FBI Memo re: Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) Challenges Encountered at Guantanamo Bay

This memo is from the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Units (BAU) discussing how the interrogation of suspected Al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects was proceeding. The memo states "several discussions were held to determine the most effective means of conducting interviews of detainees. These discussions were prompted by the recognition that members of the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) Defense Humint Services (DHS) were being encouraged at times to use aggressive interrogation tactics in GTMO which are of questionable effectiveness and subject to uncertain interpretation based on law and regulation. Not only are these tactics at odds with legally permissible interviewing techniques used by U.S. law enforcement agencies in the United States, but they are being employed by personnel in GTMO who appear to have little, if any, experience eliciting information for judicial purposes. The continued use of these techniques has the potential of negatively impacting future interviews by FBI agents as they attempt to gather intelligence and prepare cases for prosecution.”

Doc_type: 
Non-legal Memo
Doc_date: 
Friday, May 30, 2003
Doc_rel_date: 
Sunday, February 5, 2006
Doc_text: 

(Aro 03.21•2000)
SEL9mT/ORCON/NOFORN

FEDEPRIZBUR OFINVESTIGATION

Precedence: ROUTINE Date: 05/30/2003

To: Counterterrorism Attn: A/SC Reymond S. May, CTORS
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A/UCI
MI
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General Counsel Attn: Melon E. Bowman, Senior Counsel for National Security Affairs
Miami Attn: SAC Hector M. Pesquera; ASA ' liuzzi:
SSAL

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From: CIRG b7C -1 Behavioral Alvoiq Unit-fRATT1 Contacts SSAI. 1 b2 -1
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Approved By: Wiley Stephen R
Battle Frankie

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Drafted By:

Case ID #: (U) 265A-MM-C991021 (Fending) 1301
GTMO-INTEL

Title: (U)i

vlogitioni

GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA
00:MIAMI
MAJOR CASE 188

Synopsis: (U) To document BAU assistance and challenges encountered during TDY assignment.in Guantanamo Bay (GTM0).
Xlv) Derive : ,0-3 Declassii
: XS

Enclosure(s): (U) Enclosed documents provide additional details 126 -1 regarding issues encountered by SSAsiiin GTMO:
landi

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Referral/Consult
"t6/ORCON/NOFORN
DETAINEES-1261

4.:1
t
/ORCON/NOFORN To: Counterterrorism From: cInG Re: (U) 265A-Mm-c99102, 05/30/:'003 Referral/Consult DOD
3. (LES) FBI(BAU) Letter forwarded to, Major General (MGEN) G.R.
Miller, commander, Joint Task Force-170 on 11/22/2002.

)11 \ x
\\\IU 1.
5. (LES) Legal Analysis of Interlogation Techniques by SSA 1i

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FBI (BAU).

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...... X

11 7. (LES) FBI(BAU)/CITF Interrogation Plan for Detainee T1 b6 -4
1/22/2002.i b7C -4

,4 1
\\ X
I
9. (LES) Letter from FBI GTMO Supervisor/BAU to MGEN Miller re: Video
Teleconference on 11/21/2002.

12.(LES) FBI(BAU) Interview notes re: Detainee 11/22/2002. b6 -4

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Details: 08:1 During the TDY asiSSA1i

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(10/27/2002-12/06/2002) and SSAi(11/07-2002-12/18/2002),

b7C -1, , ,,te \Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), several iscussions were held.to determine
the most effective means of conducting'interviews of detainees:'411bese
discussions were prompted by the recognition that members of the
Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) Defense Humint Services (DHS)
were being encouraged at times tc use aggressive interrogation tactics
in GTMO which are of questionable effectiveness and subject to
uncertain interpretation based on law and regulation. Not only are
these tactics at odds with legally permissible interviewing techniques
used by U.S. law enforcement agencies in the United States, but they
are being employed by personnel in GTMO who appear to have little, if
any, experience eliciting information for judicial purposes. The
continued use of these techniques has the potential of negatively
impacting future interviews by FBI agents as they attempt to gather
intelligence and prepare cases for prosecution.

