Fay Report Annex: DOD Interview re: Conditions at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility

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DISCLOSURE: 3. TIME 4. FILE NUMBER
IYYYYNIAADDI
I 2. DATE
1. LOCATION
2004/06/18
CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ
7. GRADPSTATOS
6 SSN
NAME. MIDDLE NAME COL
B. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS OSJA, MNF-I
9. WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

on 17 June 2004. 1 was the senior Legal Advisor to LTG
1 was interviewed by MG FA e ber discussing the need for a CJTF-7 command

ay
SANCHE7. from 15 lune 2003
interrogation policy was after MG MILLER's visit to CJTF-7 in late August and early September 2003.We had questions about
then from subordinate units, but we didn't begin to formulate a C1 - • •• •• • • • •1i _ . during

interrogations come up before
on

their visit to CJTF-7, and I attended the MG Miller team in-brief in the C2 office. There was .: .• • ..1. ..•••.. ..•• •
need for CJTF-7 to approach interrogations from the operational versus tactical level.
methods we discussed the difference between GTMO and Iraq, including the fact that the Geneva

methods and approac
When I sat down with ell . II • •.• • on interrogation techniques, and

• 1111
ers and 1 felt that we needed to have a
Conventions applied in . length. I believe that MG
•
several of my officers discussed GTMO's experience with such a policy wi .t. •• 1 O ' • 11 I . Si counter-resistance policy. We
MILLER's visit was the genesis for the development and drafting of the C.I •
started working in concen with officers from the C2 and the 205th MI Brigade on drafting the policy.

While A Company, 519th MI BN may have had its own policy. I do not believe that it was the A/519th policy we used.as the
basis for our policy. To the extent there was a source document, I believe that it was the DOD memorandum pertaining to GTMO
that bad been published in the spring of 2003. We used the DOD cover memorandum and modified it as our own. My action

MI officers to review the approaches and scrubbed them to ensure compliance with the Geneva Conventions.
officers worked with
the Al519th document and used it, along with other comparative sources, to develop the CJTF-7 command policy. I
We saw where the document had come from and why a company had its own policy. 1
remember seeing the A/519th policy and asking
assume that some of the other interrogation units had their own policies or simply used what was in Field Manual 34-52. This use
of various policies was one of the major reasons why the recommendation that CJTF-7 needed one command policy was
compelling My office took input from the Field Manual. various policies, and MI officers and drafted the 14 September 2003
Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy. It was tater updated in the 12 October 2003 policy, which remained in effect for 7

before the final October policy. As the drafts were reviewed, there were commentsmonths. There were drafts that were staffed
concerning how effective certain approaches were and whether our policy should list specific approaches at all. 1 believe that Ml
doctrine suggests that use of approved approaches should be left to the imagination of the interrogatot, while ensuring that the

appropriate controls were in place to stay within the bounds of the Geneva Conventions. I am not sure you can get everyone to
agree precisely when otherwise approved and lawful approaches go outside the bounds of the Conventions, but that is why the
command has policies and oversight, why there is doctrine, and why there are reviews of interrogation plans. I °ellen it is
possible that the guys at the bottom weren't looking at the policy that we had issued from the top.

We provided the 14 September policy to CENTCOM and received comments through our legal technical channels. We also
received input from the MI community. We modified the policy and published the 12 October policy. I am the author of the 12
October Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy. I am responsibile for the policy document. It came out of my office. We

wrote and typed the verbiage and I walked it in for CO signature. The military intelligence expertise came from the Military
Intelligence community and I believe they are the ones who provided the input that came from their manuals.
The subject of denying detainees clothing puzzles me. Stripping a detainee to coerce or humiliate him is prohibited. While
interrogators must control the environment. this must be done while maintaining the floor, the minimum requirements, of the

