Fay Report Annex: Statement of Captain, 519th Military Intelligence Battalion re: Detainee Operations and Handling at Abu Ghraib Prison

SWORN STATEMENT
For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS
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I LOCATION 2 DATE fYYYYMI . TIME FILE NUMBER
Metro Park Sptingfield, VA 2004/05/2 f /
MIDDLE NAME 6 SSN 7 GRADE/STATUS
CPT
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
A/304TH Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Huachuca, AZ
9.
WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH .
I have been assigned to the 519th Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion (BN) since 01 May 2000. I deployed to Afghanistan for six months with A Company, 519th Ml BN on 20 Jul 02. 1 served as the Operations Officer of interrogation operations at a facility in Bagrarn until I redeployed on 28 Jan 03. I then deployed to Kuwait on 12 Mar 04, with HHS, 519th MI BN where 1 served as the Battle Captain/Assistant S-3. I crossed into Iraq on 4 Apr 04, first arriving at LSA Bushmaster, to conduct initial coordination with the 720th Military Police (MP) Battalion who was establishing a detainee facility or "cage". I remained at Bushmaster for approximately 12 days. I then moved forward to LSA Dogwood. where the 720th MP BN established a second cage, and I remained there for 10 days to two weeks at the end of Apr 03. I moved to Camp Speicher (North Tikrit) where the 519th MI BN established its Headquarters. From early May to early June, 1 served as the 519th Ml Bn Liaison Officer to the 4thID for Tactical Humins Operations. During the June tuneframe, I served at the Camp Cropper detention facility as the Senior Intelligence Officer and battalion level representative for the 519th. In early July, 1 returned to Camp Speicher as a Battle Captain, and it was shortly after returning to Speicher that the 519th received the Warning Order to establish interrogation . operations at Abu Ghraib (AG) in support of the upcoming operation Victory Bounty. On or about 23 Jul 03, 1 was a member of the 519th MI Bn site survey team to conduct an assessment of the AG facility and then returned to Camp Speicher. Due to theoverwhelming requests for updates,111111111.1.1tequested additional higher level assistance from the 519th Ml Bn so that he could focus on his company comlaran uties an o provide much necessary life support. 1 arrived at AG on 4 August, and my position was as the Interrogation OIC responsible for supervising the interrogation operations and personnel. I was responsible for screening, interrogations, and reporting of intelligence information. I departed Iraq on 4 Dec 03 on "Rest and Relaxation" leave and unexpectedly received redeployment orders while on leave. I returned to Kuwait to out-process on 24 December 2003 and departed Kuwait 25 December en-route to F Bra . I never returned to AG. c at Cam ro per, I had various conversations with my two warrant officers; . terrogation ops, an the Operations Officer. All were frustrated with the overcrX ,ded conditions at e Cropper detention fade ty. For cxarnp e, the facility was intended to house approximately 200 detainees, and there were anywhere from 700 to 1,000 detainees. Many of the
detainees were brought to Cropper for minor infractions, and most of the detainees were 'low value detainees". Several detainees
were what was referred to as "50 meters detainees', because they had been in the general vicinity of the target of a US raid and
bad been picked up essentially for being in close proximity. The "low value detainees" did not warrant long term interrogation
effort or retention, and Cropper lacked facilities for proper interrogation operations. The conditions were similar at the facilities

at Bushmaster and Dogwood. Bushmaster and Dogwood did not have sufficient logistical support - for example th w r tents for detainees and water was rationed. Cropper, however, had tents, which were routinely overcrowded voiced his concerns with the overpopulation and the disgruntled mood of the detainees with no response. He lished an Information Intelligence Report (IIR) in an effort to alert leadership of the situation and the problems within the facility. I am prior enlisted and served for ten years as an InterrogatoriHUMINT Collector (MOS 97E) and am qualified as a "Strategic Debriefer". As a Commissioned Officer, I have served in various positions involving tactical HUMINT Collection Operations. I served as a Tactical HUMINT Team (THT) Leader in Bosnia-Herzegovinia for six months (SFOR-8), as an Analysis and ControlTeam (ACT) leader in Bosnia (SFOR 9), and as an Interrogation operations officer in Afghanistan with the 519th MI BN for sixmonths. I consider myself very knowledgeable of Interrogation Operations and techniques. With the exception of what I discussbelow, during my time in Iraq, I never witnessed any interrogation methods or operations that were outside normal procedures and observed nothing contrary to Army Field Manuals, Regulations, Doctrine, or the established curriculum presented at the 97EMOS producing school at the US Army Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, AZ. The interrogation environment inIraq was challenging because the current US Army interrogation training and doctrine is rooted in and geared toward aconventional, cold war threat and not toward the Arab mindset. When I arrived at AG, there were approximately 50 to 150inmates being held on criminal offenses. The 72nd MP Company was manning AG and was significantly undermanned and underresourced. The 519th received the mission for AG in late July, when AG was designated as the detention facility for Inddetained during Operation VICTORY BOUNTY (OVB). OVB was a nation-wide sweep to pick up approximate) 1 8
10 EXHIBIT
I 11. INITIALS OF PERSON KING STATEMENT PAGE 1 OF ES
A CiDiTIONAI PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT
DATED
THE 80rrom OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER
ML'ST BE BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE US•PA VI.00

