Jacoby Report: Detainee Operations - Report of Investigation

Report by Brigadier General Charles H. Jacoby into detainee operations in Afghanistan. The purpose of the report is to ensure that forces assigned to the theater of operations understand the concept of humane treatment and are providing humane treatment to detainees in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Convention. The report is also to ensure that there is adequate supervision and that there is a competent authority to supervise the interrogations, techniques and approaches authorized by the Detainee Operations SOP dated 27 March 2004 when interrogating detainees.

Doc_type: 
Oversight Report
Doc_date: 
Saturday, June 26, 2004
Doc_rel_date: 
Wednesday, June 14, 2006
Doc_text: 

CFC-A AO DETAINEE OPERATIONS
REPORT OF D1SPECTION
26 June 2004
SECTION I. INTRODUCTION
1.
This general officer led inspection of Combined Forces Command — Afghanistan (CFC-A) Area of Operations (AO) detainee operations was initiated at the direction of the Commander, CFC-A, in FRAGO 48, dated 18 May 2004 (Enclosure A). The C.ommander, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) -76, subsequently appointed BO Charles H. Jacoby Jr. to lead this inspection (Enclosure B). The inspection was conducted beginning 19 May 2004 and continued drough 26 June 2004. Consistent with specific instructions contained in the appointment memorandum, this inspection relied upon the support of the CTIF-76 staff and their efforts to conduct collateral reviews and evaluations, and also considered previous and contemporaneous inspections and investigations of detainee operations conducted in this theater.

2.
This inspection's primary purpose was to ascertain the standard of treatment provided to persons detained by US forces throughout the detention process from apprehension to release or long-term confinement Initially, five focus areas defined the approach of the inspection: command and control (C2); medical treatment provided to detainees;

• collection area procedures; Soldier special insnuctions and general orders; and compliance with international humanitarian law as it applies to this conflict Early in the inspection it became apparent that infonnation and intelligence collection needed to be specifically addressed as a sixth focus area. The handling of detainees and intelligence and information collection are the two sub-processes of detainee operation.s. The authorities, procedures, and standards under which these processes are carried out set the conditions for the overall standard Of treatment detainees receive in US custody.
3. While there was a near universal understanding in CJTF-76 that hurnane treatment was the standard by which detainees would be treated, guard awareness and application elstandard operating procedures (SOP) was lacking. Comprehensive SOPs do exist 'in theater, but dissemination, implementation, and a corresponding appreciation for assigned responsibilities were inconsistent across the AO. Failure to establish and enforce standards throup,hout the detention process creates friction on the process, which -increases risk of detainee abuse and frustrates effective collection arid dissemination of
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intelligence and information. A lack of focused training for Soldiers responsible for both
handling arid collecting intelligence and information also increases the risk of potential
abuse.
4.
Detainee operations throughout the process have, in the past, been focused almost exclusively on its contribution to a counter-terrorism mission. On today's counter­insurgency battlefield where the population is the center of gravity and the direct object of our security and reconstruction efforts, detainee operations must become more discriminate and supportive of tite overall mission. In this vein, persons under US control are not objecu on the battlefield. They instead become put of the fabric of the battlefield where humane treatment is not just the standard but essential to successful operations.

5.
Definitions (Enclosure C).

6.
Conditions — Within a month of the Transfer of Authority (TOA) between the outgoing 10th Mountain Division and the incoming 256 Infantry Division (Light). alleptions of detainee abuse surfaced in Iraq. Amidst concerns about the scope of these issues, this inspection was initiated within a command actively engaged in major combat operations and extensive civil-military operations. Approximately one-third of the bases visited as part of this inspection were established within the past three months or were under construction. All had either recently conducted a relief in place (RIP) or were in the process of a RIP. This same period also witnessed an on-going shift operationel focus from active counter-terrorism operations to complex counter-insurgency and stability operations.

SECTION EL SCOPE
7. This inspection focused across the CFC-A AO on the full spectrum of detainee operations as conducted by personnel assigned to, or working in cooperation with, CJTF­
76. In addition to considering the viability of current regulatory guidance applicable to detainee operations, printarily that guidance found in the C...177-180 Detainee Operations SO.P, dated 27 March 2004 (Enclosure D), this inspection examined the current state of detainee operations in the field through eyes-on visits to all bases with facilities used to support detention operations (Enclosure E).
8. Consistent with the appointment order, this initiative was an inspection In name and spirit — the focus of this inspection WU current theater detainee opetstions, and not the investiption of detainee abuse alleptions. As part of the inspection process, units were provided training that emphuized current policy and areas of concern and, where required, given guidance on appropriate changes to local procedure and facilities.
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9. Of specific interest in this inspection was the humane treatment of detainees. In accordance with US policy, members of Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations and Taliban fighten captured in Afghanistan do not qualify as Enemy Prisoners of Ws:(EPW). It is US policy, however, that all detained individuals be treated humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity and security requirements, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions (Enclosure F). As a result, the reference point for this inspection was humime treatment rather than strict adherence to each provision of the Conventions.
SECTION 111. REFERENCES (Enclosure G)
SECTION TV. OBSERVATIONS
SteMiti
10. 'The consistent and ovenur.hing observation that flowed from this inspection.was that forces assigned to this co:amend understand the concept of humane treatment and are providing humane treatment to detainees in accordance with the principles of the Geneva Convention. 'There have been exceptions, and allegations of detainee abuse have been substantiated. It is, however, clear that the priorities of safety for soldiers and guards, safeguarding detainees, and gaining short/long term intelligence can be accommodated within the framework of humane treatment as a standard (Enclosure H). Additionally, it was found that although the CTIF-180 Detainee Operations SOP, dated 27 March 2004, provides a foundation for the conduct of detainee operations throughout the Afghanistan theater, it does require revisions to:
a.
confirnt interrogation approaches and techniques that are authorized in this theater,

b.
better defbae facility standards,

c.
describe acceptable standards of conduct throughout the detention process,

d.
provide for clearer guidance to capturing units concerning the proper collection and control of personal property and evidence obtained as a result of operations in the theater, and

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e. clarify that the SOP applies throughout Afghanistan and to all other units, orpnizations, end agencies working under the direction or in coordination with CJTF-76.
11. While theater forces understand the need for humane treatment and unit processes
observed during the inspection were consistent with the spirit of extant doctrine, there
was otherwise a.consistent lack of knowledge regarding theater detention operations
guidance u it applies to detainee capture, proceuing, evidence collection, chain of
custody, detention,. interroption, movement, end repauiation. Only one-third of the
bases had i copy of the current detainee opemdons SOP, which provides at least
minismun insigIn into all of the above areas (excluding repatriation procedure, capture
guidelines for evidence and chain of custody). To fill this perceived void, many bases
attempted to integrate recently circulated draft theater policy, simply applied Army
values, or followed the "Golden Rule" during their detainee operations. This situation
has been further oomplicated by recent theater-wide turnover of combat and combat
support units and-the accompanying lou of experience. Lack of thoroughly authorized,
disseminated, end understood guidance and procedures create oppontmities for detainee

abuse and the loss of intelligence value throughout the process.
12.
Accofding to 100 % of the units inspected, there is significant need and demand for local intelligence that b not consistently rnet by current theater detainee operations. Time frames to process detainees are focused on getting detainees who meet Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) detention criteria to the rear, while collection of battlefield intelligence is largely an ad hoc program based on leader experience and the capabilities of assigned personnel (Enclosure I).

13.
Even though detainee pmcessing standards were established with speeding detainees who meet SECDEF detention criteria to the rear in mind, there is no consistent propam designed to ensure the integrity of capture data or evidence. Even where detention kits are available detainee ta

