An FBI agent assigned to Camp Delta, Guantanamo Bay states that he entered an interview room and observed an inmate kneeling on the floor with a small amount of blood on the floor near the inmate's face. The inmate's nose appeared to be bleeding. The agent asked the military personnel what had happened and they explained that the inmate had become upset with them and threw himself to the floor. The agent reports that he saw nothing else to contradict the military personnel's rendition of events. The agent also stated that he had heard previously that one of the female military personnel would let her hands touch the inmates as part of their psych-ops to make the inmate "unclean" and upset them.
•
FD-302 (Rev.' 10-6.95)
E 1
• 1-
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Diftatimmtdom 09/07/2004
.SpecjAgent (SAd 1.Federal—qurPq11.
of Investigation (FBI), who entered on duty with the FBI on
and arrived at the Houston DivisiOn of the FBI,
b2 —1p
Corpus Christi Resident Agency (CCRA), on or about 01/22/1998,b7--1„2 and whose telephone number isl I was advised of the
C1, 2
identity of the interviewing Assistant Inspector (AI) and the
purpose of the interview. SA
(then provided the following
information telephonically:
SA I
Iwas assigned to an interviewing team at the
detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GITMO), from about
September until late November 2002. The interviewing team
consisted of three people; including SA Besides
himself, SA s interviewing-team Inc u.e. a contract
linguist, whom . A
belieVes was contracted through the
military and whose i en ity SA
could not recall, and an
Army representative whose name SA
could not recall, •
either. The Army representative was rom an organization
b6 —1 .
similar to -the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations•
h7c
(AFOSI);an -could. not
investigative entity; however, SA
recall' the. name of the organization. He was certain it was not
a military intelligence entity since the activities of his •
interviewing team, deemed by officials at GITMO to be law .
enforcement activities; were separated from intelligencegathering'interviews that military intelligence personnel and
representatives froM other government agencies performed. For
most of-his stay at GITMO, SAI
land his team performed
interviews in 'the morning. The afternoons and evenings were
reserved--for-interviews conducted by those who were gathering
intelligence.': SA
did not know of the specific activities
that occurred during t e afternoon and evening interviews.
Near the end of SAI
fs tour of dut at GITMO,
about two to three weeks before Thanksgiving, SA was b6 —1ppartnered with a female military intelligence en iste person b7c -1' whose identity SAI
lcould'not recall, but who may have been
a military reservist since she indicated to SA1
that she
.
was a probation officer in Los Angeles, California. SA
and the .military intelligence soldier were•detailed to an
interviewing effort that focused on a recent group of detainee
arrivals at- GITMO. .These interviews, unlike those he had
hawstipmnan0Washington, JC
09/07/2004 (telephonically)
File tA 297-EQ-A1327669-A 3105-Date dictated N/A
b6 —1p
RESPONSES-70
by SSA/AI-
b7c -1
ThiS document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your egcncy;
p
FD-302e (Rev. 10-6-9I)
.:.-
297-HQ-A1327669-A.
b6 -1 • b7C -1 Continuation of FD-302 of On 09/07/2004 , Page
performed with the other interviewing team, occurred in the
evenings. The purpose of the interviews was to gain as much
information as possible from the detainees before they were
exposed to the general detainee population.
SAI 'heard through the'person placed in charge of
law enforcement.agency personnel at GITMO that other government
agencies were-using female military intelligence personnel in
I
psychological operations-type activitieltit the detainees.
The person in pbarge,-whose identity SA could not recall,
b6 -1 • told SAl (that in.an effort to disrupt detainees who were
hp-?c -1 praying.during interrogations, female military intelligence,
personnel would wet their•hands then touch the detainee's.face,
. causing the detainee to stop praying because he considered
himself-unclean. The person resps'b e for law enforcement
agency personnel emphasized to SA that law enforcement
agency personnel were not allowt use this type of practice
when interviewing detainees. SA did not witness this
technique, 'or anything-similar to it, performed on a detainee.
SAI I did not have knowledge of interviewing tactics or techniques addressed in any type of Department of b6 -1 Defense policy since he never received a briefing or written
b7C 1-
materials describing such a policy. SAI—THwas only aware of
i
the technique of wetting of the hands from s conversation with
the person placed in charge of law enforcement agency perSonnel.
Sometime near the end of hiS tour at GITMOi. when:he was
partnered with the military intelligence soldier, SAL Land b6 -1 the soldier were conducting an evening interview of an,Iraqi b7C -1 detainee •who had been apprehended in Afghanistan. During the
interview, SA and the soldier heard banging sounds
similar to claps o hunder, but were perplexed by the sounds
since there had not been any indication of rain when they - .
entered the interviewing facility. They decided to exit the
facility to investigate the sounds.