Statement ofMIS.
Taken At Metroeark, Springfield, VA .Date 1004/05/2.1

an.
but I was overridden..
and
en a onzed several interrogations be conducted without the presence of y
interrogators and I did not have visibility or knowledge of what transpired during those
interrogations. At the beginning to mid Oct 03,

as one of my interrogators sat in on their interrogations. This responsibility was picked up by the operations section, and any other agency requesting to
conduct operations at AG coordinated with OPS. It was shortly thereafter that an incident occurred in which an OGA "ghost" detainee died during the course of an interrogation. JIDC personnel were not present during this interrogation. I have no knowledge of any OGA abuses
or violations. The practice of housing "ghosts" continued and was still in practice at the timemy departure on 4 Dec 03, and I do not know if LTG Sanchez was aware of the practice or no

Initials of Person Making Statemen .11111
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AG0000517

. Statement offIIIIIIIIII. Taken At MetroPark, Springfield, VA .Date 2004/05!21
11111/ errogators took turns reading the MFR aloud as others followed along. I am 90% certain that all interrogators and analysts read the IROE MFR, while it is possible due to sick call or some other reason, that some might have missed the meeting. I had each soldier sign a roster stating
that he or she had read and understood the IROE.
I also created a slide which synopsized the 14 September IROE and posted the IROE in numerous locations throughout the working area as a
constant reminder. This original slide contained three columns — the first column general interrogation techniques IAW FM 34-52. Techniques outside of the FM were place in a second column which I titled "OIC approval required prior to use", this was to ensure the interrogators did not have 'carte blanche', and sought guidance with more involved approaches. The third column was titled "CG's approval required for use on EPW's". After the subsequent IROE MFR was signed by LTG Sanchez on 12 Oct 03, I created a second slide to reflect the changes from the 14 September to the 12 October IROEs. Within the body of the main memorandum, it stated
• that any approach not listed in the policy required the. CG's signature. It was explained to me (1 cannot remember by who, but the guidance was from higher) that those approaches removed from the 14 Sep version were not necessarily out of reach, that they had to be approved by the CG prior to use. I therefore placed those approaches which were removed were placed under the title "Requires CG's approval in writing". In retrospect, the phrase "all other approaches require the CG's approval" would have been better verbage. This slide
was posted about the • interrogation operations room about the.same time as the CACI contractors arrived. Following the incident involving three soldiers conducting unauthorized activities within 1B, I drafted a "memorandum of understanding" in MFR format (approximately 20 Oct) which not only outlined the approaches approved for use, but also added that all interrogations will be conducted in a humane manner, interrogations involving female detainees required another female's presence, detainees will not be maliciously humiliated, detainees will not be touched in an unwanted or malicious manner, cultural boundaries will be respected, unscheduled interrogations will not be conducted and the understanding of these rules and the requirement to report any violations of these rules to the OIC. I had each member of the JIDC who was in contact with detainees, which included interrogators, analysts, contractors and interpreters, read the MFR and sign indicating their understanding. The IROE has always applied to other agencies as well and 1 mandated that if other agencies wished to use AG facilities, they were required to follow US Army IROE. Other agency reps were requested to also sign the IROE prior to any interview beginning approximately the beginning of November. COL PAPPAS told me that the CJTF-7 CG delegated to him the authority to approve sleep deprivation and sleep management, but I do not recall if he specifically stated he had received authority to approve use of stress positions. The IROE slide was posted prior to COL PAPPAS's arrival at AG on 16 Nov 03 (in preparation for taking command of the FOB on 19 Nov 03), and there was a conflict between the IROE slide, which stated these techniques required CG's approval, and COL PAPPAS's claim that he had the authority to approve such techniques. COL PAPPAS never stated to me the basis of that authority other than to state that the CG had delegated it to him. I never saw anything in writing. granting that authority. Regarding my experience with OGA, I first had limited contact with OGA while at Cropper. It was during the end of Aug 03/beginning of Sep 03 timeframe, everyone started shifting their operations to AG. OGA occasionally coordinated for interrogation space. I instructed OGA representatives that they must abide b
I ' : us [ROEwhile at AG. Most of my contact was with an individual we knew only a who appeared to in charge of the OGA interrogation operations. I never endo
• a - • . ice o
"
overnight parking" of OGA "ghost" detainees and expressed my disapproval to COL PAPPA
Initials of Person Making Statemen111 PaWOW
, age

