 several of them asked me, "Do you have your support form?" And I 3Q said, "No, I don't." Q This-- what I asked them was not in the context of a 5 support form. I said, basically, a memo that stipulated what your 6 command philosophy was. They do remember you speaking following the 7 change of command. They did not recall at least a preponderance of 8 the-those that I interviewed, ever remember or even recalling, or 9 even providing me with a copy of your command philosophy. 10 A.Q 4 Q.Q I-- I uh-- believe that for a long time that command 11 philosophy was attached to the other documents that were from that 12 day. The program from the change of command ceremony, the couple of 13 photographs. So I didn't write it for myself. 14QA portion of other documents. Q.Q 15 A.Q It was-- we were sitting in the conference room at Arifjan 16 and they were each given a-- I don't think---- 17QQ.Q Handouts---- 18 A.Q Yes sir. I don't think the memo said philosophy of 19 command, it said, maybe my-- my-- my direction or my leadership style 20 and there was attached a list of 10 or 12 bullets uh-- that was uh-- 21 may have been Karpinski's Philosophy. 22QQ.Q Sure. 23 A.Q And they were all provided those things. 66 Okay. Fair enough. Given the magnitude of your detention 2 operations or others that was associated with it, to include building 3 facilities. What were the fundamental, since you've been in this-- 4 you've been a military policeman now for the past 15, 20 years, 5 prisoners association. What are some of the basic tenets that you 6 would harp on, or provide emphasis to, when you're visiting the 7 facilities of your commanders? And in concert with all of those 8 incidents of suspected or either reported detainee abuses what are 9 some of the basic fundamental things that governs your mission 10 requirements? Q.Q . Sir, each one of the facilities were a little bit 12 different. But, when I went to each of the facilities, I talked to 13 the commanders about their soldiers. I talked to them about the 14 stress associated with being around prisoners all day long. I talked 15 about how the facilities offered challenges and that civilian 16 criminals, their mindset was different than EPWs, and so you have to 17 keep reminding your MPs that this is not internment resettlement 18 operations, that this is criminal detention operations. Asked the 19 commanders and the command sergeant majors at each location, how many 20 soldiers do you have who have criminal-- their either wardens or 21 they're in criminal corrections on the outside. A lot of them have 22 police officers. A lot of them had warden experience. The 23 facilities were built for one purpose, like for example, Cropper. 67 11 A.Q 1 Not held more than 72 hours capacity of 250. The were held there 2 sometimes for weeks, and the capacity was well over 700 at its 3 highest point. The MEK mission, although we were securing the MEK, 4 they were not criminals, they were not-- or they weren't being called 5 criminals. The downtown jails, you could literally kick out the bars 6 of the windows or the doors. They were really meant and used for the 7 training grounds for the new Iraqi corrections officers that were 8 coming out of the training courses that we were conducting. Mosul 9 was a division holding area while they were rebuilding the 10 corrections facility up there. Uh-- so it was different at each 11 location. But we focused generally, I would focus when I visited all 12 those locations, safety, the health, the welfare, how they were 13 handling the detainees, were the detainees getting food, were they 14 getting clothes, what were the logistical supplies. And every one of 15 those, and every one of the-- we handled and my S-4 insured that we 16 handled and equipped and supplied Cropper, Talil, Bucca, Baghdad 17 Central. CPA was responsible for funding and supplying all of the 18 other facilities. 19 Q.Q Outside of your-- 20 A.Q Outside of the military internment operations. And they Q 21 didn't do it. They,Qand were ,111111. 22 1111111especially was reckless and he was more interested in how many 23 AK-47s he could keep in the bathroom, than he was about prisoners 1 eating or how they were being transported or their safety or 2 security, or anything else. So, I instructed my S-4 to, for 30 days, 3 to supply the prisoners in our facilities, because they were under my 4 MPs control. So we were responsible for them. And I went to CJTF-7 5 and I asked General Wodjakowski if I could have an increase in my SIR 6 funds because I was going through them 200 thousand dollars every 7 other day. And he said, "Give me the requirements and I'll contract 8 it." And we sent the requirements up there and he turned it back, 9 and said see me. And I went to see him and he said, "We don't do 10 this for the soldiers." And I said, "Sir, there's different 11 requirements for prisoners." "But their prisoners, 111111111111 So I 12 talked about with the commanders and the staff, the company 13 commanders, I talked about their frustrations and ways to resolve 14 them. I talked about, did they understand the Geneva-Hague 15 Conventions. Did they understand how stress could have an impact on 16 the MPs, to rotate them around between tower guards and compound 17 guards and-- and they did all of those things. And they did them 18 very well. 19Q [Interview recessed at 1734.] 20 [Interview reconvened at 1748.] Q.Q We talked a little bit about your expectations when you 22 visited. Were there any set standards that you established or you Q 1 reinforced that were not negotiable and had to be carried out that 2 you expected your commanders and your soldiers to carry-- to follow? Q I expected them to be honest; I expected them to represent 4 the-- the 800th MP Brigade. I expected them to be-- to set the 5 example all the way down the chain of command. I expected them to 6 get information that I gave to them out to the soldiers. And I 7 expected them to treat the detainees appropriately, be in compliance 8 with Geneva-Hague Conventions, to be cooperative and honest with the 9 ICRC. Along those lines; I mean there was a-- there was a high 10 standard established for the Brigade and I saw it in the MPs 11 everywhere I went. 12QFor example, did your staff or yourself were aware that the 3 A.Q Q.Q 13 provisions, not the entire Convention, the provisions of the Geneva 14 Convention had to be written in the language of which the detainees- 15 nationality was from, in this care, Arabic and posted where they 16 could be visible to both the detainees and the MP guards? 17 A.Q Yes, sir. And those copies in both languages were 18 provided. And in fact we had copies of the Geneva-Hague Conventions 19 available in Farsi as well because of the MEK. 20 Q.Q The MEK, okay. 21 A.Q I think it was Arabic, Farsi, English, and somebody told me 22 there was some available down at Bucca in Urdu. Q Would it surprise you that when I visited these facilities 2 last week and the week previous that none of those were posted? Q 1QQ.Q That surprises me. Sir, I'll tell you, when I was out 4 there, after I got the information from the CID-- 5 when I was out there, I looked for all of those things. I looked 6 for-- for blue crystals-- to see if there were-- I mean, the flies 7 were under control. I-- I was-- I can't say I left no stone 8 unturned, but I was looking for the details. And I saw them. I saw 9 Korans, I saw Geneva-Hague Conventions in at least Arabic and 10 English. I-- I don't think I could tell you it was available in 11 Farsi there, because I saw that up at the MEK and I don't remember if 12 I saw it in both locations. But I was-- at Abu Ghraib, I looked for 13 those things, and they were not only posted on the wall, but they 14 were available, along with an ample supply of Korans and Bibles for 15 the outside facility and the inside facility. 16 Q.Q 3 A.Q Would it surprise to tell you that on my personal visit, I 17 personally visit each of those facilities. And the tier 1A were 18 those incidents happened, as of Wednesday I believe it was, this past 19 Wednesday, that the only sign I saw in those two tier, was a notice 20 form your IG that basically said that if you have any complaints or 21 see any signs of detainees abuse that you report it to the IG. And 22 none of the other things. 23 A.Q That would surprise me, yes sir. 71 Q Also at the MEK, when I talked to the Command Group there; 2 one, they were not aware that you had to post them on the facilities 3 itself, or anywhere in the Command Group Headquarters, until I told 4 them that they had a requirements under the provisions of 190-8, that 5 that was a directive since the Army is the executive agent for 6 detainee operations. Q Q.Q 1 7 A.Q Sir, in the hallway, in their TOC, as soon as you come in 8 the door, where the 530th is, it was posted on the wall. It was 9 posted in the latrine facility. It was posted in the-- and the MEK 10 leaders had copies of the Geneva-Hague Conventions. 11 Q.Q Okay. 12 A.Q So-- and it was posted in the mess hall, in the DFAC. So, 13 I am surprised. 14 Q.Q Okay. Well, I even had to recommend almost to the point of 15 directing a Battalion Commander, in fact it was 16 UM that he had to post that at the HVD, twice. So---- 17 A.Q Sir, at the HVD facility, in Baghdad, each one of those 18 detainees had a copy of the Geneva-Hague Convention iii.:their language 19 and some of them asked for English. And around Ramadan, when I was 20 at the HVD facility, I spoke to a large number of those HVD detainees 21 and I asked them if they had any questions, they asked very good 22 questions about--''in compliance with Geneva-Hague Conventions I'm 1 supposed to see an attorney, I'm supposed to have access to my 2 attorney. They know all of those things, sir. 3QOkay. I'm only conferring to you what I personally Q.Q 4 observed with the two recommendation I gave to Lieutenant 5 MN to post in English and in Arabic, the fundamental provisions 6 of that as I walked around the rooms I did not see any of that. But 7 they did have-- the admin office did have a copy of the Geneva 8 Convention in Arabic and it was loaned out, one copy. And if you 9 want the name of the specialist who told me that in the presence of 10 his Battalion Commander,QThat he had one copy, it 11 was loaned out. 12 A.Q When did you see them? 13QI saw them, I believe it was either Wednesday or Thursday Q.Q 14 of last week. I went to visit them twice, in fact. The only 15 facility I've only seen once is Camp Bucca and I had to tell 16 MEI down there that that was a requirement. And at the MEK 17 facility, I told then, I believe Lieutenant Colonel-- I'm sorry, 18 19QA. 20 Q.Q ----who was on duty. But, they may know it, they might 21 have posted it, but I didn't see it at least in that command 22 facility, nor did't . see it in any of the bathrooms. I did go to the 23 bathroom. So I commend that to you, that if that was a requirement Q 1 that was an understood requirement, and you made that as a non- 2 negotiable standard, then I would imagine that either your Battalion 3 Commanders, or any of that for the matter, were not following your 4 policy, nor your direction. Q Sir, I-- I don't want to try and second guess anybody. If- 6 - I had several of my Battalions and I will say, my strongest 7 Battalion Commanders, leave already, 8Qand each one of them performed a RIP with the 9 Battalion Commanders who came in. 11111111 whines and if he received 10 his OER before you got there, this may be intentional. 11111111, 11 wanted to go home four months ago and this-- I-- I don't know. I Q 5 A.Q 12 can't answer for them whenQand were 13 down at Bucca, those items were available and posted. 14QQ..Okay. 15 A.Q I-- I-- I don't even-- I can't even guess. 16QQ..Well, I only mention that to you because it's not you, per 17 se, just you alone, that has to enforce standards. Your Commanders 18 have to at least comply to that and you've got a staff that has to 19 remind them. 20 A.Q Yes, sir. 21QQ..So I just want to mention that to you. 22 A.Q Well, let me use the Rules of Engagement because that's 23 another one that when they-- when the new Rules of Engagement came 74 Q 1 out, we had training vignettes already prepared with changes so they 2 could make comparisons. 3Qwent to every one of the units and sometimes several times to 4 the units to make sure the soldiers understood. They had copies of 5 it. They-- it was all there. The tower guards have copies of the 6 Geneva-Hague Conventions. And to me when a soldier goes on duty and . 7 and I talked about this. When they go on 8 duty, it's not like there's a fight going on every day that they go 9 on duty. Take out the SOP book, read from cover to cover and refresh 10 your minds-- I'm not saying you have to read the Geneva-Hague 11 Conventions every day. But, take the book out and read it. The 12 books were there in the tower. They were in the facilities. The 13 cell block lA and B, those-- some of those items were removed because 14 in isolation or when soldiers-- when detainees are going through 15 interrogation, they're not entitled to have those things. 16QQ..Is that the rules? 17 A.Q Apparently the rules change. 18QQ..Whose rules were they? 19 A.Q They were the MI rules. 20QQ..Okay. Let's talk about-- a little bit about the Rules of 21Q, or anybody Engagement. DidQ 22 else for that matter, confer with you about a specific line in the 23 Rules of Engagement that stipulated, this is all following the riots, 1 that stipulated that they could carry, that you authorized for them 2 to carry their weapons, their sidearms, inside the compound? . Absolutely not. 4.Q.. 3 A.. Were you aware that there were comments or allegations that 5 those MPs were indeed wearing their sidearms, but were concealing 6 them in their cargo pockets? 7.A.. I-- I---- 8.Were you aware that a member of your Command Group knew of Q.. 9 that? 10.A..I am not. That they were carrying sidearms---- I-- 11.Q.. Sidearms, concealed in their cargo pockets---- 12.----inside the compound? A.. 13.Absolutely. Q.. 14.A.. They never shared it with me. 15.They never asked you for permission of that, because of the Q.. 16 dangers that were imposed to them during the riots? 17.No, sir. What they got permission from me to do was-- the A.. 18 weapons racks were removed from anywhere near the compounds. And 19 they were given permission instead of keeping them inside in the TOC, 20 they were moved to the tent, still outside the compound, but where 21 the QRF was, in a weapons rack. They got permission for that. They 22 were storing non-lethal and lethal ammunition in the same shotgun. 23 That was changed. 76 1 Q. or a verbal directive? Was that put in a written form,.2 A. it was--that's part of their-- I mean you never store No,. 3 lethal and non-lethal--except if you're regulation according to 4 5 Q. So that was already established is what you're saving? 6 A. sir. Yes,. 7 Q. Just a matter of reinforcing? 