Fay Report Annex: Statement of Chief Warrant Officer 2 re: Screening and Handling of Detainees at Abu Ghraib Prison

Statement of a Chief warrant officer 2 who was tasked with managing interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib prison in July 2003. The CW2 criticized the organization of interrogation, especially at higher levels, and described it as "amateurish". He further stated that "it seemed that the maneuver units gaive very broad instructions to round up any male from 16-60 years of age that had a cell phone... In my opinion less than 10% of the detainees had any real intelligence value. We told MG Miller, MG Fast, LTG Sanchez and COL Pappas...." It also discusses an other government agency's (OGA) ghost detainees that were "buried" or hidden in the. They explained that the OGA 'does not play well with others', and did not live the same rules as they did or have full accountability for their detainees. Interviewee described hearing that certain ghost detainees died during an interrogation. It further notes the use of guard dogs during interrogations, a technique that was approved by Col Pappas. There was also an incident involving alcohol and an unauthorized interrogation of female detainee, as well as and incident involving a detainee who was forced to strip and return to his holding cell naked.

Wednesday, May 19, 2004
Wednesday, March 2, 2005

Title 10 USC Section 301; Tide 5 USC Section 2961: E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 ISSN/.
AUTHORITY: To provide commanders and law enforeenient officials with means by Webb information may be accurately leemilefl.
Your social security number is used as an ariditionetisitemen means of identification to tickets Nino and retnevc.
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9iiii ft
6. SSN soma
March 2003) and serving for a period of •I arrived at Abu Ghraib (AG) on or about 25 July 2003, after staging thru Kuwait (12
time in Iraq at Bushmaster and Dogwood (6 -30 April 2003). On May 1st I moved to BIAP to establish the V Corps
Interrogation Facility. We conducted a Transfer of Authors with B/325 MI in June 2003 as we were expected to soon redeploy
to the Fort Bragg. However, we bad were informed by andelliMillar around 20 July that d e ovmg

to Abu (Jhraib to establish a special interrogation facility there. ' e on a recall of AG with COL Pappas others, I and several other interrogators gave recommendations on setting. up the facility and processes for
interrogating the detainees. We were first told that the objective would be to establish a specialized facility to identifying and
interrogating Saddam Fedaycen personnel detained as a result of Operation Victory Bounty. (A unidentified maneuver unit was
conducting operations based on a list of some 1800 - 2000 names of Saddam Fedeyeen. When CJTF-7 found out about the list,

proved to
Operation Victory Bounty was formed). The actual raid rounded up some 180 folks from the list out of which only 62
be of any value. The impression I had was that this operation was based on old and unverified single-source information. Many
of the detainees who were on the list really did not have any affiliation with the Fedayeen Saddam (i.e., mayors and other.
officials who were notified they were now members of the Fedeyeen Saddam then later -2 months later - notified they were no
longer members). At some point the decision was made. to expand our mission to a largerscope due to short falls at Camp
Cropper. I suspect thatlIMEMININNIMIl rosy have known about the consolidation of facilities at AG and might have wanted
for A/519 to get its footin the oor at AG and begin to lay a solid foundation for the consolidated facility. Although operational
plans for new operations called for detainees to be sent to Camp Cropper, they redirected to AG instead. AG began to receive
detainees of value from all raids in the are and gradually mesion creep set in and we were no longer sp-=ializing in attempting to
identify Fedeyeen Saddam personnel. in the beginning of the establishment of the facility at AG, MX and 205th constandy
pressured us for more and quicker reporting from detainee interrogations, at times contacting interrogation personnel directly.
Only after the intervention of the 519th BN Commander did they begin to back off and start using the established repottm chain
without skipping echelons. On or about 12 September we found out that the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (
was to be formed at AG, mostly as a result of the visit by MG Miller and his team, although the decision might have been made
prior to the-MG Miller visit. MG Miller and his team recommended to COL-Pappas on forming "Tiger Teams" with a dedicated
analyst, but in hindsight that might have been more suited to a strategic environment than to our tactical situation. One of the
main problems we faced was a lack of thoroughness by capturing units. MITs and Division cages -there seemed to be no tactical
screening, the processing was not done right, and capture tags were either not done or done incorrectly. By 12 September the
decision had been made to consolidate some facilities, and move detainees into AG. Around 14 or 15 Sep detainees from Camp
Cropper began moving to AG. A couple days later, interrogators from the 325th moved to AG. (We were joined by interrogators
from 66th, 500th. and 47 in October). While the 205th was beginning to sthe ADC around mid September. COL
Pappas informed rue that MN= w d be the ADC 0 rations OIC tha would be the Deputy ADC CDR.

