Fay Report Annex: Statement of Major, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, V Corps re: Intelligence Operations and Interrogations of Detainees in Iraq

This statement of an Army Major (0-4) who was a member of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, V Corps in Iraq after February 2004 described the general operating procedures of the various intelligence detention facilities, including Abu Ghraib prison, and the handling and interrogation of detainees. This statement is very detailed and covers several aspects of the establishment and running of the interrogation facilities used by the U.S. in Iraq.

Doc_type: 
Interview
Doc_date: 
Monday, May 24, 2004
Doc_rel_date: 
Wednesday, March 2, 2005
Doc_text: 

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
(SSNi
Title 10 USC Section 301 Title S USC Section 2951: E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943
icientWed
AUTHORITY ­
To provide commanders and law enforcement of licials with means by which information may be accurately
retrieval.
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:
Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identitscation to tacilitate filing and ROUTINE USES: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary:. FILE NUMBER
DISCLOSURE: 3. TIME
12. DATE (YYYYMMDD 1 LOCATION
2004/05/24 1800N Metro Park Springfield GRADE STATUS
7.
16. SSN
a OLE NAME
FIR 1E
B•GANIZATION OR ADDRE Resources Command, OPMD. Alexandria, VA 22332
Human
WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
1 was in Kuwait from Nov 2002 until Dec 2002 I
3, 205th MI Bde, V Corps from 10 June 2002 to 31 March 2004. • 003 and remain.ed
I was the S orw d ment of 205th inN
deployed back into Kuwait on 14 Feb 2003 and went into Iraq w My sentor rater

and the
0 - first .
ttalions consisting
in Iraq until 6 Feb 2004. My rater was ic
The 20
en COL
was the Brigade Commander - firs execunon o Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) the Brigade grew to seven battalions and
of approximately 850 personnel.

personnel. At first we had no organic or attached interrogation capability and very little organic CI in
road a strength of 1650

theater. We relied.at first on the 513th for both interrogation and CI support. Later on (APR/MAY 2003) the Bde's attached
elements of the 519th, 323rd and 325th arrived in theater and provided the Corps with a robust interrogation capability. Our
original planning for the initial portion of the campaign envisioned 100s of detainees/PWs which would be handled in stages in a

tiered approach. They would be screened and initially processed by Bde and Div elements and then moved successively thru
Corps detention facilities ending up with the 513th theater detention facility. Initial planning called for two Corps facilities ­519th, which had Balkans and OEF experience would be forward and the 325th (with limited Afghanistan experience) handling

r attached interrogation assetsthe rear. However, the rapid rate of the maneuver advance andse deployment timeline of ou
%
callfor approximately 10 to 15 of the detainees having
prevented this plan from coming to fruition. Our planning brought more and more detainees to the detention center in central

units
intelligence potential for exploitation. As the maneuver
Baghdad International Airport (BIAP)). overcrowding became a issue. The Brigade's focus was on screening the
Baghdad (vie

newly arrived detainees to determine if they had intelligence value and then the interrogation of those who were assessed to have
who were assessed with no intel value were then detained by the MPs in general population holding areas. In

value. Those
addition to receiving targeted individuals, the detention center also received a large portion of detainees who were in the target
area While limited numbers of some of these detainees had some intelligent value, most did not. Initially, regardless of
circumstance (target vs in the target arca), none of these detainees were released from detention. Generally, the maneuver units
thought they were a threat and should not be released (they would face them in combat action or other hostile incidents). As

