Sworn statement of an interviewee who was assigned to AG in early August 2003.
Interviewee generally described Sanchez's frustration regarding detainee operations situation and other miscellaneous detainee operations issues.
SWORN STATEMENT
For uss or this form, ass AR 19046; this or000nont Army is ODCSOPS
DATE TIME i FILE NUMBER
LOCATION NMF;I HQ, Iraq GRADEISTATUS
1SOCIAL S
_LAST NAME, FIRST .NAME, MIDDLE NAME -0-8/USA
I
ORGANIZATION OfTADDRESS
MNF•I, DCSOPS
-
WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
the 4th or 5211. I did not discuss the ccasolidation of operations at the Baghdad
1 arrived in recti -2003, possibly--until mid to late October. I
Central Correctional Facility with/General Sanchez at that time. We did not discuss interroptions
don't recall sitting down with eithir General Fast or General Sanchez to discuss interrogations until that time. I was more
involved with the force protection aspect of the correctional facility,•eoncentrating on the quick reaction force and counter
battery fire, ibinpof that nature. Most of these discussions were with General Wodjakowskii Myself and Genera}
Wodfokowskiltad numerous conversations concerning the security of the facility. As foriGagral Sanchez tiling frustrated in
frame
the October time frame, I did not see that. The first sign of frnstration that I witnessed vies not until the January timearticulated
t being
-
General Sanchez was frustrated at the cloudy picture as a whole. The picture of,"who is my enemy" was no
the sole
to him to his satisfaction. However, interrogation and detainee operations were only part of that frustration and not
reason for it. Sometime after the new year, General Sanchez talked to me directly at a staff meeting and
of results concerning the entire detainee operations and asked, "who is bringing this together?'
with lack
responded by saying that he was the guy, and I told General Sanchez that I was the PMO's supervisor and1 needed someone senior
in charge. This happened just before the incidents became known. I toltVGeneral Ryder.that we neededoperations because we didn't have the experts. We Deeded an 0-6 or and 0-7 and a Mobil Training Ttcam,did not have the expertise. General Sanchez never spoke to me about the counter resistance policy, nor did Intelligence implications as far as interrogafions operations is concerned. The 4th Infantry Division was extremely active, they
were conducting very aggressive offensive operations. The volume of detainees being collected by them high, that nibeing
tilt -highest
conducting operations in a very hostile envtronment and their operational tempo was
said, they were ther one of recalunit. I -
l that from
theater i have never heard of the, "50 meter" rule, concerning the oth Infantry Division or any o
mid-October on. there were discussions concerning the release of detainees. General Sanchez was concerned that maybe thewhat they should be as for the release of the detainees. Major General Fast and General Sanchez discussed
procedures were not
the "board issue" on a number of occasions. Not enough of the detainees were being released, General Sanchez accused to be frustrated at the lack of progress with the situation. Some of the problem seemed to bc that the division holding areas werebecoming too full and they needed the detainees to be moved out, that meant sending them to the Baghdad Central.Cormetional facility. Another problem was that when a detainee was released the commanders in that particular sector did not want them released in their area of operations. As for the force protection posture at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, I don't
believe that there was more of a threat there than in any of the forward operating bases and every reasonable step to provide security for the troops and the detainees was taken. Given the dynamic nature of the population in that area of Iraq and the
to protect
forces it is no wonaer that there were a number' of attacks. There are not enough resources
hostility towards coalition
every facility 100 percent of the time, the tactics being used in that area were constantly looked at and adjusted to the dinging situation. One example was the extra radar coverage in the area. This and other steps were taken to secure the facility. Constant tactical attention was given to the facility with General Wojdakowski being personally involved. The Division was given more bank space to better support the area, someone was always working it. I do not know who made the decision to
//////////////MUMMUMM//////////////////////////////// 1///1//
use that particular facility.(Baghdad Central Correcuonal Facility).
Do you have anything to add to this statement?
INITIALS PERSON MAKING STATEMENTExHOT-PAGE 1 OF-0 PAGES
CONTINUED.'
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING 'STATEMENT OF _TAKEN AT_DATED_
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND RE INITIALED OF PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL OE LINED OUT. AND THE
AS "PAGE
STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.
USAPIPC V3.00
SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 68, WHICH WILL BE USED.
DA FORM 2823, JUL 72
AGO 000544
DOD 000632
ICOnlint.imil
STATEMENT
AFFIDAVIT
, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT 1111111111.10
I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGEWHICH BEGINS .
EACH PAGE
BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.
(Signature of Pstson Making Statement!
Subacfroad and sworn to ballots me. a person authotizad by law to WITNESSES. administer oaths, the-day of
-19 at
(Stratum of Person AdministerMg Oath)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(Typed Mow of Person Adrnwrisrartng Dora, fAumorng To Admires:re DarMO
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESSINITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
111APPC V2.00
AG0000545
DOD 000633