Fay Report Annex: Deposition of Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski re: Abu Ghraib Prison Detainee Abuse Investigation

This is the deposition of Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski regarding conditions at Abu Ghraib Detention Facility. In her interview, Gen. Karpinski testified that she visited cell blocks 1A and 1B regularly; that Abu Ghraib housed juveniles detainees, including a detainee who "looked like he was 8-years old."The juvenile told her that "his brother was there with him, but he really wanted to see his mother, could he please call his mother. He was crying." Also, testified that few detainees were released by the release board, it was "releasophobia." Recalled the following comment by General Fast: "His middle name is Osama. He might know Osama bin Laden. Put him back in the box." Testified that Miller arrived to "Gitmoize" the operation, that Miller advised her to "treat detainees like dogs." Recalled that General Wodjakowski said, "I don't care if we're holding 15,000 innocent civilians! We're winning the war!" to which she responded, "Not inside the wire, you're not, sir." Recalled ghost detainee brought in by OGA ; Received FRAGO [Fragmentary Order] to hide a prisoner from the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC). Also testified that TITAN hired a formed prisoner at Camp Bucca to be a translator at Abu Ghraib despite rules against hiring formed prisoners.

Investigative File
Sunday, July 18, 2004
Wednesday, March 2, 2005

[The deposition was called to order at 1342, 18 July 2004.J
2 LA: Let's get star~ed. It is J~ly 18t~, 2004, at 1342, and
3 present today are:


1 1 previously been sworn. 12 [~he jeponer.: was swc=r..~ 1 Questions by the deposition of£~cer:
-' ~ 14 Fo= the reco=ri, Genera:, 20uld you please give me yc~r 15 :=uli na:r.e. your rank, and ),ot.:.= socia~ security number? 16 h. Janis Lelgh Karp~n9k~. 17 Genera~, C.S. Army Reserve 18 G. What is your ct.:.rren: ~n~: of asslgnment? 19 A. :::'m attached to the Readlness c'6mmand at Fort Jackson, 20 South Carol~na. 21 Q. At some point in :lme. you assumed command of the BOOtn 22 MP Brlgade. Is that correct? 23 A. Yes, sir.

DOD 000089
Q. Could you tell me when you assumed command of the MP
2 Brigade?
3 A. 0:1 the 29t :: of June 2003. I had been in theater for
4 about:O days, maybe two weeKs, at that point, and took command
5 of the aoeth M? Brigade fro:r: Brigadier General Paul Pill.
6 Q. And when you took command, who was your rater and who

7 was your senior rater?
8 A. Nobody knew, and ~ asked Major General Kretzer at that
9 t::.me---­
10 :'m sorry. Whc::.s MaJor General Kretzer? 11 h. MaJor General Kre~zer waE the commander of the 377th 12 ~hea~er Suppert :ommand. : be~~eve tis first name was Dav~d. 13 Before the change 0: command, = we~t in :0 ask him because 14 General H~ll was rated by Gpneral Kretzer. I asked Gener.::.l 15 Kre,:zer::.: he was go~ng te remalD as my rater. He said, "No. 16 You'l: move up te Baghdad and you'll be rated by, II and this is 17 exactly how he saie it, s::.r, "You':: be rated by, I guess, the 18 :leG and the com'Tlander."
19 : said, "Okay. Does~: make any d~fference that we're 20 jus: attached to tr.err., we're no: asslg:1ed to CJ':'F7?" 21 He sald, "No. It shouldn't make any difference at all. 22 You're working in their ba:::Kyard."
DOD 000090
And accually ::he quescior: had come up before that when
2 we were ir. Baghdad--Genera: Hill and I, before I took corr-mand,
3 we made a loop thro~gh al~ of our facilit~es, and i: was wher. we
4 were up ~"-Baghdad, anc I me~ General Wodjakowski and General
5 SaHchez. General 2i1:' ac:ua:'ly b=ough~ up the question wi tr. the
6 operations of:icer, wj:.cr. a: tha:: :ime was a Brigadier General
Davis, and asked hi~ whc was rating the separate ~nit
8 commanders. He said, "I: varles . Ask' Wodj 0, ,.. meaning
9 wodjakowski; We did, and WodJakowski said ~We car: work all of
10 the details o~: once yo~ ~e: up here to Baghdad." So that was
1J one 0: ~he reasons why asked General Kretzer about the rating
12 scheme, and he see~ed :c ~€ ~~ a~reeme"-: with that.
13 WheL tne headquarters actually moved up to 8aghdad--we
14 arrlved lD Baghdad cr. :ne , !:t 0: Jdy. It was at least five days
J5 la~e= when -hac t.he time to down and talk t.o General
16 WodJakowski, about the d:.rec:ion we were going, some of my
17 concerns, beca~se we had had several conversatlons at that point
18 witt the people at. the coa_l:lOr. provislonal authority, and they
19 had a di:ferer:t understandlng 0: r.bw we were going to work and
20 how mucr.we were gOlng :0 be lnvolved In the prison operations-­
21 the clvillan prlson operat.lons, so : needed some clarification,
22 anc he said to me, "Wel:', ! deD't. know. Maybe you'll be rated
by Ambassador Bremer."
DOD 000091

So I said, "Well, : don I t want to be rated by
2 Ambassador~ecause we have a military functicn, here."
3 He said, "Well, jus: give me you:-support form."
4 My aid took my support form over to him, it had to be-­
6 c. Now,
7 A. Tc General
8 s~ppo~t fo:-m ove:­ the cbJectives listed on it and the daLa

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 IE 19 20 21 22 talked to h~IT. at the upda=e, :wo n~ghts later, over at the CJT?7, anc he sald, "Year., ~ us: g:: ve me the support fcrr. and I Whateve:­v:c:-ks Dest 15 what we '1:' do." was mc:-e alo~~ the l:nes of a generic conversation ::har.:.t was, you kr.ow, "::r:~s :.s w!iy I 'IT. not gOlng to rate you." And I sa:.:i, "My '::':':::90: the s·..lppor: forr:1 back from your aid. " he sale, "No. : ~hlnk yo~ had the wr8~g ~nformation. Just ge: i: back tc me." : said, "Okay." Approximately wha: date was that--the secone conversation, we're referr~~g ::c now? The one where it had
AG0000004 DOD 000092

already been returned by ~he aic and now you're speaking with
2 him a second time saying­--­
3 A. This had to be towa=ds the end of July.
4 c. And you had taken over co~~and?
5 A. At the end of June.
6 Q. 50 we alreadv have a ~onth lapse, here, between the-.
7 time tha~ you arrived in cou~t=Y, you did your initial tour, you
8 had yo~ in~t~a: conversations before you even moved out to
9 Bagndad, a~d now it's a ffion:t later, and we still haven't
10 reso~vec ~he issue of who your rater is. Is that correct?
11 A. That's correct.
And I ~new ~hat there was conversations about it,
13 because I saw COlonel__ow::. ;.n the CPA.
l~ C. colOnel~$ the JAG---­
15 A. He is the 5JA for the C~T~7, but he, at tha~ t~me, he
16 was plaYlng a major role dowr. at the CPA. His office was down
17 there, that's where we coulc usually find him, and he was always
18 in the--above--~n the update areas, and he had a regular desk
19 there and everyt~ing. ·Genera~ Sancnez was down in the CPA
20 buildin; at least fifty percent of his time, so colone~
21 just kept his office dow::. there. I ttink that that's what the
22 focus of r.lS legal actions were. That's where I always found
DOD 000093