MI brigade CJTF-T stood up, it established a board system in which MI, MP, and JAG had "votes" on release of detainees. The
and Maneuver Units provided input to the board. The Brigade's focus on detainees was to process, interrogate and exhaust them of intelligence value and then coordinate for their placement into a general population holding area. On rare occasions MI would also nominate a detainee for release. The 205th conducted its initial detainee planning with the 18th MP Brigade, organic to V Corps. We did not initially coordinate with the 800th as they were TPFFDed to directly support CFLCC. We did not begin a
relationship with the 800th until CJTF-7 was established and the 800th became one of its subordinate units. Pre-conflict
working
planning called for coordination between MI and the MPs on lanes in the road and responsibilities - the "how, when and what to in regards to detention and interrogation operations. This coordination and planning continued throughout the operation.
dc"
locations of initial Corps detention centers were planned. their actual locations were ultimately determined by ground
While the
operations, rather than deliberate planning. Early-on detention operations and interrogation operations at Corps generally a model of tiered support. The maneuver brigades and divisions each conducting their own interrogation operations, but
lo:lowed
the Corps and Theater (CFLCC) operations were intertwined CFLCC established interrogation operations at the Theater
initially
Internment Facility at Camp Bucca with the 323rd MI Bn, and a forward interrogation facility initially at Life Support Area
elements of the 202nd. The 205th initially had elements (LSA) Bushmaster and subsequently at Camp Cropper (vic BIAP) withof the 519th (attached to the Brigade from the beginning of the war) imbedded into these early interrogation operations As
CJTF-7 established (14 Jun 03) the 205th took control of the 323rd and the interrogation operation at Camp Bucca. The 519th
initially took full control of the interrogation operation at Camp Cropper. conducting both screening and interrogations. The
and cumbersome as we initially, experienced problems with most of the
screening operations became increasingly important COL Pappas and I talke _to the Bn S-3s of 31D
-
capturing units not providing capture tags or capture tags not filled out properly.
and 4ID to get the Bn and Bde cages to do their job properly and after while there were improveme

STATEMENT
11 INITIALS OF P G
10. EXHIBIT PAGE 1 OF
TAKEN A7- DATED
ADDITIONAL

PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT. AND PAGE NUMBER
MUST BE BE INDICATED
USAPA V1.00
DA FORM 2823, JUL 72. IS OBSOLETE
DA FORM 2 8 23, DEC 1998
AG0000503
we took note of severalthe FRAGO giving us the FOB came out. During that visit
security concerns--unauthorized folks having access, and local workers being too close to the JIDC work and life support areas for example. The FRAGO directed that COL Pappas have TACON of all tenant units at AG, provide force protection and security for the detainees. 1 understood that security for the detainees was essentially the same as providing force protection for the soldiers and US Government civilians and contractors. I did not assess that there was a specified or implied task for the 205 th to run MP operations. In other words, the FRAGO did not entail the internal aspects of the confinement facility, the movement and control of detainees, care and feeding of the detainees and prisoners, or telling the MPs how to do their job in running the confinement facility. I think COL Pappas also had the same understanding. I never saw the FRAGO as meaning the 205 th and COL Pappas were to be in total control of all internal aspects of AG. We were not MPs and not in their operational chain of command. I don't feel we usurped the MP Commander's responsibilities or authorities to train, manage, and conduct MP operations. If we took or directed action on certain aspects for force protection it was because they were not doing it, we sensed a void and needed to fill it in order to maintain security and force protection for all of the soldiers, civilians, and detainees located at AG. We had discussions with BO Karpinski, Commander of the 800th MP Bdc. Prior to COL Pappas being given the FOB, our units had been TACON to the 800th MP Bde, but they wanted us to do their job in guarding the facilities, force protection, etc. We did not have the manpower to do so and simultaneously execute the interrogation mission--CJTF-7 agreed. When COL Pappas was given the FOB, 800 th
th MI Bn to AGbecame TACON to us and we expected a lot from them. We sent the 165 to assist COL Pappas in running the FOB and to assist with FP. As we saw a greater need to take control of some of the NIP operations to improve FP, we asked CJTF-7 for OPCON of the 800th MP assets at AG, but CJTF-7 DC3) said no - you don't. need that - take charge of the FOB - I will talk to e Cdr of the 800 th. I had continuing dialogurs with BG Karpinski about differences between doctrine requirements and actual manpower. I also spoke to her Bdc S3 about how we could improve FP, and on providing MP escorts to detainees being interrogated. We also discussed what TACON authorities we had been given and what was expected of them. It boiled down to them not having enough manpower. We jointly worked an RFF and the C3, MG Miller agreed to support getting contractors to do some MP functions for security and force protection, guard and escort detainees. None of the existing contracts allowed for that, so we ha new Statement of Work written; it was not approved before I departed the theat
Initials of person making statement N Page q of5
AGO000506
Date00
.

