Report of Investigation- Death of Detainee in (Redacted)

This report details the investigation into the death of Gul Rahman.

Doc_type: 
Oversight Report
Doc_text: 

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(b )(3) NatSecAct
Central Intelligence Agency
Inspector General
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
---------·-----
(Sf/NF) DEATH OF A DETAINEE IN
(2003-7402-IG)
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
John L. Helgerson
Inspector Genei:al
27 April 2005
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(6)
LA-~-·--· I acting .Assistant Inspector General
for Investigation.s
(b)(3) CIAAct I
(b )(6) !Supervisory
(b )(3) NatSecAct
Special Agent .
(b)(3) CJAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
fotoFOR-NrlMR
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NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
NOFORN·
PROPIN·
OR CON·
REL ... •
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
This Information has been Authorized for
Release to ...
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1
SUMMARY ....................................................... ~ ............................ 1
BACKGROUND ........................................................................... 5
PROCEOURES AND RESOURCES ................ ~ ........................ 6
FINDINGS ..................................................................................... 7
(5!1N'E) GUL RAHMAN's CAPTURE, RENDmON AND DETENTION ... ~ ..... 7
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (.sffNf) MANAGEMENT AND CoNDmONS A~ f ..................... 9
(-Bfil'VF) POUCY FOR CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS AT THE TIME OF .....................................................................................
. _........ . .......... -
(Sh'NF) RESPO"f'{SIBILiTY FOR RAHMAN'S INTERROGATION .................. 18
(S/INF) RAHMAN's 'TREATMENT DURING DETENTION A.Nb . . .
JN1'ERROGAT10N ••n••••••••••••••••••••••••o••••:ouuo•••••••••••••u•••••••••n• .. •••••••••,•••••0021
~/-/~) RAHMAN'S LAST THREE DAYS ................................................... 41
(W!f'OlKJ) 1JiE INVESTIGATION BY'IHE DO INVESTIGATIVE 'TEAM .... 50
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct (€f OTHERTECHNIQUESEMPLOYEDORAPPROVED
~~l~~l NatSecAct B~ f .................................................... ~ ................... '. ... ~ .................. 54
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)(f) (Sf/NF)- NOTIFICATIONS OF RAHMAN's DEATH TQ CONGRESS ............. 55
(U) APPLICABLE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND POLICIES .......................... 58 ·
CONCLUSIONS .................................................. ~ ....... : ............... 61
RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................ ~ .... ~ ......... 64
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APPENDIX
Chronology of Significant Events
EXHIBIT . . (b)(3) NatSecAct
I ~ubject:) L ----'~Gui Rahman:
Chronology of Events
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
(SifNF) DEATH OF A DETAINEE
(2003-7402-IG)
27 April 2005 .
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct INTRODUCTION
(b)(1)
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(b)(1) . 1. (g//Nf) 0nONovember 2002, an individual detamed by
(b)(3) NatSecAct the CIA inl IGul Rahman, died. OnLflovember, the
Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) informed the Deputy .
Inspector General that the DDO had dispatched a team to investigate
the death. fu January 2003, the Office.of Inspector Gen~ral (OIG)
initiated an investigation: This report reviews the events leading to.
Rahman's death. ·
. (b)(1) .
SUMMARY (b)(3) NatSecAct .
..
2. (g//Nf1) Rahman, a suspected Afghan extremist associated
with the Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) organization, who was
approximately 34 years. old, was captured in Pakistan I
(b)(1) I b ,----iio' t b 2002 1
(b )(3) NatSecAct nl I c o er · ·
I !On
. i
LJNovember 2002, L(b)( 1 ) I aircraft. rendered Rahrilan from
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(b)(1)
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(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(i)
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(b)(1) · · 1 t dt tt· a· t ti £ ili'tyl I
(b)(3) NatSecfct o_j 4-en __ Qllan. m el:~;~:ds ;eportedly found
Rahman dead in hlS cell on ffie morning·of0November 200?
(b)(1) . . ' (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct [}n D (b)(3) NatSecAct
3. (S/lNP) Between d November 2002, Rahrrian · ·
underwent at least six interrogation sessions bl' Agency personnel..
! The interrogation team included th~ jSite Manager, .
(b)(1) bn independent contractor (IC)
(b)(3) CIAAct osychologist/interrogator, I I the Station'~
(b)(3) NatSecAct 1 and an IC lingws'-"·~t--~
(b)(6) ! ~'---~
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)(f)
before his arrival in in July 2002. However he acquired
some on-th7t.'~Z) training an experience during theG(b)(1); he
had been[(b)(3) NatSecA6rrior to Rahman's death. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct 4. f:5I Rahman·was subjected to sleep deprivation
sessions of up to 48 hours, at least one ccild shower, and a "hard
I
takedown" termed "rough treatment" as reported in pre~death cables
addressing the progress of the interrogation. In addition, Rahman
~~\g\ NatSecAc'°lepor.tedlywas without clothing for m~ch of.his.time a!f f
I
iJesp1te these measures, RahJnan remamed uncooperative and
. provided no intelligence. His only concession wa,s. to acknowledge
(b )( 1) . l:tis identity onl!November 2002 and, subsequently, to explain what
(bI) (3) NatSecActv. .mlll age h e camei lio m; o the rwi·s e, Rahman re t ru:n e d his resJ·S tanc e
(b)(i) postw:e, and demeanor. The cab.le fron:ill onONo;,ember 2002
(b )(3) NatSecActeporting that Rahman had admitted his laentlty stated, Rahman
spent the days since his last session with Station officers in cold
conditions with minimal food and ~eep." f psychological .
(b)(1) assessment of Rahman, prepared b and reported in a cable on
(b)(3) NatSecA~November 2002, noted Rahman's r~markable physical and
. psychological resilience and recommended; in part, "continued
. environmental deprivations." · (b)(1)
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. (b )(6)
~·---.---.-. . · · (b)(7)(c)
2 (U//-Kil:lO/"Not all members of the lnterrogation team were.involve!! in every int1(b )(7)(f)L
session.
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--~5_._,. (S//NF) On the afternoon of0November 2002, when[]
I ~ards delivered food to Rahman, he reportedly threw his
food, water bottle, and defecation bucket at the guards. In addition,
(b)(1) he reportedly threatened the guards and told the~e b1:een their
(b)(3) CIAAct faces and would kill them upon his release. Whe as
(b )(3) NatSecAct informed of this incident, he approved or directed e guards to
/~\/~\(~) ·shackle Ralμnan's hands and feet and connect the shackles with a
(b )(7)(f) short chain. This position forced Rahman, who was ~ed below the
waist, to sit on.a cold concrete floor and prevented him from
standing up.
(b)(1) 6. \S//NF1 The following morning, the guards· reported that
(b)(3) NatSecAciRahman was slumped over in his cell. The ambient temperature was
recorded at a low o0degrees Fahrenheit. Rahman was still in the
(b )( 1) "short chain position," wearing only a sweatshirt.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
. _.LffiliNF) I Station reported Rahman's death that day in
(b)(3) NatSecAc~ :Jcable to.the DDO. The ODO dispatched an
. investigative team [the Directorate of Operations (DO) Investigative
Teaml consisting of a senior security officer assigned to the
(b)(3) CIAAct an Office of General Counsel
~~\g\ NatSecAc~t-OG-C~(b)(3) CIAAct tt?mey, and an A_gen~ pathologist to
· I I The DO Investigative Team conducted
interviews, and the pathologist performed an autopsy of Rahman.
The autopsy indicated, by a diagnosis of exclusion, that the death
· was caused by hypothermia.3 ·
8. ~//lqJ!) On 22 January 2003, the General Counsel informed
the Inspector General (IG) that.Rahman died as a result of the·
conditions at a facility substantially controlled by Agency officers.
bIG initiated an investigation into the circumstances surrounding
this incident and reported the death to the Department of Justice
3 (U) Hypothermia is subnormal temperature within the central body. The term hypothe~ is
used when an individual's body tempe).'ature is below 95 degrees Fahrenheit. This wil) occur
, when the loss of body heat exceeds heat production. ·
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(DoJ) by letter on 13 February 2003.4 On 29 December"2003, the Chief
of the Counterterrorism Section, DoJ reported by memorandw:n that
(b)(1) DoJ would not pursue a federal prosecution of criminal charges
(b)(3) NatSecActregarding Rahman's death. The matter is under review by the U.S.
I Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Virginia.
(b )(3) C IAAct
~~l~~l(c) 9. ts;t:tNfl, At the time of his assigninentui lc=Jwas
I a first-toUij___J:>perations officer who had no training or
experience to prepare him to manage a detention facility or conduct
(b)(1) interrogations. At the time of Rahman's deathJlhad not · ·
(b)(3) CIAAct received interrogation training and was f perar facility with a
(b )(3) NatSecAct di f H d 'd .J 5. . .J!- (b )(6) . mo ~ o ea quarters gm ance an'(b)(1) talion uuect
(b)(7)(c) supervis10n. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(7)(f)
10. (S//NF}' This OIG investigation concludes that
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAcplacing Ralunan in the short d1a:i:t1 position while naked below the
~~l~~l(c) waist in near freezing confinement conditions and this directly.led to
(b (7)(f) Rahman's death by hypothermia.i[exhlbited reckless
indifference to the possibility that'i:usaa:ions might cause injuries or
resultinRahman's death. (b)(1)
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1 L (S//N'F) OIG found that Rahman did not receive a ·
physical examination during his detention at and concludes
tha did
~~~gl CIAAct J.lOt attend to Rahman in the same manner and withthe same
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(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)(f)
4 (57 /NF) This referral is a requirement of Title 50 United States Code (U.S.C.), § 403q(b)(5) that
mandates .DIG to report information .conceII\ing possible violatioll!i of federal criminal law to
DoJ. The General Counsel had orally advised the Otief of the Criminal Division, Do], of the
drCUIIl$tanCes of Rahman's death on 24 January 2003. · ·
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(b )(7)( c)
(b )(?)(f) standard ofcare as the other detainees.s Furthe
'--,--~------'was aware of the lncreasin.~gl~y-c-.o~ld~c-o_n_di~.t ions
during the period of time he and Rahman were both in
.--'----'----.
