Summary of FBI Work with Detainees Held by the Northern Alliance in Sheberghan, Afghanistan

FBI FACSIMILE
COVER SKEET
P0-448 (Rev. 6-2-97)
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DEIN IS ',.NCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
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DATE: 12-16-201D
CLASSIFIED EY 65179 DMH/mjE
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DECLASSIFY ON: 12-16-2035
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To: U.S. Dept. of State Date; 12/09/2002
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Synopsis: The purpose of this communication is fourfold: 1) To provide a summary of work-todate
by an FBI deployment team that is proeessing apProximately 1,300 detainees held by
Northern Alliance forces in Sheberghan, Afghanistan for fingerprints, photographs, DNA and
biographical information; 2) To document the individuals interviewed to date that the team
considers most dangerous among the detainees and should be considered for transfer to U.S.
custody he Bagram, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and 3) To document the FBI
deployment team's contention that no individual within the detainee population can at this time
be considered "safe" to be released and the deployment team will make no such recommendation.
4) To document the FBI team's concern about credible reports that significant numbers of
detainees may be released in an Afghan government amnesty around the Eid celebration marking
the end of Ramadan. (o(a December 4). The FBI team and U.S. Department of State (DOS)
political officer in Mazar-E-Sharif believe Afghan government officials should be approached to
prevent such an amnesty with respect to Sheberghan detainees, or at a minimum to ensure that
the most dangerous among the detainees are not released.
Details•Referenced previous coram.unications laid out an. FBI team's deployment to Sheberghan
Prison, Afghanistate to interview and process the 1,300 detainees. The idea of the deployment is
to obtain identifying data on all detainees - fingerprints, photographs, DNA and biographical
information - for search and posting in FBI databases to include its 43-million electronic print
database, the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification Systeni (IAMB), and in National
Crime Information Centei (NCIC), which is accessible to all U.S. law enforcement, including
border security. , •
The 1,300 detainees will be assigned FBI numbers and maintained in the databases in the same
manner as arrest and criminal information, such as felony convictions, so that the detainees can
always be identified as enemies of the U.S. and a potential threat. The Sheberghan deployment is
one of a number lead by agents with the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (C31S)
division, which is the steward of IAFIS and NM. The previous deployments to Afghanistan
and 'Pakistan have garnered a fingerprint-based database of 5,000 Al Qaeda fighters and enemies
of the U.S.
The database is fingerprint-based because fingerprints are unique identifiers which do not age
and cannot be altered or counterfeited. Traditional name and date-of-birth databases have little
utility tracking Middle Eastern or Asian individuals, whose names are common, phonetically
spelled from different alphabets, and who frequently don't know a date-of-birth. The terrorism
investigations conducted since September 11 have also clearly shown that terrorists such as Al
Qaeda members are mobile, well-funded, criminally sophisticated and adept at obtaining false
identity documents, so fingerprints may be the only way to effectively track and identify them. .
The 1,300 detainees from Sheberghan are being added to this database, which resides within the
TARS.
The deployment tearnis equipped to nm as many as three booking stations, and have hired Urdu
and Pushtu translators to facilitate interviews, which at minimum generate mandatory
biographical information necessary for entering the subject into NCIC. This information
includes name, DOB or age, place of birth, height, weight, eye color, hair color, scars and marks •
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and tattoos. Each detainee is also asked a series of questions that are Middle Eastern or Asian
identifiers, such as father's name, village of origin and tribal affiliation. About 700 ofthe
detainees are Afghan with Pushtun tribal afffliation, and by custom have only one name. The
remaining 600 atainees are primarily Pakistani, with a. few Sudanese, Bangladesh and other
nationalities.
Each detainee is also asked the following questions: 1) Do you have any knowledge of any threat ;
against the United States or government of Afghanistan? 2) Do you have anylmowledge of any
terrorist act - past, present or future - against the United States or government of Afghanistan? 3)
Do you have any information regarding AI Qaeda? 4) Do you have any information regarding
Usama Bin Lidin? 5) Have you traveledeo any country outside of Afghanistan?