In several meetings with COL Pappas e 51 personnel raised several issues that needed to be dealt with (detainee population, composition of JIDC, reporting, detention criteria, JIDC's criteria for accepting detainees from other units, release process, use of Mobile Interrogation Teams. OGA. etc.) Detainee population: In the beginning (end of Jul to mid September) the 72d MP Company commented that the detainees held at AG were well mannered. Normally,' 519th per onnel ended interrogations by reinforcing the camp rules. Yet after the consolidation of facilities the detainees who hadm ed from Camp Cropper and other facilities who were not so well mannered or orderly began to influence our original detainees. Also, since detainees were slow to be released, we were quickly becoming severely overcrowded. The engineersoriginally built the facility to hold 300 detainees and we had a population of around 900. Detainees that had been screened and were deemed of value were placed on "MI Hold" status. The definition of MI Hold was originally our designation to let theMP's know we were interested in the detainee and to not move them to another camp. Somehow the Ml Hold status became a designation which needed slipper approval for removal, much like the designation of Security Detainee needed senior officer approval for release.


DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823. JUL 72. IS OBSOLETE IMAM V1.00

Army's hiring process had some built in quality control IAW the Statement of
Work, which was resident with the on site manager. I had heard that CACI
personnel were not to supervise military ersonnel or serve as team leaders, but

in fact at least one of them.did so temporarily for about 2 or 3
weeks, at least until some o he 66th and 500th military personnel came on
board. I do not know who approved the decision to make him a temporary
supervisor, nor do I know if a waiver was requested or approved. I did not
personally interview all of he CACI personnel as they arrived since I was too
busy with other duties such as maintaining the database, managing interrogation
operations, responding to email inquiries, and occasionally editing reports,
etc. However, I did sit down and talk with a few as I had time available. All
personnel (CACI, Titan and military) went through our "new guy" briefing and
orientation, which entailed information on IROE, interrogation and reporting
processes, and a tour of the facility. They were given a statement to sign
acknowledging that they had received a briefing, read and understood the IROE.
The signed copies of these statements were kept in a black 2 - 3 inch binder in
the ICE Operation section. Interrogation Rule of Engagement: From the time we
arrived in Kuwait on 12 March 03 to the day we arrived in AG on 25 July 03, I
never saw a document with the approved IROE from either V Corps or CJTF-7.
During that time we relied on our past experiences with past interrogation
facilities. When we move to AG to establish our fourth interrogation facility,
we knew this facility was going to have high visibility and that other
facilities were having problems. As a result, we began to outline our own IROE
drawing upon our experiences with other facilities, issues identified at Camp
Cropper, and procedures used by TF 121. In addition to'the IROE, we drafted
requests to use civilian clothes and modified grooming standards. We submitted
these requests to CJTF-7 (through HN,1111/4_1111.2) and requested the approvals
to be filed in writing. Only through.persistence did the IROE
finally reach C2/JAG and LTG Sanchez. I never saw any signed copy of the IROE,
but saw a message which said they had been approved. I can only assume the
Civilian Clothes and Modified Grooming requests were denied since I never heard
anything more about them. The IROE were constantly modified and each change was
to be signed by a General Officer. All personnel had to acknowledge that they
were aware of the changes. Again, signed copies of these statements were kept in
a black 2.: - 3 inch binder in the ICE Operation section. All new personnel were
trained in proper procedures; people knew the boundaries. The IROE were posted
in several places and we were always talking about them. For certain approaches
such as sleep deprivation (adjusted sleep schedule), we had to write up a
schedule and submit a request with the interrogation plan. It would be reviewed
by the JAG and sent to COL PAPPAS for approval, but LTG Sanchez would be
informed. I do not know for sure but I felt that COL PAPPAS was informing the
General. Other methods had to be approved by LTG Sanchez; I never saw any
written approvals but was informed that it was done electronically. Each of
these requests was forwarded up the chain for approval. For approved sleep
deprivation the schedule was given to the MPs to implement, but I do not know
how they handl d it or who, if any one, in the MPs approved how they were to

implement it



Initials of person m statement Page LI of S Pages
AM the JIDC was forming and we began to use lA of the "hare site", they

gradually started bringing their.facility. This was done

detainees to.
despite the objections from ma,.We explained, bised on
prior experience. that OGA "does not play well with of .

