Internal FBI Memorandum re: CTORS/MLDU, FBIHQ-Afghanistan

(Rev. 1-31-2003)
DATE: 07-23-2009
dLA2::5IFI2E, EY 65179 ETHINS
RE.00N: 1.4 (c) -
DECLASSIFY UN: 07-23-2034
precedence: . PRIORITY
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
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HEREIN IS UrCLA -.SIFIED EXCEPT
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Date: 09/15/2004
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To: Director's Office
Froin: Counterterrorism
. MDLU/ Fly Te m/ Operation 1-Response Section
Contact: UC
ApproVed By-:. 'Bald Gary M
Hulon Willie T
Harrington Thomas J .
Cummings, Arthur M
Battle Frankie
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Case ID #: X I .(Pending)•
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Title: (U) CTORS/MLDU'
FBIHQ-AFGHANISTAN'-
Synopsis,: JU) To provide a mission overview of the FBIAfghanistan
Detachment based on CTD Afghanistan Assessment Team
• (AAT).finding and to set priorities and, recommendations:
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Reference: (U)
Enclosure(s): (U.) Annex A, SSE Mission Approval Checklist.;,
Annex B, CT Intelligence Summary; Annex C, FBI convoy movement
and,emergency action plans for, Afghanistan
Details:
Background of U.S. Role In Afghanistan
Since the Fall 2001, the United States Government's :
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) has focused much of its attention
in Afghanistan. Operation Enduring Freedom which began by
uprooting the Taliban from power in Afghanistan and destroying Al
Qaeda's base of operations, continues to date. The role the
United States plays today in Afghanistan falls 'along two distinct
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lines: militarily to defeat the insurgents, and diplomatically to,
assist in the rebuilding of a democratic government in
'Afghanistan. Militarily, the U.S. led coalition, Combined Joint -'
Task Force 76 (CJTF76), has a clearly defined role to defeat
those insurgents who continue,to.wage war in Afghanistan and
ensure the stability of the Afghan Government. CJTF76's
operational theater is roughly the eastern portion of Afghanistan
to the border of Pakistan. The U.S. military has approximately
:18,000 personnel committed to this cause. Headquarters for
CJTF76 is Bagram Air*Field (BAF), which is approximately 50 miles .
'north of the capital city of Kabul. CJTF76 elements include
conventional and Special Operations Forces (SOF) from the U.S.
and several other nations:. The western portion of Afghanistan
falls under the military control of the International Security
Assistance Forces (ISAF), a multinational peace keeping'force
rarely involved in offensive operations. ISAF headquartersis
based. in Kabul.
cU) CJTF76 has identified the enemy, collectively
referred to as Anti-Coalition Militants (ACMs), as three groups,
that. is, Al Qaeda (AW, Taliban (TB), and'Hizbi-e-Gulbuddin •
(HIG). Though distinct groups with varying goals, these groups
are united in their overriding focus to overthrow the current
Afghan Government and rid Afghanistan of Western influence.
•While relatively small in number, ACMs continue to wage war and
make Afghanistan a dangerous and volatile environment for
civilians and coalition forces alike. In'addition to ACMs, and
often closely alighed with.them, are various regional drug and
war lords who continue to create instability for the central
. Afghanistan government and must also be • dealt with by CJTF76 and
coalition forces.
Historical FBI Presence in Afghanistan.
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Since late 2002, the FBI has sent personnel TDY to
Afghanistan. Initially, FBI personnel only played a part in the
interviews of AQ and TB detainees captured by coalition forces.
The overriding Mission FBI agents were tasked with was to obtain
actionable intelligence on threats to the U.S. or U.S. interests.