1
1011111111111.1111111Human Resources Command/OPMD, Alexandria A 22332 supposed to run the JDIC. The diers sawas the OIC an
as about his duties a coup c o

as the Ops Officer. 1 spoke wi N
times, al hough the conversations mainly endc up being about soldier support issues

mur
equipment). I p' oily dealt wi thi

aior
initial effort centered around wanting sports
has a
on the ops side of the house. As I understand it,N
anNerrogation/RDC
Affairs/PSYOPS background. I am not aware if he h background. I had to speak with him a couple of times about what his job was and what he should be doing — I had to tell him where his focus should be. I informed him that the

sNed to be occupied with
Brigade Staff would take care of the soldier support things
was probably not
and to get on with running the JIDC. I soon realizedN

appas. In hindsight, I
the right officer for running the JIDC and mentioned thatNt, did not express that strongly enough. legallalwas sent to run the JIDC because the
COL Pappas run it, which would have meant he
. would have been spending a disproportionate amount of time on an organization that represented about one eighth of his span of control. For a time there was consideration to move me out there; in fact I de a couple of visits for 24-48 hours at a time to work on some operational problemsNand I had frequent contact on the ops side and we

understood the Commander's intent. I did
alternative would have been to have
felt we could make it work.. , N
d in fact he represented the J2, not the
not have the authority to rein-0vN
205th . I don't want to suppose what COL Pa as was thinking initially, but I know thatand eventually took action
he eventually had his own concerns about Nto coordinate his removal from the JIDC. Ina session with LTG Sanchez there was a realization that the JIDC was still not where the CG wanted it and LTG Sanchez directed COL Pappas to move to AG. LTG Sanchez's reason for putting him there was to insure that intcrrngations were done LAW' proper procedures — I assess that LTG Sanchez 'determined that he would feel better if COL Pappas, a Brigade Commander, answerable to him, was there overseeing interrogations, the Brigades #1 mission as specified by the CG. There was some turmoil at the JDIC We realized that there were some disciplinary problems on the MPs side of the house which needed fixing. There was a struggle on the interrogation ops side of the house but we made it work. Some of the interrogators were upset at being extended in theater, at the ever changing mission, overcrowding at the facility, poor living conditions and the increasing threat from mortars and other attacks. There was poor discipline on the MPs side of the house, folks out of uniform, and disarray in the living and work spaces Consideration was made to move the Brigade Headquarters to AG, but that would have meant the Bde Hqs would have spent most of the time running the JIDC at the cost of seven battalions--their operations, and their personnel. • We attempted to balance the location and focus of the Bde leadership by having the Brigade Commander and a small TAC move to AG, while the DCO and I stayed at Victory to assist the commander in running the rest of the Brigade and to facilitate coordination with the CJTF-7 staff. COL Pappas had a good understanding of the situation, and understood what needed to happen in regards to moving to AG and taking•over as the FOB Commander. The place was .too vulnerable. COL Pappas had to take control and secure the facility . I took my Ops SGM there for a review the day af t
it
Page 3 015
Initials of person making statement N
AG0000505

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PACE OF THIS FORM.
200#lariZq
DATED
STATEMENT 0
.
9. STATEMENT 1Contowedl .ed for a major operation aimed at Capturing members of the Saddam Fedeyeen (SD). A
In late July/early August CJTF-7 planr.
lists of thootanrIc of names, occupations and addresses of suspected SD personnel was translated and Operation Victy Bounty
or e to stablish a
was planned to round them up. Planning called fOr placing these SD detainees at a location other than Cropper encconcentrated interrogation effort which would specialize in obtaining detailed information on the SD. This resulted in the Brigade
the 519th. Thee 325th
establishing a third interrogation effort at Abu Gburaib (AG), which would be operated and manned bythtook responsibility for continuing the operations at Cropper. During Operation Victory Bounty more an just suspeced SD
personnel were rounded up: Apparently maneuver elements corralled just about everyone in the vicinity of a SD suspect. After the personnel were sent to AG for screening and interrogation. we received a high amount of requests for informat
high volume
information requirements. To ensure we were able to assist in answering one of CM-7's top PIR, it was nearly mandated that we stay on a script of questions, centering on whether or not there was a planned and centrally controlled insurgency working
the n
against us. We kept records and forwarded information to CJTF-7 of the number of detainee's, the number screened, der
titled turned over to the S3 of the 504th, which replaced the 205th. to Iraq. The on my computer. This computer was"Victory Bounty"
ACE might be another place where the information might be retained. When we moved elements of the 519th into AG, it was
already partially occupied by other activities. There was a CPA controlled and operated civilian prison for Iraqi criminals and a