Statement o. Taken At MetroPark, Springfield, VA .Date 2004/05121
WIN
erational environment as Afghanistan, I used my best judgment and concluded they would be
109
effective tools for interrogation operations at AG. Because the winds of war were changing, and the mounting pressure from higher for "actionable
. c ence" fr interrogation operations, I
requested more options that FM 34-52 provided.
cquired a copy of TF-121IROE and essentially "plagiarized" it, changing t etterhead on the MFR, incorporating somegeneral editing, and then subm
th 1. OE 1 R for approval through the 519 th MI BN to the205 th MI BDE for approval.
ever received a response. Shortly after my
arrival, I resent the IROE MFR request to the 205 th•cc'd the 519th MI Bn. I received noicsponse a ain sent out the document to the CJTF-7 C-2X shop. I discussed the issue wi tat the C-2 shop, and he opined that the approval should be sent up through command channels rather than intelligence channels. While the MFR was being staffed, we continued to use FM-34-52 procedures, as well as sleep management and
stress positions from our experience in Afghanistan, as I believed these to be reasonable, given the similarity of the situationi. However, at AG, sleep management was requested only a few times, and it never exceeded the limit of 72 hours. Stress positions were used a little more frequently, but always in a very controlled manner. All usages of these techniques were documented in Interrogation Plans. Due to the fact the interrogations were conducted in open tents, anyone could observe the actions conducted therein. Concerning administration of the sleep management prior to the actual interrogation, the MPs implemented the procedure. The MPs would keep the detainees awake by saying "stand up" or "wake up". I did not, nor did any MI personnel to my knowledge, have a conversation or provide written instruction to the MPs as to how to exactly implement the procedure. No MP ever inquired of me as to how the procedure should be implemented. Concerning the administration of stress positions, interrogators could not utilize a stress positions for more than a total of 45 minutes within a given four hour period (meaning the total time a detainee could be in any stress position could not exceed 45 minutes. That did not mean one position could be held for 45 minutes, then move to another position for another 45 minutes.) The time keeping was the responsibility of the two interrogators in the booth, so
I can not say for
certain that these limitations were not exceeded. However, I never received any reports of excessive use of the technique. The next mile c in the effort to have the IROE approved. Onor about 25 Aug 03, two Coalition lawyers (Australia)) (I am not 100%
of e U SJA rep's name. , came to AG as a result of
providing the IROE draft to and requesting assistance and feedback. They came toAG to review operations.
e lawyers informed me that my IROE MFR seemed to be within legal purview and authority, and the Australian lawyer even commented that the techniques were rather soft. They indicated the IROE MFR would be pushed higher for CJTF-7 review. The Miller Tiger Team arrived at AG on 2 Sep 03, and remained at AG for three to four full days.
On the second day, I n a meeting with several members of the Miller Team, COL
PAPPAS, and maybe
It was during that meeting that the Team had a copy of
my IROE MFR an• or one om e team stated that it was a "good start", but that CJTF7
should consider something along the lines of what's approved for use in CJTF-170, although no

