Fay Report Annex: Statement of Major, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade re: Operations and Conditions at Abu Ghraib Prison

Interviewee was the Deputy Commander of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at the end of July 2003 in AG. Sworn statement included the following incidents, first, involved a "A/519th soldiers who conducted inappropriate interrogations of a female detainee." The second incident was a disagreement between ICRC and JIDC. The third incident was a shooting in the 1A on November 24th. The last recalled incident involved a female specialist with the 205th and her mistreatment of a detainee. Did not recall seeing naked detainees, and did see dogs but they were not being used during interrogations.

Doc_type: 
Interview
Doc_date: 
Wednesday, May 19, 2004
Doc_rel_date: 
Wednesday, March 2, 2005
Doc_text: 

SWANN STATEMENT
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I. LOCATION 2 DATE trrrntworri 3 TIME
4. FILE NUMBER
205th MI BDE HQ, WAAF Bldg 1031 Rim 104 2004/05/19 1530

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LAST NAME. FAST NAME. l DIE NAME
6. SSA_
7. GRADEISTATUS 04/AD
I. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHD/205TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE APO AE 09096 (USAREUR)

. NAN T TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH
In response to a question about when I first became involved with Abu Ghraib and what was my role, I first became involved will
Ahu Gliraib when ! assumed the position of Deputy Commander (DCO). 205th MI BDE at the end of July 2003. At that time. nu . Brigade had tasked the 519th MI Battalion to stand up the Saddam Fedayeen Interrogatioh Facility (SFIF), a temporary facility in
support of CJTF-7 Operation Victory Bounty in Augult. In September the CJTF-7 made the decision that all interrogation
operations would be consolidated at Abu Ghraib and in October it was deemed an enduring Base camp. At the CO I had_
b '_' versight for many of the improvements the brigade was trying to make at Abu Ghraib. The S-4,
orked closely with the 800th MP Brigade 54 and the CJTF-7 C cements an
c u needs for the soldiers at Abu Ghraib; throughout the fall, the S•3 _
his staff were working on multiple actions related to standing up a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC): they orkeci with CJTF-7 on the Request for Forces (RFF) that would allow us to structure the JIDC along the lines of the GTMO organization; they worked with the C2 staff to request a GTMO Tiger Team to embed into operations and train the JIDC; they haft the line and block chart and identified the required resources, where we had gaps and ho_ere '_ them: they developedthe JIDC battle rhythm and the interrogation prioritization process. The S•2
was focused on
ensuring the soldiers and civilians in the JIDC either had Top Secret clearane _

