Fay Report Annex: DOD Interview re: Conditions at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility

Interviewee was assigned to Iraq in the third week of April, and traveled to AG approximately five times from early October to late January. Interviewee's visits to AG were related to "checking on the support of CACI contracted personnel."
Sworn statement discussed the general conditions in AG. At one point described the condition as "austere." Also provided the chain of command in AG.

Doc_type: 
Interview
Doc_date: 
Friday, May 14, 2004
Doc_rel_date: 
Wednesday, March 2, 2005
Doc_text: 

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1
2. DATE arrrham 3. TIME 4. FILE NUMBER
1. LOCATION
OSJA, DARMSTADT, GERMANY 2004/05/

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
G2, HQ USAEUR, Heidelberg, Geramny APO AE 09102

9. , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I arrived in Iraq the third week in April. I was assigned initially as the G2 Planner, then as the V Corps Deputy G2. Once MG
FAST became the C2, I went to C2 Operations and eventually became the C2 Chief of Staff. I traveled to Abu Ghraib
approximately five times from early October to Late January before I departed country on 6 Feb. My visits were related to
checking on the support for CACI contracted personnel at the site. I had no relationship with the TITAN Contract, though the
CJTF-7 Language Manager (not the CFLCC contract officer) fell under me. I do not recall who was the particular individual that
had overall responsibility or was the senior TITAN Contractor at Abu Ghraib, if there even was one. My focus from a linguist
.perspective was on getting requirements from the units filled by CFLCC. V Corps was already a user of a CACI contract in placci but it was for force protection, counter terrorism and analytical slots. The vehicle used for the interrogation and screening services in CJTF-7 was under an existing Army contract that CJTF-7 did not have purview of. The contracting office was Fort Huachuca. The first time we began considering expanding the Statement Of Work on the existing contract was in the summer of 2004. The year prior when the TPFDD and the Request for Forces for the war plan were being drawn, we identified a shortage ori HUMINT and Counterintelligence assets to conduct Corps and Division level operations. We identified the shortage and FORSCOM had already begun the mobilization of numerous reserve units. We knew the reserves' mobilization would most likely! be for one year and ultimately we had to look at who would replace these units. As the ground phase of the war ended and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) began, the pace of raids and number of captured personnel was increasing through the summer. The Tactical HUMINT Team and interrogation operations were quickly becoming the "core" of the SASO intelligence effort. The Corps and divisions did not have enough assets to screen and interrogate all detainees being captured in a timely manner to provide actionable intelligence. The demand for interrogation results was intense at times as the leadership struggled with defining the emerging threat. The screening of detainees at the tactical level was not being done due to a shortage in assets. The divisions needed their Tactical HUMINT Teams out with the maneuver assets, gathering intelligence for their next operation/raid. Detainees would arrive at the theater interrogation facility without proper screening, no background data, etc, making interrogation difficult. Around July 03 we began looking at options for future MI resources/rotations. We held a mid level conference and knew there were minimal HUMINT assets available long term because they had already been mobilized (and pending demobilization in about 6-8 months), or committed to other operations such as OEF. We began looking at the option of possibly filling the HUMINT and CI shortages at static locations such as division/theater interrogation facilities with civilian
contract services to augment the military personnel. The Theater rro ati facili was in Baghdad International Airport
(BIAP), Camp Cropper at the time. Once time at Cropper, myself and some other senior
interrogators sat down to discuss the possibility of integrating civilian contractors (former interrogators and screeners) into the
operation. Everyone agreed it made sense and_ evelo s ent of work (SOW). I also discussed the concept
with 205th MI Brigade personnel, specifically_ he and oche on the C2 staff such as COL
BOLTZ. I worked the SOW and would discuss it wi as we went through versions. The
SOWs were actually for more than screening and interrogations. n June, V orps was not y staffed to become the CJTF-7
and did not have the resources required. Within the C2, Coalition partners began giving us staff but we didn't get any significant
fill from other services for months, with the exception of the USMC. For instance, we did not have an officer really qualified to
be a G2XJC2X until late September. It was a hectic time. Many in CJTF-7 looked to contracting solutions to provide services.
As examples, we needed to stand up an open source analysis cell, which started with reserve component personnel and ultimately
transitioned to contractors; the same with our SSO shop and locally employed persons (LEP) screening effort. For instance, we
developed the concept to hire LEP screeners for vetting local nationals being employed by the US military (as done in the Balkans)
so that some military CI assets could be freed for operational missions. At previously stated, the number of enemy personnel
being detained by units was too large for the assets on the ground (and growing), and the detainees were often not being screened
or processed fast enough. Often when the detainees came in to Camp Cropper, many were being dropped off without any
paperwork. This was often due to the lack of resources at the divisional and below levels. We looked at using co c services as
databasers/analysts, screeners and interrogators to help alleviate this shortfall. The package we put together for
10. EXHIBIT 1. INIT1 S ERSON MAKING STATEMENT
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING 'STATEMENT Of TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM Of EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE WMALS Of THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.
DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 DA FORM 2823, JUL 72, IS OBSOLETE NAPA 11110

AGO 000676
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DARMSTADT, GE _ amp 2004105/14
TARN AT