HRT also sent a small number of personnel at varying times who
were assigned to High.Value Target (HVT)/Medium Value Target
(MVT) fusions cells. The Military Liaison and Detainee Unit
(MLDU) was formed as an entity within.CTD and tasked to oversee
the newly created FBI mission in Afghanistan. In February 2004,
the FBI expanded its contingent in Afghanistan and positioned
qualified investigators with more forward deployed military units
to assist in HIP of intelligence
ICTD approval for SAs to be deployed in
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Operation Mountain Storm based on a specific DOD request):
CTD Assessment of FBI-Afghanistan Team Mission
In June,.2004, at the direction'of the"Assistant
Director CrTD, a CTD Afghan Assessment Team (AAT) arrived in*
Afghanistan to reevaluate the role of FBI personnel-in-theater.. b„ ;
Chief Arthur Cummings, b7 This CAT was comprised of ITOS1 Section
CTORS Acting Assistant Section Chief' ICTD Fly
Team Unit Chief land MLDU Investigative Analyst
The
e'
e team traveled to BAF, Kandahar Air PiP1A (KAP),
and Kabul where it met with military commanders
and FBI personnel. TDY'd to Af hanista a so
traveled to several_ military bases'.
The AAT- discussed past, current and projected use of FBI assets
with various' U.S. government entities and queried each as to .
their vision of the FBI role in Afghanistan. Upon its return to
FBIHQ, - AAT, personnel met With members of MLDU, as well as forer
FBI On Scene Commanders. After further consultation with FBI CTD
• management this paper.was.prepared in order to clearly confirm
and define the FBI mission in Afghanistan for the present and
foreseeable. future.
FBI-Afghanistan Mission Statement
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The primary mission of the FBI Afghanistan Team
FBI AT) is the collection of actionable threat intelligence Which
may have a possible nexus. to the United States, its citizens and
interests.. This primary goal remains in line with the FBI's top
priority to prevent acts of terror at home or abroad. •FBI
Special Agents have the skill'sets which make them uniquely
qualified above all other U.S. Government personnel to gather
this strategic intelligence through interviews, traditional
evidence collection procedures, • source development and other
'general criminal investigative skills. The early infusion of FBI
expertise in the Afghan theater has resulted in the
identification of intelligence critical to ongoing proactive FBI
CT investigations, to include the identification of U.S. based
terrorist associates and/or conspirators. It has also •
demonstrated the ability of the'FBI to provide valuable,
specialized. assistance to various civilian and DOD organizations
engaged in the GWOT. A number of priorities have been identified
within the above stated CT mission. These priorities aredelineated
as follows:
1) The interview of detainees or Persons Under
Custody (PUCs) and other individuals of interest.
Many of these. individuals have knowledge of or
are affiliated with.Global Terrorism networks
operating outside the tribal borders of Afghanistan.
.2) The support of specialized military operations .
targeting the capture . of Al Qaeda members, and
affiliates, with a view toward the collection
of actionable strategic intelligence with a nexus to
the U.S. Homeland.
3) The establishment and continued. close liaison
• with all coalition forces, DOD elements e
Bagram based DOCEX), DOS elements, the
Government of Afghanistan (GOA), and any other
intelligence gathering/processing entity, in an
effort•to ensure that any threat intelligence with a
U.S. nexus is passed immediately and effectively to
the U.S. Intelligence Community.
,
4) Support of the Combined Explosive Exploitatidn
Cell in Afghanistan (CEXC-A).
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5) Support ofl operatiOns and
missions with a view toward preventing terrorist
attacks against the U.S. and its interests.
6) Counterterrorism training assistance to the
Government of.Afghanistan (GOA) and other coalition
forces, with the expectation that the USG will, in
turn, receive a direct benefit in the form of a
close working relationship be tween Afghan and USG .
counterterorism agencies.
1) Interview of Detainees:
(U) To the extent possible, FBI Agents conduct
interviews of Persons Under Custody (PUCs), and other
individuals, to obtain actionable intelligence to be used in the
war against terrorism, and in particular, to detect, disrupt and
prevent terrorist attacks against the United States and its
interests.
DOD houses PUCs at the Bagram Collection Point
(BCP)., the Kandahar Collection•Point (KCP) and at various other
smaller holding'facilities. With limited resources, the FBI
attempts to review intake and background intelligence on : PUCs to
identify those who may have strategic intelligence which . fits
within the context.of the FBI CT mission. FBI Special Agents
utilize rapport based, long term interview strategies to conduct
interviews of detainees in 'order to obtain actionable
intelligence. Many interviews are conducted jointly wit
Military interrogators, however, all FBI personnel are fu y, ,
briefed on existing FBI policy regarding treatment of detaines
and admonished to use only those interview methods allowable
, within the U.S. legal system.
