Marine Corps Memo re: Inquiry into Alleged Detainee Abuse at the Marine Corps 2nd Marine Regiment (2/2) Division Interrogation Facility (DIF), Iraq

An inquiry in to the abuse of a detainee taken in to custody after a raid on a residence by the U.S. Marine Corps 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines (2/2). The captured Iraqi alleged that he was verbally and physically abused during the course of detention when Marines made disparaging remarks, flex-cuffed him in front of his family and kicked him while in route to the Forward Operating Base. Investigation found that allegations were unsupported and that Marines acted professionally.

Non-legal Memo
Sunday, August 1, 2004
Sunday, May 14, 2006

1st Marine Division (Rein)
OFC 40120
FPO AP 96426-0120

NNW' 11111 ER Ilits

From: Commanding General, 1" Marine Division (Rein)

Commanding General, I Marine expeditionary Force


Readdressed and forwarded. The findings of the Investigating Officer are

This investigation was prompted by a report that 1•t Marine Division
personnel had been accused of abusing en Iraqi man during the course of a
raid and subsequent 'treated
was identified as a Eased on
this report, a pral R nary n •7..Ttn.T7•1171
7a4FTTIE. • Combat
Team-1 (RCT-1) Executive Officer, The
invests ation concluded that there was no ev nee to support a allegation
that as abused or maltreated in any way on 18 July or
thereafter by m ere of the capturing unit. Based on lay review of the facts
surrounding this incident. I concur with the Inv cer's
findings. There is no evidence to indicate that was abused at
any point while in the custody of 1" Marine Divis on personae

On or about 18 July 2004, members of el Battalion, 2" Marines (2/2).. . Conducted raids on a series of targets based on intelligence provided by s source referred to 2/2 by the 507th Iraqi National Guard (INC) Battalion intelligence officer (S-2). The 501" S-2 was known to the members of 2/2 as reliable, having provided accurate, actionable information in the peat. Based on intelligence originating from this referred source, three raids were planned and executed. The first target was searched without incident. The second, a residence, led to the discovery of two complete 82:am mortar systems, RPG launchers, APO projectiles, and multiple hand grenades. Based on this discovery. and consequent validation of the reliability of the source referred to 2/2 by the TM 5-2, a third target residence was searched. The third raid targeted the residence of whet was described to 2/2 as sympathizer. The third rest ad on July 1B was that of The intelligence described esidence with particularity, to include the exaction location where tored his weapon. Upon

entering the residence, the search team Oun the weapon in question, exactly
as described by the source. This discovery, coupled with the earlier
discovery of the contraband at target two, reinforced and bolstered the
reliability of the source in f the 2/2 raid force, and as such,
led to the decision to detain based on his deacription as an ACP

4. Given the established reliability the 507th ING 5-2, wh
source of the intelligence that led to the 18 July raid of
residence, coupled with the subsequent, demonstrated rel
information actually provide by that source, I find that the raid on

residence was reasonable and proper.

3 [ USMC I MARDIV ( 18) ]


5. Subsequent to the raid, alleged that he was abused during the
course of his detention. Be.

ca a that the abuse was beth verbal and

phys cal. The alleged verbal abuse . ' ging remarks generally and n particular. ¦ I /Or.: that he was flea-c e in ront of his fami y w en e was ',ousted from the residence, and kicked while in route to 2/2's F08.
y member of the raid force was interviewed in furtherance of preliminary inquiry. There was absolutely no evidence the wag abused, either verbally or physically, at any time by the re
411112/2 raid force. To the contrary, all of the evidence indicated that the raid force acted prof n accordance with standard operating procedure (SOP). was flex-cuffed when he was escorted from hie residence in accordance with 'sir' by the marines once they learned he was end he wan never kicked or physically abused by anyone on or after the 18 July said.
ed on review of the investigation that the allegations made by are unsupported by the evidence and without merit. No further ,eves ignition is warranted.
Copy to:

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1 Aug 04


1111111115110302 USMC

To: Commanding Officer, Regimental Combat Team 1 .

Subj: THE ALLEGED ABUSE OF (u) ( 7)(C)
Ref: (a) JAGMAN Section 0204

1. This report completes the preliminary inquiry condu d nce with reference (a) into the alleged abuse of (b)(7)(C) y members of the 2/2 raid force on the morning of 18 July
004 in Mahmudiyah, Iraq.

2. Per ne co acted were:

Commanding Officer, 2d

ecutive Officer, 2d Bn, 2d Mar

perations Officer, 2d En, 2d Mar

Engineer platoon

ter the initial allegations of abuse were made by

lilliand subsequently sent to the RCT 1 Bravo Command in
Mahmudiyah, I spoke to the individuals listed above. In
addition, the battalion Executive o the Marines
who conducted the actual search of home, and with
the entire HEm which interviewed

Each individual .•
listed above gave a complete account, verbally to me, of whet he
recalled about the morning of 10 July.

4. Summary of findings: The decision to raid the Al Rahman
Mosque was based on single source reporting to the 2/2 HET. •
This source was referred to them by the 507th ING Battalion S2,

and that source had a record of reliability with the 507th which included the loc tion of /EDs in zone. The source specifically 'fi (although he did not state that he was as ping an ACF s -gave very explicit
Its .

details about the location of 0_0(71(C) home, to include the



location of the weapon which a)NTPC) kept. The initial raid
on the mosque revealed nothing, but the secondary target, which
the source had provided, turned up 2 complete 82mm mortar
systems, 2 RPG launchers, 8 RPG rounds and 36 hand grenades.
Based on this validation of the sources information, a third

home was raided. This was the home of .LH7 ,;C. . When the raid
force entered, they went to the location where the source had

stated a weapon was kept, and found the weapon, exactl as
At this ••int, it was determined to detain

said that he was produced an ID card. sensitive site exploits on earn, imine•a e y came to (0%!(C: and explained to him that until we could validate his claim, he would be detained. That decision was sound based on the had just raided a mosque less than I block from home, we had uncovered 2 mortar systems which 2/2 was confident had been used to shell their FOB, a
n would soon be up and crowds would form. (:))17 )f. C;) stet ines interviewed by the Battalion
XO verify, that was called "sir" and was treated with respect by t e Mar nes. He was flex cuf P for all detainees. Once back at Camp Mahmudiyah, 0.))17) tC1 as interviewed by HET, again being called 'sir" an ter approximately 5 hours, he was released. He was offered an
apology, a ride home, or money for a cab if he did not wish to

ride with CF. He was also told how he could file a grievance.
He refused all of the above and left. He was angry despite our
"brush off" plan. The plan was sound, and has been sufficient
in the past. I found the statements of the offi id
(Bn CO and OPSO) as well as the officers who sa

when he was • estioned (Bn XC and HET OIC)to be cre•e. I
never met although I engaged the local Iraqi Police
to establis a meeting with him to apologize for his
inconvenien w never arranged. The HET report which
implicated as sound, and I believe that he was
involved in ACE' activity. I found no evidence, nor has

IIIIIIIproduced any evidence, which validates his claim of abuse.
I find nothing to substantiate this claim.

5. Recommendations: Based on my interviews, I recommend that
this matter be closed. I stigation in indicated.
I further recommend that be monitored for future
links to reports on ACF activity.

(b)( 7) (C)