rea~ detachment, and I would usually see General--General 2 ~amondJtook over, then, for General Kretzer, and I be~ieve that 3 that was in Augus: o~ Sep:enber. I really don't have a clear 4 recollection, but I saw him. : asked General Diam6nd 5 specifically, the first t.ime ::: saw him down in Kuwait, when he 6 t.ook over ---­7 Q. wt~ch was about Augus:? 8 A. Which was about August.. ~ asked him specifically ~f he 9 had heard anything. we we~e :ry':"ng to work out whatever the
10 legal lilr.-"-t.at~ons were to be rat.ed by General Wodjakowski and 11 senio:::-rat.ed by Sanchez. He sa~d, "That 's :ny understanding. 12 YO~lre no: down here. You do~': work for me. And General 13 McKier~an ~s~'t eve~ ~~ t.he theater now, so it. would be hard for
14 . you to be :::-ated t.he Same way that General Hill was." He said, 15 "We hear yo\.: g\.:ys are do~ng gre2t th:.ngs up there. I know you 16 have ar. enormous m~ss:.on." we went ove~ to Bucca and back up to 17 Bagtdad. 18 We were hav~n9 pr~sons meet:ngs at. least three times a 19 week.---­20 Q. We can get to the operat~ons, anc. we wil:", D'-1t if we 21 could just get to the poi~: where when was it that someone
DOD 000095
1 actually accepted your OER s~pport form and signed off as yo~~
2 rater and agreed that those were good goa:s?
3 A. General WodJakowsk: had my support form, : gave it ~o
4 him mysel::. He said he wasn I t going to be bot:hered with all of
5 t.ne details of the ~nitials and everything else, t:hat he knew
6 when I got there and he kne,,; when he accepted responsibility fo~
7 me. The aid fu~nished a copy of the rating scheme that had me
8 belng ra~e6 by Genera

senior rated by General
9 San::!1ez. 10 C. [:0 yo:..: have a copy c: tha: rating scheme? 11 n. . :: 'm sure :hey do .::.:-: :ne BOC th . I don't have a personal
12 copy 0: l:, be::ause all of ~he ::~:es were shipped back in the 13 connex to the BOO~r.. I'~ sure--:'m positive they have a copy of 14 the ratln~ scheme. 15 Q. So c.id Gener

=Genera~r anyone 16 ac~ua:ly ever sign the fo~, lni:ial the fo~, and give it back 17 ~c yo:..:? 18 A. No, sir. 19 Q. While you were opera:.::.ng there as the BOOer. MP
20 commander, who did you belleve your---­21 A. General wodjakowski. 22 Q. Was your rater? 23 A. Yes, si~.
DOD 000096
Q. Who did you believe your senior rater was?
A. Genera: Sanchez. ~ha~ was on the rating scheme. .I.
3 responded to his reques-=s for information. I respondeci---­4 Q. Now, who's rating scheme are you referring to?
5 A. CJTF7, s~r.
6 Q. And yo~ ac~ua~:y saw that?
7 A. Yes, sir. I d:.d.
8 G. So, somewhere, there is a copy of that, be that at the
9 80:;~h Or a':: the CJTF7 level?

10 A. Yes, s:r. And, MaJo~Who was my S-l,
11 recelved many phone calls about get~ing the support form over to
12 ~eneral WcdJakowsk~ because ::hey wanted to publish this rati~g
13 scheme and they wanted to make sure that they had at least on
14 ~ile a suppcr~ form for everybcdy.
]5 Q. Well, I'm a lit~le confused now. If you had given it
16 to the~, why were they call~n5 se frequently asking for it?
17 A. I don't know, and = didn't ask.
18 Q. Do you send it ther:, every t~me they asked ~or i:: --or
19 did your 5-1 send it to them every t~me they asked for ~t?

20 A. 1\ot every time. He sald, "General wodJakowski has the 21 support :orm," and then the adm:.::-. officer I :: -=hink it was a 22 colonel who called the last time I said, "I don I t know what the
DOD 000097
disconnect was," or words to that effect, "but he does have it,
2 we have it, everything is in o~der now."
3 DC: You d~dn't realize it was triat complicated of a
4 quest~on, did you?
5 DO: I didn't. And my next que:st;ion will explain why.
6 actual2.y, along with ir.:ernewing a great number of people,
7 General Wodjakowski is one 0: those that I've already
8 interv~ewed, and when I aske= hi~ t~e question, he tole me,
9 po~nt blank, that you~ race~ was General Diamond. That, indeed,
10 he wasn't your rate~.
11 W"I',,· Not true. HovJeve:::-, si::=-, I wil::" tell you that when
12 a:J.: 0: this --because wha: --p::=-obably f~om November, when units
13 Knew t~ey were getting ready to leave in the December, Janua~
14 timef~ame because they hac completed their year or were getting
15 ready to relocate to Kuwai t :o~ the:.r redeployment. they PUt o.ut
16 at every S:JL', every Separat.e U:-:i: Update, that I attended. and
17 they put it au: more o':ter. ::har: t:-,a:, ":)0 not send you::-OER
18 shells over to Gene~al WodJakowsk:. He doesn't want to be
19 ~nundated w~th these, and he'l: ask for them when your unit 1s-­
20 ~t will be a part 0: the t~ansi:ion process." So, we got that
21 not.if~cation because I was OD the rating scheme. with General
22 Wad] akowskf as my rat.er and General Sanchez as my senior rater.
DOD 000098

DC: As a point of clarification, sir, General Diamond is
2 the one who actually rated he:::-.
3 WIT: Because when we got down to Kuwai':, I dropped c'::':: my
4 support form as part of the transition. My colleague, the
5. commander of another MP brigade, General Geoghan, De:-111is
6 Geoghan--he was in Kuwait :ro1)"IJuly when he arrived and took
7 command of t~e 22C~h MP Brlgade, and he remained in Kuwait until
8 the beginnlng 0: November. So when he came up into Baghdad, '
9 sald, "Dennis, what are YOl.: :rying to co? Get two OERs from
10 this deployment?"
1 1 He sa::..d, "No. I'IT =us: going to ask 'V'Jodj 0' to rate
12 me. "
13 ::: said, "He was::': yo:..::::­rater while you were in
14 Kuwait. YO'..l had more than 9[' days."
15 He said, "Ahh, ~': does::'t make any difference."
16 I said, "Genera::" :;laIT.ond should be YO'..lr rater."
17 He looked me stra~ght ln the eye, sir, and he said,
18 "Do you want General Diamond to rate you? '0
19 _ said, "But yo~ were down there for four months.
20 This ~s a distortion of the :r:..:th. It's a lie."
21 He said, "'Wodjo' said he'll de ':"t. Nobody's going
22 to pay any attention to it."

DOD 000099
So, he was, i~ fact, rated--or sho~ld have beer. rated
2 by General Diamond for four months, and then rated by--there
3 wouldn't have been enough tlme for him to be rated by Genera~
4 Wodjakowski. So he said, "WI-.at does your support form look
5 like?" That's how that conversa::ion came up.
6 I said, "I have my support form, but our missions are
7 completely different, Dennls," a~d :: said, "And you're not
8 supposed to give it Wodjakowski until the transitions of
9 authori::y is complete."
10 That :":ight, he came back over to my TOe and said, "I
11 con't think General WodJakowsk: 's going to rate you.~
12 T . ~ sa~Q, "Wha:: d:: yet.: mea:!?"
) 3 He sald, "He says he's :-atirlg me as an MP brigade
14 commancer and Spain, t!1.E Cor'9s MF brigade commande:-."
15 I said, "You kno"," , we've gone back and forth over
16 this. Genera: WodJakowski ~s listed on the rating scheme as my
1i rater, so." I dHir.' t :-un rlght over to ::he CJTF7 Headquarters
18 and ask him, because I didn': wan: :0 put General Geoghan, you
19 knew, as the couri.er.
20 So when I was a:: the SUU the nex:: t:.me, which I
21 believe was the next night, the update, I asked General
22 Wodjakowski, and !1e said, "Dor.':: give me support form until the
23 transition, Karpinski. YO\..:'re no different than anybody else."
DOD 000100