2) Support of Specialized Military Operations:
The primary focus of CJTF76 is to kill or capture
ACMs and defeat AQ and the TB network in Afghanistan. •T he
majority of ACMs operate within small cells embedded amongst the
civilian population. Therefore, the military must resort to
unconventional tactics to identify targets and accomplish its
mission. 'Among other varied 'techniques, tactical intelligence
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from human sources (HUMINT) and electronic sources (SIGINT) is
crucial to this mission. U.S. Forces in the field are focused.on
identifying and developing this intelligence. Intelligence of a
•strategic nature, which is often located alongside battlefield or
tactical intelligence, is often considered to be of secondary
importance by-U.S. Forces, -if it is identified at all. Soldiers
in combat rarely think as investigators. While thia tactical
focus is understandable it fails to recognize the importance of
detecting and disrupting the terrorist threat to the U.S.
Homeland. Bits of pocket litter, or-seemingly irrelevant
documents lying about Afghan homes and compounds, have produced a
relative windfall of U.S. based actionable intelligence..
However, FBI personnel must be in a position to identify this
information, properly collect it, and ensure that it is
expeditiously forwarded'to the appropriate U.S. intelligence
agency.
Specifically, the FBI Afghanistan Team'(AT)
accompli es he goal of timely strategic intelligence collection
by embedding agents with CJTF76 units during the execution of
operational missions defined-as Sensitive Site Exploitations
(SSE) and/or forward staged interrogations. Present FBI CTD
policy requires that the FBI Agent in Charge'(AIC), AT, collect
specific and articulable facts pertaining to any, proposed SSE and
provide this information to the AD CTD for approval prior to any '
FBI participation.
Both CJTF76 and the FBI recognize that Special
• Agents are not trained. to be combat troops; Therefore, FBI SAs
are not authorized to enter active combat areas until such time
as the U.S. Military groUnd Commander determines the location to
be secure., FBI personnel are' not to be' utilized in offensive
combat operations and are limited strictly.to intelligence
collection, interrogations, .source development; and.in an
advisory capacity in regard to the processing of any site where
intelligence (evidence) and/or PUCs that have a possible'nexus to
the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) are located.
The only exception to the preapproval requirement
for SSES, alon ies to HRT nprsnnnpl pmbpdripri with Tank 7nrr,p
Omaha.
cuLu iiuduse or cne time constraints associated with the mission,
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HRT personnel are authorized to deploy without CTD preapproval.
However, HRT personnel still follow the same SSE • guidelines
regarding participation in offensive operations and make every
effort to report their status prior to departure or as soon aa
practical thereafter to the AIC AT.
• (U) In order to track the results of efforts by the
"FBI AT, the following procedure has been implemented:
'1) The daily situation report (SITREP) issued by the
AIC lists the daily, weekly, and monthly total of approved SSE .
missions (20 since January, 04) and sets forth the initial
result(s) of the most recently concluded mission, to include the
collection,of information of a possible strategic value
(actionable Intel. has been collected during . 11 SSE,missions to
date).
2) The Military Liaison. Detainee Unit (MLDU), CTORS,
track's the number of investigative leads developed by the FBI AT
which have. been forwarded to ITOS 1 for action (over 100 CONUS
related telephone numbers and addresses have been forwarded to
ITOS 1).
. .
3) The ITOS 1• ETIU desk,' will, on a monthly basis,
track the status of all FBI AT developed leads forwarded to the
field'for action.
4) The' MLDU will publish a monthly'report detailing
the number of FBI AT missions monthly'and' year to date, the
number of actionable leads developed as•a result of theSe
missions, and a brief summary of, the current status of those
leads set to the field by 'ITOS ETIU.
The Establishment of Liaison With•All Coalition Forces:
The-AAT determined that a number of ISAF military
and governmental organizations are actively collecting
intelligence throughout Afghanistan.' There is a glaring lack of
interchange between many of these collectors, as well as a lack
of focus on the collection of information that may have a nexus
to the terrorist threat'beyond the Afghanistan theater, most
notably with a U.S. nexus. It is therefore critical that the FBI
make every effort to maintain contact with theSe different
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organizations, most of which rotate their personnel out of
Afghanistan annually or more frequently.