(b)(1) . Novem~bl(~702) and did not advocate more humane
(b)(3) NatSecActtreatment for Rahman.(b)(3) NatSecAct
12. OIG also concludes that I I
(b)(1) 'd not provide adequate supervision forl I ·
((bb))((3) CIAAct .. · M ,--._ dir t 'bili'ty 3) NatSecAct:ictiv1ties at oreover~ ~v~ars ec respons1
(b )(6) · .for failing to include pertinent facts in his official written account of
(b)(?)(c) Rahman's death that led to material omissions and inaccuracies being
(b )(?)(f) proviciPd to the Congressional oversight committees.
' (b)(1) .
. (b)(3) NatSecAct ·
(b)(1)
BACKGROUND (b)(3) NatSecAct .
:· 13. (.S//I early2002, the Station took the initiative to begin conductin
interrogations of detainees using a on gwsts. (b )( 1 ) __ __,
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(b)(3) NatSecAct 15. (57 /NF)/ ~eceived its first detainee on (b)(1 )_· · Qeptember 2002. After the first month of operation, the tb )(3) NatSecAct
population had grown to its maximum capacity of 20 detainees. 1
(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )( 1 ) (b)(1) .
(b)(3) NatSecAct PROCEDURES AND RESOURCES (b)(3) NatSecAct
~ _ 1_8_.~(.S//NF) Two OIG officers traveled toj jinspected
and conducted interviews there as a part of the .
~in-v-es-ti-.g-a~tion. OIG reviewed the material collected during the Spt;cial
Review, Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Program (2003-
7123-IG), that is relevant to this investigation. Included within that·
'···

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· material are policy doctiments, cables, and infernal and external
comm~cations. OIG also drew material for this R,eport from[] of . /
the interview reports prepared during the Special Review. OIG
reviewed all materials assembled for the DO Inyestigative Team and
that team's final report, including a final autopsy report. · (b)(3) CIAAct
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FINDINGS
(S,'-,1Nr) GUL RAHMAN'S CAPTURE, RENDITION AND DETENTION
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19. -fa! j I Rahman was a suspected Afghan extremist fi:om
Lowgar Province, who was associated with the I:IIG organization.7
CTC identified him as a close associate of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and
Abu Abd Al-Rahman Al-Najdi, an alleged member of Al-Qa'ida.s
Rahman was an ethnic Pashtun who spoke Pashtu, Dari, and Farsi
)
· and was approxi.mately.34 years old.
. .
(b)(1)
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.,~ :21. (S/ J____ j Rahman was apprehended in Islamabad, __
· · PAf (b)(1)
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7 -${JI During an interrogation session after he admitted his true identity, Rahman said he
was fr~langar Village, Pol-E-Alam Region, Lowgar Province. Lowgar Province is ·
immediately southwest of Kabul.
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(b)(1)
,_ __( b)(3) NatSecAct ______(b_ )_(3_) N_at_s_e_cA_c_t ____~
. ·~·---~
Orfl October 2002 ! 22. Station sent a
(b )(1) lcablle.L ______ l----r-:---:----:--:c-----r~!
(b)(3) NatS:;:.:ec=-A=-ct=-----r.-7---co--'-o-,-__,_a_d_VIS_· ,ed thatl I during a
had identified one of
(b)(1) re uested that the
(b)(3) NatSecl;\ct of the
apprehension. In a reflection of how important a detainee Rahman
(b)(1) was believed to be,.Headquarters subs~quently advised
(b)(3) NatSecActmd Stations that Sec~ofDefense Donald Rums~~fe~ld~h-ad_,,
· . requested an \.!.pdate on tT(b)(1) lease.
· (b )(3) NatSecAct
··-----~---.
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
. [ [On
·]November 2002. Rahman was rendered tol (b)(1)
b 1 . (b)(3) NatSecAct . (b)(3) NatSecAct /blbl NatSecAct 24. -(5"/ L i Following Rahman's rendition t~ J
I ==1generated six cables regarding Rahman, including two cables
following his death. Only one of these cables, which reported the
chronology of Rahman's death, provided a characterization of .
Rahman, describing him as an: "enemy combatant."12
12 (U / /FeBe} The Department of Defense defines an "enemy combatant" as an individual
who, under the laws and customs of war, may be detained for the duration of the conflict. (Letter
from William). Haynes II to Senator cart Levin, 26 November 2002.)
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. . . . . l(b)(1)--,
(8ffNE) MANAGEMENT AND CONDITIONSAT(b)(3) NatSecAct
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27. «J//~JF) The detention facility~-----~-~-~
consisted of 20 individual concrete structures used as cells.
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(b)(1) 29. {S//NF) I I was not insulated and .had no central air
(b )(3) NatSecAcct ond itio ·r u. ng or h eat in"g ; an Ag ency-purc ha sed . generat o· r support e d
its power requirements. Whenl received its first detainee in
September 2002, by many accounts the temperature was hot and
~~ igi CIAAct remained generally hot or warm until November 2002.15 Individual
(b)(3) NatSecAci:ells were designed with a recess for electrical space heaters;
(b)(6) however, electrical heaters were not placed in the cells.
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(?)(f) . . . 3o •. ES/./NF) c=:Jestimated there were between six and iz
ga8 heaters in the cellblock at the ti.me of.Rahman's death .. C =1
[ !officer ·Who participated in the DO Investigation
. Team, reported there were five gas heaters in the detainee area of the
(b)(1) f~,.;litybefore Rahman's death. · · ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct ·
~ _3_ 1._~//NFr According t~e customary practice at
(b)(1) I _Jvas to shave each detainee's head .and beard and conduct a
(b)(3) CIAAct T\ledical examination upon arrival. Detainees were then given
(b)(3) NatSecAct . ·
(b )(6) Uniforms and moved te> a cell. Photographs were taken of each
(b)(7)(c) detainee for identification purposes. While in the cells, detainees
(b)(7)(f) .were shackled to the wall. The guards fed the detainees on an .
alternating schedule of ohe meal on one day and two meals the next
(b)(1) day. In anticipation of the cold weather) lqrrectedl ~~l~~l~c)
(b)(3) CIAAct . ·
(b )(3) NatSecAct (Sf/ttf)- According tCJ the door had to be opened to deliver water bottles and ac~ess
( b) ( 6) · . the excrement bucket. .
(~)(;)(f) · 15 (U) .In November 2002, the temperature(~anged from a high ofOo a low o(J
( )( l.( l degrees Fahrenheit. (b )(3) NatSecAct
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~~lg\ CIAA t assistant, toacquir~;arm,runiforms,heaters,
(b)(3) NatS~cAct propane, and blankets. According t he was successful in
(b )(6) purchasing the uniforms, blankets an some heaters. It was difficult
(b)(7)(c) to purchase heaters because they were in high dem.and. If a detainee
(b )(7)(f) was cooper to include a mat, blankets, a Koran, a lamp, and additional food .
choices. Detainees who were not cooperative were subjected to
austere conditions and aggressive interrogations until they became
li t (b)(1)
comp an ·. (b)(3) NatSecAct
32. (S//N'F) I I for the U.S. Bureau of Prisons
(b )(1) ..rn9P) to send a[ ~aining team toQfrom Cto
(b)(3) NatSecAcL_jNovember.16 ThiS team worked .with the mtenor guard force
concentrating on techniques such as entry and escort procedures,
application of restraints, security checks, pat down and cell searches,
and. (b)(1)
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. 33. (S//NF)
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~~ \~;m;l ~de-scn-.b-e~d~--~as-a-,-'hi-. h_ris_k_,_hi-'.
(b)(1)
:., '
(b)(3) CIAAct In an electronic message
(b)(3) NatSecAcl(e-mail) to the DDO two days after Rahman's death! !wrote in
(b)(6) . .. . . ,
(b)(7)(c) · part,
(b )(7)(f)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
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(b)(1) 17 (~ rvedi(b)(1) omAugust2002untilJuly2003.
(b)(3) CIAAct ~~ (b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(?)(c)
(b)(?)(d)
(b )(7)(f)
~~lgl CIAAct . 35. (8//NF)I . ~ai 4dnotknowwhathis'duties
(b)(3) NatSecActwould be when he arrived in He believed the primary factors
(b )(6) . in his assignment as! were the vacanc in the
(b)(?)(c) detention prog;am and that
(b)(?)(d) j I lihadn~o-£~0-rmal-~ms~_.t ru_c_ti~.o_n_r_e~~a_ti_n_g_to_~
(b)(?)(f) · interrogations untrrAPril 2003,0months into his ~our.21
. (b)(1)
36 · (~' 'Nfi) ,~------J~assigned.i (b)(3) NatSecAct
• I I '
resnonsibili+v for all etention-related ctionsl
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(?)(c)
(b )(7)(f)
(b )( 1)
(b )(3) C IAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)(f)
"1q . .
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(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
~~jgj CIAAct 37. (~//!~) Qexplained that he selected
(b)(3) NatSecA~t several factors, mdudm the fact
based on
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)(f)
that he watched
\----,----------------,---~ discharge his duties and was verv satisfied with the job he
~p-er~fo~rmed. [ Ja1.ked a lot
about issues. ad free access to thd tation front office,
an rec ed consulting wl.th t least once·a day;
· · 38. (S//NF) [ !stated that he andl I briefed II
on CIA policies anQ.I ~earned from on-the-job training. L==J
believed thac:::Jreceived whatever guidance was available at ·
CTC before he arrived, butll did not know what that was. ·
· ·· · ·'llsaid that the guidan~assed to! !included such issues ..