specific tools or techniques were discussed. Shortly thereafter, on 10 Sep 03, the CJTF-7 MFR providing IROE (possibly the result of my MFR and the CJTF-170 approved IROE) was signed. I do not recall seeing a copy of the 10 September, however was provided a copy of the 14 September [ROE. At about the same time, on or about 10 Sep 03, the 325 th MI BN arrived and I
began the integration of the 519 th and 325 th personnel. During a shift change meeting whitincluded both 519 th and 325 th personnel, I handed out copies of the 14 Sep IROE approval MF
Initials of Person Making Statement
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Statement o AMR
Taken At MetroPark. Springfield, VA Date 2004/05/2 1
inees and MI Holds were put in to Camp Ganci and thus scattered throughout all
three AGsites. By the time of my departure, the AG population had swollen to about 6,500, and locating and rounding up detainees for interrogation became problematic. With the pulling of the MP detail, the interrogators had to track down and transport the detainees themselves,
wasting a
considerable • amount of valuable time. The MPs also pulled the MP overwatch from the interrogations, putting the interrogators at greater risk. For clarification purposes, a "Security Detainee" was an individual perceived to be a threat to Coalition Force, i.e. detained
for weapons
possessions, LED involvement, etc. An "MI Hold" is anyone of interest to MI and
can include a Security Detainee. This category would also include Al Qaeda types, individuals possessing information regarding foreign fighters, infiltration methods, or pending attacks on Coalition Forces. A "Criminal Detainee" is, as the name indicates,
an individual simply involved incriminal activities unrelated to Coalition Forces. All three groups were treated equally. Our
interrogation approaches and selected techniques were driven by the; individuals circumstances of capture and placement/access, and not determined by their status as one of these categories.The "hard site" consisted of Cell Block "IA" and "113" as two man cells, and several other wings
which were utilized as they became available, which were 4 or 8 man cells. The hard site, like the rest of AG, was under MP control. MI had no say so or influence over inmates or activities in Cell Block 1B, which primarily housed criminal female and juvenile inmates or any of the 4/8 man cell wings. Cell Block "IA" was .primarily designated as the holding area for "Security Detainees" and "MI Holds". While the MPs controlled "IA", MI requested and had influenceover who would be placed and housed in "IA". "IA" consisted of 40 cells, situated on
two
levels, with twenty cells on either side of a central corridor. Each cell had two bunks, but efforts were made to have only one detainee at a time in each cell. No detainee could be kept in "IA" longer than 30 days without LTG Sanchez approving an extension. If I, or one of myinterrogators, wanted a detainee to remain in
"IA" longer than 30 days, the interrogator wouldwrite up a justification and request, forwarded from the section leader to myself, which I wouldforward up through the 205 th MI BN for LTG Sanchez's approval. We maintained an electronic dossier folder on each detainee of MI interest, and I placed the approval request and final
approval documents in the affected detainee's e-file. The final signed copies were placed in the detainee's paper dossier Although "1A" was primarily designated as an MI holding area, onoccasion, the MPs placed other detainees in "1A". These might include unruly or "problem" detainees and detainees of interest to CID or OGA. However, "lA" was never so crowded that
we could not get a cell for an MI detainee. I did not, nor did any other MI personnel to my knowledge, track non-MI detainees for status or release after 30 they
were not my
responsibility. The MPs were the "inn keepers", specifically an
We began
interrogation operations at AG using accepted Field Manual 34-52 norms and techniques. Wewere moving from a tactical to an operational or insurgent environment and it increasingly felt to me like my experience in Afghanistan. I did not want my folks to loose sight of their boundaries
and their left and right limits.
I saw the situation moving to the "Bagram" model. Pressures
were increasing
from overpopulation, the mission creep from bona fide Security Detainees to
others who probably really didn't need to be detained for a long period, and the realization that
Iraq was evolving into a long standing mission. I increasing felt the need to draw on my
experience in Afghanistan. We had used "sleep adjustment" and "stress positions" as effective
techniques in Afghanistan. Although I never saw written authorization, the techniques had SJA
and CJTF-180 C-2X / C2 review and approval on a case by case basis. Because we had used the
techniques in Afghanistan, and I perceived the Iraq experience to be evolving into the sam