CITF-7 operated military interment facility which would process and hold personnel and then move them on to Bucca. CPA had begun to refurbish portions of the old Iraqi AG prison complex. The area being refurbish included two wings of 50 cells each which were suitable for isolation of detainees. We requested 50 of those cells for our use for Victory Bounty detainees. We .
eventually got use of the 50 cells, and later received CPA authorization to use both wings. The 205th and CJTF-7 both
considered consolidation of interrogation facilities of the three widely spaced interrogation facilities into AG. This was driven for

the most part by a need to achieve operating and manpower efficiencies. Overcrowding at Cropper and a plan to close Bucca also L G Sanchez, COL Pappas and I, the
factored into the consolidation plan. In late Aug 'or early Sep at a meeting involvingT
decision was made to conduct the consolidation of the coalition interrogation facilities. The base plan involved the 800th MP
Brigade conducting detatnee operations and providing the detainee guard force. LTG Sanchez was informed that the

consolidation plan would improve the interrogation process and =ease intelligence output. In early Sept 0311111111/11.11111,
Inc 519u„ 325 and 323 to beginplanning the consolidation. While I was

wnu 1.44s m?, Assisian: S-3, and I met with the S-3s of
TDY later in Sept, a deculon was made to establish the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (MC) at AG. This decision
at AG - it was already a JIDC in everything but its name - therewas made to reflect the realities of what was actually occurring ., even if
was an overriding mission set that us effect dictated what it was to become. The debriefing portion of the name was key
it re flected"a capability if not an actuality. However, AG personnel were already accomplishing debriefings at locations other

than AG and it was envisioned that debriefings as well as interrogations would be executed at AG in the future. What we
Nmay have been considering what was being done at GTMO even
. before MG Miller vicited Iraq. 1 sense that in at least one conversation between LTG Sanchez and COL Pappas at which I wasnot present (I was TDY back in the States), the GTMO process was explored and discussed. MG Miller's visit and the follow-on assistance team from GTMO certainly cemented it. Based on the information obtained from the GTMO assistance team visit, we had additional discussions with MG Fast in which we looked at GTMO and how they were structured. We felt that we did not need the full GTMO infrastructure (mostly analytical and requirements management) support staff as that could be provided by the Coalition Analysis and Control Element. We submitted a request for forces (RFF) in order to establish a premier • interrogation facility. which would include MPs: for running the detention portion of the facility, a dog team to support MP operations. a behavioral science team, collection management and reports section, and additional analysts. We pursued the establishment of Interrogation "Tiger Teams" consisting of an interrogator and an analyst, supported by a linguist. The Tiger Teams were designed to be able to draw out information from detainees, process and report, analyze internally, and conduct
conceived actually came into being I suspect that LTG Sara:her. How v r we wanted a
research for further exploitation. We initially decided that we did not need a Bn structure at theN

COL Pappas cho o execute these
field grade officer to set the JIDC up Nc as the operations officer.
several tunes a day to discuss plans, requirement Nr operationalresponsibilities. I was In contact wi N
aspects of interrogation operations. He was 111 pined at elements of the 519th. 325th and 323rd would be there to conduct the Brigade HQs would provide staff support. By collapsing the
unerrogation operations but that there would not be a full stiff;
other two interrogation facitili s we were able to pull in all the subject matter expertise from the other locations into one place.

sele ted to "run" the JIDC As I understand how the situation developed, CO NandLater on•in late-Sep,N
o
the DU) met witiLMN and a decision to place an 05 at the JIDC was made and MG Fast tol NassignalMilipto COL Pappas urpose of running the JIDC. We eventually stood up a MDC Headquarters ons y

the soldiers
iaTFEWIT a company commander on the ground responsible for the health, welfare, morale and discipline. for at the JIDC. The company was formed around personnel from the 323rd, who was also sty responsibility to assist the company at the battalion level The 323rd, however, was never put in charge of running the JID
to fact st
INITIALS Ch, PERSON MAxiNG STATEMENT
PAGE 2. DA FORM 2822. DEC 1998
AG0000504
f.r7teett 41 DATED 2-1( 4/125-4°
TAKEN AT 67 STATEMENT
9. STATEMENT (Continued)
There were two aspects of 205th taking over the FOB - insure that interrogation ops could be conducted in a safe and productive
Du: it did no;