A series of questions regarding length of tittle fighting for the Taliban, weapons assignment,
battles fought, tactics used, commanders and command structure, and place of capture by the
Northern Alliance forces are also asked. Detainees ate then asked directly the following
questions: 1) Are they enemies of the United States? 2) Would they attack and kill the FBi
interviewers if they could? 3) Would they continue Jihad against the U.S. upon release? And 4)
Would they be willing to conduct a martyrdom mission? About ten percent of detainees answer
affirmatively to this series of questions.
To date, about 800 detainees have been processed by the FBI team, which deployed from the
U.S. in early November, when General Abdul Rasheed Dostum, the Special Representative for
the North of the Afghan Government who controls Sheberghau prison, indicated he would give
access to the detainees. The team consists of a CMS Supervisory Special Agent and three
Evidence Response Team (ERT) Special Agents from the Newark Division of the FBI. A C.11S
technician accompanied the team as far as Kabul, and in FBI space in the U.S. Embassy annex •
installed a computer platform with the latest in fingerprint technology, which converts the
fingerprints on a standard FBI fingerprint card to digital information and benches the prints by
satellite for search and posting against IAFIS and NCIC.
The team is supported by a U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) team, A Company, First Battalion,
201 SFGA, ODA 2014, based in Mazar--E-Sharif which provides the liaison contacts with
General Dostara that allowed the deployment to occur, provides the contents for hiring local
translators fluent in English, Fushtu and Urdu, and provides security at Sheberghan prison and ,
convoy travel from the General's compound and an OGA safe house in Mazar-E-Sharif. A U.S.
Army Military Police (MP) team, 972"4 Military Police Company, Melrose, Mass, from K-2 base
in Karshi-Khanabad, Uzbecldstan, has been integrated into the booking process and provides
additional security and assistance with collection of identifying information.
The team gathers prints, photos, DNA and biographical information by the following process:
Beeler of extremely primitive conditions at the prison, which lacks power, running water, heat
and concrete floors, prints are gathered on a briefcase-sized station with printer's ink and paper
PBI cards, two cards per detainee for quality purposes. Each detainee's picture is taken five
times with a digital camera on fine quality - full front, right 45 degree, right profile, left 45
degree and left profile. The sequence is based on recommendations from vendors developing
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emerging facial recognition technologies. The five photos are backed up with two 35 ram photos
taken in the traditional law enforcement mugshot Sequence: full front and right profile. Two
DNA bucal swabs are taken from each detainee, air-dryed and placed iu evidence envelopes. A
short-form interview form based on questions detailed above is completed by agents and
translators. The print cards, swabs and interview Lomas are maintained in a large manilla
envelope, and each item as well as digital and 35 mm photos are tagged with a tracking number
based on characters: SIER-0000.
The packets, film, CDs containing digital photos, 35 mm film and floppy discs containing all
interview write nos and accomnanvinR electronic cOtrununications are packaged and S)
'The prints, photos and other information are scanned by
the MS technician into the remote fingerprint platform, which submits the prints and
information by satellite link to CMS for search and posting against TARS and NCIC, The DNA .
•swabs and the hard copies of the prints are sent by post to the FBI Laboratory. The remote .
submisions ofingerprints and other information involves the foloV•ring:
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I) The detainees' prints are searched against the IAFIS fingerprint file of the FBI's 22
most wanted terrorists.
2) The detainees' prints are searched against IAFIS files to include the fugitive and
criminal history files.
3) The detainees' prints are searched against the latent print file containing unidentified
crime scene prints from terrorist acts including Tanbomb, Kenbomb, the USS Cole bombing and
the World Trade Center attacks.
4)The detainees are assigned FBI numbers, which are permanent tracking numbers, and
their prints are permanently posted in IAFIS for future searches and comparisons.
5)The detainees' photos and biographical information are posted permanently in the
NCIC Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (VGTOF) for retrieval by any U.S. law
enforcement agency making an inquiry.
