Fay Report Annex: DOD Interview re: Conditions at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility

<p>A statement by an individual stationed at Abu Ghraib as an individual augmentee on or about October 16, 2003. The individual stated that at Abu Ghraib, &quot;there was no oversight of most of the interrogations being conducted as everyone was very busy?&quot; &quot;Many of the interrogators were young, inexperienced? did not know what to do so they reverted to throwing things, in other words, harsh approaches. After they didn't get what they wanted, they could send the detainee to isolation for thirty days or more as long as they wrote the right memo... . The memos were being approved by Col Pappas... no one was checking to ensure the recommendations were sound.&quot; Began developing SOP based on GTMO. &quot;I would say that the DAB identified about 85% to 90% of detainees were of either no intelligence value or were of value but innocent and therefore should not have remained in captivity.&quot; Several individuals reported mistreatment: drunk MPs took detainees to Hard Site, tied them up, blindfolded them, placed them in a circle and beat them up. Another detainee stripped naked, made to stand on box with arms spread out and bag over head while he was hit on his legs by the MP. Another detainee stated he was abused on capture - MP threw him to ground, poured dirt on him - he tried to tell them he was diabetic, then he went into diabetic shock. Detainees were often stripped. Some interrogators would insult the detainee's religion and family to humiliate them. OGA detainees weren't processed and we couldn't talk to them. Female linguist was asked to humiliate detainees by making comments as to their manhood and genital size. Various reports were made of &quot;interrogators, linguists and civilians treading gray line between harsh interrogation and violation of the Geneva Conventions&quot; but no importance was placed on them until the CID investigation. Innocent people detained for long periods because nobody wanted to take responsibility for releasing them and insufficient training. &nbsp;The individual explained what checks and balances should have been put in place. The individual recalled one incident where a detainee was walking around the hard site naked, but stated that he/she was pretty far away and could not tell who it was.</p>
<p>[The ACLU redacted what appears to be a social security number on the first page of this PDF.]</p>

Doc_type: 
Interview
Doc_date: 
Tuesday, May 18, 2004
Doc_rel_date: 
Wednesday, March 2, 2005
Doc_text: 

IPRIVACY ACT STATEMENT AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301: Tole 5 USC Section 2951; LO. 9397 dated November 22. 1943 (SSNI. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To pmvieacerrenentlars wet law enlacement officials with muss by which intimation may be accurately identified. ROUTINE USES: your social security number is used as an adliticewIlartemate mew at identification to faciiitate Ming and retrieval. DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntsrv. 2. DATE IYY1IMMDDI 3. TIME 4. FILE NUMBER imil I. LOCATION ARMY G2 PENTAGON, WASHINGTON DC 2004/05/1 1.,) ; 3 d JO 6. SSN ; 7. DRADEISTATUS 5 r - 633-22-9845 I SGT 8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS B/CO 470TH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE GROUP, CAMP BULL1S, TX 78254 9. , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH : I arrived at Abu Ghraib as an Individual Augmentee from the 47 ut 16 October 2003. 1 was assigned -to the Detainee Assessment Board (DAB). My DAB Supervisor was When I first arrived, we didn't receive any training for working in the DAB. We received the IROEs an believe I signed theifi. The IROEs I would say were only vaguely understood due to the speed at which operations had to be conducted. Since the focus of the initial groups was on maintaining a steady stream of intelligence reports answering PIR's, methodology took second stage to volume of output. The TROE's were clarified three months later when we received updated IROEs which we signed again. WP were shown the Geneva Conventions and told to adhere to them. They were on the wall along with the IROEs and other memorandums from various commanders within theater for the perusal of anyone who wished to review them. There was some controversy in relation to what the school taught and the environment we were in. The school is an environment where you have some overwatch and where the ambience wherein interrogations are being conducted in a safe place with no additional stresses involved, but at Abu Ghraib, we were so busy there was no oversight on most of the interrogations being conducted as everyone was busy -trying to hold up their part of the process. Most individuals arrived one day and were conducting operations the following day. Additionally, because of the additional stresses and due to the detainee's cultural and religious upbringing, many of the things taught at the school house were nearly useless or even irrelevant, which is why experienced or flexible interrogators were so absolutely necessary. Many of the interrogators should not have been conducting interrogations on their own. Most were young, inexperienced, and reservists who did not have the sufficient training nor the experience needed to achieve the