basis for detendon is often poorly documented. As a result, quality interrogation is impeded and justification for detention limited. This occasionally leads to longer periods of detention than is Justified.
14. Although SECDEF criteria for detention art generally known and understood, the approach to detaining personnel differs substantially across the theater. In some areas, ferw persons are detained =len there is a specific pre-existing Justification or a threat to the force present. In other locations, cordon arid search opemtions yield large numbers of detainees without apparent application of specific criteria. There i3 an inverse correlation
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between the length of time a unit has been in theater and the rsumber of individuals it detains. As a result wh
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IS. Very significantly, there is inadequate authority for the interrogation teclunques and approaches authorized by the Detainee Opemtions SOP dated 27 Much 2004. However, consistent with the observation that only one-thir' d of the bases had the SOP, it was genemlly not guidance icnown or relied upon in the field. In fact, there is a void in the availability of interrogations guidance in the field, and interrogation practice is as inconsistent and varied across the theater as are detention methods and procedures. There is some correlation between individual training and experience and interrogation methods being used, but there is little correlation between location and techniques employed. Inconsistent and unevenly applied standards in the detention and interrogations process increase the possibility of the abuse of detainees, especially forward in the battle area. Ironically, that same weakness in standards degrades the intelligence collection process with negative effects growing the further a detainee moves through the system.
16. Most units, while having received basic cultural training before deployment, were not truly attuned to the cultural sensitivities they encountered. While most units know not to enter a Niosque unless invited or mission dictates, and some units specifically request female Soldiers to accompany them on missions to assist with the search of female detainees, there are situations where the cultural standards are not known and thus not adhered to. For example: situations where men are unnecessarily detained in front of their families, or caused to be seen naked Alen not required, or where dogs have been used in the past to intimidate or humiliate. These situadons ma afoul of Afghan culture and create unwarnusted misperceptions about our actual intent to provide security and stability for the peopde of Afghanistan. iitm s •.% I g .41 •
17. The International Committee of the R
04 was assi Liaison is 'provided by a judge advocate officer who. beginning in APrii 4 _t• (.3).\ oepi... \-5 0 L'-}
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Specific Obtervation4
l8. Specific observations as they relate to key functional areas delineated in FRAGO 48 include:
a. Command and control - inconsistent throughout the theater. Likely accentuated by the general lack of theater-wide detention operations implementing guidance and instructions, there is a direct correlation between assigning responsibility for base/unit detainee operations to a single leader and the integrity of the process. Bases and units with a designated NCOIC/OIC of detention operations do it better; those with personal
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clear unity of coma:land. Centralized C at the CJIF-76 level aho needs to be evaluated, and a clear lead established between military police arid military intelligence. Currently, there is no one individual below the CJTF-76 commander who is clearly responsible for the coordination, supervision and execution of detainee operatiow at the CJTF level.
b." Medical treatment - a favorable aspect of detainee operations across the theater. Detainees were uniformly offered medical evaluation and treatment far better than they had ever received. While treatment was expansive, efforts to sensitize medical exams and physical inspections to cultural norms need improvement There has been no evidence to reinforce the need for rectal or hernia examinations, and little or no justification for requiring full-body nudity as a put of exams or inspecdons. Guidance =wiring these processes from our procedures has been issued as part of this inspection. All locations clearly understcod that medical exams or inspections are not part of any interrogation method. Fail= to establish an appropriate standard for the medical screening and care of detainees could create perceptions of or opporttmities for detainee abtne.
c. Collection area procedures - up to the point of initial. detention in a forward facili roeedures are c units need better
conamanders created local facilities and adapted detention procedures to available expaience and expertise. All wanted more guarantees that battlefield Intelligence would be a by-Foduct ofdetention.
d. Compliance with international humanitarian law standards as they apply to this conflict - although Conunon Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either Al Qaeda or
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Taliban detainees, it is US policy that we will treat detainees humnnely and, to the extern
appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with Geneva.
The nature of detention operations is complicated and unpleasant, but providing humane
treatment is the accepted standard across the theater (Enclosure J). Detention facilities
across the theater differ markedly, just as facilities for assigned military petsconel are
different, and some are significantly better than others. All provide the basics of food,
shelter; and medical care, but few could not find ways to be improved. Some facilities
were constructed out of bed frames, others with Hesco, tentage, lean-tos, and some in
new or renovated buildings. Sanitation facilities at approximately 50% of the locations
were only marginally acceptable. Suggestions for improving these facilities were issued
as part of this inspection. By far, the most conunon *corrections involved hnprovh4
ventilation and defining standards for how detainees should be held (e.g., goggled,
shackled). Many facilities, while adequate for =tuner, won't be acceptable during the
winter. As the theater matures and conditions for our forces improve, we have an
opportunity to create corresponding improvements in our detention facilities.
ve-Nornati
e. Soldier s ial instructi •
ED 129.51? 1.46 , e wi no se po cy or prac CC WI nt4tlArhar) Ion; should lie performing guard duties and what training they should have prior to S-L4SC ST", performing duties. Some commanders had special instructions providing succinct guidance regarding overall detainee treatment (Enclosure K). Approximately 50% of locations did not have existin,g, written, posted guard orders at the beginning of the tio al ... • • 1.0, . . , • ........ . , ... . . , , lo —.HO • 0 0 ..).
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SECTION V. FINDINGS
Sasnsal
19. CFC-A AO detention operations are functional, but lack cohesive direction, and are constrained by friction at critical junctures. Specifically, in addition to the previously discussed lack of comprehensive detention guidance, there are significant problems associated with timely aircraft movement of detainees, lines of communication critical to both processing detention approvals and receiving detainee operations guidance, andjoiot
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use of detention facilities. Current titeater guidance is drafted clearly, but is not
comprehensive or well known outside the task forte headquarters. In addition, a
comprehensive means of disseminating guidance, training, and inspecting detention
operations needs to be developed.
Bnecial Findings
20. Special findings focus on specific phases of detention operations including initial capture and detr.ntion, release, short/long tenn detention and movement within theater, trawler to military detention facilities at Guantanamo Bay, release and repatriation, interrogations, and overall process management (Enclosure M). All phases and C2 of the process suffered from a lack of lcnowkdge of current theater policy and procedures.
a. Initial capture — policy on initial capture is lacking. Units 1st theater regularly
conduct cordon and search operations, but some detain few if any persons, while others
detain in I e numbers.

generate orras to document capture data; few if any MILS had standardized detention kits available to ensure a consistent approach to identifying evidence and recording data. Screening individuals initially detained is done on an ad hoc basis dependent on resources. Some units bring the screening resources to the scene; others take those detained with them to field detention facilities. While wtderstanding conditions on the battlefield vary greedy from operation to operation and region to region, standardization can help ensure humane treatment and better intelligence collection. Additionally, when battlefield conditions permit, working ind coordinating with Afghan officials enhances our ability to avoid conflict with cultural sensitivities, particularly concerning Afghan women and children.
b. Field detention facilities — there is no set structural sts.ndard for field detention sites. Some units use adsting facilities what they can, while others build structures out of plywood or Hesco barriers. Consistent with CJTF-I SO Detainee Handling Guidance, issued in February 2004 (Enclosure N), once transferred from the capture site, detainees should be housed in secured facilities that, as a minimum, has a living area big enough tostand up in and lay down 'without coming into contact with bare ground or another detainee, allows for direct sunlight to enter the confinement area, allows air to circulate into the cell arca, provides overhead cover to prevent rain and snow from entering, and is located near a latrine. While sorne facilities were clearly better than others, only minor modifications needed to be made during the inspection to bring all facilities into
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compliance with acceptable standards. Detention operations at this point in the process
aro an inherent part of combat operations. Regional conunanders utd component
commanders must take full responsibility for the conduct of these operations.

c. — this facility was initially established using the EPW
collection point standuds in AR 15,0-8. While an outdoor facility, it provides for the
basic needs of the detainees in a secure compotuid. As a temporary holding facility for
detainees enroute tolling, detainees may be required to stay in this facility for long
periods of time — u to several months. Overcrow ' conditions at Ba durin the

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holding facility rather than a temporary collection point. Provisions have been made for
ICRC access and detainee interviews at the end of June 2004, and further facility
enhancements are being programmed (Enclosure 0).

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the minimum neceuities for the long-term detention of detainees. Structural upgrades are required and plans are in place to improve the security and structural int:pity of the facility, and an expansion plan is in place to handle projected increases in the detainee population. Environmental studies have aho been conducted, and a final assessment by the US Arm Center for Health Promcrtion and P ventativ ine CHPP has
failed to progress (see Enclosure D, paragraph Me).
f. Other detainee inputs - at both forward operating bases and the Bagram detention facility, detainees are brought into the system from a variety of sources. For example,
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01=3 stationed in Kabul. Guidance regarding these transfers is lacking, and detainees are often accepted front non-DOD sources without DOD approval. As they would when processing any detainee, C.ITF-76 forces document the physical condition of trazuferred detainees at time of acceptance, but supporting documentation marding these detainees is inconsistent. Given that an detainees in our custody will have the opportunity to tell their story to the ICRC, CJIF-76 will invariably be left trying to explain any allegations of abuse or maltreatment made by a truisferred detainee with limited ability to produce evidence In response. elTF-76 forces need to understand the criteria for accepting transfers and from whom transfers are authorized. Also, as Afghan insdtutions mature, alternatives to detention by US forces, like arrest by civil authorities, needto be considered.
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h. 'Command and control and process management — C2of the detainee operations
process requires additional emphasis at all levels. At some locations substantial attention
i3required. For example, commtuuiers at some locations had little or tto involvement in
detainee operations; others had security lapses or careless attimdes towards detainees.
Those forward collection points that have desipated a "warden," a single point of
contact who is in charge of these operations at the local collection point, are AM well.
Those that don't have intleS. Clearly, a holistic approach to detainee operations, starting
at the top, needs to be considered. Expertise to provide custodial care and oversight over
detainees resides in the Reserve Component Internment and Resettlement (I/R) units.
There are no I/R units in theater, nor 'individual augmentees with confinement or detainee
operations experience in the theater assigned to tbe appropriate positions to provide
oversight of theater wide detai ee •

ent speci c command oversight for individual detention facilities in forward operating bases from regional command levels, and no definitive designation of C2ovar detainee operations theater-wide. The relationship between the JIF and Bagram detention facility is good but not formalized.
i. Detainee movement within the theater - the transfer process IS slow due to the lack of dedicated transportation assets. Designated ring supply flights are often interrupted by operations or weather conditions, and grotmd transportation is extremely limited by poor infrastructure and security concerns. Additional delay is also caused by the &Uwe of capturing units to properly document and transfer capture data and evidence to the detention facility. This is caused by a lack of clear guidance from higher headquarters and poor quality control by the receivin facili to ens
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Revised permanent guidance from CFC-A Headquarters is scheduled to be issued in the
very near future. V/hatever "dance CFC-A ma issue it is lilcel that rules for C.TTF-76

