FBI Facsimile Cover Sheet

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11/08/2005 11:09 7036321592 HRT PAGE 01
FD448 (Rev. 64-97)
ALL INFOPITATION CONTAINED
• HEPEIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 05-01-N09 BY 55179 DITHIMJ5
FBI FACSIMILE
COVER SHEET
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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
• DATE 06-01-2009 BY 65179 DME/MJS
FEDERAL BUREAU OF:INVESTIGATION
•• ti
Precedence: ROUTINE
To: CIRG
Front: CIRG
Squad: HRT
Approved By:
Drafted By;
Case ID 4; IR 244-0
Title: HRT ADMINISTRATIVE;
AFTER ACTION REPORT;
QUANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN, DEPLOYMENT;
12/11/2001 THROUGH-02/11/2002
Synopsis: After Action Report (AAR) for the. FtI Deployment to
Quandahar, Afghanistan, 12/11/2001 through 02/11/2002, in support
of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) sponsored by the U.S.
Central. Command (CENTCOM).
Situation:
Coalition Forces military actions in Afghanistan had
lead to the capture of thousands of suspected Taliban and AlQaeda
members. These individuals were termed detainees and were being
held in detentiOn facilities throughout Afghanistan and in
Pakistan. Detainees in these facilities were screened by the b2
Military Intellicencel b6
1 Quandahar,
argnanistan, was identified as the location for retention of the..
detainees singled out by this vetting process. Detainees at
Quandahar were interrogated by Military Intelligence for force
protection issues, future target identification, and potential
threats against U.S. interests foreign and domestic. The initial
role for the FBI in Afghanistan was to question detainees at
Quandahar to further criminal prosecution and develop
intelligence to prevent further terrorist attacks.
Mission:
The initial role for the HRT during the Afghanistan
deployment was twofold; first to act as security for the FBI
investigative teams and second to assist in the investigative
effort of the incoming detainees to the Quandahar detention
facility. Perimeter security provided by military units and the
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confinement of investigative efforts to interrogations being
conducted at the detention facility eventually dismissed the need
for HRT operators for force protection. Collocated at Quandahar
airport with the detention facility was the Joint Special
Operations Task Force-South (JSOTF-S). In late December 2001,
the JSOTF-S was preparing for its attached forces (SEALs, ARSOF,
and assorted coalition special forces (SF) units) to conduct
Direct Action (DA) and Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE)
missions. The JSOFT-S commander requested FBI HRT involvement
for the SSE missions. The SSE missions encompassed the
exploitation of selected priority targets for time sensitive
intelligence relating not only to the immediate needs of the
battlefield, but also with respect to post or future attacks
against U.S. interests worldwide. it was in this latter area
where the JSOTF-S envisioned FBI HRT operators could uniquely
benefit the mission force packages assigned to targets. A
typical mission force package. comprised an SF team, two USAF
tactical communicators, two FBI HRT personnel, one linguist and a
chemical/bioloaioal RnpniAlir On 01/05/2001, HRT operators, SAs1 b6 'participated in the first SSE. b7C
Details:
On 12/11/2001, a ten member FBI team deployed to the
Middle East'in support of CENTCOM's campaign against the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan. The team was comprised of two Tft.P.MhPr nf
the Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), SAsl
two New York (NY) case agents, one Washington Field b6 . Office (WFO) b7c
case agent, four Crisis Resoonre Unit (CRU) personnel, and team
leader Unit Chief'
The team deployed via military air charter on
12/11/2001 from Baltimore Washington International airport and
arrived on 12/13/2001, at an intermediate U.S. staging base in
Doha, Qatar. Two CRU members set up a communications base
station at the JIATF forward operating base in Doha and remained
at that location.
On 12/16/2001, the remaining eight members forward
deployed via military C-17 to Jokokobad, Pakistan. Due to
daylight fight restrictions into Afghanistan, the team waited
approximately 18 hours for a flight to Quandahar. On12/17/2001,
the team continued on a military C-130 to Quandahar, Afghanistan.
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precipitation. Temperatures ranged from 60-65 daytime highs to
10-20 nighttime lows. Cold weather equipment was a necessity.
Upon arrival, personnel at Quandahar were limited to
the Marines controlling the perimeter and the Special Operations
Task Force-South. Any support infrastructure was non-existent.
All food and water was flown in on nightly supply runs. All
personnel were rationed to two MREs and two bottles of water a
day. The latrines consisted of slit trenches utilizing old tires
on two parallel bars as seats. Hygiene was a persistent problem.
As each,night passed, additional units arrived to
include a contingent of Navy Seabees who quickly constructed
functional military burn barrel latrines. After two weeks of
infrastructure influx, a well was discovered at the airport which
soon was pumped into a makeshift bath house. However, due to the
steady increase in base personnel and the lack of sufficient
airflow, food rations continued for the duration of the mission.
