Interviewee, an AR 15-6 Investigating Officer. The interviewee briefly referred to two violations, one involving a claim of abuse by two female detainees. The women's claim was not described by the interviewee, but they claimed abuse by three male interrogators. The interviewee only stated that the interrogators failed to follow interrogation rules. The second violation involved a female interrogator, the interviewee could not recall the specifics of the incident.
SWORN STATEMENT
F ., use of this 1 0, se. AR 190.45; 'hp proponent agency is ODCSOPS
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
THORITY.
Tint. I0 USC Section 301; Tina 5 USC Section 2951; E.D. 9397 dated November 22. 1943
eRINCIPAL PURPOSE: Toiprowide commandoes and law enforcement officials with means by which information may
be accurately ioentilied. ROUTINE USES: V Dur
social security number is used as an additional/anemia. means of identification to facilitate Ming
and retrieval. DISCLOSURE: Oisclosure (31 your social security number is voluntary.
1. LOCATION 2. DATE TYYYYMMDO) 3. TIME
• FILE NUMBER
Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342 2004/02/11 1800
ME, MIDDLE NAME O. SSN
7. GRADE/STATUS
COL/0-6
B. ORGANIZATION OR DRESS
HHD, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, APO AE 09096
WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH
t was interviewed
by Mann General Taguba, an AR 15-6 Investigating Officer from CFLCC, on 9 February 2004 concerning detairee operations at CJTF-7 and allegations of detainee abuse at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib. The purpose of this statement is to pros idc a written record of that conversation by highlighting and amplifying key areas of discussion Including comunand and control, the nature of detainee operations, and the relationship between intelligence and military police at the FOB. As a caveat, the instances or detainee abuse under investigation occurred before !assumed command of the FOB. This statement
must be understood (ruin that perspective.
Command and Control at the FOB was a complex intermingling of four distinct essential
tasks under the command of two separate brigaoes, the 205th Military Intelligence Bngadc and the 800th Military Police Brigade. These essential tasks included: detention operations and monitoring, the conduct of operational and strategic interrogations of key
coalition detainees, providing assistance to the Iraq Bureau of Prisons in establishing and running a maximum security prison, and enhancing force protection for the
approximately 1000 service members and civilians assigned to Abu Ghraib. Detailed information about the forward operating
base and its tenant units is provided in the attached briefing (enclosure 1). In light of mortar attacks where both soldiers and
-ietainces were killed, the FOB had taccal control
) of f es I lied to twosi
_uslizajasks: force protection a -a tnee securii (enclosure T. The 32018—Military Police (MP) atm ion (13n) was Charged with ex ention operations
t e .
is included assignment of detainees to internment camps, the establishment of standards for internment facilities,
me training and regulation of guards, transportation of detainees throughout the theater, and the establishment of policy and
procedure relative to rest (dement operations. Likewise, they bad the responsibility for reporting of detainees through the
National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and the forward of Serious Incident Reports (SIR) concerning detainees. The
CTTF-7 jlaff Judge Advocate • te's Cell was charged with developing systems to review the status of detainees, ensure
they were given appropriate hearings, Antic c 78 appeals, and status reviews. The F-7 SJA had the lead in facilitating visits
by the International Cununittee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The Joint Interrogation and e ne mg Cege7PMC) totlgi the
2,Q5th MI Bde, was charged with executing interrtlations at the FOB. The Commander. CJTF-7 set forth the ra ting
parameters Or ihe J1DC ten:lusure 3). Priontization of interrogations was determined by the interrogation
Targeting Bog/stand
cot u,, ,tryu.)r 2057711 Bde.
In .i vert real sense,
eve rvine working at Abu Ghraib is involved in "detainee operations." Abu Ghraib. also known by MPs as
me Baghdad Central Curt ectional Facility (BCCF), currently holds over 6500 detainees. Over 5500 of these are in direct U.S
custody
Just over 1300 of these are of intelligence interest to the coalition. The FOB exists to house these detainees•and
tacit 'laic intetrogathi;7There are threellanc components of "detainee operations" that include detention, interrogation, and
release s • c u ryisti in c I these
functions is provided by the Provost Marshal, the C2 and the Staff Judge Advocate
iseipuell ¦ ety iniiirtunate•ls. this split responsibili for detainee operations increased the pressure at lower levels and blurred
lines ril •• sr Inn r an q the FOB provi.e• • I, • a pe (;)u•uinput, as a • in the
Ili;UMItIn nn .amunand and control, poke and task execution was conducted alongu
functionalulines through functional
commands. As .1 lc stilt animal all or • ex fie ce-mutraince opeTations comes trom the interrogafion perprErriq7The details
•Ter-11917arr. :pet:list. Jr,. pri•vided b ow.
Pulls: s•-• I • 1 .
eiltiro est.hltshed by the JIDC relative to detainee operations were ac d as the res of it
triol I ry Nililli:r thi.: court sa
riTir Of Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay. During is visit ner., .1-ocused no tour key
?rre7s-.
—TaTtlirenitc integration. synchronization and fusion: analysis: interrogation: and detention open ions. During his visit he
intik:1rd .t written tepol.I.
which is provided in this statement (enclosure 4) 1
have also provided his in-brief (enclosure 5), hisiiut•hi lei icialiisip. (» .itut .i draft update for the Secretary of Defense (enclosure 7). The key findings of his visit were that the
1 INITI
SON MAKING S1 ATEMEN PAGE OF PAGES
,fEADING -STA rEmENT OF T4KEN A7 _. DA TEC
,,,.;(35 EifiR
THE INTTIALS OF THE ?EASON AAATCING
.S7s3 TEMEN7. 4NO PA , MBEP
t.)A4 I urtM It fits:
1 998 DA FORM 2823. JUL 72. IS OBSCLETE
AG0000532
DOD 000620
USE THIS PAGE F NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED. PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FOAM.