(b)(1) ~'s prohibition on torturej
(b)(3) NatSecAct land the fact·"'th~.a~f~it~is..-..~ p-errrus~'~s~ib~l~e-to-·_ us_e_c_e_rt_am~~. .. -.~.- --"
tactics in debriefing that cannot injure, threaten with death, or induce
(b)(1)
lasting physical damage to the detainees.
~~jgj ~=;Act · 39. (S//P.JF)i $aid he was briefed on particula~
(b )(6) . interrogations on a case-by-case basis. If there was a new or
(b)(7)(c) important detainee a~ ~e was briefed every day as the
(b)(7)(f) i. nterrogati. on ran i' ts course; ((bb ))(( 1) 3) NatSecAct ·
40. (S//NF) 1.dvised that he had discussions wl.th .
Station mana ement-1
very other day, or
when issues arose. stated that someone from Station
~~-~~
(b)(1) management visited about once a month.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)(f)
(b )(3) NatSecAct.
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
41. {S//N:P) The Director-of CTC-in written comments on the
(b)(1) draft report endorsed by the DOO, who served as the previous
(b)(3) CIAAct Director of CIC-said thaf, by thle fall of 2002, the shortage of veteran
(b)(3) NatSecAc!Jperations officers had hit(b)(1) Station hard. To accomplish critical
(b)(6) . . '
(b)(?)(c) nuss1ons, . (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(7)(f)
CTC often relied on talented young officers-such as
·~----~ to take on responsibilities beyond their training and experience. In § se, he was asked to take on enormous responsibilities
(b)(1) rincipallybecauseofhisl I
(b)(3) NatSecAct d relative maturity, which qualified him better than
most for this entirely new DO mission.
(S/INP) POUCY FOR CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS ATTIIE TIME OF
RAHMAN's DEATH
42. (S//N:P) Prior to the time of Ralunarl's death, CTC and
OGC disseminated policy guidance, via cables, e-mail, or orally, on a
specific case-by-case basis to address requests to.use specific
interrogation teclmiques. Agency management did not require those
involved in· interrogations to sign an acknowledgement that they.had · ·
read, understood, or agreed to comply with the guic;lance:provided;
nor did the Agency maintain a comprehensive record of individuals
· who had been briefed oil interrogation procedures.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(?)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
···--·····---····· --········---··· -(b)(3) NatSecAct·------- -·-- ····- ··········· -·······
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. . ...... ;':.~' ·.
. ·. .. ~ ~: -.
•... :
~(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)------------~-------
(b )(7)( d)
(b l\7)(f)
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(b )(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(S)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)(f)
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SECRI!'.f I j fNGFeiB:q//MR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(S) I (b)(1)
(b)(6) (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(?)(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(.b)(?. )TL ___ _____(~b) ~(?-)(fl) ~~-l(-c)----------~
(b)(i) 49. (B/(NF) Ac,ording td . fue initial interrogatiorui
(b)(3) NatSecAct:onducted at in September and October 2002 were more
custodial interviews, with the added psychological impact of being in
that facilitv with total darkness and seoaration from other detainees.
(b)(1) I
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)(f)
:·'
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(S)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b) 7)(f)
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(b).(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) . .
(b)(3) CIAA 1 . 51. ~) Accordingly, when'--~~~~~---~
(b)(3) NatS~cActarrived inl~~Jovember 2002, for his first TDY assignment
(b)(S) in\ I _Jeportedlyadvisedli"Youcannotharmor
(b )(6) kill the detainees, out you can handle the aeon-1~interrogati.ons
(b)(7)(c) as you see fit." It was not apparenttoOthaL_Jknewwhatthe
(b )(7)(f) rules were.26 . . _ · · ·
(Sff'NF) RESPONSIBILITY FOR RAHMAN's INTERROGATION
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
· (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7 (f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)(f) (b)(1) (b)(1)
'---------(b)(3) NatSecAct_(b)(3) NatSecAcl.-----~
26' lfroCNovember 2002 unlij]J~~20=0=3·"------,J
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)
~------~~------~-~---(b)(3) NatSecAct
28 (S: According to a October 2002 CTC/UBL cable as be.ing sent tq I
~ in-depth interrogations of several key AI-Qa'ida operativ~ recently detained in
L____1:Wunan was not captured until 00ctober 2002.
29 (5//Hf)Cwas in[(b )( 1 ):onfl0ctober until ['November 2002.
· . (b )(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )( 1 )
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct ·
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
1~ .
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
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(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1) (Bil/~) RAHMAN'STREATMENTDURINGDETENTIONAND
(b)(3) CIAAct INTERROGATION . (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct ·(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
61. ~S//l\IF) . said he dir not s~ecifically recall Rahman's
treatment upon arrival ail stated that Rahman's
clothes would have been removed early in his detention, and most of
the time RahnuuJ. was naked or would have been wearing only a
diaper. ·
(b)(1) . 62. "{S/ /NF) lsaid that Rahman was either in hjs cell or
(b)(3) CIAAct in a sleep deprivation cell when he was not being interrogated.35
~~~~~~ NatSecAlt ~id not know exactly how much tim~ Rahman spent in the ·.
(b)(7)(c) sleep de rivation cell.but estimated it was about 50 percent of the·
(b )(7)( d) time. contended that no slee de rivation was conducted on
(b)(7)(f) Rahman d added there
would have been no point in continuinl it thj because Rahman was.
not .being interrogated.36 According to Rahman arrived at
(b )( 1 ) ·· · ·· I jin a diaper and it was removed at soni.e point. He was ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct'robablyput back in a diaper. when he.was put in a sleep deprivation
cell.37 Howeve~ jsaid there wowd have been-no reason to use
a dlaper when Rahman was not in a sleep deprivation cell.
(b)(1) 63. ES//:t>JF) characterized Rahman as stoic and very
((bb ))((3) CIAAct bb unlik" . th th d t . H th bb 3) NatSecAct stu. .om,. . e e .o er· e ame~s: e was e most stu om
(b )(6) individual they detamed at the facility.38 Although most of the other
(b)(7)(c) detainees were "compli(b)(1 )almost immedi(!.tely, Rahman wa8 hard-
(b)(7)(d) (b)(3) NatSecAct .
(b )(7)(f) 35 (S//~IF} As mentioned earlier[~pf the 20 cells a.---------------,
I ffhese cells could be used to force the
detainee to stand during sleep deprivation sessions. ·
36 (5,1/l>!P)
(b)(1 )' . . 1· .11 .
(b)(3) CIAAct 37 ~ DuringtheOIGvisitt pn_janCMay2003,twodetaineeswere
(b )(3) NatSecAct undergoing standing sleep deprivation in these ce~. Both were naked.
(b )(6) · 38 (stfNF) At the time of Rahman's death~ (b )(1 )een in operation for 69 days.
(b)(7)(c) · (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(7)( d) 21
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(b)(1) core Pashtun. He had been a combatant all his life and had been
(b )(3) CI AA ct wounded many times. Rahman did not complain and simply said,
~~ l~~l NatSecAcThanks to God, all js well." When reminded that in his video.'"'ta=p~e=d __
(b)(7)(c) 19 December 2002 interview with the DO Inlestiga~ve Team,~I ---~
(b)(7)(d) stated that Rahman complained incessantly, aid he just
(b)(7)(f) .. recalled Rahinan being stoic. ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct"
64. ~/ J I According to cables reporting Rahman' s
interrog.atioris, he _didl complr about conditions. After the _first two
(b)(1) days of mterrogation, eported that Rahman "complained lb )(3) NatSecAcl>out poor treatment, coinplained about the violation of his human
rights, and claimed inability to think due to conditions (cold)." The
subsequent cable reporting Rahman's interrogation sessions
(b)(1) describe~pression that Rahman "continues to use 'health
(b)(3) CIAAct and welfare' behaviors and complaints as a major part of his
(b)(3) NatSecAct . . ,, · (b)(1)
(b )(6) resIStance posture. · (b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(?)(c) ·
(b )(7)(f) 65. (S//J?>l.F) The DO Investigative Team in~e~ewedD
L_Jguard commander four days after Rahman's death. .
· · According to the·guard c0mmander, Rahman wore pants for , , ... · .... ·'· ~,
appr~xin:Uitely _his first.~ee ~ays at/ (Jfftj:lthen spent the
· remamder·ofhisdetentio:n without pants.· (b)(3) NatSecAct
~~lgl CIAAct 66. {5//NF)/ . ~aid th~t Rahman's ~aper~~ clothes·
(b)(3) NatSecActwould have been removed at the mterrogators direction:. The guards
(b )(6) would not have removed them wi~out direction. According to .
(b)(7)(c) Rahman was without his clothes more than he was with them.
(b )(7)( d) The interr~ators gave Rahman some clothing after he admitted his
(b )(?)(f) "d . b 2002 .
1 entityo (b)(1) ovem er .
----·(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) _____ _
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
..,,,
S'f!CRET / I ~O!'ORl\I//UR ~-~
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(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
Even when Rahman was
depleted-psychologically, fie woiilo r()utinely respond that he 'was
( b) ( 1 ) 40 {S,l,LMF) A cable reported thatc:::=Jwas invoived in six interrogation sessions with
(b)(3) CIAAct Rahman.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6) :
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)(f)
23
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(b )(3) NatSecAct
"fine" when asked about his condition. The only concession Rahman
made was to admit his identity when it was clearly established and
irrefutable.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
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(b)(3) CIAAct ~CRE111 YNrn>GIU>l//bd:F.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) . 73. (5/ Rahman's Medical Care., According to the ~ .
