Fay Report Annex: Statement of Major, 6th Military Intelligence Battalion, 98th Division (IT) re: Operations and Conditions at Abu Ghraib Prison

SWORN STATEMENT
mos AR 19045; the Proponent agency is OOCSOPSFor use of this form,
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951: E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 ISSN/.
AUTHORITY:
To pianos commanders and law enforcement officials with mums by which infarmation may be accurstaiy idamilud.PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: security number is used is art addnionsUaltornsw moons of identification to facilitate filing and removal.
Your social
ROUTINE USES: Disclosure of your social security number to voluntary.
DISCLOSURE: 4. FILE NUMBER
DATE fYYYVAM 3. TIME
12.
1. LOCATION
2004/05/28 I6DEVENS, MASSACHUSETTS
7. GRADE/STATUS
8. SSA
NAME, FIRST ME, MIDDLE NAME
04/MAJ
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
6th MI BN, 98th Divisuxn (IT)
, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
011/1111111.

I was mobilized with the 325th MI BN. My duty position was the Assistant S-3 (Plans). We tweeted to Fort Dix ca February
22, 2003 and were there for about a month. We then deployed to Kuwait and were there for about a month. We crossed the
OD April 26. 2003 and set up in Baled, Iraq. Sometime in May a tasker came down for personnel to work with in
417.00nti17 lime, I wasmiLio the C2 Staff - m particular the C2X shop. My immediate supervisor waw
rsplaced him. The first time -I heard about Abu Ghrail, was when plans ortilaINIIIII

VICTORY BOUNTY were being developed. The operation was focused on a list of FEDEYEEN MEMBERS we had received.
CROPPER was not an optical because they

We had to identify a location to place personnel captured during the operation. CAMP
Ghraib but this facility was good because it had been a maximum pns000r

were overcrowded. I am not sure who sel
facility and it was being renovated already. c in and told mc about the plan to use Abu Ghraib. Within 48 hours, he and I were traveling to Abu Ghraib to assist m e set up of Abu Ghraib as an interrogatiOn facility. This effort was of the staff process to develop an OPORD for the in se . I do not remember when VICTORY BOUNTY took place. It must have been sometime in August. Wh I visited Abu Ghraib for the first time, the only

nnel there were the MPs. Abu Ghraib was an overflow for civilian detainees identified as haqi on !regi crimes (Criminals).
ere was a huge pen with concertina wire around it already set up. The highest ranking individual I saw these was a major (I do
not remember his name). There was another %mit arriving and they were setting ome detainees there already.
They were all in civilian clothes but I did not sec any abuse A week later, both I visited Abu Ghraib to firm
up and try to solidify what facilities were available to use for VICTORY BOUNTY, including the newly refurbished cells inside
the former maximum security pnson. We took photos and also looked at potential sites to deploy a TROJAN to Abu Ghraib. By
this time, the 205th was also conducting its leadership reconnaissance on the ground but I can't really remember who was present.

then began traveling to Abu Ghraib twice a month or so and would coordinate with the 519th and the 325th until the middle of
October. 1 never observed any detainee abuse during of m visits and nothing seemed out of the
ordination I di with Abu Ghraib was primarily wl tl or if she was not available it was wi
. These coordination visits were of on a routine schedule; they iocreased what there was an operation going
on and decreased when to operations took lace. did coordinate with the Inuarogation Control Element (ICE) on a
routine basis because he had a daily report be had su t to command group. My conversations were loaned on HUMINT
Requirements. My responsibility was to focus and reinforce priorities and discuss in results. I BG(P) FAST
information on all data collected and a summary on HUMINT Options. I spoke to
o try to find out where ' were going, what information they ga and the of theei!"I would go directly use most of the information I was her was being requested by higher and they wanted it imm ly so I y went to the BCE. I would try to keep the BDE or the NUMMI Operations Cell informed of our inquiries and requirements via e-mails. There was an extraordinary amount of p we from the of
get results. I was sensing this pressure directly from COL BOLTZ initially and than BG(P) FAST
as there. Once COL SUMMERS arrived. I was not as heavily relied upon bbyy BG(P) FAST, although she tacked me directly. This pressure was occurring during the same time VICTORY BOUNTY was hang planned and no ming.There was a concern we we not getting the feedback from interrogations and we needed to do better to fix it. We needed to find •out a way to get more feedtack. There was a sentiment that the CG and OSD were unhappy with the level of products coming out of interrogations. There was frequent expression of dissatisfaction The Cl/HUMINT mission took a back seat and we hadHUMINT problems out in the field. The source handling was extraordinarily broken. The maneuver commanders were notadhering to the requirements in the umbrella concept for Countertntelligenee and HUMINT Operations and were rimming sources.Untrained personnel were routinely tasking 'informants' to collect information, in direct conflict with the requirements of the umbrellaand long-established Army doctrine, The Diva= commanders would tell "this is how were going to it.""clincegeir views they were having success capturing a lot of folks, conducting re'
10. EXHIBIT 11. INITIALS OF P4NAtAKING STATEMENT PAGE I OF 411111L;
ADDITIONAL PAGES-MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST SEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER
MUST BE BE INDICATED.