The remote submission ensures that at the least agents will know before the deployment is
completed that no wanted individual is among the 1,300 Shebergh.an detainees, will know
whether any of the detainees had been arrested in the U.S., and will know that the fingerprints
and the photos are of sufficient quality to reside in IAFIS for future searches and comparisons. It
is noted that the utility of this database could be critical to border security in coming years, as the
U.S. may go to a fingerprint-based visa system.
To agents conducting the interviews in Sheberghan, it became quickly apparent that the detainees
had been coached in counter-interrogation. Several detainees, in fact, stated that leaders within
the prison had held classes in what to tell the Americans, techniques that fit precisely into what is
. known of Al Qaeda counter-interrogation techniques taught in Bin Laden camps. The detainees'
pre-rehearsed stories, as agreed upon in the classes, admits the obvious, some involvement in the
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Taliban and the detainees' surrender Koncluz or Irganalc. But detainees decline to give or claim
they don't remember any specifics of their battles, tactics, command structure or communication
structure. Most minimize their involvement, again as they were coached, advising they were
conscripted, were only with the Taliban days or a few weeks, and were non-combatants: cooks,
drivers.and farmers. Many denied even knowing what Al Qaeda or 10BL was.
Detainees advised other detainees were debriefing as to the American's questions upon return to
their cells, and on their answers. A few detainees further advised that it was widely known inside
the prison that a detainee who began cooperating with General Dostura's criminal intelligence
officers was murdered on orders of e leader among the detainees. Agents have identified the
leader and two of the conspirators, who tortured. the victim with electric shocks for about a halfhour
before then strangling him. The three openly admit the murder, though they dispute the
motive of the victim's cooperation and describe it as a personal grudge. Agents have obtained
the local officer's files, which contain a dozen statements of witnesses and participants to the
killing, and are having the statements translated to identify other conspirators. Interestingly, the
statement of one that has been translated indicates the leader's motivation was the victim bad •
information that would have sent him to Cuba. A letter recovered from the leader makes a '
remark about fearing transfer to Cuba if more were known of him
The victim in thcrkilling is described as follows:
The leader and the two conspirators adMitting the murder are described as follows:
Agents have begun fast-tracking the booking process as much as possible, and aim to ensure that
all identifying information of the remaining 400, to include fingerprints, photographs, DNA and
biographical information is gathered by Bides, the Muslim holiday marking the end of the fast of
Ramadan Agents have also begun the tedious process of comparing varying detainee lists, to
include the prison's poorly documentedebandeenitten lists, to ensure every detainee has been
processed. Missing some detainees is areal possibility, in that guards have on several occasions
brought detainees who already had been processed.
The decision was made to fast-track the booking erocess b ause of persistent rumors passed to
agents by Local officer] bat the Afghan government may
release all the detainees as a "good will gesture" coinciding with Bides. Agents on the FBI
deployment team have been asked whether they could provide lists of detainees who would be
"safe" to be released. As stated in the summary of this communication, agents strongly contend
that none of the detainees are "safe" to be releaSed and will under no circumstances describe any
detainee as anything other than a continuing threat to the U.S., to soldiers and U.S. citizens in the
combat theater and to the Government of Afghanistan.
The deployment team agents and two Temporary Duty ariy) agents based in Kabul have made
contact with U S military in Tiagrara about transferring detainees deemed most dangerous into
U.S. custody for re-interviewing and possible transfer to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Chief among
this group is the prison leader who issued the Fatwah resulting in the torture and murder of .
another detainee, and the conspirators who admit involvement. The agents have further sent
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electronic communications, referenced above, requesting FBIEIQ guidance as to criteria and
procedure for effecting transfer into U.S. custody.
General Dostum has indicated to the FBI on-scene supervisor that the U.S. could take custody of.
any detainee it wants. The SF group that is supporting the deployment has contacted the U.S. .?jr
Force to accomplish an airfield survey of Shebergban airfield for possible use by C-130s or other
Air Force planes for prisoner transport. It is noted the MP team integrated into the booking
process is Raven-trained to provide security for such transports.