8 A. sir. Yes,.9 Q. Okay. 10 A.. And I-- on Christmas Day when I was out there and I was up 11 in the towers, I spoke to the MPs. And I said, "What do you have in 12 your shotgun?" "Non-lethal and lethal." And, I said, "In the same 13 shotgun?" "We don't have enough shotguns." "When you came on duty 14 today did you check?" "No ma'am, I didn't." "So if somebody fired 15 non-lethal last night, you wouldn't know." "No ma'am I wouldn't." I 16 said, "Do you check when you come on duty?" "No ma'am I don't." 17 Q.. Did you discuss that with Colonel---- 18.I spoke about that with A.. .I-11111111 . 19 was on his way back because his 20 mother-in-law or father-in-law passed away and he had to go home on 21 emergency leave. 22.Q..That was--.was still in command at that time? 23 A.. He was not. 1 So when he left for the second time, who was in command Q. 2 the Battalion? 3 A. was out there. 4 Q. So411111111/was the acting Commander. 5 A. I also brought.down from the MER compound. 6 Q. And he was doing the mayoral stuff? 7 A. He was doing the base defense plan. 8 Q. With relative-- with regards to policy memos, command 9 policies, are you aware, have knowledge of two command policies that 10 were signed by General Sanchez with regards to respect and dignity 11 and treatment towards detainees or Iraqi people? 12 A.. Right. I saw that. It was widely published. 13.Q..How was that articulated to you and what actions were you 14 supposed to take when you received those memos? 15 A.. It was-- we made sure it was distributed. The Commanders 16 all had it and in most cases it was delivered and when I made a visit 17 to the compound or whatever facility it was, we talked about it. And 18 I will tell you, sir, that at Abu Ghraib the soldiers in the mess 19 hall-- or in the dining facility inside the hard facility that's 20 really a cafeteria that's not being used yet. They were the ones who 21 sat there, or I should say, stood up and said, "How can anybody talk 22 about dignity and respect out here when the detainees, all of their 23 rights are being violated. They're living in mud, we can't give them 1 a hot shower. The food sucks. You know, we don't give them answers 2 to the questions that they have. The contractor that is coming out 3 here is smuggling in beer and taking out notes and we can't answer 4 anything that the prisoners are asking us about. They have compound 5 representatives, we're just lucky." Those are the things we heard. 6 And when you have soldiers who recognize that the person, who signed 7 that policy letter about dignity and respect, has about as much interest in dignity and respect for prisoners as he does about the 9 cleanliness of bathrooms- It wasn't consistent. And when I spoke to 10 them, I said, "Don't worry about the piece of paper, as long as 11 you're doing the right thing.. Don't worry about if the person who 12 signed that piece of paper has been out here to visit you or has seen 13 the conditions of the camp, you know the right things to do. And I 14 understand the stress and I understand the pressures." We went-- I 15 wasn't out to all of the facilities nearly as often as I should have 16 been to be able to respond to those kind of questions. But I made 17 certain, my sergeant major made certain, we always gathered them 18 together and addressed those concerns. Nobody said [pause] well 19 we're going to treat them the same way that the divisions are 20 treating them when they bring them into their holding areas. My MPs 21 take the handling and the care of prisoners very seriously. 22.Q.. Okay. Did you follow those two memos up with a command 23 policy of your own? Not that I remember specifically. Was there a requirement on those two policies that it be 1.A.. 2.Q.. 3 read to everybody. 4.A.. That is be disseminated to the lowest level. And it was. 5.Q.. And it was? 6.A.. It was. Did you get an acknowledgement from each of the Battalion 7.Q.. 8 Commanders that that happened? 9.A.. I did not. 10.Q.. Was that a requirement? 11.I don't recall without seeing the memo, it might be. I A.. 12 don't know what the other memorandum was though. 13.Q.. There were two memorandums. There was a memorandum on the 14 "3•` :', I believe, of October that stipulated respect and dignity towards 15 Iraqi people. And there was a memorandum on the 13 th of December, I 16 believe it was, that re-stipulated, or at least re-emphasized dignity 17 and respect for-- during detainee detention operations. 18.A. Sir, I'll tell you that when we were talking about the memo 19 of December 13 th, that the Provost Marshal for CJTF-7 at that time was 20 a guy by the name of11111111111who learned a lot about detention 21 operations, by force, by hook or by crook, not willingly. But when 22 we were over capacity at Baghdad Central, his solution, and with full 23 ops and General Wodjakowski's solution was cram more tents into the 80 compounds. And I said-- I said, "It doesn't sound like dichity 2 respect to me." "These are prisoners." I heard that a hundred 3 times, sir. "These are prisoners." The soldiers don': have those 4 kinds of things. In the middle of the summertime when we were still 5 rationing water up in Baghdad, I understand. I understand how you 6 could be in conflict when you have to give three bottles cf water to 7 prisoners and you only have to give two to each soldier. But, then 8 you're in compliance with Geneva-Hague, with the road ahead, the plan 9 for the road ahead. And---- 10.Q.. 1. But that was a directive, General Karpinski, it was a • 11 directive not to be questioned, that it was to be followed. 12.A.. It was followed. But soldiers have the right to question 13 it. Not whether it will be implemented or not, but they have a right 14. to their opinions. 15.Q.. Absolutely, but I think it is your responsibility to insure 16 that one, that there's an understanding for them to be able to 17 ameliorate themselves of a particular situation that they would be in 18 compliance with, as you said, the Geneva Convention, treatment for 19 them as opposed to treatment for all others. 20.A.. Sir, I said to General Wodjakowski many times, I can't say 21. if it was six or sixty, many times. I said it to General Fast, I 22 said it to Hitwell, who was the previous Provost Marshal. We have 23 responsibilities, we have to treat these prisoners-- when I submitted 81 the first contract request for food, for feedinc just at one 2 facility, I thought General Wodjakowski was going to take my heat of 3 because it was for $25 million. That's rather voluminous I would think, 25-- to feed how 1. 4.Q.. 5 many? Your soldiers, the MIs that were there---- 6.A.. No. sir, these were the prisoners that were there. Three 7 meals a day from a DOD approved facility and we had almost 7,000 8 prisoners there at the time. 9.So there was some either appropriate supported, non- Q.. 10 supported means. Did you know that there were dogs in the facility? 11 A. Working dogs? 12 Working dogs. 13 A. sir. Yes,. 14 Q. Did you know why they were there? 15 A. sir,. Yes,.we requested them. 16 Q. Was that a formal request---- 17 Yes,. sir. 18 Q. Did you know how they were being utilized or ----from you?. 19 employed? 20.They were being used at the entry control points and they r... 21 were explosive bomb dogs, I believe, and patrol dogs. 22.Q.. Patrol dogs. 23.A.. They had them down at Bucca and then they moved them---- 82 Do you know the composition of those? Ala Army? Al: Navy 1.Q. 2 or? 3.A..think we got one Navy doc handlinc team I-- I do not, but I 4 in. I-- I-- I don't know. But I know that they were Army primarily. 5.Q.. Would it surprise for you to hear that those dogs were used 6 for unauthorized use either for interroaation or for photo 7 opportunities that were done by soldiers and members of your command? . 8 A.. Yes, it would surprise me to hear that. . Were any of those reported to you? 10.A. 9 Q.. They were not. The first I heard of them getting a 11 military working dog--I read it in the CID report. Uh-- because I 12 saw them at the ECPs, I saw them at the entry control points. I saw 13 the dog handlers when they were-- and it was a-- it was a force 14 multiplier, if you will. They were walking around the compounds, on 15 the outsides of the compounds. The prisoners could see the dogs. 16 The dogs were serious business. I never saw them by lA or 1B. The 17 first time I heard of it was when I saw the report that they'd called 18 the dog over there to be used in an interrogation and they had the 19 dog biting the detainees legs. 20.Q..Okay. Were there any reports given to you that those 21 detainees that were being held in tier 1A, or for that matter, tier 22 1B were being stripped of their clothing? 23.A.. Yes, sir. 83 . When was that made aware to you? 1.C. . The ICRC team went out to Baghdad Central to-- because they 3 really have unrestricted access, they give us the courtesy of lettinc 4 us know that they are going to come around a certain time. But-- and 5 we always open the doors for them. They said that they wanted to-- 6 and they talked to a couple of prisoners, they looked at the cells. 7 they noted improvements, they turned the water on to see if it was 8 running, if it was clean, those kinds of things. They looked at the 9 food, they talked to the compound detainee representatives and they 10 asked to ao in to the interrogation cells. And they did. And they 11 opened one of the facilities and there was a naked prisoner in there. 12 So, they did not want to appear-- they didn't want to overreact to 13 it, : think is the words that they used. And they interviewed the 14 detainee and the detainee reported that not only was he made to sit 15 there without his clothes on when he was taken in for interrogation 16 they took his clothes away from him and then made him walk back to . A.. 17 the cell naked. And confirmed it for me and he said 18 that they were no longer-- and he had talked to Colonel Pappas about 19 it and he was no longer going to be in the business of escorting the 20 detainees once they were through interrogation, because that was not 21 something that the MPs were trained to do, nor did they agree with 22 it. And the ICRC report was rendered and it mentioned that there was 23 a naked person in a cell with no means of cover. I believe in-- 84 1 after sometime they go a blanket or some kind of coverino for the 2 guy. And there was a report-- in that same ICRC report it was also 3 told to the ICRC representative that the prisoner was made to wear 4 women's underwear on his head and parade around in front of the other 5 detainees, that they often paraded up and down in front of the other 6 prsoners. And I talked to 411111111111.11 to Colonel Pappas, to .. 7 and to They were all together over at 8 CJTF-7 headquarters. I spoke to them, and I said, "I saw the 9 report." And they made a joke of it. And the joke was, I told 10 Colonel Pappas to stop sending those prisoners Victoria Secret's 11 catalogs. And I said, "Are you going to respond that way in the ICRC 12 report, this isn't funny. And.looked me in the face 13 and said, "They're just joking." And I said, "I don't think the ICRC 14 is joking." knd he said, "These are detainees." You know, they're 15 not always the most honest people on the street. And, all of that 16 has come true. I didn't make a joke of it. The intel people made a 17 joke of it, joined by immilp who was generally pretty 18. reliable. 19.Q.. Did you bring that-- did you bring it to the attention of 20 General Wodjakowski? 21.A.. I did. 22.Q.. Or General Sanchez as well? 23.A.. I brought it to General Wodjakowski's attention. 85 . And his guidance was? Q.. . We'll see what the ICRC report-- the response is. : sa:d, 3 "Colonel Pappas is preparing the response, sir." . 2 A.. Are you aware of an interrogation ROE? . 4 Q.. I am not. . 5 A.. Have you seen one like this, since the interrogation 7 operations have been conducted in conjunction with your detention 8 operations? 9 [MG Taguba passes document to BG Karpinski.] 10.A..have never seen this Interrogation Rules of Engagement 6 Q.. I 11. before. 12.Q.. But you were aware that interrogations were being done of 13 the detainees that is under the detention operations of the 320t1'. 14.A.. No, sir. The detainees under the control of the MPs were 15 escorted to an interrogation booth, or room, and it was under the 16 complete control of the MI people. 17.Q.. But then policy was explained to me that somebody picks a 18 detainees by ISN either from Ganci or Vigilant for the hard site and 19 escorted by your personnel to the interrogation. Was that often? 20.A.. Originally that's true-- that was true. They were 21. escorted. 22.Q.. When did that stop? 86 1 A.in mid-November or later because it was That stopped,. 2 actually stopped when.got out there to Abu Ghraib, 3 because it fell in line with the internal taskings. And it stopped 4 because a female and a male MP were tasked to escort a detainee back 5 from interrogation and he was naked.."I And I said,.agree." 6 called me,.I."Stop. he said this is what took plae, said,. 7 We're not going to do it." 8 Q.. Okay. 9 A.. I have never seen this. 10 Q..Okay,.So from then on You've never seen that..thank you. 11 in,.at the time to report or did you ask.to you,. 12 record for you, any incidents of detainees being escorted back to 13 their cells in the nude? 14.A.. I did. 15.Q..How many reports? 16.A.. There were no reports because the MPs were no longer 17. involved in it. 18.Q.. Okay. Since they were no longer involved in that, none of 19 the MPs when they were remanded back to their custody, those 20 detainees were fully clothed? 21.A.. The reports would indicate that they were fully clothed. 87 1.Because, let me understand this. When a detainee is asked Q.. 2 or been directed to be interrogated, they are taken out of the 3 compound. You don't allow the MI personnel inside the compound? . That's correct. They are---- Escorted to a gate of some sort, and then they are 4 A.. 5.Q.. 6 transferred, the custody is transferred to whoever is interrocratino-- .. 8 A• The MI or the ISG or whoever---- . How is that done? Is that done with a piece of paper, here 10 you are? 11.A. 9 Q.. There's a sign out sheet, put their signature there, they 12 put the ISN number of the detainee, it's a printed form. They sign 13 for them, they take them into custody. If they are going to leave 14 Abu Ghraib it requires basically a hand receipt, a prisoners hand 15. receipt. 16.Q. And followinc interrogation, they're returned back to MP 17. custody. 18.A.. Right. 19.Q.. Okay. And there's a special set of instructions for a 20 detainee that had to have some sort of a special treatment. Special 21 treatment like sleep deprivation, meal plan, that sort of things, 22 segregation. How, under your knowledge, how was that communicated or 23 articulated to the MP? 88 The-- I asked that question specifically, specifically s:: 2 And it was different. We had a visit earlier on last year, : mean, 3 probably around August or something from General Miller, Major 4 General Miller from GITMO. And his direction was that he was going 5 to GITMOize the confinement operation. And he was going to use Abu 6 Ghraib. And when he made that decision, I said to him, "Abu Ghraib is 7 not mine to give to you. It belongs-- it is a CPA facility. I own 8 the wire and those aren't the people that you---- . 