nA C/10118 rsc• •csoo ma gnaw 11171 1111 77 s macros VIM IM.* VI /1I1

AG 0000384

DOD 000472

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED. PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.
TAKEN AT 11111111 DATED 20°4105'2i
STATEMENT OF
. STATEMENT Montinuftell
y would raid a house and take everyone. They refused to let anyone go due to the fear that the wroog guy mie,ht lx let loose or they felt that they would simply be gathering this same individual the next day. By doctrine, this should not be done and sources could he placed in danger. The division commanders had the full authority to release detainees at their level. I would discuss this problem with the Division G2Xs and they would tell me that they knew about the problem, but their commanders didn't want to release anyone (they replied via Itooccall). My e-mails to them were saved on my folder in the computer I had in
ernist
over to the individual who replaced me. The Divisions had Captains as their G2Xs. IntIraq. The compo 205th MI SJA, was tasked to come up with some huesrogation Rules of Engagement.
o all e pressure I do
a memorandum with the CG's signature block,for CG's approval. 1 remember .
velored a memoran all of theCG'
that
not remember if ever saw a signed memorandum. There were =lain
frustrated and
methods and techniques in the memorandum were contained in the FM (according guidance. She
stated that if we wanted her to do something different than the authorized doctrinal piing to go out on a limb. She refused to budge from the standard methods without written guidance. Anecdotally,
was not
people talked about sleep deprivation and stressed positions but I never saw anyrequous. I never beard any discussions about
Baked detainees or humiliating detainees. During MG Miller's rust visit, I was in BG(P) FAST's office. I was made the POC for the initial Abu Ghraib visit. I coordinated for a convoy and took the team out to Au Ghraib. We returned that same day after spending four hours on site looking at the facility and bow operations were being nm. We did not discuss interrogation
ion of the Tiger Team concept. l did not go tack to Abs Ghraib with the team. 1 did meadtechniques. Our f us was cli I was also tasked to develop an extensive detainee database and 1 met with a GTMO who hadmeeting vri
Milt a data in T There was some controversy when the GTMO Team came. The GTMO team was supposed to go to Abu Ghraib and show the 519th and the 325th how to run operations. The 519th and the 325th were some of the most tactically experienced interrogators under combat conditions. They had conducted operations in Afghanistan and now there was a team coming from GTMO to teach them how to nm operations - to make our operations like GTMOs operations. It did not in well,
'raving outsiders whom had not operated under fire critiquing their work. I did not attend the out-brief MG MILLER gave. No one from C2X attended. The briefing, I believe, was directly given to LTG SANCHEZ. 1 never saw a copy of the =brief. The only violation of IROEs I was aware of was from Umm Qasar (Camp Bucca). I coordinated with OGA and felt late we had a good working relationship. There was an OGA LNO in the C2X and we shared resources. We discussed bow we could share
to answer each other's requirements. I visited the Chief of Station once
intelligence they gathered and intelligence we gathered
and met with another individual at another time. CJTF-7 esublished a release board whose members wereallIIIM BG

self as an MI
—
KARPINSKI and BG(P) FAST (chair) The recorders wered1M111111Man MP Assistant Recorder and mi
Assistant Recorder. BO(P) FAST was tasked by MG W01 IMCM4SICITDOGrrlo resolve the prison overcrowding problem as it
related to the MI Holds. Although the overcrowding of Abu Ghraib was an overall concern, the reason for the establiganem of

aiUmWdiW's suns be reviewed e months. Since we
the board was a legal reason. The Geneva Convention_ tweft closing in on six months for the lust detainees, SJA was tasked by come up with a procedure to release detainees. The recorders screened all detainee files. I would look for circumstances of capture and assess their intelligence value. If no intelligence value was identified, they were sent up to the release board for review. As time
oalition Provisional Authorit be an to peers us ID more quickly deal with the backlog. We then began a two-tier
went on
and I would sit on a mini panel and look at 100's of cases. We would do ourIcTiltry to identt y something in the file that wood assist the board in determining whether they stayed or were released. Since we had so many cases to review, the Release Board began meeting twice a week. The last week I was there, I reviewed over 500 cases. As part of my battle handoff. I extended the involvement of the C2X Section to include three additional MI
I to
help expedite the review of backlogged cases. CJTF-7 held a commander's VTC every evening (the Battle Update L erfieTte

r BUB) in the Joint Operations Center. Each C2 section was required to said a representative, including C2X. Peri sally, I mended the BUB as a C2X representative. The parposc of our amending was in get insight into curzent and ongoing operations in order to stay in touch with the operational tempo. As a tenth, it was intended that we would be able to anticipate short-term imerroptioo DM know remember who
mows:menu. One evening, after a BUB (I did not attend this BUB), I overheard several officers (1 do they were) returning from the BUB discussing how the CJTF-7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, bad made some startling remarks during the BUB. They said that during the BUB, one of the subordinate commanders had reported the capture of a number of Iraqis during a raid. In response to this report, LTG Sanchez allegedly replied something to the affect of 'Why arc we detaining this people, we should be killing them." This type of comment contributed to a command climate that fostered an atmosphere where ill intentioned personnel could perceive circumstances where deeds not consistent with military standards would be tolerated if not condoned. I was of to discuss this investigation with anyone else. Q. is that anything you would like to add to
this statement? A. N
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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
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IMP& V I MI
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AG0000385
DOD 000473

DATED .2004,415/28
Devens, MA
STATEMENT OF 11111111111r—_,___ 'TAKEN AT
9. STATEMENT Wont:num.*
Sed

!DAVIT
, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
1,
I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
.
WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3
INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE
CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT
THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION. UNLAWFUL INFLUEN NLA

iSoimatre es1 .LTi1t5tp Statement)
Subscribed and sworn to before me, • person authorized by low to
WITNESSES:

MAY 2004
administer oaths, this 28th day of at Dcvcns, Massachusetts
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
yped Nemo on Administering Oath)

UCMJ, ARTICLE 136
(Authority To Administer Oaths)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
Inuva VI tin
n n
AGO 0 0 03 8 6
DOD 000474