Internal FBI Memorandum re: Darkening Clouds; MC 199; IT-Iraq

DECLASSIFIED EY 65179 DI _'3, 17JS
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Tof Counterterrorism 'From: Counterterrorism
Re: ' 66F-HQ-C1416754-H, 09/11/2003
Precedence:: PRIORITY Date: 09/11/2003
To: Counterterrorism
From: Counterterrorism
Fly Team, Operational Response SAntion
Contact: Poi
Approved By: ' Gebhardt Bruce J
Mefford Larry A
Pistole.John S
Harrington Thomas J
Battle Frankie
199E-HQ-.1404383
Title: Darkening Clouds;
.MC 199
1T-Iraq
Synopsis: To establish guidelines and protocols for all FBI operational activity in Iraq..
sify
Reference: 199E-HQ-140438.3 serial 204:
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U) tat}s: During the month of July 2003; ASC and UC1 ( . b rC
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conducted' an on-scene inspection of the Iraq Tas orce F) in Doha,..Qatar
and Baghdad, Iraq. The primary purpose of the assessment was to evaluate and
assess the current situation in Iraq and make any necessary adjustments to the-miSsion
and direction of the ITF: Three months after the major thrust of the military campaign in
Iraq . had concluded, the circumstances and investigative imperatives had changed to a
large degree and necessitated a transition in the focus of the IT.F.
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T_T) Based•n the findings of A/S and consultation b7C
with CTD management the following policy is ou ined specifically for ITF.
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• Re: 66F-HQ-C1416754-H, 09/1'1/2003
The ITF was initially created in order to expeditiously exploit any
intelligence available as the United States and coalition forces moved into Iraq. The
concept was to conduct document seizure'missions of designated sensitive sites in Iraq
primarily known Iraq Intelligence Service (IIS) locations and to immediately triage those
documents•in the ITO in an effort to identify any threat to the US or US interests. •
.Ancillary components of the ITF mission were to exploit, any computer media obtained '
and to thoroughly interview any captured IIS personnel.
As of 7/9/2003, all documents obtained by the FBI through Sensitive'
Site Exploitation (SSE), or any other means, for which the FBI - was responsible for the .
initial processing•via established DoD protocols, had been processed and provided to -
DoD: Intervi ws of IIS personnel continue.
Pa The ITO remains an' extremely dangerous and volatile environment'
. where:communications are difficult, and logistical and support structures are limited.
. The scope of terrorism, intelligence and criminal priorities for the' FBI continue to
increase. .Based on'the on-scene inspection, as well' as input from. the current
On-Scene Commander and the International Terrorism Operations Section II, the
current priorities for the ITF are delineated as follows:
1) Interviews of High Value Detainees (HVD)and individuals of
interest; ,. • 2) Assist U.S. Government Doc-Ex activities; •
3) Assist COalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and .Iraqi Authorities
with terrorist investigations', 'including • scene processing; bl
4) Support of specialized Do perations, as defined herein.
Interviews of High Value Detainees .
(U) tzi In addition to forrrier high level regime members, other individuals from
a variety of categories can be designated as HVD's: These include indicted FBI •
fugitives and individuals who may have recently entered Iraq to perpetrate acts of
and have been taken into custody. •
The interviews of these HVD's for reasons of prevention, prosecution,
intelligence gathering and background are a high priority for the US Government and
--the FBI. Approximately 92 HVD's are currently detained by DoD in a compound at the :
Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). Typically it requires multiple interviews, over a
period of in order to glean •all possible information and intelligence from these
HVD's,. This is complicated by the need for Arabiodanguage translators to facilitate
each interview and, in many instances, for subject matter expertise on the part of the
interviewer in order to be fully effective.
Assist in Doc Ex Activities
The Iraq Survey Group (ISG)'has been tasked by the-Administration •
and DoD to locate WMD in Iraq. To accomplish this, the ISG has created an analytical
element to receive, analyze and exploit all intelligence from all sources within the ITO.
. This includes volumes of information derived from past and ongoing interviews of
sources, assets and HVD's, as well as some SIGINT, and all document exploitation.