I said, "Are yo'.; rat~n9 me, sir?"
2 He said, "Is my name on the ra-:ing scheme as your
3 rater?"
4 I said, "Yes, sir. But there's been some confusion
5 an~ I just wanted to make sure ~t was right."
6 So when we got doWY. to Kuwait after the -:ransition of
7 at.:::hority 0: the 800:h ---­
s Q. When did ::hat conversation occur? The one where you
9 ~ad asked, again, about the rat~n~ scheme and about him rating
10 yo"...! anc hirr­ saying, "Do no: 9lve ~: to me until after SUU"?
11 When did that occur?
12 h. Unt~: a:ter :he--o" dt.:rln~ the -:ransition of authority­
13 -t~ere was a lot of acror:yms t~a: they used: TOA, SUU, BUA, all
14 those th~ngs. But t~lS was a::er the transition--it was
15 supposed tc be part of the trans~t~on packet. It's my
16 recollection that it was a:ter--: hadn't seen the photographs
17 yet, but thls was after the tranSl:10I1--it was supposed to be a
18 par: 0: the transitlon packet. It's my recollection that it was
l~ after--I hadn't seen the ptctographs yet, but I had known--I
20 already knew that there w~re allegations.


DOD 000101
Q. This is January?
2 A. January. Mid-January.
3 So when the transfe~ of authority was under way, we
4 briefed General Wodjakowski--al: of the MP brigades briefed him
5 at the same ~ime W .• t:.1 the ~eplacement brigades. irl ~he brif:f~ng.
6 General WodJakowski was there. He said, "Fine. Okay, guys.
i Just g~ve me the rest of the stuff you're supposed to turn over
8 -:0 me. II So we did. ::: belleve everybody did. I know I did.
9 Q. This was in Jan'J.ary?
10 A. This was -:he las-: wee~ of January.
Il And then when we d~c the TOA--we did the transfer of
12 aut::o~:. ty cr.. the ::. St 0: Fec::-~a::y a:-:d on the 2nd of February we
13 :~ew down to Kuwait. Lle~tenar..: co:cne1IllllllllphonetiC], who
14 was the sen:.or person lD the rear detachment down there for me,
15 the Booth, and she said to me, "Dlamond says you have to give him
16 a support form because Wodjakows~:'s no: going to rate you."
17 And I can't say : re~embe:: it verbatim, but I remember
18 sayins, "Well, sure. Why not? Everythlng else has changed.
19 You know: left my s'...lpport fo:rr.. u~ there. Do you think he said
20 any-::h:ng to me?"
21 She sa:.d, "Ma' arr., : dor:': kno..... , but General Diamond
22 said Genera: Wodjakowski' 5 :;0: gO~:1g to ra-ce you."
DOD 000102

Q. So did you actually give a support form, then, to
2 General :Jiamond?
3 A. I did.
4 C. A~d that would have oeen in Jan---­5 A. February.

6 Q. And did you have any conversations with General Diamonci
7 in February a::te~ you gavE: h:'T:1 that support form?
8 h. No. What I did was take it over. I asked his aid if
9 Genera:::' Qiambnci was avai.2.able, and he said, "No, rna I am. He IS

10 really nC':.. "
11 :: said, "I have support :orm. " ___ _
12 Q. !~ the whole time tha: you were there, it would have
13 been :rom Cune, as I reca~~, t~rough February, now?
14 ~.. Yes, s:.r.
15 C. Did you have any conversat~ons with General D~amond
16 about performance or issues or t~e operat~ons of the Booth MPs or
17 wjat was go~ng on? The norma: cOi.versations that you would have 18 with someone that would be your rater? 19 A. No, sir. I did tal~ to him several times, and, like I 20 said, every t:.me ! was down ii. Kuwait, : went over--and I really 21 went over to drop in and see hirr.. One time I visited him 22 because I knew that General Helmeley [phonetic) was coming over, 23 and! wanted to know if they had the details o~ his schedule so
DOD 000103
I could make arrangements, i: it was possible, to see him up at
2 Baghdad, They did~'t have them at the time---­3 Q. So, in your mind, there wasn't th~s usua~ command
4 relationship betwee~ you and Gene~al Diamond?
5 A. .~solutely not, sir.
6 Q. You bel~evec that you were working for General
.., wodJakowski, then, correct?

8 A, And General Sanchez.
9 Q. you accept an OER :rom General Diamond? 10 A. ::: d~d not. 11 Q. You did not? 12 1"'. ' ::: d~d not. He tcld ~e he was not go~n9 to rate me. 13 Q, Genera! D~amo~d was~'t go~ng to rate you? 14 A. Yes. That is exactly what he to:d me. 15 C, Why was General S~amond, noY,', not going to rate you if
'16 he was 9c~n9 to be you= race=? 17 A. I dropped my suppo=: fc:-r. 0:: w:.tt the aid, with a note
18 attached tc -_.. , "sticky" note, that sa~d, If: Ive heard you're 19 supposed to be my rater," next 1::..ne, "News to me. Just in case, 20 th~s is my support form." Le:t:.t there. For not being 21 ava~lable, 30 minutes later, ~ieutenant co:onel~ 22 lphonet::..cl was in receipt of that suppert form, from General
DOD 000104
Diamond, who said to her, "Would you please tell your boss that
2 I'm not going tp-rate her. I don't need this."
3 She brought it over to me. I saic, "Thank you very

4 much." -took it back over. I said, ~I need to see Genera:
5_Diamonc. '
6 liMa' arr., yo:.: just misped him." That I s what the aid told
7 me.

8 .;. saic, "Would yot.: please leave this for him," and
9 there's a note on the front, now, that says, "Please, ca:l me."

10 . Sc he didn't cal:. Sc I ::alled him. It must have been II abo~t:O o'clock at nig~t whe~ : spoke to him, and he said---­12 c. And you were st~:: i~ co:.:ntry ~n February at this 13 poir,::? 14 A. Yes, s:.r. I was. 15 Q. :n Kuwa;.t? 16 A. Ir: K..lwa:"t. 17 I said--and we had not--at th5t po:"nt, we didn't know 18 that Genera: Taguba was concu:::ing an lnves:igation.--That's not 19 true. We had heard rumors t~at General Taguba was conducting a 20 15-6 lnves::igation, but we ale not ~now what ~t was involving or
2] anything at that pOlnt. When: talked to General Diamond on the 22 phone at about 10 O'clock that night, I said to him, "I was told 23 that Genera: WodJakowski's no: gOlng to rate me because we're
DOD 000105
not assigned. I though~ that that legal problem had been fixed
2 according to colonel_back months ago."
3 A..'1d he said, "We::":", :'m not going to rate you either.
4 I didn't see you up in Iraq, = don't know what you did, anc
5 (.eneral Wod] akowski 's YO'..1r ra:.er."
6 Two days later, that changed. He said, "I called
7 General Wod]akowski. Genera:" Wodjakowsk~ said he's not going to
8 rate Y0l:."
9 -said, "Well, wnc do = work for?"
10 A:-.d he said, "We::"::", r"-gh:. now, ! guess you work for
11 me. "
12 And: said--hlS ::rs: naDe is Mike. ! said to him,
13 "Mike, you never came up an:::: sa...... me in Baghdad. The half a
14 dozen :'lmes tha:. : was l~ Kuwal: ln your office, you spoke about
15 all of the grea:. news YOl: heard about the Boott and you were
16 sorry :.hat you couldn't s-...:ppor:. us Dore wlth the requirements we
17 hac at the prisons, but Y0l: were no:. :unded or your budget would
18 not allow you :0 provide a:l 0: :.he support that we needed for
19 refurblshing and supplying the prlsoDs.
20 He said. "I know. .: know. I kr.ow. But, apparently,
21 Genera: Wodjakowski's no:. gOlng to rate you, so I'm your rater,
22 or so they tell me."
DOD 000106

o. Did he rate you?
2 A. He did.
3 o. So you accepted ar. OER from him?
4 DC: Recelved. We dor.': like the word "accepted."
5 Q Did you 3ign the OER?
6 A. did not.

