Interviewee, an AR 15-6 Investigating Officer.
The interviewee briefly referred to two violations, one involving a claim of abuse by two female detainees. The women's claim was not described by the interviewee, but they claimed abuse by three male interrogators. The interviewee only stated that the interrogators failed to follow interrogation rules. The second violation involved a female interrogator, the interviewee could not recall the specifics of the incident.
SWORN STATEMENT For use of this fern, soo AR 190-45: tne proponent agency is CDCSOPS
PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301: Tine 5 USC Section 2951: E.O. 9397 dated November 22. 1943 /SSA,/ PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately idanutitte ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of Identification to Willem riling end retrieval.
1. LOCATION 2. DATE IYYYYMMODI Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342 2004/02/11 DISCLOSURE' Disclosure of your social securi ty number is voluntary 1 j 3. TIME 1800 4 FILE NUMBER
b. LAST NA F E, MIDDLE NAME 6. SSN 7. GRADE/STATUS COLO-6
N OR ADDRESS
HHD, 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, APO AE 09096
WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH
11111•1111111,___
1 was interviewed by Major General Taguba, an AR 15-6 Investigating Officer from CFLCC, on 9 February 2004 concerning
detainee operations at CJTF-7 and allegations of detainee abuse at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib. The purpose •t
this statement is to provide a written record of that consersation by highlighting and amplifying key areas of discussion including
command and control, the nature of detainee operations, and the relationship between intelligence and military police at the FOB.
As a caveat, the instances of detainee abuse under investigation occurred before I assumed command of the FOB. This statement
must be understood from that perspective.
Command and Control at the FOB was a complex intermingling of four distinct essential tasks under the command of two separate brigades, the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade and the 800th Military Police Brigade. These essential talks included: detention operations and monitoring, the conduct of operational and strategic interrogations of key coalition detainees, providing assistance to the Iraq Bureau of Prisons in establishing and running a maximum security prison, and enhancing force protection for the , approximately 1000 service members and civilians assigned to Abu Ghraib. Detailed information about the forward operating base and its tenant units is provided in the attached briefing (enclosure 1). In light of mortar attacks where both soldiers and detainees were killed, the FOB had tactical control (TACON) of forces limited to two specified tasks: force protection and detainee security (enclosure 2). The 320th Military Police (MP) Battalion (Bo) was charged with executing detention operation; at the FOB. This included assignment of detainees to internment camps, the establishment of standards for internmen: facilities, the training and regulation of guards. transportation of detainees throughout the theater, and the establishment of policy and procedure relative to resettlement operations. Likewise, they had the responsibility for reporting of detainees through the National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and the forward of Serious Incident Reports (SIR) concerning detainees. The CJTF -7 Staff Judge Advocate Magistrate's Cell was charged with developing systems to review the status of detainees, ensure they were given appropriate hearings, Article 78 appeal:. and status reviews. The CJTF-7 SIA had the lead in facilitating visit. oy the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC;. The Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) through the 205th MI Bde, was charged with executing interrogations at the FOB. The Commander, CJTF-7 set forth the operatuig parameters of the JIDC (enclosure 3). Prioritization of interrogations was determined by the Interrogation Targeting Board and sent directly to the JIDC by 205th MI Bde.
In a very real sense, everyone working at Abu Ghraib Is involved in "detainee operations." Abu Ghraib, also known by MPs as
the Baghdad Central Correctional Facility (BCCF), curomtly holds over 6500 detainees. Over 5500 of these are in direct U.S
custody. lust over 1500 of these are of intelligence interest to the coalition. The FOB exists to house these detainees and
facilitate interrogations. There are three basic components of 'detainee operations" that include detention, interrogation, and
release. Staff supervision of these functions is provided by the Provost Marshal, the C2 and the Staff Judge Advocate respectively. Unfortunately, this split responsibility for detainee operations increased the pressure at lower levels and blurred lines of responsibility. Although command of the FOB provided me knowledge of all aspects and limited input, as lad out in the discussion on command and control, policy and task execution was conducted along functional lines through functional commands. As a result almost all of my experience in detainee operations comes from the interrogation perspective. The detail.s of this perspective are provided below.
