Formica Report Annex 122: AR 15-6 Investigation (Death of detainee at Temporary Tactical Holding Facility, Al Asad Air Base, January 9, 2004)

Summary of findings of inquiry into the death of a detainee on January 9, 2004, at Al Asad Air Base. Detainee, probably named Asad, was captured on January 4, 2004 and held at a Temporary Tactical Holding Facility (TTHF) at Al Asad Air Base. On January 6, he was "place in a concertina wire isolation cage ... as punishment for repeatedly talking." During an interrogation on January 6, detainee "unexpectedly lunged at [redacted]" and "fought hard for one or two minutes" before being subdued and handcuffed. He provided information regarding the location of an IED, and accompanied military personnel when they went to neutralize the IED and locate a weapons cache, and on the return trip "made an effort to escape by opening the truck door." After further interrogations on January 8, he "had repeatedly stood up and tried talking with the guards," who did not speak any Arabic, and had been "punished by the guards for not standing or sitting fast enough with the other detainees." He had been hog-tied "with his arms over his shoulders, his hands tied to at least one foot, and his face to the floor" for at least half an hour. Later that night, he attempted to escape "by stepping over the concertina wire" and was see "moving fast toward the TTHF exit," but was tackled by a a guard and had his legs shackled together. On the morning of January 9, after three attempts to get the detainee to stand up, a guard used flex-cuffs to tie his hands to the top of the metal door frame leading to his cage, exposing bruises on his sides. Detainee "had begun to speak incessantly," whereupon "[redacted]... had attempted to gag him," which required the assistance of another guard to force the detainee's mouth open. "After approximately five to fifteen minutes," detainee "was seen slumped down, hanging by his hands." An ambulance was called but "CPR was unnecessary due to the condition of the body." "Doctor [redacted] arrived at approximately 0900 to pronounce Asad dead." Section on "inconsistencies" is completely redacted. Section on "other relevant facts" notes that the detainee "had not asked for medical attention at any time when he could have been understood," and did not seem to exhibit "any physical disabilities or injuries ... until minutes before" his death. Summary of findings states that he died "due to injuries sustained during an escape attempt" and "the placement of a gag in his mouth by guards." Document includes memo dated January 14, 2004, appointing [redacted] Investigation Officer.
Final 3 pages of document are a Memorandum for Record regarding an Informal Commander's Inquiry into allegations that SPC [redacted] assaulted a detainee at Ar Ramadi on October 30, 2003. Memo is labeled "Formica Report – Annex 122" but seems to refer to the same incident discussed in ACLU-RDI 2612 ("Formica Report – Annex 123"). Most likely a labeling error.

Investigative File
Thursday, June 29, 2006

tramtwook AMMO& FORCES WOW 01111011111)
11A01100. WAIL APO At Om

14 January 2004

HSC, 1st
Battalion, Sth Special-Ydrces Group !Airborne),-APO AE

msamanom FOR CPT ­
SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer

Effective 14 January 2004, you are hereby appointed as an
investigating officer pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 1S-6, for
a Commander's Informal Inquiry involving with Al

AI Acid
Detention Facility and DetaineelINNIPbetween on or about 4
January 2004 and 10 January 2004.

In your investigation, use informal procedures under AR 15-6.

in the course of your investigation you must advise all
witnesses of their rights under the UCMJ, Article 31, or the
Fifth Amendment, ss appropriate. You may obtain assistance with
these legal matters from the office of the Staff Judge Advocate.

Stbmit your findings in memorandum format within 10 days.

During the course of your investigation, you will, when
possible, obtain sworn statements from witnesses. Do not,
however, unduly delay your investigation simply to obtain sworn
statements. If, in the course of your investigation, you suspect
any person nay have committed a criminal offense, you will advise
that person of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ, prior to
questioning. You will make findings and recommendations based on
the evidence you discover during the course of your

Your findings and recommendations will be submitted on DA
Form 1574 to this Headquarters NLT 24 January 2004. Requests for
extensions of time should be submitted in writing and approved by
the undersigned.

Period: Until officially released or relieved from

appointment or assignment.


Fomdos Repot- Annex 122

i•ex)i. 4(As

AOSO-SFA-F-CO SUBJECT: Appointment of invesftafing Officer
8. MS appointment. supersedes all previoUS duty appointmants.

