Memorandum re: CTORS/MLDU, FBIHQ-Afghanistan

'"11.•.- •
(Rev. 01-31-2003)
DATE: 07-22-2H9
CLASSIFIED BY 651'79
REASON: 1.4 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON 07-22-2034
Precedence: PRIORITY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION •
ALL I? Ei EATICII CONTAINED
'HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
LOTAIN OTHERWISE
Date: 11/23/2004
Director's Office
.C1RG
To: Attn: DD John PistOle.
Attn: SAC Stephen .Tidwell •
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,From: Counterterrorism
MPIU/ Fly Team/ Operations Response - Section
Contact: UC
Approved By: BaLd..Gary M
Hulon Willie T
Harrington 'ThoffaS J
Cummings Arthur.M
Battle Frankie
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Title: .(U) CTORS/MLDU
FBIHQ-AFGHANISTAN
(Pending)
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Case ID It:
- Synopsis: an To provide a mission overview of the FBIAfghanistan
Detachment :based. on CTD Afghanistan Assessment , Team
(APT) finding and to set priorities and recommendations.
Reference: (U)
Enclosure(s): (U) , Annex A, SSE .Mission Approval Checklist;
'Annex'B,• CT Intelligence Summary; Annex C, FBI convoy movement
and emergency action'plans'for'Afghanistan .
' Details:
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To: Dir ctor's Office From:, Counterterrorism
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Background of U.S. Role In . Afghanistan
(U) Since the Fall 2001, the United States Government's
Global Wa on Terrorism (GWOT) has focused' much of its attention
in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom which began by
uprooting the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and destroying Al
Qaeda's base of operations,. continues to date: — The U.S. military
has approximately 18,000 perSonneI committed to this operation.
Headquarters for CJTF76.is Bagram Air Field (BAF), which is
approximatety 50' miles north of the capital city of Kabul.
CJTF76 elements . include AnVentional and Special Operations'
Forces . (SOF) from the U.S. and several other nations. The
western Poition'of,Afghanistan.falls under the military control
of the International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF),- a
multinatiOnal peace keeping force rarely involved in offensive
operations. ISAF headquarters is babed in Kabul.
(LT) " CJTF76 has identified the enemy, collectively
referred o as Anti-Coalition Militants .(ACMs), as three groups, '
that is, Al Qaeda :(AQ), - .Taliban (TB), and Hizbi-e-GuIbuddin .
(HIG). Though distinct groups with varying goals, these groups
are united in 'their,overriding focus to overthrow.the current
Afghan Government and, rid Afghanistan Of Western influence.
While-relatively small in number, ACMs continue towage war and
make.Afghanistan a dangerous - andvolatile environment. for
civilians and coalition forces alike,' In addition to ACMs,-and
Often closely aligned with them, are -various regional drug andwar
lords who continue to create instability -for the ,central
Afghanistan government and must 'also be dealt with by CJTF76 and
coalition forces.
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,Historical FBI Presence in.Afghanistan.
Since late 2001, the FBI has sent pefgOnnel TDY to
Afghanistan. Initially, FBI personnel only played a part in the
interviews of AQ and TB detainees captured bY:goalition forces.
The overriding mission FBI agents were tasked with was to ,obtain
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actionable intelligence on threats to the-U.S. or U.S. interests:.
HRT also sent a smal number of personel'at varying times who
were assigned to High Value Target (HVT)/Medium Value Target;
• (MVT) fusions cells. , The Military Liaison and Detainee Unit
(MLDU) was formed as an entity within CTD and tasked to oversee
the newly created FBI.mission in Afghanistan. In February 2004,
the FBI expanded its contingent in Afghanistan• and positioned
qualified investigators with more forward deployed military units
to assist in the millprtion'of intelligence (see l h2
ICTD approval for SAs.to be deployed in
.Operation 'Mountain Storm -laased,on a specific DOD request).
CTD Assessment of FBI-Afghanistan Team-Mission
OLT) . - In June 2004, at the direction of the Assistant
DireCtor ETD, a CTD' Afghan Assessment Team -(AAT) arrived in
Afghanistan to reevaluate the•rale of FBI personnel in-theater.
