Major General Geoffrey D. Miller's sworn statement. Stated that he was in D.C. briefing the Deputy Secretary of Defense in May 2003 when he met with MG Ron Burgess and spoke with him about Joint Task Force-Guantanamo (JTF GTMO) assisting with intelligence, interrogation and detention in Iraq. After US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) issued a Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) to that effect, Miller and his team departed for Iraq. Noted that operations at JTF GTMO greatly differed from Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7) operations as the latter were conducted under the provisions of Geneva Conventions 3 and 4. Noted, "The operations at JTFG GTMO conducted detention and interrogation of enemy combatants. JTF GTMO adhered to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions except where military necessity dictated as directed by the Nov 01 Presidential Directive." Recorded discussions with Fast, Sanchez and Pappas. Stated that he recommended written interrogation policies for CJTF-7 and that "we provide the [Secretary of Defense (SECDEF)] approved interrogation authorities from JTF GTMO to CJTF-7 legal staff." Added "we never used dogs for interrogations while I was in command of JTF GTMO," and that to the best of his knowledge JTF GTMO never utilized removal of clothing as an interrogation technique over the period (12 Dec 02 to 15 Jan 03) for which SECDEC had approved this technique for use.
SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form. MI AR 19045; the proponent agencY Is ODCSOPS
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 6 USC Section 2951: E.O. 9397 doted November 22. 1943 aSN). AUTHORITY:
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE; To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately
and /envoys]. Your social security number Is used as an additional/attempts means of identification to facilitate nano ROUTINE USES:
Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary. 4. FILE NUMBER
DISCLOSURE: (YYYYMMDDI 1-3 . TIME
2. DATE.
1. LOCATION 2004/06/19 CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ 7. GRADE/STATUS
O. SSN
5. LAST NAME. FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME 0-8
MILLER, GEOFFREY D.
B. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL-D•TAINEE OPERATIONS
MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES-IRAQ ,
WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
Geoffrey D. Miller
I.
Q. How did the JTF GTMO mission to assist arr: 7 originate? 7 was directed from the Joint Chiefs of Stall to
A. The requirement to establish a JTF Guantanamo Assessment Team for CJTF
SOUTHCOM. 1 was in Washington D.C. briefing the Deputy Secretary of Defense in May 03. 1 met with MG RON BURGESS.
from Major Combat
some challenges in OTF-7 with the transition
were
JCS .1-2 and during our discussions he stated that there detention. I told him
intelligence. interrogation, a
Operations to SappOrt and Sustainntent Operations (SAS()) in the areas of
there was a request for ITF GTMO to conduct ao assistance visit that JCS must, ask SOUTHCOM to conduct the mission. About
WARNORD tosupport CJTF-7 and that o FRAGO was comm
ten days later. SOUTHCOM celled and notified me they had a
out to deploy. rsonno who were currently
interrogation nperations, and detention operations. The Assistance tens pe rations , interrogation
intelligence fusion ope
assigned to JTI: GTMO or those who had recently been a_ssigned to assist on how rted to ltaq.
etter inegrated. .Once we received the FRAGO, we depa
operations, and detention operation could be.
Q. What was the difference between the mission at JTF GTMO and the mission of CTIT-7?
A. The missions were significantly different. Operations conducted by G17-7 were conducted under the provisions of Geneva
Convention 3 for EPA's and under Geneva Convention 4 Int Security Internees. The operations at TM GTMO conducted
detention and interrogation of enemy combatants. JTF GTMO adhered to the provisions of the Geneva Convention except whore
military necessity dictated as directed by the Nov 01 Presidential Directive.
Q. Who at CJTF-7 did you discuss the JTF GTMO assessment visit strategy?
A. 1 met with LTG Sanchez soon alter the Team arrived lot an in brief and we discussed the assessment pian. We discussed the
applied in Iraq. I told him the Team would need 96 hours visit strategy and applicability of Geneva Convention requirements that at the CJTF-7 level. to conduct our initial ussessment of intelligence tusion operations un the staff, the interrogation operations
and the CJTF-7 level detention operations. Following the initial assessment I would provide an in-process review tit the findings.
hog. focused on :he intelligence fusion and interrogation operations.
11.1..1 a soniiiir dtsi.urssion with MG
Q. What were the Teum's assessments in the area of intelligence and interrogation and to whom were they provided?
A. The assessments of all :item and recommendations were provided in the assessment report on 9 September 03. f briefed both
LTO Sanchez and MG Fast on that day and provided the amassment report and associated SOPs.
environment and locus of the intelligence and Interrogation you observed during your
Q. Can you characterize the operational
assessment visit?
has recently transitioned to a C.IfF structure. The intelligence operations and interrogation operations at both
A. The Vth Corps --to operational level
the Camp Cropper facility and Abu Ghraih were focused at the tactical level, working to transition requirements for the On'. Camp Cropper and Abu Ghraih were two separate interrogation facilities with their own independent
just beginning to
collection focus. The majority of the interrogations were being c:onducted at Camp Cropper. Abu Cihraib was
establish intelligence exploitation and interrogation operations. I discussed our assessment and recommendation to establish a
fusion and
Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center with MG Fast and LTG Sanchez, We discussed the process of intelligence
how strategic interrogations were conducted at JTF GTMO.