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with OCF or OGA, they may also create perceptions of abuse or, even worse, set
conditions where abuse may be more likely to occur. For example, conventional forces
may fail to atop use of abusive interrogation techniques by other forces when they don't
lcnow what standards apply and may resort to unauthorir.ed techniquesthey observe other
forces use under the misapprehension that they are authorized for general u.se.

l. Chain of custody — other than transfers between chain of custody processing is inconsistent and non-standard. There are inconsistent methods and a variety of forms, soma locally produced, used to document chains of custody for detainees, detainee property (to include money), and documents. Capturing units and subsequent locations do not maintain copies, and accountability for valuables is erratic. This has caused issues later in the process when a released or repatriated detsInce
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requests the return of property, and also makes claims for mining property difficult to
adjudicate. Generally, units believe that the standard EPW is insufficient to • ro • erly

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SECTION VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
21. Improving CFC-A AOR detainee operations will involve commitment of resources and effort along five primary lines of operation: forces, training, technology, facilities, and C2and management.
Ezra
L To properly conduct detainee operations throughout Afghanistan. requires dte right kinds of-forces to bring the requisite expertise to the process. Ivlilitary Police liFt units, C,onffnement units, and MP Guard comptinies if assigned, would provide the custodial care and expettise to run the two major collection facilities at Bagram and Kandahar, as well as assist the theater forward collection points with the proper guidance, training, and
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When these • eialties e • t • • • • •s • 1. • • -ft. the next
Training
d. Training in detainee operations as opposed to EPW opemtions is a relatively new concept for the Army. Units guarding detainees at all levels require the most cunent TTP

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excellent training package on detainee operations drat could be sent to deploying units as an exportable training package to prepare them for detainee operations pripr to deploying into theater.

e. There is a steep learning curve for incoming units during the first few months in theater cone detainee o rations. Pred o ent trainin normall focuses on
/ • q 62'0 operations as much as possible. Appropriate conunand emphasis should be placed on training non-traditional tasks involved in detainee operations ptior to deploytnent.
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level. ecific cordon and seuch o mtions more-often than not result in a
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might be hostile. This can clearly have a negative effect on the local populace. Vihenever possible, participation and support of Afghan military or police forces and government officials should be sought. Additional detention training, to include profiling training, is required to maximize the effectiveness of cordon and search operations.
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g.
Troops in contact (TIC) is an event of high stress and emotion that may result in the detention of individuals. If a TIC results in detention, an oppontmity for abuse arises as a result of the stress and emotion. There is a need for additional individual and collective pre-mobilization training that emphasizes doctrine, the 5 S's (search, silence, segregate, safeguard and speed to the rear), and cultural sensitivity. This will allow those who come into initial contact with detainees to respond in accordance with their training vice emotion and stress. Leadership and supervision, in addition to tmining, are the keys to success in detainee handling at the point of capture.

h.
Improved interrogation training leading to the certification of all interrogaton will improve intelligence gathering and disseminadon of actionable intelligence as well as improve the detainee screening process. Interrogators need training on Afghan culture, traditions and history to be able to pt the most intelligence from detainees. Additionally, combat commanders at all levels need training on interrogation and detainee chain of custody to ensure that unit actions do not interfere with or negatively affect the interrogation of detainees. Recommend that each commander's right seat ride include case studies on the interrogation process and how the capturing unit can best facilitate and positively irnpact the process.

4/6
Tecimology Support Reauirements
. All facilitie ;, • • •. e• II • — • • o• • I • • ..aa • • sa •
=tor and record mterroptions, a capability that would facilitate enhanced supervisory oversight and review of interrogations for additional content value.
k. Communication ca bilities =us be
intelligence either forward or to the rear. Real tinte data transfer will hisprove the SECDEF criteria analysis conducted at points of capture, thus en.suring only individuals who are likely to meet the criteria are further processed.
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m. Access to US national databases at the unit level would be a very useful way to check whether those temporarily detained should be detained further, turned ova to civilian authorities, or simply released.
n. Handheld metal detectors can discover hidden devices undiscoverable by an external search. Metal detectors can abo nepte a par,eived need for more invasive physical examinations in excepdonal cases. All facilities and units that handle detainea should be equipped with these proven devices.
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p. At Transfer of Authority (TOA), no non-lethal equipment was available at the flagrant or Kandahar detention facilities. A full suite of non-lethal capability must be on hand at both facilities and available to regional commanders.
Uverades

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s. Minimal standards for field detention sites must be included in a revision to the
Detention Operations SOP and distributed throughout the theater. These standards
should include adequate room to lay down and stand up without touching the walls or
ceiling, proper ventilation, sufficient lighting, both natural and/or artificial, protection
from die elements, cover from attack, and adequate latrine facilities. Each detention site
should also have a pre-established plea for segregating women and children from the
men.

C2 and Manasement
t. Detainee operations should be a theater-wide focus, not one solely directed towards the detention facil' •

).44:1Xc)
reports dlr.' ectly to the CJTF-76 CO. This organization will coordinate detaineeoperations directly with the Regional Brigade.and Component Command Headquarters. Regional Brigade and Component Commanders should appoint commanders in their region responsible for the safeguarding and care of detainees while detained in collection points in their areas of operation. Base commanders should in turn appoint an OIC or NCOIC as the "warden," or single point of contact who ii in charge of detainee operations at the local collection point. A cleu mandate to operate the facility according to standards established by appropriate authorities and an unequivocal acceptance of COMM/Xlid responsibility at these facilities will go a long way in preventing detainee abuse and maintaining standards.
u. As the theater matures, we have an opportunity to create corresponding improvemenu in our detention facilities'and to better provide for the well being of detainees consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions. Particubuly for Low Level Enemy
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Combatants (LLECs), many of whom have already been detained in the Bagram Colkction Point for extensive periods and who have little chance for release in the foreseeable future, alternative arrangements are worth evaluating. This may be a significant challenge in the short-term given significant detainee population increases, but future construction efforts at Bagram may provide an area separate from otbm detainees where more space to exercise, take instruction, and even work might be made available in the spirit of Geneva without hindering the intelligence pthcring function.
SECTION VII. RECOMMENDED DIRECTIVES
22. Upon approval of the findings and recommendations, the Commanding General, CFC-A, should consider directing the following actions:
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SECTION VIIL CONCLUSIONS
23. For incoming units of CTTF-76, this inspection occurred at the right time. Tbe observation.s. findings, and recommendations of this inspection wilt serve as the basis for an action plan that will improve theater detainee operations throughout the detention
process. While humane treatrnent of detainees is in fact the understood and pracdced standard in the theater, lack of clarity regarcling authorities, standards ofdetention, and standards of Interrogation, provides for sufficient friction in the process to create opportunities for detainee abuse and impede effective intelligence collection and dissemination. While the ctrrrent detainee system we observed is being executed in a
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(StrirE"T)
professional and diligent manner, and the current standad operating procedures had been updated in the last 90 days, the expanding scope and complexity of detainee operations, constant tumover of fomes, the emerging role of the Afghan government, and the changing mum of the battlefield require a more rigorous process, better defined standards, and clearer authorities.
24.
An action plan must now be developed based upon the approved recommendations of this inspection along the lines of operations of forces, training, technology, facility upgrades, and C2 and management, Improvements can be made that will reduce the risk of detainee abuse and enhance mission accomplishment Many of the key components of a revised system are already in development and are listed in the amerces to this report.

25.
While this inspection revealed no systematic or widespread mistreatnsent of detainees, opportunities for mistreatment, our commitment to keep faith with the American and Afghan people, the fact of ongoing investigations, and a maturing battlefield argue for modifications to the current detainee operations pttscess On the emerging counter-insurgency battlefield of Afghanistan, creating the security environment needed to rebuild Afghanistan and enable Afghan government institutions requires...detainee operations that both garner and disseminate useful intelligence and recognize the centrality of the Afghan people in the struggle to create a stable Afghanistan. In this view, mistreatment of detainees anywhere in the process works directly contrary to US and Afghan national objectives.

