Marine Corps Memo re: Inquiry into Death of Detainee Awayed Wanas Jabar

U.S. Marine Corps investigation into death of Awayed Wanas Jabar. Jabar was taken in to custody on April 17, 2004. He sustained a head injury in an escape attempt. A doctor examined him and said he was “OK”. A guard witnessed Jabar take his last breath. The exact cause of death is unknown because the body was released to Iraqi personnel at their request in order to ensure burial by sundown on the day of death. It was not determined if the death was due to the head injury from the window fall, or asphyxia. Investigation concluded that “There is no evidence that his death was the result of any assault, pummeling or any other abuse once he was in our custody”.

Doc_type: 
Non-legal Memo
Doc_date: 
Friday, May 14, 2004
Doc_rel_date: 
Sunday, May 14, 2006
Doc_text: 

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS . 1ST MAR/NE DIVISION (REIN) OTC 40120 FPO AP 96426-0120
IN REPLY MEN TO:
5830

saki." MAY 1 4: 2004
THIRD ENDORSEMENT on I of 27 April 2004

From:. Commanding General, 1st Marine Division (Rein)
To:

File

Subj: RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS JABAR, DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

1.
Readdressed and forwarded.

2.
In the case of the Iraqi detainee's death in our custody, it is clear that
his Marine guards repeatedly used minimal force to carry out their mission of
holding this enemy fighter prisoner. He refused to remain bound, appeared
intent on hurting himself, and refused admonitions to cease his escape attempts.
Medical oversight was repeatedly provided by our medical personnel. There is no
evidence that his death was the result of any assault, pummeling or any other
abuse once he was in our custody. The guards would have been within their
authority to shoot him on at least one of the esca attem ts. While the
changes to guard routines at olding
area are appropriate, none of t em in emse yes wou have prevented t e death
of an enemy intent on dying in our hands.

3.
The findings of the investigating officer, as endorsed, are approved. I
concur with the Regimental Commander and the case is closed.

&-7.11r:. MATTIS

File
11
USMC 1ST MARDIV (23) ]
minnem STATES Hamm CARPS
REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM - 7
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN) FMF
UIC 415000
FPO AP 96426-1500

=CCU, 121DORallaseNT on (b)(7)(C ) PI of 27 April 2004
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding General, 18t Marine Division (Rein)

Subj: RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS JABAR, DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

Enclosure: 3d Battalion, 7th Marines Preliminary Inquiry into the death of
Wanes Jabar on 19 April 2004 conducted by (b)(7)(C)

(b)( 7 )(C)
1.
On 19 April 2004 the Commanding Officer, (twroc) initiated
a preliminary inquiry (PI) into the death of Awayed Jabar. This PI was
completed on 20 April 2004 and was available for review by the RIAT Team
during their visit to Camp Al Qaim on 23 April 2004. After a review of both
PIs I noted discrepancies in the investigating officers findings and
conclusions concerning the amount of time Awayed Jabar was required to stand
and whether any of Awayed Jabar's head injuries resulted from the guards
attempts to resolve the discrepancies I
directed to interview all available witnesses.
His intervi w e r leted on 9 May 2004. The sworn witness statements
gathered by are on file at RCT-7 and available for review or
additional administrative or legal action. This endorsement is based on my
review of all the available information concerning this specific incident
leavened with my judgment of how this event fits into the larger context of
the battle fought in Husaybah, Iraq on 17-19 April 2004.

2.
Awayed Jabar was detained at 1000 17 April 2004 in the city of Husaybah,
Iraq. He was detained after leaving a building where RPGs, RPKs, and AK-47s
were found. Jabar was dressed in black and wearing a red turb a 'uniform"
consistent with other anti-coalition forces engaging Marines
on 17 April. Jabar's hands were dyed black and he had a prayer sad sewn into
his clothing, both symbols indicative of someone expecting to become a martyr.
Jabar arrived at the Camp Husaybah Holding Facility at approximately 1330 17
April 2004. Between his arrival and his death at approximately 0300 19 April
2004, Jabar was provided food, water, and shelter, received three examinations
by corpsmen and a medical officer, made approximately 20 attempts to escape
his bonds, successfully released himself three times and jumped out of a
window head-first in an attempt to escape. The Battalion Medical Officer
conducted a post-mortem, external, non-invasive, examination of Jabar at
approximately 0630 19 April 2004. Based on his physical examination and the
history of Jabar's leap from the window causing him to land on his face and
head, the Medical Officer opined that the cause of death was an epidural
hematoma leading to a catastrophic hemorrhage causing sudden death. However,
to specifically determine the cause of death would require a timely autopsy.
Awayed Jabar's body was released to !CDC personnel at their request in order
to ensure burial by sundown on 19 April 2004. There is no evidence available
to we at this time to indicate that any of Jabar's head injuries were caused

by guards attempting to restrain him foll0Wing his escape attempts. Between
his arrival at the holding area on 17 April 2004 and his death on 19 April

2004, multiple witnesses observed Jabar sitting or squatting.

3. Camp Busay e s b h Port of Entry with Syria. The Camp
is occupied by rives with responsibility for

security and stability operat ons in the city of Husaybah, Iraq.

(b)( 7)(C, esumed this area of responsibility on 20 March 2004 and, from that

date until 20 April 2004, was in contact with enemy forces on a daily basis.

Camp Husaybah's line of communication with the battalion at Camp Al Qaim

requires all convoys and resupply to transit through the city of Husaybah.

Routine resupply and other routine convoy movement is conducted at night post­
curfew, and is often delayed or cancelled due to enemy activity or combat in

the city. Due to the distance from Husaybah to Camp Al Qaim, and the frequent

closure to routine traf Al Qaim to Camp Husaybah,

the Commanding Officer, authorize

of a detainee temporary holding facil ty at Capp Husaybah. (u)(7)(c) tainees

are brought to the holding area, receive an initial interroga on, and are

either released from detention or moved to the battalion detention facility at

Camp Al Qaim. Detainees are not authorized to be held at Camp Husaybah longer

than 24 hours and are normally transported to Camp Al Qaim on the first

available convoy after detention.. However, cancellation of a convoy has, at

times, caused detainees to be held at Camp Husaybah for up to 48 hours. When

detainees are present at the Camp, guards are provided by the platoon assigned

to Camp Security. This mission rotates every 96 hours. A sergeant of the

guard, platoon sergeant and platoon commander supervises the guard. The

tactical structure for detainee guard at the Camp is based on the doctrinal

use of a company EPW collection point where security is provided by designated

members of the company prior to movement to the next higher echelon of

detention. To prevent overtasking the guards, and to ensure proper supervision

of detainees, the battalion would organize a special convoy whenever 7 or more

detainees were present at the Camp. The Company Commander and Company First

Sergeant conducted daily inspections of the Holding Facility when detainees

were present. The temporary holding facility was not considered en Initial

Detention Facility.

KAM 04 S.

4. On the morning of 17 April 2004, three11111111111patrols were ambushed
simultaneously in the city of Husaybah. This enemy action was the prelutil 7

A over 48 hours of urban combat that resulted in 5 FK/A, 29 FW ; and
60 personnel detained or captured. The Commanding Officer of (h)(7)(C) as
killed in the first 30 minutes of the battle. His Executive • cer, ompany
First Sergeant, and Company Gunnery Sergeant sallied from Camp Husaybah,
extracted the three ambushed units, reorganized the company command and
control, and commenced offensive operations. The senior man remaining at Camp
Husaybah was the Platoon Commander of the current security platoon. By 1500 on
17 April 2004 the entire battalion was fully committed to combat operations in
Husaybah or to perimeter security at Camp Al Qaim and Camp Husaybah; the
battalion remained fully committed until 0900 19 ion
commander had no internal reserve available. The and
remaining three battalions were committed to operat ons n t eventy of
Fallujah and had no forces available to reinforce/MEM

5.
Camp Husaybah came under direct attack multiple times on 17 and 18 April.
At approximately 1300 17 April 2004 the battalion S4A assumed command of an ad
hoc platoon of CSS and 54 Marines to allow the security platoon commander to
reinforce the perimeter with his full complement of infantry. This ad hoc
platoon assumed responsibility for detainee handling and the ECP. Members of
the ad hoc platoon were on duty during the detention of Awayed Jabar. They did
not receive any detainee handling training.