Specifically,` the FBI AT has identified the
following positions and/or individuals critical to the effective
conduct of•the FBI AT's mission, and has established a flexible
schedule for contacting these persons on a regular basis: •
CG U.S. forces, Bagram *(currently Lt. Gen. Olsen)
Deputy CG/Operations, Bagram (currently Brig. Gen.
Dan Jacoby) .
Deputy CG/Admin., Bagram (currently Brig. Gen.
Bernard Chapeau)
CO DOCEX, Bagram (currently Col.
CQ, 25th ID J2 (currently Lt. Col
OIC, Bagram Collection Point (currently Maj.
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Chief, Criminal Investigation Task Force.(CITF),
Bagram
CENTCOM Liaison, Bagram .
COMTECH/DOCEX,- Bagram (currently
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Under Control.(PUC) Officer ,Navy Lt.
JTF 76, BCP, Bagram
CJTR 76 Air Operations POC, Bagram
Staff JudaPl'Advocate, Bagram (currently Maj.
XC-A, Bagram (currently USMC.Capt.
CJTF 76. Jo(' Security Officer (currently Army Capt.
DMMMC
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Only through the regular appearance of FBI
personnel and the sincere offer of assistance, can the FBI and
the U.S. Intelligence Community. achieve any degree of success in
sharing in the collection of intelligence with various ISAF
members. Assisting, yet complicating, this equation are a host
of other such as the U.S. Embassy Regional Security
Officer, DEA, .numerous U.S. Military groups stationed
throughou e country, as well as the organizations in charge of
To: Director's Office From: 'Counterterrorism
Re: I 1 09/15/2004
Defense Humint Services (DHS) OIC, Bagra:M, Army Lt.
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U.S. Embasqv Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM); Kabul
(currently I
U.S. Embassy Consul
CO Allied Command Counterintelligence, Kabul
(currently Lt. Col]
Head of Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) Secret .
Service. (currently General Naimat Jallily)
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DEA Country Liaison,.Kabul (currently
Afghanistan' National Directorate of Security (NDS),
Kabul
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a number of PUC detention facilities and the BAF based Document
Exploitation Center (DOCEX). Sharing in the 'collection of
intelligence throughout Afghanistan is a daunting , task,
particularly.in a country where travel, in itself, is difficult
and risky and the collectorS are widely disbursed.
The,BAF based DOCEX is designated by military
order to be the principal collection/analysis point-for all .
material collected in-theater. The FBI does not Officially .
participate- in-the BAF DOCEX, however, efforts by the FBI AT to
develop'a relationship with BAF DOCEX - have proven highly ,
successfully. DOCEX officials have re prioritized their approach
to reviewing collected material with a view toward identifying
and relaying to the FBI AT any information that appears to have a
nexus to the TT S Aq an pxamnlp of imnrnirprl
'While DOCEX is deemed to be
the principal collector of in-theater material, DOCEX personnel
willingly admit that they are vastly understaffed and would
welcome whatever assistance.the FBI could provide. In.
particular, this operation is in dire need of translation and
analytical skills.
Recommendation In order to improve the '
identification and flow of intelligence with,'a U.S. nexus the AAT
recommends that an FBI analyst be assigned to FBI Bagram in
order to assist the, DOCEX facility. .
'4) Support * of . the Combined Explosive Exploitation Cell:
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(U) FBI SABTs provide-ekperience and advanced -
investigative skills not available within the DoD structure.
These skills can be applied to the processing of post blast
scenes, the collection and documentation of critical components
and evidence, the location and the interview of suspected bomb
makers, and the effective search of suspected bomb making
locations while reducing the inherent risk.
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6) 'Provide Training to the Government of Afghanistan (GOA):
(U) The Government of Afghanistan has expressed a
desire for training at every level of its security forces. This
desire; supported . fully by the O.S. Department of State, is to
transforna service formally modeled on the Soviet system of a
closed, autocratic society, to that which will support and work
within a'progressive, democratic system. .