necessary mindset of an interrogator in a combat zone. They did not know what to do so they reverted to screaming and throwing things, in other words, harsh approaches. After they didn't get what they wanted, they could send the detainee to isolation for thirty.days or more as long as they wrote the right memo. The focus was on intelligence, and the fast tempo dictated that oftentimes the individual interrogator or direct line supervisor had to be trusted to make the right judgment, but unfortunately not everyone was equipped to make the right decisions. The memos were being approved by COL PAPPAS or whatever individual had the authority at the time. No one was checking to ensure the recommendations were sound with any sort of regularity. At the beginning even a memo was not required as far as I knew but as I was not there during the first few weeks of the reorganization of Abu Ghuraib into an interrogation facility, I cannot speak with any certainty. We were standing up the JIDC, being mortared daily, and the gate guards were being attacked. The DAB was not part of the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) and there was:. no SOP in place on how to run one. We began developing one based on the GTMO concept, but the environment was different than GTMO. We were in a combat environment and the numbers of detainees requiring processing was higher so we had to make a lot of changes to the SOP. We were responsible tor debriefing all detainees interrogated by the ICE. When -a detainee arrived, he was screened and was either identified as being of intelligence value or not. Those with intelligence value were placed in CAMP VIGILANT. Eventually, CAMP VIGILANT became overcrowded some detainees having intelligence value were sent to one of the GANC1 camps. A lot would go into isolation to prevent them from corruption of intelligence. I would say that the DAB identified about 85% to 90% of detainees were of either no intelligence value or were of value but innocent and therefore should be not have remained in captivity. We debriefed all the detainees considered to having some intelligence value to ensure intelligence was not getting lost and determined if detainees required to be held longer or recommend release of detainee. At the beginning, the initial group at Abu Ghraib became overwhelmed with the number of detainee being delivered by lower echelon units. The prison went from 200 one day to thousands during the following days. We did not have enough personnel to conduct the screenings and interrogations and determine the value of each detainee on a timely manner, When a oetainee was able to answer a Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR), he would get interrogated numerous times and therefore, others would go without being interrogated for months The DAB would identify those who had not been interrogated and question the JIDC why it hadn't been done. An interrogation would then be conducted but this didn't always occur because of the shortage of interrogators and due to their focus on detainees of intelligence value. This of course changed for the better after the JIDC was more established and more direct oversight began to be conducted by higher echelon commanders. We would then get the detainee once the interrogator finished with the detainee. We would conduct a thorough debriefing of the detainee. The 10 EXHI5IT 11. INMAL N MAKING STATEMENT PAGE 1 OF PAGES T' ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING -srartiosr OF TAKEN AT DATED THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITL4IS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICA7FD. DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823. JUL 72. IS OBSOLETE IMAIA V1.00 STATEMENT ;V657 faatimmill their participation and a request to not arrest these particular individuals. These papers were ignored and the detainee's held for months without any particular care paid to these documents. These detainees's, who had the potential to be great friends to the U.S./Coalition efforts in Iraq, would have very little reason to stay their hand, and every reason to become implacable enemies 0 the U.S. once released. The detainee assessment branch functioned as a checks and balances for the JIDC interrogators who were constantly being pressured to produce and thus had no real opportunity to check their work or pay attention to the detainee's themselves. Individuals within the ICE attempted to do away with the DAB, stating that the interrogators themselves were qualified to make final decisions as to a detainee's final disposition, but as evinced in the statements I made above and in the actual reports present in Abu Ghraib, oversight from a section not directly involved in the Interrogation Collection Element was necessary to avoid not only missing information of possible intelligence value, but also to prevent the needless incarceration of innocent people who may have never even talked to an interrogator before their fate was decided upon. A comprehensive report was necessary to ensure that the proper disposition of detainee's was being enacted and that interrogators did not recommend further incarceration of detainee's who had done no wrong but had been unlucky enough to be present at the scene of a raid. Beyond that, I believe a system of cheeks and balances was sadly lacking at the lower echelon