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S ) Support of specialized Do eratioris to include SSE's and the 'ca•ture of FBI
fugitives. . . bl
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• To: Counterterronsn. ;:rom: Counterterrorism
Re: 66F-HQ-C1416754-H, 09/1.1/2003 .
Due to its enormous mandate, the only action WMD 'driven •
information and intelligence.. In the process of searching for WMD, other tremendously
important information will be discovered by the ISG. The FBI must be in a position to
.immediately receive and action all information of investigative and intelligence import to
the FBI, or there is tremendous risk that any opportunity to exploit this information will
be lost.
This is especially critical regarding the document exploitation
component o the ISO. Beginning in July 2003, when all DoD document exploitation in
the ITO was placed under the purview of the ISG, two Central Media Processing ••
Centers (CMPC) were established - one'in Baghdad and one in Doha, Qatar. These .
two centers evolved frot what had previously been the DoD/DIA driven DocEx .effort.
These two centers are responsible for processing all of the documents
and compute( media acquired in Iraq. In. mid-July 2003, in Baghdad' alone, there were
over 200 batches of•documents that filled a 10,000 square foot warehouse at the
CMPC Baghdad. A batch can consist of 2 documents or 250 boxes of documents, a
large quantity of which have not.been properly catalogued due to the frenetic combat
conditions under which most of these documents were seized during the initial weeks of
hostilities. .
It is necessary for the FBI to integrate into the ISG analytical element
in Iraq, as well as the CMPC in both Baghdad and Doha. This assures FBI access to
virtually all intelligence and information available to the USIC in Iraq..
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Assist Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and Iraqi Authorities with terrorist
investigations, including crime scene processing. •
There are multiple indicators, to include .
continuous in elligence reporting and recent terrorist acts, that
indicate an influx of radical Islamic terrorists into the ITO•is occurring at an alarming rate. Currently there are four bomb , -. •
scene inVestigations'ongoing in the-ITO, requiring a majority of.
the investigative resources. The requested resources include,
'investigators, bomb technicians; explosive experts, and on scene'
evidence collectiOn.
Proactive interviews, intelligence gathering and,
•sharing, assistance to other government agencies and the vetting
of threat reporting are occurring on a daily basis. These
efforts directly subscribe to.the FBI mandate of preventing.
future acts of terrorism,
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Numerous proactive tactical operations are '
•- occurring within-the ITO by DOl I These operations often
have a direct bearing on the furtnerance of the FBI's
counterintelligence (CI) and counterterrorism (CT) mission.
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Re: 66F-HQ-C1416754-H, 09/1112003
Often these operations are the 'only opportunityto,obtain -
information directly relating to ongoing FBI investigationS and •
CT and CI mandates. -
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After a'case by case review, and with the'Specific
,approval of FBI OSC, and AD Counterterrorism,'FBI Agents will
support these operations to facilitate the timely exploitation of
documents-and electronic media. These' exploited items will be .
:processed through established' standard operational procedures
. (SOP1 s)•. These areas•will be physically secured by DOD prior to'
introduction of • FBI exploitation teams. The. FBI is not to -
participate 'in proactive combat operations and will not enter on-
:Scene until it 'iSsecure. For safety reasons, FBI Agents will
travel under the force protection of •OD• All aspects of any
operation where the FBI provides a supporting role will be bl
S) closely coordinated-{ knd DOD prior to integration.
These operations are designated as SSE's. FBI participation in
S•E's has been previously approved Via Operation'Order 1015
located in file 199E-HQ-140'4383,Serial 204.
The OSC also has the authority,. .upon receiving
approval the AD, CTD. to assign FBI a.gents to DoD specialoperational
'group known as Task Force 20, soon to be renamed Task.
Force 121. This integration, or fusion, has been . requeSted'on. I
several occasions by DoD command staff to the OSC in the:ITO.