The deployment team has maintained a running list of individuals who they believe need to be
extensively re-interviewed. The list generally falls into three categories: 1) Individuals who
openly advise that they are committed Jihadis who want to kill Americans and will do so upon
their release. 2) Individuals who agents suspect are prison leaders or possible Al Qaeda
members. 3) Individuals who. though they describe themselves as conscripted farmers, have
S been previously identified IFBI communications as Al Qaeda members. (The TDY
agents in Kabul are effecting these identifications.) Agents strongly contend these individuals, in
addition to their intelligence value, are simply too dangerous to consider releasing.
Agents further have maintained close contact with the criminal intelligence officers, who have
worked within the prison for a year. The Officers advise that there are about 100 individuals at the
prison who they believe axe Al Qaeda members or committed Jihadis, in particular among the
600 Pakistanis detained therq. Agents. have obtained this list, translated it and have passed it to
I The list is attached and made part of this communication, and this
EC and the attached agent list also will be passed in its entirety tel land by
the Kabul agents to military authorities in Bagram.
What follows is identifying data and brief summaries of the deployment team's list of detainees
who require re-interview. It is noted in compiling this list that 400 of the Pakistanis have yet to
be processed, and that the Pakistanis have to date had higher percentages of individuals
committed to continuing, religiously motivated war. The list, which is followed by the
intelligence officers list of 100, is as follows:
On 11/10/2002, SAI I interviewed the following individuals at
Sherbergan Prison, Sherberghan, Afghanistan.
He
claimed to not be involved with the Taliban or military conflict. He also claimed no
knowledge of US involvement in Afghanistan. He stated that he was indifferent to the US and
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did not have any enemies.
1Hc also denied any
knowledge of the existence of Al Qaeda or Usama Bin Laden.
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On 11/11/2002, SAI interviewed the following individuals who were
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incarcerated at the Sherberghan Prison.
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1 IHe further stated that he didn't know who his
Ienemies were.
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IHe did state that all.
persons who interfere in Afghanistan, including Americans, are his enemies.
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continue to fight jihad if released.
IHe stated that he Would continue jihad if
released and that he ennsidentrl all infidels his enemies.
expressed a desire to continue the jihad when he was released.
1 wilt
IHe believed that the Americans attacked Afghanistan and were his
enemies. He said that he would continue jthad if released.
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would continue the jihad when released. He considered
the Americans that bombed him his enemies.
is enemies are
the Americans. He said that he would continue jihad against the infidels when released.
On 11/18t2002, SAI 'interviewed the following subjects who were
being detained at Sherberghan Prison, Sherberghan, Afghanistan.
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On 11/20/2002, SAI 'interviewed the following individuals, who were
incarcerated at the Sherbergan Prison, Sherbergan, Afghanistan. The following information was
provided. Unless otherwise noted, the individuals denied any knowledge of the Al Qaeda,
Usama Bin Laden, or pending attacks on US interests.
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Initially, he denied knowing was Al Qaeda was, but later stated
that he had heard of it.
1
e was very uncooperative and
aggressive. He did state that'
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tie denied supporting
the Taliban and stated that there was no freedom when they governed. He denied all lolowledge
of Al Qaeda and stated that he had to mercies. I
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I He maintained that he
could not remember the name of his commander.
He
believed that Islam should control all the world and infidels were his enemies_ He stated that he
has not yet killed an American, but would like to do so when he has the opportunity. He also
said that he would be willing to perform a martyr mission if he was asked to do'so.
by
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He also stated that Americans were his enemies because they arc infidels.
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He said that he would like to have the opportunity to kill Americans. He Tully supported
TJSAMA BIN LADEN and would participate in a martyr mission if UBL asked him. He stated
that be would travel to America and become a martyr there if he were ordered by t./BL to do so.
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considered all Americans bis enemies. If a religious leader ordered him to perform a marty
mission to kill Americans, then he would do it.