(b )(3) NatSecA~ovember 2002 cable that reported the chronology of events
· connected with an's death, Rahman was brought td Ion
(b)(1) ~ovember and 'ven a h sical'examination. However, des ite this
(b)(3) NatSecAct ffi 'al tin' (b)(1)
0 Cl re or ' (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) . .
(b)(3) CIAAct conducted physical examinations at on ~an or other
(b)(3) NatSecAct detainees who were rendered there during that period. The brief
~~l~~l(c) chec~ 'performed on rendition detainees iif !could not
(b)(7)(d). be considered a physical examination because, in part, it did not
(b)(7)(f) involve. ques~?ning the detainees·(b)(6yt their health history and
current cond(b)(3) NatSecAct. . (b)(7)(c) . .
'" b
November 2002, St . . d(b)(1)
atioil, re orte (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct (b )(3) NatSecAct
'
75. ~JI The 0November 2002 ca, reported that
during two m'ontJuY assistance visits t~ by the medics, all
(b)(1) detainees were taken from their cells to a room and given a private
(b)(3) NatSecA2.!1edical evaluation where they were interviewed by an Office of
Medical Services (OMS) officer and a urine speciinen was talqm to
determine the specific nutrition and hydration levels. It reported that
(b)(1) . the last routine visit~asN ovember 2002 and the urine testing
(b)(3) NatSecA , . . nounshment and hy ation. e cable further reported that·all the.
43 -(S//Nl'J' Whe{ ( b) ( 1 ltation used the term "medic" it ;,.eant Physiclans' Assistants.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
detainees were cooperative with i:he medical personnel regarding
their health and welfare except for Rahman, who simply stated,
"Thanks to God, all is well."44 ·
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6) .
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
44 (e) tated that he provided[J~th some of the informatlon·that .
appeared in this cable. .
45 "" All renorted nre;iousl~ Rahman arrived there oJlNovember 2002.1
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
~-----;=====;---------------------;:======--~
(b)(1) · 80:\Stl I Reports of Rahman's Interrogation. .
(b )(3) NatSecAct first cable report of ~:r, · terrogation was issued thrle: dayj
· . after his rendition ti{ It reported that I ~d had
(b)(1) interrogated Rahman over a, 4 -hour period and noted that e
(b)(3) CIAAct psychological and physiological pressures available forus.e were
(b)(3) NatSecActJ.inlikely to make Rahman divulge significant information. The cable
(b )(6) '
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6) I
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
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(b)(1) . . .
(b)(3) NatSecAct1ted that, although the other detainees who had been brought to
I Jdropped their resistance within 48 hours, Rahman
remained r:elatively unchanged. It added,
Despite 48 hours of sleep deprivation, auditory overload," total
darkness, isolation, a cq\d shower, and rough treatment, Rahman'
remains steadfast in maintaining his high resistance posture and
demeanor. (b)(3) NatSecAct
i~lgl NatSecAct-~k!Sl'B/ .A second, post~rendition cable was sent from
I It or{]November 2002. It reported that Rahman
appeared to be p ysically fatigued but defiant during interrogations.
(b )( 1) · Tt sought material to employ as psycholo ·cal ressure and re uested
(b)(3) NatSecAs_\a re are a videota · e of
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAActL-----,=~r===;------,------------~
(b)(3) NatSecAct 82 . .(!31 ~I lsent a third post-rendition cable on
/~\i~\(c) . []November2002, "Subject: Gul Rahman Admits His Identity.'' It
(b)(7)(f) reporte.<:i tha="" jin="" rahman=""> · oQovember 2002, and that Rahman had. spent the days since his
last mterrog~tiqn session in cold conditions \Vith rμinitnal food and
sleep.so It further reported that Rahman was ·confused for portions of
the interviews due to fatigue and dehydration.51 The cable reported
that Rcihman provided his true identity and biographical information
(b )( 1) but provided fictitious and rehearsed resronse)about his
(b)(3) NatSecActelationship witlf , eported that
l{ahman was afforded improved conditions an would be
reinterviewed on~November 2002. ·
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
((~))((~)) CIAAct 49 (SI/NB Thereisnoindicationthal be,,,,,t.t=hi"s ,,,,re=s""t"'--------~
I ~(b)(1)
i~ li~l NatSecAct (b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(?)(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct
( b )( 7) ( d) · 51 {&/JI As previously reported, th ovember 2002 cable reported the Station's
(b )(7)(f) medictlsupport to detainees. The cable cite that, during the o ' ovem'ber 2002 medical ·
· assis.tance visit to[ ( b) ( 1 ) lit was determined that all detainees were receiving sufficient · .
. hydration. (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(1) .
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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. (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct ~ I I~ 11..r · .
83; ('$'/ ;1 sent a fourth cable on LJ"ovember 2002.
That cable was prepare yr~and reported a mental status
examination and a recomn\.e~mterrogation plan for Rahman.52 It
~~ igi CIAAct re~orted that Rahman had demonstrated a rigid and .int:actable
(b)(3) NatSecActres1stance posture and would not be affected by continwng
(b)(6) interrogations. The cable recommended continuing environmental
(b)(7)(c) deprivations and instituting a concentrated interrogation regimen of
(b )(?)(f) 18 out of 24 hours. It also recommended that the Station[ (b )(6)
collaborate with the interrogation team to achieve the optimum (b)(?)(c)
balance and noted it was reasonable to expecftwo or more weeks of
the regimen before seeing any progress. Finally, it recommended
using the newly trained interrogators from Headquarters' recent
(b)(1) training class. (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct ~· ·
84. (5/ On the reported day of Rahman's death,
0November2002 entacabletotheDDO,~ ~Gul
· Rahman: Chronology o · vents." It reported that R'ahman appeared
calm and controlled to his interrogators but had reportedly .
(b)(1) •hreatenedj !guards previously, vowing toidfrthe,.,· m.....-.allrlho"'r~-----
(b·) ·( 3· ) ··N at·"S· ec· Acnt ave·. th, em k. ille d f o ll owi· ng his re1 e ase.5 3 This was cr·t e d as ,t he reason
that Rahman was constantly restrained with hand and ankle
(b)(1 r · restraints in his cell.54 It also repC:ineil that ast saw ·
(b)(3) NatSecA~l!.ahman on the afternoon of0November 2002, and that Rahman
was found deq.d on the morning of[]November 2002. The Station
concluqed it was not possible to determine the cause of Rahman' s
death without an autopsy. The cable did not include the information
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct .
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct,, " ) N S · A
(b )(3) NatSecAct3 at ec ct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)(f)
52 fB1::':=J The mental status exam was req~ested by CI'C/UBL o[]-Jovember 2002.
CTC/UBL noted " Headquarters) UBL is motivated to extract any and all operational information
o 1 om Rahman ... [and] achieving Rahman's cooperation [is] of great
importance. We wou · to work quickly to create circumstances in which he will cooperate."
. 53 ~!:!!Q!l!'_tedly heard fromJI beforeZNovier 2002 that Rahman sensed
the guards ~d threatened ti5iarnhem, bu said he never witnessed the
(b)(3) NatSecActguardsmistreatRahman. · . . ! · ·
54 (SJI Despite the assertion that Rahman was constantly restrained with hand and ankle
( b )( 1 ) J;!straliilslnffiS cell, the same cable reported that Rahman's hand restrain ls were removed on
(b)(3) NatSecA0ovember2002: ·
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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(b )(3) NatSecAct
that Rahman was naked below the waist or that a series of chains and
restraints (the short chain position). was used on Rahman that forced
him to sit bare-bottomeci"on the concrete floor of his cell.SS
"--c-(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
· 55 (SI c=J 'This cable w~ the basis for the information provided.in the 29 November 2002
Congre8sional NotificatioMn Rahnwl's death. It was not witil a second Congressional ·
Noti.fiC"otion was made or[_J.iay 2003, three months after the DO Investigative Team's report was
issued, that CIA informed Congress that Rahman was naked below the waist and shackled in the
(b)(1sho)rt1 cha-in- J?osition that nrevented Rahman from standing ui:iright. ~ -~.- ------·-·--·
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)1
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
~~3.0
SECRET 11 [N""""O"'r'"'O'"RN...,..,.7..,.,7M R'"""
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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~------------~It was during that period that
the temperature dropp'ed precipitously; checks were normally
conducted in the morning, and also in the evening if the weather was
cowey had observed the detainees shivering around the period
of November. Some detainees with blankets were shivering.
~~~g~ NatSecA6those w1 out blankets were those who were not cooperating.
(b)(1)
91.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
b)(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
~-~
They were concerned that the provision of blankets to all of
the detainees at that time could send the wrong signal; they tried to
use desired items like blankets as something to earn by cooperation.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
'--------------------·(b)(3) NatSecAc'---------~
(b )(6)
---;:::========-------'(b)(7)(c) _____ ~
(b)(1)
(b )(7)(f)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(5//l'fl Durin0 an inrrview with the DO Investigative Team oCNovember 2002,
'------~pted that did not know at what temperature one would reach hypothermia.
(b)(3) NatSecAct ~2
(b )(6) SECREL_J /NOFORN//lo!R
((bb)(7))((c)7 )(f)--------------......(b.).(3_) _ Nat_SecA_ct _____________ _.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
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(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b )(7)(f) 94. ~S//WE) Five days after Rahman's death, the DO
Investigative Team interviewed The one and one-half page .
report that resulted from that interview contained the following:
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
95. (.S//NF) During an OIG interview, less than four months
later, when asked if he had conceins regarding the temperature at
(b)(1) at the. time of Rahman's death,!
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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. (b)(3).NatSef:!ACt.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
CU6'.J41 /lJ
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SECRET/j rNVFvRN//MR
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
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. (b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
100. {5/I IIn Decemper 2002, less than one. month after
~~lgl NatSecAct R~'s hypothermi"b"i1iiuced ~eath~c:=Jreported the following
regarding another!( )( )l,,_·-·---·
. .(b)(3) NatSecAcf
[The detainee] was submitted [sic! to sensory deprivation, cold, and
sleep deprivation within the parameters of [a referenced cable} ...