1.A.. 9 Q.. You're talking about the prison complex itself? . 10 The hard facility. And he said that was what he was going 11.And I said, "It is not mine to give to you. That has been to take.. 12 CPA funded. That belongs to the CPA." "They're your MPs inside." 13. said, "Yes, sir, they are. But we don't own the facility." "Are you 44 supplying it." : mean, I kept emphasizing to him that I didn't own 15 the facility and it was only an interim facility and so he had 16 everybody leave the room and he said, "Look, we're going to do this 17 my way, or we're goino to do this the hard way. I have permission 18 from General Sanchez to take any facility I want. And we're going to 19 put MI procedures in place in that facility because the MI isn't 20 getting the information from these detainees like they should be." 21 And I said, "Sir, if I am directed to give you that facility, I will 22 give you that facility." And he said, "We're going to send MPs in 23 here who know how to handle interrogation. We're going to leave a CD 89 1 and a POI with the MI people and they're going to conduct traininc s: 2 your MPs know how to handle certain requirements." And : said, "Sir, 3 if the decision is made to handle it that way and that cell block is 4 going to be given to the MI people." They never conducted training 5 sir. They never left a CD, they never left a printed PO:, they never 6 gave my MPs any specific training. 7.Q.. Were you out-briefed after his visit? 8.A.. Yes, sir, I was, by him. 9.Q.. Individually, or as-- in a group setting? 10.A.. Both. 11.Q.. Okay. 12.And he told me specifically that he left that POI with 13.and with Colonel Pappas. That they were going to 14 conduct classes, that they were going to bring a team of MPs that 15 worked-- had experience down in GITMO that knew his procedures and he 16 was going to use the hard facilities out at Abu Ghraib. I didn't aet 17 any of that from CPA-- as a matter of fact, they were adamantly 18 opposed to it. And the one cell block that they had given to the 19 MIs, at that point they wanted to take back. And.was 20 the intermediate between me saying we're going to take it, and you 21 know, like 99 percent of the law is possession and we're in 22 possession of it right now. And he said, "Let me talk to them." So 23 he was the go-between. Nonetheless, I think in answer to your 90 1 question, the-- the interrogation people, the MI would sign the:. 2 they would bring them back and they would tell them, I'll be back in 3 an hour, and they're not going to get any food, don't give them a 4 meal. We're going to be back in an hour, we're going to, va know, 5 talk to them for another 15 minutes; you won't have to take them out 6 of the interrogation cell. I might come back at two o'clock in the 7 morning and take them out. That was the sleep deprivation. They-- 8 they didn't-- Colonel--111111111111/, who was the, I think she was 9 the ops for the MI brigade, said to me, "The reason we don't want the 10 ICRC to go in there anymore is because it interrupts the isolation 11 process. If we have them in isolation for a week, if they have a 12 chance to interface with a person who is speaking their language, 13 that interrupts the isolation process and we have to start all over 14 again in order to put the pressure on them. So, if we can just have 15 the cooperation of not letting the ICRC." I said, "We need to put it 16 in writing and explain to them, this is why." 17.This is the reason why I showed you this. On the right Q.. 18 hand column on there are specific rules that General Sanchez had 19 approved. 20.A.. He most likely approved this for the MI people to apply, 21 but I have never seen this. 22.Q. None of your staff had seen it? 91 I can't speak for them, but if they had seen it, : think 2 they would have told me, you know there is a rules of engagement for 3 interrogation, but---- 4.Q.. 1.A.. None of that.---- 5.----when I was out there at cell block lA specifically, 6 took their notebooks off the shelf and I looked for anything. 7 looked for a history of the sign out sheets or anything. Now the NCO 8 that was there at the time told me. that the CID had taken most of 9 their books. But, there was no evidence of anything except the 10 Geneva-Haaue Conventions, the ICRC rules and my rules about treatment 11. of detainees. 12.Q.. Okay. 13.A.. And we have ye: to GITMOize the operation. 14.Q.. I'm sure. I've read the report. So, I don't know when 15 they're going to implement that. Detainee accountability. What is 16 the Brigade's standard in accounting for every detainee that enters a 17 compound or a facility? 18.A.. They-- when it was down at Bucca, of course, they used the 19 NDRS. And at Ad Diwaniyah and Hilal the Marines were there, that was 20 the lst MEF region, and they were using the BAT system, the Biometric 21 Automated Tracking system. 22.Q.. Sure. 92 And in those facilities down there, they allowed the MPF t: 2 the BAT system to maintain accountability and pictures and-- were 3 actually testing it out and their plan was that we would buy those 4 systems off of them when they left because they were fieldinc it for 5 Lockheed-Martin, I think owns it. And, we liked the BAT system. 6 There were-- the NDRS system, down at Bucca, when it was just EPWs, 7 third country nationals and displaced civilians it worked. Because 8 it was one location, they were being processed, then they started to 9 come out with new, like change one, change six, I think they're on 10 change nine or eleven rignt now. But every patch that they sent out 11 sometimes it would corrupt what was already there, sometimes it would 12 freeze the database from functioning. And we had no means of 13 communication, so we coul -'t network the system. So each facility 14 became responsible for accounting for their own prisoners. Ard if we 15 looked-- if we knew the ISN number we could go into the database and 16 locate the prisoner. The problem was, they didn't often have the ISN 17 number. So---- 18.Q.. 1.A.. Why is that? 19.A.. Well, because in a lot of cases, the family members didn't 20 know that the prisoner was even being held. So, they would use the 21 name: Janis Karpinski. Well there's lots of different spellings for 22 Janis; there's certainly a lot of different spellings for Karpinski, 23 and depending on who input the data, you-- if you didn't get an exact 93 1 match, you didn't find the person. So you'd have to go down the :is': 2 looking for anybody that was a Janis, or a J-A-N or whatever they-- 3 they-- we got them eventually, but we couldn't get them instantly, 4 and that's what people were expecting. It was an unrealistic 5 expectation. I told Ambassador Bremer that, I told General Sanchez 6. that. 7.Q.. How was the database from the BATS, the Biometric Automated 8 Tracking System integrated into the National Database Recording 9 System? 10.A.. It wasn't. It was a separate system because they weren't 11. compatible. 12.Q.. So there's a matter of manually inputting everything back 13 into the NDRS? "4.A.. Yes, sir. 15.Q.. So they were not talking to, or not interconnected? 16.A.. No, sir. But it was my understanding now they've worked 17 the link out. And the other problem is that its BATS because they-- 18. mean that was another issue, when we got it up in Baghdad the 19 people that-- the C-6 who was supposed to be responsible for it at 20 General Sanchez's instruction, transferred it to the C-2. They 21 linked it to CHIMS which was a classified system, so that broke the 22 firewall on BATS, so it was no longer an unclassified system. So, 23 they couldn't link the data from BATS to the NDRS until they worked 94 1 out this connectivity or this patch or this firewall, whatever 2 was. 3.Q.. Was there a common policy across the Brigade or was 4 decentralized for how and when each of the detainees would be 5 accounted for on a daily basis? Besides BATS and---- . 6 A.. They were in-processed---- . Understand.-- . 7 Q.. ----and they were BATd then and they NDRS. Sc every day 9 the compound NCOs would count the prisoners, account for them, record 10. 8 A.. _t----11 Q..How was this supposed to be?----12.----and I will say, consistently, and the easiest means to 13 do accountability checks during the daylight hours was when-- at 14 mealtime. And that worked very effectively. Naturally, in an 15 outside facility, most of our escapes occurred during the hours of 16 darkness. So you have to, on the night shift you have fewer people, 17 but you have to develop-- . 18 Why is that?---- 19.A.. It was a matter of resources, sir. So, there's most of the 20 activity with the prisoners during the day or the problems will come 21 up during the day; and at night, the majority of them are sleeping. 22 So, if you have to make adjustments-- 23.Q.. But the escapes were being done during the night. 95 Correct, but with light sets, with the power on and the 2 light sets turned in, I mean, you adjust because then you take the 3 steps necessary to-- to limit those opportunities that you can 4 exploit. So, yes, most of the escapes occurred at night. But, when 5 the light sets were operational, you have good light sources and 6 everything. The problem was, at Abu Ghraib, the light sets, which 7 they were depending on, would often fail at night, of course, that's 8 when the lights are on. So, the prisoners had a plan, when the 9 lights fail the next time, we're out of here, and two of them would 10 be, or three of them would be. When the lights fail, you know, if it 11 happens that often because they kept looting the power lines for the 12 copper, so then you have tc have a fallback plan. You have to be 13 able to come down out of the towers, or go up in the towers, or have 14 an alternate light set-- alternate light source, a generator, 15 whatever it was. Sir, we couldn't get generators-- when we got 16 generators out there, they didn't work. They contracted it and the 17 contractors brought the aenerators and then they left and they didn't 18 come back and the generators didn't work. I didn't have engineers 19 to-- except building construction engineers. I mean, it was just one 20 challenge after another. 21.Q.. 1.A.. How many-- how many reported escapes were you made aware 22. of? 23.A.. For the whole duration? 96 1 Q. from the time you took command. Yes,. 2 A. I think there was about 32 total. 3 Q. Reported? 4 A. Actual. Reported.. 5 Q. And how many detainees, of those 32, how many total 6 detainees escaped? 7 A. Completely escaped? 8 Q. Yes. 9 I don't know,. I would guess about 15 because there was 11 10 from Bucca at one shot. 11 Q. This past January before the 310th TOA'd with the 724 th ,. they 12 told us there were two recorded cases of escapes prior to the 310th 13 and there was one after the 310t1',.They did say that so that's three.. 14 those escapes happened during periods of limited visibility. 15 Typically it happens when the fog rolled in. And, of course, from 16 the same location predominantly, the same pattern, and I basically 17 asked them how would you improve on that and typically what kind of 18 guidance they would get from. Brigade to improve based on the report. 19 Would it surprise you that they never got any response from Brigade? 20.A..within That's not true, sir. I spoke to. 21 hours of the first escape. That was when one---- 22.Q.. This is the previous Battalion Commander? 97 He is previous to .That's just simply not t.ruE-. 1.A.. . myself within hours of 2 Because : spoke to 3 happening and it was one individual who was in a compound and the 4 auards were not on the money, and he escaped. And they immediately 5 sent a QRF, they saw footprints, they tried to track him. They were 6 crackinc him all day lone until about, when it was no longer 7 practical, until about noontime, the rain started and then they lost 8 the trail and everythinc else. But I spoke to.all 9 day lone about it. . 10 So what instructions did you give him? 11.A..: said, "Tell me what happened." He sent : gave him,. 12 tne report, then he sent a more substantial report. I told him that, 13 -You can't prevent the foc from coming in." He understood, he was-- 14 they were impiemen--they were developing the fog plan, they were 15 acing to implement it because the fog was typical for that time of 16 year and they did. And you-- the fog is thick down there, it's not 17 that far from the port, there's no visibility, these prisoners are in 18 a wire outside, and they take advantage of it. But, that case, the 19 subsequent case and the one escape under the 310tr', I spoke to the 20 commanders. Now Colonel...wasn't there when that escape took 21 place. He did this RIP and the TOA and I did not speak to him. 22.Q.. Was it your policy that every time there was an_escape that 23 a staff assessment, either led by you or your S-3 would go down and 98 1 make a quick determination on how it happened and what procedure; tc 2 be done? . Yes, sir. . 3 A.. Each and every case? . 4 Q.. Every case, with the exception of the case loyal". 6 1111111 because the investigation was so tliorough by him, that the 7 report was concise. I sent.over to Bucca and she did 8 the assessment for me. . 5 A.. Okay. Your staff basically said there were about 34, 32, 10 34 reported escapes and also indicated there's roughly around 34, 35 11 that actually escaped. This is a matter of record. How would you--- 12 9 Q.. That can't be correct because they captured some of them 14 and brought them back, and those were the escapes that were reported. 15.Okay, I'm just mentioning to you what your staff mentioned 13. A.. Q.. 16 to me. These are folks that I interviewed and they told me with a 17 degree of accuracy, they even quoted to me the percentage of that, 18 based on the number of detainees that were either held or transported 19 by your command. . 20 A. Yes, sir. . So---- . 21 Q.. 22 A.. I'm-- I'm not questioning them. . 23 Q.. Okay. 99 They must be focused on-- on other things now. How would you assess, based on your experience, when yo.,: 1.A.. 2.Q.. 3 took command of the Briaade. What was your assessment of command 4 climate, your assessment of the operational readiness of your outfit, 5 and your leadership assessment of those leaders that are commanding 6 those major subordinate commands? . When I came into the Brigade, it was, and I'd come from the 8 largest RSC in the Reserves, in the United States, that was the 81 51 . 