interrogation facilities, and someone should have been given the task of spot-checking every facility occasionally to ensure the proper implementation of the IROES as well as adherence to the Geneva Conventio We re iv a airing class by a linguist who taught us what type of words to use to humiliate the detainees. His name w as also requested by those interrogators who used more aggressive techniques. Although this does not necessarily entail any wrongdoing on his part or on the part of those interrogators who used him, the fact that the class occurred at all was indicative I believe of the notion that it was OK to humiliate detainees, to curse their mothers and daughters, to deride their religious practices, all unnecessary to a truly professional interrogator. I was shown s otos ang was able to identify some of the military intelligence personnel. Photo #6 and #7 in file 5 show observing some detainees on the floor. Photo 23 show an analyst in PT uniform and _is leaning against the wall to the left. Photo #11 in file named, ' ows a female interpreter (name unknown) and a CACI interrogator who I believe was a member of a special interrogation team Though this is probably of little relevancy, I would also like to comment that I was personally present at the general population camps in Abu Ghuraib at one of the riots that occurred in November and which resulted in the deaths of some detainee's(number unknown) and the injury of several. The riots were a constant threat to the MP's during that time period due to the Muslim religious holiday of Ramadan Many of the detainee's, especially the innocent ones with families, and who had been there a long time, felt like it was extremely unfair to them and were easy prey to the leaders amongst them who called for riots and such forms of violent expression. Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement? OM A. No //////////rff/////////////////////////////////End of StatemenUM/M//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// It" AFFIDAVIT . HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE I HAVE INITIALED ALITZORRICTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM CF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. WITNESSES: Subscribed end swom to before me, s person suthonzed by low to ednenis ter oaths. the 18th by of MAY , 2004 at A • Y PENTAGON, WASHINGTON DC ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS ISametura of Person Adarsnataatag Oath) hyped Nam. o Adaunattnic Oath) UCMJ, ARTICLE 136 ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (Authority To Atiatiostat Oaths) INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT PAGE 4 OF PACES PAGE 3, DA FORM 2813, DEC 1998 IOWA V1.00 /Statements such as these were insufficient of themselves to commit detainee's to longer incarceration but couple that with supervisors fear of releasing anybody, and what came out was detainee's being held for months on nothing but an interrogators personal opinion for which no substantiate information was given. The biggest issues that lead to the inefficiency in the collection process, I believe arose from the actions of lower echelon interrogation facilities and the capturing units themselves. The capturing units themselves were often not accompanied by appropriately trained individuals, namely members of THT or interrogators, able to make quick determinations of the value of a detainee and the appropriateness of detaining an innocent individual even if he did have information of intelligence value. Since the detainees were not properly screened on the spot and the capturing units were often not even qualified to conduct those types of operations; anyone who was in the area or looked out of place was detained regardless of culpability. When these individuals were taken to a brigade or division level facility, they were screened by civilians or military personnel who were not sufficiently or properly trained, or even sufficiently staffed, to render intelligent judgments as to the detainee's suitability to the information exploitation process. This resulted in the glutting of Abu Ghraib, a facility, which should have been housing only individuals necessary to the interrogation process, and not innocent individuals who should have never been taken from their homes, much less gone through two or three different interrogations facilities. Reports from lower echelon facilities were often not available and even when available, spotty at best. This led to a lot of duplication of effort at Abu Ghraib, which in turn meant an unnecessary delay in the detainee exploitation process. This was also true however of interrogators in Abu Ghraib, as stated above, who were also often not qualified or experienced enough for the job they were doing. The failure to ID those that could help us out in the communities instead of holding them in detention is a major cause, as far as I'm concerned, for the political instability/anti-U.S. sentiment existent in Iraq at the moment. I personal interviewed several individuals who were influential in their communities, military, religions, etc. but who had done nothing wrong or had previously voluntarily cooperated with U.S. agencies but were detained anyways. Some had letters from U.S. officials detailing the extent of MO aft 3 Tait o'c past o F Per Son 5+-c. if en4 TAKEN AT Army G2, Pentagon