Statement of Major General Geoffrey D. Miller re: Investigation of Possible Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay

Major General Geoffrey D. Miller was the Commanding General for the Joint Task Force in Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) from November 4, 2002 to March 26, 2004. He was interviewed regarding his knowledge of detainee abuse at GTMO. He mentioned that his role at GTMO was to "fix" the detention and intelligence operations there because it was "broken."
MG Miller recalled knowing of only a handful of incidents that were outside of the directives he set in place. In one incident, a female interrogator removed her shirt and rubbed against a detainee during an interrogation. In another incident a Military Police officer struck a detainee. MG Miller was also told of an incident where a senior interrogator duct taped a detainee, he was also aware of the use of short shackling, yelling, use of loud music, as well as inappropriate touching. The MG stated that if something was reported to him, he took appropriate action.

Thursday, March 31, 2005
Monday, January 1, 2007

MG Miller was interviewed on 18 March 2005 at WFO, Arlington, Virginia. The witness
was sworn by LtGen Schmidt. His statement was substantially as follows:
I was the Commanding General for the Joint Task Force, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from 4 November 2002 to 26 March 2004.
My overall responsibility was interrogation and detention at Guatanamo Bay, Cuba. JTF­160 was set-up for detention and JTF-170 was set up for interrogation. My task was to integrate them so that they, were in synchronization. USSOUTHCOM wanted to improve intelligence and detention. I was told to fix it. It was broken. I did not perceive that I worked for the SECDEF. General Dunlavey and I had four days of overlap. We had a change over from 4-9 November 2002. We did not have a conversation about whether he had authority beyond GTMO. JTF-180 in Afghanistan was not in my command relationship It was a coordination and information relationship. The detainees did come from JTF-180. Detainees and interrogators all came through JTF-180. There were no detainees that came from IRAQ or Operation IRAQI FREEDOM when I was there.
The command climate at GTMO was dysfunctional when I arrived. There were two
separate organizations with senior leadership that was at odds with each other regarding how they would integrate their missions. My first job was putting that together. The
leadership had a single mission focus that was separate. Single unit disparity did not
allow the units to be successful. There was no abuse or torture going on. The
organization was not working together efficiently. It did not affect the detainees. SOPs
needed to be updated. The basic standard was going on. The detainees were treated in a
humane manner.
I did receive FM 34-52. The additional techniques that were requested went up to GEN Hill. I was uncomfortable with Category III. I was not comfortable using Category III techniques in interrogations. We were going towards incentives. Category would not help develop intelligence rapidly and effectively from the detainees there. I did not intend to.use them. They were approved, but not directed. I had the latitude to use them. It was an order that came down through the SECDEF. I did not question than about not using the techniques in interrogation. They wanted to do aggressive techniques. Special Interrogation Plans (IPs) had to be done in detail and sent to a higher authority. The purpose of the techniques was to support the nation's effort. There were two Special IPs; they were enormous documents. The IPs were the way to set standards. Everyone understood where the limits were.
Hovrad'adling was I? I'll be frank with you, when you put an organization together
you say here are the new standards. Some thought they were more aggressive. I would
state how to do and what to do. It is part of team building for success. You win the
battle one day at a time. Senior leadership got on board right away. That is why GEN
Hill asked me to come down to GTMO.
AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 114S -or76-Exhibits



We had incidences of good faith mistakes. We stopped them. I would do a
Commander's Inquiry and corrective action was done on an interrogator. Retraining was