9 And I'd had several months to go through this process of, not only 10 mobilization and concerns from commanders in that command, but seeing 11 it on the ground, knowing full well what happens if a commander stays 12 in command for too long and how complacency sets in and all of those 13 things where a person's been in the same unit all of their career, I 14 mean, on and on and on. I sat on promotion boards and selection 15 boards, battalion command selection boards where they do a letter to 16 the president and they say this is the only battalion I want to 17 command because I'm the UA in this unit and so I don't have to travel 18 for drill. So I knew al of those signs, I knew all the signals and 19 I saw every one of them and more in the 800th . And I was very 20 concerned. I used a couple of examples with General Hill. And I did 21 not-- I was a Battalion Commander under the 800th under a different 22 Commander. I didn't know-- I knew.from years before and 23 I wanted him out of the position as the deputy because he hadn't 7 A.. 100 1 changed from when I knew him. from years before. He was commander 2 he was running his position and influencing the soldiers from-- as if 3 he were functioning from Desert Storm. He was at best, a warrant 4 officer. I use the example of the detainee abuse at Bucca and 5 General Hill kind of minimized it, not kind of, he minimized it and 6 he said, "These things happen." No they don't happen. They're 7 investigating it, these were MPs that reported other MPs, okay so 8 they did the right things, but it happened because there was a lot of 9 wrong things going on..is a West Point graduate, 10 he's certainly intelligent and he's been in the MP community for 11 years and I said-- and he said, he wasn't there when it happened. We 12 really got it crossed-channels on the situation with the violation of . 13 General Order Number One with .And and 14 we not only got it cross-hairs over that because I said I don't care 15 how you slice it, it's a violation of General Order Number One and 16 this is a major and a senior NCO. That's fraternization and 17 everything else that's cooking there. And he said, "They were 18 friends from a long time ago and this was a couple of drinks." And I 19 said, "A drink is a violation of General Order Number One." It was a 20 discussion that General Hill, I think, dug in his heels. 21.Q.. Did you take action to that? 22.A.. I-- I did not. It was a completed action and the only 23 reason it continued to be an item of interest was because 101 . 111111111 we moved up to Baghdad with us. IIIIIII 2.mcontinued to hinge every discussion on how she had made a 3 mistake and she was going to pay for it for the rest of her career. 4 I talked to her for more than an hour, sir, one-on-one up in Baghdad, 5 and I said, "Look, it's going to be an issue for the rest of your 6 career i" you keep prefacing every conversation with a reference to 7 it. Okay? Get over it. You made a mistake, it was a serious 8 mistake, you paid the price, but you can get over it, if you stop 9 mentioning it as the reason for why you're not doing all the things 10 you're supposed to be doing." I said, 1111111111111111111 you're smart, 11 you're able, and you're doing all the of the things that people want you to do because you're a female. Do you understand that? Do you 13 understand you come off as a silly, goofy woman, instead of an 14 intelligent major." And she said, "That's my personality. I'm in 15 marketing." And, I mean, it just goes contrary to everything I was 16 trying to say to her. But she never did get over it. As a matter of 17 fact, when she came in to see me in my office about four days ago, 18 it's the first thine she said to me, was that "I know you're still 19 angry about that violation of General Order Number One." "We've come 20 full circle now, a year later and you're still mentioning it to me. 21 I wasn't here when it happened. I have formed my opinion of you on 22 what you've done since then." And she said, "And what is it?" And I 23 said, "Be careful what you ask for. Because if you ask again, I'll 102 tell you." And she said, "I'd like to know." And I said, and : told 2 her what my opinion was. And besides that, mentioned that WM 3 iad come up to the TOC, had done a great job, moved on. He 4 had been so good that we moved him out to Baghdad Central to be the 5 HHC first sergeant when the first sergeant reached his expiration and 6 was going on. By that time, they got the command-sergeant majcr, who 7 was part of the 320" into the 320th. He got cleared from the medical 8 station-- or the medical hold in the states. He knew the situation . 1. 9 with so he kept him in his lane; worked out very 10 well. Sir, guess what happens, we move.up to Baghdad 11 Central to train the-- to give her skills to the people that are 12 gonna-- Sergeant--.and another sergeant that were 13 aonna take on the NDRS and she's right back there linked to 14 11111. I had to talk to.and I had to talk to_her 15 about it, again. And I said, "You know you've come too far to undo 16 everything you did. Now I'm gonna tell you the same thing I've had 17 to tell several other people in this-- senior people in this six 18 months. If you don't stop, I'm gonna put it in writing, okay?" 19.Q.. Who else were troublesome to you? 20.My command sergeant major. A.. 21.Understand. Q.. 22. A. 11111111111111 out at Abu Ghraib, who under-- when they were 23 at Bucca, she got, there was a detainee down there, an EPW by the 103 1 name of-- he took a Christian name, his name was MIN He was 2 detained because he was picked up during the war as a member of the 3 Iraqi Republican Guard and he was fighting us. He was detained as a . 4 combatant, as an EPW, and took a liking to him and to . 5 another auy by the name of Now that was before 6 I took command, again. But it became a prJblem afterwards so I had 7 to track the history back and find out what the heck had happened 8. there. Well, anyway, to make a long story short, if it's possible, 9 Michael ends up at Baghdad Central as a translator. He was released 10 from-- he was paroled, didn't leave because they kept him around and . 11.and him were in love this Specialist-- at that time 12 and I said toll." "And this makes sense to you?" She said, "I 13 had nothing to do with it.".I said, "Did you employ"... 14 And she said, "Well, I paid him once or twice because he was helping . 15 around the mess hall. -I had . IG go out there and 16 check that out because I said, "This is moving into a different 17 area." And he went and checked it out and he came back and he said, . 18 is working there. he no longer is, because with 19 your authority, I told him, You know, you can't work here anymore, 20 you're not supposed to be in around-- once you've been an EPW you're 21 not supposed to be around." bkay, so now I go off to Baghdad Central 22 and I go out there one day and this translator comes up to me who is 23 speaking beautiful English and he says, "Oh, General Karpinski, I was 104 1 looking forward to meeting you. My name ill...now. = ar7 2 Christian, I was down at Bucca." I'm thinking that this guy was a 3 translator down at Bucca and he got transferred up to Baghdad Central 4 when the 320th moved. And.says to me afterwards, 5 "That's the guy that's involved with Specialist Duke." : said, -What 6 is he doing in DCL; uniform?" And he says, "He's a translator here. 7 Titan hired him." : went back and I said to."You 8 find out what he put on his application for Titan and I want to find 9 out what, if you listed that he was an EPW. He's not supposed to be 10 working out there. I mean, he's working the processing line, he's 11 allegedly involved with this female out there. This is out of 12 control, do you and--." He calls Titan and Titan doesn't have a file 13. on him. 14.Q.. No background check? 15.A.. No background check and I reported him, sir, to Colonel 16 Pappas, to . Titan Corporation, to the ISG guy that 17 was out there working with the prisoners and putting them on the box 18 and everything else. I talked to Wodjakowski about it. I talked to 19., who was the Deputy D, uh C-2 at the time. I talked to 20 General Fast about it several times. Nobody seemed to care that this 21 guy was out there and had full access to everywhere on the compound 22 which was, you know, at level two or something. Nobody knew if he 23 was a level one or a level thirteen or anything else. I--when I 105 1 sent 111111111111111 out there, I said, "You put eyeballs on t'nLF 2 guy and you keep your eyeballs on this guy, because I don': :rust 3 him." I was out there one time and the guy comes up to me this way, 4 walks straight up to me, I thought he was going to say hello and all 5 of a sudden he puts his arms around me to hug me. My psr is pullinc 6 him off and I said to my aide and the PSD afterwards, "You know that 7 wasn't a hug, that guy wanted to know if I had a weapon on me, he 8 wanted to know if I was wearing a vest under my shirt. You guys have 9 to stay between me and any of these infiltrators. I don't like that 10 guy,. don't trust him and I don't want him around any of the . 11 detainees." And I told that, I told 11111111 12 WW1that, and it seemed like every time I went out there the guy 13 was somewhere else around that processing line. Now, as far as 14 anybody could tell me, he was never involved over in the cell block 15 1A and B. But, sir, that was just one of so many examples where it 16 was clear that there was people with the opportunity to come in and 17 leave that could make it dangerous for my MPs to operate out at Abu 18 Ghraib or up at the MEK compound or any of the other facilities. 19.Q.. Those are examples where either you took control of the 20 situation and either referred them back to your Battalions, or 21 whatever. That's why I was asking before, standards. It would 22 appear to me that the examples you are giving me where even to the 23 point where these people are hugging you and whatever have you, it 106 1 appears to me that you were the only one that was takinc.tc- a: 2 any kind of correction. Did you do any delegation of anythinc at all 3 to any of the Battalion Commanders about that? . Absolutely, sir. How would you assess each of your Battalion. Commanders that 4 A.. 5.Q.. 6 were attached to you? Just give me a couple---- 7.Snapshot? 8.Q.. Yes. 9.A.. 115'', 11111111111/ he had a horrible facility in Cropper 10 and a great facility in. the HVD. He was-- he knew what the rules 11 were and he was a team player. A strong commander, had a good chain 12 of command and had a handle on it. Occasionally he would get out of 13 line,. mean with some kind of comment or something, but he knew the 14 rules and they followed them..who was securing the 15 MEE was a great performer, great commander, knew the rules. Had an 16 opinion about what the MEE were, if they were really terrorists or a 17 threat. Had to kind of keep him under control of that sometimes in 18 conversations like, look this is the direction of the SECDEF, so 19 that's the direction we're taking, and he understood. Very strong, 20 had a great chain of command. 111111111111111 with the 400 th had the 21 initial operation transferred to them by the 18th MP Brigade. They 22 were treated very badly when they were under their C-2 and he took 23 his resources, put them in the right place. He understood the rules 107 1 and he had a good command sergeant major, and also good supervislon 2 great chain of command..had command of the Battalion 3 for a long time and was the first one at Baghdad Central--sorry, 4 Bucca and set it up. 11111 got in there and was allowed to take 5 control of that operation, with General Hill's blessing. gill. 6.was-- was probably-- not probably,.was 7 disgusted with the situation because she didn't feel like she had a 8 voice and General Hill wouldn't listen to her. When General Hill 9 left and .1 took over, that changed a little bit, but it really wasn't 10 enough time for her to get spun back up again. So I had the new 11 Battalion-- Lieutenant Colonel who was selected for battalion command 12 by a board, for that Battalion. And I talked to.and 13 I talked to General Stott who was.boss in the 143rd and 14 1 said this would be a great opportunity for him to take care of the 15 Battalion, have the experience with the Battalion in the field, in 16 this situation. Everybody agreed. That's how Colonel Coulter became 17 my rear detachment XO. 18 Q..who else? .Besides. 19.A... I had 111111111, and I had was down at 20 Bucca originally, then moved up to the MEK compound and took on that 21 mission. 11111111 is a-- definitely a team player, has good control 22 of the chain of command. There probably was some discourse between 23 him and .WARwas the new guy on the block and 108 1.guys had done a lot of the work and he didn't think111111111 2 appreciated it. Thought that.was a prim. Dona. But they 3 worked it, they sorted it out, recognized their own differences but 4 WIN was a good Battalion Commander. Strong, solid, knew the 5 direction he was taking. 111111111 a whiner and a complainer and he 6 had an easy mission down :here in the MEF region with the multi- 7 nationals. They had a DFAC, they had at least electricity with 8 moving air and he continued to whine. He had more REFRADs than any 9 other Battalion because he thought that if he got down under sixty 10 percent strength, he would have to send-- we'd have to send the • 11 Battalion home. And we stopped that drain when I told him, "We'll 12 creak up the Battalion, and you will come up here to my staff and 13 your staff will either ao out to fill vacancies, but I will break up 14 the Battalion." And suddenly, the REFRAD requirementS dropped 15 considerably. And I said, "You have an easy mission there, you're 16 aonna establish a training facility." And they did, and they did it 17 well, but .something else. He's a whiner.. 18 somewhere in-between. He's conscientious, but he complains about a 19 lot of things. He doesn't have the resources to do the HVD mission, 20 he doesn't want to go downtown. He had the mission at Talil first. 21 And I-- I, sir, I said to him, "You whine about everything. Here you 22 are in Talil. Your average strength in your compound is three. And 23 you have all these MPs to do this mission. And yet, you're still 109 1 complaining you can't do the mission. You're aoinc to run this 2 downtown. You're taking on more things, that's called mission creep 3 and you gotta stop it. Because if you don't stop it, I'm not aonna 4 listen to you anymore. Because I know what the mission is that I've 5 given you and you're doinc these other things, which means you have 6 too much time on your hands." He still whines. He got the HVD 7 mission, he got the jail mission in downtown Baghdad, and he trusted 8 a few people that were probably not trustworthy, but he has a aood 9 chain of command that kind of makes up for his whining. And then 10. there's 11.Q.. Do you think that your Brigade was a cohesive team? That 12 the,: were coalescing, were they segmented, fragmented? Do you think 13 that your Brigade exuded a lot of pride? 14.A.. I think, let me answer that question first because that's 15 really easy. I think the Brigade did exude a lot of pride. I think 16 that the MPs were embarrassed when the situation took place in Bucca. 