DATED 2005/05/18 STATEMENT OF 1111111N1P .,STATEMENT (CmtinuedlXn November, we also began to ask all detainees we debriefed if they had ever been mistreated while in the custody of the U.S. Several individuals stated they had. One general stated that while at Abu Ghraib, some drunk MPs had gathered the him and five other generals from the General Population and taken them in to the Hard Site. They were tied up, blind folded and placed in a circle and were punched by the MPs. After the MPs were finished beatin them, th were placed back into the cncral population. I wrote this on my DAB report and reported it to my th MI. She tol d it was reported to a warrant officer (do not know his name. He is part of the unit w o is ere now). He received a copy of the report and thanked us for reporting it. Another detainee stated he was stripped naked made to stand on a box with his arms spread out and bag over his head while he was hit on his legs by the MPs. There were also two other instances where detainees reported being abused before they arrived to Abu Ghraib. One reported being electrocuted by an Egyptian interpreter who was working for a civilian agency. This had occurred four to five months prior to us speaking to him. Another detainee stated the capturing MPs threw him to the ground and pour dirt all over him. He said he was diabetic and was trying to tell the MPs and he went into diabetic shock. More prevalent than any abuse while in U.S. Custody were the reports that the detainee's had been abused by the Iraqi police and the BADR Corp. I never witnessed any detainee abuse except when I saw a naked detainee walking in the Hard Site. But that is all I saw. I was pretty far away and could not tell who it was and do not know the circumstances. I do know that when criminals were placed in isolation they were often stripped. I was in the hard site at that time picking up a detainee to debrief. IN reference to humiliation, I know that some interrogators would insult the detainee's religion and family. They did not physically abuse them, but humiliated them with words. The use of words was kind of questionable. We didn't know how far they could go with words. In reference to dogs, One of my friends, I do not remember who, said someone used the dog for an interrogation. That is all I know about dogs. We did not know what the MPs could do with the dogs or maybe the MPs did not know what we could-do with the dogs, some things appeared to be in gray areas and often the individual interrogator or MP may have thought they had to make the decision themselves. In reference to OGA detainees, all I know was that some•were not processed and we could not talk to them. They (OGA) came and went as they pleased for the most part though some coordination was required. The operations section of the JIDC would know more as they were the POC for these agencies. I never saw or knew of an hot s or videos of detainees until after the CM investigation began. a fellow DAB member, stated that ACI employee ee against the wall once. This was rted in the written re rt and r orted u th chain. oke Id him that waa,not acceptable. We told spoke to became my partner. -I not p e i his work. e e comments which were unnecessary. I did not allow the interpreter to translate the comments. He would insult their religion and would state that this was the time for them to show their loyalty to the U.S. I reported to my supervisor that I did not want to work with I He left a few days later to owork as an escort. I wrote about the incidents on a memorandum that I believe was submitted y my supervisors • I believe all1111/IIIIIIIIIIIIIbthe CACI supervisor on the ground in Abu Ghraib, w cry leery about doing 'Eythmg to his guys. 'Another incident I was rriade aware of (I believe it may have been ho told me but cannot say with any degree of certainty) was of a female linguist or interrogator (If linguist aelieve it to be the female on the photo shown inphoto #11 on file named who was asked to humiliate male detainees by making comments as to their manhoodby talking about the size 6 their genitor s. My personal opinion is that of all the female linguists, she was the only one that wouldhave agreed to something of that nature. I believe I heard this right before the CID investigation, but cannot say for sure. She was a bit more open than the other female linguists. I personally know of one female linguist and a male linguist that quit because they did not agree with the way interrogators spoke to detainees. My assumption on the CACI personnel is that a lot of them were being hired on the bads of their experience in law enforcement and other such areas but that no true determination of their abilities as interrogators/screeners, etc. was done by the civilian company that hired them. Most of them were not properlytrained on questioning and interrogation methodology but due to the fact that a lot of them were as much as twice as old as the interrogators leading Tiger Teams, they were not willing to listen. The focus on numbers (i.e. output) was so great that non-qualified individuals, both military and civilian, were allowed to have positions that gave them what seemed at times full powers over another persons life, namely detainees. Because these individuals (U.S. Personnel) were not screened or trained properly and not properly supervised, detainee's