6.
detained 60 individuals during the course of
opera ions. e ma or y were detained in the eastern part of Husaybah and
transported to the Detention Facility at Camp Al Qaim. The approximately 18-20
detainees from the western part of the city were moved to Camp Husaybah. From
17 April through the morning of 19 April, combat operations interdicted the
lines of communication between Camp Husaybah and Camp Al Qaim. The battalion
was able to transport 8 detainees to Camp Al Qaim on the night of 18 April
before the road was again closed to routine convoy traffic. The remainder of
the Camp Husaybah detainees were transported to Camp Al Qaim on 19 April 2004.

7.
Based on interview response and sworn statements, the guards were
restrained in their treatment of Jabar following his three escapes from
restraint. Guards state that Jabar was either simply led back to position or
was moved back to position employing a MCMAP arm-bar. According to witnesses,
Jabar attempted to free himself at least 20 times. Review of witness
statements reveal an "escalation" of restraint as attempts and escapes
increased: Jabar was initially restrained with flex cuffs to a window, than
his wrists were flex-cuffed apart, then hands and feet restrained apart
combined with a high waist-chest restraint. The reasoning given for the waist­chest restraint was to prevent Jabar from turning his head to chew through the
engineering tape used to tie his wrists; guards had previously observed Jabar
using his teeth in his attempts to free himself.

8.
The lack of training combined with the disruption in unity of command
caused by the death of the Company Commander, the employment of an ad hoc
platoon, and the guards' lack of familiarity with where HET fits into the
command architecture caused some confusion. This confusion resulted in
temporary but questionable practices by the guards. At least one guard
believed he was required to throw water on Jabar every two hours in order to
keep him awake. At least one guard believed he was not to give any detainee
food and water for 24 hours. Both of these practices were immediately
corrected when brought to the attention of the HET Team or the S4A.

9.
The proximate cause of Awayed Wanas •abar'a death cannot be determined in

2
the absence of an autopsy; and in the absence of an autopsy we cannot
determine with certainty that Jabar died as a result of his head injury, as a
result of the manner in which he was restrained on the morning of 19 April
2004, as a result of potential drug use---common to the "martyrs' and
consistent with Jabar's pattern of behavior-- -or from a combination of two or
three of the above. Failure to preserve the body for autopsy was a mistake in
judgment on the part of the battalion commander. However, I strongly believe
his decision to release the body was a result of his desire to bury Jabar
according to Muslim custom and not an attempt to hide evidence.

10. The Temporary Holding Facility at Camp Husaybah was managed within the
spirit and intent of the Division Detainee Handling and Detention SOP. The
temporary holding facility was managed in general compliance with the
direction in Section II, page 7 concerning battalion temporary holding
facilities. All of the equipment and supplies listed in paragraph 11.8.2.4.a
were not available at Camp Husaybah. All other requirements for temporary
holding facilities were met. However, the holding area was not structured or
managed in complete accordance with the direction contained in Section 11.3 Of
th SOP •over in• Initial Detention Facilities (IDF). The Commanding Officer

manages a very well run and humane IDF at Camp Al

• a e o • ng area at Camp Husaybah, as mentioned earlier, was considered simply that: a place to hold detainees until transportation could be provided to move them to Camp Al Qaim. Given the Commanding General's emphasis on proper and humane detainee handling, and the linkage between the Division ethos and detainee handling, both the RCT-7 Commander and the Marines commander should have ensured all or part of the IDE 1111111111tere applied to the company holding facility, particularly concerning guard personnel. However, given the circumstances in Husaybah on 17-19 April 2004, itis very likely that personnel assigned as permanent guards would have been committed to combat operations and temporary guards assigned to the holdingfacility. A permanent guard force established with a routine and set procedures may have provided the temporary guard force a better handoff of responsibilities and techniques, to include effective but humane methods of restraint.
11.
In my opinion, using the preponderance of evidence standard, Jabar's self­inflicted injury incurred by jumping through a window while trying to escape
was the strongest factor contributing to his death.

12.
In my opinion, there is not sufficient evidence to support or dispute that
the manner in which Jabar was restrained was a casual factor in his death.

3
Jabar was restrained with the chest/waist strap for 90 minutes and only after
other means of restraint had failed to prevent his escape. However,
experienced leadership would have immediately made the connection between the
waist/chest strap and possible asphyxiation. That experienced leadership
disappeared when unity of command was disrupted by the death of the Company
Commander, the subsequent actions of the remaining company leadership, and the
establishment of an ad hoc platoon led by an individual unfamiliar with
detainee handling.

13.
There is sufficient evidence to show that Jabar did not stand continuously
for 36 hours. However, he may have exhausted himself during repeated escapes
and attempted escapes.

14.
There is no evidence to support a claim that injuries to the detainee's
head resulted from being restrained by guards.

15.
I recommend that the (b)(6)

(b)( 7 )(C)
o ensure a e e ements of Detainee Handling
SOP concerning IDF, and applicable to the Commanding General's intent and
stated goals, was enforced at the.Company Holding Facility at Camp Husaybah.

in releasing the

y of wa anas r and to ensure that the elements of
Detainee Handling SOP concerning IDF, and applicable to the Commanding
General's intent and stated goals, was enforced at the Company Holding
Facility at Camp Husaybah.

17. The Commanding Officer, is directed to implement

the corrective measures out

ne n his en orsement.

18. I recommend this investigation be closed.

(b)(7)(C)
4
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1ST MIME DAWN (PO% Rif
CAW AL WV!
at 4105
FPO Al 96014575

It RIMY NUM 70
5800

xo4111,

9 May 04

11:14DORSEMENT on (b)(7)(C) ltr 5800
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team - 7

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQOIRY INTO THE DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS JABAR,
DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

1. The operational situation between the 17th through the 19th of
April needs to be placed into perspective in light of this detainee's
death. Coalition Forces were attacked on the morning of the 17th by
an estimated 300 plus anti-Iraqi insurgents and foreign fighters from
various parts of the area of operations. The City of Husaybah, Marine
Forces and the civilian population were engulfed in house to house ­block by block high intensity combat.

(b)(7);c)

a.
based in Husaybah was the target for destruction of
the AIF. The conflict began at 0801 on the 17th and by 0930 had three
platoons decisively engaged by enemy ambushes. By 1100 the Company
had suffered five killed in action, to include the company commander,
and fifteen wounded in action. By 1600 that day the majority of the
battalion was engulfed in this conflict with three companies sweeping
the city house to house fighting AIF with mortars, rockets, and rotary
and fixed wing close air support.

b.
Amidst this situation the (bX/K:i executive officer
reorganized the company and moved forward with the rest of the unit's
combat power to initiate the decisive assault against the enemy
command and control positions. The company base's defense remained
critical as the Battalion's primary resupply point in Husaybah. The
service support personnel manned the posts, to include the company
holding area.

c.
This fighting continued into the night of the 17th and through
the afternoon of the 18th. Subsequent sweeps were completed by the
following morning of the 19th. The result of this conflict was: five
friendly KIAs; twenty-nine WIAs; one hundred and twenty insurgents
KIA; and sixty detained or captured.