Initials of Person Making Statemen IIIII
Pager-jo,p,
Statement o
.At Mgageaduzzgrit_a
i el V.
DateCI
L0.4/(21_
ontractors, was the CACI "site manager"at Ack, and became my POC for CACI issues and
personnel. I relied heavily on o manage the CACI personnel and I did not personally interview each contractor in ivi ua y and knew very little about their qualifications,trusting that higher echelons had validated
their qualifications. Most contractors had prior
mili or •olice ex •e: rice. I basically would rely ochief,. my military section
7 eedback from section leaders and
bilities an• q i i.gions to judge a contactor's
ns. I had only one performance issue with a CACI analys the analyst continually inte ected and attempted to dominate the interrogation.
discussed this issue.
th.
within the JIDC. d the analyst was relocated to another section n (I
his original unit is within the Utah unsure
National Guard), arrived approximately 30 Sep (very unsure of the date, after the mortar attack
on 20 Sep and..___
about the same time we be an
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIr

operations) afte/. usin the hardsite room for interrogationan ad arrived. He had been the 01C/S10
at Camp Bucca. When Camp Bucca close its collection mission, the 205 1" brought 3231( assertsto AG as part of the centralization process. The majority of 323 ° personnel became the
Comm d and Control/staff/headquarters element and were pot used in i rrogation operations.323 rd MI, became the screening OIC and
NCO[C. I 4,. became the CM&D
(originally from the 141 4 Itonal Guard) attached to
the 323 "1-MI BN,
came t e Headqua •
-- i under.. became the Operations
Officer and I worked closely with him. together. I took most guidance from.worked closely who provided oversight to thc interrogation
operation. During this time period C.
tWo, tO • 'PA s visits increased from visiting every week or2-3 visits a week, to occasional ovemighting, until late rnid Nov mid he moved out to
AG.
At the beginning of Nov 03, LTG SANCHEZ and MG FAST visited AG for a bnefing and to assess the situation. This was the second visit to AG LTG Sanchez made following the 20 Sep mortar attack. The first was on approximately 30 September, when LTG Sanchez's focus was primarily the force protcction and defensive posture of AG. LTG Sanchez toured the entire facility, to include a short brief on interrogation operations, which took place in the building recently aquired for use by the JIDC. , LTG Sanchez expressed concern about the interrogation
operation to COL PAPPAS and indicated that the issue would be, further discussed "later". Shortly. after the second visit in November, LTG SANCHEZ issued a FRAGO on 19 Nov 03, which appointed COL PAPPAS as the FOB Commander, giving him responsibility for all assigned at AG. In discussion with COL PAPPAS, it was my opinion that this vvas not a good siruation and that there should remain a .clear delineation between MI and MP, and that COL PAPPAS should recorrunend against the appointment. I believed that MI should not become •
involved in detainee or prison operations.
As a result of the OPORD, my understanding was that
COL PAPPAS would take control of AG security and force protection, but not "warden

res...._
ponsibilities". After the OPORD, COL PAPPAS assigned AG Force Protection responsibility
to nommems, 165th
MI BN Commander. Was a good choice because of

his tactical knowledge, and he brought in fragments Of the 165 6 Long Range Surveillance (LRS)
Company to provide a more robust forcc protection posture and guidance than the MP could
provide. The MPs had had many breaches of security and poor installation access control, and
frequently allowed private vehicles and taxis on the base without escort. The FRAGO generated
tension between MI and the MPs. The MP chain of command pulled thc MP detail dedicated to

MI for transportation of detainees between their holding area and the interrogation booths. By this time, Camp Vigilant and the hard site (Block IA and IB) were overcrowded, so sec
Initials of Person Making Statemerilli Pat111. 11(R,
AG0000513

Statement of.1111111111
. . Taken At MetroPark. Springfield, VA .Date004/05/21•

111..
ceived.any .direct feedback as a result of the visit The only feedback I saw was from the 205
°
following the recommendations from MG MILLER's visit.
I do believe that the Miller visit
propelled to become a "mini-mo". Shortly after MG MILLER departed AG, Illrived at AG on approximately 10 September, approximately the same time atthe n rsonnel. He was the Senior Intelligence Officer (S10) to AG. I believe
ill.
role was to be the 20
resentati at AG, provide guidance, and implement a
mandate from COL PAPPAS and . to replicate the JTF-GTMO model in the
form of the Joint Detention and nterrogation enter (JDIC) at AG, beginning with the introduction of the Tiger learn interrogatio conce t and strategic level collection(knowledgeability briefs, for example). Prior to .
arrival, I had one chief
warrant officer and approximately 12 active duty c
E. 97B), an analyst and
a Trojan communications team working for me. I continued to send operational reportingthrough the 519 th MI Bn Tactical Humint Operations (THOPS) to the 205'h MI Bn and COLPAPPAS. It was at this time (10 September) that the interrogator personnel from the 325 11 MI
began arriving and the process of merging the 519 th and 325th MI assets began. The 325'hTeams", with one interrogator and one analyst per team. Because initially sent five "Tiger
I
needed leaders for the new arrivals, I pulled one NCO from the five teams to act is a section leader. To facilitate the integration of the 519 th and 325'h, I then broke up the original teams andmerged the personnel of the two units. As
the 519th did not have analytical assets, the
reorganization benefited the collection mission. The resulting structure was four sections with an NCO in change of each, and at least one analyst per section. This organization did not follow the ."GTMO Model" and I receive pressure from the 205 th leadership to maintain aninterrogator/analyst structure. I believe the structure implemented (two collectors per team and
analytical support to the entire section) was more efficient and effective for our operational
working environment and available manning.