17 I know that they're embarrassed by what's happened up at Haghdad 18 Central. They take pride in their accomplishments and deservedly so. 19 Because, sir, I can tell you that they made the impossible possible. 20 And they ran those facilities, and they took care of those prisoners, 21 and they did more with less. Cohesive, no. I think the Battalions 22 in and of themselves were. When I gathered them all together on 23 several occasions for quasi commanders conferences or they all came 110 1 up for the MP summit or the out-brief from General Rider's :ear:. 2 talked to each other, they got along with each other. They had 3 differences, sure, but they exchanged ideas, we talked as Battalion 4 Commander and they talked about what their Company Commanders were 5 asking or saying. But they were so far spread, they were not-- they 6 didn't-- they hadn'r worked together before. These weren't 7 battalions that knew each other; they weren't familiar with each 8 other. One from Florida, a company from Florida, company from Las 9 Vegas, a battalion from California, a battalion from-- a BLD from 10 Indiana, from Pennsylvania cross-leveled from the 220 tL, the companies 11. cross-leveled into the 320`' that had never worked with the 800 tb 12 before or any of the people in the 800 th. The only unit that we 13 deployed with that was familiar with the mission of the 800 th was the 14 310'. And 111111111, to my understanding because I asked, was a 15 whiner before. He's been very focused on whether or not he's going 16 to be on the 0-6 list because he wants to stay in the military, and 17 if not, then his mandatory retirement date is this summer. So they 18 all had different agendas. We moved so quickly to Baghdad and the 19 mission was so fast and furious then because, again, the 18 th MP 20 Brigade and all the divisions were handing prisoners over to us and 21 we didn't have facilities to hold them. So we put them in Cropper. 22 Cropper became overcrowded. Renewing the interest and the 23 requirements out at Baghdad Central, we were shipping them down to 111 1 Bucca. We weren't a transportation unit, we didn't have 2 transportation assets available to us. CJTF-7 made a very slight 3 attempt to give us transportation assets and it didn't work. We went 4 back to doing it ourselves. I mean, it was just on and on and on. 5 And we were trying to stay ahead of an absolute failure. 6.Q.. Did_you try to address some of your Jogistical requirements 7 to your parent unit, which is way back down in Arifjan? 8.r. Yes, sir, I did. 9.Q.. And you said none of that happened? 10.A.. None of it happened. Because the supply lines were so long . 11 and what does CJTF-7 doing for you? And talking to he's 12 saying that they're goinc to do what they can. Sir, we couldn't even 13 get a spare part for a vehicle. 14.Q.. Even though that there was core support command, and you 15 had no interaction with the core support command? 16.A.. With-- at the COSCOM up at Anaconda? We did. We went up 17 there and they couldn't support us because we weren't on their list 18 of units that they were required to support. 19.Q.. How aid you utilized, since you didn't have a deputy 20 commander, he was doing somethinc else? And your XO, met your XO 21. today. I'm getting kind of an inkling that a lot of this stuff you 22 either take it on yourself or you did not direct your staff, which 23 should not be your job, a XO or what have you to say, "Okay do this, 112 1 do that." Since everything seems to be gravitating to the 2 operational side, called your S-3. . 3 A..is a great guy. He's a civil affairs Colonel. 4 officer. He thinks himself a leader, and he's not. . So you had a failing there? . 5 Q.. I-- I did, and I reccgnized it. . 6 A.. 7 How would you, did you direct your S-4 and say, "Get me the Q.. 8 tools that I need so I can resource this Battalion? . 9 A. No, sir. What I did was get Colonel UM in my office 10 and tell him the words to use to get the S-4 to do it. And if 11 Colonel 'MI and went to the S-4 himself and said, you need to do 12 this or tell me what you're doing with this, most of the time Major 13.would just kind of blow him off. I had dismal response from my 14 AGRs. They didn't want to be there, they didn't think that this was 15 in their equation, or whatever. The first thing that Major low 16 and Major 111111 did when I took command was come in and tell me why 17 they needed to stay at Arifjan and not go to Baghdad. So I had to 18 clear through that. And. was more obviously angry with me than 19.was. But they were both ticked off because I made them go to 20 Baghdad. And they dug in their heels, and I told them both 21 individually, "You know what, it's not gonna work, because I'm gonna 22 win. So, you're going to do the PERSTATS and you're gonna do the G-4 113 1 functions." And.got it, but it took coaching and choosinc 2 words and telling him why. . Why was he selected? Was he the only available one? 3 Q.. . He was the XO at-- General Hill made him the XO down at 5 Arifjan---- . 4 A.. Did you ever-- I guess this goes back to, you didn't have 7 any of the other choices because there were no other? . 6 Q.. I really didn't. I had no depth. I had a battalion 9 commander, by the way I forgot to mention him, Colonel-- Lieutenant 10 Colonel VW who in the first week of July went back to the 11 states. He was medivac'd to Germany for a.and then 12 they sent him back to the states and he never came back. I had a 13 Captain, 1111111 who stepped up to the plate and took charge of that 14 BLD, and he did a great job. 15.Q. You had another Captain, a Captaing1111 16.A. Captain UM 17.Q.. 8 A.. Could you elaborate on his conduct? 18.A.. Also out at Baghdad Central and I found out about the 19 incident after it had been investigated informally by al& and--- 20. - 21.Q.. So none of these officer misconducts were reported to you 22 initially until after an investigation was conducted? 114 1.The only-- the only infraction that was reported to me was, A.. 2 and I might think of another one, but I-- I-- the one on Lieutenant 3 Colonel by the name of MEI who was a BLD commander, and he was 4 out of Indiana and a Specialist was being harassed by him. And he 5 had exchanged emails or sent her emails of a very suggestive nature. 6 She provided them to me. I initiated an investigation. Colonel'. 7 did the investigation and Colonel 111111111was removed from the 8 position. I can't say he was relieved because it's not a command 9 position, although they call themselves commanders. And he was 10 reassigned to a different position and Major -who was the XO 11 of that BLD took charge of the BLD. He was very weak, but---- 12.What disciplinary action did you take on Colonel Q.. 13.A..removed him from the position, gave him a letter of I 14 reprimand, and OER that was appropriate fcr his behavior. 15.You assigned him somewhere else? Q.. 16.We did. Sent him back here to 377th, General Stoltz put him A.. 17 in the l43rd in a position that ColonelMillwas holding before he 18 gave him up to take command of the 724 th . And Colonel 1111111111 was 19 not responsible for supervising anyone. He's filling a position down 20 at the port and all reports say he's doing a good job. . 21 What's Captain now? Q... . 22 A.. Now? He is assigned to the 377 th . . 23 Has he been relieved? Q.. 115 . He has been. He was relieved immediately. . 1 A.. What was the allegation against him? . 2 Q.. The allegation was taking photographs of a soldier while 4 she was in the shower facility. 5.Q.. 3 A.. Seems to me that there's a tracking. All the stuff that 6 you've indicated so far. That you had serious disciplinary problem 7 with both enlisted and officer in your Brigade. . 8 A.. And especially in the 320th, yes, sir. . And given those circumstances there, wouldn't that have 10 been, in retrospect, more palatable to induce new leadership if they 11 were available into that Battalion? 12.A.. 9 Q.. Yes, sir. But I didn't have anybody available. 13.Q.. Despite the fact that you could have taken some risk and 14 moved some people outside of current positions, like the three or 15 somebody else. There's another major that was working in the three 16 shop at that time. 17.A.. Major 18.Q.. Right. Because I believe one of your staff members 19 intimated that their infusion of sorts of support requirements into 20 the Brigade, especially for the 320 th because they were short handed 21 because of their mission requirements. Let me ask you're assessment 22 here. What you indicated to me that you would highlight problems or 116 - 1 issues to Sanchez or Wodjakowski or Miller or anybody else at CJTF7 2 did you feel like they were blowing you off---- . Yes, sir.---- . 3 A.. ----Or, you know, did you, based on that feeling, did you 5 convey to General Speaks or even General Diamond at that point? . 4 Q.. I did. I-- several times I said to General Speaks when I 7 came down to talk to him about Command Sergeant Major 111111111 He 8. 6 A.. said,---- 9.Q.. Did you tell-- did you tell General Diamond about it? 10.A.. I did. And I not only told him about that, but I said, 11 several times when I was down at Arifjan and General Diamond was 12 there. I-- I may have had one conversation with General Kratzer 13 before he left, but it-- it happened fairly quickly after I took 14 command. I did talk to General Kratzer and Command Sergeant Major 15.about Command Sergeant Major'''. and I did a letter of 16 reprimand--I talked to him verbally, counseled him and I told him 17 that it wasn't going to be a conversation next time and he just 18 completely disregarded that and uh---- 19.Q Who was this again? .. 20.A... Command Sergeant Major I talked to General 21 Diamond about him, I talked to General Kratzer about him, I talked to 22 General Speaks about him. I talked to General Wodjakowski about him. 23 I told him I was coming down to see General Speaks about it because I 117 1 needed a command sergeant major before I could take him out of that 2 position. And he said, "What has he done?" And I said, "This is 3 what I-- the action I took thus far and he's continuing to do that." 4 And he said, "Well we're probably going to have to do an 5 investigation and if he's guilty and then we're going to have to fire 6 him." And I said, "Can you st'rt to look now?" I talked to the 7 Command Sergeant Major at CJTF-7 and Command Sergeant Major 8 said that uh--let him know and he would find a CSM for me. Sir, I-- 9 the reason it seems and it was likely that I took a lot of the 10 actions that I did and took charge of situations myself was because 11 nobody was helping. I got Colonel, this Lieutenant Colonel.. 12 came to see me and said, "I understand you're looking for a a Sheriff 13 out at Baghdad Central, an FOB-- or-- base defense planner." And I 14 said, "Well, where did you come from?" And he said, "Well I was on 15 179 day orders. I spent two months down at CFLCC, and now I'm up 16 here and I'm really looking for a job." And I said, "Well, what do 17 you bring to the table." And he said, "Well, ya don't have anybody, 18 Ma'am, so I might be all you get." And I said, "Well, I'll be in 19 touch with you." I just didn't need another problem, and there were 20 lots of people that were up there offering to help that were 21 straphangers. They didn't want to work they just wanted to stay in 22 Iraq. And I had radar detectors going off all over the place with 23 those people. I didn't need any more problems. The Battalions were 118 1 functioning and the MPs were doing a great job because they were 2 dedicated; because they were professional. And because they knew 3 they could do this job. But, sir I gotta tell ya, it was-- as 4 General Hahn said one time, he was asking me some questions, and he 5 said, "And how many battalions do you have, four or five." I said, 6 "Nine." And uh, "How are the prison rebuilding systems coming?" I 7 said, "Sir, there's a lot of problems with it, there's-- there's all 8 the obvious indicators of theft of those millions of dollars that 9 they were supposed to be putting into rebuilding the prison. And he 10 threw his pen down on the desk and he said, "We're running a prison 11 system for an entire country by the seat of our pants. What's CPA 12 doing?" And I said, "There's two experts there and they're leaving 13 in about 30 days." And the guy who was running the prisons 14 department was a budget officer. 15.Let me go back to your sergeant major. Sergeant Major Q.. 16 1111111111 came out of your ops, okay. And obviously a trusted agent 17 because you picked an ops sergeant major as opposed to picking a 18 serving Battalion Command Sergeant Major to come up and given the 19 fact that it probably put him in a tenuous situation of being a 20 junior guy that's going-- now going to do that. Did you know he was 21 also dividing his time between what you had directed him to do and 22 the other time was that he was working in--as the Ops Sergeant Major? 23.He was in the TOC where I was. And he was---- A.. 119 1.Understand, but then did he tell you that he was also Q.. 2 working to keep up in helping the S-3 shop? . The-- there may have been some projects that he had 4 initiated or was involved with, but we got a master sergeant 5 promotable from the 317 th and we got a-- a sergeant, another senior 6 NCO that came in and they were taking that responsibility away from 7 the Ops Sergeant Major. I-- I know, sir, and I talked to Sergeant 8 Major.about putting him in that position. But, as opposed 9 to taking a Command Sergeant Major from one of the Battalions and 10 putting him in the Brigade because there was nobody after the Command 11 Sergeant Major, with the exception of First Sergeants in some cases, 12 I made that decision because I felt that the Battalions needed the 13 chain of command as it was. And sergeant-- Command Sergeant Major 14 wanted to be the Brigade Command Sergeant Major. His 15 Battalion Commander, Colonel 1111111 said, "I really need him up here 16 at Ashraf." And I knew what that mission was and it was becoming 17 more intense and I made that decision. I-- I did an evaluation of 18 who would be hurt the most and I preferred that it be the Brigade uh- 19 -because I knew that Sergeant Major.was strong enough to 20 talk to the other CSMs and-- and it had been disruptive enough, sir. 21.Well, in retrospect, given that you're not getting much of A.. Q.. 22 an assistance from higher command, that your own staff was 120 1 overwhelmed in providing all sorts of assistance to the Battalions, 2 you still took that risk. 3.A.. Yes, sir, I did. 4.Q.. Okay. You didn't know that he was pulling double-time so 5 to speak. I-- I didn't-- oh I wasn't aware that it was a problem. 