1 - Bn Cdr
2 - Sn Xo
3 - Appointed Officer


Fonnke Repot - Annex 122

AOSO,SFA-F-SA 23 January 2004
MEMORANDUM FOR Commander. V' Battalion, 5* Special Fames Group (Airborne)
Subject: Commanders Informal Inquiry
The purpose of this inquiry is to determine the relevant facts ofel111111111111.111M11.5=ISand the death of detainee 111111111111111116, Forward Operating Base Rifles Base., Ai Auld Air Base, Iraq.
2. It is my conclusion that the death ofaMairalrainallM80///.. resulted from injuries sustained during an escape attempt at 090230CIAN04 and thc placement of a gag in his mouth by guards at the temporary tactical holding beady at Al Mad Air
Base, Iraq at approximately 090645CJAN04. nuthentutre.
111111111 did aot contribute to the circumstances of 111111111111.

3. Invesngating Officer examined the following evidence to support the facts in this report

19 interviews with witnesses, protagonists, and experts.

Preliminary autopsy report and interpretation of medical doctor.

2 interrogations summaries from the deceased.

Photographs of relevant locationt.

4. The relevant facts of this inquiry are as follows:
On the 4* of January, 2004,
was detaincd_hyplements of the I* Squadron
ACR while traveling north west in a taxi on highway 12. Maas captured with three Motorola radios ri ed as initiators for an Improvised Explosive Device (IE)). Spatial Forces (SF)
located on Forward Operating Base (FOB)Rifles Base, Al Mad air base, Iraq, were notified from 66* Military Intelligence Company (MI)interrogators at the Temporary Tactical Holding Facility (TTHF) theL• detainee had beencaptured with what appeared to be IED initiators in•his possession. had been assigned tothe Al Mad TTHF as
At approximately 1030 on the eh of January, Sergeant First Class (SFC).11111111111. and Titan
interpreter (TI)
picked upallifrom the 'UHF located in an Iraqi airerafthanger.allihad been placed in a concertina wire isolation cage adjacent to the remainder of thedetainees as punishment for repeatedly talking (see photographs I, 2, 3, 4) since his arrivaL
all and three other detainees were.ready for transport flexi.euffs secured in place whoa
arrived. Two of the detainees, numbered .111/11.111/1111werc the taxi driver
I of6pages


Subject: Commanders Informal Inquiry
and his friend wheallialud been captured with. The fourth detainee was 111111111.1a who
was a SF informant and had been placed in the TTHF to gather information on other detainees. The four were driven to the to SF holding facility located near 111.11Mtin house and living quarters (see photographs 5, 6). Detainees 1111111/111111.were interrogated briefly first by SFC 1111111111111111=1111111116 and Thinthe SF interroption room (see photographs 7. 8)
At approximately 1130 on the 6 *. OS interrogation began (see 6* January Inoterogation h (.4) Summary). was field-cuffed and theell) members who would conduct the interrogation wore civilian clothes and black masks with 9mm pistols in shoulder holsters. TIIIIIIsat behind a large table serving m the interpreter. OWbegan the interrogation by providing his personal information. 111Dhad been an Air Defense Lieutenant Colonel in the Iraqi Army in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. elbcontinued the interrogation by providing the interrogators Rase statements about where and why he had gotten the radios. and his final destination when captured. At approximately 1200, the interrogators received the three detainees' initial capture report, which corroborated detainees' 111111101111111 story. The initiators were apparentlygip and the interrogators confronted him with the information. 1110 began explaining how he had made a number of bombs in the past, but had recently set an MD near highway '12 in an attempt to kill Americans to free his country. Gwent into detail the how the initiators worked and the methods he used to place the IED.