When moved to the interrogation room for interrogation sessions
[the detainee] was stripped and had to earn his clothing with
cooperation and information. When he demonstrated resistance,
[the detainee} was left in a cold room, shackled ;ind stripped, until
he demonstrated cooperation.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
~ECl"ET ~NOFORN//MR
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
104. ~ . , ased on the len of time RahmaRwas at ,~,,~-·B gth.
(b)(1) . estimated that Rahman would have received
((bb))((3) CIAAct h I 1 nl h d · 3) N 18 A 1two.s owers. .o yones oweran itwasa
(b)(B) a ec c cold shower. Rahman did not like the show.er, but the l@ards
(b)(7)(c) were able to g'-'-et~him~"_cl"--ean-=·-L_ __________ _J
(b )(7)(f)
105. (5//Nl') Several of the officers mterviewed about the
possible use of cold showers as a technique cited that the water .
(b )( 1 ) · heater wasjnoperable and there was no other recourse except for
(b)(3) CIAAct cold showers. However,Qexplained that if a detainee were
(b )(3) NatSecActooperative, he would be given a warm shower if possible. II
(b)(6) . . . . ~
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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(b )(3) NatSecAct
stated that when a detainee was itncooperative, the interrogators
accomplished two goals by combining the.hygienic reason for a
shower with the unpleasantness ofa cold shower.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) Na!SecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
107. (5//Nf') Hard Takedown. During the course· of
Rahman's autoJ>SY, th_e A:gencyj?atholo~t!lot~cl._§E!Veral abrasions --~
on the od .67
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
~//tit'} The Final Autopsy Findings noted "superficial excoriations of the right and left
uooer shoulders, left lower. abdomen, and left knee, mechanism undetermined."
(b)(1)
(b )(3) Na!SecAct
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9EGRJ1T I I fl\IO'J;QR! (b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
, (b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f) I 109. ts//Wl) According t khard takedown was
employed often in interrogations atl las "part of the
· atmospherics!t It was the standard proceaure for moviJ::lg a detaine¢
to the sleep deprivation cell. It was performed for shock and
:(b )( 1 ) · psychological impact and signaled the transition to another phase of
[(b)(3) NatSecActthe interrogation. He said that th~ act of putting a detainee into a ·
I · diaper also could cause abrasions if the detainee struggles because ·
the floor of the facility is concrete.
I (b)(1)
, (b)(3) CIAAct 110. (S//NF) J (b )(3) NatSecAct
((bb))((6) I ~ 7)(c) This was
(b )(7)( d) . accompliShed by running hiiii up and down the corri or. As
{b}U}(f) Rahman wos berg movf down the 'omdo•, he lell ru>d gOt a =•pe
on his shoulder. · d not remember where else· Rahman
received injuries. [ explained that the scraping .;,,as not
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6) I
(b)(7)(c)--------------------~
(b )(7)( d)
(b)(7)(f)
SFCRJOT/I jNDpQJ?N//lv!R
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
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(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
expected to be part of the process, and he was displeased vyith the
results because Rahman was injured. [ !asserted that he had no
interest in hurting the detainees. He observed that abrasions cause
·management problems because there is a need to summon the
physician to the facility to tend to the detainees' wounds to prevent·
(b )( 1) infection.70 I ~tated that neither he~ ~talion management,
(b)(3) NatSecActor anyone else involved with the program ever authorized or
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
encouraged anyone to hit, slap, or intentionally inflict pain on a
detainee.
. . .
((bb))((1) . . C//hllJJ I dth . 3) NatSecAct ·. 112. (,,,r,r·u·~note ere was an alternative to the hard
takedown that he called the "gentle takedown." It was reserved for
(b)(1) · · ' detainees who had been cooperative and were being transferred from ·
(b)(3) CIAAct : In those instances, the detainee is advised what to expect
(b)(3) NatSecAct in advance and instructed to lie on his stomach and nofiesist(b)(i) - •:"
~~ l~~l( c) .. - .
0
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(d) 113. (S//NF~ lstatedhedidnotdiscuss the hard
(b )(7)(f) takedown with Station managrrs; he thou t the understood what
techniques were being used al(b)(1) I
(b)(3) NatSecAct
'---------(b)(6)1--------------------'
· (b)(7)(c)==, · . ·
70 (5iiNF). if[ ;treaf;ed Rahman.for those abrasions, it was not reported to OIG
during the contact with the three medical care providers present during Rahman' s detention.
(b)(1) I (b)(3) CIAAct 1 _________________ (_b-)(1_) _ _
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c) . (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(d) (b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)(f) (b )(7)( d)
'-------------------(b)(7)(f)----"
. 8ECR£T )~:t>IOPORN//l'l>fR .
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
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£!!CR-BT~ l;1> (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct 119. (3/ L J Despite the visible presence of abrasions on
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
Rahman's body,! ptation reported in theCNovember 2002
cable that constituted tl:l_e official report of Rahman's death to the
DDO, "The StatioC ]inspected the body and noticed no obvious
contusions, abrasions, marks, swelling, or other indications of specific
cause of death." This same language was incorporated in the
29 November 2002 Congressional Notification of Rahman's death.
(SltNF) RAHMAN'SLAST'THREEDAYS ~~~g~ NatSecAct
(b)(1) D (b)(3) NatSecAct 120. (S//N:P) In the November 2002 cable sent to the DDO,
L._ __ Station reported a chronology of the events regarding Rahman,
with specific reference to the last days of his detention and his death.
No other cables documented Rahman's activities or status after
(b)(1) !)November 2002.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
5cCltl'lT J I tMOl'ORN I / ]\i[R
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )( 1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(i) ~I _ __,,1122. ~S//NF) 0November 2002. The0Novernber 2002
(b)(3) NatSecAct jchronology cable reported:
'
(b)(1)
(b).(3) NatSecAct
The last time Rahman was seen bgofficer prior to his death
was on'the afternoon of Monday ovember 2002. At that time
Rahman was assessed to be in goo overall health. Station noted
that Rahman had small abrasions on his wrists and ankles as a
result of the restraints. His ankle restraints were loosened and his
hand restraints were removed when Rahman was returned to his
celJ.74
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1)
~------------------·(b)(3) NatSecAct--~
74 This is the only passage in the cable that addressed the events of[]November 2002.
would have made this assessment of Rahman's health.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(C)•-------------------~
(b )(7)(f) ~--4?
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(b )( 1 )
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
::iLL~ l I 1 jl (b)(3) NatSecAct
"...... . .. ' . ~ .
,, .~ ......= , .·· •. ., ~ .... '
(b)(1) (b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
: I
(b)(1 )-~26. (-SIC][]Novemb~r 2002. Th{]November 2002
\b)(3) N~tSecAcrlogy cable reported:
At 1530 local .or[}Iovember 2002, fue[ }ommander
told station that when Rahman had been given fooa at 1500 local,
he had thrown it, his plate, his water bottle and defecation bucket
at the guards who had delivered the food. Station requested that
(b )( 1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )( 1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
43.
S:OCltf:T lj l1""MO""F""'O-r.u. (b)(3) NatSecAct
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th~ ~ommander to replace [sic] Ralunax{s hand
restraints to prevent this from reoccurring, or prevent him from
undertaking any other violent actions.76 ·
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
127. (S//NF)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f) [__ __________ __J The guard(s) reported that Rahman
had been acting violently and had thrown his food and defecation
bucket at the guards .. Rahman had also threatened the guards, noting
that he had seen their faces and would kill them when he got out of
(b)(1) the f;acility.I !confirmed.it is likely that Rahman had seen the
(b)(3) CIAAct guards' faces because they were sometimes lax about using their
(b )(3) NatSecAct . ' .
(b)(6) kerchiefs to cover therr faces.
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1) (1)
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)
(b)(3) NatSecAct----------------(b)(3) NatSecActr-----
(b)(6) -------
(b )(7)( c) 76 (Q This is the only.passage in the cable that addresses the even~Ll~ber 2002. It
(b )(7)(f) · has been established ~t the term '.'station" in this paragraph meansjL ___ J_
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(b)(1)
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(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b)(7)(f)
(b)(1) . 131. (S.t!NF)j ftatedhedidnotknowwhatmighthave
(b)(3) CIAAct prompted Rahman to act in this manner. He was the only detainee·
(b)(3) NatSecAct ·
(b)(6) who had ever threatened the guards or thrown food at them. As a
(b)(7)(c) result of this conduct ordered the guards to shackle Rahman's
(b )(7)( d) hands. !lwas not certain whop. roposed the idea to short chairr
(b )(7)(f) RahmaiLc=:Ju:spt!Cted tlie guar~(s) rjommended it and he ·
approved. Regardless of the origm) acknowl~~ that he .
would have authorized Rahiriari's short Chaining oi:iJ. _yovember
·2002. .. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
~~lgl CIAAct · . 132. {SffWF)! !explained th~t.the s~ort chain was .
(b)(3) NatSecAct necessary to prevent Rahman from throwmg things.7711 . .
(b)(6) reasoned if only ~an's hands had been shackled t~~he still
(b)(7)(c) would have been able to throw objects. That is, manacling one hand
(b )(7)( d) to the other still permitted the limited range of movement that would
(b )(7)(f) .
(b)(1)
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(b)(3) NatSecActallow Rahman theability to throw something.78 In view,
(b)(S) trying to harm others when they entered the cell crossed thjline; al
~~ j~~j( ) detainee who acted in this mariner needed to be restrained.
(b )(7)( ~) did not want Rahman throwing things even though the tray was
(b )(7)(f) constructed ·of cardboard and the bucket and water bottle were made
of plastic. I ]did not know if the defecation bucket was empty at ·
the time it was ffirown.79
(b)(1) 133. ES//NF) According t9 \the sho_rj:chaining was not .
