Memo from Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) re: Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy under CJTF-7 Control, October 12, 2003

This DOD memorandum establishes the interrogation and counter-resistance policy for security internees under the control of CJTF-7. The memo outlines various interrogation approaches when dealing with security internees.

Non-legal Memo
Thursday, October 2, 2003
Monday, January 13, 2014

06-Sep-2013 I
N0.035 P.2
CJTF7-CG . \12. QGT ~Q.i i'
C2, Combined Joint Task Fotce Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
C3, Coll)bined Joint Task Force Seven, Bakhdad, Iraq 09335
Commander, 205th Mililaryi:ntelli~e;;1gade, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
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1.---(Sli'NF) This memorandUlll es~blishes ~e interrogation and coun~r-resistance policy for
security internees under the control of CJ'I'Ji-7. Security internees are civilians who ate
detained pursuant to Articles 5 and 78 of th~ Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War of Augu.t ~2, 1949 (hereinafter, Geneva Convention).
2. (~I approve the use of specified inlen:ogation I!D.d counter-:resistance approaches AQ,
as described in Enclosure 1, relating to security internees, subject to the following:
. I
a. ~se of these approaches is bimired to interrogations of security internees
under the control of CJTF· 7. I -
b. (SM>il'J These approaches must be sed in combination with the safegu>~Ids
described in Enclosure 2.
c. (Sfi'Nl')Segregation of security in ees will be reqllired in many instances to
ensure the success of interrogations and top vent the sharing of interrogation methods
among internees. Segregation may also be D.bcess!Ujl ro protect sources frOJD other detainees
or otherwise provide for their security. Addi~'onally, tbe Geneva Convention provides that
security intemees under defullte suspicion o activity hostile to the security of Coalition
forces shall, where absolute military necessi requires, be having forfeited ri,.ohts
of communication. Accordingly, these security internees-may be segregated. I must approve
segregation in all cases where such segregati.l.n will ex:ceed 30 days in duration, whether
consecutive or nonconsecutive, Submit writtlm requests with supporting rationale to me
through the CJTF-7 C2. A legal review fromj the CJTF. 7 SJA must accompany each request.
. d. (SI~ In employing each of ~e au~orized approaches, tbe interrogatOr must
maintain control of tbe intmogation: The inbgator should appear to be the one who
controls all aspectS of the internlgation, to inJtude the lighting, beating and configunition of
the interrogation room, as well as the food, clething and shelter given to the security internee. l .
o- (b)(3)
(b )(6)
N0.035 P.3
SUB JEer: CJTF· 7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy
3. (.Sit.!lt.F)Requests for use of approaches not listed in Enclosure 1 will be submitted to me
tl'rrough CJ'IF. 7 C2, and will include a description of the proposed approach a:nd
recommended safeguards. A legal review from the CJTF. 7 SJA will accompmy each
4. ~Nothing in this policy liniits existing authority for maintenance of goqd order a.ud
discipline among persons under Coalili011 control.
5. (SJ.f.Nf}This policy supersedes the CJTF-7 Tntetrogation md Counter-Resistance Policy
signed on 14September2003. ·
6. ~POCisL-----------------------------~
2 Encls
1. Interrogation Approaches (SI)
2. General Safeguards
CF: Commander, US Centtal Command
Lieutenant General, USA
C~mandjng ·
N0 •. 12135
(S/fNF) Use of the following approaches is subject to the application of the general safeguards
provided in enclosure (2). Specific implementation guidance with respect to approaches A-Q is
provided in U,S. Army Field Manlllll. 34-52. Brigade Co=anders may provide additional
implementation guidance, ·
A. J§LiNi9-Direct; Aslcing straightfo:rward questions: The most effective of all approaches, it is
the most simple and efficient approach to utilize~
B. (SIIN!l)!ilcentive/Removal of Incentive: Providing are ward or removing a privilege, above
and beyond those required by the Geneva Convention. 'Possible incentives may include favorite food
items, changes in. environmental quality, or other traditional or regional comforts not required by the
Geneva Convection.
C. (S/INF) Emotional Love: Playing on the love a security internee has for an individual or