, Q. S0 do you have an officialpositior. relative to that
8 OER.?
9 A. He wasr.'t my ra--: have to appeal i~. I have to fl1e

10 a---­11 DO: Okuy. !'ve got ~:. Thank yo~.

12 Yot.:'re rlght. : wasr.'t expecting that much
13 lnformation from the :.:.rst ques':".lor. .
14 :JC: • wcu:"dn':: have e~ther, but r knew the background so I
15 knew wha~ wa~ going to be cO~1ng as soon as you sa1d it.
16 GOlns back ::0 whe,. you firs: took over command, you
1: took over command from Genera~ H~::", as : reca~l you saying, and 18 yot.: did an ~nitia:" to~r. :ar. yot.: :e:"2 me what your initial 19 impressions were, coming ir. to commanc the Booth? 20 W:T: From that tour? 21 Q. Yeah. What was in your mind when yot.: f~rst showed up 22 and you're a newly assigned commander, you meet General Hill, 23 yot.: flnd out wr.at the mlssion ~S, you're new in country, you go
DOD 000107
on a tour--tell me what your in~tial impressions were 0: the
2 unit?
3 A. Just very quickly, !'11 tell you tha': I commanded a
4 batta:ion under the .aooth , se = knew what the missions were of
5 the battalions that were asslgned, t~t looking at the lay down
6 fro~ the units that were ir. thea':er, I knew that they had some
7 combat s'...!pport 1.lnlts there. They had units that they'd never
8 wori::ed wi tr, before assignee to ':he 8Doth, and coming from the a:at
9 RSC, I was wel~ aware 0: a:~ 0: the problems that 1.lnits were
10 havlng--r.e: :us: the military police uni':s, but all 0: the
11 problems that the units were ~av~n9 at the mobilization
12 sta':.lons. Cross leve:ing ..·,as a. nlghtmare and equipment was a
13 n:.ghtmare. I was well aware 0: that. So : was prepared for
14 getting lr.:O the theater, but there was a delay, because they
15 were planning to send the Boct~ MP Brigade back to the states,
16 and ther. the ceclsior. was mace through SENTCOM [phonetic] that
17 it would be a great idea for me to even have five or six weeks
18 wlth the brigade in theater. Se: had a couple of conversations
19 with General Hil: before I go: there. He was talking abou: how
20 the units were since the endcf majcr hos:ilities had been
21 declared In May, they were really wlnding down as far as the EPW
22 mission went, that I would have some time with the soldiers, and
DOD 000108

that would be a good thins. And I was in full agreement with
2 that.
3 I sa~d, IIWell, where a:!'"e you, now, s:.r?"
4 And he saic., "We're in Kuwait, but the EPW camp is just
5 across the borde:­at Eucca, and we have twO othe:=­lC"lC 3.tions , and
6 they've beer. tossing around the ldea of some of the units gains
7 ::0 Bag1-'.dad."
8 Sc ::: said, "E?W operat:.ons?"
9 Anc he said. "Nc. Tr.is:.s a theate:--wide shortage of
10 M?s. So some c: the ur.~~s that oct here late, they're Just
11 talk:.nsabou: t~E possib::":"::"ty 0: rr.oving them up to do regular
12 m~l:l.ta:-y police ope:::-at:':J::s."
13 So wnen ::: go: :.::tC the t~eater, I arrived at about 2
14 o'clock i:: the mo:=-ning, ~ th:.nk I got about four or five hours
15 of sleep, and then the next day. I went in, and I was briefed by
16 the staff and what they haC. been doing and thei:::­contingency
17 pIa:: fa:=­shifting units fo:::-wa:::-d. but they were no longer calling
18 it a contingency plan because tne FRAGC had been c~:: to send the
19 U:-.::"ts forward tc Baghdad, a:-.d : sald, "Combat support units?"
20 A."1d she sald, "No, ma'am. We're gOlong to be doing
21 detention operations lr. Iraq."
22 "Can I see the FRAGO?" The FRAGC says rebuild,
23 resto:=-e, and operate Iraqi correctional institutes and secure
DOD 000109

the MEK and contir.ue your mission at Bucca, the Corps holding
2 area, 'which will be transfe:-red over to you and the mission fo:­3 the HVD, the high value detainees, the deck of cards.
4 Q. Okay. You're getting ~nto what your missions were, but

if yo:..: could j Llst give me what your impressions were, relative
6 te the -..:.nits that were assigned to the BOOCh ? If you could tell
7 me what you believed to be t.::e conditions of the unit.
8 A. Okay. 0:-, this qu:'ck whJ..rlwind tour, which was the next
9 day, we went en it--so I ~ad this idea that we're going to do

10 t~is new opera~ion, cross the border into :raq and go to Bucca 11 first. It was a fairly typ~ca: EPW operation. Wires, receipt
1:2 prisoners 0''':: :"ocally around tr,e camp doing the work projects 13:ha: they can send E?W's o~t o~. The population was probably 14 between five and seve~ hundred at Bucca. They had closed a lot 15 of the compounds, because they were releasing a lot of the 16 Fr:sone:-s. But they were--Bucca was net a very good location.
... , .
17 There was a tremendo-..:.s pOF~latlo~ c~ ~ • .l.es. The soldiers seemed 18 to be happy, but their reorale was good because they believed 19 that they were going home. We left there, we went to Tawil 20 [phonetic), where the condit.l.ons were rea:ly terrible for·the 21 sold~ers, but once again,: asked the commander, and he said, 22 "The morale of the soldiers is much better, now, because our 23 populat.l.on of prisoners is now about three."
DOD 000110
I said, "About three hundred?"
2 He said, "No, ma'am. Three. We're really just the
3 transfer po~nt, a mid-way point between Bucca and the Corps
4 holding area, so we have no population right now." Ane he said
5 tr~e sold~ers didn't have mess hall and they'd like to have a
6 mess ha2.2..
7 And everywhere in =~aq it was austere, but i: you
8 talked to the soldiers, they wanted to know when they were going
9 home. It JUSt so happened that when we were at Tawil

10 [phonetic],---­11 Q. Was their performa:1ce gocd up to that point according
12 to what General H~:l had told ycu? Were there any problem
13 per:ormers, speci:ica:':::'y by uni::, 0:::-any problems that General
14 Hill passed on to you as he was leav~ng comman~?
15 A. As he was leavi~g command, but at that point, he didn't
16 s~are. He sa~c, "There's been some problems, but we can talk
17 abou:: them when we get to Baghdad."
18 C. You have sign~:~car.: background as a soldier and also
19 ~n mil~tary police. Anyth~r.9 :ar ou:: cf the ordinary relative

20 ::c the Booth MPs that struck yo~ wher. you first took over
21 command?
22 A. They--not--not--l guess from that trip, yes.

DOD 000111
1 Q. What was it?
2 A.. Wel~, I came to find out that COlonel~whc was ~he
3 depu::y, was really runnlng the whole brigacie. He had taker:
4 charge at Bucca wi~h Gene~a: Eill's blessing and concurrence,

5 and he was not let::lng the bat.t.alion commanders
6 there. He want.ed t.o be l~ charge. I t.alked to
7 battalion commanders at Bucca. I talked to the
8 commander at Tawil [phonet.lc], and when we got
9 talked te the ba::talion commande~s up there and
10 se:-.timent..

do thei~ J.)b
each of the

to Baghdad, ~ it was the same
11 Q. nOW many battallons were assigned to the BOOen whe~ you
12 took over?
13 A. Nine. B"­ some c: t.hem were smalle!:" :'n config·,uation
14 t.han a normal s~zed batt.allo~. They're the liaison battalions
15 and they're much smaller. B~t. there were great companies
16 assigneci: National Guard and Rese!:"ve .. Unfortunately, t.here
17 were losses for p~lmari:y ~edlca: reasons at t~at point, anc
18 when: asked the S-l tc JUs: glve me a snapshot of what the unit
19 strength was, it was not a goed thing.
20 Q. W~at was the unit strength when you t.oo~ over?
21 A. Well, each--say a bat.t.allon was supposed t.o deploy with
22 ninety percent, some of the batt.alions were down to seventy­
23 elght or seventy-six percent..
DOD 000112

Q. Now, YOll had nine batt.alions. How many of them were
2 down that low?
3 A. All of t.hem were do~. to at least. eighty percent. Some
4 of them were lower thar: that..