2. The bottom line is that this foreign fighter did the while in our
custody. We were responsible for his well being while in our control.
Since this incident we have taken the following measures to prevent this
from happening again.

a. The holding area has been improved with engineer support and
class Iv to better control the detainees before their transfer to the

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS JABAR,
DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

Al Qa'im Detention Facility.

b.
A dedicated SNCOIC has been assigned to manage the company
holding area.

c.
A dedicated guard force has been assigned and trained by
experienced correction custody personnel.

d.
There are separate cells for control of detainees.

e.
The potential hazards for injury to detainees have been
mitigated to the maximum extent possible.

f..A review of the unit's procedures for the Husaybah Holding Area
has been completed.

3. I do not concur with portions of the summary of facts and opinions
of the investigating officer.

a.
Husaybah has a holding area for staging and initial review of
suspects, not a detention facility. This is not a mere play on
semantics, the procedures for proper detainee handling is adhered to,
but the detainees are only in Husaybah until transported to Al Qa'im
within twenty-four hours of capture or apprehension. The
transportation of the detainee was delayed due to the on going
conflict in the city.

b.
There is no evidence in any Marine's statement from our
investigation that the guard's restraint of the detainee during his
escape attempts caused any head injuries. The head injury while in
custody was clearly the result of the detainee's attempt to escape and
his fall through a window.

c.
The detainee was not continuously standing for thirty-six
hours, in the holding area. Review of multiple witness statements
contained in the Battalion's original preliminary investigation bears
this out.

d.
The detainee was not restrained in a manner to intentionally
cause harm to the detainee. Considering his multiple escape attempts,
to include chewing through his bonds, the engineering tape was used to
prevent this type of escape again. There was no willful negligence,
intentional or malicious act of Coalition Forces during his captivity.
The self-discipline exhibited by the Marines and sailors is borne out in
their statements and actions. The restraints and procedures used were
necessary to provide force protection and preserve the health and
control of the detainee.

(b)(7)(C)
Copy to:
Legal Files

2
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REIN)
UIC 40120
FPO AP 96426-0120

IN REPLY REFER TO:
5830

MAY 0 1 2004
From: (b)(7)(C). ) )
To: Commanding General, 1 Marine Division

Via: Staff Judge Advocate, 1" Marine Division

Subj: RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE
DEATH OF DETAINEE 0132 AT FOB HUSAYBAH, IRAQ, ON OR ABOUT 19 APRIL
2004

1.
On 22 April 2004, the lit Marine Division was made aware of the death of
a detainee in U.S. custody at FOB Husaybah, Iraq. The incident was reported
to have taken place on or about 19 April, 2004. • Upon learning of the report,
the Commanding General, lit Marine Division tasked the Division's Rapid
Incident Assessment Team (RIAT) with investigating the circumstances
surrounding the reported death. On the morning of 23 April, 2004, the RIAT
was transported from Blue Diamond 'Headquarters to FOB Al Qaim, and from there
to FOB Husaybah to conduct the investig t'on. onarvn FOB H
the RIAT interviewed several members of

2.
On 17 April 2004, a lengthy firefight erupted in the town of Husaybah
between Marines and AIF. The firefight resulted in several U.S. casualties,
and also led to the capture of numerous detainees. Detainee 0132 was among
those detained on 17 April 2004. He was caught retreating from a building
from which the enemy had actively engaged Marines. Numerous weapons were
seized from the building detainee 0132 was fleein•at the time of his
capture. Detainee 0132 was delivered to th. u7)(C) holding facility at •
FOB Husaybah at approximately 1330 on 17 Apri 11•

3.
The Humint Exploitation Team 1 (HET1) personnel who processed and
interrogated detainee D132 at or around 1330 on 17 April 2004, noted that at
the time he was processed into the detention facility, detainee 0132 appeared
disheveled and had some bruising around his face, but seemed to be in •
relatively good health. After being processed, detainee 0132 was
interrogated by members of HET1. During the course of the interrogation,
HET1 was able to determine that detainee 0132 was probably a dedicated

Mujahadeen fighter, who was expecting to martyr himself. HET1 was able to
support this theory for two primary reasons, first, the detainee's hands had
been dyed in accordance with a ritual in which an imam blesses and dyes the
hands of fighters preparing to go into battle, and second, detainee 0132 had
a prayer bead sown into his clothing, which is indicative of a Muslim fighter
who is planning on martyring himself in battle. HET1 felt that detainee 0132
would be a valuable source of information, and was desirous of further
interrogation. During the course of the initial interrogation with detainee
0132, FOB Husaybah came under direct enemy attack and the HET members were
forced to terminate the interrogation so they could take up a position, and
contribute to the defense of the camp. Detainee 0132 was secured to the

metal bars on one of the windows at the detention facility. The detention
facility guards were advised of detainee 0132's suspected Mujahadeen
affiliation. No further interrogation of detainee 0132 was conducted on 17
April.

Subj: RESULTS OF THE PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
DEATH OF DETAINEE 0132 AT FOB HUSAYBAH, IRAQ, ON OR ABOUT 19 APRIL
2004

4. No interrogations were possible on 18 April because the HET personnel were
on a patrol in Husaybah, from approximately 0900 until 2230. HET personnel
checked on the detainees' status, before going on the patrol at approximately
0800, on 18 April 2004 without incident.

S. The detention facility at FOB Husaybah lacks any permanent OIC or guards.

The dut of managing and manning the facility rotates from one platoon within
to another, approximately every 4 days. The frequent rotation

o aci staff is a result of personnel challenges and staffing shortages
in . HET1 personnel h.v= t the staffing challenges to
attent on of t e leadership of (b)(7)(C) but, due to the Company's
demanding mission in Husaybah, ey were unable dedicate any permanent
personnel to the facility. The leadership of was aware of the staffing
issues at FOB Husaybah, but faced staffing shortages and were unable to
dedicate any additional resources to the detention facility at FOB Husaybah.
On approximately 6 occasions, HETI personnel discussed the ossibility of
assigning permanent staff to the detention facility with leadership.

•t atoon that had the duty was commanded b (b) ( 7)(C)
(b)(7)(C) Three of his Marines, (10 )( 7)(C)

(b)( 7 )(C)
(b);IAC) were • Os • as ar• s a e acs y w en a nee •
P.),(7)K;) was the senior Marine on duty on 18-19 April.

None of the Marines who were tasked with manning the facility during the
period from 17-19 April had any training in detention facility management, or
detainee handling procedures.

7.
On 18 April, at approximately 1730-1800 (b)(7)(C) examined detainee
0132 and found him to be in fair condition, with no significant injuries.

8.
All personnel concerned characterized detainee 0132 as a "problem"
detainee. The detainee was frequently able to escape from his bindings
during the period from 18-19 April. Detainee 0132 needed to be watched
closely because he frequently managed to untie himself. Every time detainee
0132 escaped from his bonds, he was subdued by one or more of the guards.
According to the guards, the force they used to subdue detainee 0132 ranged
from simply grabbing him by the arm, and leading him back to where he was
tied up, to grappling with the detainee, and using an "arm bar" to force the
detainee to submit. Due to his ability to untie himself, they nicknamed
detainee 0132 "Houdini." At no time did the guards admit to beating the
detainee. The guards indicated that detainee 0132 was not combative with
them, and simply kept untying himself. They further indicated that they were
frustrated with detainee 0132 because of his repeated escape attempts. The
situation in the detention facility was exasperated by the fact that there
were no locking rooms to put the detainees in if they were problematic. The
facility has no locking cells or doors. To secure a detainee, the guards
have only two choices: place them in one of the open rooms, and stand there,

physically watching the detainee; or, tie the detainee to some fixture in the
facility. To control detainee 0132, the guards chose the latter of these two
options. As a result of being continuously tied to a window, detainee 0132
had been standing or leaning against a wall continuously since he was in­processed into the detention facility.

roximate2y 2100 on the evening of 18 April 2004, (b)(7)(C)
rri ntion facility to examine some of the det ainees.
The duty OIC, noticed a significant amount of blood coming from