they did not live
the same rules as we did and was notorious for receiving'but not sharing
information. Also, the did not seem to have full accountaq .ity for their
both promised the


but that did n happen. over-
handled mos the dealin
himself primarily worked. :misted

woiiin only with.did not go through the established process.
pent some of his tile either at the MI LSA, or the lA hard site (I
suspect more time at the hard site than he should have). sealed to

have an affinity for OGA and special ops. initially questioned and "broke" a detainee.ho then followed up with more questioning. maw 4110111101role.as very limited. He was not present during the interrogation, but stated he heard slaps butmas not sure if the slaps re done to the det-.•r to the table in the room. I was not informed of an Sh rtly after returning from leave on 11 Dec. r 003, I heard that ghosts died during an interrogation. Although I did not delve into.
ails, I card that it was suspected he died as a result of

wounds inflicted during capture. Also, I heard that .1111111...was involved, but I do not know the extent of his involvement. Interrogations were to be scheduled through the JIDC Interrogation Control Element (ICE) and conducted by interrogation teams. However, I air aware of two occasions where unscheduled interrogations by unqualified personnel were conducted. The first was conducted b.According to.(the primary interrogator for the
• detainee), was directec by BG FAST (thro h.in
interrogate using the fear up approach immediately. woke am

-001111Wanti an interpreter to assist in the interroga ion. Against the advise ofillel...1111111111111111101ginsistec on the interrogation, knowing the detainee has just ended a 72-nour adjusted sleep scnedule and waa now resting and
recuperatinc. The detainee collapses during.


estion' . Afterward(,, I
ormed of the incident and found that both



11111111write. ­
tement concerninc the incident. The secon incl ent a

A female oetainee net of inters t to MI) claimed to
have information. concerning Saaaar. Hussein.. took his assistant,

not assigned as a 0 facilitate questioning

(n anterroga.
report writing.

riting. Later,1111111110Pbecame involved when he heard that the

female oetainee's family frequently VI -sated the gates of AG to determine how she was (=Inc. He began to 'task' her father to provide information saying things' like "come back with some information, and you can visit with your daughter".
Although we disagreed with the whole situation, we insisted that if he was to
continue watt has unauthorizec "interrogation" he would have to•complete all
required reports.

COL PAPPAS was aware of these interrogations. As both our

mission and detainee population quickly expanoed, we did not have enough
military Interrogators to handle the workload. CACI contract interrogators
started to arrive in mid-October. For the most part the

professional and experienced, with the exception of'.He was

very limited in his skill set anc seemed to use the "fear up" 'Tinkly during

interrogation. I talked
with his section 1 der about this observation and
suggestec he talk withellabout it..and possibly.would

interview the incoming CACI personnel to determine their background and experience. Although 7 was never informed that we could reject any unqualified CACI personnel, I did know based on working with contractors in the past that we
had an influence in accepting/rejecting the contractors. I trusted that the