After the close of Cropper (approximately 5-7
da s later , the 325 th provided additional personnel who became the Operations section. ink
arrived at AG on or about 15 Sep 03 and I understood him to be the "new boss". His
original title was "Chief of JDIC", but c stated t .

he did not like the title and changed it to"Director of JDIC". I understood tha was ir charge of the JDIC at AG.11.11
Nap was fairly uninvolved with interrogation operations within AG and never provided
interrogation guidance, Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), or directives, probably because
he was not overly familiar with interrogation operations. At the end of S,

ep 03 I do not regal'
the exact date), t of the CACI contracted civilian interrogate
arrived. Although I had been tol to eventua y expe
contract augmentees, the three CACI contractors arrived out of the blue. I never received official

• guidance or perimeters from higher as to how to employ them. I
briefly interviewed each
contractor, provided in-brief information, and standards of conduct and interrogation rules of

engagement and paired them up with a military interrogator since I knew my soldiers capabilities
but did not know that of the contractors. At this time I created a three to four page initial
counseling statement which each contractor

signed. The statement essentially covered the
standards
of conduct, performance expectations, informed them of the military chain of
command and to whom to report any incidents, operational security awareness. About five days
later, seven more CACI contractors arrived, and then one's and two's arrived periodically over
the next couple of months.

I presented each CACI contractor with a new arrival briefing and had
each sign an i_ it
n ia1 counseling statement and acknowledge his understanding of the operationand IROE. a contractor who arrived in the second group of several
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AG0000512