It is the po
training of NDS should be, a
lt i on of thpl Ithat the , I The AAT
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concurs with this opinion. ine um.dining mission, which•is
already ongoing, will only expand as an FBI Legat is established
and the Afghan Government grows. The,benefits of this type of
training are known. - The relationships. developed between the FBI •
..and Afghan officers will rRa .rewards for the U.S. Government
I I
AAT Summary:
The Afghanistan theater is large and collection
effort's are divided between a number of organizations with little
coordination and varying priorities. There is a strong,
justifiable need for FBI'Agents in Afghanistan to conduct .
counterintelligence investigations regarding unaddressed or under_
addressed issues pertaining to CT matters which transcend Afghan
borders. These matters fall well within the Bureau's
counterterrorism mission. The FBI will not be in a position to
fully exploit actionable intelligence or emerging threats unless
personnel are on the ground at the point of collection. There is
algeRIEt
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Conclusion - As the role of FBI-Afghanistan is
critical and falls within the Bureau's CT mission, a commitment
to provide the necessary, resources is appropriate, This •
commitment will require logistical and personnel enhancements an
should be reviewed at regular intervals to assure that the
maximum product is being attained while providing for the
security and well being of FBI personnel. After extensive
research by MLDU personnel, armored vehicles have been identified
and purchased. 'Delivery is expected within weeks. An improved ,
communications package', which will increase efficiency and
safety, is being developed. With the exception of the need-for
one FBI analyst in Bagram, the .current staffing level of
is deemed sufficient,. but should be regularly monitored.
With few exceptions, personnel should be rotated through the
Afghanistan theater no less than every.90 days, while the AIC and
DAIC should be rotated on a 6 month baSis in order to ensure
continuity. Personnel Should be selected based upon several -
criteria, to include, prior . tactical or military experience,
health and preparedness to deal with an inhospitable climate and.
extended work hourS, and the ability to work compatibly with
others. The AAT also recommends that FBI CTD continue to be
represented in theater. The presence of CTD personnel will
ensure that HQ concerns are properly addressed, including the
timely and correct submission of rePorts.and intelligence.
Personnel assigned to the MLDU should regularly conduct on-site
reviews to further ensure that logistical and administrative
matters.are properly addressed.
By embedding'FBI personnel with military' I eleMents in a semi permissive and often hostile environment, the
FBI has embarked on a new mission. While the FBI's role in Iraq
bears some'similarity, there are anumber.of unique and entirely
new challenges, in 'Afghanistan. The'possible benefits, however,
justify the commitment., It is broadly accepted that. the . command
element of AQ has established itself in the wild tribal areas
along the Afghanistan/Pakistan border. To fully address the
terrorist threat' against the U.S., terrorism's leadership must be
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located and dismantled. We must be where the terrorists are.
• Just as organized crime or drug smuggling investigations need to
transcend borders to be successful so does the FBI's antiterrorism
efforts. The AAT believes that the methods employed in
the collection of actionable intelligence. from detainees,
sources, and through physical evidence are the same proven
"methods used by Special Agents in all criminal investigations.
No other national asset has the skill sets or experience that FBI
Special" Agents possess in this area. Therefore, the AAT believes
the FBr is uniquely qualified for this mission and strongly
recommends that the FBI remain a lead agency,in,the strategic
intelligence collection process in Afghanistan.
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. ( ALL INFORHATION CONTAINED '
-HERE TN T.S L A S, TFTS..P.
DATE 07-2372009 EY 65179 D
A NEN X A
Mission Approval Checklist
TIER I MISSION .
For FBI approval purposes a SENSITIVE SITE EXPLOITATION
(SSE) will be defined as:
Whenever FBI personnel participate in an operational
mission .which has as its primary objective the -capture of
individuals determined to support or participate in . anti-
, coalition activities or the recovery of items deemed to
contain information of . tactical or strategic intelligence
value and where there exists the poSsibilitY of
"encountering hostilities.
Any mission' falling within the above definition will
require prior authorization from FBIHQ before any FBI
personnel may participate.
