Fay Report Annex: DOD Interview of Major General Barbara G. Fast re: Conditions at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility

Interviewee, Barbara G. Fast's sworn statement regarding conditions in AG. MG Fast reported to Combined Joint Task Force 7 on July 29, 2003 assigned to C2 in Badgdad.
Fast's statement provides a general description of AG environment (leadership, training, etc.) Described her own job responsibilities, Miller's visit and GTMO teams at Abu Ghraib. Stated that she did not witness abuse of detainees, stated, "leadership was not ware of this abhorrent behavior... ."

Doc_type: 
Interview
Doc_date: 
Sunday, May 9, 2004
Doc_rel_date: 
Wednesday, March 2, 2005
Doc_text: 

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; T. 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated Neverrier 22.1943 /334.
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcernent officials with mons by which infommtion may be accurst* identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security mintier is used as an additioraliahemate moons of identification to fat/tett Sic and retrieval.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary. 1. LOCATION CAMP VICTORY, BAGHDAD, IRAQ 2. DATE (rrroaroa 2004/05/09 3. TIME / o 4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME. MIDDLE NAME FAST. Babara G. J 6. SSN 7. GRADEISTATUS OBRA
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS C2, CJTF-7, Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
I reported to CJTF-7, Baghdad, Iraq on 29 Jul 03. I was assigned as the C2 for CJTF-7. I was tasked by SecDef thru CENTCOM to complete an assessment of the intelligence architecture in Iraq and specifically address intelligence resources, processes and priorities. I spent the first part of the month with the newly arrived C3, visiting all the divisions and various activities, with an eye on the intelligence system. In both my interim and final assessmentsfor SecDef, I highlighted my concerns with detainee operations as a number one problem and an area where we have the greatest challenge. At that time, interrogation operations were strung across the country, from Camp Bucca to Camp Cropper to Ashraf. It was about the time I arrived when Abu Ghraib was opened for interrogation business--bringing in detainees associated with a major CJTF-7 operation. Against that backdrop, I greatly welcomed the visit of MG Geoff Miller and the GTMO team. Although GTMO is a very different effort (no combat, no ongoing operation into which it must fit in a timely manner, a singular effort vice a coherent full spectrum HUMINT effort), I believed we could map GTMO best practices into something that would work in Iraq. There was much work to be . done--from organization to facilities to reporting and management. The C2 and the MI Bde immediately began to implement the recommendations from MG Miller's GTMO report. In the C2 area specifically, this included standing up a robust C2X (which, lacking even a competent OIC, I had already identified as my most critical fill) and an analytic effort that capitalized on debriefing reports and focuses interrogations. COL Pappas also begin to implement GTMO recommendations, to include an internal reorganization to establish Tiger Teams, as well as receiving GTMO teams augment his effort and provide additional expertise an mentorship. Arrangements were made for a Huachuca MTT, which come in and conducted additional interrogation training In Sep, the CG published an interrogation policy letter which outlined proper and authorized conduct for interrogation (updated in Oct 03). All of these aforementioned initiatives were implemented from mid-Sep to the end of Nov (being in part dependent on resourcing). Meanwhile, the CG's goal was to close Camp Cropper (less the HVD facility) and consolidate all detention operation into Abu Ghraib by 1 Oct 03. When the first detainees from Camp Cropper began to arrive at A Ghraib, interrogation operations were conducted in tents. Up until that time, the Cdr, A Co, 519th MI Bn,t as the senior officer on the
site. Soon, MI personnel from the various MI units began to arrive at Abu Ghraib anroperate. terms of responsibility, the M Brigade was responsible for interrogation and the MP Brigade was responsible for detention operations. COL Tom Pappas,.205th I MI Bde Commander, initially operated from his headquarters in Camp Anaconda, but found it necessary to relocate to Baghdad in der to be closer t CJTF-7 and key components of his command, such as into ation. I am of familiar with the timing of
signment to Abu Ghraib. That assignment was made by y deputy and the V Corps G2.
e t personnel assigiments, due to the backbone of the intelligence coming tet of orps assets and the close workingrelationship he had with the CJTF-7 Cl, who was also the V Corps GI. The first time I recall meeting was just after the mortar attack which killed and injured numerous MI soldiers. It was just before this incident that COL ap began spendingmore and more time at Abu Ghraib, often overnighting. After the mortar attack, COL Pappas made a decision to move all operations and billeting into the hardened buildings to prevent injuries from future atta prodously said these buildings ere off-limits to CJTF-7 use). During my visits, I was normally briefed by d i o operations;howeve as always in the wings and often discussed various operational and life support APP vi IP (eg.compute , rs . From an austere, bare bones installation, interrogation operations steadily improved. Facilities were rehabilitated to allow for segregation of detainees. Interrogation booths were built. Databases were built and software improved to link detainees to interrogations and reporting. Unfortunately, there were different databases being used by MI and MP's for detainee/interrogation operations. The decision to begin using BATS was slow in being implemented (just now being fielded to
Isatisfaction). During my visits to Abu Ghraib, I observed areas of concern—shortcomings in defensive preparations, lax conduct
lamong MP's, and a general laxity in cleanliness standards. MI personnel were forced to conduct their own escort of detainees,pull guard duty--something COL Pappas raised as an issue. I voi cone to the DCG, MG Wodjakowski, about the needIfor someone to be in charge of the entire facility, as did the JAG, LTG Sanchez made the decision to appoint COL,Pappas as the Forward Opera der at Abu .Ghraib.
n was placed under his TACON. This decision
I was published in a FRAGO.