FBI• personnel bring investigative, experience,. investigative'
resources; and subject'matter expertise, that greatly enhances
the ability of Task Force 20 to locate and,apprehend HVT's, and
disrupt terrorist operations and cells. Conversely, Task•Force
20 provides.the FBI the ability to safely conduct" significantCT
'and CI investigations in a dangerdus environment with no reliable
civilian infrastructures. Often these investigations are dynamic
and produce perishable intelligence,that requires subject matter
expertise and investigative experience in order-to identifY,
opportunities in a timely manner. This full-time int'egration'has
proven successful in both Afghanistahsand YeMen. FBI agent
personnel will not conduct any supportive role with Task Force
20, outside secure DoD'facilities without the specific' authority
of, the FBI OSC and the' AD CT. Again to reiterate the FBI is-not.
to.participate in proactive . combat operations.
Command and Control:
(U) The On-Scene Commander (OSC) iS command. of,the
'FBI assets in theater and will•be faced with a myriad of
operational matters whereupon decisions will have to be made'
daily. The OSC will be responsible for approving all FBI reports ,
. to FBI Headquarters, will approve all requests for substantial -
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Re: 66F-HQ-C1416754-H, 09/11/2003.
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resource enhancements, and will be .respOnsible for all in theater.
_fiscal matters. No FBI personnel will travel off BIAP without_
the approval.of the OSC or the Deputy OSC. Although the OSC ha's
necessary operational latitude, no investigative efforts outside
-EhascOpe . of this document shall be undertaken without the '
,approval of the ASsistant Director of the Counterterrorism
Division. •
(U) The FBI Deadly Force policy is in effece for all
•agents operating in the ITO. Thisfpolicy has been. completely
articulate in Operation Order•1015 located in file • •
199E-HQ-1404383 Serial 20'4.. . - • -
Personnel:
(U) The OSC working with CTD's•Operational Response
Section must ensure the following functions are fully staffed in
Iraq:
'(U) Although DoD has reiterated its commitment - to
provide medical support: it remains extremely beneficial to'the
overall health of all FBI personnel to maintain. the presence of a'
medically trained agent.. •
Arabic Language Support personnel will provide
translation services for the interviews of the HVD's, and provide
any other translation requirements as necessary.. It.is of
critical importance to maintain FBI language capability in the .
ITO, for both investigative- matters' and integration into the ISG
analytical element and the CMPC.
,(U) Communications will be maintained by CRU. These -
individuals are rotated. into theater -on a'separate basis from the .
overall agent deployments - providing necessary overlap. All of
the communication equipment is provided and maintained by CRU.
' • (U) .HRT will provide personnel security and coordinate
all movements outside the safe zone . of Baghdad International
AiLport (BIM)).
(U) The Fly Team will provide investigative expertise
for each rotation.
(U) The OSC will be required to ' Consult with the CTD
Operational Response Section in regards to any additional . •
personnel requirements.,
Training: •
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To: Counterterrorism From: CounterterroriSM
'Re:: 66F-HQ-C1416754-H, 09/11/2003
(U) All FBI personnel prior to their deployment to
Iraq'must successfully complete the following:. '
(U) Conus Replacement Center (CRC) .training from the
U.S. military which-includes, - specialized.military training in
which,agents receive military identification, equipment, medical
.screening and NMD.training. The FBI conducts predeployment
training for personnel prior to entering the ITO. This:training
Include•twu -days concentrating on: the.following:
Briefings from. the Middle East Operations Unit/ITOS.
-II/CTD on Iraq and appropriate investigative issues;
HRT training regarding weapons,familiarization,
movement dril"l.s and emergency, action scenarios;
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and medics.
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utilizing
'Medical,training regarding preventative. measures
concerns specific to the ITO;' and
Training' regarding the scanning of dOcuments.
BI equipment and SOP!s for the
_Summary:
This document outlines. the priorities for:the FBI
.within the ITO, and further articulates that no investigative-
.efforts outside the Scope of these priorities will occur Without
the,approval . of the Ab/CTD. All FBI personnel must obtain prior:
approval from the. OSC or Deputy OSC to travel outside of BIAP: •
Agents.are to operate under the FBI's standard deadly force
. policy while in the ITO.' FBI agent personnel.can provide.limited
support. to DoD and other' government agencies during, approved
operations.
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