.In order to .submit a• request for SSE participation the
following mission specifics. will be required:
•
1. Date, time and location of the SSE.
2. The nature of the target i.e. Al Qaeda . supporter;
Taliban commander; foreign fighter, •etc.. If the
target is of a material nature then.the items
'likely to be recovered and their strategic
intelligence value.
3.. The military coMpOnent conducting the SSE
including the force protection elements (air
assets, armored vehicles, etc).
.4. The means of transportation and duration of the
SSE. If SAs are to RON in the field,
justification for the RON.
5. The FBI Personnel involved in the SSE.
. 6. The purpose and other details to justify the need
for FBI to participate in the'SSE. In particular,
articulable facts need to be presented which
explain the CT nexus the.FBI would like to exploit
or the intelligence value of the mission-
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TIER II MISSION
Whenever FBI personnel'seek or have been requested to
provide assistance of- an investigative f(to include,
interviews), forensic, or training nature to.DOD, other USG •
agendies, or. Afghan . Government . entities , ata. location
outside of a.secure USG base or facility, prior
authorizationmust first be ob, tained from the FBIAfghanistan.
Agent In Charge (AIC).
Every effort should-be made to provide the AIC with as Much
of the above:SSE preapproval information as poSsible as set
forth in the Tier'I missions.
TIER III MISS ION
Whenever FBI personnel seek or'have been requested to •
provide assistance of an investigative (to include
interviews), forensic, or training nature to DOD, other USG
agencies, or Afghan Government entities'at. a location - -
within a secure USG base of facility, FBI personnel will
.keep the FBI-Afghanistan AIC' regularly, briefed on
developments and intelligence obtained.
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE - C7-L3-3009 BY.' 51.79 D 7/11.12
Annex C
Ground Convoy Movement Checklist
• Semi-Permissive Environments
Prior to any ground convoy or force protection mission
taking place in'a semi or non-permissive environment, essential
pre-mission guidelines should'be considered prior to executing
the mission. The checklist guidelines,set out. below help the
AIC/DAIC develop an operational plan for any type of ground
movement.
Pre7Mission,Planning:
Mission:
a:.What is the mission?:
.b. Mission worth the risk?
Personnel Available
. a. Enough personnel'to safely conduct the mission?
b. Are other unknown personnel entities involved?
•Capabilities? Military Escort Available?
Vehicles Available
a. What type of signature.to be presented? •
b. Armored? Low Visibility VehicleS, Indigenous?
c. Are non-FBI vehicles involved and what are there
..capabilities or limitations?
Command - and Control
a. Who is over all in charge? •
b. IndiViduaI Vehicle Commanders identified?-
c: Communications capabilities?' Intra-Team, SATCOM?
• d.-Emergency Response Contingencies?
Intelligence
a. New, risks or enemy tactics? Current Threat Level?
Route Planning
' a. Primary and-secondary : routes?
b. Time of,travel? Maximize Randomness. ,
c. GPS, Maps, Falcon View? Each vehicle should be able-to
independently navigate if necessary.
Pre-Mission Checks:
Vehicle Checks - Fluid levels, Tire Pressure, Spare Tire. and
. appropriate Jack, VS 17 Panel, American Flag Panel, spare vehicle
equipment, Water/MRE's,,Glint Tape, spare ammunition and
ordinance, smart cards.' .
Team Leader Brief - Mission, Vehicle order and pax,
position(Profile people based on skills and where they sit),
ID vehicle commanders, Total Pax, Movement Tenets (Speed,
Distance, Check Points,'Formations), Weapons and Equipment
FBI019384CBT
OGC-CTLU#2#9. FE10000802
DOJOIG013004
• Cheeks.
Route Briefing and Alternates: Route to be taken, Choke Points
and Areas of Concern.
Communications - Channels (primary, secondary, others),
Intra Team radio"and SAT. Comm checks, Falcon View checks,
Iridium'Checks, loss comms plan, radio - checks and commands.
Contingencies - Vehicle breakdown., Bump Plans, .route
blockage, medical and medivac procedures, -IED or ambush Immediate
Action-Drill's, bump plans, Go/NO do criteria,'Known.U.S.
Hard Points along route:.
FBI019385CBT
OGC-CTLU#2#9 FBI0000803
DOJOIG013005