E /ORCON/NOFORN
2
DETAINEES-1262

/ORCON/NOPORN

TO. Counterterrorism Pram: CIRG
Re:i

(U) 265A-MM-C99102, 05/30/2003

Referral/Direct

tI6 SSA antir."."1with +•ha yroinnrrsarirg. of RAH

wrrintliremrererstrremrarromm tuntortunately, these arguments were
d resistance by senior DHS
officials in GTMO, despite several attempts to convince them
otherwise. Nonetheless, the DHS have falsely claimed that the BAU has
helped to develop and support DHS's interrogation plans.

(U) During their TD? assignment, SSAsi and IIIII kept

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the BAU apprized of details of the above controversy, Alitionally,
-1 they offered interviewing assistance and provided training on

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interrogation methods to FBI/CITF personnel.

a .
.,_
I
12 02 2002 SSP MINII sent several documents via e-

mail to Uh t a:f BAU, Quantico, who advised he would
forward them to Marion Bowman, egal Counsel, FBIHQ. These documents
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included a letter to the JTF -170 Commanding General, Major General

, .i(Encl 3), a U.S .Army.Legal Brief on Proposed
Counter4taiistance Strategies'iuppOrtingthe use of aggressive
interrogation techniques (Encl 4), and a Leant An lysis of
Interrogation Techniques (Encl 5) by SSAIi

(S) It is noteworthy that the case agent in GTMO, SA

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and senior officials from the Criminal Investigative ), who have been involved in GTMO sires the beginning,
* Lirrxr.rum_rcrint

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b1
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(S . /ORCON/NOFORN
WIRESi3 DETAINEES-1263

To Counterterrorism From: CIPG
Re: (U) 265A-MM-C99102, 05/30/7.003

(S) The differences between OHS and FBI interrogation
techniques and the potential legal problems which could arise were
discussed with DHS officials. However, they are adamant that their

interrogation strategies are the best ones to use despite a lack of

evidence of their success. The issue regarding the effectiveness of

DHS's techniques was amplified during an awkward teleconference

between GTMO and Pentagon officials. During this teleconference

officer overseeing military interrogations, LCOL

USA, blatantly misled the Pentagon into believing that th
endors 6 DRR'c AffrIT-PCS4VP find controversial Interrogation Plan (RC1

6) for

b6 -1,2,4 a detainee C9mmon1v rpf1—iI
I. as'i

r

Prior o rola vice0 teleconference, Ms! larldijhad

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discussed with DHS the advi

es. and rationale regarding the FBI's
interrogation strategy fort i

7), and had made available to

ll

them a written draft of this p an.

P'N¦
Referral/commit non
The military and DHS's inaccurate portrayal to the
Pentagon t at the EAU had /nod and, in fa hel to mug

DHS's interrogation plan forLIprompted SSA iSSA(i

land
the FBI on-scene TDY operations supervisor, 8 Al 1 to

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send a letter (Encl 9) to MGEN Miller correcting these misstatements
b7C -1,4 and requesting an opportunity to address the matter with MGEN Miller
in person. During a subseouent,smeting between MGEN Miller_and SSAs

and "SA) Pdetails'eml rationale for
tne bfflGT sinterviewing approach were presented. Although MGEN Miller
acknowledged positive aspects of this approach, it was-apparent that
he favored DHS's interrogation methods, despite FBI assertions that
such methods could easily result in the elicitation of unreliable and
legally inadmissible information.