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would like to be able to kill American infidels. He denied that he would travel to American to do
so, however. He denied that he spoke any English, but he responded to all directions that were
given in English.
ericans were his enemies,
He considered all Americans his enemies and would continue jihad
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On 1 lil 1/02, SAI !interviewed the following individual at SliF-RBERGAN
PRISON, Sherbergan, Afghanistan regarding his incarceration after being captured by the •
Northern Alliance:
provided the following:
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nor ha l he heard of AL-QAEDA. Later in the interview stated that he had heard that
I3tated that he had never h BIN LADEN (UBL),
-UBL was a great man and that he had done great things for the people of Afghanistan. Further,
l(ph) conside ' part of AL-QAEDA because MULLAH OMAR supported
the TALIBAN and UBL la) also stated. that he felt that he was part of the
MUJAHADEEN (ph) statecithat he would continue to accept orders from Mullah
OMAR and UBL even if the order meant that he had to kill innocent women an children.
(ph) stated that he considered that anyone who did not follow the Holy Koran to be an
infidel and, that it was necessary to kill them. Mullah OMAR is the lead= of the Islamic world
and as such' 1(Pb) felt that it was his duty to obey bid orders without question.
I I
I--1(ph) stated that he joined jihri against the U.S. after the bombing attacks in
Afghanistan. MULLAH OMAR stated that it was time for Afghanistan to fight aodl
(ph) strongly agreed) I(ph) still considers himself a soldier and stated that if he were
released that he would finisb. his Islamic studies and continue his jihad.I I(ph) stated that
he would kill SAI lif he could and That he would kill General ABDUL RASHEEM
DOS'IDM, Commander of the Northern Alliance Troops, if he were ordered to do so by Mullah
OMAR or UBL.I
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I(ph) stated liatimaild follow any orders issued by either of these
men to include being a suicide bomber has never been asked to be a suicide
bomber nor does he know anyone who has been a suicide bomber. •
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Below are the list of prisoners interviewed by SAI (that require additional
interviews:
lrefused to
give any further information.
would provide no information. It was the opinion of the interpreter that
was someone of great importance.
he subject denied any knowledge of Al -queda or UBL
This subject should be re-interviewed.
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This subject should be re-interviewed.
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Ilse did not believe Bin Laden was dead or fled the
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country.
This subject has significant information on the Taliban and possibly Al-Queda, he
should be considered for transport and additional interrogation.
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The subject advised that he did not know about Al-Queda and had first heard of them from the
BBC radio broadcast. He advised the broadcast was in english. When confronted with this
contradiction concerning listening to an english radio broadcast and denying to understand
english the subject refused to answer. The subject advised, he did not know who Usama in
Laden was and had never heard of the name
The subject advised that there were no leaders in the prison and he was not aware of anyone
being killed in the prison. He advised that the conditions in the prison were great and he had
better food and medical conditions then he had at home in his village.
'advised that the subject interview was a complete lie.
This subject should be considered for transport and interrogation.
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The subject
'aimed he had never heard of Al-Oueda or Usama Bin Lad
This subject should be considered for transport and further interrogation.
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Misc: Tbis subject advised that he believed in the Taliban government
and
and wished that they had won this wan, He believed in Martyrdom and hoped to be a martyr some
day. The subject advised he will always follow the jihad. The subject advised that he would not
answer any question honestly because he was incarcerated. The subject advised that he would not
say if he knew about AI-Queda to UBL. This subject should be considered for further
interrogation and transport.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
•
Misc: This subject denies ever being with the Talib. Claimes he went to
find a friend and was captured by the Norther Alliance. The friend he was going to see was
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This subject should be considered for re-interview.
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Misc: The subject was captured by the Taliban and forced to fight. The
subject was captured and has been in custody for seventeen months.
frhe subject denied ever hearing about martyrdom.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
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Misc: Subject doling to have been a fanner and have no working
knowledge of IBL or AL-Queda.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
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This subject should be re-interviewed and evaluated for transport and further
interogation..
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• • ••n •••
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This subject needs to be re-interviewed.
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This subject should be re-interviewed.
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This subject discussed in detail the Taliban use of young boys for sexual gratification of the adult
men. The subject advised that the Talib would take boys, usually between 9 years old and fifteen,
for sex. An adult male could take a boy, but would be responsible to clothe and feed the boy or
boys Iv: tank_ This whiert arivicprl that his nrrtfArenattwaq fnr boys s PeA ten nr eleven]
This subject should be re-interviewed.
