Fay Report Annex: DOD Interview re: Conditions at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility

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rrived in Iraq, early August 2003, possibly the 4th or 5th. I did not discuss the consolidation of operations at Baghdad Central Correctional Facility with General Sanchez at that time. We did not discuss interrogations until mid to late October, I don't recall sitting down with either General Fast or General Sanchez to discuss interrogations until that time. 1 was more involved with the force protection aspect of the correctional facility, concentrating on the quick reaction force and the counter battery fire, things of that nature. Myself and General Wodjakowski ; had numerous conversations concerning the security of the facility. As for General Sanchez being frustrated in the October time frame, I did not see that. The first sign of frustration that 1 witnessed was not until the January time frame, General Sanchez was frustrated at the cloudy picture as a whole. The picture of.. 'who is my enemy", was not being articulated to him to his satisfaction. However, Interrogation and detainee operations were only part of that frustration and not the sole reason for it. In mid January 2004:General Sanchez, at a staff meting voiced his frustration with the
rations situation and said something on the Order of, "so who in the staff is bringing all this together?' Our
• tated that he bad staff responsibility, and I followed up by saying that since 1 supervised the PMO that I
• sue. Approximately one week later I e-mailed General Ryder and requested his assistance because I felt we did not have the proper expertise on the staff with regards to detainee operations. This resulted in two formal requests; (1) dated 16 January 2004, for a MobilTraining Team for military corrections specialists, and (2) dated 29 January 2004, requesting a detention operations cell to augment the PMO staff. General Sanchez never spoke to me about the counter resistance policy, nor did we discuss military intelligence implications as far as interrogations is concerned The 4th Infantry Division was extremely active, they were
conducting very aggressive offensive operationt The volume of detainees being collected by them was high, that being said, they were conducting operations in a very hostile environment and their operational tempo was one of the highest in theater. I have never heard of the, "50 meter rule", concerning the nth Infantry Division or any other unit. 1 recall that from mid October on, there were discussions concerning the slow release of detainees. ¦Cieneral Sanchez was concerned that maybe the procethires were not what they should be as for the release of the detainees. Generals Fast and Sanchez discussed the, -board issue' on a number-of occasions.' Some of the problem seemed to be that the cilVISIOn holding areas were becoming too full and needed the detainees to be moved out, that meant to the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility. Another problem was that when a detainee was released the commanders in that particular sector did not want them to be released in their area of operations. As for the force protection
posture at the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility, I don't believe that there was more of a threat there than in any of the forward operating bases and every reasonable step to provide security for the troops and the detainees was taken. The tactics being used in that area were constantly looked at and adjusted to the changing situation. One example was the extra radar coverage in the area. This and other steps were taken to secure the '.,.: Ai k. i , .1: , , ,,,, :.i.ti...:i attention was given to the facility. I do not know who made the decision to use that particular facility. . .1 •I• ..i Liii.. , f. 0.,-icc11.-.;,.i; I „::::111 ,..• . . -•.• .. . ,.: •• •• — -•• ; Uta vtiu have anything to add to this statement? • • .. 111111111111111111111111111111111111
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