Manual or the
Conventions. The leadership and those reviewing the interrogation plans should catch anything that violates the Field Geneva Conventions. Now 1 go back and look at our policy and 1 ask myself if anyone might have misinterpreted or misunderstood what we wrote. The use of dogs is an example. Military working dogs cart be used for security. If they were present in the cellblock for security purposes or on the grounds for crowd control or bomb-sniffing, they are not subject to our policy. However, if they are to be part of art interrogation approach, then their use would be restricted by the policy and subject to all of the safeguards and approvals. I doubt that any request to bring dogs into an interrogation booth as part of an interrogation approach would be approved because of issues of coercion and safety. Segregation is keeping a detainee separated from the
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9. STATEMENT !Continued)
general population for security or to prevent collusion. Segregation is also used to separate officer and enlisted POWs. males and females. adults and juveniles. Although often used interchangeably and not defined in the policy, it is different than isolation. It isbe coercive. Segregation in excess of 30 days required CG approval.
to
not solitary confinement and cannot be done
If a detainee was placed in a dark, dank room for purposes of setting conditions for interrogation, it should have been laid out in the interrogation plan and all those leaders reviewing the interrogation plans should have said, 'wait a minute, this doesn't look right." I agree that both MI and MP should have known what was going on in the facility. COL PAPPAS worked tirelessly trying to get the place running to appropriate standards and I have observed him to be a very conscientious officer. People were on edge and under pressure in the September/October/November time frame. In the Fall of 2003, CJTF-7 was under intense pressure not only as to interrogation operations, but also as to the production of intelligence in general. I cannot recall ever discussing this with LTG SANCHEZ, but I do recall conversations with officers at the Colonel level stating that the boss or the C2 had just received a call from D.C. in reference to intelligence production. I recall everyone being very tired by this time, and a lot of activity was going on We all seemed to be under a lot of pressure. but that is part of being in combat for a sustained period. 1 do not reca
CENTCOM pressuring us for intelligence.
In the simmer and early Fall of 2003, there was an enormous problem in getting supporting documentation when a detainee was
captured. CJTF-7 wrote and published enters and policies on how to tag personnel, and how to document the circumstances of
capture. In May or June, we produced detailed capture forms and an accompanying training package. Compliance in the field was
uneven at best. Between March and November 2003, we would commonly have prisoners with sparse documentation. This was a
problem consistently addressed by the command. Eventually, we published orders that said we would not accept detainees without
proper documentation, including sworn statements. It is correct that the biggest problem with documents, numbers and pushback