(b)(3) CIAAct · the result of the verbal threat to the guards. t .. llidnothave any
(b)(3) NatSecActfirsthand knowledge of the threat; the guards~ about it. They
(b )( 5) did not appear very worried or frightened th
(b)(5 (b)( ) f d this . . b J 7)(c) oun Sl!!R_nsmg ecaus!:\, ______ ,__~-~---
(b )(7)( d) Rahman had reportedly
(b (7)(f) "--thr~e-a-ten-ed~th~e_gu_ar_ds,_p_r_e_vi~.o -us~y-.~ -~did not recall Rahman
being punished for the previous threatsi~-- thought he would
recall if Rahman had been punished.
(b)(1) 134. (S//NF) stated it never occurred to him that short
(b )(3) CJAAct chaining Rahman while wearing no pants would have consequences.
(b)(3) NatSecAct Q . (b)(S) In retro~pect ~aid he c~ see there.we~eproble.rns caused by
(b )(6) . thafa~tion;· ·t e time, he viewed short chainmg as JUSt a
(b)(7)(c) mechanism to safely secure Rahman.!llid not think he had
(~)~7 j~g) crossed the line in ordering the short ~g. It was not done to
( )
7
induce pain or suffjring. I only thought at the time ·was to make
Rahman )mmo:>bile. stated they are not in the punishment
game at[ ((bb))((31)) -N-iaLtS1e.c. Actare m' the b usm' ess of ge tting u;_u~o rm.a t io n.
. . .
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CJAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct========-------------:---:----'
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(b )(6)
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(b )(7)( d)
(b (7)(f)
78 {SI/NF) Despite this view, there·was no need for the guards to enter the cell to deliver food.
The doors for each cell were constructed ·with a small slot near the bottom of the doors. The
pwpose of the slot was for the safe delivery of food to the detainee·without opeliing the doors.
The' same slot was used by the guards to inspect the cell and monitor detainees during security
~e;~ Fo~ of the officers who responded to Rahman's ~ell onnNovemb.;, 2002 said they
. did not see or smell urine or excrement in or around the cell. · ( b) ( 1 )
· · (b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct 137. (5//?qil)
(b)(6) ---~~~
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d) ..
(b ),!!Wl. · ..,.. · · L.-hrri-.--.-~.l~d~-~t.._,.-_,.-_~b-th'""'.. ..,,th_h_ds--d-::-'thThef ori~thal. · ·_,n · tee que mvo ve. u.taJ..Lw•g o e- an an e eet. to e w.U...
The wall hook was less than two feet from the floor. '.fhe detainee
would have to sit on the.floor of the cell with his arm elevated ·and
bent.sij
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138. (Stc=L]Novem~er2002: °U;')([]November2002
(b)(3) NatSecACJmonc;>logy cable reported. · (b)(3) NatSecAct .
Interviewed separately or(] November 2002,-each of the twdl
~~ ig l NatSecAct guards reported that during normal cell checks ·at 2200, 2300, ~
and 0800on[(b)(
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)November, they_ saw Rahman was alive in his .
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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(b )(6)
(b)(1) i
(b)(7)(c) 's-sr1 ~(S::i./,~·~~W-l'Tu'i'hPerl'diliiffMer;;enmce"1bl2'etwtw.leenmttthwetvtwmoT.te;cJchnimfci'qrnues~istlitha;;>i1::""i,wi:vi·!hth""ilth1"eOionri (b )(7)( d) detainee is chained to the wall, and there is no third chain connecting the hands to the feet,
(b )(7)(f)
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cell. Rahman was visually inspected through the door cell slot but
no guard entered his cell. Both of the two guards. on the 0900 cell
check said independently that Rahman was definitely alive, with
his eyes open, seated in his cell at 0800 hours on'lNovember
2002. . . . Shortly after 1000 hours onONovem6ef 2002, Station
personnel then present at the facility to mndnct an interrogation of .
another individual were notified by ~ards that GulRahman
was sleeping in his cell but there was some problem.
These officers were escorted to the cell by the guards. These
officers realized. Rahman was deceased and· they subsequently
requested via secure radio that Station medic visit the facility.
Officers reported that a small amount (palm-sized pool) of dried
blood was present in and around the mouth and nose of subject .
. Rahman was observed still shackled, and slumped over in the
seated position ....
At approximately 103o hotirs, Station medic arrived at the location.
The Station medic inspected the body and noticed no obvious
contusions, abrasions, marks, swelling, or other indications of
specific cause of death. He noted that the blood in evidence was
dark, not in keeping with a wourid to the nose or mouth area. The
medic's notes on Rahman's condition are filed at Station. His
estimation was that Rahman had.been.dead less than a few hours.
(b)(3) NatSecAct ___ ~-----------------~
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(b)(1) .. 140. (S//l ((bb))((3) CIAAct ffi · · d · th · QN b 2002 3) N 18 A 1o cers trie to contact on e morrung o ovem er .
(b)(6) a ec c when Rah.man's death was discovered. He indicated the radio was
(b)(7)(c) not always on.j jsaid he was not certain where he was at the
(b )(7)( d) time Rahman's bod was found.l!thought perhaps he was at
(b )(7)(f) the Station but h~owledged that had he been at
the Station an (bJ(f) trio c ed, someone "."ould have located him.82
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) . . (b)(1 l--,.
(b)(3) CIAAct 82 (SHNF) Noneofthepersonnel,includfil~ lwh6werepresei(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(3) NatSecActtd became aware of Rahman's death that date could account fotj whereaboul;s L____J
(b) ( 6) throughout the morning when ~'s death was reported to the Station.
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
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When the ,officers subsequently returned to the Station from
I I they informed selected Station personnel of Rahman's
~~lgl CIAAct ~eath. One of them, ~de~tity unrecalled, informe~ ftl1ey had
(b )(3) NatSecAcfOund Rahman dead m his cell.83 Whec=Jwent to see D he
(b)(6) was alreadY, aware ofRahman's death.84 . ·
(b)(7)(c) · (b)(3) NatSecAct • · .
~~l~il~~) 141. (S11L: !acknowledged that the account of the
guards checking on J: an at 2200 and 2300 and 0400 hours, as
reported in the cable, was odd and ·inconsistent with the policy of the
rounds conducted every four hours. He mainthlned, however, that
this was what the guards told him 'said he thought it was
(b)(1) unusual that the guard commander was not present at! I .
(b)(3) NatSecActvhen Rahman's death was reported. Other officers also cited that
this absence appeared unusual.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
· 142. fS/ J~ From what he heardOsaid he was
confident ~ed of hypothermia. Being on the bare fl()or was
(b)(1) likely a factor. I ~tated he had no more experience than the
(b)(3) CIAAct average person with.hypothermia. From life experienc~
~~ l~~l NatSecAc'. recognized that if the ground is colder than your body, itTsprua'ent
(b)(7)(c). to have something between'your body and the ground. [ I
(b )(7)( d) I .
(b )(7)(f) ! assumed
that other detainees did not die because they were more warmly
dressed. Rahman was the only prisoner short chained in his cell at
· th.e tjme; he was different from the other E:lo.n ers. When asked if he
(b)(1) thought Rahman would have been alive o November 2002ifhe
(b)(3)CIAAct hadcooperatedj lrespondedthatif anhadbeen ·
(b)(3) NatSecActcooperative, he would probably still be alive.· (b)(i)
(b )(6) . . .
(b)(7)(c) · (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
83 .IS~'ld') Wheri interviewed by the DO Investiftive Team three days after Ralunan's death,
[ . . lated he learned of the death fronj I ]confirmed this during his OIG
(b)(1) interview.- ..
(b )(3) C IAAct 84 (5//lffl No photographs were taken of Rahman or the condition of his cell. The only
(b )(3) NatSecAct'hotographs of Rahman were the photographs taken in conjunction with the autopsy on
(b )(6) L}lovember 2002. ·
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f) (b)(1)
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(b )( 1 ) (W /FOl:le) THE INVESTIGATION BY THE DO INVESTIGATIVE '.lEAM
(b )(3) NatSecAct
144. ~//~lF)\ \statio:p_r~ported Rahman's death in an.
(b)(3) NatSec~ct pable to the DDO onLJNoveni.ber 2002,.the day of
Rahman's death. Shortly thereafter the DDO ,patche1 three
(b)(1) · Ao-ert officers the "DO Investigative Team") t on.a
(b)(3) NatSecAct to investigate the circumstances of the death.85 The
D Investigative Team, col1Sistin of ho was the
(b)(1) senior security officer assigged to
(b)(3) CIAAct I
(b)(3) NatSecAct d d · ·
(b)(6) I . con ucte mtel'Vl.ews, and the
(b )(7)( c) pathologist performed an autopsy of Rahman.86 .
. ,. .... ..,..,,~.... ' ·~ ., .. ·' .: .. ·
145. (S//Nll~ ~dvised the, DO Investigative Team that
(b ) ( 1 ) · ·detainees were examm~·"" ·e,,,d,__.an.....,,d~=-'""""""""""""~""'-'--"""""-"""~""
(b)(3) CIAAct protect the Agen
(b)(3) NatSecAct However, wh , on
(b )(6) C'--_J_an_u_ary 2 _0_0-3,-tw-o_m_o_n__ths_ af _te_r_Rahm-~ an's arrival · ,---t-~~
~~ ~~im)) requested the identity of the medical officer, the results of Rahman's
medical examination, and co12ies of the rendition photographsc=J
did not produce them reported that no medical documents
. were retained from the renditions, cu;i~ation did not retain
(b)(1) . medical documentation of detaineesL_Jaid he could not
(b )(3) NatSecAct · .
(b)(1)
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(b )(6)
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identify the medic who reportedly exarhined Rahman and also said
(b)(1) the digital photographs of Rahman had been overwritten. (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) CIAAct · · . (b)(3) NatSecAct.