5 Q.' And can you te::':: me about: th~ personnel issues relative
6 t.o replacement:s?
7 A. There was nc replaceme~ts, s~r. We couldn't get MP
8 companies t.ransferred fror.. eve:-. Kuwait to the 800~h. They were
9 usin9 MPs t:o do entry con:ro~ security. Not that MPs can't do

10 t:hat, they can, but any so:dle~ can do that. When yo~ have a 11 requlre~en: for MP spec~~:c ~orK, like we did at the detention 12 :acilitles, you can't take a mar:ne or a field artillerymar. and 13 put. hlrr lD there because yo~ say, "here's a soldier," but you 14 car. put them on entry c~~tro: POlr.ts and pass the MPs along, and 15 they refused to cia It. Cne of the reasons that we remain--l 16 cio~'t. want to forget to make that pOlnt, because there was a 17 vallc reason--CFLIC's deterIT.lnat:ior., not rr.lne, of us remaining 18 ass~gned t.o CF~IC as opposed to belng asslgnec to CJTF7. I was 19 to:d t.hat. that decision was actually ar: argulng point bet.ween
20 General Wall.ace, first, who was the Fi ftr: Corps commander before
21 Genera: Sanchez. I don': know .+ he was the CJTF7 commander,
22 but---­23 DO: He was not.

DOD 000113
A. ----bu~ ~hey disagreed over how the--~here was some 2 concern frorr, General McKiernan that the MP br~gade wO'..lld be 3 assignee to CJTF7 and then ~hey would be broken up to use to 4 supplement the Fif'Ch Corps MP Brigade, the Corps--the CJTF7 5 Br~gade, and to do other MP 'Cype missions other thar. cetention. 6 So tha'C was a conscious decis~on on General McK~ernan's part; 7 CF:..:rC I s part, :::0 keep the 80 c~t. fv:P Brlgade assigned to CFLIC as 8 opposed::o assign~ng 'Chem tc Cc"TF7. 9 DO: I know that ::ralni~g ~s an issue and has been issue
10 re~atlve tc the 800~~ MPs l~ the prior discussions that have
11 occ~rred i~ some o! your d~Sc~sslons wlth General Taguba and
1~ some c! the s::atemen::s yo~ made ~elative to training. You had
13 nlne oattallons asslgnej.
14 Q. ':'he Booth was a:-. EPv;--:ha:: was the rrjssion of the Booth?
15 A. [':'he deponer:-c ~ndica-ced an a:f lrmative response.]
16 Q. C: those nine ba::::c~lons, could you tell me how many of
Ii those were actually trained as EPW battalions and which ones had
18 only Ilmlted EPW training?
19 A. T!1e ones that were at Bucca, the 724tb , the 530t t. ___ _

20 Q. I:: might be bet::er .& you could go---­21 W:T: Give you numbers?
22 DO: Well, the nu~ers are fine. I just have to absorb
23 them.

DOD 000114

Q. So, a: Bucca, there was? 2 A. Wel:, there was four battalions at Bucca. They were 3 al: tra~ned in EPW operations. 4 Q. They all were? 5 A. Every one of therr.. The batt::alion that was at:: Taw~l 6 [phonetlc] was trained ~n 2?~. The bat~alion that was up in 7 Baghdad, the 400th , k~ew EP~ and they were trained in EPW, but 8 they're AT's for prevlOus years had been combat support, not EPW 9 miss~ons. ~he companies :ha~ were ass~gned to the battalions,
10 and ~her; the VLDs--I 'm 50:::-:::-1', the ot!1er batta:ions, the liaiso!':. 11 bat:a:lons, t!1ey were all ~P~. They had plenty of trainin9 ln 12 EP~. They d::.dn',,: necessa::-::y have formal training in detention 13 ope:::-a:ions before :hey deployed, because detention operations
14 are vastly different thar. EP~ operat:ons. Therein lies one 0:
15 the F~oblems from the sta:::-t. ?eople d~dn't get that
16 clariflca:ion, and I know they didn't get tha: clarification
17 when the dec:sion was made, because when I went to Genera:
18 Kretzer and sald, you knm" detent:on is no: really our mission
19 a::-:d:.t is not a heavily trained :iHss:.or. for the m':'lit::ary police,
20 whet::her it's active component c::-not. He said, well, maybe, but
21 your brigade has the misslon closest to detention operation.
22 Q. Did yo~ disagree Wlt::t that?
23 A. I did.

DOD 000115
Q.. What did you believe :he al:ernative to be?
2 A. There was no alternative.
3 Q. Alright. :f there was no alternative, I'm somewhat
4 confused. Because if we have all of these people to be detained
5 al.c they need to have a dete:-:':lcn unit be assigned to them, who
6 would you have suggested be used for that if not your unit?
7 A. We:l, I actually went in there asking for a delay in
8 our relocation to Baghdad, because---­9 Q. And w~c were you speakin~ to, again?

10 A. General Kretzer. MaJer General Kretzer, the 377tb-_we 11 were a theater asset, so during the initial---­12 Q. This is the inltla:, before you moved ~p to Baghdad? 13 A. :: was when we came back from the wtirlwind tour. 14 Q. Yeu asked for a de~ay, anc what was the---­15 A. I went in and I sale, "Thls is not really our misslon." 16 He said, "I know, :,u: your brigade is your closest to 17 detent ion. " 18 I said, "Sir, lS there any possibility that--we have a 19 :ot of soldlers that are wardens and jailors lD their civilian
20 jobs anc we're going to rely heavily on their expertise, but EPW 21 operatlons are different from EPW operations. Is there any 22 chance we can delay moving to Baghdad--"
DOD 000116
1 "No. They needed you there last week. There won't be
2 a delay." And he said , 11 Gc up there and do the best you can."
3 Before I even took command of the brigade, sorr.e of ~he
4 units had already gone up to Baghdad. We had the 400th up there,
5 and they had ~he 72,.·:1 MP Company, which is National Guard­-~.t has
6 to be one of the fines: mil~:a!y police companies I've ever'
7 worked with. They had people ~hat were, like all of our Reserve
8 units :hankfully do--we have a lot of police officers, fire
9 fighter-s, and everything, b-..:t they were--they were running Abu
10 Ghraib. They were on the grounds of Abu Ghraid. The 400th and
11 their­subordinate companies were, at that time, up until the
12 FRAGQ ar.d the transfer of :::-espons~bility, were assigned to the
13 Fifth Cor-ps MP Brigade--tha: was colone~
14 When : go: to Baghdad and went out to see Abu Ghraib
15 and the 72 0 :: MP Company, :hose so::'diers, 183 of them and their
16 leadership element, gathered around us, the command sergeant
17 major­and myself, ar.d told us that they hadn't seen the
18 commander since they'd been tnere---­
19 Q. This ~s the 400t~ MP Br-~gade?
20 A. This ~s the--there'S the 72 nd MP Company, subordinate
21 unit of the 400th MP Battalior:.
22 Q. Who were they referr~ng to?
23 A. They were referr~ng to COlone~
DOD 000117