Initials of personmakint statement

Page 3 of 5-Pages

STATEMENT 1Contintodl
would n • SancheZ's approval for release. By mid-August wet one point, we were told that all Victory Bounty de
;and I tried to convince those above us that we werehad some 300 plus detainees from various raids
maxed out, but there was no change. Prior to the arrival of additional interrogators from 325th MI, the 519th conducted
interrogation operations during the day. After 325th interrogators arrived (on/about 15 September) tip to about 20 Sep we
worked in two shifts: A/519th on days and 325th on nights. The detainees moved from Cropper were a part of a huge backlog of
detainees that were earlier designated as M3 Holds by 325th MI had had not yet been interrogated. This schedule lasted until the
mortar attack on 20 September 2003 which killed two of our personnel. Composition of MC: Likely influenced by MG
Miller's visit, a decision was made to form Tiger Teams (consisting of an interrogator, an analyst, a reports officer and an
inteplus su rt personnel. Using our past interrogation experience, A/519th leadership tried to explain to COL Pappas
on how best to structure the organization and how the interrogation operations had worked for us.
d for a
was no on site most of the time; he received input by phone and email and then made decisions).
list of sill in and personnel (by rank and MOS) so I can begin organizing the "Tiger Teams" I was toldwould decide on the composition of the teams, not me. Around 23 to 25 September we had a meeting wt concerning changes in operations, likely due to the recent visit by LTG Sanchez. He instituted changes like nobeen checked out" and "interrogations had to be
rrogatio would be accomplished until all round information
former quickly proved to be unrealistic. Beforeoved I could respond, the later was intensely questioned by i. interrogators and section leader as to why the approval a veray (Interrogation Operations) level. The approval process was later delegated back down to the appropriate level sometime in October. Reporting: We were informed during MG Miller'S visit that only a few of the 350+ Intelligence
Information Reports we had sent were actually forwarded outside of theater. This gave the impression that the interroption •
facilities were not doing their job in extracting and reporting triformation. MG Miller and others on his team had commented that
there was nothing wrong with interrogation operations and reporting, the problem was somewhere up the intelligence distribution
chain (likely C2). Since there was this misperception of the lack of reporting, both BDE and C2 began to ask for the actual notes
from the interrogation. Interrogator notes arc close bold working papers intended to document in detail to aid. other interrogators
who may conduct an interrogation of the detainee at a later date. They are not intended to beto be forwarded up the
intelligence chain, much less to organizations outside the intelligence chain. Yet, they (C2 anderris
rG Sanchez) had been reCeiving
these types of reports from other units (TF 121 and possibly IAD) and wanted the same from us. We vehemently objected to
releasing these reports saying this would lead to others Without knowledge of interrogation operations questioning our
interrogators, their methods, and the informa • the obtained. We were able to delay releasing these reports until 10 October when I was ordered by COL Pappas, through that 'this is a copy of the report. This is exactly bow I want it to look." By mid-October we started the process of "cleaning up" (sanitizing them for release in a way that would shield the interrogation teams a. much as we could) the interrogator notes and submitting them as Summary Interrogation Reports. Since there seemed to be an insatiable demand for data by C2 (wanung the interrogation notes soon after an interrogation) we were instructed to change our reporting priorities - interrogation notes, then intelligence reports. On the surface we complied, however, I told my section leaders that if we come across any information that is time sensitive, we will report that information first. At one point we were directed to write out each question and response in the Interrogation Notes. Obviously, this was met with much objection and did not last long. Since the JIDC quickly expanded and no one initially took the time to define dutypositions and duty descriptions, there was constant confusion about who does what and how. Throughout this whole process I had the impression that We leadership from the BDE level on up did not know and understand the process and procedures of interrogation operations, which led to a confusing and unorganized. amateurish; and undisciplined organization. Motile Interrogation Teams (MIT):. We bad concern over bow MITs were utilized by maneuver units. By doctrine, they are to quicklyidentify, screen, and interrogate detainees who could provide valuable information to the supported maneuver commander. . However, in personal conversations with some of the MITs, it became apparent that they were used to aid in filling out. the capture information for the detainees. They did little to no screenings or interrogations. When questioned about the purpose of the operations they were supporting and the questions they were able to ask, they stated they did not know the purpose and only questioned detainees concerning CJTF-7 PIRs. It seemed that the maneuver units gave very broad instructions to round up any male from 16 - 60 • ' an o verification that they were "bad guys". During a meeting with COL Pappas, suggested that the JIDC provide MITs for specified °petitions as we would ulumately receive the e and this would aid us since we would already be familiar with the operation and the supported Commander's PIRs. Detention criteria/JIDC acceptance criteria: In my opinion less than 10% of the detainees had any real intelligence value. We told MG Miller. MG Fast, LTG Sanchez and COL Pappas (anyone that wouldlisten) that there needed to be established criteria for the maneuver units and the Division cages on whom to look for and how to process and forward detainees of value to the JIDC. I felt some of the maneuver units' interrogators were interrogators in name only The 4th ID folks were really bad, the I AD folks were OK and the 101st folks were so-so. On more than one occasion Ihave seen as many as three screening reports on one detainee where the three screeners commented "deceptive, needs to beInterrogated by higher" (some were also labeled as having no noel value but were forwarded to the JIDC). 4th ID in particular, itappeared they would simply pass them off without conducting any questions, since after they would forward their detainees wewould receive a list of questions to ask them I responded 'why don't your interrogators do their jobs?" OGA: had what we refer to as ghost detainees that were "buried" or hidden in our facili . OGA bad started in early September to comeover to talk to some of our detainees with one of our interrogators prese
PAGE .2, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998