7.Q.. A.. Okay. What did what priorities did you give him? 8.A.. I wanted him to get out to the Battalions, each ones 9 separate locations to make sure that the soldiers were being taken 10 care of, that the Battalion Command Sergeant Majors understood the 11 direction we were taking. Any of the new changes of information, 12 that the rules were going to be standardized from facility to 13 facility to facility and they were. And that he had my authority to- 14 - I mean as the acting CSM-- I'll tell you the only thing I might 15 have done differently in retrospect was that the 310 th had a Command 16 Sergeant Major111111111and a Master Sergeant . Master 17 Sergeant . then came out on the CSM list, the promotion 18 list. So, I could have taken one of them and probably been done 19 little disruption, but at the time, Sergeant Major.was 20 there and it was a fix. And he was strong. 21.Q..Would it surprise you that somehow it overwhelmed it? 22.A.. It would surprise me. Cause---- 121 Would it surprise you to figure out that because he divided 2 his time, he lost-- lost focus of his priorities as your senior 3 enlisted advisor that could have assisted you in your quest to get 4 all sorts of things fixed in the whole Brigade? . 1.Q.. 5 A.. It surprises me because he was out there doing that. . That's what he told you? Did he travel with you? . 6 Q.. 7 A.. Occasionally he did travel with me. . How often did both of you share some of the information, 9 both in your travels and your observations down to the Battalions? 10.All the time. When I came back from any trip, or wherever 8 Q.. A.. 11 I was, if he wasn't with me, we sat down and talked about it. 12.Okay. Q.. 13.Uh-this is when I saw these soldiers doing-- Sergeant Major A.. 14 MEM is still trying to color outside the lines, is I-- the 15 expression I used. When I----16.Why didn't you just move. Q..knowing full well that he 17 had--was a problem to you? Why didn't you just yank him off instead 18 of perpetrating all of that? 19.I did. I did, but it was too late. A.. 20.First time. I mean, you took charge. You keep telling me Q.. 21 you were taking charge.---- 22.Yes, sir.---- A.. 122 ----But if you were taking charge, you would have fixed the 2 problem with them. 3.A.. 1.Q.. Sir, when I went to CJTF-7 from whatever the first incident 4 was at Baghdad Central, and I believe it was when the mortars started 5 to come in and killed six of the prisoners and injured forty-seven. 6 We stepped up the campaign. It was several times a day then, as 7 opposed to just once a day asking for force protection and 8 emphasizing in the 3, in the CJTF-7, they didn't want to be bothered 9 with it. They did not want to be bothered by me. And-- were they 10 blowing me off because I was a Reservist? Yes. They used the excuse 11 that I was TACON? Yes. And for a lot of other reasons? Absolutely. 12 But, we asked, and we got nothing. We had to find a way to do it, 13 because they wouldn't help. Sanchez didn't care until two MI 14 soldiers were killed. When those prisoners were killed, General 15 Wodjakowski said to me, but they're prisoners Janis. Did you lose 16 any soldiers? And I said, "I could have." And my soldiers take the 17 care of those prisoners seriously. They didn't care. And I was 18 told, "I don't care if we're holding 15,000 innocent Iraqis, we're 19 winning the war." And you're making enemies out of everyone of those 20 people you're holding without a reason. I said, "I'm on the security 21 detainee release board and reviewed these records. Not a piece of 22 evidence in the file." Put him back in the booth because his name is 23 Omar, or because his name is something related to Al Queda. This 123 1 isn't a fair carriage of justice. This isn't dignity and respect. 2 This isn't the road ahead you are allegedly preaching all of the 3 time. This is corruption at its finest. This is smoke and mirrors, 4 a façade of security in Baghdad. There was no such thing. And the 5 Divisions kept giving us more prisoners. Well, increase capacity. 6 Where would you like me to increase capacity? Cram some more tents 7 into the compound. The guy who's in charge of the FOB, on Christmas 8 Day, the LRS team that fell from the sky when those four people were 9 more than he could handle. They're going to do a capabilities 10 demonstration that day. We went out to visit soldiers, to see them. 1 1. wasn't there, he'd gone home on emergency leave and he was 12 trying to get back to Baghdad. I saw those guys getting ready to go 13 out on an operation, I said, "Where you guys going?" They said, "Oh 14 Ma'am, we're going to do a capabilities demonstration." I said, 15 "Really? What--what time?" They said, "Well you know these reports 16 about them trying to overrun the prison out here, we just want to 17 make sure that they understand that we're right here." Two 18 helicopters-- he gave me a real quick briefing on what they were 19 going to do. And I said, "What time?" And he said, "Around twelve 20 o'clock." "Okay. Where?" "In the big compound around Ganci, no 21 Vigilant." So I said, "Is it going to be over the security 22 detainees?" "It's going to be over the big compound." That's Ganci 23 actually and most of them are security detainees. But-- so we're out 124 1 visiting, we're in the-- we're in the towers talking to the MPs and 2 all of a sudden the helicopters come in and they had planned this and 3 orchestrated it. They had the marks on the ground, away from the 4 tents and one helicopter comes in and hovers right over one of the 5 tents--right over one of the compounds. And nobody's jumping out of 6 the airplane, nobody's repelling out of the helicopter. And al: 7 these tents are blowing everywhere, and the clothes that they just 8 hung up to dry that they'd washed'in wash basins and everything else, 9 and then they act as if this is a surprise and they go over to the 10 spot where the other helicopter is, which was right on the mark. And 11 I called Colonel MIN and I said, "Your guys did this 12 intentionally." "I can assure they didn't do this intentionally." I 13 said, "If they practiced, then how did they get it wrong, because my 14 MPs are the ones who have to bring that under control this afternoon 15 when they get pissed off about what just happened." And I said, 16 "Don't tell me it wasn't intentional. Don't screw with me. I don't 17 have any patience for this kind of stuff." And he said, "I can 18 assure you Ma'am, I talked to them already, it was a mistake." And I 19 said, "Tell me how you make a mistake." "There's no compounds." 20 "There is a compound. And you decide to hover over the compound?" 21 He said, "I'll take care of it." And--and we didn't have an issue 22 because the detainees knew that it was a holiday and chose not to 23 make an issue out of it. General---- 125 1 Did you report--did you report that to the General? Q.. 2 Yes, sir I did. Yes, sir I did. Nothing happened. Or-- A.. 3 mean-- not that General Wodjakowski has to come back and tell me what 4 he did, but he--he didn't. And nothing happened. General Sanchez 5 cut a FRAGO to send me up to the MEK because he was getting beat up 6 by Secretary Rumsfeld and he wanted a general officer up there that 7 could give 'em ground troops. So they cut a FRAGO to send me up to 8 Ashraf. I went to General Miller, I asked him twice. He said--I 9 went up as soon as I got the FRAGO. I think it was even in a draft. 10 And I went up to see General Miller and I said, "You know, I have a 11 Brigade to run, I just don't-- and Ashraf is not convenient." He 12 said, "If there's any opportunity to get him to change his mind, it 13 will be today. Let me see if there's a chance this afternoon." I 14 talked to him that night and he said, "You gotta go because this is 15 high visibility, it's gonna get more so and they want to close the 16 radio station. He just needs you up there." "Okay." I went to 17 Wodjakowski at the SUU and I said, "You know I'm moving up to Ashraf. 18 I have a Brigade to run, it's not running as smoothly as I'd like it 19 to be. Bucca's not closing, it's staying open, we have a new 20 contract for 48 million dollars. I mean, the last place I need to be 21 is up at the MEK compound. I can go up there, there's a Battalion 22 Commander up there that knows what he's doing." "You have to go." I 23 go up there and-- okay-- we made a couple of changes and everything, 126 1 they delivered this message and they closed the radio station down 2 and I never got a call from Secretary Rumsfeld and everything seemed 3 to be okay. Was that a-- a directive to move your TOC or just you? 4 Q. Just me. 5 A. 6 Did you stay there for a period of time? Q. Yes, sir. 7 A. How long? 8 Q. Until'relieved from that mission. 10 So who did you turn the Brigade over to? 9 A. Q. I didn't turn the Brigade over to anybody. I just 12 commanded the Brigade from up at Ashraf. 13 Was that information conveyed to all your Battalion 11 A. Q. 14 Commanders that you'll be---- 15 It was. A. 16 Let me talk a little bit about what happened with the 372nd . Q. 17 What do you think caused that to happen? 18 I think there were several important things that caused it A. 19 to happen. Because I don't have all the details of when or if it was 20 more than one time, but--- 21 Q. Over a period of time---- 127 1 A. ----I think there were some--I think there were some bad 2 people, bad MPs, bad soldiers, just bad people. And one of them, 3 unfortunately has a history of this in his civilian job. 4 Q. Did you know that before? 5 A. I did not. But General Gagin did, and didn't decide to 6 share the information with me until after this thing broke loose. 7 Q. Who's General Gagin? 8 A. He was the 220th MP Brigade Commander. And one of his NCOs 9 works with Grainer in his .civilian job, and Grainer was apparently 10 suspended several times for prisoner abuse. And he told General 11 Gagin, "You know there's a guy in the 800, and that was back in 12 September or something," and he said, "Do you think I should tell 13 General Karpinski?" And-- well-- let's see what happens. I don't 14 know what he said, but he told me afterwards and he said he knew 15 before and unfortunately he didn't tell me. And we uh-- the MI said 16 that they-- at the time, since you're familiar with the cell block 17 there, there's a door on the end of the facility as soon as you come 18 in there's cell block lA and 1B and then the hallway. The offices 19 outside of that cell block, there were separate offices, and they 20 were used by the Iraqi corrections officers, the--the warden and then 21 they used it for a break room and that's where the female Iraqi 22 corrections officers would be. So the MI wanted a privacy panel put 23 in place at the-- on the cell door---- 128 1 Q You mean a partition?---- . 2 A. ----a partition to-- to prevent anybody from seeing into 3 the cell block and uh--he said, "What we really want are those 4 offices outside, and CPA said no." And--and I did talk to-- at that 5 time it was a guy by the name of uh--anyway he's in 6 charge, and they said no. You know, that was their facility, and as 7 a matter of fact, the MI was going to have to find a new place to use 8 for interrogation-- or for isolation cells. So, they didn't push it, 9 and-- and they put this-- they had the engineers put this plywood 10 panel partition so you couldn't see down the cell block. And they 11 implemented-- they being Colonel= they implemented procedures 12 where nobody from the Battalion, without permission---- 13 Q. This ill." 14 A. This could go into the cell block unescorted. 15 There was an MI operation, except for the MPs who were only taking 16 them out of the cells, putting them back in the cells, taking them to 17 showers or whatever and giving their meals, making sure the medical 18 piece was taken care of. 19 Q. Was that already cleared with you that MI would take 20 control of that tier, or did =Stake it upon himself to assume 21 control of that tier? 22 A. I actually helped them to procure or secure that facility. 23 I went to---- 129 1 Q. [inaudible)---- 2 A. ----Yes it was. I went to the CPA and I said, "Some of 3 these are bad people, and they don't have an interrogation facility, 4 and if we could use that 1A, umm--that would be a great benefit." 5 And they agreed to it. Umm---- 6 Q. Did you-- did that relinquish control of that tier to the 7 MI or did you? 8 A. I-- I-- I did. I mean, I---- 9 Q. Because comments were made that there were never any MI 10 controls since there were still MPs guarding that. 11 A. There were MPs guarding it. But it was under MI control, 12 Lieutenant Colonel 1111111 who's no longer there, is the one who ran 13 cell block 1A. He would-- every time I was out there, he would 14 appear. And I said to him one time, "Do you ever sleep?" Uh. And 15 he said, "No, this is my responsibility." So, and it was-- no there 16 was MPs there because MI-- they don't do guard duty. So it was the 17 MPs who were doing the-- the guarding role, but it was MI-- the Mis 18 people were responsible for who went in there, when they came out, 19 how long they stayed in isolation, when they were interrogated, 20 everything. 21 Q. What was the established interaction between them and the 22 MPs that umm--that the MPs, you thought, understood that-- that the 23 MI would control access to those facilities? 130 1 A. Right. And the M-- the MPs up until the time that Pappas 2 took over as the FOB Commander, the MPs understood that the MI had 3 the authority to come in there, tell them who they needed to-- and at 4 that time the MPs were still escorting them, so they could say, we 5 need Prisoner Number 12345, we're going to take them to the 3 interrogation room and probably be out for an hour or two hours, or 7 we don't know howl long. They occasionally somebody from the ISG 8 would come by with somebody from MI to get a prisoner out to 9 interrogate them. In most cases they didn't interrogate them there 10 on-site, they took them to the ISG facility. They signed a 11 handreceipt and---- 12 Q. ISG or the JIDC? 13 A. The ISG. The Iraqi Survey Group. 14 Q. Okay. Were there cther folks that were interrogating these 15 prisoners? 16 A. OGA. Other Government Agencies, they were a variety: CIA, 17 uh--Delta Force---- 18 Q. So it was a multitude of other folks that were accessing 19 Abu Ghraib, tier 1A---- 20 A. They could not access tier lA without somebody from the MI 21 and it was usually--during the day it was usually Captain Wood and-- 22 or somebody from the MI doing it. 23.Q. But umm---- 131 1 A. But they weren't out there in the same force that they're 2 out there now. They weren't that organized. They had a couple of 3 tents---- 4 Q. Was that before1111111 or after11111111/ 5 A. That was before 1111111 and was out there the night 6 that the mortExs killed those two MI soldiers. 7 Q. But whenillillishowed up, to take responsibility for the 8 FOB, did that continue? 9 A. Yes, and became it increased. 10 Q. Okay. Alright. 11 A. And-- and I rally can't speak for how much took place over 12 at Vigilant because their interrogation booth was right there. The 13 MI people would go into the compounds, take somebody out, take them--14 we didn't-- the MPs didn't even have to get involved in the process. 