(b )(3) N"S•cl\ot 146. $1 /Nf)Tho DO fuv"~"'tivi T~ ffite (b )(6) employees and contractors and .th _J1181de guards. I was
~~ l~im)) interviewed a second time when he returned to Headquar ers whj}e
on leave from I find by an e-mail message. that was sent to
lllater attejpting r locate additional information. On . -
'Dfcm'uary 2003, ompleted a 33-page report with 50 .
(b)(1) "ttachments, including the post-mortem photographs.
(b)(3) NatSecAct._· ______________________ ~
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(b)(1)
: . '.:'"'. , .... · ..
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
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(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1) 148. (-SL-I 0nONoveinber 2002,j ~ent an e-mail
(b)(3) CIAAct message to several OGC attormtys assigned to the DO that was.
(b )(3) NatSecAct intended to.be a preliminary report of Ns findings.87 Included in the
(b )(5) ail . th J; ll .
(b)(7)(c) e-m messagewas e .. o owing:
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(S)
(b)(1) · 87 (JJi /~) said he did not prepare any other report on th;s matter.
(b)(3) CIAAct \ ~-~ "
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151 . .(SHNF) The autopsy indicated, by a diagnosis of
exclusion, that Rahman's death was caused by hypothermia.BB The
Final Autopsy Findings reported the cause of d~ath as
"undetermined," the manner of death as "undetermined," and the
clinical impression as hypothermia.
152. 1$/ /1¢F)- The DO Investigative Team concluded:
• There is no evidence to suggest that Rahman's death was
deliberate.
• There is no evidence to suggest that Rahman was beaten,
tortured, poiSoned, strangled, or smothered. ·
• Hypothermia was the most likely cause of.death of
Rahman.
• '.Rcμunan's death was not deliberate but resulted from
. ·incarceration in a cold environment while.nude.from.the .
waist· down· and-being shackled in a position that
prevented him from moving around to keep warm.
Additionally; this kept him in direct contact with the col.cl
concrete floor leading to· a loss ofbody heat through
conduction.
Rahman's actions contributed to his own death. By
throwing his last meal, he was unable to provide his body
with a source of fuel to keep him warm. Additionally, his
violent behavior resulted in his restraint, which
prevented him from generating body heat by moving
around and brought him in direct contact with the
concrete floor leading to a loss of body heat through
conduction.
88 (U) A diagnosis of exclusion in a death case is one where all other causes of death are
excluded and the clinical environment in which the victim was found is examined along with the
immediate history developed during the investigation. However, no definitive tests cir findings
establish that diagnosis. · · ·
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(b )(6) (b)(7)(c) tcJ OTHER TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED OR APPROVED B~~-----~
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(1) , - .... · 155;--(S//NF) Four other officers and ICs who were
(b)(3) CIAAct interviewed admitted to either :earticipating in such an incident or
~~ l~~l NatSecAc}tearing about one of them.89[--- -------- ----- -···
(b)(7)(c) II
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f) I
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(b 1(11 156. (S( :NF) I I l•dmitted that h• prnicip•""' m • "mod
((bb))((3) CIAAct ti' " t h th fir t d t . . d H 3) NatSecAct~u on a w en e s e amees arnve . e
(b )(6) contended the etainees were there only one day, and he hoped to
(b )(7)( c) shake them up quickly.L Je.xplained he discharged a firearm in a
(b)(7)(f) safe manner while anL_ pfficer lay on the floor and
(b)(1) (b)(1 )-~
(b )(3) NatSe_cAct (b )(3) NatSecAct
~~ ig l C IAAct 89 f.rl-i*F'I It is difficultto dete~e how many mock executions were staged during this
(b )(3) NatSecActiod. There appear to be at least two. c::::::::Jadmits to participating in only one.
(b)(6).
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c) chicken blood was splatter~n the wap. The t~chnique waJ~--~
(b )(7)(f) idea and was based on theL_ J concept of showing
something that looks real, but is not. According toj Im that case
it was not effective because it appeared to be staged. (b )(6)
~------(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1) . /1 ~ I dth
(b)(3) NatSecAct 157. (Sn NF.jstate at~---------~
· a1$o_enmloyed the mock execution techni ue once; the officer
informe~ !about it afterwards. The re ortedly tried
~~lgl CIAA t the techniqueoecause the detainee knew it was ,facility
(b)(3) NatS~cActand the officer wanted to induce the belief tha ould do.
(b )(6) anything.I !contended that he did not know when this incident
(b)(7)(c) occurred·or if it was successful.
(b )(7)(f)
... : :.:.: .... '; .... '
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(7)(f)
(Sf/NF) NOTIFICATIONS OF RAHMAN's DEA.m TO CONGRESS
(b)(3) NatSecAct · ·
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
. 160. ·~ As. discussed previouslyj ~eported ·
· Rahman's death to Headquarters in a[}Jovember 20021 (b)(3) N~tSecAct
(b)(1) · I
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(b )( 1 ) 90 (b)(3) CIAAct · · (b)(3) CIAA~tJ'
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(b )(7)(f)
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cable to the DDO. (See Exhibit.) an0November 2002~ I
i (b)(1) . rot'lorted I ~tation Medical Support to Detainees in
(b)(3) NatSecAct to the DDO. This addressed the medical care
provided to detainees in general along with a comment about the
medical treahnent orovided to Rahman. · '
(b )(3) NatSecAct ,
16l. $;J J On 29 November 2002, the Dire~tor of
Congressional Affairs (D/OCA) provided the Chairman and ranking
member of each Intelligence Committee and the Chairman and
Ranking Member of the House and Senate Appropriations
Subcommittees on Defense a background paper entitled "Death of
Detainee Gul Rahman." The paper identified Rahman as "an AlQa'ida
operative and Hezbi-Islami Gulbuddin/Hekmatyar associate
who was also a close contact of senior Al-Qa'ida facilitator Abu
Abdul Rahman Al-Najdi." It reported CIA was sending a team of
officers toCJto conduct an inquiry-into Rahman's death,
((bb))((3
1 )) N s A•11cluding an autopsy to determine the cause of death. The
at ec octa c k ground paper repor ted ", Rahma n arn.v ed at t~ h~e tenti. on
-· · facility on[]November [2002]and was given a physic examination
.~·
(b)(1) mhich indicated no· medical issues Ol'··preexisting medical (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct diti "·con ons. 91 . . . (b).( 3) Na.t SecAct
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.162. wCJ· On 23 January ~~3, ~e-IG reported to the DCI .
by memorandum that the General Counsel had informed the IG on
22 January 2003 of the death of Gul Rahman: Further, the IG stated
that the OIG was investigating the issue. On 30 January 2003, the
DCI forwarded the IG's memorandum to the Congressional ovei:sight
committees and reiterated the DCI had notified the committees of·
this matter by formal notification on 29 November 2002. The DCI's
letter added that the DO Investigative Team's report was nearh:tg
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct.
91 (SI h The first portion of this statement appears to be drawn from the [}iovember 2002
I ~\ioieTeporting the death of Ralu:rian. As explained earlier, this information is inaccurate.
There JS no evidence that Rahman r~eived , physical examination upon his arrival atll
or at any time following his arrival · It cannot be determined where the Office'-o~
Congressional Affairs ob tamed ihe information that Rahman did ·not have any medical issues or a
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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~ee_xisting medical condition because that conclusion was not reported in either the0or ·
L_JJovember2002cables. . ··(b)(1) . (b)(1) \
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completion and CIA would be sending the corrunitt,ees a follow-up
. notificatio(b )(3 )1NaiS~cA~t1ture.
163. ~;J I On2May2003,theD/OCAprovidedan
update to the Intelligence Committees of Congress and Chairman'
and Ranking. Member of the House and Senate Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense in the form of a background paper entitled
"Death of Detainee Cul Rahman." The background paper,
"Investigation by the Directorate of Operations," which included an
autopsy and toxicology, disclosed that Rahman's death was
accidental and xnost likely resulted from hypothermia."92 The
background paper reported that Rahman was nude from the waist
down and that "an autopsy disclosed several surface abrasions which
. he obtained withii:t the first few days of his incarceration. "93 The
background paper reported, "During his incarceration, Rahman
(b )( 1) threatened several times to killl I guards.94 ... At 1500
(b )(3) NatSecA~hours] onC}Jovember 2002 ... Rahm;m again threatened to kill the
guards and threw his food, water bottle, and waste bucket at the
guards.'~ Finally; the background paper reported, "As a result ofhis ·
tjolent behavior, and following procedures recommended by the
U.S. BOP, Rahman was shackled to the wall in a short chain position
. which prevents prisoners from standing upright."95
(b )(3) NatSecAct
92 T.S/ C As reported above, in actuality, the autops~ reported the cause of death as
"undetermined," the manner of death as "undetermined," and the clinical impression as
(b)(3) NatSecActhypothermia. The investigative report concluded, 'There is no evidence to suggest that
Rahman's death was deliberate." .
93 ts! Fl The initial.'eport to ~on~ess on ~g. November 2002 did n~t report that Rahman
was nake~ow the wrust and chained ma position that forced him to sit on the concrete floor.
The autopsy did not address the age of the abrasions. As explained earlier, the pathologist
opined to OIG that the abrasions to the shoulders and hips occurred from one to three days, at
most, before Rahman's death. . · · · .
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94 .is,t.[I A at . ec C dmhig.lliew'eek of []November and oi{]November.
95-(S?)iAs reported previous! advised OIG that he did n e.caUnunishin.~-,
(b )(1) Raiunan'r ortfie first alle d verbal threat.
(b)(3) CIAAct
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(b )(6)
(b)(1)
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(b )(6).
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)(f)
(b)(7)(c)
~--------------------~· (b)(7)(d)
5? . (b )(7)(f).
