This statement of Major General Geoffrey D. Miller is a description of how he became aware of difficulties at Abu Ghraib prison and the measures and steps he took to address the matters as they presented to him. He described his discussions with Col. Pappas, Gen. Sanchez and Gen. Fast. He stated “We visited Abu Ghraib and conducted an assessment of the operations. I told LTG Sanchez once we completed the assessment of the operations that I was going to be blunt. Abu Ghraib was not working well.” He then stated “We were laying out the baseline we used at GTMO. I told them that the working dogs were used in GTMO help the with the custody and control issue and that it was very effective when you have a lot of detainees and few guards, the dogs help with reduce the risk of demonstrations.” But added “We have never used the dogs for Interrogations at GTMO, and I did not discuss this with them because I did not have this concept.” Finally he stated “As far as removal of clothing we had received authority to use the removal of clothing as technique for about a six-week period between Dec. 02 to Jan. 03 but that was never done at GTMO. I did not elect to use that technique.” That was rescinded [Very similar to ACLU-RDI 801]
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CAMP VICTORY 5. LAST NAME. "FIRST NAME. MIDDLE NAME 6. SSN 7. GRADFJSTATUS 08
MILLER. GEOFFREY
S. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
Geoffrey Miller briefing the Depity SecDef when I received a call
My .initis] visit to Iraq occurred, 31 August to 10 September 2003. I was in D.C.
nansition fit= major combat
from RON BURGESS, 3-2. In my own words, be stated that there were some challenges with the
Operations (SASOI The intelligence fusion and intelligence capability was not
operations to Support and Su in
I told him that the only way was to task SouthCom and that I would assist in looking into Detention Operations because we were
-7 and that a
good at it Ten days later, SoutbCom called and said they had a call from JCS and had a WARNORD to support CTTF A FRAGO was coming out to deploy. I put together a combined interagency lean with illteliagenCt, law =forcemeat, DI
We took personnel who were currently at GTMO or those who bad been there to assist on how detention operation shoulde GTMO was under Geneva three and ltati was
received the FRAGO, we departed to Iraq. This was apples and oranges as
Once we a Geneva
under Geneva four. I stated that we needed to make sure from the beginning that was =denim& We banded everyone Coovennon handbook to all we met with. I met with LTG Sanchez and told him we would need 96 hours to conduct an assent:nen to look at the prison and ace how it is established Lod•bow they are operating. We visited Abu Gbraib and conducted an assessment
of the operations I told LTG Sanchez once we completed the assessment that I was going to be blunt. Abu Ghraib was not working
14.15196 was on
well. The Corps was enamor:ling to a CTTF and the focus at Abu Ghraib was tactical not strategic as it should be. the ground and they were literally conducting tacncal operations. They had split operations at Camp Cropper where the majority of the interrogations were being conducted (6xbooths . and Abu Ghraib where they were beginning to establish operations (laRFAP and
I xTrolan Spirit). I told Men how strategic Interrogations worried at GTMO and how you go about gathering information and segmenting it from high and low level value. I told LTG SANCHEZ be needed to establish interrogation limits quickly because the
but not because we had seen any abuse. They just needed to know whatsoldiers on the ground didn't know what had to be done,
some of the limits were I also stated that he needed to get leadership down at Abu Ghraib to oversee the operations and ready to
Id back or stop people when things started to go wrong I wrote my report and sent it up to SouthCom d JCS 32 RON BURGESS and no one at DOD
as discussed with them how you go about establishing operations. We were
1 spent time with COL PAPPAS and laying out the baseline we used at GTMO. I told them that the working dogs were used in GTMO whelp the M:1 7: with the custody
you have a lot of detainees and few guards, the dogs help with reduce the riskand control issue and that it was very effective Wnen
At Abu Ghraib you had Camp Ganci which was an open area with three strands of concertina ware. To use theof demonstrations.