manner and running the physical plant of AG. We had always done the first and had to assume some of the second, entail telling the MPs how to do their MP functions. The MG Miller visit came while I was TDY. 1 never met or spoke with him. COL Pappas had a vision resulting from his discussions with LTG Sanchez and MG Miller. When the assistance team was
a strategy, courses of action and an organizational design of what we needed for the JIDC and how to get
there we mapped out there. We realized there were several differences between GTMO and AG. They had a consolidated MP and MI data base
erect all aspects of controlling and exploiting detainees and fed into a National system. We didno , bu t tamed getting involved on the ops side and worked in getting the assets we needed-both systems and personnel,
system which c
similar syst getting p. o I ie JIDC for integration. I was involved in a couple of discussions on interrogation methods and concepts with
and er s folks but nothing out of the ordinary. The discussions raised nothing that we would queralley centered around
MG ed on ensuring the
right out of the manual and standard, accepted doctrine. My involvement in these discussi OPS of which interrogations was just one (albeit the
item.
efficient execution ("meeting the commander's intent) of the ent put them together, based on experience in
most critical) part. At first there were no approved IROEs tint not get involved in the requests or approval for
Afghanistan.. It resulted in 205th and CJTF-7 approved IROEs. exceptions for the IROEs except for one time when I was tl e acting DCO. My experience had % been limited to assisting in processing several 30-ciav extension of isolation, mostly while serving as the
DCO. I knew that interrogators had to get
permission to use dogs and to use sleep deprivation. 1 never saw.a request or an approval for anything but isolation extension. I did not see, observe and was not informed
As stated, however . , they were not generally routed through me or the Bde S3 shop.
of any abuse or humiliation of prisoners, pictures or videos, or use of dogs against detainees. I know that CL Pappas was

reviewing some pictures that had been taken but was excluded from his office area while he was doing so. I was generally not
involved in disciplinary matters. I was aware of the Article 15 given to the three soldiers over the drinking and interrogation
incident. 1 was informed of the shooting incident immediately after it happened and knew that in the aftermath there were

changes in our security procedures. I worked some of the r

• cs for enhanced security. The OIC of the JDIC or the Ops Officer would decide who could get into the hard sit
kept a status board on detainees that we were working for interrogation and was supposed to control who went into
ever, the MPs often used our cell areas that were unoccupied for 'trouble makers" from other areas, without our permission. OGA put their detainees in our area without hilly identifying them to us - we knew they were there, accounted for as "OGA 1" or "OGA 2" etc. We tried to work a MOA with OGA and CJTF-7 about their use of our area and doing interrogations under our rules, but it was never accomplished. Siiirg of intelligence from their interrogations, and our interrogators at times worked with them on interrogations. and I discussed some of this and he gave me a comfort level that an appropriate level of coordination and overs[ t place. I did not really get involved in the internal aspects of interrogation operations but dealt mainly with requirement, priorities, and resources. There was training and orientation for all incoming personnel - soldiers, civilians,
.contractors. It was aligned with training at GTMO and included ROEs, Geneva Convention and the like. We did not QC the contractors, but assumed that the SOW was sufficient for the company to nrovidi. quality, experienced and capable interrogato We telt that tne company did the vetting.
Q. Is there C...t4 -[lee 64sz; ,40.,/,_ Z,L) c, ,- di /,Kr.ii0
A. PIO. 047i4-tit 71.1t4 -Q1;:/:
AFFIDAVIT
HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE I HAVE toe, WITHOUT
CONTAINING THE STATEMENT I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WI ROUT HOPE OF BENEFIT G.Ti
THREAT OF PUNISHMENT. AND WITHOUT COERCION UNLAWFUL INFLUENT OR L I.
• rson M. 1!
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to
WITNESSES
administer oaths, MIS 4.• ati, clay of I-4A el, 21904/


0! (-4 Ctiii V
rs
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS Signature of Person inistering Oath!
yped Name of Person Administering Oath)
,a‘ /3C.
.1
(Authority To Administer Oaths)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING sTATEME
PAGE 5 OF -011

USAPA V1.00
PAGE 3 . DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998
AG0000507

Doc_nid: 
3072
Doc_type_num: 
73