done. The interrogator would go back under the supervisor and then interrogate again. A junior interrogator needed oversight It was a handful of occurrences. The occurrences did not rise to torture, maltreatment, or inhumane treatment I had an interrogator that exceeded the bounds. It was a female interrogator who took off her BDU shirt and inappropriately rubbed on the detainee. The female rubbing was brought to my attention by a contract interrogator. We pulled her out We found she did cross boundaries. She was given an administrative Letter of Reprimand and retained her. One incident, the intorogatof asked the MP to help in an interrogation and the MP was actively involved. I got it fixed. We continued to refine the policy. We built the SOPs. It was a continuously evolving operation. We had a weekly meeting that had enormous leadership involvement about staying within standards. Whoever violated the standards received appropriate action. In another incident an MP could not control his temper. He struck a detainee. He was a pretty good soldier. It occurred in the cell block. The standards were well known. If any standards were violated, appropriate action would be taken. When a mistake was made we took appropriate action.
The detainees are ruthless, murderous people. We had to teach interrogators and MF's not to hate. I spent a lot of time with the chain of command and how to control them professionally. We had to talk about this to all interrogators.
There was a high leader touch. We had to lead the led. I was down there engaged at the Camp. I spent enormous amount of time going through the cell block. It was difficult keeping that balance. We had weekly meetings. The lawyer went over the standards. The lawyer would tell the in • at if you cross the line call me. It got to be a
Qt. joke sometimes. I said call Do not cross those standards. G
General Hill told me that you are the Commander. Here are the basic guidelines, go
ahead, and go forward.
ist. We had numerous actions routed through the J2 I worked for General Hill. A direct line to him would interrupt his comman au onty. was very clear of my chain of command. I talked to OSD almost every day. There was lots of talk. I understood for whom I worked for. I had informal conversations with OSD. I sent a report to DEPSECDEF through USSOUTHCOM.
I have known General Hill for 20 years. If I had a problem, I would call him. We talked
once or twice a week. I got guidance and all the support I needed.
Therotitractors probably made up roughly 50% of the personnel. There were a higher number of contract analysts that supported the interrogation mission. I gave the same talk to the contract analyst, their supervisor, and contract interrogators. I told them they were soldiers without the uniform.
4 2


The FBI was at the established weeldy meeting. I had an FBI agent come down. They
had opportunity to come to the meeting every week. We had a meeting and I gave the FBI Special Agent (SA) an hour. I told him it was anything he wanted to talk about. They had a different perspective. They had a law enforcement perspective. There was significant friction between th • : d JTF on how interrogations were done. It was the first one and then SS e later. I said here are the standards. No FBI SA questioned interrogation meth. u s ogy. For segregation, we had to go to General Hill for 30 days. No one from the FBI came to talk to me about that. One of the Doctor's of CITF came to talk to me about interrogations.
I am not ad.-expert on detention or interrogation. I spent an enormous amount of time to help me understand how I.can do this business better. I had a talk with every leader, CITF, FBI and the JTF and told them that they would follow the standards. We would come in on occasion and look at interrogations.
Nothing placed me in a compromising situation.
There was an interrogation SOP in place when I got there. I split the JIG, ICE, and J2. They Were counterproductive. It was the most dysfunctional I've ever seen. I could not believe it. It was senior leader's squabbling on personal matters. It was debilitating to the organization. The JIG did normal 2 stuff.
A Iviili working dogs- No, not in interrogations. They werall111111 (;,
They were used for detention, not interrogation.
Duct tape — Not that I knew of Aft I left I w ld that a senior interrogator ducttaped i3 be :omeone's mouth. I was told it w ut that is only speculation. I was =prised. I don't know when it happen or e es,
I knew about the false flag. I don't know any instance. It was an authorized technique in
the IP.
Impersonating FBI- No.
Yelling-at detainee and loud music It was an approved
technique. The interrogator was authorized to do that.
Interference with FBI — There was an FBI and CITF focus on law enforcement on
DoD guidance f0 develop intelligence. Their focus was on evidence. We were developing intelligence. They had a different focus. We followed DoD. FBI followed public law.
Sleep deprivation

3 seer

Short shackling. While I was there the detainees were chained to the eye-bolt for
security. Every interrogator saw the detainee's legs and feet. I saw hundreds of
interrogations. There were no stress positions. I gave guidance.
Food and water we do not use as a weapon. wined 30 pounds. IA
Hot and cold temperature — Not to my knowledge.
Inappropriate touching is not au . . It ught to my attention and we took care of it The touching was done by tx
SGle ever came to my attention.
Ink and menstrual fluid — No.
There were no ghost detainees that were under the control of JTF-GTMO.
What humane treatment means to me are adequate food, shelter, medical care, and an
environment that would not cause physical or mental abuse.
come interrogation techniques that SECDEF granted authority for was beyond what I
was comfortable with.
I never saw a memo or received a memo from the FBI that commented on SIPs.
It was clear to all the standards. The boundaries were for all. FBI and CUT had the
same boundaries for all DoD included. In our discussions, everybody understood the
standards. We have the same guidance. Everybody was formally notified that the
superior commander made the guidance for interrogations.
I recognize the CITF memo objecting to the Special IP. I sent the interim plan up and it
was approved by higher headquarters.
My focus was on the relationship between the CUT and the JTF. My focus was to improve it. They were at odds professionally and personally to the detriment of the Mission. I called the CITF commander personally. We discussed that they were trying to developevidence and the JTF position is not to develop evidence, but intelligence. The meeting was attended by General Ryder (the Cl]) Commander), the CUT commander, and myself. We talked about an effective relationship about doing the mission. Subordinates are to work together effectively. An interrogation plan was approved and
we followed the plan_
I directed the Director of the JIG to conduct an investigation into the lap dance negation. I agreed with his endations and findings. The Director of the JIG w as an effective leader and did a good over watch. He was a senior leader down there that would execute the mission.