Have the dogs when the detainees arc awake not when they are sleeping. Wedogs as a base would reduce noting or demonstration
have never used the dogs for Interrogations at GTMO and 1 did not discuss this with them because I did not have this concept. When 1 let 1 did not leave any documents at Abu Ghraib 1 did leave a disc with GTMO SOPs with the C2 and CO. I did not leave COL PAPPAS attended three to four nightly AARs we held while in inn. I wanted him to
instructions with the subordinate units.
SANCHEZ, I was asked to send assistance to
understand where we were going and to be ready to respond to MG FAST or LTG
Abu Ghraib to help get the 7iger v MG FAST I told her to go through JCS and ask for the teams. .1 ended up ) do not know who were the team members who accompanied him. They
sending five Tiger Teams lead b
were supposed to have been the b . I told FAST that the teams would work as a team and not be split. Other soldiers could be added to use team to learn from them. The teams consisted of an interrogator and an analyst. They deployed for 90 days and were OPCON to C.ITF-7. They did contmue to • t with GTMO but not me. They would ask for SOPs
not have taken actions if something was wrong. Heand other In would be out of character lot
and
g we d receive eDef authority to use the removal of clothing asis a solid Warrant Officer As far as removal of cc)
technique for about a six-week period between Dec 02 to Jan 03 but that was never done at GTMO. I did not elect to use that
technique. That was rescinded.
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TAKEN AT DATEDSTATEMENT OF
9. STATEMENT (Continued) to
In relation to the intense pressure: When I visited Iraq for the first time, the Corps was transitioning from combat operations
to help the fight.
SASO operations but there was still a significant amount of fighting going on. In looking at actionable intelligence I saw that at the operations level the ability to get information was bulky. There were a lot of calls being put
I didn't get to that level.
out for request for information. There were about 90 priorities and the folks on the ground (Abu Ghraib) were confused and didn't know what to focus on. I told MG FAST that they were confusing the soldiers with what they wanted. They needed to reduce the number of priorities to help them focus because they did not know what they were looking for. C2X was not functioning and they
I never heard or
needed to relook at how they were prioritizing the requirements. We helped them established SDRs and priorities.
was aware of pressure coming from higher up. There were no DR process fro a long period of time. They were writing MIR. We
suggested to at least writing MFRS for their interrogation summaries. •
When I first visited Abu Ghraib, I noticed there was a lack of equipment. They had a tent as an interrogation booth. The system they were using for interrogation was not working and we recommended they use the Tiger Team concept. In order for them to put in place the GTMO system they needed computer systems which they didn't have. To do the kind of linkage we had at GTMO and to link with the fusion cell for analytical support was just not there. They were not doing too many interrogation plans. We told them they needed to develop interrogation plans and then get it approved. The senior NCOs and Warrant officers need to get involve and check on their soldiers. The analyst need to get help get an interrogator on track by reviewing the interrogation plans for quality
ccntrol, they need to provide an assessment based on wismijak_rmation they have gathered.of the detainee and provide assistance by telling an interrogator where they need to go next with the interrogation. They were working very hard and trying to do their best I didn't see the capability to move this very fast without the proper automation. My
and much of their work had to be done by hand.
first priority was to get the organization of teams established and my second priority became establishing the computer system to
help with linkage to the fusion cell and C2X. It is still an on going process and continues to get better.
Q. Is there anything else you would like to add? A. No
/11/8//////////////////////////////0///flarEnd of StatementilliM1111111111111111011111111111,1111111111111111111111111111111111
AFFIDAVIT
HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2.
FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD. WITHOUT
THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.
(Signature of Person Making Statement)
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authonzed by law to
WITNESSES .
JUNE , 2004
administer oalbs, this day of
at CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ
(Signature of Person AtImmistenng Oath)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
y,saa ry•of :1• i''er4:_m Av:hiPlfol;;;
1. ARTICLE 1:46
(Authority To Administer Oaths)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
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