26.
US detainee operations can only be normalized by the emergence of an Afghan justice and cnirections system that can assume the responsibility for the long-tenn detention of low level enemy combatants currently held by the US. The detention process is fundamentally designed for intelligence collection purposes. To that end,tactical commanders continue to place great value on intelligence derived from battlefield questioning and screening. At the operational level, and to a leuer degree the strategic level, detainees ars of important intelligence value. The value of continuing to keep Low-level enemy combatants in custody is simply to keep individuals that represent a proven threat to coalition forces off the battlefield. Thb is a function that can and should be undertaken by the Afghan government With detainee input to the system coming from multiple US, agencies across Afghanbtan, the detention challenge will grow over time. Despite efforts to improve the procesi, the preu of a grol.Ving detainee populadonwithout an Afghan solution or ccatirined transfer to GTMO will continue to create the potential for bad choices to be made at several points in that process.

27.
CJTF-76 has committed Itself as an organization to the short and long terra actions required to improve detainee operatiozu across the CJOA. In addition to initiatives that improve the effectiveness and efficiency of detainee operations, C.ITF-76 will consider

20 /S-2-eR-rs,-T)
.
DOD JUNE
9 6 4
DOD055065
(54-G-E14-13
options that better provide for the well being of detainees. Humane treatment must continue to be understood and practiced u the unequivocal standard for the conduct of detainee operations that protect the force and detainees, produce effective intelligence, and keep faith with the US and Afghan people.
21
(S-rtreft
DOD JUNE
965
DOD055066
CFC-A AO
REPORT OF INSPECTIO.N
Table of Contents

Introduction Page 1 Scope Page 2 Observarions Page 3 Findinp Page 7 Recoinmendations Page 13 Recommended Directives Page 18 Conclusions Page 19
Enclosures: • Encl A - Frago 48 Encl B —BO Jacoby Appointment memo Encl C — Definitions Enci D — Detainee Ops SOP Encl E —Detention Facility Locations Encl F —Presidential Guidance Memo Encl G — References End H — Priorities Encl I — SECDEF Screening Criieria Info Paper EncTJ — CENTCOM Guidance tnel K — FOB 31 PUC SOP/Sample Commander Guidance Encl L —Example Special Orden Encl M — Detainee Processing Encl N CJTF180 Detainee Handling Guidance
-

Encl 0 —ICAF ICRC Authorization Letter Encl P —NEC Treatment Guidance Encl Q — CTTF-180 Intarogation Guidance 16 March2004
. Enc1R — SECDF2 Guidance 16 Apr 03 (DRAFT) EncI S — I-25 MI FRAGO 14 June 2004 w/Appendices End T —CTIF-7 Interrogation Policy 13 MAY 04 Encl U — Request for 31Es and DETOP 05 MP C2
Encl V —Request for Interrogators Encl W - Request for MTT
Annexes:
Annex 1 — CJTF-76 Detainee Operations SOP (DRAFT)
Annex 2 — Interrogation Techniques SOP (DRAFT)
Anna 3 — BCP PM0 SOP (DRAFT)
Annex 4 ICRC Visit SOP (DRAFT)
Annex 5 —Implementing detainee ops inspection program (DRAFT)
Annex 6 — Issuing detainee operations fragmentary order (DRAFT)

Standardized DetentionlCits, Detainee Air Priority Process,
Release program guidelines, Cap= guidelines,
Chain of custody analysis

Annex 7 — Bagram and Kandahar detention facilities renovation plans
Annex 8 — LLEC Review Board (DRAFT)
Annex 9 — Detainee Review Board SOP (DRAFT)

DOD JUNE 9 6 6
DENUUMENT OF DEFENSE
WIADCWARIERI.00111111401,10PIT TASK POP= te.-M9-r•
IACIPAll AMMO, APOMANISTAN
APO Al 01364

CJTF-76-CG
• MAY 1 9 2934
MEMORANDUM FOR BG JACOBY, DCG, CM-76
SUBJECT: Appointntent Order - Top to Bottom Review of C,FC-A AOR Detainee Operations
1.
At the direction of the Commander, CFC-A, I am appointing you to lead a top to bottom review of CFC-A AOR detainee operations. As you determine necessary, you are five to detail members of the CJTF-76 staff to support this investigation and conduct collateral xylem and evaluations. Further, all previous and contemporaneous inspecdon.s and investigirdons of detainee operations conducted th this theata are available for your review.

2.
You will review and evaluate detainee operations in CITF-76 AOR to ensure compliance with

CUrrent Vergional Pittance Ind DOD and Army regulations for the safeguarding of detainee,. Specifically, you will address focus areas articulated in PRAGO 48 to CFC OPORD 04-03 by evaluati6g the following lines of operation and supporting tasks.
L Requests for forces - address the requirements for command and control over all levels of
detainee operatic= to specifically include BCP and JIF operations; contractor support or melt' usessment team to provide technical expertise bi the area of prison security and detainee mental health and well being; and future ME? 6 and beneq) staffInt requirements for guard companies, a detainee operations /iFiD, and MP confinement specialists.
b.
Requests for training -dat can define and provide training for detainee guards, ASOTs/first echelon tactical questioning, iutd interrogator certification.

c.
Technology support -jdentlfv technology requirements to suppott security and interrogation operations across the C.T0A-

d.
FicilitY uPgrades Ad.MMI=IllIthaia=8ll81llllULIbRattalUIZI

oeerations facilities inclucling field detention points (spokes), area colleetionAnitial interrogation points (hubs), the Bagram theata collection point, and long-ierm Afghan detention facilities.
3. As part of your inspection, you will conduct weekly Pas and provide progress reposta through ma to the CFC-A CJ2 NLT every Wednesday, 1300Z. Your complete assessment should be finalized for my review NLT 15 June 2004, and should include the following outputs:
a. Recommendations, both specific and general, for immediate to long-terrn modifications/chants to theater detainee operations.
DOD JUNE 9 6 7
CTIT-76-CO SUBJECT: APPointinent Order - Top to Bottom Review of CFC-A AOR Detainee Operations
b.
Identification of best practices in al detainee operstions functional areas..

c.
Listing of conective actions taken with regard to detainee operations aod reporting procedures during the course of your investigation.

d.
Suggestions with regard to Rare commend efforts end initiatives necessary to monitor

detainee operations in an effort to ensure enduring adherence to operational and regulatoryguidance.
4. QUOStiOrd regarding this appointment, or requests fcc 'additional time to complete this investiption. should be coordinated directly with me.
ERIC T. OLSON MO, USA Commanding
2
DOD JUNE 9 6 8
180945EMAYD4
FROM COHCFC-A

TO COMCJIF76 BAGRAM AFGHIG//
CDR OMC-A//
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL AF//
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PK//

S-ECRET/NOFORN
OPERIENDURING FREEDOW
MSGID/GENADNIN/COMCJTF76 BAGRAM AFG//IG//
SOW/FRAU° 48 To crC oPORD 04-05 CoMCFC-A ASSESSMENT OF DETAINEES
OPERATIONS

1

I. (U) SITUATION. NO CHANGE.

1.A. (U) ENEMY. NO CHANGE.

1.B. (UI FRIENDLY: NO CHANGE.

2.
(0) MISSION. NO CHANGE.

3.
(U) EXECUTION.

3.A. (U) CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION. CJTE-76 WILL CONDUCT A SPECIAL INSPECTIoN OF DETAINEE OPERATIONS. THE PURPOSE IS TO REVIEW AND EVALUATE UNIT DETAINEE OPERATIM IN CFC-A AOR TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH DOD AND AAMY REGULATIONS roR THESAFEGUARDING or THE DETAINEES.
3.8..

TASKS TO CJTF-76.

3.B.1. ASSIGN'A GENERAL OFFICER TO LEAD AN INSPECTION TEAM TO PERFORM A

ToP-TO-BCTIOM REVIEN or ALL DETAINEE FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS IN THE CFC-
A CJOA.

3.B.1.A. ASSESSMENT WILL INCLUDE CJTF 76, CJSOTF, AND OCF DETAINEE
OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES.

3.8.1.B. (U) REV/EW AND ASSESS COMMAND AND CONTROL (OPORDS, SOPS,

TRAINING) AND TECHNIQUES, TACTICS AND PROCEDURES (TTP) USED IN DETENTION
OPERATIONS AND PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REVISIONS, MODIFICATIONS, OR
SuSTAINmENT.

3.8.1.C. (U) ASSESS mEDIcAL TREATmENT pROVIDED TO DETAINEES.

3.8.1.0. (0) EVALUATE CONFORM/TY TO /NTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS (ICRC) STANDARDS OF COMPLIANCE.

3.9.1.E. (U) REVIEN AND ASSESS FORNARD OPERATING EASE COLLECTION AREA
PROCEDUREs.
3.9.1.F. (U) REVIEW AND ASSESS SOLD/ER SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS AND DETENTION
FACILITY GUARD oRDERS.

3.B.1.G. (U) EVALUATE COMPLIANCE WITH OS RECOGNIZED STANDARDS OF
INTERNAT/ONAL NuMANITARIAN LAW.