The subject believed in
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martyrdom and hoped to be a martyr some day. The subject advised that he would like to kill
Americans.
Subject should be re-interviewed.
Consider for re-interview.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
This subject believed in martyrdom and jihad
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any additional information on Al-Queda.or ITBL.
he subject provide negative answers for
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This subject should be re-interviewed.
- trhe subject denied knowing English, but did respond to commands in English. The
subject also appeared to be reading what was written in English.
The subject advised that he knew
I ad no details.
about Al-Queda and UBL, bu
This subject should be re-interviewed and considered for transport and interrogation.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
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This subject should be considered for re-interview.
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This subject should be re-interviewed.
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ID 7D
The subject denied any knowledge of UBL or Al-Queda.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
IThe subject
denied any knowledge of UBL or Al-Queda.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
FBI003038CBT
b6
b7C
b7D
DOJOIG012596
•••••• • 411. ./
1:) 7 D
he
subject denied any knowledge of english, but responded to english commands. The'subject was
clearly deceptive and gave contradictory information to the translator concerning his travel.
This subject should be re-Interviewed.
IThis subject made several contradictory statements and
was very deceptive:
This subject should be re-interviewed.
This subject should be considered for re-Interview.
FBI003039CBT
b 7 C
b7D
b7D
b
b7C
b7D
DOJOIG012597
This subject denied knowing any english, yet did respond to english commands and some
questions. I
claimed that he wrote this, but then denied knowing what he wrote. The subject was very
deceptive.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
b6
.b7C
b7D
b7C
ID6
. b7C
b7L
b6
b7C
b7D
[The subject refused to answer any questions pertaining to AI -Queda or UBL.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
FB1003040CBT
b6
b7C
b7D
be
b7C
b ID
DOJOIG012598
DEC. 9.2002 12:32PM NO. 150 P.17
The subject denied having any knowledge of Al-Queda. or UBL.
This subjectshould be re-interviewed.
iC
b7D
bC
b7C
lo7D
b6
b7C
b7D
Ifhe subject refused to answer any further questions and was detained in the holding area
for one hour.
IThe subject denied any knowledge of Al-Queda or
UBL. This subject was way deceptive and uncooperative with the interpreter.
This subject should be considered for re-biterview.
be
. b7C
b7D
CC
b7C
b7D
bC
b7C
b7D
DOJOIG012599 FBI003041 CBT
b
b7C
b7D
b7C
37p
b6
b 76
b7D
This subject advised that he would always fight the jihad against Amexica, The subject advised
that he hoped to kill all the Americans at'Sheberg,han if given the chance. The subject advised
that he would also like to kill all the translators that worked with the Americans.
This subject should be transported and interviewed in depth.
6
b7C
b7D
bc,
,b7C
b7C
FBI003042CBT
DOJOIG012600
v. J.J1.1 I . 1J
The subject began to refuse to answer questioni the more be was interviewed.
This subject should he re-interviewed.
b6
b7C
b7D
b 6
b7C,
ID7E,
The subject advised he
believed in Jihad and would like to kill as many Americans as possible. The subject advised that
he was familiar with Al-Queda, but did not train with them. I
I The subject refused to provide any additional information.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
b6
• b7C
b 7L,
L7D
b7p
b7C
'c71)
FBI003043CBT DOJOIG012601
IHe went on the jihad to kill Americans. The subject denied
N • I •
b G
b 7 C
b7D
The subject refused to answer any question about UBL or Al-Queda.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
b6
b7C
676
I The subject denied any knowledge of Al-Queda or UBY.. The subject advised that he
wanted to kill Americans. I
66
677
676
lit was the opinion of the interpreter that this subject was an
extreme fundamentalist and had additional information to provide.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
h6
h7C
b -76
66
1-17C
67D
FBI003044CBT
DOJOIG012602
N6
b7C
2,"/D
subject denied any knowledge about his Mull* UB1 or Al-Queda..This subject was very
deceptive. He responded to all english commands, but insisted that he did not Imow any Wish
E
knowing english, but responded to english commandsl
The subject denied any knowledge og Al-Queda or UBL. The
subject was very deceptive and refused to answer most questions.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
The subject refused to answer any additional
questions.