was 4ID.
RELEASE BOARD: This Board was called the Review and Appeal Board and began in August 2003. At the beginning the files coming to the Release Board were thin. They would sometimes include an incomplete capture tag or CPA apprehension form, and sometimes a sworn statement, and sometimes a seemingly random assembly of MI documents. MG FAST was the Board President and expressed great frustration at the lack of documentation available, particularly Ml documents. The recorder would put together a Board file for plenary session review by the Board members. Adjunct members from MI, MP and CID would attend so the Board had as complete a picture of the detainee as possible. At first, it was very difficult to assess the detainee files. The Review and Appeal Board looked at security internee files only. There were two Boards and the other one dealt with criminal
detainees. BG KARPINSKI chaired the Criminal Detainee Release Board.
The Review and Appeal Board would base its decision on the information on the capture tag or CPA apprehension form, Ml documents, sworn statements if available, and on the judgement of its members. Even if a person was no longer of intelligence value, they could still pose a threat to Coalition Forces or security. At the beginning, the Board went through a learning and maturation process on how to manage risk. We had no experience base or historical data/demographics to fall back on. Insofar as
know, this was the first time since WWII. then using customary law and the Hague Regulations, that this type of Board was
I
established. In the Fall of 2003, the insurgency became a real issue, the security situation worsened, and we found ourselves in a in attacks from the Former Regime Elements and they were becoming more
more dangerous tune. There was an increase
organized. Intelligence became more critical, both enemy attacks and our offensive operations increased, and the security internee population mushroomed. The Board was trying to find an appropriate balance between release and security, and we took the side of security. We did not want to take a chance based on what we didn't know. Unfortunately, we didn't know much from an intelligence standpoint, at least early on. At times there were no screening sheets and the only thing we had was a capture tag stating that a detainee was captured during a raid of a former regime cell. We would return the file for more MI input and would request that the interrogator talk to the detainee to obtain more information. Despite the difficulties, the Board system wasundergoing constant improvement and reviewed thousands of cases, releasing the majority of detainees considered by.the Boards.
After a couple of months of Boards, we created more mechanisms to push cases through this process. In October, the Detainee Assessment Board started sending the Board cases of persons who were deemed of no further intelligence interest. We created pre-screening panels of MI, Judge Advocate and MP officers. We devoted increased resources to the problem, all taken out of hide. In the SJ A section alone, we had ten personnel doing detention operations. which is not our task or mission, and for which we are not resourced. By the beginning of November, the Board was meeting more frequently and General Officer members were replaced by field grade officers so that the Board could meet for longer periods of time and more often. By February, the Board was meeting six days a week, all day, with permanent members. By January 2004 I think all of us involved in the detainee area knew that we had to change the Boards philosphy and predisposition from retaining detainees to releasing detainees. I proposed that we take steps to change the Board's release philosophy and the CG agreed, authorizing these changes with the implementation of the full-time Board in February. At the same time, however, we continued to have tremendous push back from some commanders in the field. There would be a huge outcry if the Board released one perceived bad guy among thousands of releases. The CG issued command policy memoranda and orders, and I did a presentation at the commander's conference, concerning the need to treat all persons, including detainees, with dignity and respect. The preientation, as well as our published Rules for Conduct in Combat on which all Soldiers were to be trained, emphasized that Soldiers were to use judgment and discretion in detaining civilians, and were to detain civilians only when necessary and authorized by the ROE. The CG suessed precision.
focused raids.
ICRC: I was not present at Abu Ghraib during the [CRC visit in October 2003 and, insofar as I know, nobody from the CJTF-7 headquarters or my office was present at the ICRC out-brief. Usually, one of my officers or I would attend the out-brief on ICRC
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were
tcoorrwee0
camp visits. We met with the ICRC periodically at their Baghdad headquarters until it was bombed and then the meetings
0. STATEMENT the CPA Office
e. often occurring at CPA. Attendees would include officers from my office. 800th MP Brigade, PMO and
always possible. Throughout 2003. allGen
of General Counsel. We tried to have an MI officer attend as well. although this was not
to the commander or subordinate commanders of the 800th MP Brigade. SIA received a copy of
essed to LTG SANCHEZ were given to me and 1 would prepare the respome for him.
ICRC reports were addressed i addressed ,' woe responded to orally and the 1CRC did not desire or expect a amenon specific tonics
reports. Abu Ghraib was transmitted by cover letter dated
Many of the ICRC reports. called "woriung utas to
ramoom from the camp commanders. The 1 C report of the Octoberrigsdier General KARPINSKI. I believe that it was given to one of my officers by the
12 through
' the ICRC held on 16 November. 1 'ow on leave from
2003 and w
12Nove
an analysis of the report on 25 November. Two days
Protection Delegate at view, On December, a
ICRC mber 4
November and one of -2 and the 800th MP Brigade for re ten
30 out to the order to discuss the report. 1 did not atd the
tater. my office sent the analysis and by MP, MI mad legal personnel in
meeting was held at A attended the meeting. In mid-Dember. the draft respoose was sent by my officeio the by
The Brigade has as own SM mend legal section, and is, of course. commanded
meeting. I believe rdition , but I don't know if the Brigade made changes to the final
800th MP Brigade for
a Brigadier General. 1 recall seeing drafts of the response in
the oaae couldn't believe it. I spoke toproduct. General KARPINSIG
report uniform reaction was
When 1 saw the ICP. at A .0 Cibralb and
wt tffi
Judge Advocates and MI *Me Deputy Commander of the 205th MI Brig
old not be I talking ate of the 205th MI Brigade, all of whom I know to
the C ' the statement was
remember a conversa
ous g that the SKI. e
made that the allegations Were crazy, because or
In hindsight. I regret not having tale had taken place in November, we would have notified CID a
ted the abuse we subsequesuly discovered because it
The ICRC next visited Abu Geraib during the period 4 through Blamer/ 2004 and, compared to
the Fourth Geneva.
month earlier than we did.
October, it was a good visit. The ICRC positively commented on improvements. Invoking Article 143 ofwere undergoing active interrogator& but
Convention. we did not allow the ICRC to have private interviews with II internees who
did allow the ICRC delegate.to see the detainees. observe the conditions of tbeir detention. and obtain their names and Internee
interviews in future visits, and this was done. The nig ht Serial Numbers. We informed the 1CRC that they we found females and criminal detainees commingled with hernia the ICRC visit. I went to the Hard Site with the detainees there for cue of security and observation.
ight. This
J ets on the I A side. The MPs stated and that the detainees had to be moved mat n
and 1 told them that this violated the Geneva Convention
. s there anything else you would like to add to this .sutement1 A. No.
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AFFIDAVIT
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