15 Q. Did inform you of this particular setting, or was--16 did understand that particular arrangement, or was that 17 arrangement between you and Colonel 111111111 18 A. I didn't have any arrangements with Colonel.. 19 Q. How was that translated, in terms of who is going to take 20 control over what? 21 A. We--Colonel Colonel 11111111 22 Captain." and I sat down out at Abu Ghraib---- 23 Q. Without ColonelIM just the MI? 132 1 A. No, Colone11IIIIIII Captain111111 Colonel , Major 2 111.1.1, and myself---- 3 Q. When was that, do you know?---- 4 A. Uh--that was before he took uh--command of the FOB. 5 Q.. That was prior to---- 6 A. Much-- much before that. Because it was after--it was just 7 after General left. And I-- I it was my impression that 8 Colonel...got beat up pretty badly by General Miller, I mean in 9 terms of his criticism. And-- and he was having a pretty difficult 10 time with General Fast. So, I wanted to support him, we all did. 11 And if made the interrogation operation go smoother, then it meant we 12 were going to be able to release prisoners faster and our population 13 would go down, so everybody felt the peace of the--derived some 14 benefit from it. 15 Q.. Would it surprise you if I told you that that arrangement 16 never occurred? 17 A. What arrangement never occurred? 18 Q. The arrangement that the MI stipulated that they never had 19 control, absolute control, of that tier 1. 20 A. That's not true. I mean, the MPs were, like I said, they 21 were guarding it, and the MI would come and say I need prisoner so- 22 and-so, and the MPs would go and get them and come back. But they--- 23 - 133 1 Q. In your mind----2 A. Colonel 1111111was in charge of that cell block, sir. And 3 Colonel 1111.worked for Colonel_ 4 Q . But, who replaced 5 A. Nobody did. He-- I mean, you want my opinion? The timing 6 was very suspicious. He was gone just on the leading edge of when 7 the investigation opened up. 8 Q. Okay. Alright. So let me ask you again. So the 9 responsibility for the actions of those soldiers, that were charged 10 by CID for mistreating those detainees should fall on the MI as 11 opposed to the MPs? 12 A. The responsibility? No sir. I saw some of the pictures. 13 The--I think the MI gave the MPs the ideas. And I think---- 14 Q. So there's some complicity to that? 15 A. Yes sir. 16 Q. You're suggesting that there is? 17 A. ----And I think that it became sport. And--and even saying 18 this makes me feel sick to my stomach, but, they were enjoying what 19 they were doing and the MPs who saw this opportunity-- seized the 20 opportunity. I don't know if they shared the ideas with the MIs or 21 whatever they did, but there was definitely agreement, and-- then 22 some of the procedures they were following, they just elaborated on. 23 And-- and I would imagine and I don't know this to be fact, but would 134 1 Q. Certainly, somebody requested for them. At least the three 2 Navy dogs. That they would be placed under one command and control 3 and be utilized properly without proper authority for employment. . 4 A. Yes, sir. 5 Q. Did you check on them? A. No sir, I didn't. 7 Q . Okay. Alright. Given the circumstances then, do you 8 believe that perhaps proper supervision at night since these events 9 happened between the periods of 2200 and 0400 and who would you place 10 that supervision responsibility to? 11 A. There is a and-- and it is precisely the reason that 12 Sergeantillillis relieved from-- or suspended from his position 13 right now. Because he was responsible. He was the Sergeant of the 14 Guard, the NCOIC, whatever term they were using. He was all of those 15 things. And a platoon sergeant. 16 Q. Did you know what the Platoon Leader or the Company 17 Commander were doing? 18 A. I do not. And I talked to the Captain amyself. And 19 he said randomly he or the First Sergeant, or both of them would go 20 through all of the facilities. 21 Q. During night or day? 22 A. Nighttime, daytime, afternoon, lunchtime, feeding time. 136 1 A. Well, he's had enough time to figure out what the best 2 avenue approach is, I guess. 3 Q. Well, let me put it this way. Knowing that the importance 4 of that particular facility, how often did you talk to the company 5 commanders? 6 A. I-- 7 Q. Did you senior rate all the company commanders? 8 A. I did. Uh-- I saw all the company commanders. I-- I would 9 tell you that the-- unfortunately, that the largest gap of time uh-- 10 between seeing a company commander and between seeing a company 11 commander and seeing him again was more than six weeks with Captain 12 UM 13 Q. Would it surprise for you to know that there's at least one 14 Company, the 320th as we speak today, or then at that time, that was 15 assigned to that Battalion, 320th, and up until I believe two weeks 16 ago was being utilized as a filler company? 17 A. [Pause] Would it surprise me to know that? 18 Q. That they were not employing him in his capability as a 19 cohesive company with his capability, but yet he's being used as the- 20 -you fill here, you fill there. So, basically,---- 21 A. his company was spread out. 22 Q. Right. And he doesn't have a function. 138 1 A. He-- if he's being used as filler, I mean, he's doing an MP 2 mission. 3 Q. He's doing an MP mission that----4 A. The Company Commander doesn't have a----5 Q. ----the Company Commander is not responsible for any 6 specific mission because his Company was being utilized as a filler 7 company. Individual----8 A. I would tell you----9 Q. ----fillers, not as a platoon, not as a squad, it was fill 10 this and fill that. 11 A. I will tell you, sir. It doesn't surprise me. Uh--I 12 didn't know about it, but like I said, I saw all those company 13 commanders out there whenever I visited----14 Q. Sure, but nobody ever mentioned any problems of how things 15 are being----16 A. No, because the personnel numbers were so serious and Major 17 Sheridan was really making the best effort to get those internal 18 taskings reduced. And it took a whole MP Company just to do the 19 taskings. It got better when we got-- when the 82nd put a Company on 20 the same compound. 21 Q. How many Companies did the 320th have? 22 A. Umm--23 Q. Six, seven, eight? 139 1 A. No, no. The 372nd, the 670th, the 186th, and some of them 2 were guard companies and some of them were combat support. 3 Q. You had the 229th. 229° MP Company's also there. It's an I 4 and R Company. 5 A. Some of them come up-- some of them came up because we were 6 getting ready to--some of the other companies to leave. 7 Q.. General Karpinski, what would you recommend for corrections 8 of detainee abuses? 9 A. Sir, I--I actually started to make some of the-- I think-- 10 I started to implement for the rotational forces coming in. I called 11 the Battalion Commanders that were coming in behind the rotational 12 brigades when I could get in touch with them at their mob station. I 13 told them that they needed to, ya know, get the people involved, to 14 give briefings to their soldiers before they deployed over here about 15 the potential for detainee abuse. The indicators--the processes or 16 procedures to head off infractions, to continue to reinforce it. 17 Umm--and I think that soldiers need to be reminded. I-- I-- at the-- 18 at the guard mount, at shift change, on duty. You take an example of 19 an MP company like the 320th MP Company, which is out at Abu Ghraib. 20 They were down at Talil, they're a combat support company, but their 21 First Sergeant and the Company Commander were very much involved in 22 the Company and the operations. Talked to soldiers all the time, 23 gathered them in small groups. The First Sergeant was fully engaged. 140 1 Q. Is that Captain 2 A. It is. 3 Q. Would it surprise you that he was the one who is saying it 4 is not utilized as a Company up there today? That he is being used a 5 filler Company. li .A. He's not being used as a filler Company, sir. 7 Q. How do you know that? 8 A. Well, I know what they're doing. They were the-- they 9 were-- they're not doing a combat support MP mission, because that's 10 how they-- they weren't deployed to do that mission. They-- couple 11 of the teams, the driving teams were tasked to the TOC to do my PSD. 12 My two vehicles were from the 320th MP Company. He had some MP units 13 that were doing the escort missions down to CPA or down to Bucca if 14 we were transporting prisoners. He would-- so he's got a variety of 15 missions, but they're not filler personnel. He may have used some of 16 his MPs to do some of the force protection towers. But there isn't a 17 Company that's doing only force protection. I wish I had the luxury, 18 I'm sure the battalions do too. 19 Q. His comment to me was, when I asked him, "What specifically 20 is your mission set?" And-- then he mentioned something about I have 21 compounds boom, boom, boom, boom. I don't recall those compounds, 22 and I said, "So you're directly responsible for those compounds 23 then?" He said, "No, that's relegated to Headquarters and 141 1 Headquarters Company 220t1": MP Battalion. So what is your extent of 2 your responsibility?" I said, "I just provide personnel." So in 3 essence---- 4 A. Well that's not what his support form said, and that's not 5 how he was rated, and that was never my impression when we walked to 6 the different -compounds that were under his control. 7 Q. Well, the support form-- the support form doesn't really, 8 and you mentioned that that everybody should have-- could have 9 mistaken your support form for that of command philosophy? 10 Basically----11 A. Sir, I never focused on that.-- 12 4. Well, I'm just making a comment to the comment you made. 13 A. Yes, sir. But---- 14 Q. ----And so, basically, the Company Commander is given a 15 mission and the Company Commander felt that he's got a capability to 16 provide. And the Company Commander felt that he's not-- his 17 capability's not being utilized. Cause I asked him directly, "What 18 is your mission?" And his response to me was, "I'm a filler Company, 19 sir." Today, I said, "How long has it been going on?" He says, 20 "From the time I arrived until last week." 21 A. Well, that's not true. He was down at Talil, they didn't 22 have a vigorous mission down at Talil, they went out and did the same 142 1 thing. They did law enforcement, patrols, down to the prisons in 2 Najaf. Do you know what the 229th MP Company's mission is? 3 Q. 4 A. They're responsible for the URF and for the compounds at 5 Ganci. 6 Q. So, basically they'r? being utilized as a guard company? 7 A. They are. All of our MP units are being utilized as an 8 escort guard or guard company for this confinement mission. 9 Q. Would it surprise you that Captain Jones trained himself 10 and nobody ever validated him prior to deployment? 11 A. That does not surprise me. 12 Q. Did you know that he had prior experience as an MP, prior 13 to taking command of that Company from the Virginia Army National 14 Guard? 15 A. I did not. 16 Q. Did you know that he had to provide support to the canine 17 unit, both Army and Navy, but he does not have command and control of 18 those canine units? 19 A. That's with the HHC or with the Headquarters of the 320th? 20 Q. Somehow, somebody's yet to find a house where those dogs 21 were. That's what I mean. It's knowing what each of those Companies 22 do, because it's their capability that you want to utilize. Okay, 23 what other recommendations would you make? 143 1 A. I think that the-- the span of control covering the whole 2 country of Iraq is too big without the additional assets, either 3 aviation assets, or transportation assets, engineer. General 4 Wodjakowski did tell me several times that they did not do a good job 5 of supporting us. We were running 15 civilian jails and 5 internment 6 facilities, and he said, "You're running three internment facilities, 7 how hard can that be?" He didn't know what we were doing. 8 Q. How often did-- you had the SUAs. I guess in the separate 9 unit updates provided it depicted at least number of detain-- 10 detention centers you were-- you were operating; number of Iraqi 11 prisons that you were overseeing or providing training for; number of 12 other things that you were missioned for; number of detainees that 13 were accounted for, based on the last report; and personnel situation 14 and your operational revenues to accomplish that mission. Umm--when 15 those were posted, to include your maintenance capabilities, what was 16 the-- what was the percentage-- what would you-- what would you 17 consider as your C rating would be? 18 A. Overall? 19 Q. Overall. 20 A. C-3 at best. 21 Q. And that was amplified, you mentioned repeatedly to the 22 Battalion, to the CJTF-7? 144 1 A. It was. I-- I said to-- now when Colonel--General West 2 came in, he wasn't there originally, I don't remember who his 3 predecessor was who was the 4. But General West was-- and-- and 4 General Davis who was the Engineer Commander at the time, both. of 5 them gave me tremendous support, but it was after we had found 6 another way, another mechanism to do it. 7 Q. Sure. Which was network with your fellow general officers. 8 A. General. 9 Q. Networking with your fellow general officers, you know. 10 Was that helpful to you? 11 A. They-- General West was very helpful. General Davis was 12 very helpful. The CA guy who is General Kern, and said several times 13 "I don't know anything about detention operations, but, ya know, tell 14 me what else is going on." We couldn't get CA support. We could not 15 get CA support. I spent time with General little bit of time with 16 General Hahn and uh--and really the only time General Sanchez or even 17 General Wodjakowski spent any time or showed any interest in anything 18 I was doing was when there was a problem. 19 Q. You--previously you appeared very critical of General 20 Sanchez or General Wodjakowski for their lack of concern or lack of 21 support on behalf of your mission and on behalf of your soldiers. 22 Would you kind of draw conclusions as to why that is? Your 23 perception why that is? 145 1 A. I think that General Sanchez is [pause] I think that his 2 ego will not allow him to accept a Reserve Brigade, a Reserve General 3 Officer and certainly not a female succeeding in a combat 4 environment. And I think he looked at the 800th MP Brigade as the 5 opportunity to find a scapegoat for anything that his active 3 component MI Brigade or his active component MP Brigade was failing 7 at. And if I was not capable, why didn't he tell me? Why didn't 8 somebody tell me sit down and let me give you some suggestions 9 because when DEPSECDEF Wolfowitz came into the theater, the first 10 time he came out to Baghdad Central he stayed an extra hour and 11 forty-five minutes because he was so proud of me and what the MPs 12 were doing. And he told General Sanchez that, and one night when he 13 got behind schedule on another visit, he asked specifically if he 14 could see General Karpinski before he left because he wanted to hear 15 how the prisons were coming. And on the headphones in the 16 helicopter, General Sanchez and General Fast, who was briefing him, 17 he said, "Am I going to have an opportunity to see General Karpinski? 