,_.'. This AAT was comprised of ITOS1 Section Chief Arthur Cummings; 6 _ CTORS Acting Assistant SeCtion.Chiefl ICTD Fly "b7(
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Team Unit Chief 1 I - and- MLDU Investigative:Analyst
The team traveled to BAF, Kandahar Air Field (KAF) 1 ,
and .Kabul where it met with_military commanders,
(S) :
FBI-Afghanistan Mission Statement.
The primary "mission of the FBI Afghanistan Team
FBI AT) is the.collection of'actionable threat .intenigence which
may have a possible nexus to the United States, its citizens and
interests. This primary goal remains in line-with'.the FBI's top
priority to prevent'acts of terror at home or abroad. .FBI
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.and FBI:personnel.TDY'd to:Afahanistan. AAT nfarsnnnt=1 A qn
traveled to several-militaryl
The AAT discussed past, current and projected use of FBI assets
•with various U.S. government entities and queried each as to•
their vision of the FBI role in Afghanistan. Upon its return.to
FBIHQ, AAT personnel met with members of •MLDU, as well as farmer
FBI Oh Scene Commanders. After further consultation with FBI CTD:
management, this.paperwas prepared - in order to.clearly confirm
and define the FBI mission'in Afghanistan for the present and
foreseeable future.
(U)
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it ctor's Office From: Counterterrorism
Re: 1 11/23/2004
Special Agents gather strategic intelligence.through interviews,
• traditional eyidence collection procedures, source development
and other general criminal investigative skills. The early
infusion-of FBI expertise in the' Afghan theater has resulted in
the, identification of intelligence critical to ongoing proactive
FBI CT investigations, to include.the identification of U.S.
based terrorist associates and/or conspirators: - It has also.
demonstrated. the ability of the FBI to provide Valuable,'"
specialized assistance to - various civilian and DOD organizations
engaged in, -.L7he GWOT: A number of%priorities have been identified
within the above stated CT mission. These' priorities are
.delineated as follows:
1) The interview of ,detainees or Persons.Under
Custody (Bgcs) and.other individuals of interest.
Many of these,individuals have knowledge Of or'
are affiliated with.Global Terrorism networks
operating outside the tribal borders of Afghanistan.
2) The support of specialized military' operations
targeting the capture of Al Qaeda members, and , '
affiliates, with a 'view toward the collection .
- of actionable strategic- intelligence with a nexus to
the U.S. - Homeland.`
3) The establishment and continued. close liaison
'with all coalition forces, DOD elements (e..
Bagram based DOCEX), DOS elements, the.
Government of Afghanistan ((GgOoA ).,, a u any er
intelligence gathering/processing entity; in an
effort to ensure that any threat intelligence with a.
U.S. nexus is pissed immediately 'and effectively td
the U.S. Intelligence Community.
4) Support of the—Combined Explosive. EXploitation
Cell in Afghanistan (CEXIti
5) Support df specialize operations and
missions with a view toward preventing terrorist
attacks against the U.S. and its interests.
6.) Counterterrorism'training assistance'fd the
Government of ,Afghanistan. (GOA) and other .c oalition
forces, with the expectation that the USG will, in
turn, receive a dirett'benefit in the form of a
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close Working relationship between'Afghan and USG
counterterrorism agencies..
1). Inteririew of Detainees:
(cJ) To the extent possible,•FEI Agent's conduct
interviews of Persons Under Custody (PUCs), and Other'
.individuals, to obtain•actionable intelligence to be used in the
war againserrorism, and In particular, to detect, disrupt and .
prevent,terrorist attackSIagain•t the United States and its
interests.
1 1 •
DOD houses PUCE at the Bagram Collection Point
(BCP), the Kandahat Collection Point (KCP) 'and at various other
smallerholding facilities. With limited resources, the FBI
.attempts to review intake and•background intelligence on PUCs ..to
identify those who may have strategic intelligence which fits
-within the context of the FBI CT mission. FBI Special Agents .
utilize rapport based; long•term interview strategies toconduct
interviews of detainees in order to obtain actionable
•intelligence. .Many interviews are conducted jointly' ui
military interrogators, however, all. FBI personnel are tully
.briefed on existing FBI policy regarding treatment of detainees
and admonished to use only those interview-methods allowable
within the U.S: legal system.