Subsequent contact with FBI personnel in GTMO has
revealed t MGEN Miller remains biased in favor of DHS's
interrogation methods, although there is some indication that his
attitude regv be shift4mi mliahtiA Y-AAAiPAAi­
4 11 4 Nr4c4t by AMMA
lv (.1__nw_YIrr
officialRA

I

Referral/Consult DOD
sEET/ORCON/NOPORM

4 1 DETAINEES-1264
.„,
4(kET/ORCON/NOPORN

To; Counterterrorism From: CIRG
Re: (U) 265A-MM-C99102. 05/30/2003

1
Referral/consuit coo

ir••••1
SSAs la n d observed that DHS personnel

1i

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have an advantage over the PBI as esult of their longer periods of
deployment. Currently, DHS personnel are deployed for six months,

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whereas the FBI on-scene supervisor and interviewing agents are
assigned for periods of only 30-45 days. About the time an FRI
supervisor or interviewing agent begins to feel comfortable vith
his/her surroundings and is able to establish meaningful rapport with
detainees, he/she must prepare ti) depart GTMO. There are several
examples in which DHS personnel have awaited the departure of an FBI
supervisor before embarking on aggressive, unilateral interrogation

which they knew would not have been endorsed by the FBI. For
this a.aaavu, SSA Iandf -1 suggested to Acting Unit Chief

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(A/UC)I that the GTM8-rtForce consider extending periods

ik

b7C -1 of deployment for the on-site FBC supervisor and for some agents
assigned to conduct interviews.

M) -- ..... X SSAs.

and r—Idiscussed the above issues not
only with BAU managemesialso wrth A/UC raveled to

u

GTMO in early December. As part of his visit. A/UCI 1 participated
in a second teleconference between MGEN Miligx,iik-Tref and the

b6 -1,2 Pentagon. During this teleconfezewe, A/UC Challenged DHS's
assertion that the FBI had endorsed DHS's interrogation techniques.

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This disclosure surprised Pentagon officials who had hpeo lrcl to
believe that the FBI and DHS were working as a team., i

who
was present at the Pentagon during this teleconference, advised that
he would follow up on this issue by meeting with senior members of the
Department of Defense (DOD) Legal Counsel to provide further
background.on this issue

(U) Upon their return from GTMO, SSAs I land briefed the BAU and provided unit members with copies of relevant documents. During this brief, both explained that although they were compelled by timing and circumstances to devote a considerable amount
-of time to the above policy issues, they were able, nevertheless. to

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assist agents conducting interviews and provide training to FBI/CITF
b7C -1,4 personnel. Of partic 1r ' tance were a series of successful
interviews which SSA nducted with,

((known as detainee who had stopped talking to
interrogators. Utilizing i ervlowing techniques taught by the BAIL
SSA! (was gradually able to re-establish a dialogue (Enol 12)
which ultimately led to the detainee's renewed cooperation.

/ORCON/NOPOEN

5
DETAINEES-1265

• 41
/OROONAlorosN

SEi

To: Counterterrorism From: CZPG
Re: WY 265A-Mm-C99102, 05/30/2003

XMSSAsr--77 -1 and7-1 recognize that issues regarding

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differences in interroaa ion techn ques may not be encountered by all
BAU agents who travel to GTHO. However, considering the constant-

b7C -1 placement and turnover of personnel there, it is an issue which is
likely to surface again. At prevent, FBI agents and w D investigators
conduct interviews on a daily basis in response to a steady number of
criminal and intelligence-related leads. Some of the information
gathered from these interviews iv likely to be used in military
tribunals and, possibly, in federal court. Therefore, it is essential
that FBIHQ, DOJ and DOD provide specific guidance to protect agents
and to avoid tainting cases which may be referred for prosecution.

/ORCON/NOFORN To: Counterterrorism From: CIRG Re:i(U) 265A-MM-099102, 05/30/2043
LEAD(s):
Set Lead 1: (Discretionary) COUNTERTERRORISM AT WASHINGTON. D C
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set Lead 2: (Discretionary) GENERAL COUNSEL AT WASHINGTON, DC
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Set Lead 3: (Info) MIAMI Nr MIAMI. FLORIDA (U) For'information only.
. . /ORCON/NOFORN 7 DETAINEES-1267 cc: SSAIiHAU-East GTMO Coordinator b6 -1 b7C -1

Doc_nid: 
5791
Doc_type_num: 
63