Q. which would have been 400tll MP Battalion commander?
2 A. No. was the Corps---­3 DO: Okay. The b:::-:"gaae commander.
4 A. I said :'0 .the Bat.t.a:'ion Commander, colonel
5 "Why hasn': he bee~ out he:e~

6 He said, oo(:olone_doesn't even t:::-eat. us well, and i we're co-:'ocat.ed ....:i:.h r'llr. .... ~e said. "I've been out here as 8 eften as possible. but the one time that the unit saw the 9 command se:gea~: ma:o:-. he s:oppec a soldier and told h~m his
1(1 sleeves were too shor: or: h:.s DCUS." 11 ':'hey had!:':. seer. anycody --because with the FRAGO and 12 :ne 60C:r. MP Brlgade mov:.n~ := Ba;hdad, we were taking over the 13 :espons:b::l:Y for those ~~:ts--a:':' of the Reserve and National 14 -Gua:::-c -..:.~i:s :.~at were ur.de:-.::me 0: my battalions, bu:. they 15 hacr.'t received any su~po:::-:. :.hey hadn't received any logistics. 16 :hey hadr.':' :::-ecelvee any encouragement :ro:r. the Corps I from the 17 C..:'TF7 ......he was their head:r..:a:ters at thE t.:.me. They told me.
who was the company commander. and hlS !irs: 19 sergeant told me then. :: sa:.d. "Can you do the det.ention 20 nuss:..on?" 21 He said. liMa' am. as long as you're here and as long as 22 we have support, we car. do t.hlS mlSSlor.. " 23 I salo. "How a:!'€ yo'..: going to do ...
"t" ?f'


DOD 000118

unit was not adequa~ely trained at that point, and you brought 2 tha: to the attention 0: r1ajo::-General Kretzer. He said, "They 3 need you up there now." So you moved the units up there at t~a: 4 point? 5 A. Some of them had al::-eady been moved up there. 6 Q. Sc, in your mind, now, as I hear it, there was a gap 7 between wha: they know, wha: they've been trained to do, and 8 wha: the:::-mission is now ask~n9 them to do. What did you do to 9 fil~:..n t~a: gap?
10 A. My percep:ion: Th.l.s ~s not what they deployed to do 11 and now they're being g:..ve~ th.l.s m:..ssion, but I talked to 12 sold.l.ers and ~ talked to ba::al.l.o~ commanders, and they felt 13 that they were ready to co th.l.s m:..ssion. 14 Q. SO did you make a determination at that point that the 15 train~ng was therefor ade~ate? 16 A. Yes, I did. J knew t~a: the soldiers were trained and 17 ready tc do the mission. They'd been or. site, they were working 18 the m:..ssion, and in talk.l.ng to them and to thei::-battalion 19 commanders and the company commanders, firs:: sergeants--they all 20 felt that they were ready :0 do it. So I ohanged my---­21 DC: Just to clari:y something that she said earlier and
2.2 make su:r-e--these units had people in there that had done 23 deten:ion operations :rom the civilian world, and she believed
DOD 000120
that those people could train the other people internally. And
2 I just want to make sure that's clear on the record.
3 Q. Is that accurate?
4 A. Yes.
5 DO: Yes. I understand that.
6 DC: Okay.
7 WI~: And in addition to that, sir, the SJA, not only from
8 the brigade, my JAG off~cers for the brigade, from the
9 battal~ons, were g~ving refresher training on Geneva/Hague, they
10 were exp~ainlng tc them the d~fferences, and this was a legal
11 quest~on, not necessarily a train~ng question, but they wanted
12 to make sure that the MPs ~~derstood and they got clarification
13 :rom COlCne~WCl;.:"c.. Iraq: pr~soners be afforded the same
14 rig:-.ts.
15 wOo I understand. It's an ~mportant area that I believe
16 needed to be cleared ~p because perceptions have been created
17 that in fact these MP units had been placed with inadequate
18 training and that, in :act, the tra~ning was not up to what the
19 mission was calling for, and ~asedon other parts of the
20 investigation ~hat I have conducted, other than incidents that
21 occurred at Abu Ghraib, that there was a significantly favorable
22 impreSSion of many 0: the un~ts and sold~ers of the Booth, and,
23 in fact, it doesn't seem to be indications of inadequate
DOD 000121

training on the part of the Booth for these detention operations.
2 And what I believe: Just hearc you say is that you made your
3 command judgmen~ that ~here may have bee~ a shortfall, but after
4 doing a command review anc checking with the soldiers and
5 understanding tha: a number of them had civilian personnel
6 skil~s that they were going to bring to the table, that you
7 judged that it was an adequate situation, given the
8 circumsta~ces, fo~ this mission to go forward. Is that
9 accura'Ce?
10 A. Yes, Slr.
11 Q. Because tha~ is no: the irr.pression that I believe the
l~ general population curre~:ly nas.
13 A. Sir. I de wan: to te:: yo~ that I was not at mobe
14 [phonetic] statlons when these JDits deployed. Many of them
15 talked abD~t what a bad experience they had at the mobilization
16 static~s, that i: was a gooe thing that they were trained
17 othe~ise by their units C~ w~:le they were at Bucca or at Tawil
18 [phonetic) .
19 DC: = want to put i: out, sir, that a lot of the general
20 populous perception of what occurrec over there 1S based upon
21 what happened at Abu Ghraib in cell blocks lA and lB, but also
22 on the summary of the Taguba Report with outing of the annexes,
DOD 000122

1 which somebody leaked it to the press and put it on the
2 websites.
3 DO: Okay. However they got them, I Just wanted to make
4 sure that in this forum, at least here, that we are clear.
5 WIT: And yot..: trught get to thil' question later, so if you
6 plan to, then I'll stop sho:::-t.now, but it doesn't mean that'they
7 were equipped appropriately, ---­
8 DO: No. We haven't gotten to equipment yet.
9 ----and does not mear. that when the situat~on changed
10 and they were in ~he middle c: the worst hostile fire zone in
11 the theater, that they were ~reparec with the necessary
12 equi~ment or platforms te ce ferce protection.
13 DO: Yeah. And: belleve t~a: you':::-e referring, now, to
14 Ab~ Ghraib specifically w~th those commer.ts. :;: I m really not
15 familiar with what the s~tuation was ~n all of your other
16 assignments that yo~ had over there. I believe that you had
17 like fourteen or fifteen---­
18 WI':': Seventeen,
19 DC: ----seventeen. -really--the extent of most of my
20 knowledge ~s Ab~ Ghraib.
21 DC: Again, just to poi~: out, even MPs that are t:::-ained in
22 deter.:ion operations arer.'t trained to take hostile fire. So
23 this is a unique mission. : mear., ~f your runnlng Fort Knox
DOD 000123

Correctional Facility, you Just detair. prisoners. You're not 2wcrrieci about somebody attack~ng you from the outside at the 3 same time. 4 DO: Okay, Major. We car. go off on that tangent. I don't 5 choose to. Soldiers are ~ra~ned to take fire, but we won't go 6 into that right now. It'S not a~ area for this investigation, 7 which is mil::ary :ntelllgence oriented, but I find your las: 8 statement debatable, but = choose this as to not to be the forum 9 for it.
10 D:::: wel:, : was Just ~ry:..ng to explain that they were
11 do:..ng two d::ferent thlngs that are not supposed to be done at
12 the same tlme.
13 DO: Alright. Noted, and we':: move on.
14 Q. Wrien you were g~ve~ your order ~o move up, I be:ieve
15 you sa~d that there were seve~teen sites or facilit~es that you
16 had responsibi:ities for?
17 A. We did not have seventeen at the time.
18 Q. Okay. Could you :USt te:: me when you first took over
19 command and then you moved up and then eventually got seventeen,

20 i~ yo~ could just oriefly go through that scenario, how it got
21 to be from when you flrSt arrJ..ved in country and were told to