• The standards were known across the mission. I four duct Oil later. It never came to my level. I believe it came t ttention _
took appropriate action.
I had several counseling sessions wigs
He is very fine man. He did o —
Alp ,
manner that demonstrated what the arc.

I am a standards guy. If you don't follow the standards, I'll take the appropriate action. When honest mistakes are made, you counsel, coach, and mentor.
I came to a dysfunctional organization not with mission success. I spent a large amount of time fixing it

I am aware of the 2 May 2003 memo I signed. It was in response to the up and down incident. The letter was signed in response to an AR 15-6. It was a Fear up. The MPs were told not to do it anymore. This particular incident was a single incident There
were some cases of the MPs being actively involved in interrogation; that was not my guidance.
The ICRC brought several general statements for revi
The guidance every week revalidated the guidance. It was very important.
The FBI and CIA representative came every 30 days.
Interrogations require that we would restate the standards every time. I knew the contract
interrogators. I gave them the same speech for standards.
TheTnigifairly large friction between 3TF and ICRC. One of my focuses was to make it
effective. It was producing unnecessary friction.


I have not been through SERE. I don't believe to my knowledge that the interrogators went through SERE. The Psychologist, Forensic Psychologist, and Clinical Psychologist were trained through SERE.
Most inteiVe—gators were school trained on tactical interrogation. Tactital debriefing in
strategic interrogation, some were trained. It was a small number. Some picked up
training while there at GTMO.
We established the Ti er T
I have seen several hundred interrogations now. When I showed up at GTMO I had
never before witnessed one.
I believe one of the things we found out holistically. Unity of command for success and standards demonstrated success on a regular basis.
JTF-1 60 and JTF-170 was an ad hoc organization that started from a cold start that we
normally would have in our institution. There were a lot of developmental operations
and procedures for strategic interrogation on how things should be done.
Abuse problems are simply about discipline setting, standards and developing these standards. You need leadership involvement that clarifies and focuses on the importanceof the mission.
GTMO and Iraq are different. I have had a year and a half to look at GTMO. GTMO used standards, how to treat detainee that are not combatants, how to interrogate, and incentive based interrogations. GTMO was successful.

Thcanilaiogations did not involve torture.
GTMOize inappropriately reads bad information. I have heard of it. If you apply aleader and standard there is adherence to the standards. In another context, it bringsdiscredit to all the leaders.

On 26 March 2004, I departed the island and went to Iraq three days later.
MG Geoffrey Miller was interviewed, via secure telephone, a second time on 31 March
2005 at 1843 EST. At that time Lieutenant General Schmidt advised MG Miller of his
rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Lt Gen Schirlidt asked MG Miller several questions regarding events that have been
documented in the interrogation logs obtained from GTMO. U Gen Schmidt asked MG
Miller if he had ever read the interrogation logs and MG Miller responded that he had
not. MG Miller responded that he was unaware of the following events:
- on 21 and 23 Dec 02, MPs held down a detainee while 11011111111Nstraddlexi the detainee without placing weight on the detainee
- on 4 Dec 02, SGTtIIIIIIIII
jmassaged the detainee's back and neck over his clothing



da. ake letter from the White House that spelled
gut his au onzation
t -
MG Miller stated that had he known of the threats family, he would never have allowed it.
MG Miller stated that he was aware of the following:
-that detainees were yelled at and that music was used in interrogations
as interrogated for 20 hours a day with 4 hours of sleep from 23 4ovember until 15 January 2003
-thatillipvas separated from the detainee population from 8 August 2002 until 15 January 2
inagalmill111,Ppersonated a Navy Captain from the White House
c3 aeclare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the stateme

given by the witness, MG Geoffrey Miller. Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Bas, Arizona, on 31 March 2005.
Lieutenant General, USAF
AR 15-6 Investigating Officer