Due to DM cooperation, the Real-cuffs were removed from his wrists as a measure of good ( At this Point, SFC amiloweenicred the interrogation room, and stood benveenallp and the exit. in unexpectedly lunged at_ grabbing the front of his shirt and bringing him to the ground. TIIIIIIntrnained behind the. table and did not interfere. Zitgrabbed
MO feet and legs and hung on to keep him from kicking the interrogators. and worked to try to flexi-cuff fib for his and the team's safety, asilifle had a 9mat pistol in a shoulder bolster neer.* hands. Because the team could not hand-coffee, they gave him
blows to his sides in an attempt to get him to bring his arms down into a position diet hand cuffs could be placed on his wrists. Oafought hard for approximately one or two minutes. Oncedoe was hand euflkd and settled. the Interrogation continued.
IND was given water from a plastic bottle by M. After gulping from the bottle...180 (-(
one of his top front teeth onto the floor of the interrogation room. 1111111111. who has medical_ training, examined elillemouth to see why his tooth had comc out, whileIMIS baked at the tooth. allitooth had come out whole, with little or no blood present on the tooth Of in his mouth. it was determined that tooth had been rotten, and he had extensively poor dental
hygiene. Ontcontinues with the interrogation and explained that he could show the mean the location of the IED that he had placed. The interrogators show4111111* map of the area, and ask that he show them the exact spot of the IED. 1111 could not pinpoint the location on the map.The team had brought in terrain images of the general are that alhad described, and again41//pwas unable to pinpoint the IED location for the team. The team decided that iall/ would have to accompany the team to find the exact bunion of the 1ED.
• Detainees ill.1.1111111.11bad been returned o the TTHF. while the team had prepared equipment sad vehicles for the mission. The team radioed in that they would be taking detainee
• 2 of 6 psges
Subject: Commanders informal inquiry
111116to locate the lED, and additional team members were prepared to assist with the mission.
Mad hod sat outside the holding area while the team's white Defender pick-up and tan lii-Lux pick-up arrived. SFC had explained to dial they all would be going to identify the location of the lED that he had placed. and asked him if had any questions; he had replied that he did not. TI lahad then gone to his roam to get his body armor, while SEC
111111111111111fteonducted radio checks in the vehicles. Staff Sergeant (SSG) INhad climbed into the back seat of the Defender, which was used to transportellIt IND attempted to MIMED into the truck, where he began so actively and passively resist getting into the back sold Several minutes passed where apcontinued with his defiance, and the team had begun to feel
pressured that somewhere on highway 12 was an lED that mid be used against Coalition Forces (CF). lawas pulling owfrom inside the truck while gown pushing from the rear. Mr was halfway into the truck, and moused his foot to shove die rest of the way into the back seek ;was hooded, and sat in the back scat withilLwhileilIMIS drove and TI 111111translatod from the front passenger seat. lab and SSG 1111111had driven die Hi-Lux as the security force.

AM was given water and bad his hood removed during the first leg of mission to Bagbdedi. small tows several miles from the front gate of Al Asad Air Base toward highway 12. The team continued to the 1ED site, and upon arrivallinpandell.identified the eemPeneets associated with the system, while .and T1111130stayed in the Defender (see 06 JAN Interrogation Summary for lED details). Generally. the system was five meters from the road and had consisted of three I S5mm artillery shells dual primed and dual initiated, buried with a five meter squad and ground tamped to focus the blast toward passing vehicles. MIN fiexi ­cuffs were removed and he was given more water. 1111/.1111111 led him to the LED system to have his picture taken where shad sat down and relaxed for approximately 30 minutes while the team cleared the IED eemPettems• flexi-cuffs were replaced. and the teem loaded into the trucks and moved to a safe detonation location. The torn had pulled the initiators and
drove fist over rough terrain to escape the blast radius of the IED.
Mrhad then volunteered the location of the munitions cache where he had gotten the 155 nun • shells. The teem radioed back to Al Mad the neutralized lED and their intent to identify a potential cache. As the team had approached the cache access road, shad repeatedly insisted that the team drive on the dirt road. For this reason, the team had driven across rough twain to reach the site. The team had passed a disused Mujabadin training camp mouse to the cache. Upon arrival at the cache site the team cleared several abandoned buildings, detained, and later released four local Iraqis whom were questioned. The cache had been secured, the location radioed to the 34 ACR, and the team had waited for the arrival of conventional force* aim flexi-caffs had been removed and he and the team climbed a small hill in the area to eat dinner.

bad rejected the food offered, but drank more water.11111111111111b had joked with asthat he needed to eat for energy so they could all go swimming in the river nearby. shad jolted back about not being able to swim well, and suggested they could do that another time. As the team telexed. SIB had told the team that his wrists and lower back were sore. Elements from the 3141 ACR had arrived after approximately two hours. and the teem loaded back into the trucks. On the return trip, shad made an effort to escape by opening the truck door. As a resuk the tarn had placed a hood on MShead. The two trucks weal in separate directions upon arrival
3 of 6 pages

Subject. Commanders 'dermal Inquiry
to the Al Auld Air Rust Hi-Lux returned to the team house, while the Defender returned 1111110 his isolation cage at the TTHF.
The team had decided thetas a result of the successful identification of the IED, and complexity
with which it was designed and placed, shad known more than he had *drained to. The team's engineers examined the initiators on the 7 1` aleatory, and had wanted more information from/NI about how be had made them or from whom he had gotten them. The conclusion was drawn that SIMI probably did not act the IED by himself, due to the size and number of shells used.
The team had used Sergeant (SOT) lop and Warrant Officer IMMO 66* Ml Company interrogators as their Ornery points of contact at the TTHF interrogation facility. The team would request access to the building and.detaimees through these points of contact, and onso shared intelligence, which had been gathered through interrogation. The seam had not sigaedout detainees for imerrogutions in the pmt, and had only completed paperwork for detainees that were not returning to the TTHF, or going on a minion.
as interrogator had