2

Subj: RESULTS OF THE PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
DEATH OF DETAINEE 0132 AT FOB HUSAYBAH, IRAQ, ON OR ABOUT 19 APRIL
2004

. detainee 0132, and ordered (b)(7)(C) to examine detainee 0132 and treat his injuries. (b)(7)(C) found detainee 0132 standing, tied to a wind _n -c- rtyard of the detention facility. At approximately 2130, (b)( 7 )(C) (b)(7)(C) -xamined detainee 0132 and treated him for a 1-inch laceration on e op of his scalp with no bleeding, a broken nose with significant bleeding, a black-eye, a laceration to the inner right thigh with moderate and another laceration to the right arm with moderate bleeding. (b)(7)(C) id not examine detainee 0132 on the previous day when he was in-processed, had no knowledge of when the detainee was brought to the facility, nd as m that the injuries he was treating were incurred during capture. finished treating detainee 0132 at approximately 2215 on 18 April.
10. 1111121111111khen attended to another detainee in a different room. He treated that individual lint' • -ly 2245. After finishing with treating t?*e other detainee, (b)(7)(C) returned to the area where detainee 0132 was t-1d. U.on walking out into the area where detainee 0132 was restraineu, (b)(7)(C) saw detainee 0132 free himself from his restraints, and attempt to c i • t rough a broken window, while attempting to do so, the detainee tell and hit his head. The fall was approximately 2 feet, onto hard concrete. Immediatel the •uards restrained detainee 0132 and tied him to the window again. (b)(7)(C).then went to attend to other duties in another part of the facility. e re urned to the area where detainee 0132 was held at approximately 2315, and again, l itnessed detainee 0132 free himself, however this time, there was a guard immediately next to the
'detainee and he was able to restrain him. As a result of this attempted
escape, the guards decided to move the detainee to another part of the
facility, and tie him there. They moved the detainee to the corner of the
facility and tied him to a barred window. This window was rectangular,
approximately 6-7 feet high, and approximately 4 feet wide. The window had
bars that covered the entire length of the window, and there was no glass.
The guards tied detainee 0132's hands to the bars of the window. At this
point, detainee 0132 was facing the window.

I I • 19 April, the Battalion Medical Officer,
(
b)(7)(C) examined detai.-- I examination
substantially mirrored the one conducted by (b)(7)(C).= t 2130 on 18 April,
with the exception of finding that the detainee was alert, and had a "good
pulse" and that the bleeding had been controlled.

12. Soon thereafter, detainee 0132 was able to free himself. Again, the
detainee was restrained, and this time the guards tied both his hands and
feet to the bars, facing the window. Again he freed himself. He was
restrained, and this time the guards tied him to the window with his back to
the window, his arms stretched apart, with his legs tied to the barsOof the
window. The guards also tied a strap of engineer tape to the detainee's
midsection, to further restrain him. His position resembled that of a person
who had been crucified. Detainee 0132 did not free himself from this
position. He was secured to the window in this fashion at approximately 0100

19 April.

13. The detainee stayed in this position until approximately 0230, 19 April,
when a HET1 member visited the detention facility. Be noted that the
detainee appeared to be exhausted, with his entire bodyweight appearing to be
supported by the strap around his midsection. The HET member indicated that
the strap was "pushing back, almost touching his spine." The HET1.member

3

Subj: RESULTS OF THE PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING
DEATH OF DETAINEE 0132 AT rca HUSAYBAH, IRAQ, ON OR ABOUT 19 APRIL
2004

instructed the guards to cut the waist strap. When the guards cut the strap
the detainee immediately fell limp, with only his arm straps supporting his
weight. The detainee appeared to be unconscious. The HET1 member gave the
detainee a light tap to the face to see if he was awake and detainee 0132
mumbled incoherently. The HETI member instructed the guards to get a
corpsman to examine the detainee. He then left the facility.

14.
Approximately 15 minutes later, one of the guards witnessed detainee
0132 take several deep breaths, exhale deeply, and cease breathing. A
corpsman was summoned, detainee 0132 was cut down, examined by the corpsman,
and appeared to be dead. The corpsman then went to the HET team and reported
the death of the detainee. The HET1 members instructed the corpsman to go
tell the watch-officer. The corpsman then reported the death up the chain.

15.
The exact cause of the death of the detainee is unknown. The RIAT was

unable to facilitate an examination of the body of the deceased detainee
because members of ,1)1(7 , C1 turned the detainee's corpse over
to the local Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) before an autopsy could be
performed.

16. It is my opinion that

(b)(5)

(b)(7)(C)

UNITER ataimirs
1ST MANN DIVISION CVO, Fir
OAP AL 04114
VC 41E5

nvoi6424-157, ri minium. To 5800
X0411111

2 May 04

FIRST zamonssammiT on (b)(7)(C) ltr 5800 of 20 Apr 04
From: Commanding Officer
To: Commanding Officer RCT-7

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS JABAR,
DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

1.
I concur with the summary of findings, facts, recommendations, and
conclusions of the investigating officer.

2.
The operational situation between the 17th through the 19th of
April need to be placed into perspective in light of this detainee's
death. Coalition Forces were attacked on the morning of the 17th by
an estimated 300 plus anti-Iraqi insurgents and foreign fighters from
various parts of the area of operations. The City of Husaybah, Marine
Forces and the civilian population were engulfed in high intensity
house to house - block by block high intensity combat.

a.
0(7)(C) based in Husaybah was the target for destruction of
the AIF. The conflict began at 0801 on the 17th and by 0930 had three
platoons decisively engaged by enemy ambushes. By 1100 the Company
had suffered five killed in action, to include the company commander,
and fifteen wounded in action. By 1600 that day the majority of the
battalion was engulfed in this conflict with three companies sweeping
the city house to house fighting AIF with mortars, rockets, and rotary
and fixed wing close air support.

b.
Amist this situation the (W)(c) executive officer
reorganized the company and moved forward with the rest of the unit's
combat power to initiate the decisive assault against the enemy
command and control positions. The company base's defense remained
critical as the Battalion's primary resupply point in Husaybah. The
service support personnel manned the posts, to include the company
holding area.

c.
This fighting continued into the night of the 17th and through
the afternoon of the 18th. Subsequent sweeps were completed by the
following morning of the 19th.

d.
The Husaybah Holding Area is necessitated by the tactical
situation in the Al Qa'im area of operation. The unit was and remains
in compliance with all applicable rules and procedures for detainee
handling.

3. Recommendation (d) was completed once the engineer Support and

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS JABAR.
DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

class IV became available to improve the control of detainees before
their transfer to the Al Qa'im Detention Facility.

a.
There are separate cells for control of detainees.

b.
The potential hazards for injury to detainees have been
mitigated to the maximum extent possible.

4. A review of the unit's procedures for the Husaybah Holding Area
has been complete.

a.
A dedicated SNCOIC has been assigned to manage the company
holding area.

b.
A dedicated guard force has been assigned and trained by
experienced correction custody personnel.

5.
The bottom line is that this foreign fighter did the while in our
custody. We were responsible for his well being while in our control.
However, the 10 is correct - there was no willful negligence,
intentional or malicious act of Coalition Forces during his captivity.
The restraint exhibited by the Marines and sailors is borne out in their
statements and actions. The restraints and procedures used were
necessary to preserve his health and control his resistance to
captivity.