vire tong proeesse_r them: establishing the
Tactical Sensitive Compartmented Intormation Facility (TSCIF); and. establishing the intelligence architecture that would allow
the JIDC to access JWICS and TS databases, which was a recommendation from MG MILLER'S visit. The S-2 also attended
CJTF-7 Tar etin meetings to ensure that the JIDC priorities were In
c with the CITF-7 targeting priorities. The 5-6.111/P a nd the Information Management Officer tIMOI _
were focused on tactical communications for command and control throughout the brigade. infoffnation management support tor the servers in Baled and Abu Ghraib that housed our intelligence databases, improving the intelligence architecture fin concert with the S21, and installing the MWRpackages for Abu Ghraib and other brigade locatinns
COL PAPPAS was working on a strategy tor how we would implement the findings and recommendations from the MG MILLER
report and the CJTF-7 CO's guidance from a briefing COL PAPPAS gave to LTG SANCHEZ on 1 I September. In particular,
COL PAPPAS was focused on aligning our operations with a GTMO-like model and on consolidating our three interrogation
facilities at Camp Crupper (run by the 325th MI Battalion), Camp Bucca (run by the 323d MI Battalion), and Ahu Ghraib (run by
1 MI Ba_intwane. Placing the right staff out to the JIDC was a high priority. COL PAPPAS immediately plaid then the Assitant Brigade 53. at Abu Gluajb as the operations officer. The CJTF-7 CG. LTG NCHE , told COLTA AS that the JIDC probably needed an 0-5 un the ground to_ The 205th Mi Brigade didnot have any 0-5s_'I_al this role. I was present for a conversation between _ and_PAPP Sreference placan_
a newly arrived C2 staff officer, at the JIDC. If I remember correctly _
Bough t civilian experience, he would be a good candidate to run the JIDC. My wcis_
tug was thatsent tu • c JIDC to serve as its director.
Part of standing up the JIDC included moving the 13rig4 amps Bucca and Cropper to Abu Ghraibby the 1 October consolidation deadline set by CJTF-7.
as in charge of a small team at
interrogators that had been r n a p bucca fn s lie was sol
operations officer because of In;experience at Buee_ arrival on or about 25 September transitioned his title to XO,second in charge I
In response to a question about bow it is possi
ay.• their roles differently from the way
COL PAPPAS did. it would not surprise me i
c was the one in charge of intern _ at theJIDC. COL PAPPAS initially told him that h g_
guy,' prior to the C2 staff offering u to run
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9. STATEMENT (Comma&
the JIDC. I think that vas very proud that COL PAPPAS had ita confide= him to make him the initial operations officer at A as placed in charge, there
hi-alb and h orked very hard to make it work. were numerous occas • PAPPAS called out to the JIDC and was readily available to answer any questions when often as either not readily available or di not imow the an wer.
riiiirteen seemed more focused on resources and quality of life improvements than on interrogation operations. I had
embers o t c brigade staff in Baghdad and members of the brigade at Abu Ghraib working on resourcing issues and
that to he the brigade's responsibility - COL PAPPAS held me responsible for infrastructure and resources
peatedly brought supply . ' ' e Issues to COL PAPPAS who redirected those issues, appropna , to me to tx. 1 one point, I sat down will t Abu Ghtaib and told him that COL PAPPAS needed him to focus on • interrogation operations and that the brigs e wo resource Abu Ghraib; and I asked turn to trust that the brigade would get it done as fast as ssi he e coast its of being in Iraq. The brigade had already placed a lot of resources in the JIDC, to
elude serve as the JIDC "Mayor" working quality of life issues as the mission expanded.
'as there om ate r mber to late October.
l'suppose COL PAPPAS saw e differently than id becaus was sent to Abu Ghraib to do, id weigh in on o issues. I heliev as trivo v
developing the Joint Manning Document. esta Its mg Tiger Teams, and he seemed to be involved in the handling of several
incidents that happened out at Abu Gluaib. When asked if ! could recall those incidents, I explained that I did not liviiiiat Ahu
G I was out of Iraq from 12 November to 5 December, but to the best of my recollection, the first incident .
as involved in was identifying the A/519th soldiers who conducted inappropriate interrogations of a female detainee.
e 5hd incident was the International Community Red Cross (ICRC) vis I do not think the facility was prepared for the visit and the JIDC did not know the ICRC was coining on that day. ad a disagreement with the ICRC concerning access to detainees on IA and that made the ICRC angry. The ird incl ent was the shooting in 24 of November. during which time I was on leave. As it was related to me after I got back to Iraq in December; &I the MN resolved this issue prior to bringing it to COL PAPPAS' attention. The 1 nt I recall was the inappropriate treatment of a detainee by a female specialist attached to the 205th. roughs this to COL PAPPAS' attention and told COL PAPPAS that he would discipline and retrain the soldier. response to ucstion about how frequently I went to Abu Ghraib, I responded that I traveled to Abu Ghraib once or twice in August and three to four tunes in September. Ou headquarters was still in Balad at that time and it was dangerous to travel back and forth. Once we moved the brigade headquarters to Camp Victory in early October, 1 would travel to Abu Ghraib once or twice a week. Many high-ranking personnel visited Ahu Ghraib and I would often accompany COL PAPPAS as he briefed them and walked them around Abu Ghraib. I was at the Hard Site at least half a dozen times and all of the visits except one were during hours of daylight. Once or twice I was there alone, but usually with a small group.
In response to tt series of questions regarding my knowledge of the alleged abuses: I never saw any naked detainees - they wore Jumpsuits or civilian clothes: 1 never witnessed or had any knowledge of any detainee abuse or photos or videos of detainees; I never saw dogs used during interrogations. I. did see dogs at the front gate and saw the dogs being walked around the camp.
In response to a question about my observations of the atmosphere, morale and level of training at Abu Ghraib, I stated that the atmosphere at Abu Ghraib changed over time and it changed with every unit. Many of the soldiers in the 519th were upset because they were supposed to redeploy in August but instead were given the interrogation mission at Abu Ghraib. I also think that as we transformed from the SFIF to the JIDC there were many changes from the MG MILLER report and from our own assessments that they either did not want to Implement or didn't think were necessary - there may have been some bruised egos in the process. My impression was that the 325th soldiers were content to leave Camp Cropper, which was overcrowded, and they looked forward to the new mission. After the 20 September mortar attack that killed two and wounded about 11 soldiers, the soldiers' morale dipped. Then the JIDC began to take shape and had some successes with the intelligence they were producing. I seemed to me that at that point morale improved. In October and November, the JIDC received 25 additional interrogators from INSCOM. they were formalizing interrogation plans and holding weekly targeting meetings and JIDC update briefings with the Tiger Teams; the Magistrate Cell and medical team were in place and it started to look and operate more like a JIDC. In responst to a question about whether I thought soldiers were disciplined or not, when I walked through the JIDC it seemed to me that soldiers were disciplined and adhering with Army policies, military customs and courtesies, etc. My expectations were that there were some variations across the board based upon the different units the soldiers came froin.
In response to a question about whether it would surprise me to know that some Ml soldiers were involved with detainee abuse, 1 said yes 1 was surprised. To the question as to how it could have happened I said 1 did not know - prior to consolidating operations at Abu Ghraib there were three facilities run by three battalions in the brigade and I believed that the soldiers were
trained and that those facilities ran without incident. So I did not understand how the same soldiers could have behaved so differently after relocating to Abu Ghraib.
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9. STATEMENT !Continue

When asked if there was anything I wanted to bring up that the interview did not address, I explained my understanding that the MP Brigade retained control of the access in and out of IA and IB throughout the 205th's tenure at Abu Ghraib.
Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?
A. No.
This statement was taken by MG Fay, the procedure 15 Investigating Officer on Thursday May 13th at 1330 hours at the Darmstadt Legal Center, building 4006, Darmstadt Germany.
I swore to the statement at the 205th MI Brigade Headquarters, building 1031, Wiesbaden Army Airfield, Wiesbaden Germany on May 19th at 1530 hours. 11111111111111111/111111111111111111111111111111111End of Statement1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111 .
AFFIDAVIT
, HAVE READ OR HAVE IIAD READ TOME TIIIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS AGE I, AND ENOS ON PAGE_
3 _ FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT
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T r UT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE. OR UNLAWFU JOUCEMENT
(Signature e Pers.Statement
WITNESSES:
Sutscnoed and swam to before meg person unbowed by law to
Borrower oallu, ton if day of_/M;Y L a_ 1/4.1r_,
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
/44--Puc4117
ORGANIZATION DR ADDRESS
(Authority To karmic, patrol

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