As SA and the soldier were exiting the
interviewing faci y, they noticed a detainee on the floor in
b6 -1panother interviewing room, "crumpled over," and crying. SA
b7Cp asked the personnel in the interviewing room, all of whom
appeared to be militar ersonnel based on their uniforms, what •
' recalled that the military personnel
had happened. SA
may have responded that the detainee had thrown himself to the
floor. SA bserved that the detainee's nose appeared to
RESPONSES-71
-
FD-302a (Rev, 10-6-95)
297eHQ-A132-76697-A
b6 -1
b7C -1
Continuation of FD-302 of pI , 02/071_2004 , Page
be bleeding. SA did not see or hear anything else aboUt
the incident thatdisputed the account offered by the military
personnel present in the room. SA' ] did note that when he
exited the facility, there was no indication of thunder outside.
The lack of thunder caused him to wonder about the noises he had
heard. However, since he did not observe the events that
transpired in the other interviewing room, and he did not
b6 1-
receive other information contradicting the account of events
b7C 1
provided by those in the room where he found the detainee
bleeding; apparently from the nose, SA1 'could not say that
what transpired in that interview room fell outside U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) policy. However, SAI 'stated
that there was potential for the events' occurring in that
interview room to not fall in line with either FBI or DOJ
policy. SA' 'emphasized that he did not observe any FBI or
. ,
DOJ personnel- present]in,the interviewing room where he observed
the bleeding detainee.
- --SA Add not know the identify of the personnel -
ptesent--in-the-interviewing .room where he observed the bleeding
detainee,. or the identity of the detainee; however, SA
b6 -1pfelt that determining . their identities would'be possible by b7 C -1p
quer in logs maintained by the military at GITMO. According to
SA the date, interviewing room, and the identities of
-the'interviewers and detainees for each interview were
maintained. by the military at GITMO. SA' 'produced an FD
302:of-his_interview of the -Iraqi detainee that evening;
however; he did-not maintain a copy.
• In addition to the military intelligence soldier on SA
s-interviewing team on the evening he observed.the b6 -1pbleeding detainee, SAF7----lreceiVed interviewing assistance
b 7 C -1
from an Army psychologist or psychiatrist who was an officer.
SA' 'stated that this ingvidual was a -major, but that he
could not recall his-name. SA made a comment about what
he had observed to this person:
SA described the interviewing facilities at
GITMO as temporary structures. The interviewing facility he b6 --1 used consisted of about 12 interviewing rooms on either side of b7C -1 a hallway. There were six rooms in a row on one side of the.
hallway and six rooms on the other side. Adjacent to each room
were surveillance rooms that allowed other persons to observe.
interviews without entering an interviewing room. -During the
evening when SAI 'saw the bleeding detainee, SAI (was
RESPONSES-72 •
ti
a 1.1
FD-302a (key. 104-95)
297-H12-A1327669-A
b6 -1
b7C -1
Continuation of FD-302 of , I ,N09/07/2004 Mtge I
occupying an interviewing room at one endbk-th'e facility; and
he observed to.detainee in an interviewing room two to three
rooms from his, and on the same side of the hallway.
SAI received a tour of the detention facilities b6.-1pat GITMO; however, lie did not talk about what went on at the b7C -1pfacility with the military personnel he encountered during the
• tour. SA1 [did not consider any of these contacts
substantive in nature.
SAl noted that during the course of at least one
detainee. interview, but possibly another as well, he documented
information he received from the detainee about abuses that 'may
have occurred in Afghanistan. SA stated that the Iraqi
he interviewed the evening he observe t e bleeding detainee was
b6 '-1 'pone of the.. detainees whose information about possible abus4s in
b7C -1pAfghanistan was specific enough to document in an FD 302.' SA 'documented the information relating to possible detainee abuseAn ,a.separate case file; one that was being set up to addreSs possible war'crimes. SAI Hid not know the case. file number and he did not maintain a copy of the FD 302. SA 'believed that representatives from other law enforcement agencies at GITMO documented information regarding possible, detainee abuse. -
Based on the condition of the facilities, and having
had the opportunit to walk through the cells where detainees
were held, SA -had no indiCation of systemic detainee
b6 -1
abuse at GITMO.. SA believed the detainees were,well fed
b7C -1
and provided with essential needs, such as medical treatment.
He was made aware of one detainee who received medical treatment
costing around $100,000.00 for an eye injury he sustained while
building an•explosive device in Afghanistan intended for use
against U.S. soldiers.
RESPONSES-73