I STATEMENT OF
STAMM:11T .fCateessU

was for approximately 5 x screens's. 3 x interrogators, and 2 x analysts/datsbaseas. For the theater level, we needed
^iviaio. n
analyau. The sows were staffed
more mterrogators, so the package was approxmmately 6 x screeners, money for the contract wasin July. The final approval for the SOW and funding was the DCG, • • • • review all resumes and would
receive the first hires in • -,, ;.
MIPRed in Au or me, for those that met the required skills as specified in the =ram There were manyforward to
resumes the not even cons a due to lack of skills required, and rejected by CACI without sending to us. We did specify
, valid clearance etc, and that employees fell underin the SOW employees had to have the right skills such as pnor I reviewed the resumes as a QC; I couldlocal twat SOPs, regulations, etc for interroption operations. Both . — — w • -.• was the only one who reviewednever say 100% because life downrange was hectic and busy.
a HUMINT professional. We
4 I •• . •'
the resume -sueh was the personal and professional relationship I had . • ,..• It ae.. Iand clearance validation. I do not know if
would approve the individual to co= to theater based on the resume quahCACI actually conducted imenriews with those meeting the requirements. The contract did not specify that interview had to be . done. Those hired would travel to a CRC where they would receive their equipment andiraining. (I do Dot kocnv what tbe speci
was but would assume tbe Geneva Convention was covered as a general topic). I did meet with the
training •
205th 5-3 and I had a daily relationship on a range of issues) ale discussed the integration of the
contract() t o units, from both a suppo rational standpoint. I believe it was clear that the contractorsor I did the same.with the Divisions. Once in theater, the first green
. If flk
belonged to the unit, and worked for the unit.
suiter they saw was usually when they arrived to the .".•rted unit, because usually the contract country manager on sue was dlr.: who met them first at BIA.P and arranged movement to the unit. We told the units that the contractors were just iffiotha asset
ono
that belonge4 to them; sirnilar in concept w the individual augmemee military imaroptars that came from other commands. I 'wow there was a 20Sth MI Brigade training propam at Abu Ghraib. but I do not kixow its content. The contract did not specify how a contractor could be fired or what steps needed to be taken. If someone left, I tried to find out why, but I cannot say that
was always the case or always possible. I also can't say that I actually sat down with 205th leadership and laid out how the firing process went if any contractor did not perform to standard. But I believe they knew to go to me if there ever was a problem that could not be resolved on site - we (the Bde and the G2/C2 staff) were a close team. I only know of one individual fired due to her questionable suitability, and that was a staff position. and I directed the firing based on statanents provided by the stdf section supervisor. She made inappropriate sexual comments, lacked the appropriate clearance and refused to respect military rank. She did not follow the CACI rules of conduct, and CACI took swift acuon to remove her. There was an analyst who was reponed by the unit chain (302d MI BN) to have used alcohol one nigh! (before the CACI rules of conduct were established); that individual was appropriately reprimanded by CACI, with my full Icnowledge and approval or their action. I have no other knowledge of any problems with. performance of CACI employees. There were some who abound up and saw the austere conditions and quit. That was not at all unprecedented, because we were used to TITAN linguisu quitting all the time because of the conditions since the beginning of the war. CACI did move some personnel between sites due to minor issues such as internal personality disputes, or to balance out teams between theater and divisions. However, I was never made aware of any pmblems with co Ghraib regarding their conduct or performance from CACI or the unit chain of command. Feedback that I gotand COL Pappas was always good regarding their performance . I can say that when I visited Abu Gbraib, my you didn't get a good feeling. I didn't see many mid level icadership or above oa the MP's side. Conditicms were vay antere, with seemingly lax &county/standards. I did have complaints from the contract scmeners that they sometimes bad to do prisoner escort, when the detainees initially arrived at the holding arca and were being y are not required to do) and wanted to be armed for self defense. I reported the issue tc. COL PAPPAS they raolved it. I also informed the C2, BG(P) Fast, At the time I left Iraq, the issue of arming contract n was still ualer consideration, penclin,g theater policy. The MI personnel I interfaced with were very pro extraordinary conditions. 1 believe COL PAPPAS and staff were doing their u ost to • one of the hardest working individuals there, a real professional. Regan did a g intuitive feeling about what he was doing sometimes, though nothing tangible. F took me dotted the facility and I lett thinking, -Is he really an MP or is he MI (I later found out he was CA. former MI)7" He seemed to spend an inordinate amouss of time concerned with detention operations, vice interrogation. There were some professional issues between him and COL PAPPAS.
I COL PAPPAS never came out and told me. but through ty, I knew there was some tension between the two, but do not believe it was related to inappropriate behavior represented himself as limning interrogation operations and we all understood that was at Abu Ghrai . At some point (around DEC 04) COL PAPPAS made it known that he was not comfortable wi I helped facilitate the move from Abu Ghraib to job within the C2.
Q. Do you have anything e O statement?
A. No.
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FF 'DAVIT
, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE I, AND ENOS ON PAGE
FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF NE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PARE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION U' 91 OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.
ture tement)
WITNESSES: Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by few to
aciinsruster oaths. Om 14th day of MAY 2004 ,
at DARMSTADT. GERMANY

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
SOnmar• at Prsan Admas
(Type Mow of Pawn Adowstenag Oath)
UCMJ, ARTICLE 136
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS lAurbanty To Admeostor Oaths
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING ST PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES
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