RSO MAKING STATEMENT
I n INITIALS OF P
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MUST BE BE INDICATED.
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AGE w NEEDED. • IF THIS mos IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO NNAL PAGE Of This POW
uSE THIS .
DATED 2004/06/1 9CAMP VICTORY
TAKEN AT
DEFFREY D. MILLER
STATEMENT OF
STATEMENT /Continua ll
S.
Q.
II has been reported that41.1111111111111Mwas notified of inappropriate interrogation procedures and did not report this
wrong. His
further. Would this surprise you? g was wro
11.11011.111.1Mpo nut have taken actions if something
A. Yes'. It would be out of character for performance at JTF GTMO was superb.
• interrogation authorities at TTF GTMO that authorized the removal of drothiog as an intetrogation technique?
Q. Wcrc there the interrogation ataborily to remove stems
GTMO had SECDEF approved r used this
A. Yes, From 12 December 02 to 15 January 03 JTF technique during that petiod.
of clothing as a part of interroptions• To the best of my knowledge JTF GTMO neve
All personnel were notified in January 03 that this technique was no longer authorized.
Q. Was there inten•: pressure on COL Papas to produce intelligence from interrogations?
A. When I visited Iraq for the first time. the CJTF was transitioning from combat operations to stability and SASO operations,
amount of fighting going on. 1 did not detect any extraordinary pressum being applied to COL
but there was still a significant
Papas. In my experience. there is always pressure to provide intelligence to help the commander better be prepared to win thethat
fight. It simply saves soldiers lives and is always a priority.• In looking at actionable intelligence to help the rig, I assessed
and not rapid. Oneat the intelligence operations to develop actionable intelligence and information for the commander was bulky
of intelligence priorities and requirements for the unit to answer. The
of the challenges 1 observed was there were a large number C2
Ghraib were confused and didn't know what to focus on. I recommended to MG FAST that the
leadership and soldiers at Abu
reline and prioritize the intabgence requirements. C2X • klUMIT operations - was mot effective and should be redirected to
better assist in establishing intelligence collection priorities. The unit at Abu Ghraih was not producing Intelligence Information
of the essential documents to assist in developing actionable intelligence for the
Reports in a timely manner. This is one
commander The 'learn suggested that the Intelligence Cell at Abu MOM) at least begin producing Memorandums For Record for
their intarogouon summaries.
Q. What was your assessment of the intelligence unit at Abu Ghriab's ability to accomplish its mission?
of equipment and facilities to conduct interrogations. There were very few computers for
A. The Team noticed there was a lack a canvas tent that was being
the troops to use to leverage the information contained in other intelligenim databases. They had
integrated team. WC recommended they
used us ao interrogation booth. Their interrogators did not have analysts that ailed as an
the interrogator and analysts routinely worked together so they could be more effective. To do
use the Tiger Team concept where
the Lind of system linkage to make the most of out the interrogation opportunities we recommended they should establish an
intelligence lesion cell for analytical support. The unit was functioning a very basic level - lots of effort but not much intelligence
output.
they developing interrogation plans as the basis LOT interrogations?
Q. Where We
producing many interrogation plans as the basis for interrogation.
A. The learn assessment was that the organization was not and
recommended they should develop interrogation plans and then get a approved prior to all interrogations. The seriorNCOs
ssiorsro officers should he involved and train their soldici-s in this task. The analyst needs to help the interrogator by reviewing
the intenngation plans for quality control.
Q. Who did we provide your report after departing CITE 7?
report to SOUTTIJCONI J2, and it was forwarded to the JCS 12. 1 do not know how it was further
A. I sent the assessment
distributed.
Q. is there anything lose you would like to add?
A. No
of Statementi/MOOMO/M///////////////////////////////l/M// 1////8////
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DATED 2004/06/19
TAKEN AT CAMP VICTORY
GEOFFREY D. MILLER
STATEMENT OF
(Continued)
9. STATEMENT
AFFIDAVIT HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
GEOFFREY D. MILLER
I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE a
CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL
B EFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT
I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF
CONTAINING THE STATEMENT.
I U EA ENT
OR UNLA.
THREAT PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFL .
¦ (.) .
ire of Parson Making Statement)
\suhsc ibed an• w ern to before me, a person authonzad by Law to WIC JUNE , 2004
admtptsier aths, this 2-z. day of VICTORY, BAGHDAD IRA
/eV.
, azure of Person Administering th)
NOR ADDRESS
storm(Typed Nome
UCMJ, ARTICLE 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES
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