6.
Pursuant to the above, recommend closure of this investigation.

(b)(7)(C)
Copy to
Legal File
CO,

2

UN
SA MIME 1:411110M MO, Alf
VC 416111
ADOPP 1111431141170

PINUIYIERWTM
5800

20 Apr 04

From: Investigating Officer

To: Commanding Officer

Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS JABAR,
DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

Ref: (a) JAGMAN Section 0204

(b) First Marine Division Detainee Handling and Detention Facility
SOP dtd 17 Feb 04

(c)RCT-7 Detainee Handling and Detention Facility SOP
dtd 29 Feb 04

(d)3d Battalion, 7th Marines Detainee Handling and Detention
Facility SOP dtd 16 Mar 04

Encl: (1)Appointment Ltr dtd 19 Apr 04
(2)CPA Forces Apprehension Fo
(3)CPA Sworn Statement Form of (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)
(4) #..f.(b)(7)(C)
(b ),/, ( c)
(5)Statement of (b)(7)(C) Battalion Surgeon,
(6) =r0-4, • (H(.' ,iC)
illi)
(7)Statement of (EX-NC)
MHG, II MEF

(8)Statement of (b)(7)(C )
MHG, II MEF

(9 Statement of (b)(7)(C)
MKG II MEF

(9)Statement of (h)i/W;)
KI(7)(C) I MEF

1. This preliminary inquiry report was conducted in accordance with the
reference and regards the circumstances surrounding the death of Awayed
Wanes Jabar, Detainee 132 in the Camp Husaybah Holding Area on August
19, 2004. Enclosures (1) through 4) are provided as supporting

documentation.

2.erso o to •
(b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(C)
(b)(7)(C) ttalion Surgeon, ( b) ( 7 ) (C )
SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS JABAR,
DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

(b)(7)(C)
(b)( 7 )(C CSSB 7
(b)(7)C) , CSSB 7
(h)(iIK1

CSSB 7 , I MEE
(A7)(C)
3.
Materials reviewed: I reviewed the above enclosures, references and
statements. I also inspected the Husaybah Holding Area and the location
where the detainee died.

4.
Summary of findings.

a.
On 19 April 2004, at a roximately 0300 the Camp Husaybah Holding
Area reported to the Watch Officer that Detainee 132 Awayed
Wanas Jaber had died while in custody.

b.
At approximately 0230, (b)(7)(C) • bserved 132

erventilating while standing in the Company Holding Area. Soon after, (b)(7)(C) .observed the individual collapse and fall to the ground.
c. Upon 132 collapsing a corpsman was summoned. (h)7pC) arrived on the seen to assess the vital signs of the collapsed detainee.
assessed that the detainee did not have a pulse and all
vital signs were negative.

d.
Detainee 132 was taken in to custody on 17 April 2004, in the
area of the former Ba'ath Party Headquarters along Market Street in the
city of Husaybah.

e.
Detainee 132 was held due to suspicious behavior. He was
discovered fleeing the scene of a firefight with blood on his hands and
feet.

f.
Once detainee 132 was taken into custody he was interrogated by
the Battalion's Human Intelligence Exploitation Team (HET). During the
course of HET's interview, black ash was discovered on his hands as well
as prayer beads wrapped around his waist. Both the prayer beads and ash
on the hands are signs of extremist Jihadist affiliation. In addition,
detainee 132 expressed to HET his desire to be a martyr for Allah.

g.
Between 17 and 18 April 2004, 132 made several escape attempts
from the company Holding Area.

h.
While in the course of one of his escape attempts, the detainee
fell and sustained a number of injuries to his face and head, to include
lacerations to the cheek, forehead, and a broken nose.

2
SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS
DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

i.
In response to his escape attempts the guards bound the detainee
by his hands and feet to window fixtures within the holding area.
Engineering tape was used to secure the detainee.

j.
At approximately 0630 on 18 April 2004, (b)(7)( C)
Battalion Surgeon assigned to Camp Husaybah, examined the body of the
detainee.

k.
All facial and head wounds, which he observed, were consistent
with the wounds that were previously observed before the detainee's
death.

fficially pronounced the detainee dead at
0630.

m.
Zt is the on-scene physician's opinion that the cause of death
was a Cranial Hemorrhage, which the detainee sustained while attempting
to conduct his escape.

n.
The body of 132 was turned over to the local ICDC on 19 April
for burial in accordance with Arab customs.

5. Facts.

a.
The Detainee was apprehended and held for questioning by the
company during combat operations in Husaybah.

b.
All company personnel normally assigned to the Holding Area were
involved in direct assaults and engagements in the City of Husaybah.

c.
Detainee 132 continuously resisted his captivity, which resulted
in his injuries on the 17th and 18th of April.

d.
Detainee 132 was observed by medical personnel and several
holding area guards throughout his detention at Camp Husaybah.

e.
The restraints and procedures for handling 132 had to be
increased with each escape attempt.

6. Recommendations and Conclusion.

(b)(5)
3
SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS JABAR,
DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

(b)(5)
g. I recoimnend that no further investigation is warranted and that this investigation be closed.
(b)(7)(C)
4

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
3D BATTALION, TIN MARINES, RLT-T
1ST MARINE DIVISION (REMO, MD
CAMP AL 134114
IOC 41570
FPCMP £16428 -1570

pmftylmum
5800
LEGAL
19 Apr 04

From: Commandin• Officer

.
To: (b)(7)(C). (b)(6) USMC
Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO THE DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS JABAR,
DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

Ref: (a) JAGMAN

1.This appoints you, per chapter II of the reference, to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding the death of said named detainee.
2. Investigate the cause of the incident, and determine any fault, neglect, or responsibility. Recommend appropriate administrative or disciplinary action. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in letter form by 20 April 2004, unless an extension of time is granted.

(b)(7)(C)
Copy to:
Legal Files

ENCLOSURE ( /
COALITION PROASIONAL AUTHORITY FORCES APPREFENSION FORM
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YELLOW FIELDS KW BE RUED IN, IF APPUCA8L4 UPON APPREHENSON
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DOD JUNE 1157

COAUTION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY FORCES APPREHENSION FORM
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• ENCLOSURE ( 2.)

DOD JUNE 1158
DODDON000896

SWORN STATEMENT
For use WM this form, see AR 190-45; the pima** ariOnCY lc OCICSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT AUTHORITY: Tills 10 USC Section 301; The S USC Smbors 2951; E.O. OW Med November 22. 1S43 (SSPIA PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide counenders end law enforcement oniciels with means by which information may be accurately
ROUTINE USES:
Your social security number le wad as in addibonalhiternala means of Identification to Waal. filing and retrieval. DISCLOSURE: Discbsune of your social sec" number Is voluntary.
1. LOCATION 2. DATE fYYYYMMDD) & TIME .
Husaybah, IZ 0 1 /0c70 .....
7. GRADEMTATUS '
(b)(7)(C) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)
r
e. I IZA • P •. ..._
U.Ster C., (t))( 7)(C)
9.
1. (b) (7) (C) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
ON (7 Atka, 240+1 AT 16007 AT GRID 8S14 7 0 757 i DETNNED WITNESSED THE DETAINMENT OF FOR THE FOLLOWING OFFENSES/ REASONS: —TNT .s—capiir,,g- 4,41s. perirte.ett „sealin„,e eilycirit 411 Perer-OgOor aCtakienlio+/ •wa4.Corret
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10. EXHIBIT 11. INITIALS • -'- • KING STATEMENT I PAGE 1 OF JZ. PAGES
(b)(7)(C)
.
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING 'STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOMA/ OP EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST SEAR THE INITIALS OP THE PERSON AIMING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE SE INDICATED.
ENCLOSURE(3)

DOD JUNE 1159
DODDON000897
DATED
TAKEN AT
STATEMENT OF
9. STATEMENT (CONTINUED)
AFFIDAVIT
, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
WHICH GE I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED All CORRETIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT
THREAT OF PUNISHMENT. AND WITHOUT COERCION , UNLAWFUL