18 Because she always does a good job for me." And I thought at that 19 time, this is not a good thing. It is never good to be more popular 20 than your boss. If I was not doing my job, I wasn't aware of it. 21 And I'm sorry, but I took care of those soldiers, I took care of 22 those detainees. We provided support beyond what anybody expected to 23 the CPA to keep Ambassador Bremer out of trouble. Because when Major 146 1 and Colonel were trying to push all the jails off on us 2 in a briefing to General Sanchez, Major said, "Well we don't 3 care if they're eating or not, sir, that's the Iraqi's 4 responsibility." And he corrected them. And we made sure that they 5 were eating and that they did have water. They didn't. Because in 6 spite of what aeneral Sanchez was telling them, they were doing the 7 easy thing. And I think General Sanchez has no use for Reserve 8 component or National Guard soldiers. And he has little use, would 9 not see it as time well spent, mentoring me. How dare I succeed as a 10 female, as a Reservist, as an MP, in his combat environment? How 11 dare I. And I became determined to show him that I would. 12 Q. Who would you pin the responsibility on the actions of 13 those individuals at Abu Ghraib? 14.A. The MPs that were involved. That's who I'd pin it on and 15 I'd pin it on 1111111, the Platoon Sergeant, and the First Sergeant, 16 Captain.. 17 Q. You wouldn't pin it on anybody else but them? 18 A. I would--it was Colonel domain but it was 19 Colonel ...I FOB. And he was the one who established the 20 limitation for those cell blocks. He was the one, and Colonel 21 was the one, whether he's here to say it or not, he was the one who 22 set the rules. Major.limited them and influenced them to 23 the extent he could by taking the MPs out of unhealthy and 147 1 inappropriate settings. But they were still the guards in those cell 2 blocks. And they were still the ones who did those things that they 3 did to those detainees. Do you think proper training, supervision, and effective 4 Q. 5 leadership, not just for that Battalion, but throughout the entire 6 Brigade would have sufficed, could have prevented it? 7 A. No sir, no sir. Because it's not typical. 8 Q. Given the fact that that same Battalion was involved in the 9 Bucca incident back in May? 10 A. Sir, I talked to-- was a different Company-- no that's not 11 an excuse, I talked to and I talked tog.. and I 12 talked to them-- 13 Q.. It's your Brigade.---- 14 A. Yes sir, yes sir. ----I talked to them the next day when I 15 found out about it, when I was out there. I talked to all the 16 Company Commanders and the First Sergeants. And-- and they asked 17 good questions. And they raised the issues again about fair and 18 decent treatment and when were they going to see magistrates, and 19 when were they going to be able to give answers, and how can you say 20 dignity and respect and then not give them anything that they're-- 21 even the basics that they're entitled to: clean clothes, decent 22 food, bed or a mat to sleep on. These are bad people and people who 23 were led by bad people in that situation. But, once again, it was a 148 1 good MP, a good soldier who turned them in. I talked to 2 about the consistency in these events. And that isn't something you 3 would put in an attribute column when you say, what did I do right or 4 what did I do wrong in this situation. "Did you exploit the 5 opportunity?" I asked him. "Did you exploit the opportunity to talk 6 to soldiers if they were assigned to the Battalion and tell them, 7 This is what happened at Bucca and this is not tolerated here.'?" 8 And, no he didn't. Did he use the lessons learned? No he didn't. 9 Did he know how to do it? I don't even know if he did. 10 Q. You think possibly a command policy memo from you or 11 General Hill would have stipulated lessons learned at Bucca that it 12 not be repeated? 13 A. I think that would have been extremely helpful. The other- 14 -the other---- 15 Q. But none of those memos fell out and you didn't follow up 16 on that memo? 17 A. No sir. And when the incident down at Bucca was resolved, 18 we spent months working on it and-- and I don't wanna say me, because 19 I don't wanna-- I can't take credit for the hard work that was done. 20 The 32, the CID investigations, the supervision of them at Bag-- at-- 21 down at Arifjan. I think it was the first time they were effectively 22 supervised when Colonel 11111111 got them under control. But the 23 system failed us. And it was because the tenure had changed. And at 149 1 about the same time when those incidents were taking place out of 2 Baghdad Central, the decisions were made to give the guilty people at 3 Bucca plea bargains. So, the system communicated to the soldiers, 4 the worst that's gonna happen is, you're gonna go home. 5 Q. Where would you place them if they were not going to be 6 remanded to go home? 7 A. It was supposed to go to a court martial, and it didn't. 8 And suggestion by a Company Commander out there at Baghdad Central, 9 was that-- in front of everybody else, was that "Ma'am, everybody 10 knows the reason it didn't go to a court martial was because they 11 were protecting that Lieutenant Colonel who took a prisoner out to 12 the clearing barrel and cleared his weapon into the clearing barrel 13 right next to his head. And they wanted to be able to forgive him." 14 So that was the change in attitude. And I said,---- 15 Q. Do you think that was associated in that? 16 A. Yes, sir. He said it there in front of a group of people 17 and nobody turned around like they were shocked by this revelation. 18 So I knew that that was what was permeating. What I told them during 19 that meeting was, "Look, let me tell you something, the UCMJ system 20 in my opinion is fair and impartial. And people who make decisions 21 to go to court martials or take other actions, do so with extensive 22 advice and study and everything else, whether you believe that or 23 not, okay." This took seven months to complete. But, let's talk 150 1 about results, okay? There were four cases. One that was considered 2 a relatively weak case, was plea bargained out, and the individual 3 signed a statement saying that this was planned, it was orchestrated, 4 and there was definitely collusion or whatever that word is that they 5 use. . But did you know that the events actually happened since 7 you were not there? . 6 Q.. 8 A.. Alright, well, I only know it from the Article 32 from 9 reviewing that case and then for recommending it go to court martial. 10 But I do know the results and I know why they--they gave that plea 11 bargain, or the plea package to the first individual. And that 12 individual signed statements saying this was planned, it was by 13 design, Master Sergeantillill'orchestrated the plan. She told us 14 exactly what to do, etc. etc. So, she gets an other than honorable 15 and goes home, yes. And she understands her responsibility to come 16 back in case it goes to a court martial. I said, "Do you realize 17 that if we went to a court martial on any one of those cases, any'of 18 them if there were four or ten or twelve whatever the original number 19 was, the were all going to be tried individually because that's your 20 right under UCMJ. And do you realize that if we went to a court 21 martial and the board said or the panel said, "Not guilty," those 22 individuals come back as MPs and maybe back to the same unit or the 23 same battalion. And is that a factor, considering your options? 151 1 Absolutely. And I got a lot of stares that time, because there's 2 another side to the story there, there's another perspective. I don't think unless they get a bar to re-enlistment that 3.Q.. 4 they'll ever make it back to wear the uniform. 5.A.. Well, they won't now because they are permanently barred 6 from coming back in. They are reduced. They are-- all of their 7 benefits and privileges from this deployment are suspended. So, we 8 get what we want from that action. And rather than take the risk-- I 9 mean, I-- I didn't like it at first, but I understood it, after 10 conversation with Captain . ColonellIM But, I wanted to 11 make sure that the leadership element out there at Baghdad Central 12 understood it because that seemed to be their concern that these guys 13 knew that all they would get would be a trip home. 14.Q.. Well, put in that perspective, then General Karpinski, when 15 everything is put before the courts, and I have no reason why you 16 will not be placed before the military court system, and the 17 revelations of all these inhumane treatment of detainees. You think 18 for one moment that those MPs that were accused of those allegations 19 were not made complicit of those-- the unit that they served under, 20 the battalion that they served under, the brigade that they served 21 under, that they will reveal all sorts of things that will put your 22 entire command under the microscope. 23.A.. Absolutely. 152 1.Q..The fact of the matter is that that will be the second 2 incident to which the 800 th MP Brigade would be associated with 3 potentially war crimes? . Yes, sir. . 4 A.. How would you deal with that? . 5 Q.. The same way I've dealt with other situations in this 7 Theater of Operation. Tell the truth. And we were spread throughout 8 the theater of Iraq with a mission and the MPs have countless 9 examples of how well they performed and how professional they were 10 and are. And do you get, out of 3,400 people; do you get some bad 11 MPs? Yes. And do some of them have a history of this in their 12 civilian job? Yes. And does their civilian employer have a 13 responsibility to report these infractions to the military? No. Now 14 were there mistakes made? Yes. And are we taking actions to make 15 sure that they don't occur again? Yes. Can we guarantee they won't? 16 No. Because we've never forged this road before. 17.Q.. 6 A.. Nobody has. 18.A.. Yes, sir. So we have to rely on values and those people 19 have none, at least if the pictures tell the story. I don't care 20 what their specialty is; it's just more offensive because they're 21 MPs. What they did was vulgar and abusive. And I hope it-- it never 22 reaches the media's attention. I can't-- I can't-- I didn't get a 23 vote. Nobody said, "Okay, you're taking over command of the 800 th MP 153 1 Brigade now, and what happened before doesn't count." Because 2 does. And-- and all I can hope to do, is to make it better. Not on 3 the run, not on the fly, but with conscientious--conscientious 4 effort and-- and leadership. I am a good leader. And taking all of 5 this out of context, and using this example of what the 800 th MP 6 Brigade is capable of doing, is what is typica], I say, of what 7 Sanchez is all about. I told my soldiers this morning when they were 8 leaving, "You go home with your heads held high, because you did 9 everything and more that was asked of you, expected of you, and you 10 did it better than anybody else. You're all heroes to me, so no 11 matter what is said, nobody can take it away from you." And I 12 believe it, and I want those 19- and 20- and 35-year old soldiers to 13 believe it, because it's true. And Sanchez doesn't give a flip about 14 a soldier. And I never said that before. And he cares less about a 15 Reservist and a Guardsman. 16.Q..You think in your heart that that's true. 17.A.. Yes, yes, sir I do. 18.Q..Did you spread any of these thoughts with any of your 19 civilians? 20.A..said to them was, "General Sanchez Never. Because what I 21 has an enormous job. He was a division commander before." I used 22 all the right expressions. 23.Q.. Do you shift all this blame? 154 1.No I'm not. I'm not shifting all of anything. I'm takinc A.. 2 responsibility, but the situation accurately is a shared 3 responsibility. And they failed us and trying to cover their 4 failures it's going to cost the 800th MP Brigade or me? Okay. 5 Because it'll give me an opportunity to tell the truth. I know what 6 they were doing and we kept finding a way to succeed. So they'd give 7 us some more. When I took the-- when I briefed General Sanchez on 8 the condition of the civilian jails and why the progress was so slow. 9 He turns on me, and he says, "What's wrong with you Karpinski, you 10 were briefing me just a month ago or five weeks ago that, you know, 11 they were going to be on track and we were going to have capacity for 12 3,100 by now." And I said, "Sir, because the construction is not 13 taking place. And I've been to every one of the facilities and I see 14 no evidence of appropriate expenditure of funds; millions of 15 dollars." I said, "I'm not a contractor, but I know what $25,000 16 worth of work should look like, and I know what $2 million worth of 17 work should look like. And there's no evidence of it anywhere." 18 "And what have you done?" "I went to the finance office at CPA. I 19 looked for the IG's office at CPA. I looked for the GAO office at 20 CPA. I talked to finance officer at Arifjan at the 377 th. I talked 21 to Colonel 11111111 I talked to General Wodjakowski." "Well what 22 happened to the money?" I said, "I don't know, sir. It was a cash 23 operation and I suspect that the two subject matter experts borrowed 155 1 some of it permanently." "Are you suggesting that they 2 misappropriated funds?" "Yes sir, I am. If the evidence of the 3 construction of the facilities is-- is what I have to go by, because 4 there is no GAO and there's no IG at CPA. And they wouldn't show me 5 the contracts that they let for all these places. But I do know that 6 the only place where construction is taking place is at Abu Ghraib, 7 because my MPs are there. They're not the contracting officer 8 representatives." And he turned to his SJA and said, "Since this has 9 been dumped in my lap, tell me the next step I take." He never came 10 back and asked for information. He never came back and asked for the 11 information I had, or the evidence I had accumulated. Nobody ever 12 came back to me and said this is what took place. As a matter of 13 fact, Colonel ;aid to me, "You want to steer clear of the 14 issue." I'm not blaming General Sanchez or General Wodjakowski. I 15 just want them to take responsibility for what they didn't do. And I 16 don't ever expect a person like General Sanchez to change his 17 personality or his way of thinking or his way of succeeding or 18 anything else. I have only ever asked for a fair chance. And, no 19 sir, he did not give it me or anybody in the 800 th MP Brigade. . Fair enough. Do you have any closing comments you want to 21 make? . 20 Q.. 22 A.. No, sir. . Thank you General Karpinski. 156 23 Q.. 1 Witness was warned and excused. 2 [Session completed at 2035 15 February 2004.] •¦• 157