On 01/04/2002, a replacement team consisting of three
SAs from NY, two SAs from WFO, two SAs from HRT, and one UC from
the ERT were deployed via the Bureau's G-5, to replace the FBI
personnel in Quandahar, Afghanistan. On 01/06/2002. the rntatinn
of personnel was accomplished. However, HRT SAs
were not rotated so they could continue to'participate in SSEs,
and CRU SSA I Iwas not replaced and remained ar
Quandahar. The two HRT operators were
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The NY and WFO SAs were assigned to work with the Army
CID SAs present at Quandahar. The U.S. Army was responsible for
conducting the Military Tribunals of all detainees not criminally
prosecuted by the Justice Department and CID was to be the
investigative branch for development of case files. After
approximately one week, two of the NY Agents were sent to Bagram,
Afghanistan to assist in interrogations being conducted at that
location. Task Force Bowie was located at Bagram and headed by
General Harrel. Their primary mission was to develop
intelligence from interrogation of very high value detainees.
The NY Agents with their specific case knowledge were helpful:inthe
interrogation process.
On 01/23/2002, Director Muller with Deputy BAD Tim
Caruso visited Quandahar, Afghanistan. Accompanying them were
the Legat and Assistant Legat of Islamabad, Pakistan. All were
given briefings on the FBI's involvement in the processing and
interrogation of detainees as well as, participation in SSEs.
After their departure, the decision to cease participation in the
SSEs was made. without a mission to provide security or
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participate in SSEs, and'with the 2002 Winter Olympics about to
begin, the HRT Operators returned to the U.S. On 02/10/2002, the
second team was relieved in place. Two SAs from NY were sent to
Bagram and one NY SA and Los Angles SA were sent to Quandahar.
Lessons Learned:
A: Investigative:
. 1. Lack of a clearly defined mission and no clearly
defined intent from FBIHQ:
While there was value to a Bureau presence in
Afghanistan, it seems that as an organization the FBI did not
moved beyond simply establishing a presence. The investigative
priorities were for the most part decided by those on the ground
at Bagram and Quandahar - little input was received from FBIHQ or
the field offices. The Bureau should implement a. mission of long
term.substance which includes-the proper support if we intend to
maintain a presence. The time frame for transport of detainees
to Cuba has been extended over a period of months and will
thereby prolong our presence in Afghanistan. It is likely the
Bureau will have agents in Afghanistan well into late March, or
later, until Cuba is prepared to receive the remaining detainees.
The agents. on the ground evaluated the relevance of the
detainees to AL-QAEDA or the Taliban. This was an incredible
task given that there were more than 500 detainees that passed
through/into Quandahar in the past 45 days. With obstacles like
the criminal/Intel wall, which has since been lowered, and the
recently restricted access to all military draft IIRs, agents
were handicapped from fully evaluating the background of each
detainee. Detainees also commonly arrived without any
identification and their true identity.was difficult to
impossible to establish in Quandahar.
Recommendation: That a section at FBIHQ UBLU/RFU be dedicated to
oversee matters for personnel in Afghanistan and help set
priorities. The UBLU/RFU sections would be logical selections as
they work closely with New York, are the central conduits for
information from Afghanistan, and benefit most from the
information gained in Afghanistan. This unit could oversee
coordination for military transport, logistic requests to include
coordination with CRU, CIRG, HRT, and investigative issues. More
than 500 detainees have passed through the Quandahar detention
facility and it would have been beneficial to have UBLU
coordinate traces and responses on each detainee.
2. Intentions with Detainees:
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Agents in Quandahar were limited in conducting in depth
interviews due to limitations with translators, lack of available
intelligence, space restrictions (six tents were available for
interviewing in'Quandahar), and prioritization of interviews to
the military. Once key AL-QAEDA members were identified, they
were quickly transported to Bagram for further exploitation.
This discouraged agents from investing a great deal of time in
any one detainee. We saw our role in QUandahar as performing
triage - identify key members of AL-QAEDA or the Taliban and
recommend them for immediate transport to GTMO for in-depth interviews. •
Recommendation: New York and FBIHQ need to be more. proactive in
reviewing the detainee lists and making recommendations for
interview and transport.
Recommendation: the FBI should TDY language trained agents,
support personnel, or contract local nationals. Local nationals
are being contracted by other government agencies.
3. Inprocessing and Outprocessing of Detainees:
The FBI team that took part in this particular mission,
had serious doubts as to• why FBI agents became involved in this
venture. The entire inprocessing/outprocessing procedure was
under the command and control of the Malitary Police. The FBI
and CID assumed the role of taking fingerprints, photographs and
a DNA samples of incoming detainees and taking an outprocessing
photograph after the detainee has been clean shaven. If
necessary, the FBI could conduct this process; with the exception
of the incoming photograph, under better conditions once the
detainee arrived in Guantanamo. To have a combination of three
to four FBI and CID agents spending countless work hours
processing detainees, many of which were later repatriated, was a
waste of valuable resources, when this could have been
accomplished by lower enlisted men of the Military Police.