STATEMENT (Continued)
Optimally, I would like to have constant interrogations conducted while a detainee was under the adjusted sleep schedule.

However, it took too many resources (interrogators/linguists) away from other interrogations or one interrogation team would be
i as much sleep deprived as the detainee it would have been fruitless. The use of sleep deprivation was monitored; we did not want
to harm the detainees. Beginning. in mid-December we had Air Force doctors monitor the detainees. One instance fortheif l-

a guard do (in late December) entailed having the dog under control of the handler but present during the interrogation as the interrogator. No direct reference was made to the dog, but it was felt that just the presence of the dog would unsettlingi to the detainee, as we knew the de • were typically afraid of dogs. I do not know who actually approved the procedure, but I had verbal notification fr who got it from COL Pappas, that it was approved. The written
approval should be on file with the JAG. The Ps o etfused the dogs for random inspections. I did not see any maltreatment of detainees with the dogs. Abuses: Some time in late September or early October, there was an incident involving the use of alcohol and an unauthorized interrogation of a female detainee. This was quickly dealt with. It involved an interrogator, two 97Bs and a Titan interpreter. The three soldiers were reduced in rank and given extra duty. I do not know exactly what happened to the Titan contractor, but I do know er worked for us as an interpreter for interrogations. Although I was not involved with the incident, I am
sure tha . informed Titan that the interpreter was no longer welcomed and should be fired. Shortly afterwards, although we id not-have any female detainees of MI interest, the procedures for dealing with female detainees were added - only females could interrogate female detainees. After I returned from leave 11 December 1 • formed of the incident with
in which she made a detainee strip and • • naked, mmended an Article 15 for
humiliating the detainee but was overruled by was taken off interrogator rotation and given extra
duty. I did not witness any physical abuse o etainees. I saw some "normal" pictures of AG which included detainees, but
nothing of an untoward nature. I told my personnel tnat pictures were not to be taken. I was not aware of any exchanges of
pictures among personnel. I am not aware of any videos made. My personnel never reported to me that they had observed any
abuse, humiliation or use of guard dogs durin a *on 111 had been old or knew of any incidents I would have reported
them. For example, in late December, xpressed concern that the one of the MPs may be
'taking things too far", possibly abusing etainees. The MP was earlier shot in the chest by a detainee who obtained a gun
smuggled in by one of the Ir • t was though •s in • t was affecting his judgment when handling detainees. We
brought these concerns up to and possibl ho then talked with the MPs. I am not aware of the

I outcome as I as preparing to rEave ra o Emer en e. Comment on the picture of the detainee on the ground surrounded by MI and MPs: I identified 6B 97EVAIIMIllfa96B; andel/NON Titan Contractor. I was unable to identify the other individual in the picture who is said to be MI. Looking at the picture and noticing who is present and their state of dress, I am certain it is not an interrogation as reported by the press. 1. Night shift MPs are present 2. AO"
is in shorts and flipflo s •s also tells me that it occurred early in October when 325th lived near the facility and not in the NE compound. 3. as never assigned as an interrogator, although he is a 97E. 4. Interrogations never occurred in the open areaS—at e prison. Always in the booths, the stairwell, or the detainees' cells. 5. I believaalllwas an interpreter for THT at this time
Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this stattmenmt?
A. No.
//////////ffil/11/1/1/1/1/1/1/1/1///1/////////1//////End of Statemcnt//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////MBM/


rson Making Statement)
WITNESSES: Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to
administer oaths, this 19TH day of MAY , 2004
at Metro Park S rin field VA
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS / vita ere rson Administering Oath/
(Type dministering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (Authority To Administer Oaths)
PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 USAPA Vi.00
AGO 0 0 0 7 8 4