Support of Specialized,MIlitary Operations.:
• •
The primary focus of CJTF76 - is to kill or capture
ACMS and defeat AQ and the ,TB network, in Afghanistan. The
majority .of ACMs operate within small cells embedded amongst the •
civilian population. Therefore, the military must'resortto
unconventional tactics to identify .targets and accomplish its
mission. Among Other varied techniques, tactical intelligence
from "human sources (HUMINT) and electroniC sources (SIGINT) is -
crucial to 'this mission.. q.s.. Forces-in the field are focdsed on
identifying and developing this.intelligence. Intelligence of a
strategic nature, which is often located,alongside battlefield or
,tactical, intelligence, is often considered to be Of-secondary
importance by U.S. Forces, if it is identified at all. Soldiers
'in combat rarely think as investigators. While-this tactical
focus is understandable it fails 'to recognize the importance" of
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detecting.and disrupting the terrorist threat to the U.S. -
HoMeland. Bits of pocket litter, or seemingly irrelevant .
documents lying about'Afghan homes and .compounds, have produced a
relative 'windfall of U.S.. based actionable intelligence.
However, FBI-personnel must be in a poSition to identify this
information, properly collect it, and ensure that it is ,
expeditiously, forwarded to the appropriate D;S::.intelligence
agency. .
(U) .Specifically, the FBI Afghanistan Team' (AT)
accomplishes the goal of'timely strategic intelligence collection
by embedding agents with CJTF76-units during the.eXecution .of
operationaI"misSions defined as Sensitive Site Exploitations •
(SSE) and/or forward staged interrogations. Present FBI CTD -
policy requires that the FBI Agent in Charge.(AIC), AT, collect
specific and.artitulable facts pertaining to any.proposed'SSE and
provide this information to theAD,CTD for approval. prior to any
FBI participation.
Both CJTF76 and the.FBI recognize that Special
'Agents are not trained to be combat troops. 'Therefore, FBI SAs:
are not authorized toenter active combat areas until. such time
as the U.S.:Military ground-commander determines•the location to
'be(secure. .FBI personnel are not-tá be utilized in offenSiVe
combat operations-and are limited strictly to'intelligente
'Collection, interrogations, source deVelopment;. and in an
advisory capaCity in regard to the processing of any site Where
-intelligence '(evidence) and/or PUCs that have a possible nexus . to
the'GlobaI War on Terrorism (GWOT).'are located.
The only exception to .the preapproval reauliemPnt
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yi une Lime constraints associated with the mission, .
HRT personnel are authorized to deploy without CTD preapproval.
However, HRT personnel still follow the same SSE guidelines
regarding participation in offensive operations and 'make every
effort to report their status prior to departure or-as soon as
practical thereafter to the AIC, AT.
(U) 'In order to track the results Of efforts by the
FBI AT, the following procedure has been impleMented:
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UJ) Re: 111/23/2004
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1) The daily situation report (SITREP) -issued by the
- AIC lists"the daily, weekly,'and monthly total of approved SSE
missions (20 since January, !04) and sets forth , the.initial
result(s) of the most recently concluded mission, to include the
.collection of information of a possible strategic value' .
(actionable Intel. has been collected during 11 SSE missions to
date).
2) .The: Military LiaisOn Detainee Unit (MLDU), CTORS, ,
tracks•thember of investigative leads developed by the FBI AT
which havebeen forwardedfto ITOS 1,for'action (over 10.0 CONUS
related telephone numbers and addresses have been forwarded to
ITOS 1).‘ •
3,) . The ITOS 1, ETIU desk, will, on a monthly basis,.
track the status of all FBI AT developed leads,forwarded—to the
field for action.
• 4)- The MLDU will publish a monthly report detailing.
the number of'FBI AT missions monthly and year to date, the
.'number of actionable leads developed as a result of these •
'missions, and a brief-summary.of the current status of those'
leads -set to the field by ITOS 1, ETIU.