WITNESSES: Subscribed and swoon Won me, a person authorised by Ise to
administer oaths, this day of
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS ($ms:um of Person AdmInisteting Oath)
(Typed Nam of Parson Adnenisteeag Oath)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (Authority To Administer Oaths)
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE .Z OF 2 PAGES
ENCLOSURE ( a )
DOD JUNE 1160
DODDON000898
SWORN STATEMENT
For um WM the ions. see AR 190-45; the moaner* agency is OCCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
(SSM.
TWe 10 USC Sedlon 301; TIM 5 USC SectIon 2931: E.O. 0397 dited Mumble 22. 1943
AUTHORITY:
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide comrnenders and Mw enforcement Odle witti meant by MOM Information may be magetely
addelonel/alemate mains of lemdfleadon to fecilitabe Niro and rerievat
Your seelnI &murky number In used so an
ROUTINE USES;
Deolomme of your amen weft 'ember Ms vol misty.
DISCLOSURE: 4. FILE NUMBER
2. DATE (YYVYMMCID) 3. TIME
1. LOCATION Husaybah, Z -2c04 lott/i7 /Qua
(h)(6)
(b)( 7 )(C)
. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
L
1.EMNII111.111111111--. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

DETAINED/INIT/4E8SW THE
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ON 17. tea. 2.004 AT /0t3r1 FOR THE FOLLOWING OFFENSES/
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10. EXHIBIT
PAGE 1 OF Z. PAGES
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DATEDADDMONAL PAGES musr CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MOST SEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT. AND PAGE WADER MUST BE BE INDICATED.
ENCLOSURE (44
1161
DOD MINE

DODDON000899

• .
TAKEN AT DATED
STATEMENT OF
9. STATEMENT (CONTINUED)
AFFIDAVIT , HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH . I FULLY UNDERSTAND. THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT have BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRETIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE PM STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF = = OR REWARD, INITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION , UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(7)(C)
WITNESSES: Subeabed end MOM before ow a goon eublorlsed by law to
administer oaths. Ude 9eY M
at
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (Signahthr of Person Admkalsioring Oath)
(Typed (Vane of Pathan Administering Oath)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (Authority Tr, Admithotor Oatha)
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE Z OF Z. PAGES
ENCLOSURE ( )

DOD MINE 1162

DODDON000900
19 Apr 2004
To: (b)(7)(C) BN Commader From: it, , ,, ¦ BN Medical Officer Subj: Statement of Death of Detainee
1. At 0645, after examination, I declared a detainee dead. .
was awoken at 0630 and notified that a detainee had "died" 3 hours ago. This was a detainee that was called to my attention yesterday evening. This detainee had tried to hours earlier in the day and jumped out of a one-story window. I sent thiffiriToi examine him. He returned reporting that he had a number of superficial lacerations on his face and scalp and had no life threatening injuries.
inee was called to my attention again at around 0010 this mor i
ncent.RI
'bed the same injuries as before but stated that he was co ause his face was "full of blood." At that time I went to HET to do my own examination. On examination the patient was alert, breathing, talking within a good pulse. I had no interpreter so I could not ascertain if his speaking was coherent. He had a one-inch laceration at the top of his scalp, a one inch laceration below his right eye, a .5 inch laceration on his forehead and a small cut along his left eyebrow. There was good 'N control of bleeding of every wound. His nose appeared broken and his pupils were j reactive to light A cursory head-to-toe examination did not reveal any other significant injuries. At that time I gave my good-to-go and returned to the CP.
At 0645, after declaration of death, another head-to-toe examination was conducted. No changes were observed compared to my previous examination except for a squashed nose caused by his face lying down on the floor facedown for the past three hours.
Based on the history and physical examination, my best educated guess is that he died of brain hemorrhage caused by his fall out of the window. To specifically determine his cause of death would require a timely autopsy performed by a forensic pathologist
Battalion Medical Officer
ENCLOSURE ( 5 )
DOD JUNE 1163

TO: Higher Authority (b)(7)(C)
From: (b)(7)(C) (b)(6)
$ubj: condition of detainee 132 before his depth
Approximately 1500 on the 19 of April, the Medical Officer (b)( 7)(C) nformed • me that their was some concern as to the conditions of several detainees and that I should go check them out. At about 1730 to 1800 I arrived at the detainee facility and began my assessment of the prisoners. All of them were in fair health and had swelling of the feet due to constant standing. Detainee 132 was tied to the iron window frame with 550 cords and like the rest had a sand bag over his head for a blinder. He was squatting and mumbling something some thing about "You are not my brothers, my duty is to die." This translation was received from one of the other detainees who spoke some English. Detainee 132 was in fair condition and responded to physical motions of the body, i.e. lifting him up caused him to attempt to stand and when lifting pressure was removed he returned to the squatting position. My exam was minimal looking for life threatening injuries only. He had minor scrapes on his body and swollen feet and hands. He responded to sound and basic direction. His blinder was not lifted, and I found no life threatening injuries on him.
(b)(7)(C)
ENCLOSURE (co )
WITNESS'S STATEMENT
(b)( 7)(C) ME= (b)(6)

Name Rank/Rate Social Security Number
(b)(7)(C) 1 st. Marine Divisio Command Division
...war. I
I came on watch at 1900 on the 18th of April 2004. The detainee
outside because he was trying to untie his restraints. Around 1930-2000 (b)(7)(C) came by and told me to put the detainee back inside after the doc finished cleaning him up. I was informed that the detainee had already gotten his hands free and had jumped out of the window. This occurred about 1800-1900. After the detainee was inside be worked his way out of at least 4 sets of restraints, on free and started moving towards
I t:
the door but was intercepted b (b)( 7 )(C) ho restrained him. At about 0230 HET came by with two (2) more detainees and also talked to the detainee for no more than Ove (5) minutes. Shortly after the HET left I was watching the detainee. He was breathing really hard and took in about 10 deep breaths. After he quit breathing hard I walked over to him and just as 1 got there he took one (1) more breath in and then collapsed. This took place no later than 0240.
I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to the best of my
oq 0 Sex, co6oG
(Date) (Time)
(Witness' Signature) (Date) (Time)
Sworn to me before this date.
(Investigator's Signature) (Date) (Time)
ENCLOSURE ( 1-)
(b)(7)(C) (b)(6)
!)eta . nee rnE an iictd 14...eac h a Po; i 9OD ctyk t iv. c/c out s-, 41V" o( Apo because. he nock 5
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nit the chlor 6 wrt.5 ;flier-cep/eel/
(b)(7)(C) tiAts put him back ; :LbeuT O P.30 N C r CA ,r+* b 41., h A.00 CD) mom delccinecs :14 also 4+ (keel Ito -14.) e ee .ar r-)o f•icrc A hez.fri
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(b)(7)(C)

ENCLOSURE (-1-)

DOD JUNE 1166

WITNESS'S STATEMENT
b)(7)(C) b)t7 C)
Name Rank/Rate Social Security Number

(b)(7)(C)
let Marine Division
Command Division

On the 17th of April 2004 at around 1300 1 assumed detainee watch. I was briefed by a member ofHET platoon about the detainee we had apprehended. The detainee was tied to a window frame. We were instructed to poor water over the detainee every two (2) hours to ensure be was awake. On the 18th of April 2004 at about 1400 I found that someone had brought the detainee inside. Around that time the detainee had broken free from his restraints. So since I was the NCOIC. I decided to tie him back up outside. At around 1800-1900 the detainee broke free. Later on be broke free once again and another Marine and myself ran towards him, he then dove through the window and busted his head on the floor. We then restrained him to another window at around 2130. I wasn't there to see him die. This is all the information that I have on this incident.
I swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to the beat of my
knowledge or belief.
(Members Signature) (Date) (Time)
(Witness' Signature) (Date) (Time)
Sworn to me before this date.
(Investigator's Signature) (Date) (Time)
ENCLOSURE (8 )
DOD JUNE 1167