suffered incarceration and varied other discomforts, from mild to major, which were completely unnecessary in my estimation. Various reports were made of interrogators, linguists, and civilians treading the gray line between harsh interrogation and violation of the Geneva Conventions/LROE, but as far as was apparent no particular importance was placed upon them until the advent of the CID investigation. Some of the civilians thought that they wereexempted from the rules of conduct which governed the soldiers and some of the interrogators seemed to feel the same. This, Ibelieve, led to some of the misconduct that occurred, since the civilians didn't fear negative action and the soldiers could honestly say they were not personally involved in the actual misconduct. These statements arc conjecture based upon my personal observations and conversations with other individuals and do not reflect any but my own opinions. I also think that U.S. personnel, especially civilian contractors, allowed their personal biases to color their reports, leading to detainee's being placedin isolation and being incarcerated for a longer period of time though no proof of wrongdoing was apparent. Often enough, the conclusion at the end. of a report which the determined a detainee's future disposition (release/further incarceration), was more a matter of persona] opinion than actual analysis of information given. People were afraid to take personal responsibility of recommending release of detainee's, even when obviously innocent, and often this would lead to condemning statements such as"the detainee told the same story seven times but is lying because he should know such and suc tion and was therefore uncooperative. Recommend detainee be held in U.S. custody for the duration of the conflict." INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING ST AT MAW 411111 PAGE OF '11 PAGES PAGE 7, OA FORM 2823,088 1592 ULU% VI.OD PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT • AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; lids 5 USC Suction 2951; E.O. 9397 and November 22, 1943 ISSN/. To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with mean by which information inn be accurately identified. PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: Tow social security number is used as an ablitionalmIternate meals of ideetification to frame Ting and retrieval. ROUTINE USES: Disclosure of your social secunty number a voluntsry. DISCLOSURE: 4. Ft/ NUMBER 1. LOCATION 12. DATE IYYYYMAIDO)OW 3. TIME 1 OSJA, DAMSTADT, GERMANY 2004/05/1 ,..i. 153. _ 7. GRALUSTATUS 6. SSN sm. . LAST NAME, FIRST NAME MI D E NAME . TION OR ADDRESS A/302tul MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BATTALION, HEIDELBERG, GERMANY APO AE 09102 # 9. . WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: I arrived in Kuwait on 12 February 2003 and was assigned to the targeting cell in the Intelligence Fusion Center at Camp Victory. This was a Coalition operation and we were con port and Stability Operations. Sometime in January. 1 was sent to Abu Ghraib to interrogate a I had developed a linked diagram on this GENERAL who had over 100 members was working the targeting fo r for the —eneral knew more about him than most people. I was sent by ,. id order' to verify or val . link diagram I had created. I was to possibly e p more targets from this interview. Wie n 1 arrived at Abu Ghraib, =Iced to speak to the GENERAL. They tried to find the GENERAL because they did not know where he was. Some interrogators told me, do not know who they were (a SFC about 5'9, balding light brown hair, in his mid 40's, and possibly wore glasses.) that I could not interrogate the GENERAL because he had just endured a 14-hour interrogation and had been broken. They did not want me to jeopardize their interrogations. I was told that the GENERAL was very concerned about his son due to his age. 17yrs old. The interrogators (not sure what type of soldier did this -MP, Intel, or exactly what MOS) took his son and got him wet. They then put mud on his face and drove him around in the back of the Humvee. The boy was very cold. They placed the son in an area where his father could observe him. The GENERAL thought he was going to get to see his son but they just allowed him to see his son shivering and this broke the GENERAL (this incident su sedl took la the day before I interrogated the General's son). The son also verified this account in my interrogation of him. as with me as my analyst and took notes while I. interrogated the son. The son said he wanted to go to another tem where his rothers were because he was afraid of the other men in his tent. Q. Is there anything else you would like to add to your statement' A. No. 111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111End of Statement//////////////////////////////////////////// /////////////////////////// ,---- -iijtorlftj 5 IC EXHIET . ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STArrmtwr OF 1 11 iNiTi OF P R N KING STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED PAGE 1 OF /Pei THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE 111177ALS Of THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BENINDICATED. DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 _ DA FORM 2823. JUL 72. IS OBSOLETE 111211% V1.110

Doc_nid: 
3176
Doc_type_num: 
73