A) The Establishment of'Lialson With All'Coalition Forces:
The AAT determined that .a number of ISAF:military
and -governmental organizations are actively collecting
intelligence throughout Afghanistan. There is a glaring lack of
interchange between many of these collectors, as well as a lack .
of focus on the collection of information thatmay have a nexus.
to the terrorist threat beyond the Afghanistan theater, most.
notably with a U.S; nexus. .It is therefore critical that the FBI
'make every effort to mainta.i.n contact with these different
organizations," most of which rotate their personnel out of
Afghanistan annually or more frequently.'.
X.Specifically, the FBI, AT has identified the- .
following positioriS'-and/or individuals critical to'the effective
conduct of the FBI AT's mission, and has established a flexible
schedule for contacting these persons on a regular, basis:
CG U.S. forces, Bagram (currently Lt. Geri. Olsen).,'
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) I I 11/23/2004
Deputy CG/Operations, Bagram (currently Brig..Gen:
Dan Jacoby)
Deputy CG/Admin.,•Bagram (currently Brig. Geh.
Bernard Chapeau)
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CO DOCEX, Bagram (currently Col.
,g.q4 25th ID J2 (currently Lt, Col.
OIC, Bagram Cllection Point'(currently Maj.
• Chief,'Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF),
Bagram
CENTCOM Liaison, Bagram
COMTECH/DOCEX, Bagram,(currently
Person-Under Control ,(PUC) Officer Navy Lt.
I JTF 76, BCP, Bagram
CJTF 76 Air Operations POC, Bagram
Staff CindaT Advocate, Bagram (currently:Maj.
be .
'137C
C-A, Bagram (currently USMC . Capt.
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CJTF JOC Security Officer (currently_ Army .Capt..
Defehse
Col d
Humint Services (DHS) OIC, Bagram, Army - Lt... bE
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NSA,J2T; Bagram
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.(currently.
U.S.'Embassy Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), Kabul
(currentlY1 1
U.S. Embassy Consul,
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C14.3Allied'ComMand Counterintelligence, Kabul
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Head . of_Afghan Ministry of Interior'(MOI) Secret.
Service (currently General.
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.To: Director!s Office Ffom: Counterterrorism
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Afghanistan National,Directorate of Security (NDS),,
.Kabul ,
only through the regular appearance of FBI .
personnel an the Sincere offer of assistance, can the FBI and
the U.S. Intelligence Cbmmunity achieve any degree of success in
sharing. in the collection of intelligence•with various ISAF
members.. Assisting, yet complicating, this equation are a host
of other entities such as the U . S. Embassy Regional ,Security
Officer, 1 DEA, numerous U'.S. Military. groups stationed
throughout the country, as well as the organizations in charge of
a 'number of PUC detentiOn - facilities and the BAF based Document
Exploitation. Center (DOCEX).." Sharing in the collection of
intelligence,throughout Afghanistan is a daunting task,.
particularly in a .country where travel, in itself, is difficult
and risky and the collectors•are widely disbursed.,
The BAF bas&d.DOCEX is designated by military
order to be the principal collection/'analysis point,for all
material collected in-theater. The 'FBI does not officially
participate in the BAF DOCEX, however, efforts by the FBI AT to •
develop a relationship with BAF DOCEX have proven highly
successfully. DOCEX officials have re prioritized their approach
to'reviewing collected material with a view toward"tdentifying
and relaying to the'FBI AT any. information that appears to have a
nexus to the U:S.. As an example of this improved relationship, .
DOCEX .personnel now hand carry items believed to be of interest
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to the FBI command post in ; Bagram. While DOCEX is deemed'to be
the principal collector of in-theater material, DOCEX personnel
lwillingly.admit that they are vastly'understaffed and would
welcome whatever assistance the FBI could provide, In
particular, this operation is in'dire.need of translation and
analytidal skills:
Recommendation - In order to'improve the
identifica'tidh and'flow of intelligence with a. U.S. nexus the ANT
recommends, :hat an FBI.analyst be assigned to FBI Bagram. in
order to-asist the DOCEfacility.