(b)(7)(C)
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ENCLOSURE og )
DOD JUNE 13.68
WITNESS'S STATEMENT
Name Rank/Rate Social Security Number
(b)(7)(C)
I st Marine Divisiok Command Division
On the start off shift the detainee was given water and was fed by myself and
(b)( 7)(C) and then we allowed him to sit at about 0900. The detainee was in good health.IIII At about 1830 the detainee got his hands and feet free. (b)(7) (C) • ed walking toward . . the detainee jumped thorough the window hitting his head and face. At 1901 (b)(7)(C) leaned him up and looked at the detainee and said he was good. The detainee got free three (3) times and then we moved him inside with his back to the window and his hands tied apart. HET showed u at 0230 saw the detainee and then left. At 0240 the detainee went limp and I had go get the Doc. The Doc showed up and said the detainee was gone.
swear (or affirm) that the information in the statement above is true to the best of my knowledge or belief.
000 61 (Date (Time)
(Witness' Signature) (Date) (Time)
Sworn to me before this date.
(Investigator's Signature) (Date) (Time)
ENCLOSURE (9 )
(b)(7)(C) (b)(6) a, st, e:T FTC 54:fi— elect 'nee Was -mattre,a1 Fted br (b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C) AA) allow./ re sit-0,00.1- 0100. tile defame t 90,01 1,14c. IA. 4 b•wr . (130 lot 11;s hang& Fe41-Fry (b)( 7 )(C) Sorted w41k;49 over etetamer._ ''.»1#`o. ; IOW 1014;41 iT,Ta r-m«,e 1700 (b)(7)(C) Cle4•01 vor (R•. feekof Ath:•ce ; 01 Mess lieteo4e 7 tere s we
/or 6" '"'"461 As5i4e 6t ic rb 4/ 1"4"" tuouis tied alomer, tiErs.H0wLi .,0 oz?c, Ven eitiraget 1 tet 'O'Z-0ittoc;4e weft" i nrio had (b)(7)(C) er s 4owel. v,0 deti.;,ev ueol ort: .
(b)(7)(C)
ENCLOSURE (c?

DOD JUNE 1170
DODDON000908
a
14124OR1I1Dial FOR TEE RECORD
(b)(7)(C)
' 19 0006-04 R L 004
FROM: TO: COMMANDING OFFICER,

SOB: SWORN STATEMENT ON DETAINEE AWAYED WARM JABAR ((RL —JARAIWIE))

1. DE IVERED TO FOB HUSAYBAH ON 17 APRIL 2004 AROUND 1330
BY QUICK REACTION FORCE (QRF). ACCORDING TO THE
CORPORAL OF THE GUARD (COG, NAME UNKNOWN), QRF tiALDISPATCHED TO

PICK UP TWO DETAINEES FROM AN UNKNOWN UNIT PROMISE. COG THOUGHT

.

THE CAPTURING UNIT WAS BUT HE COULD NOT BE SURE.
REPORTING OFFICER, RO, (07)(C) ESCORTED THE TWO DETAINEES TO THE
HOLDING FACILITY ABOARD •: 411 ": AND PUT THEM IN SEPARATE ROOMS

PENDING DEBRIEFING. RO NOTICED BOTH DETAINEES APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN
ROUGHED UP BY THE APPEARANCE OF THEIR CLOTHES BEING TORN AND BRUISES

AND MINOR SCRATCHES. RO LEFT FACILITY WITH INSTRUCTING THE MARINE

GUARDS NOT TO LET ANY DETAINEE SPEAK TO ANOTHER

(b)( 7 )( E) (b)(7)(E)
(b)( 7 )(E) (b)(7)(E) . THE SUBSEQUENT SEARCH PRODUCED A WALLET WITH NO IDENTIFICATION, A SMALL PHONE BOOK, AND 550 IRAQI DINAR. THE DETAINEE'S BANDS WERE BLACK FOR NO KNOWN REASON. THE DETAINEE ALSO HAD AN ELASTIC STRING, WITH A SMALL PLASTIC PRAYER BEAD SEWN TO IT, WRAPPED AROUND HIS WAIST (RO COMMENT: THE DETAINEE WAS SHOWN TO TWO OTHER DETAINEES WHO DESCRIBED THE BEAD AS A GOOD LUCK CHARM FOR SOMEONE WHO IS EXPECTING TO MARTYR
THEMSELVES. THE OTHER DETAINEES FURTHER STATED THE DYED HANDS WERE
DONE AT A MOSQUE AS A PRAYER RITUAL TO HELP A FIGHTER FIGHT WELL AND
SHOOT A WEAPON STRAIGHT).

2.

(b)(7)(E)
3.

DETENTION. DETAINEE STATED OVER AND OVER AGAIN, "I SWEAR TO GOD, I
AM A SHEEP HERDER FROM THE DESERT. I DON'T KNOW ANYTHING." RO
EXPLAINED DETAINEE WAS NOT BEING ACCUSED OF ANYTHING AND THE
DETAINEE FINALLY STATED HE WAS FROM BA'AGE WHICH WAS APPROXIMATELY
FOUR HOURS AWAY. DETAINEE STATED HE LEFT HIS HOME AROUND 0900 AND
DROVE FOUR HOURS, ARRIVING AT 1000 IN HUSAYBAH. RO ATTEMPTED TO
CLARIFY THE DISCREPANCY BUT DETAINEE WOULD NOT CHANGE HIS STORY. HE
STATED HE CAME TO HUSAYBAH FOR SUGAR AND FLOUR. RO ASKED WHO HE
CAME TO HUSAYBAH WITH AND DETAINEE REPLIED HE RENTED A CAR. RO
ASKED AGAIN AND DETAINEE RESPONDED "I WAS KIDNAPPED TO HE BUT
I WILL NOT 'SNITCH' ON THE MEN WHO BROUGHT ME HERE."

(b)(7)(c)
4.

ENCLOSURE (00 )

CHANGED. HE WENT VERY STILL AND LICKED HIS LIPS AND SMILED.
DETAINEE BECAME VERY AGGRESSIVE AND CONTINUED TO SMILE AND SAY
"THANK YOU" TO EVERYTHING RO ASKED. RO CONTINUED TO QUESTION
DETAINEE BUT HE STOPPED MAKING ANY SENSE WHATSOEVER. DETAINEE THEN
STARTED ACTING LIKE RE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE INTERPRETER AND THAT
HE COULD NOT HEAR. RO
INTERROGATION TRAINING.

RO ASKED AGAIN ABOUT
KUJAHBDEEN HUT DETAINEE INC. THE DEBRIEF LASTED
ONLY APPROXIMATELY 15 MINUTES AND WAS STOPPED WHEN FOB HUSAYBAH
STARTED RECEIVING SMALL ARMS FIRE. ALL AVAILABLE PERSONNEL WENT TO
T ROOFS ,1 T•A A DEFENSIVE POSTURE.

(b)(7)(E)

G -6 ASKED •lk PECI C INSTRUCTI•S ON DETAI 7 E AN' OL
TO KEEP THEN SEPARATE, QUIET AND NOT TO HIT THE DETAINEES. RO WAS
VERY SPECIFIC ABOUT WARNING ALL GUARD PERSONAL AGAINST STRIKING
DETAINEES. RO ENCOURAGED MARINES TO USE LOUD VOICES AND PHYSICALLY
ASSISTING DETAINEES TO STAND BUT, AGAIN, WARNED AGAINST INJUR/ING.