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(U) APPUCABLE LAo/S, REGiILATIONS AND POUCIES
164. (U) . Title 18 U.S.C. §112, Manslaughter, provides in
pertinent part :
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without
malice. It is of two kinds:
Voluntary- Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
Involuntary - In the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting
to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or
without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which
.might produce death. ·
165. (U) Title.18. U.S.C. §2441, Torture, provides penalties for
"who[m]ever outside the United States commits or attempts to
commit torture." The statute defines the crime of torture, in pertinent
part, as:
an act committed by a.person acting under the color of law .
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to la'.Vful
sanctions) upori another person within his custody or physical ' .
control. .
166. (U) Title 18 U.S.C. §2441, War Crimes, provides penalties
for "whomever, whether inside or outside the United States, commits
a war crifile" wherein "the person committing such war crime or the
victim of such. war crime is a member of. the Armed Forces of the
United States or a national of the United States.". The statute defines a
war crime as any conduct defined as a grave breach of the .Geneva
Conventions [or any protocol to such convention: to which the United
States is a party].96 The prosCribed conduct includes the following
96 · (U) The United States is not yet a party lo either of the two "Protocol$ ·Additional t~ the
Geneva Conventions."
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relevant offenses: willful killing, torture or inhum1μ\ treatment,
including biological experiments, willfully' causing great suffering to
body or health.97 ·
167. (U) On 7 February 2002, President Bush issued.a
memorandum noting that the "provisions of Geneva will apply to our
present conflict with the Taliban" [in Afghanistan] but would not
apply to· Al-Qa'ida.98 Neither the Taliban nor Al-Qa'ida would be
entitled to enemy Prisoners of War status, however. Nonetheless, the
Presfdent ordered, "As a matter of policy, the United States ·Armed
Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the extent
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner
consistent with the principles of Geneva."
168. (3//NF) On 24 January 2003, the General Counsel orally
informed the Chief of the Criminal Division, DoJ of Rahman's death.
On 13 February 2003, OIG reported Rahman's death in detention to
the U.S. DoJ by memorandum.
· 169. "(S//~W)' On 29 December 2003, the Chief,"" ·" · · ·
CoU.nterterrorism Section, Criminal Division, DoJ, reported by letter
that it declined to pursue a federal prosecution of criminal charges in
this matter. As of April 2005, the matter is under revi~w by the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Eastern District ofVl.rginia pursuant to the
direction of the Attorney General. ·
97 (U) Grave breaches are defined in the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Persons in Time of War are listed in Article 147. (Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention
. Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War lists i:l)ese same offenses as "grave breaches.")
98 (U) Memorandum from the President to·the Vice President, Secyetary of State, Secretary of
Defense, Att.orney General, Orief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence,
Assistant to' the President for National Security Affairs, and the Chairman of the Joint Oriefs of
Staff, "Humane Treatment of al Qa.eda and Tahoan Detainees," dated and signed 7 February
2002.
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170. (U I /FOUO} Agency Regulation 13-6, Appendix I;
Standards for Employee Accountability provides:
a. Consequences will follow an employee's failure to comply with
a statute, regwatior:i, policy or other guidance that is applicable
to the employee's professional conduct or performance.
b. The lack of knowledge of a statute, regulation, policy or
guidance does not necessarily excuse the employee. However,
. lack of knowledge may affect the level of employee ·
responsibility and the extent to which disciplinary action is
warranted. Therefore the following factors will be considered
prior to holding an employee accountable for a particular act or
omission:
(1) Agency efforts to make employeei; aware of the statute,
regulation, policy or guidance;
(2) The extent of employee awareness of the statute,
regulation, policy or guidance;
· · · (3) The Importance of the conduct or performance a tissue;
·(4) The position or grade of the employee.
c. Any finding of deficient performance must be specific and may
include omissions and failure to act in accordance with a
reasonable level of professionalism, skill, and diligence.
d. Determinations under the above standard will be based in part
on whether the facts objectively indicate a certain action should
have been taken or not taken and whether the employee had an
opportunity and the responsibility to act or not act.
e. Managers may be held accountable in addition for the action(s)
or inaction of subor.dinates even if the manager lacks
knowledge of the subordinate's coriduct. Such accountability
depends on: '
(1) Whether the manager reasonably should have been
aware of the matter and has taken reasonable measures
· to ensure such awareness.
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(2) Whether the manager has taken reasonable measures to
ensure compliance with the law and Agency policies and
regulations.
CONCLUSIONS
171. (S//:N:P) CIA had not issued any applicable custodial
interrogation guidelines by the time of Rahman' s detention. The
~~lgl CIAAct ~rac~ce at that ti.me was for interrogators to propose in.terrogation
(b)(3) NatSecAcfechniques to CTC for pre-approval. I ~d not take
(b )(6) this step prior to the interrogation.. of Rahman. Further, a CTC legal
(b)(7)(c) advisor said Headquarters would not have knowingly approved
(b)(7)(f) several of the techriiques that! !employed, including cold
showers, cold conditions, hard takedowns, and the short chain
restraint.
(b)(1) · .. 172. (S//~f.P)I . !treated Rahman harshly because of
((bb))((3) CIAAct Rahman' all d t tur his . . . ti' t th 3) NatSecAct s ege s a e, . uncompronusmgreac on o e .
(b)(6) . interrogation and"lack of cooperation, the pressure onCJto
(b)(7)(c) ''break him," an~ llack of experience with a committed
(b)(7)(f) interrogation resister. (b)(1) ·
(b )(3) NatSecAct
173. (8//Nfi) 0nONovember 2002~ !ordered or
(b)(i) approved the guards placmg Rahman in the short chain position
(b)(3) CIAAct whereby he was compelled to sit on.. the concrete floor of his cell.
(b)(3) NatSecActRahman was only clothed in a sweatshirt. This act directly led to
(b )(6) Rahman' s. death by hypothermia. llwas fully cogni,zant that the
(b)(?)(c) · temperature in ]had fallen sharplyin November. Two ..
(b)(?)(f) individuals said that they raised the subject of the cold temperatures
with I On[}Jovemberrldirected that actions be taken to
he~p other detainees ward off theco1cl. Other officers and contractors
(b)(i) present a~ In November i002stated they recognized it was
(b )(3) NatSecAct very cold and some detainees were inadequately protected against
the cold. They stated they were personally aware of the possibility of
hypotherinia, but some said they assumed it was the responsibility of
someone else to address.
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b )(7)(f)
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174. (S//NP) exhibited reckless indifference to the
possibility that his actions might cause injuries or result in Rahman's
death. There is no indication that~tended that Rahman .
(b )(1) should be severely harmed or kill~ · . ·
b)(3) NatSecAct
175. (S//NP) The initial account of guards that
Rahman .died in the mid-morning o0November 2002 is unreliable
(b)(1) and self-se~g. It is ?J (b )(3) NatSecActhe guards waited until Station officers were present a~ Ito
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[ report his death. Nonetheless, there is no evidence that the (b)(1)
(b)(1) .guards assaulted or independently mistreated Rahman. (b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
. 176. (S//!'ifE) Rahman did hot receive a physfcal examination
((bb))((1) £ 11 ' his diti fr. t . tim hil d t . d 3) CIAAct 10 owmg ren. on o or a any e w e e aine
(b)(3) NatSecActtl ldesI?1te report to the contrary. Although
(b )(6) I Jthe physician's assistant at that time, reported that
(b)(7)(c) he examined all the other detainees held at he did not
(b)(7)(f) examine Rahman. allowed Rahm.all's statement that all was
· well to supplantaphysical examination. (b)(1) ··. · · ··· (b)(1) ·
. · (b)(3) NatSecAct . (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) 177. (S//-e-w)I jwho was in ~uring the fustO
((bb))((3) CIAAct ,, fRahman' d t ti did t tt d t Rahm . th . 3) NatSecActays o s e en on, no a en o an m e same
(b )(6) . manner and with the same standard of care as the other detainees. .
(b)(7)(c) §was aware of the cold conditions; indeed the temperature in ·
(b )(7)(f) . d reached a low of ~1 degrees the day before he departed.
onONovember.I ~e should have
advocated more humane treatn;)(6)' for Rahman that would ensure
~~lgl NatSecAc~ health and safety. . (b)(?)(c) . · · ~~lgl NatSecAct
178. (S//]).JP.) / !Station's reporting of the details of
Rahman's detention and death in Station cables contained false
((bb))((
3
1 )) N
8
A ~tatements and material omissions. Consequently, the Congressional ·
at ec cnt ot ifi'c at io n dra w. n 1i:.i. om the cab le info rmat io n b ore i.n ac.c uraci. es an d
(b )( 1)
material omissions. the inaccurate reporting.obscured or minimized
the cirCu.mstances of the death, the involvement of [==1 in the
mistreatment of Rahman, and the absence of adequate supervision by
A follow-up report to the Congressional oversight
(b )(3) C IAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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committees was prepared on 2 May 2003. That.report, drawn from
the DO Investigative Report, accurately reported salient
circumstances that contributed to Rahman's death that were initially
(b)(1) omitted.
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSe.cAct 179. (S//~f:F) I bears direct responsibility for failing
~~l~~l(c) to include pertinent facts in hisLiNovember 2002 official written
(b )(7)(f) .account of Rahman' s death. The lcable s~ecjcally rthheld
information known tq land that directed the (b)(1)
guards to place Rahman in the· short chain position while he was (b )(3) NatSecAct
naked. below the waist, thereby forcing him to sit bare bottomed oh ~~ l~im;)
(b )(1) the bare concrete floor of his cell in what were known to be very cold ·
(b)(3) NatSecAcrt empera ture s. · ·
180. (S//NF) I ~ears responsibility for not
providing adequate supervision ofl ~ctivities at I (b)(1)

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(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)(f)

(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(6)
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(b )(6) .
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RECOMMENDATIONS
1. (9//NF) The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
. should convene ari Accountability Board to review the performance
~1 ~
regard to the events that contributed to the death of Gul Rahman.
CONCUR:
(b )(6)
L. Hel -erson
Inspector General
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(5)
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