APPLy IMNEDIATE CORRECTIVE AcTzON AND REPoRT CRITICAL ',Mum AREAS WHEN DISCOVERED. 3.8.1./. (D) DEVELOP BEST PRACTICES FOR CONDUCTING DETENTION OPERATIONS.
3.3.1.H..

3.B.I.J. (U) DEVELOP BASELINE REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS FOR MANNING, MAINTAINING, AND OPERATING DETENTION FACILIT/ES.
3.2.1.K. (U) PROVIDE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS OF
FAcILITIES.

3.B.2 (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

3.8.2.A. (U) CONDUCT WEEKLY IPRS AND PROVIDE PROGRES, REPORT TO CFC-A/C12
NLT EVERY wsg, 1300z.
3.8.2.8.1.4(41RF) TIMELINE: COMPLETE ASSESSMENT AND PROV:DE ALL
RECOMMENDATIONS To COMCFC-A NLT 15 JUNE 04.

4.
(U) SERVICE SUPPORT. NO CHANGE.

5.
(U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL. NO CHANGE.

f. U POC IS.CFC-c3 RATTLE MAJOR

7. (U) ACKNOWLEDGE.


SE,GREFONG;084...
Encl A - Frago48

DOD JUNE
969
CFC-A AO DETAINEE OPERATIONS
REPORT OF INSPECTION
DEFINITIONS
/. 4/(401'3)
PD.
i (q)(5)
3. F.nemy combatant (ECY - any person that the US or Allied forces could properly detain under the laws and customs of war. For purposes of this conflict, an EC includes, but is not limited to, a member or agent of al Qaeda, the Taliban, or another international terrorist organization against which the US is engaged in armed conflict The term enemy combatant does not confer enemy prisoner dm: status on persons taken WO custody by US forces in the USCENTCOM AOR pursuant to the global war on terrorism. 'The term "enemy combatant" is broad enough to encompass all individuals who are of custodial interest to the United States but who may not ultimately meet the SECDEF guidance for transfer to GTMO.
6. Detainees2 - person ve been screened and have completed in processing who no lon er meet c . • .111 • • • • • a as
there is no ambiguous status
Eitel C - Definitions
DOD JUNE 9 7 0
310.
I. LI CcYci
6. Under DoD Control6 - when an individual is either in the physical control of DoD, or, if in the physical control of another agency, has been designated by dte President or his designee for transfer to DoD conuol.
b. I
1.4161.6
)
8.
Releases - the process by which an individual, who has been determined no longer to pose a threat to the US or US interests, is released to a foreign government with no promise, in return, for continued deteation.

9.
Conditional rekase9 - the release of an EC svbo has been determined no longer to pose a threat to the US or US interests, under • promise or agreement of that EC not to take up arms, or panicipate in further fighting, against the US or its allies in exchange for freedom.

Encl C Defuitions
9 71
DOD JUNE
DOD055072
-SaINETIPMF-ORN-
DEPARTMENT OF DE.FENSE
COLINNEGUOINT TASK FORCE 180
OPERATION ENDURING FREE0081
SAGAMI WIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AN 09354

OJTF-160 SJA 27 March 2004
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: OJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
1. (U) Purpose. 'To provide guidance regarding detention criteria, handling, treatment, detainment, and intelligence gathering process for persons under control (PUes) in the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA) from their capture to release/transfer to

Guantanomo Bay (GTMO).
2. (U) References.
a.
(U) 66 F.R. 57833, Military Order of November 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trill of Certain Non-Citizens In the War Agalitst Terrorism, UnclassMed.

b.
(U) USCENTCOM, 090138Z Dec 01, FRAGO 02-029 Detainee Handling Procedures, Operation Enduring Freedom, SecreV/NOFORN.

c.
(U) CJCS, 082315Z Jan 02, implementing Guidance on DetaineeScreening and Processing for Transfem to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO), Secrett/NOFORN.

d.
(U) CJCS, 101319Z Jan 02, Rules of Engagement (ROE) Serial One for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) Detainee Operations, Confidential.

e.
(U) USCENTCOM, 240701Z Jan 02, USCINCCENT Guidance for Detainee Handling, Operation Enduring Freedom, SecreV/NOFORN.

(U) USCENTCOM, 251314Z Feb 02, CFC Detainee Operations Guidance,Secret//NOFORN.
g. (U) CJCS, 171400Z Apr 02, Poky and Guidelines tor Transfers of Detainees to
Foreign Govemment Control, Secreti/NOFORN.
h. (U) USCENTCOM, 19 Apr 02, Memorandum, Sublect: Detainee Release and Transfer Policy, Seccet/NOFORN.
I. (U) SECDEF, 101700Z Jun 02, Supplemental Public Affairs-Guidance (PAG) on Detainees, Secret//NOFORN,
‘6EGRETINO-FOEIN
(NCloSAvt-C,
DOD JUNE 9 7 2
DOD055073
CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operationa Standard Operating Procedures

j.
(U) USCENTCOM, 061317Z Oct 02, Detainee Visitation Approval Procedures,
Operation Enduring Freedom, SecreV/NOFORN.

k.
(U) CJCS, 0914252 Jan 03, Modification 1 to SECDEF Implementing Guidance
on Detainee Screening and Processing for Transfers of Detainees in Afghanistan, to
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO), Secret/M0FORN.

1. (U) CJCS, 181655Z Jan 03. Implementing Guidance for ROWING or Transfer of
Detainees Under U.S. Department of Defense Control to Foreign Govemmerd Control,
SecreV/NOFORN.

m.
(U) USCENTCOM, 101437Z Feb 03, Clarification Message to Modification 1 to
SECDEF Implementing Guidance on Detainee Screening and Processing for Transfers of
Detainees in Afghanistan, to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO), SecretIINOFORN.

n. (U) CJTF180, FRAGO 6 to OPORD 01-02, 040400ZJUNO2, Seoret/NOFOFiN.

o.
(U) CJTF180, CJTF180 Detainee Handling Guidance, 261800ZFEB04,
Unclasiified.

p. (U) Common Articie 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Unclassified.

q.
(U) USCENTCOM, 102133Z Jul 02, USCINCCENT Delegation of Authority toRelease Persons Under U.S. Control Who Do Not Meet SECDEF Detention Criteria, Secrett/NOFORN.

r.
(U) SECDEF, 21 April 2003, Memorandum, Low-Level Enemy Combatants,Secrel//NOFORN.

s.
(U) CJCS, 082315Z Jan 02, implementing Guidance on Detainee Screeningand Proc:essing for Transfers to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO),Sacret//NOFORN.

t.
(U) CJCS, 040002Z APR 03, Standing EXORD on Detainee Transfers. '7 Operation Enduring Freedom, Secret/NOFORN. •

u.
(U) CJTF-180 Authorized Interrogation Approaches and Strategies, 18 March2004, Secret/NOFORN.

3. (S/NF) Detention Criteria
?.6.1 j J. xleg)
2 frC-GREVNOR06115L.„
9 7 3
DOD JUNE
C.ITF-180-SJA SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
3 --GEGREENQBae&
b. i Lim
DOD JUNE 974

CJTF-1130-SJA SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
4. (S/NF) CJTF1B0 Detainee Handling Guidance.
3°0Y)
b. (U) Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, states that persons who are out of combat due to detention (captured) shall in all cases be treated humanely. (Reference P) In addition, the following acts are prohibited with respect to detained
persons:
1) (U) Violence to life and person, In Nuticular murder ol all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture.
4
-eeeRertter-oaa,
DOD JUNE 975
DOD055076
CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures

2) (U) Outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment.

c. (U) CJTF180 Detainee Handling Guidance (Reference 0) provides the
following:

1) (U) All personnel or units assigned, attached, OPCON, or TACON to CJTF180 will, under all circumstances, treat PUCa humanely and to the extant appropriate and consistent with military necessity and security requirements, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions of 1949. Under no cfrcumatances will PUCs be subjected to humiliating or degrading treatment
2) (U) Once transferred from the capture site, PUCs will be:
a) (U) Provided reasonable protection from the environment by placing them In interior holding areas or providing overhead protection from the sun and raln.
b) (U) Placed on a floor or other form of barrier material to protect them from the ground.
c) (U) provided blankets, clothing, foot covering, or other similar items as needed to protect them from the elements.
d) (U) If sensory deprivation is required, provided daricened goggles ardor earmuffs — NOT hoods, burlap sacks, or sandbags.
e) (U) Allowed to exercise basic personal hygiene and be given adequate access to latrine facilities.
I) (U) Provided opportunities for prayer. .
g) (U) Provided adequate food end water on a regular basis.
h) (U) Provided medical attention.
3) (U) Units whose missions may require them to capture PUCs obtain and stock supplies to meet the above standards at all Initial holding sites. Units that unexpectedly capture PUCs obtain these supplies as soon as possible after capture.
4) (U) The detaining unit will documerd compliance with paragraph 2 above for each PUC detained. A DA Form 1534 Journal le an appropriate tool to track PUChandling.
i) (U) Once a PUC is in the custody of CJTF180 personnel, the above
5
DOD JUNE 9 7 6
CJTF-180-SJA SUBJECT; CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
standards will apply regardless of the capturing organization or the organization
conducting the interrogation.
6) (U) If another organization requests, or in any way attempts to have CJTF180 personnel violate any of the above standards, such requests or attempts willimmediately be reported to HO, CJTF180.
d. (U) Protection from Harm. Defense of detainees from harm by third parties isrequired. (lAW References D and F)
b . I
I. q(co(d)
b. 1
1. ticqXci)
6. 1, Li 6)(01)
b. I /. /Ccl Yol
6 teCRE1'1149FORAI-
977
DOD JUNE
CJTF-1 80-SJA SUBJECT: CJTF-1 80 Detalnee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
7. (S/NF) Status ot Detained Persons. There are several major labels that might be given to a person detained by the United States. These labels Include the following:
1
q(q)(c
7 frEertETYNAFORN-
978
D OD JUNE
CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures

process. The 1SN is ultimately maintained by the National Detainee Reporting Center
(NDRC), which in theory provides the ICRC the Ust that gives them vielbillty of persons
currently being held by the U.S. The CJTF180 PMO Detainee Ops Section issues the
ISN. Prior to issuing the 1SN, the PM0 gives notice to all interested pardes.

L.
1. t164Xc
q 61Ye:
•. 6.1
g
8. (S/NF) Interr ation Techn ues. All technl ues can be found in Field Manual FM i. ikcirc
a ) SEOREFMGFAMI
DOD JUNE 979

CJTF-180-SJA SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
10
-fteREf410WRN--
DOD JUNE 9 8 0
CJTF-180-SJA SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedtxes
b.1 vq(4)(c)
107-(eff4I+Rules for the Use of Force (RUF)
a.
(U) Nothing In these rules limits a commandoes inherent authority and obligation to use aU necessary means available and to take ail appropriate action in self­defetute of the commandoes unit or other U.S. forces In the vicinity.

b.
(U) When the use of force is necessary, guards shall use the minimum wnount of force necessary to maintain discipline and compliance with detention facility rules. Such use of force wit be proportional in that it should be reasonable In Intensity, duration, and magnitude based on all facts known at the time.

c. (U) Waning shots are not authorized.

d.
(U) Use of hot control agents is authorized as a riot control Malan to protect and control detainees.

6. (U) Defense of detainees from harm by third parties is required.
f. (U) Circumstances permitting, the following options will be considered when
determining the appropriate amount of force used:
1) (U) verbal persuasion.
2) (U) unarmed defense techniques.
11 SeeRETINeFARN.
DOD JUNE
981
DOD055082
CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
3) (U) chemical aerosol Irritant projectors.
4) (U) MP/riot control dub..
6) (U) Tazers
8) (U) military woridng dogs.
7) (U) presentation of deadly force capability.
8) (U) deadly force.
g. (U) Deadly force is justified only under condtions of extreme necessity vihen:
1) (U) lesaer means have boon exhausted, are unavailable, or cannot reasonably be employed; and
2) (U) the risk of death or serious bodily injury to Innocent portions is not significantly increased by use; and the purpose of ks use Is one or both of the following:
e) (U) when deadly force appears necessiuy to protect U.S. forces who reasonably believe themselves or others to be In imminent threat of death or serious bodily ham by the hostile delainee(s); or
b) (U) when deadly force appears necessary to prevent the escape of detainees/PUCs.
3) (U) The detention facility commander must ensure that each detainee understands the meaning of the English word 'halt.' In the event of an escape attempt, apply the folknvIng rules for the use of force:
a) (U) Shout 'hal? three (3) times. Thereafter,
b) (U) Use least amount of force necessary to halt detainee.
c) (U) If there Is no other effective means of preventing escape, deadly
force may be used. •
b. 1.4(00(c)
12 -SECRET/NORWIN•
DOD JUNE 9 82

CJTF-180-SJA SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
b. 1
).qcfxe)
b
q(cii(c
13 -seatertrieFeRN-
DOD JUNE 983

CJTF-180-SJA SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operalions Standard Operating Procedures
d. Procedures.
15 8EGFIETINOPORN
DOD JUNE 9 84
CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
h. q (4)
2) Non-Govemmental Agendas (NGO). The ICRC observes the repatriation and logs each pemon who returns from GTMO. The ICRC also provides each detainee with traditional clothing that they can wear once released from U.S. custody. UNICEF will be Involved when minors are being repatriated.
14. ( Fijiintemational Committee of the Rod Cross (1CRC). The 1CRC Is the only age outsIde ot the U.S. government authorized access to PUCa and detainees. (SeaReferences F and N).
a. ICRC liaison. Each facility conducting detainee operations will appoint an
!CRC liaison. (Reference N) By doctrine. the ICRC liaison is a Judge Advocate. TheICRC liaison for the Bagram Collection Point is tha C4TF180 detainee operations Judge
16 -SECRETtNerCAN•
DOD JUNE
9 8 5
DOD055086
CulTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
Advocate. The ICRC liaison for Kandahar, If necessary, Is the maneuver task force trial counsel.
b. Frequency of Visits. Pursuant to international law, the duradon and frequency ' of visits shd not be limited. (Reference N) However, the Judge Advocate nelson and the ICRC may coordinate for mutually convenient dmss tor visits, as operational needs dictate. The ICRC typically visits every seven to ten days, and the visits typically last from one to three days. The frequency and duration of the visits Is set by the ICRC depending on the nurnber of PUCs and detainees as well as the availability of ICRC
interpreters.
Li
b
17 semeritiefeitti-
DOD JUNE 9 8 6

CJTF-180-SJA SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
1, a

-
DOD JUNE 987
CJTF-180-SJA SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard OperatIng Procedures
19
-eecRertNeffeRt+-
988
DOD JUNE
CJTF-180-SJA SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
.2.
e. interim meetings/sessions. There are occasions when the CRC.visit
Elagram between regularly scheduled visits. Examples of such occasions Include:
1) Detainee deaths
? b.I
3 1. 4/(1)
4) Eld holiday (to deliver food)
5) Meetings with the SJA or CG
AIM
f. There are occasions when the CRC liaison will visit the ICRC outside of
Bagram. Mounples of such occasions include:

1) Delivery of remains to famines (outlying provinces)
2) 1CRC Mine Action Center, Kabul
3) ICF1C Prosthettc Clinic, Kabul
g. Letters from the ICRC. The ICRC will occaelonalty send letters to CJTF180 concerning detainee operations Lssues. Typically, these letters are addressed from the Head of the Afghanistan Delegation to the Commanding General of CJTF180. Examples
of such letters Include:
20 -SeeRfffilltWCAlt
989
DOD JUNE
DOD055090

CJTF-180-SJA
SUBJECT: CJTF-180 Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures
1) The 8-month Review. This fetter provides a comprehensive review of
detainee Issues that arose over the past sbc months.
2) Interim letters.
a) Dec 02 — concern over detainee deaths
b)Jan 02 — request for location of Wiliness alleged to be in U.S. cuatody
c) Mar 03 — allegations of mistreatment at safe houses
d) Request for access to HVTri.
3) JCS/CENT'COM Letters. Occasionally, the ICRC will send a letter to

D.C. CJTF180 will assist CENTCOM arid JCS legal in response to ICRC Inquiries
directed to D.C.

bC,iiiiiiiiiiiiimi
nemorandum Is the undersigned at
Encl
LTC, JA
Staff Judge Advocate
LTC, MI Director of Intelligence
Task Force Guardian Commander
21
SECREPNOFORN
9 9 0
DOD JUNE
DOD055091

CJTF 76 cn
18 MAY 2004
Information Paper
SUBJECT: Background Information on All Facilities and Sites Held by DOD in
Afghanistan Since January 2001
1.
(U)Purpose. To give an understanding of the locations of all detention sites held by
DOD ln Afghanistan since January 2001.

2.
(U)Facts.

a. (U)Since January 20, 2001, Combined Joint Task Force 76 (previously C.ITF-
180) has used 19 separate temporary facilities to hold Person Undor U.S. Control
(PUCs) and one semi-permanent facility to hold PUCs, Low Level Enemy Combatants
(LLECs) and Enerny Combatants (EC) avraiting transfer to Guantanamo ea

1 I Lob)
b I I q(q)(9)
d. (S/REL)11111 have also been while undergoing battlefield interrogation or Initially , these field detention sites were &Tilted to a simple structure of concertina wire end
q ox5 tentage for protection from the elements. Over time, some of the more active facilities have been improved to provide better security and afford better treatrnent and protection from the elements for the held there. However, for the majority, these
SEeRET-REL--GOTF-
End r. -Detention Taal). Locations aod Bockground Info

9 9 1
DOD JUNE
SECRET REL GCTF
-I •-•.- do s• se e-s •
are temporary structu I -g it • • requirements
SECRET REL GCTF
End E - Detention Fue1111) Locations and Background Info
9 9 2
DOD JUNE DOD JUNE 9 9 3
Enclosure F

Exemption Public
Document

13.
(U) USCENTCOM, 101437Z Feb 03, Clarification Message to Modification 1 to SECDEF Implementing Guidance on Detainee Screening end Processing for Transfers of Detainees in Afghanistan, to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base (GTMO), Seccetl/NOFOFtN.