Recommendation:
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B; Logistical support;
1. Communications:
Personnel:
The Crisis Response Unit (CRU) was deployed'on
12/11/01. The initial deployment consisted of two Supervisory'
Special Agents (SSAs) and two Electronics Technicians (ETs). The
problem was that the Director said that only Agents, could go to
Afghanistan. CRU only has three Agents in the Unit (one Unit
Chief and two SSAs). The rest of the unit is comprised of ETs.
This made rotation of CRU personnel impossible. Possible
solutions would be to staff the unit with more Agent personnel,
or to arm and train the ETs. •
ACS and.GroupWise:
As part of the initial loadout, CRU brought two M-4
terminals, a standard B terminal and two Cliff Packs. The M-4s
are high data rate InMarSat terminals, mostly used for data
transfer. The Cliff Packs are devices that when attached to an
M-4, standard B or ISDN line can provide connectivity to the FBI
network, which gives access to ACS and Groupwise. The idea was
that one Cliff Pack and M-4 would go to Quandahar and one would
stay in Doha. Upon arrival in Doha, CRU was told that they would
have to limit the amount of eauinmAnt f-Alrpn Zarges boxes. I wo
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Handheld Portable Radios:
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radios_ alnInnrri rt.7i4at1l.l, y, CRU brought ten MASHR handheld portable
TacSat:
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Iridium:
CRU initially deployed with two Iridium telephones.
During the personnel rotation on 1/6/02, one of the Iridiums was
taken back. These telephones proved very useful in that thatr hael
InMarSat:
CRU initially brought an M-4 and a Mini-M InMarSat
terminals with them. The M-4 was used with a Teles box to attach
to the STU III and then to a viasat card. This gave the
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Computers:_
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Crypto:
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2. Transportation and notification of travel:
Individuals selected for rotation should be notified
well in advance of the date set for relief in place of the incountry
personnel. This would allow time for purchasing
equipment, qualifying with weapons and obtaining visas and
pertinent shots. There should also be time built into
preparations where the team leader could meet with individuals
arriving from various divisions, and brief them on his intent and
the mission requirements. This should not occur as being loaded or in transit the plane is where there are no secure gathering
facilities.
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A site shoul be DOD for use of d with th
fund
military airlift into and
continuall
ou
y
t of
maintaine
the theater of
the
operations. As has been witnessed in this instance, operational
use of the Bureau's G-5 does not always take precedence and
alternate means of travel should be established and in place
prior to the commitment of personnel to overseas operations where
commercial air traffic is not available.
Recommendation #1: Agents being deployed to Afghanistan should
be given ample time to prepare the following. and not depart the
U.S. until the following items are in order:
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C. Command and Control
There should be one contact point at FBIHQ for the flow
of information to and from the forward element. The use of
multiple personnel to maintain contact looses continuity for the
forward element. Issues and taskings that had been discussed on
earlier shifts or on other days are not necessarily know to a
change in personnel. This can lead to confusion, a repeat of
assignments and a loss of morale for, personnel assigned as the
forward element.
In this particular situation, Qandahar, Afghanistan,
the use of a conference call was extremely difficult. The
location of the command post was in the Airport terminal
building. Doors and windows had been blown out during previous
fighting. Ambient noise levels were hiah tz nAr-; =1 i.r mn cl.
were being orocessed
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I would recommend the use of speaker phone conference calls
be limited to those circumstances where absolutely necessary, and
that one person be appointed as the point of contact for all
messages be passed 1-". o and from FnrwmvA
D. Sensitive Site Exploitations:
Case agents assigned full time work on terrorism
matters possess the most extensive knowledge of
information. However,
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The current war on terrorism is a mixture of law
enforcement efforts and military actions. With its leadership
role in pursuing criminal prosecution against terrorism, the'PEI
needs to be in a position to timely information. The FBI's
participation in sensitive site exploitations (SSEs) is one
mechanisM to assist in this endeavor. To make SSEs a viable
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option for the FBI, I feel the following areas should have FBI
involvement:
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4.
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6. If HRT is to continue participation in SSEs then I make
the following suggestions to better prepare them for these
assignments: .
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IThe training with lso be responsible for cross b2 components and overseeing the
establishment of appropriate lines for intelligence
comminlirAtirm oTnnwIrrem
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a.
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The SSA would also be responsible for placing an LNO
1 Ito further enhance intelligence collection
and fusion into this cell.
b. HRT should alter training to increase those skills
necessary to address SSEs with TF components.
(Specific training objectives TSD but should include
greater emphasis on patrolling and the use of varied
types of communications equipment.)
c. I
The above does not detract from the HRT's current
mission statement, but rather adds to it. A commitment of
reoccurring personnel and financial resources should accompany
the additional responsibilities.
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