group, May involve an incentive, such as allowing communication with the. individual or group.
· D.- (&1/NPfEmotional Hate: Playing on the genuirie hatred or desire for revenge a security
internee has for an individual or group.
· E . .(Ji!fl(L) Fear Up Harsh: Significantly increasing the fear level in a security internte.
F, ~ar Up Mild: Moderatcly increasing the fear level in a security internee.
G. (8f!NF) Reduced Fear: Reducing the fear level in a security internee or calming him by
convincing him that he will be properly and humanely treated. ·
H. (S~ Pride and Ego Up; Flattering or boosting the ego ofa security internee.
I. (S#NF} Pride and Ego Down: Attacking or insulting the p~de or ego of a security internee.
J. (~ Futility: Invoking the feeling in a security internee that it is useless to resist by playing
on the doubts that already exist in his mind.
K. (S/MF) We KJJ.ow All: Convincing the security inremee that the interrogator already knows
the answers to questions being asked. ·
L. (Sl~ EStablish Your Identity: Convincing the security intemee that the interrogator has
mistaken the security internee for someone else. The security internee is encomaged to "clear his
M. (S/fN:F)Repetition: Continuously repeating the $allle question to the security internee during
an interrogation to encourage full and candid answers to questions, ·
· N, (SIJNF.) File .and Dossier: Convincing security internee that the inten:ogator has a
voluminous, damning and inaccurate file, which must be corrected by the security internee.
JJ:nclosure 1 T 5 -3
·@PPROVW ffl~i@!LE~Sf!'l5~ TE: 06-Sep-2013
NO. 0. fS/fN.F9 Mutt and Jeff: An interrogation team consisting of a friendly and a harsh
interrogator. This approach is designed to cause the security internee to have a feeling of hostility
toward one interrogator and a feeling of gratitude toward the other.
P. (S/R'tl?) Rapid Fire: Questioning in rapid succession without allowing security to
answer questions fully.
Q .. (S/f!:ifF) Silence: Staring at the security interilee to encourage discomfort.
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P..CO:: 1 a= 2
1casrs for Investigation: About 2245, 4 Nov 03, SAl ~as notified by CW5 Group
nF>r·atir'n" Officer, 3'd Military Police Group (CID), 6f the death of an Iraqi national at the Abu Ghraib
IBetwE~en 1 000 and ·1 030, 5 Nov 03, sAD conducted a death scene examination of the prison
l«n•owE~r on the second floor of the prison.
HARACTERISTICS OF THE SCENE: The shower room is located on the second floor of the Abu
·prison in wing A-1, along the western wall or the northern wing. The room is constructed of
'"n'n"r"t" and cinder block material with a drain along the west wall, centered between north and
The shower room is approximately 10·foot wide and 20 foot long. The shower room has a
r~ol1~r.ete floor and a concrete ceiling. The shower room has·a window along the west wall near the
end of the room. The window has bars and a cage over it to prevent anyone from escaping.
shower room has a doorway along the east wall with a door made of bars. Also along the east
are three other doorways with. bars, which have been locked shut and do not open. The shower
is equipped with two fluorescent lights along the east wall. One of the fluorescent lights did not
-DNDITION OF THE SCENE: The shower room was clean of debris. There was a meal ready to
box in the center of the room near the north wall. There was a plastic b'ag with an orange jump
arid trash located next to the door along the east wall. There was a plastic bottle of chlorine
Uoc:ate1d next to the plastic bag. There was a bl~:~ck in color body bag along the south wall, with the
\dece!ase'd individual inside. There were no stains on the floor or wall area at the time of the exam.
ITh""' w•=r" sheets placed over the qar doors, to prevent people from seeing into the room. There
no unusual odors detected.
NVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS: The temperature outside was appr,oximately 90 degrees
IF'Ahr.;·nh•>it and the sun was shining. The temperature inside was approximately 80 degrees
There was no precipitation in the past twenty-four hours.
PERTINENT TO ENTRY/EXIT: Access to. the sc£;~ne could only be gained through the
doorway into the shower room.
rov·t:•~•t: DOCUMENTATION: A crime scene sketchwas prepared byS.AJ I SA CJ exposed
lnh I SEARCH FOR LA TENT IMPRESSIONS: A search for latent impressions was not conducted due to
nr~"'""nt at the scene not