14.
(U) CJTF180, FFtAGO 6 to OPORD 01-02, 040400ZJUNO2,
Secretl/NOFORN.

15. (U) CJTF180, C.17180 Detainee Handling Guidance, 201800FESO4,
Unclassified.

18. (U) Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Unclassified.
17.
(U) USCENTCOM, 102133Z Jul 02, USCINCCENT Delegation of Authority to Release Persons Under U.S. Control VVho Do Not Meet SECDEF Detention Criteria, Secreti/NOFORN.

18.
(U) SECDEF, 21 April 2003, Memorandum, Low-Level Enemy Combatants. Secret//NOFORN.

19.
(U) CJCS, 082315Z Jan 02, Implementing Guidance on Detainee Transfers, Operition Enduring Freedom, SecretUNOFORN.

20.
(U) CJCS, 040002Z APR 03, Standing EXORD on Detainee Transfers, Operation Enduring Freedom, SecretNNOFORN.

21.
(U) CJTF-180 Authorized Interrogation Approaches and Strategies, 18 March 2004, Secret//NOFORN.

Encl -References
9 9 5
DOD JUNE
996
DOD JUNE
CJTF 1 80-SJA
20 April 2003
Information Paper
SUBJECT: SECDEF Detention Criteria

-64441-6-I
Encl I - SECDEF Screening Criteria Info Paper

997
DOD JUNE
DOD055098
Enclosure J
Exemption B 1

DOD JUNE 998
• 1 May 2004 From: Colonel mmanding Officer, CTF Stonewall To: Battalion ommanders and Provincial Reconstruction Team Commanders
Subj: Handling of Persons Under Control (PUCs)
Ref (a) Recent press releases from Iraq on the mistreahnent of PUCs

1. Commanders, following is my guidance for the handling of PUCs:

L We will condone to treat all PUCs professionally within the guidelines of CJTF 180 directives and the Geneva Convention.
b.
We will not dishonor the American military through the mistreatment of PUCs.

c.
We cannot and will not alloy/ Ely of our personnel to compromise himself or hernelf or CTF Stonewall by mistreating PUCs.

d.
We will not stand idly by if we witness mistreatment of PUC3 by other American or Coalition Forces.

e.
Any mistreatment of PUCs must be reported via the chain of command or directly to the Stonewall COC and SJA.

1. ye cannot afford to be detracted from our mission by an incident involving inhumane or humiliating treatment of PUCs.
2. Therefore, review CJTF 180 FRAGO 274 regading the handling of PUCs in this AO.
L Stonewall fortes have a duty and an obligation under applicable international law . to ensure that persons captured or detained by US forces are treated htunanely and not subject to torture or czuel, humiliating, or degrading titIttMCDt.
b.
Detainees will be provided reasonable protection from the elements by placing them in interior bolding areas or providing overhead protection from the sun and rain.

c.
They will be provided medical attention, .food, water, blankets, clothing and foot coverings to protect them from the elements.

d.
If sensory deprivation is required, provide blindfolds or darkened goggles,
earmuffs or earplugu.

e.
Hoods, sandbags, burlap sacks are not authorized at field holding sites or during later movement to another PUC facility.

f.
PUCs will be allowed to practice basic hygiene and given adequate access to latrine facilities and time for prayer.

g.
Interrogations will be conducted in accordance with DoD guidelines.

3. I expect each tutit to plan ahead and have on band sufficient supplies w provide for PUCs buic needs.
a.
It should not come as a surprise to us after operating in this AO that many PUCs will require certain items such as blankets, clothing, etc. in order to comply with this guidance.

b.
As professionals, we must plan ahead for these actions. If you need supPort. mY staff stands ready to assist you.

c.
Nothing speaks louder than daily Professional Military Conduct in the execution of all our duties!

End K - Example Commander's Guidance
DOD JUNE
9 9 9
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DOD JUNE 1015 DOD JUNE
1016
DOD055117
Encl N - CITF-1130 Ouidanc.o
1017
DOD JUNE
Encl N - CJTF-I 80 Guidance
DOD JUNE 1018
Encl N - C.T17-180 Guidance
DOD JUNE 1019
Enclosure 0

Exemption B3 10 USC 130c
Enclosure P

Exemption B5

.0
DOD JUNE 1021
-SECRET/11,40PORR"
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMINNED/JOiNT TASK FORCE (CATF}IsoOPERATION ENDURING FREEDOIA LAMM. AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN

APO AE 08354
CJTF-180-DCG 16 March 2004
MEMORANDUM FOR SEE DISTRIBUTION
SUI3JECT: CJTF-180 Authorized Interrogation Approaches and Strategies
1. Purpose. The purpose of this document is to Identify approved interrogation techniques and stretegies to be used at Battlefleld Interrogation lies throughout the CJTF-180 AOR and at the
Joint Interrogation Foci* located In Sagram, Afghanistan.
2. References.
a.
FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, dated 28 September 1892.

b.
Working Group on Detainee Interrogations In the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),

dated 15. January 2003
c. Counter Resistance Techniques In the War on Terrorism, dated 18 AptIl 03.
b.

J.
L (q)(66)

4. Battlefield Int •.•
ffieltiiT4940FGAN-
cp
DOD JUNE 10 2 2

Enclosure Q

Attachment
Exemption B 1

Enclosure R
Exemption B5

DOD JUNE 1024
Copy of _Copies
125th MI BN
BAP, Afghanistan
13 1000 (Z) June 2004
Change 1, FRAGO 24 (Interrogation Guidence) to OPORD 04407 {A.GHAN MS)
1. SITUATION:
A. Friendly: No Change.
2.
MISSION: No Change.

3.
EXECUTION: No Change.

C.ommanders Intent: All units in 1256 BN will strictly adhere to the following interrogation guidance and approved techniques. Teelmiques not explicitly described in this order will not be used without express approval from the Cammander-12r BN and Commander-CITF76.
A. Tuks to Subordinate Units.
1. Only qualified school-trained interrogators will conduct buerrogadoos. Interrogations will only take place inside ofthe controlled environment of CTIF76 approved interrogadon facilities.
SECRET-Itt443FORI÷
1
Encl S - 1-25 MI FRAGO 14 June 2004

DOD JUNE
1025
DOD055126
SERREriffieFORN—
FRA00 24 TO OPORD 04-007 (AFGHAN EYES)

6. ; q143(e)
B. Coordinating Instructions. No Change.
4.
SERVICE SUPPORT: No Change.

5.
COMMAND AND SIGNAL: No Change.

BC
OFFICIAL
GATES
S3

Srlei=afaRti,
2
Earl S - 1-25 MI FRAGO 14 June 2004

DOD JUNE 10 2 6
DOD055127
FOUO
APPENDDC A (Tactical Questioning Procedures and Requirements) to FRAGO 24 (Interrogation Guidance)
1.SCOPE: (U) The following techniques are approved for non-intertogation trained personnel. It is important to note that improper, unlawful, or inept attempts at field exploitation can hann or destroy potential critical intelligence sources, and send US soldiers to prison. Any decision to attempt these procedures is a command responsibility.
2.
DEFINITION: Tactical questioning is the effott to obtain comtsat information of immediate use to the battalion or subordinate unit by a senior intelligence professional. It is important to note that tactical questioning is not an bate:rogation.

3.
PURPOSE:

i ). q (exc.)
4. Tactical Questioning (TQ).
6,1 (4-04-1-
b. a 0144 )
c. (U) PUCs are medically screened and provided necessities 1AW with dte Geneva Convention, i.e. food and water.
A-1
DOD JUNE
1027
DOD055128
APPENDDC B (Interrogation Procedures and Requirements) to FRAGO 24 (Interrogation
Guidance)

1.
SCOPE: (U) The following techniques ate approved for interrogation. It is important
to note that improper, unlawful, or inept attempts at field exploitation can harm or destroy
potential critical intelligence sources, Ind send US Soldiers to prison. Any decision to
attempt these procedures is a command responsibility.

2.
DEFINITION: (SIIREL OCTF) interrogations are conducted by trained interrogators
in an attempt to elicit specific intelligence information.