OF OMR TAKEN AT Victory Base. Iran DATED 2004102/I
9. STATEMENT (C¦ oumlureT
interrogators and analysts, develop a set of rules and limitations to :uide Interco tions. and provide dedicated MPs to
Su rt of
interro ati As a result
rements for Nuns wer request ortortes F) And a joint manning document (JMD). All reconnnendaticeu were implemented with the exception of dedicated MP
super. •
The basic rules for interrogation operations arc contained in Army Regulation 34-52, Interrogation Operations. The standards for
t. ct of intern
torandum dated S Oct 10 3 Subject: C.ITF-7 rnTerrogation and
Counter-Resistance •obey (refer to enclosure ) that were Its c _ . tams entry Command. These rules provide the
left and right limit
Despite de articulation of clear rules. there were two violations of these standards that were brought to my attention prior p my
ass:mention of • •of rah
nit the incident that precipitated this investigation. The first of these was reported to me bythe MPrrilarly October.
e incident involved two female detainees and three male interrogators. The three seldiers accusedof detainee abuse were renioveernemi -men-
unerrogsnon positions and I asked CID to investigate because of the potentialexplosive nature of the incident. The investigation was unable to show beyond a reasonable doubt that detainee abuse occurred.However, it did show that these interrogators failed to follow established procedures for interrogation, constituting dereliction of duty. Each of the three soldiers involved was given punishment under Article 15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(enclosure 8).
Punishment was posed by me. he second instance involved a female ungrogamr. It was reported to me by
4-...tf. the then !MC Deputy Dire
ecall the specifics of this incident but the interrogator was removed
r--.).‘ from her position as an unerrog •r an• re
or additional training. Long after the I was made awareof some additional allegations of abuse in an ICRC re t (enclosure 9). These allegatio
e y with some of the
allegations brought to my attention by CID in anaary.1r Afe
f41."
_u theftsulksalmnsjaLajause. the leadership at the JIDC decided to implement a more aggressive policy of ensuring that
rt-tr
their personnel were aware of all the limitations surrounding interrogation operations. All soldiers wbo conduct interrogations arc
•equirtd to sign a memorandum that they understand the rules and agree to abide by them. A blank copy of the agreement isovided (enclosure 10). Additionally, prior to starting work
at the interrogation facility each person assigned undergoes training
familiarize them with the facility and operations at Abu Gttrat This training is conducted by the section leader. A copy of. the training slides is provided as well (enclosure ll ) Finali). to have a reminder of the interrogation rules of engagement ((ROE)
as well as other important information the JIDC created a wall wt
blow u of the IROE and . •
r
Sanc hez. Ev . ., a. a . . t
I CSC "' on .
t y enter an cave the JIDC facility. Pictures of the
wall are prove e (enclosure 12)
corneum
con .1. id and control inhere in detainee
rations makes the inter. tionshi s sm.organizations extremeiv lomonani an• contentious. aespue a genuine commitment on 4. • o seniors at brigade leve to make
tneretartorump work,
in•re were several areas ortnction ¦Netween 320th MP
-Bn and the J DC. There were significantdiffernces in standards hetween the two units in major areas, such as allowing local nationals to live in the billets. uniform
standards, and the saluting policy
In comlusion. in response to a request of the investigating officer.1 would make two recommendations as a result or my
experience and the incidents that occurred. First, ensure that.MPs supporting the interrogation mission are attached to
the JIDC
so they art be better sensitized to the rules of interrogations and provide additional value added to the interrogation process.
Secoml. iF the desire of the task force is to put detainee operations under the purview of one commander at
commander Abu Ghraib, that
mum have mining in detention operations. interrogation operations. and detainee release procedures. The commandrelationship between the FOB cnnunander and subordinate units should be OPCON. the officer should not have additional
command responsibilities and the level of responsibility probably
//mix.vhirillpm necessitates a General Officer. NOTHING FOLLOWS //////Illi
.Ia;T1,
ENEAT
PAGE 2 OF PAGES
RAGE .7 DA FORM 282:i DEC 1998
AG0000533
DOD 000621
;STATEMENT 01 TAKEN AT Victory Base. Iraq
DATED 2004/02/ 11
1 . STATEMENT Continued/
NOTHING 1":1)I.LOWS
AFFIDAVIT
WHIT HAVE READ OR HAVE Ht.D READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
NS ON PAGE 1.
AND ENDS ON PAGE__./ • FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADEBY ME THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED
CONTAINING THE ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE
STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD. WITHOUT
THREAT
OF PUNISHMENT AND WITHOUT COERCION,
UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE. 0
(Signature of PelSOil Making Statement)
Subscribed and sworn to
before me.
a person authortZen by law to adrturhstel oaths, This 11Th day ofu
Esa,, „ Z OOS{
OR ;ANIZATION ''R Aoc.R:ss
_u• -1
. k ¦ oscQ
,Typed Name of Person Admorustertng OarAi
¦ 0 Q5 c— ‘0N-4
1 4,ithurity
To Adrninals, Oaths/
FACE 3 OF IS PAGES
•••vC Ju
Or".uO..u/. t, IYya
AGO 000534
DOD 000622