.Statement oil.. Taken At MetroPark. Springfield, VA.Date 2004/05/21
the 320th MP Battalion started operations there about the same time. While the military constructed a mass holding area (Holding area GANCI), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was simultaneously renovating the hard-site within AG prison. There was no suitable location to • establish an interrogation facility and operations area. The 519 th established the interrogation and administrative area in the vicinity of Holding Area VIGILANT, using a ARFABs, DRASH tents. The 205 th MI BDE coordinated with the CPA to utilize 10 cells of cell block "IA". As a result of the renovation effort, Iraqi National workers employed for the CPA sponsored renovations utilized the courtyard immediately next to cell block IA as a ccntcr of gravity for their welding and construction operation. The 519 th initially used the outside portions of AG, not the hard site, due to the on oin renovation .
ject. The 205 th MI BDE, specifically
11111111111111.111.COL PAPPAS.
ere Bde battle captains and constantly requested up tes.) kept pressuring e .to utilized the hard-site, but the site was not acceptable for use until about three weeks after our arrival (3 14 week in .Aug 03) because of the following reasons: the proximity of the construction workers could allow communication with detainees, insufficient numbers of MPs to guard detainees housed in the area, the MPs did not have locks, and the wing did not have electricity or running water. Camp Ganci was constructed within the confines of AG as an outside, main holding facility intended to hold up to 4000 "criminal detainees". Camp Vigilant was an outside facility intended to house general population of "security detainees". Although AG had been designated as the repository of. the OVB detainees, we received only approximately 180 OVB detainees. Of those, approximately 62 were on the original list of 1,800, and only about 20 provided information, and that information was not particularly "actionable intelligence". About two weeks into OVB, AG started receiving "security detainees" from operations other than OVB and mission creep began as AG started becoming a general security detainee facility and eventually became the central, consolidated detention facility. I did not believe AG was the best place to use as a central facilit • and durin a meeting focused on consolidating assets on at AG • late Au: 03 (Co Cdr, 325th MI Bn), anMI Bn ()Inman Cr.voice• concerns about the defensibility o e acility, man-power shortage, location, and the stigma attached to AG. On or about 2 Sep 03, MG Miller and repiesentat;veS from the Joint Task Force (JTF) at Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Cuba, arrived at AG. It appeared that LTG Sanchez was not satisfied with the amount of actionable intelligence resulting from the interrogation operations at AG, and he had requested MG Miller review and assess the AG operations and provide recommendations learned from the . detention facility at JTF-GTMO. I had discussions with MG Miller on a couple of occasions and these conversations centered on renovations and improvements of the facilities, challenges of interrogation operations, and the need for increased MP/M1 cooperation. Specifically, I recall he discussed the implementation of dedicated MP support to MI. The purpose of dedicated MP support, for example, was to transport detainees to the designated interrogation booth, observe detainees while in holding and provide feedback to the interrogators. I never discussed specific methods or techniques with MG MILLER. The JTF-GTMO focus was more strategic than the tactical screening and operational environment of Iraq, and I believed the JTF-GTMO model
• could not be replicated in the Iraqi environment and experience. Although I attempted to express the concept, I. do not know if MG MILLER understood my position and he appeared to press forward with his JTF-GTMO recommendations. I recommended a central facility could be constructed at Camp Speicher rather than AG, however I understood the reason behind thew decision was an immediate demand for a facility. I never saw the
final Miller Report, no
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STATEMENT OF TAKEN AT Springfield, VA DATED 2004/05/21
TATEMENT (Continued) -
the first officer in the "interrogation chain", I was comfortable that my subordinates knew their boundaries and believed they
would have informed me of any violations or infringements of the IROE or any abuses they might witness. I did not have any
concerns about any specific subordinates. The first incident of abuse of which I was aware was the "unauthorized inter n"
wing morning and only have second hand knowledge. Three soldiers
were involved in an incident at about 0200 when the three soldiers co d an
interrogation of a female crinis detainee in Cell Block "IB", who was not an MI Hold. CU) investigated the Incident, but I never saw the report. All three soldic ch ly removed from JIDC duties, received Article 15 punishment under UCMJ and were reduced in rank ediate corrective action was to call a mass formation
the next morning at which all personnel were presen tormauon that there had been an "altercation" and
"unauthorized interrogation". He stated that "such action won't be tolerated", and r C mission. The second
incident of inappropriate actions during interrogation of which I was aware involve uring the first or second
week of Nov 03. She had submitted an Interrogati e primary app irect approach", but 1 do not recall her secondary approach plan. 1 gathered tha sewed the detainee as having a flippant arum& in responseto her questioning, perk.. • • . -- • ating becaus She then decided to strip the de ly did sodown to his underwear who was the analyst sitting in on the interview passed a note t which he asked her "are you sur s". After the interrogation, the inmate was cscone semi naked back to VIGILANT. i •card MPs king about the incident and ini s to what
• • • • • • • •• •• • • ta.port a the incident t s sectio
fronte \cla • • . • • • • ,• '5 • ••.. • •••¦••••.•••••• ...... •.ong. • otific•I in • d`, I recommended a -',apt. • • • PAPPAS and but • • • re y received a written repr • .. ro. int ation recommended she be returned back to her parent unit for • -comp were removed from interro ation duties ,.• • • ••• • w
Sr • Ire.•• a no knowledge of the results or findings of those visits. Such visits would have been coordinated with the MPs.
I was unaware of any incident involving administering cold showers to detainees, or the throwing of cold water on naked
detainees, possibly in support of sleep deprivation efforts I was unaware of any incident in which a naked detainee was forced to
stand on a box with a hood over his head holding bottles in outstretched hands. 1 walked through the hard site, more often during
the day or early evening hours than in the late hours of the night, but I never saw or heard of any naked detainees or any incidents

involving women's underwear.
Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to this statement?
A. No.
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////i//////End of StatemenUM(/////////////////////////////////////////////////

AFFIDAVIT
HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
WHICH BEGINS N PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE

LY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT
THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION. UNLAWFUL INF

AWF INDUCEMENT
ature of •erson Making Statement)
WITNESSES: Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to
administer oaths, this 21 day of MAY , 2004 tro Park S rin field V
ORGANIZATION OROR ADDRESS
ature o •erson Administering nth)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
UCMJ, ARTICLE 136
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMEN
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PAGE 3, DA FORM 2823. DEC 1998 USAPA VI.00

AG0000518
DOD 000606