5. AROUND APPROXIMATELY 2200, THE DETAINEE CALLED OUT TO RO, WHO WAS CHECKING IN ON DETAINEE WHO WAS SECURED STANDING UP TO A WINDOW FRAME, "PLEASE OUST KILL ME." RO REPLIED, VIA INTERPRETER, THE DETAINEE WAS ROTS FRIEND AND THEY WERE GOING TO SPEND LONG HOURS TALKING ABOUT THINGS. RO LEFT DETAINEE, AND ALTHOUGH HE CHECKED IN ON HIM UNTIL APPROXIMATELY MIDNIGHT, HE DID NOT SPEAK WITH DETAINEE AGAIN. THROUGHOUT THE TINE RO SPOKE WITH DETAINEE, THE DETAINEE CONTINUOUSLY DISPLAYED INTERROGATION RESISTANCE TRAINING. ALONG WITH THE PRAYER BEAD WRAPPED AROUND DETAINEE WHICH IS camoN FOR ISLAMIC EXTREMIST ABOUT TO COMMIT MARTYRDOM, AND THE DETAINEES HANDS BEING DIED FROM AN ISLAMIC RITUAL PRIOR TO FIGHTING, DETAINEE WAS ASSESSED AS FOREIGN FIGHTER WHOM WAS IN HUSAYBAH, IRAQ PARTICIPATING IN ANTI-COALITION ACTIVITIES.
6. ON 16 APRIL 2004 AT 0600, HETI CHIEF r ¦ -', ( CHECKED IN ON THE DETAINEES CURRENTLY HELD. r 7 Ci INSTRUCTED THE GUARDS TO ENSURE EACH DETAINEE WAS • . AT Him RSONNEL AT FOB HUSAYBAH DEPARTED FOR A PATROL WITH HETI. PERSONNEL RETURNED FROM THE PATROL AROUND 2230. AT 0400 ON 19 APRIL 2004 RO WAS INFORMED THE DETAINEE DIED AT THE FACILITY. A MEDICAL CORPSMAN CAME IN TO WHERE HETI PERSONNEL RESIDE
AND ASKED WHAT TO DO WITH THE BODY. HET
MOVING THE BODY TO AN APPROPRIATE PLACE.
INFORMED THE WATCH OFFICER OF THE DAY WITHIN THE
OPERATIONS CENTER OF THE DETAINEES FATE.

"Ce-.4•01.0
3-07777i-1AA7r- 06-ise).

(b)(7)(C) (b)(7)(C)
ENCLOSURE (io)
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
marmot. rnt warm
us MOMS 060101111111" RIF
SIC IWO
wo w 111431141175

INRISKYREFERT*
5800
s3
19 Apr 04

From: (b)( 7 )(C)
To: Commanding Officer

Subj: STATEMENT CONCERNING THE DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS JABAR,
DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

1. Having been informed of my rights under Article 31 of the
UCMJ, I voluntarily choose to make the following statement:

I spent the entire 6e iod from 132 OODAPRO4 until
221000DAPRO4. On 14 Apr (b)(7)(C) oured Camp Husaybah
to include the holding area that (b)(7)(C) established to
conduct field interrogations and to hold detained personnel
until they could be transported to the detainee facility at Camp
Al Qa'im. On 14 Apr there were detainees in four rooms of the
facility. All of the detainees in the north two rooms were made
to stand. Some of he detai s in the south two rooms were
permitted to sit. (b)(7)(C) inspected the log of visitors to
the holding area and made comments to the guard about the
importance of being able to document the timing and frequency of
interviews conducted by the Human Intelligence Exploitation Team

(HET). He then toured the holding area, stopping at each

detainee to inspect their physical appearance, and assess their

well-being. The area was well policed and not crowded. We

departed after about 20 minutes.

The next time that I returned to the holding area was the morning of 18 Apr after 24 hours of fighting in which b I )(C ) lost five Marines killed in action and about three times that number wounded. (b)(7)(C) igned me into the facility accompanied me during my nspection of the guards and the detainees. The Marines guarding the facility were tired but professional in receiving me for an inspection. They had responded to what appeared to be imminent attacks on Camp Husaybah several times on 17 Apr. The holding area was crowded compared to my previous visit. Several known and suspected Mujahedin fighters were captured on 17 Apr and brought to the holding area while the battalion continued to conduct combat operations. All of the detainees were cuffed with plastic flex­cuffs or 550 cord and were made to stand, and all but one was blindfolded. Some of the detainees showed signs of fighting on the previous day. These consisted of minor cuts, scratches, and
ENCLOSURE ( 1 1 )

Subject: STATEMENT CONCERNING THE DEATH OF AWAYED WANAS JABAR,
DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

bruises. All but one detainee was quiet and compliant to the

orders of the guards, who did not harass or attempt to

• -e the-detainees during my inspection. I asked (b) (7)(C)
(b)(7)(C) o remove the blindfolds of several detainees to inspect

them for injuries, which he did, revealing the cuts, scratches,

and bruises noted above.

Detainee 132 was conspicuous among the group because he sat

outside of the facility with his hands tied to the window frame

by 550 cord. He rocked back and forth while mumbling to himself

and constantly attempted to untie his bonds. I noticed a one­
inch to two-inch cut on the top of his head that attracted a

large number of flies. The guard stated that detainee 132 would

not allow anyone to treat the wound and that he would not stop

trying to untie his bonds. As a result of this activity, his

bonds needed to be continually re-tightened. I directed that a

corpsman and the battalion surgeon on hand inspect 132 and clean

his wound. He refused this medical treatment, but medical

personnel were able to determine that 132 had no major injuries.

I conducted a subsequent inspection of the holding area

later in the evening of 18 Apr. During this inspection I

noticed that 132 looked much worse with what appeared to be a

broken nose, swollen eyebrows, and cuts on his face. He was now

sitting inside and his wrists were bound to a window frame with

engineer tape, which he again constantly tried to remove. When

asked how he became so beat up, the guard related the

circumstances surrounding 132's attempted escape. 132 was

reported to have escaped from his bonds and attempted to leave

the facility through a window. He fell from the window and

landed on his face on the concrete sidewalk surrounding the

building. Given 132's actions each time that I saw him this

seemed entirely feasible. He always appeared too weak to be

able to run or jump and wavered on his feet. This did not stop

the constant wriggling and attempts to free his hands and feet.

Excessive force was not necessary to control 132 as the guards

turned him around several times so that I could observe him and

he moved where they directed him.

After m ins•ection I visited the battalion surgeon
attached to (b)(7)(C) and directed him to examine 132
immediately •ue to t e broken nose and swollen brow. After the
examination, (b)(7)(C) reported that none of 132's injuries

were life threaten ng and that he would be fine until he could
be transported to Camp Al Qa'im on 19 Apr.

At approximately 0530 on 19 Apr the watch officer awakened me to report that 132 died at about 0330. I woke the stir eon and directed him to examine the corpse. I also woke (b)(7)(C) and directed him to begin a preliminary inquiry into the events surrounding 132's death. Both officers departed for the holding
2 ENCLOSURE (II )
Subject: STATEMENT CONCERNING THE DEATH OF AWAYED MAMAS JARAR,
DETAINEE 132 ON 19 APRIL 2004

area at 0630. 11111111111111reported that 132 probably died from
a brain hemorrhage caused by the impact with the sidewalk that
could not have been diagnosed without a CT scan. 132's body was
placed in a body bag and moved to the Company Aid Station until
the Combined Anti-Armor Team delivered it to the ICDC.

During the eriod of 132's detention and death opmxc) and the rest of fought a 48-hour battle in the city of Husaybah. Camp Husaybah itself was directly threatened on 17 Apr.. The number of detainees in the holding area doubled at the same time that the number of available guards decreased­due to the requirements of combat operations. Despite this, the detainees were protected from direct and indirect fire, received food and water every day, were escorted to the head and given adequate time to use it, and, based on my three inspections of the facility, were treated extremely gently by the guards and the HET. As soon as the main body of the company returned to Camp Husaybah on 19 Apr the Company XO arranged the transfer of detainees to Camp Al Qa'im and cleared the area of the detritus of two days of combat operations.
2. Cont OS (b)( 7 )(C)
follows: (b)(3)
(b)(3)

(b)(7)(C)

3

ENCLOSURE ( ( )

Doc_nid: 
2938
Doc_type_num: 
63