DOD 000124
move forward and then there were seventeen? How did that come
2 about?
3 A. Well, they had--a~d : can tell you very quickly--~hey
4 were operating Bucca, they had five battalions there, and :hat
5 includes one 0: the liaisor. battalions. They had, at the
6 fulles~,: t~ink they had about eight-thousand EPWs if I reca:l
7 the stats correctly. ':'he maJority of' them had been released
8 when the end 0= major host:'l:.t~es were declared. But the
9 battalions t~at were stuck at the mobe [phonetic] station,
10 pr:.marily Fort Dix, up un~i~ April and May timeframe, and some
11 of the~ were EPW battallC~S, they moved them to--on~ to Tawil
12 [phone::.c] a~d one to Ae ~:war.:aa~ :.n support of the marines
13 that were there, the ME? And they had two battalions north
14 ·a~ready:.n Baghdad suppor~ins, which became mine. So when I
15 came into the theater, we had primarily Bucca, where most 0= the
16 battalions were, and the~ we had one battalion at Ad Diwaniaah
17 in s~pport of the MEF, an~ one battalion at Tawil [phonetic], at
IS the a:.r base, that was a s~opp:.~g pOlr.:. I had two battalions
19 north when the FRAGO was published, when I took command, they
20 were a~so aligned under me: but they had beer. a:igned under the
21 CorDS. So, they had moved, "t.hey" belng my ops center--they got
22 the FRAGO and they moved two battalions north. Another one to
23 the ~VD facility in Baghdad and to do the local Jails, and one
DOD 000125

battalion up to the MEK, to secure the MEK compound. So we had
2 three facilities: a large one in Bucca and two other ones, up
3 until we moved to Baghdad. Then we kept those three and alsc
4 took responsibility :or the HVD facility and another battal.:.on
5 that was do~ng the local Baghdad jails. I. liaison battalion up
6 in Mosul, one up in the MEK securing the Iranians, and then
7 :iaisor. ba~ta:ion at CPA.
8 Q. Qui~e a number 0: d:verse locations throughout the
9 ent::.re counr.ry?

10 A. Yes, sir. The ent::.re co~r.try. A large AOR.
11 Q. How did that actually work? A few times you sa~d,
12 "they." Was CJTF7 d~rec:::..n~ W:lere you would place your
13 battalions or d~d they :us: turn the mission over to you and yo~
14 decided where the ba::al:.ons wo~ld go and which units would
15 deploy in wh~ch locations? r.ow did that actually work?
16 A. I don': tnink they care, but that's just my
17 op:.nicn, except for they wanted us to keep a battalion---­18 O. The "they" lS CJTF7?
19 A. The C:TF7. General Sanchez, General wodjakowskl, and

20 the planners wanted us tC keep a battal:on--instructed us to
21 keep a battalion at the a::..=por: tc do the HVD facility, the high
22 valuedeta.:.nees and to run ~he Corps holding area.

DOD 000126
Q. This was Camp Croppe~?
2 A. Camp Cropper.
3 And they ins~ructed us to send a battalion to Aj Sharaf
4 [phonetic) to secure the MEK. To do a relief in place with ~he
5 ir:fantry battalion t.1at was there­-I think It. was armor, and
6 secure the MEK. They lns:r~cted ~s to coordinate with the
i Prisons Department of the 20a:ltior. Provisional Authority to run
8 detention operat~ons as req~J.red and to maintain a company at
9 Abu Ghraib to restore the Jai::'s to operational standards and
10 ~hen transfer the prisoners that were being held there--there
11 was less than one-hu~dred :J.:ty, I thin~, at the time, that had
12 been t~rned ove~ to Abu Ghraib by some of the divisions. So we
13 had to come up Wltr. the pla:: 0: whe~e the battalions were going
14 :'c be and what mlssion they were gcing to do. That was why it
15 was so ~mportant dur~ng the =~rst week in Baghdad that we speak
16 to the coalition Provislonal Authority Prisons Department
Ii because they had started au: by saylng ~hat they had already
18 ldentified fifteen jai:s a::d they weie still traveling around,
19 "they" being the command sergeant inaJor from the Corps MP

21 22 23 traveling around identlfying other facilities. And I said, the meeting, I said, "~lme out. I don'~ have an unlimited number of MPs. We have to get the most bang for our buck. at Tell
AG0000039 DOD 000127

I said, "Then we'll go and talk to the ambassador,
2 because I can't .make more MPs appear. I have certain things
3 that I have to do. I have to continue to run Bucca," I wen:
4 down the list. So he said he would take a look at the list.
5. An~whowas the senior guy, he was an Irishman who
6 ran the Prisons Department, he. told me that he understood tha:
7 that's absolutely what we hac to do and we would do that. And I
8 said, "Look, if I can take an MP company and run a prison, it
9 makes more se:1se to be holding three hundred prisoners than it
10 does to be holding seventy."
11 He said, "I agree."
12 So, that's what they were focus1ng on, and they got it
13 dowr. to seve~ ir. Baghdad, a couple outside of Baghdad, one that
14 they were :00king at down in Basra. So w€ were planning,
15 te:1tatively, the battalions ~hat were still down in Bucca, we
16 were p:anning on where we would shift them depending on where
17 :he prisons materialize. They were supposed to have contractors
18 come l~ to rebui:d the prisons or at least supervise the
19 rebuildi~g of prisons with loca2 contractors. Sir, I can tell
20 you that the only prison that was u~der construction with the
21 :unds that they were expend~n9 for reconstruction was Abu
22 Ghraib, because r had my 72 1ld MF Company out there.
DOD 000129

1 Q. And those othe~s, there wasn't enough funds ~c do
2 construction?
3 A. There was funds. They were funded, but there was some
4 question when the contracto~s left, after their 90-day contracts
5 were :~nished anc they were giving the--it was not my
6 respons:bility to go ou:---­
7 DO: It was the CPA ~esponsibility.
8 WIT: It was.
9 Q. But they were hav'ing ci.:£ic'..llties fulfilling that
10 m:ssion to reconstruct those?
11 A. Well, not accorcing to thei~ timeline, sir, because
12 every week 0:::­more o:ter. they would prov~de :::0 me how this
13 partic,--,la:::­facL.l ty "X" --hoy; i:. hac this much more capaci:y now
14 :::-estored. So I was b:::-lef:'-9 the ambassador once a week, a~
15 leas:.; and I was brie:ing General Sanchez at least once a week
16 on lncreas:ng capaCity. They had slmilar goals, that being get
17 Iraq:s back into Iraqi prison facilit~es and t'..l:::-n it back over
18 to the Iraqls, but they had a different mot:vation. General
19 Sanchez was interested beca~se he wanted us to be more available
20 to do securlty detainee ope:::-atlons--specifically milita~
21 operat~ons, and Ambassador Bremer was inte:::-ested because he
22 wanted this to do be an Iraq: m:ssion. But it was of one mind,
23 "Give us a brief ing on the tlme line."
DOD 000130