3.
INTERROGATIONS:

L (S/iNF) Safeguards. kiterrogation techniques are suiVect to the following
safeguards:

10.1
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DOD JUNE
10 2 8
DOD055129
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DOD JUNE 1029
,
1030
DOD055131
APPENDIX C (Joint Interrogation FacWty CHF) Interrogations Procedures and
Requirements) to FRAGO 24 (Interrogation Guidance)
1. SCOPE: (U) The following techniques are approved for interrogation trained
posonnel assigned to the Joint Interrogation Facility, Bagram, Afghanistan. It b
important to note that improper, unlawiW, or inept attempts at exploitation can harm or
destroy potential critical intelligence sources, and send US Soldiers to prison. Any
decision to attempt these procedures is a command responsibility.

b.

I.
q6.`10:3)

anummaf
3. PURI'
. OSE:
L To conduct tactical and strategic interrogations based on the intelligence requhements and specific guidance from the CJ2.
4.IV INTERROGATIONS:
WiNF) SafelNards. Interrogation techniques are subject to the follosving safeguards.
C-1
DOD JUNE
1031
DOD055132
1. L/01.11c )
(6) The following are the only approach strategies approved for use in the Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF) by trained interroption personnel only:
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HEADQUARTERS
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ATTORCNOP

CJTF7 • CG 13 !day 2004
MEMORANDUM FOR
Ca Combined Joint Task Force Seven, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
C3, Combined Joialask AMOS SOM.:8441dg h.aq °9335
Commander, 504thlifiliney Intelligencellripde, Baghdad, Iraq 09335
Conlmendetsi Woe SUVOi4insieConunaods
SUBJECT: ent4 lotaroption abd Counter-Resistance Policy
1. f31/14,171bis meutorandons establishes the:10szept* and sountitmeadammo policy for all security internees afder the control Of iirtalizinada thccomniend'ind control. of CJTF-7 and successor organizations, tehinchide the tAN17.-. Secinitrbtlentainte.eiviliane:wbo ire deteined pursuant tO Ardcles and 73 of the &nail Coityaiitioateltitivo to the Protectionlif Civilian Pawns in time °riga of August 12, 1949 (berdnafteiClatevi Convatdos). •
241L13194 approve the use of specified interrogation and counter-resistance swatches as descnIed in Enclosure 1, relating to security internees, subject to the fbilowing:
a.41i1F}Use °Muse approaches is husked tO interrogitions of satiity internees.under the =viol of CYTF-7.
b.(511/NPfTbese.approaches must beused in combinatiortivith the safagitards described inEnclosure 2.
c)
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DOD JUNE 1 0 3 5
4.01 A.CLAsS,P,ED
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SUBJECT: C1TF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy
1.4
d. (mann employing cob of theenthorized approaches, the inter:op.:or must maintain control of** intaroiption. intenogalor should appear to be the one who control all aspects of the interropdon, to include the lighting, hoodoo anti configuration of the interrogation room, as wdl as the food, clothing and shelter given to the security internee.
3.cliabirriteouests for us* of apt:coaches not listed in Enclosure 1 will be submitted to me through CJTF-7 C2, and will include a description of die proposed approach and tecommender safeguards. A. legal TtViell bun the CifF..7 SIA will ac.company est/ meat Under no circumstances vnil the foSowingintarogslidirtedmiquck*.* eved.or u41#0d: Meg) .
managentent, SIMS porldens, change ofscenery, diet roadpuistion, CAVErOritaelt asafpuision or sensory deprived=
4.417Nodting in thia policy limits ccisdng authority far maintenance of good order and discipline mons persons under Coalition. antriol .
• 5 (SAffe This polio)? sopa:soli:5.th* CJTY-thateartgatirm and Ciannerriterriitenco Policy iigned on 13 October .2003.
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biterrogadon Approacher (S1) thaitirientlIeneial, USA

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Otneed Commanding


CF: Commander, US Central Command

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Enclosure I
GENERAL SAFEGUARDS
(floW4f1)-Applicadon of these interrogation approaches is subject to the Salinvitult Selletet
safeguards:

(i) limited to use by specifically trained interroptiottpersonnek(ii) theta Is a-Namable basis to believe that dm security hussies pompon informatiorsof intelligence value; (lb) the saeurity internee is medically evaluated's:it suitable andidatrfor intmalgatiorqgelleidetinfi sa approaches to be used incombinadon); (iv) spite* iitarroAticin plan, includingreasonable safeguezds, limits on duration. intervals between applimainns. teetaillidou ethane eed the presence or avatiability of qualified medial personnel has been developed: and (v) Mara is
appropriate supervision.
MTh& purpose ()fall ioneviews and intscrogations tato get the most information front a
sectaity intenset with the lout intensive method. applied in a humine and linvful manner with
sufficient oversight by trained invenipthis or inteaogatoes. bteaoplors and supavisory
personnel will ensure uniform. emefolourd safe canduCtOf interroptinns.

FAffirinterroptionsmust ahvays be planned, Obligate actions that take into account factors such as* security intenieseacurrent and pest perfprmaneein both detention rind interropdan; a searity internee's emationei
pbyeiciletrengths;aed weskierms4.asiessermat of appear*
end iedivideel.teciteitleel thst IffectfrefitreePlaiiii weaknesses iifintniogaton; sad
factors which may =cambia:the supurmation ape:stunt&

(rbet0)-Interrogatioa approubm snitssigned se maktipalate the Newby internee's =notions andweeloseues to pin.
acopenition.'hirerrogedon operations are never conducted in a •vacuum; they arm In close coppenitirm wide* detainingomits. Detention regdations
and policies. .
*hi Ohindribiliaittopiaed to Mien consistency with die
iatetrogatiottivelicieaUffbeintelligascermilectionsmit: flunk mirmistiney WillhelP.taMaximize
the welthitt5"tethe interrnpliarrienn Bathe effeadvieless ofdiebbinogitien. Strict
adherence to such repnitions, policies and standard apemen procedures is essential.

(WU Inteaogstors nnut appeerto compkrtely cannot ths intonapdam environment. lt
importent drat Interroptars be•provided•reasonable letabde-to vary eppoiebet depeseding on the
security interneee cultural backirmundstringibs, weaknesses, envimernent, extent of resistance
training es well =the tugencY with whirl information believed in the possess/clot the secutity

internee must be obtained

{Stiarkbenroguars must ensure the eafeey of security intemens. and approaches num in no way endanger them. bterroptors will arm= that pecutity intetiesiare allowed adequate sleep end that &as provide adequate food and water same= no Orem Medics& iir eultureleffects.
Wham soirsgstion nacessary, aecazity isstesessi:suust inositssesed ler adv.'s. seediest or psychigegiCal ructions Should:unitary worldng dop.be:presett during interroptions, they will be mundad and imiler control of a bugler at an dmes to ensure Wiry. • 5
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DOD JUNE
1039
DOD055140
1.4iVeadf/P7940
Enclosure 2
LA . %Wit While approaches are considerediadividually within this analysis, it must be understood that in Placdce. approaches are usually used in combination. The tide of a particular approach is not always fully descriptive of a particular approach. The cumnladve effect of all approaches tobe employed must be conridered before say decision is made regarding approval of a particular
Interruption plan.
6
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DECL ON: 03 JUN 04
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DOD JUNE 1043
DOD055144
FM CJEF180//P140//CJ3//
MAU CFC-A//C3/
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OPER/ENDURING FREZDOW
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMCJTF180 BAGRAM AFG//CJ3//
SigingnitainitaNA STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT(SAV)FROM THE PROvOST
MARSHAL GENERAL OFFICE TO ASSESS THE INTERNAL OPERATIONS OF TEE
DETA/NEE DETENTION FACILITIES IN THE OEF-A CJOA.
MARA/1. (S) REDOIST A STAFF ASSISTANCE VISIT (SAV) FROM THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL OFFICE TO ASSESS THE INTERNAL OPERATIONS OF TRE DETAINEE DETENTION FACILITIES IN THE OEF-A CJOA. ASSESSMENT WILL
INCLUDE FACILITIES AT BAGMAN, KANDAHAR, AND FORWARD OPERATING SASES
(F08) HOLDING AREAS. ASSESSMENT SHOULD FOCUS ON INTERNAL DETENTION FACILITY OPERATIONS AND STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF EXISTING rAcrurxes, TO INCLUDE A UMW OF PLANS FOR FUTURE DETAINEE DETENTION FACILITIES. ASSESSMENT TEAM SHOULD ALSO REVIEW THEATER WIDE DETAINEE OPERATIONS AND
ADVISE mr-tso ON RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO BETTER STREAMLINE DETAINEE
b. I
I. q (q.
4. 10) POCS ARE MAU .CJT DPNOCJTF180.ARMY.SM.IL,. DSN:.OR DSN (SECURE) OR LTC CJ7F180 RATIONS, CJTF180- 3 t'iloye.) bc, 1)2_
CHOPE8CJTF180.ARM.SMIL.MIL DSN
S. (U) ACKNOWLEDGs.

OLSON, MG,

OFFICIAL:1MS CJ3 . 640.
END OF MESSAGE

DRV FM: NSA/CSSM 123-2
Dated: 12 MAY 04
DECL ON: 12 MAY 14
SEGRETANOFEIRitt End - Request for MTT
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