Ott the th of January, 11 1111111111111bas interpreter and SFC donned their civilian clothes and black masks and returned to the TTHF to further interrogatedid not have flesi-cuffs on upon arrival for interrogation, but instead, had bandages

on his wrists and leg shackles on. Una "shuffled" imp approximately SO meters from the TTHF to the interrogation room. and Mad was out of breath when he had arrived. Nap had questioned alabout the details of the initiators, including circuitry and capacitors. qpi bed been scared enough that his leg had trembled throughout the interrogation, sad he had appealed
to TI elpas an "begin to let him go home lealleheritage is Kurdith - Iraqi, although be is US citizen). Tice interrogation had lasted less than an hour, and...returned SID to his isolation cage while.111.111palked with SGT.. shout the interrogation. wand
11111.1111both had agreed theta/had probably had more Anti-Coalition Force contains and
resources that might have been exploited with fixture interrogations. .
Later on the 8th of January, between the hours of 16000 and 2COX, shad repeatedly stood up and tried talking with the guards. No bib:gird= were on sit, nave of the guards spoke Arabic, and nobody had understood what iswas saying, other than the word "home" he had repeated in English. At approximately 21000, the night before his deatiudirhad been punished by the guards for not standing or sitting fast enough with the other detainees. had been hog-tied with his arms over his shoulders, his hands tied to at least one foot, and his face toward the floor. althad remained hog-tied for apptoxintate(y a half an hour. after which his leg shackles and flati-cuffs were removed. illamay have been stepped on or sat on by at test one guard tsec item 4, "inconsistencies" in this report). Approximately 0902300. — had andnpted to escape by stepping over the concertina wire, which had surrounded his cage. Once on the far side of the wire, had "trotted; moving fast down a narrow corridor toward the
TTHF exit. A guard named and possibly SGT.11111/11(see item 4, "inconsistencies" in this report) tackled MI and returned him to his cage. SGT _bad shackled am kip together to keep him from escaping again. Sometime after his escape attempt and before 090400CM/had defecated in his clothing.
4 of 6 pages


Subject: Commanders informal Inquiry
At approximately 090630C,4111111111. and other guards had woken all the detainees by telling
so them to stand up. By 0640C, all the detainees wan standing and told to stop talking. VIIhad remained in a sitting position in his isolation captor= wake up and after. 1101111111) had fuse t° 1•011cage!k_
nd told him stand, which igmebad done. Each time emshad turned his back on ea=would sit down. After three anempts,111111/11had taken another set oftlexi-cuffs and tied hands to the top of the metal door frame lading into his cage.

shirt had risen above his ribs to where the other detainees had seen large., dark bruises on abdomen and sides. This had been the first and only confirmed time bruises were seen onprior to his death. anhad begun to speak incessandy, and had not stopped after repeated demands front the guards. None of the guards understood what _had been saying. As a result WIN& odkiag1111111. had taken a three or four foot section of cloth from a mattress, in which a knot had been tied mukiple times near the easter, and had attempted to gag PEP
1111111 bad refused to open his mouth for the gag to be set. and 11111111111Phad called for the assistance of another guard, Specialist (SPC) MIS had put pressure on VIM lower jaw and neck to force mil¦ mouth epee fbr the gag to be placed. Oncellehad openedhis mouth, linfietoad inserted the knot and tied the gag into place mound the back of mophead. 111111111.1 had gone to wash his hands after setting the gag because UMW defecated in his clothing. After approximately five to fifteen minus:5,mM had seen amptiumped down, hanging by his hands. elm had gone to died onellband had realized he was not breathing the MI interrogation building to call the ambulance, which had arrived between 15 and 30 minutes later. The ambulance medics had 'amassed that CPR was unnecessary due to the condition of the body. Doctor... WU called from the Al Mad Medical Facility, and had arrived at approximately 090900C to pronounce Mad dead.
5. Inconsistencies noted during this inquiry are as follows:

6. Additional relevant facts:

a. 111111thad not asked for medical attention at any time that he could have been understood by interpreters or interrogators.
b. None of the persons interviewed had seen Illowith any physical disabilities or injuries, other than being tired and needing bandages on his wrists, until minutes
DOD JUNE 317 6

Subject: Commanders Informal inquiry
se before fall had died. Fie had been seen "trotting" and "moving fast" during his
escape attempt
C. shad not been medically evaluated or treated, other than by a Special Faces
medic inspecting his mouth, until the time of Ns death. 6(1)
d. L only been interrogated by members of1111111111111.
Investigation Officer
TAB A 10 Report
TAB B PhotoVaPhs
TAB C Interview Summaries
TAB D ISM Interrogation
Summitries and Supplemental
Action Report
• TAB E TAB F TAB Ci TAB F1 Preliminary Autopsy Report Height Reference (photographs) DA Forms 3881 Rights Waivers Inquiry Appointment Orders
6 of 6 pages


• DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY Charlie Company, 2143 Battalion, 14* Infantry Regiment rd Brigade, 10'" Mountain Division (LI)
Fort Drum, New York 13602
AFZS-LF-AC 03 November 2003
SUBJECT: Informal Commanders Inquiry of SPC
1. Purpose. Determine validity of allegations that $PC L did, on 30 Oct 03,
physically assault an Iraqi detainee in Ar Ramadl, Iraq and to recommend necessary actions to the chain of command.

2. Background. Since Jun 03, C/2-14 IN has supported e BN and now 1 st SN, SFG by conducting security at 12 locations throughout Iraq. During this time the company has operated in team and Squad ala elements in order to provide necessary force at each team location. SPCSSIMihas supported teams in Baghdad 111111111Pand Ar RamadiallaM11111111111111 Although SPC
primary OS is 13F, he has opwasci as an Infantryman during the past six months. SPC has been part of the security element in Ar Ramadi since early August 03. During his time in Ar Ramadi, the team house has been attacked several times by rocket propelled grenades, mortars, and small arms.
3. Events Preceding Incident On 29 Oct 03,11.1111111 conducted a joint During this operation, the team detained two personnel transporting 12 RPG rounds. One of these personnel was a man named MIN aftworked at Meg.
steam house and had been employed there for several months. He was a trusted employee of the team and worked closely with the C12-14 IN personnel guarding the team house. ging held Msat the team house to conduct Initial interrogation. On the evening of 30 Oct 03, the team house came under small arms tire (small fire turned out to be friendly fire from Se FOB). SPC _was outside at the time and rounds were fairly close to his position. This occurred at approximately 1930 hrs. Additionally, sometime in the third week of October, SPC11111011111wife told him that she and his little boy would not return to Fort Drum when SPC S redeploys. M attempts to contact her since that time had failed.
4. Incident. The incident occurred at approximately 1930 on 30 Oct 03. SPC entered the detainee-holding cell and assaulted the prisoner. pFcalli promptly entered the detainee cell, witnessed the assault, and verbally instructed SPC =me
to stop. SPC
yed these instructions, exited the cell, and returned to the
house. PFC
immediately reported the incident to his squad leader. SSG 11111111s
Pavia. Repot - Now 122

317 8
• 5. Actions Following Incident. SSG.* was prewtrig to depart for a mission with the ODA when he was informed of the incident. SSCI instructed SGT1 (a team
leader at the site) to ensure SPC 011111had no further contact with the detainee and proceeded with the operation. During the mission. SSGallidiscuseed the incident
with SFC INS (member of ODA 522). The411l cornmanderillilla learned
of SPC actions at approximately 2200hrs. Notification up the disk) of command continued on 31 Oct 03, following completion at the mission. SPC
was counseled by SSG elk removed from the site, and returned to C/2-14 IN Headquarters. During this time, ensured the detainee received a medical
examination. An 180 from within the.conducted the initial examine and determined that the detainee had possible fractures of the Ms, nose. and jaw. Alter further medical review by a doctor, the detainee suffered no broken bones during the
6. Findings. There is no doubt that SPC ]assaulted the detainee on 30 Oct 03. SPC and SPC41111fisbaternents both attest that SPCIONII•struck the detainee three or four limes. There is no evkience that the detainee attempted to escape or provoked the assault when SPCIIIM entered the detainee holding area.
8. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at OSMIUM/NM
Endosures INIMMNINNIS CPT, IN Commanding

• Foingos Raised -Annex 122
DO D056995

DA Form 4856 (Counseling). DA Form 3881 (Rights Warning)

DA Forms 2823 (Sworn Statements) SPC PFC

Official Message Traffic from ODA 522

Medical Documentation of Detainee's Injuries Medical Summary from CPT OMRecord of Medical Care dated 31 Oct 03 Record of Medical Care dated 1 Nov 03 Detainee's )(Aloe

Letter's of Recommendation for SPC Mtill11111r SFC141111111111.111/11111Recommendation 1 LTIMM(C/2-14 IN Fire Support Officer) Recommendation SSG11111¦1 012-14 IN Fire Support NCO) Recommendation SSG lnddent Report dated 29 June 03

SPCIIIMMIERB and 2-1 and Copy of Deployment Orders.

b 1 17‘2

1. 4°—
Fonuica Report -Aram 122