Support of the Combined ExplCsive Exploitation Cell;
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.6) Provide Training to the Government of Afghan.tstan (GOA):
(U) The Governmeht of Afghanistan has expressed a
desire for training'at every level of its security forces. This
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desire, supported fully by the U.S. Department of State, is to
transform a service formally modeled on the Soviet system of a '
'closed, autocratic society, to that which will support. and work
within a progressive, democraticsystem.
- is the -po'Sition oft [that the
training- should be al 'vent-tire. The AAT
concurs with this opinion: The training mission, which is
'already ongoing, will only expand as an FBI Legat is.established
and the Afgnn'Government,igrows. . The benefits of this type of
training -are known. The relationships developed betvieen the
and Afghanofficers will - rpip rewards for the U.S. Government
AAT Summary:
The-Afghanistan theater is large and collection
efforts are divided between a number of organizations with little
coordination and varying priorities. There is a,strong,
justifiable need for FBI -Agents in Afghanistan to conduct
counterintelligence investigations regarding, unaddressed'or under:
:addressed issues pertaining to CT matters whiCh transcend Afghan:
border's. These'matters,fali well within the Bureau's' • -
counterterrorism mission. 'The FBI will not be in a position to
fully'eXploit actionable'intelligence:or emerging threats-unless
" personnel are on the ground at•the point of collection. 'There is
no substitute for access to raw intelligence at the point. of
collection.
Conclusion = As the role of FBI-Afghanistan is'
critical and falls within the Bureau's CT mission, a commitment .
to provide the necessary reseurces:is appropriate. This
commitment, will require lo4Tstical.and . personnel enhancements and
should be reviewed at regular.intervals to 'assure that the
maximum product is being attained while providing for the
security and well being,of..FE:I personnel. After extensive '
research by MLDU personnel, armored vehicles have been identified
and purchased., Delivery is expected within weeks:•An improved
communications package, which will increase efficiency and
:safety, is being developed. 'With the exceptidn of the need for
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one FBI analyst in Bagram, the•current staffing level' I b2.
is deemed sufficient, but should be regularly monitored.
.With few exceptions, personnel'should be rotated through the .
Afghanistan theater no less than every 90 days, while the - AIC and •
DAIC should be rotated on . a 6 month. basis in order to,ensure
continuity. Personnel should be selected based, upon several
criteria, to include, prior tactical or- military experience,
health and preparedness•to deal with an inhospitable climate and -
extended wo4 hours, e.ridthe'ability to work compatibly with '
others.,,,The AAT also recOmmends that .FBI ,CTD continue to be,.
- represented in theater. The presence of, CTD personnel"will
ensure that-HQ concerns are properly addressed, including the
timely and correct submission of reports and intelligence.
Personnel assigned to the MLDU should regularly conduct on-site
reviews to further ensure that logistical and administrative
matters are properly addressed.
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By embedding FBI---personnel with military
elements in a' semi permissive.and often hostile environmen ,•t e
FBI -has embarked on' a new mission. While the FBI.'s role in Iraq
bears some similarity, there are a number of unique and entirely.
new challenges in Afghanistan.. The possible benefits; however,
justify the commitment. It is broadly accePted,that the command
elementof-AQ has establijhed itself in the wild trihal'areas
along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. To fully address:the .
terrorist threat against the U.S., terrOrism'S leadership must be
located and dismantled: We must,be Where the terroristsare'.2 "
'Just as. organized crime or drug smuggling investigations need to
transcend-borders-to be successful so does . the FBI's,antiterrorism
efforts. The AAT believes' that the methods employed in • ,
the.colleCtion of actionable intelligence from detainees,
sources, and through physical'evidence are the same proven
methods used by ,Special Agents in all criminal'investigations.
No•other national assethas the skill sets or experience that•FBI
Special Agents possess in this area. Therefore, the AAT believes
the FBI is'uniquelY qualified for this mission and 'Strongly
recommends that the . FBI remain a lead agency in the strategic'
intelligence collect-ion proces•in Afghanistan.
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