This subject should be re-interviewed
b7C
D
This subject should be re-interviewed.
176
b7C
The subject responded to all english commands, but denied knowing any english. The subject •
denied to have any information about who he traveled to Afghanistan with, who sponsored his
trip, what groups he belonged to, any knowledge of UBL or Al-Queda.
FBI003045CBT
h6
b7C
b7D
DOJOIG012603
,.„
NO.150 P.22
This subject should be re-interviewed.
b
b
The subject refused to answer any questions about Al-Quecla or UBL. The subject
advised that e came to fight the BIM and kill .Annericaus, The subject advised that he would
like to continue to fight and kill americans. The subject advised that America will always be his
enemy.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
b6
b7C
b7C
!The subject denied any knowledge ofAl-Quecla
C7C
b7C
or UBL.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
The subject came to Afghanistan for jihad. to kill
FBI003046CBT
IDE
b7C
b7D
b7C
.b7D
DOJOIG012604
E T
v.e.uld2 . 2:37PM
b7C
b7D
americand
This subject should be re-interviewed.
126
b7/2
b7D
b6
b7C
1 'The subejct den Al-Qued.a,U111:or the Taliban.
This subject shoidd be re-interviewed.
bb
b7C
b7D
b6
b7 C.:
.b7D
b7C
b7D
b6
b7C
FBI003047CBT DOJOIG012605
DEC. 9.2022 •12:38Pti — • NO.152 P.25
subject was very reluctant to answering any questions.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
The subject denied any affiliation with any groups. The subject denied knowing his commanders
name. The subject advised eh came to Afghanistan alone. The subject refused to answer
questions concerning his unit and where he was captured. The subject denied any knowledge of
-UlElL or Al-Queda.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
b7C
The subject denied any knowledge of Al-Queda or TJBL. The subject refused to answer any
questions about his group, his leaders or his travel to Atharlistan. The subject said he was
committed to jihad and martyrdom.
This subject should be re-interviewed.
b6
b7C
b7D
DOJOIG012606 FB1003048CBT
DEC. 9.2002 12:39PM M0.150 P.26
IThe subject denied any knowledge of UBL or Al-Queda.
This subject should be re-interviewed prior to being released.
This subject denied knowing the name of his commander, He denied knowing th enames or
anyone he traveled with. He denied any knowledge of or Al-Queda.
This subject should be re-interviewed prior to release.
I The subject denied any knowledge of UBL or Al-
Queda.
This subject should be re-interviewed prior to release, RUSH PRINTS.
°b7D
FBI003049CBT
136
b7C
b7D
b6
b7C
b6
b7C
b7C
6,7D
b
b
DOJOIG012607
OM... nA.4...nr1 Sign+ 1.•12 novoll 1" A frtIqtartictart to •tiitt in iihadi
e subject denied any imowieage of
UBL or AI-Queda. The subject refused to answer most questions.
This subject should be re-interviewed prior to release.
Er ® 1 x
DEC. 9.2002 12:40PM
IThe•subject reffised to
answer most questions. He would not a ns wer questic= LTBL, Al-Queda or why he
came to Afghanistan. The subject
This subject shouldbe re-interviewed, RUSH PRINTS.
The subject denied any affiliation with any fundamentalist group. The subject came to
Afghanistan for the jihad.I
This subject denied any information
about UBL, Al-Queda, any commanders or anyone he may have traveled with.
This su *ect should be re-interviewed and evaluated for transport.
3
FB1003050CBT DOJOIG012608
FBI003051 CBT
ET
DEC. 9.2002 121 41PM M0.193 P.28
The subject denied knowing who his commander was. He denied k110Willg anything about UAL
or Ai-Quedal
'The subject denied ever seeing any Al-Queda or
foreigners. The subject was very uncooperative and tefused to answer most questions.
Subject should be re-interviewed.