Policies and procedures established by the JIDC relative to detainee operations were enacted as the result of a visit by MG
Geoffrey Miller, the commander of Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay. During his visit General Miller focused on four key
areas: intelligence integration. synchronization and fusion: analysts: interrogation; and detention operations. During his visit he
rendered a written report. which is provided in this statement (enclosure 4). ( have also provided his in-brief (enclosure 51. his
out-brief (enclosure 6) and a draft update for the Secretary of Defense (enclosure 7). The key findings of his visit were that the
10. EXHIBIT
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9. STATEMENT (Continutrel
interrogators and analysts, develop a set of rules and limitations to guide interrogations, and provide dedicated MPs to support ofinterrogations. As a result of his visit the task force formed a JIDC. The requirements for manning were bid out in
a request forforces (RFF) and a joint manning document (JMD). All recommendations were implemented with the exception of dedicated NIP
support.
The basic rules for interrogation operations are contained in Army Regulation 34-52. Interrogation Operations. The standards for the conduct of interrogations arc outlined in CJTF7-CG Memorandum dated 5 October 2003. Subject: CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (refer to enclosure 3) that were staffed with United States Central
Command. These rules provide the
left and right limits for interrogators.
Despite the articElation of clear rules, there were two violations of these standards that were brought to my attention prior to my assumption of command of the FOB and the incident that precipitated this investigation. The first of these was repotted to me bythe MPs in early October. The incident involved two female detainees and three male interrogators. The three soldiers accused
of detainee abuse were removed from their interrogauon positions and
I asked CID to investigate because of the potential explosive nature of the incident. The investigation was unable to show beyond a reasonable doubt that detainee abuse occurred However, it did show that these interrogators failed to follow
established procedures for interrogation. constituting dereliction ofduty. Each of the three soldiers involved was given punishment under Article
15 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice(enclosure 8). Punishment was
e second instance involved a female interrogator. It reported to me by
the then JIDC Deputy Director the specifics of this incident but the interrogator was removed
from her position as an interrogator and remanded t.
r additional training. Long after the fact, I was made awareof some additional allegations of abuse in an ICRC report enc osure 9). These allegations track closely with some of theallegations brought to my attention by CID in January
After the first allegations of abuse, the leadership at the UDC decided to implement a more aggressive policy of ensuring that
their personnel were aware of all the
limitations surrounding interrogation operations. All soldiers who conduct interrogations arerequired to sign a memorandum that they understand the rules and agree to abide by them. A blank copy al the agreement is
provided (enclosure 10).
Additionally, prior to starting work at the interrogation facility each person assigned undergoes trainingto familiarize them with the facility and operations
at Abu Gtuaib. This training is conducted by the section leader. A
copy ofthe training slides is provided as well (enclosure I I). Finally. to have a reminder of the interrogation rules of engagement (IROE)
as well as other important information the JIDC created a wall with a blow up of the IROE and applicable memorandums signed by LTG Sanchez. Every person entering the JIDC passes by these items as they enter and leave the JIDC facility. Pictures of the
wall are provided (enclosure 12).
The complex and sometimes confusing command and
-
control inherent to detainee operations makes the inter-relationships among
I organizations extremely important and contentious. Despite a genuine commitment on the part of seniors
at brigade-le"el to make
the relationship work, there were several areas of friction between 320th MP Bn and the JIDC. There were significant
differences in standards between the two units in major areas, such as allowing local nationals to live in the billets, uniform
standards, and the saluting policy.
In conclusion, in response to .
a request of the Investigating officer,' would make two recommendations as a
result of my
experience and the incidents that occurred. First, ensure. that MPs supporting the
interrogation mission are attached to the JIDC
so they can be better sensitized to the rules of interrogations and provide additional value added to the interrogation process
Second, if the desire of the task force is to put detainee operations under the purview of one commander at Abu Ghraib,
that
commander must have training in detention operations, interrogation operations, and detainee release procedures.
relationship between the FOB commander and
The command
subordinate units should be OPCON, Inc officer should not have additional
command responsibilities and the level of responsibility probably necessitates a General Officer. NOTHING FOLLOWS
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NOTHING FOLLOWS
AFFIDAVIT
HAVE HEAD OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
WHICH INS DN PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON RAGE_Z I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED AL_ CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM CF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE TH'S STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD WITHOUT
THREAT OT PUNISHMENT. AND WITHOUT COERCION. UNLAWFUL INFLUENCER UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.
ISInarure of rson Making Statemen
Subscribed and sworn to before me, a Deism authorized by law to adma-I¦ stet oaths. th,a k-r day of rzr,j era., . 200,4 noNACIA,C1 \TLN:Q.
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fi5 Pia r\rarl] IritAls? (Typed Name of Person Admittisianno Oathi
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