10 EXHIBIT
11 INITIALS F PER TEMENT PAGE 1 OF
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING 'STATEMENT Of
TAKEN ATTDATED
THE 807 13M OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND PAGE HAIDER MUST BE BE INDICATED.
DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998 OA FORM 2623, JUl 72. IS OBSOLETE IOWA V1.00
AGO 000565
DOD 000652

a. STATEMENT (Coarimadi
Despite this being around the time of the detainee abuses (as founded in the Taguba 15-6), the command leadership was not away
t reason to believe that oche
of this abhorrent behavior to the best of my 'mowledge(1 simply can't speak for all others, but hav staff and the MI Bde Cdr knew about it) and it therefore played no role in the timing of COL Pappas uncovered several disciplinary problems . at Abu Ghraib, and to the best of my knowledge, he immedia It oroughly investigated and took action on each one. These included soldiers having pets and local nationals living on and running a cafe. The relationship between the MI Brigade and the MP Brigade was a frustrated one, with COL Pappas unhappy about the level of MP support. COL Pappas' rater was the DCG, :MG Wojdakowski -, with LTG Sanchez as Senior Rater. BG 1Carpinski's_rater was LTG McKiernan (I thought it was MG Wodjakowski until just this week) as 800th MP Bde was only TACON to CJTF-7 and LTG Sanchez." My responsibility as the C2 was one of staff supervision for interrogation operations. The C3 was designated by_LTG Sanchez as the overall staff supervisor for detention operations, with the PMO being responsible for detainee operations. Ii my belief that there was a premise that most units would surrender during Phase III, resulting in there being few detainees. I just don't believe that folks envisioned ever needing a robust detainee operation on a scale not seen since WWII, either during or after hostilities. There are doctrinal and training lessons to be learned and which have been developed throughout OW. With regard the detainees abuse--I never saw nor was I made aware of the alleged detainee abuse, the use of dogs during interrogations by MI or MP's (if it occurred), nor was I aware of any photos until the investigation was being initiated. I do not recall if it was just before the investigation began (but after the notification to the CG) or if it was after the investigation commenced when I actually became knowledgeable do recall being absolutely sickened by the description, and later, by the pictures (I have never seen the CD). Clearly, had I been aware of this activity, I would have reported it, just as I immediately actioned a reported violation in th December tine frame (repotted to me one day, went to JAG the next day and we went to CO—forwarded initial report to CENTCOM as they owned the unit). /////////////////7////////////////////////////////////MMUMWM/M/MWM/M/MB/M/M/Mll
The board consisted of three voting
I served as the President of the Appeal and Reh.ase Board from its inception in August 2003.
members, the CJTF7 Staff Judge Advocate, the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and me. There was also a Board Recorder,

-
Military Intelligence representative, CID representative and Provost Marshall(all non-voting members) The votes are formulated decision on each case, which was documented by the legal recorder. There was never a refusal on my part to approve the release of such prisoners after a recommendation for release was made by the board.M/M/M/MM/Minn/MMM/M/M/WM/M/M/
Q. Do you have anything else to add to this statement? /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////ffill/MMIIMUM/M/Mll
A. No. /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////11/////////////////////////////////n/MMWM/
AFFIDAVIT
I JF) cha" ‘*.r. 0J-cG r HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT
WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1. AND ENDS ON PAGE IIF LT UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE
BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS
STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD. WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT. AND WITHOUT COERCION. UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE. OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Peteon Making Stormont/
Subscnbed and swam to baton me, a person authorized by law to
WITNESSES
adnwuster oaths. the 9 day DI May 2004
at Camp Victory, Baghdad, Iraq

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (Signature of Person Aollinistwing OM)
/Typed Name of Paso; Adotinistefing
UCMJ. ARTICLE 136
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (Authority To Adoniester Oaths/

INITIALS OF PE
IMP
PAGE VIP Z. PAGES
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DOD 000653

Doc_nid: 
3095
Doc_type_num: 
73