1 the detention operations. You tell me the locations. We' 11 do
2 ar:. assessment. It real:y makes no difference to me where they
3 are. I have MPs allover Iraq." I've been 0'.1:: to Abu Ghrait.
4 I:: has some aspects that we don't have a:: any other prison
5 facilities. It was _arge ar:.d i.t had a large wall around it, but
6 the humanitarian organizations anc CPA were vehemently opposed
7 ~c ~t, and it was a big discussio~.
8 Q. Is that because of its history, the humanitarians?
9 h.. Yes, sir. They said there were--"The Ghosts of Abu
10 Ghraib, " was the title 0: one 0: ~heir position papers, because
11 there were stories a~d a 10: 0: truth to it. They found the
12 ropes, they found the hanging chambers, they saw the--there was
13 a :ot 0: t~in~s that were ourned that I guess he set fire to a
14 lot of :ac~:ities to hide past travesties and everything, but we
15 went to a lot of facilities that were absolute n~ghtmarish, but
16 Abu Ghraib, with its we::-~nowr. reputation--I never participated
17 in a discussion or even listened :c a discussion where anybody
18 talked about it being a long-term, restore Abu Ghraib to pre-war
19 standards and use it as a facil~ty. Never. Never, ever. It
20 was always discussed as, "out we need to use Abu Ghraib now
21 because, number one, it's large, number two, some of the cells
22 inside can be refurbished with l~ttle investment, millions as
23 opposed to hundreds c: mill~ons, and the wall is still ~n tact
DOD 000132

use this facility temporarily because we could run one facility
2 anc how several hundred as opposed to running five facil.:.ties
3 ana housing the same number.
4 Q. Who was addressing the force protection issues, if
5 anybody, relative to the locatioh of Abu Ghraib, asije from the
6 humanitar~an issues and its dark h~story? Who was raising, if
7 anyone, who was raising concerns or addressing the issues of
8 where it was specifically located, the surrounding area, whether
9 lt was a de:ensible site, those types of things?
10 A. Wel~, the CJTF7, the Corps MP Brigade, selected that
II location early on in the war because there was a wall there and
12 because the sector belonged to the First Armored Division. The
13 lsth M? Brigade--why do : keep say~ng that? The corps MP
14 Brigade, Fifth MF Brigade--F::th Corps MF Brigade--maybe they
15 are the 18th MP Brigade. Maybe that's why I keep saying it, but
16 whatever the MP Brigade ~s, they support it--First A-~ored
17 D~vision. That was their m~ssion in Baghdad. They provided MP
18 support to the Armored Dlvis~on.
19 So they selected that slte because they knew that they
20 had very few prlsoners ln there d~ring the war and they were
21 actua:ly pO~lced up during con=llcts where they would be looting
22 or stealing a car or bust~ng a checkpo:nt or whatever. And they
23 knew that the A--rmored Dlvisionpatrolled that area and could
DOD 000134

provide force protection for ~t. When we got there, the 72" MP
2 Company immediate::'y­--­
3 Q. But you got there after the decision was made to use
4 it. !'m still interested in who sat down--and I've been out
5 there an~ you've been out there, and you look at it, and it's
6 jus: not a good place from a de=ensive standpoint. It's in'the
7 middle of the Sun::i Triang:Le, it's surrounded by a network of
8 roads, it's got open fields, ~:'s got urban areas close to it.
9 It's just not a good place.
10 So who was it that was looking at that perspective
11 before the decision was made to place them there?
12 1-... Absolutely. The 0:::::';; pe::-son who was mentioning that
13 perspective was me, and: was me:::~oni::g it because, in spite of
14 the fact that major nosti:1tles were over, sir, that location
15 was bein~ mortared three nlghts out of the week. And my guys-­
16 the largest vehicle they had was a :ive-ton.
17 Q. WeI:, we':l get to the defense and the force protection
18 issues, b~: :'m still at who was it that thought about that, if
19 anyone?
20 A. Yes, sir. ~ said to General Wodjakowski, : said to
21 General Sanchez, who said back to me when I sald, II It never


DOD 000135
makes good sense, sir, to run a prison operat~on 0: any kind i~
2 the middle of a hos~ile fire zone."
3 And General Sanchez said to me, "The war is over."
4 Q. When did that conversation occur?
5 A. September?
6 Q. September was af~ey ~he decision was made and they were
7 actually moved ~nto it. ~ere there ~ny---­
8 A. Then it had to be before that, because the decision had.
9 no": been made yet by the ·CPA.
10 DO; The first units moved ~n in July, so the 72nd actually
11 ayrived there :'n July. ---­
12 Kr~: They m~ght have even been there before :::hat, because
13 :hey---­
14 DO: ~hey may have bee~, but my recollect~on was that they
15 had .ctually arrived i~ July.
16 WIT: They came under us start~ng ~n July, but they were
17 a:ready on the ground, I :::h~nk, securing those prisoners there,
18 but tha: decision was made---­
19 Q. So somebody before that had to--so your conveYsation
20 with General Sanchez, if that occurred in September, had to have


DOD 000136
occurred well after the decision had already been made to put ~t
2 out there.
3 A. Yes, 5i=. But at that time--I believe chis, and I
4 wouldn't want :0 defend a decision that was made by the CJTF7,
5 l:-ut they were--they had some tents, and t:hey had detainees
6 there, and it was ---­
7 o. In the very beg~nning?
8 A. In the very beginning.
9 ----I don't know i: they ever planned to make it a
was going to be an Iraqi
11 prison, they wou:'dn': have cared.
12 I talked to General Sanc~ez about why we were going to
13 :im~: the 5~ze 0: refu=b~shmen:, because it was not a good idea
14 fo= the :raqis, even; to be usino this fac~lity.
15 Q. Okay. Before we ever. get to the refurbishment, I'm
16 st:'11 t.ryl.ng :c +,. •.J..l.ne out, was there anybody that actually looked
17 at the force protection issues connect.ed to Abu Ghraib?
18 A. Not tc my knowledoe. No: when the decision was made to
19 occupy.
20 DO: Not when the de=l.sior. was made to occupy.
21 WIT: I b=ought it up because---­


DOD 000137
Q. And you brought it up to who?
2 A. At first :r brought ::.t up t~and to....
4 Q. And what did they say?
5 h. And they said ~t'S only--"That's why we're ~alkin9
6 about an interim facil:.. ty. ,. So then when they were talking
7 about lons:-terrr: use, be::.n9 twe years, that is when I had the
8 conversatior. that this was neve= a good idea to run a prison---­
9 CO: And that was a::e.=wa=os--that was after the decisio:-.
10 had al~eady been made, anc ur.: tS had already been placed there,
11 anc deta:.nees were alreac;.-.. there.

13 DO: :I~ not say:r.s :..: sno~ld,-'t be addressed, I'm j~St 14 say:n:;:.: 's a ::iifferer:: t::ne pe::::oc. 15 W:"r: 'Yes, sir. 16 Q. Okay. Se now Abu G~:::a~b has beer: chosen. Anci you said 17 that during that se~ect~c,-precess, you had actually been to Abu 18 Ghra~b. Car. you tel: me the :i.=st tlme yo~ were at Abu Ghraib? 19 A. It was on that wh:~lw:.nd tour. I went out there w:.th

and---­21 Q. So the 72~ was a:ready ::.r. place? 22 A. A~ready::.n place---­
DOD 000138
Q. So that would have been in June, then?
2 A. Right. ~ate June.
3 Q. And---­4 A. &~d they had fer a month. At least a month.
5 Q. SO they perhaps had gotter. there i~ May?
6 A. Right.
7 Q. Were there any, at ~hat point, when you made the
8 whirlwind ~our, were there detainees present then?
9 A. There were prisoners that were the loot.ers, the

10 cr~minals--m~nor crimes really, t.hat. t.he divisions didn't want.
11 to carry along with the~ during their operations, so they just
12 dropped them off there to the MPs.
13 Q. But they were a:l ~r~n~nals--?

. 14
A. All criminals. 15 DO: To your recollection, they were all criminals. 16 Q. When was the nextt:~me--then you took over commar..d and 17 YOL had this major missior. that was assigned to you, when was 18 next time that you actually visited Abu Ghraib after that 19 initial Whirlwind Tour?
20 A. We got up to Baghdad, anc I went out there, probably 21 the second or third day I was in Baghdad, becaus 22 the contractors under CPA, wanted to meet me 23 ou~ there.

DOD 000139
O. When you were--when you arrived in Baghdad, where was 2 your headquarters? Was i~ in Victory? 3 A. It was. 4 Q. So you and ~he headquarters for the Booth was located at 5 Victory? 6 A. At Vic~ory. 7 Q. And then you got a message from CPA that they wanted to 8 meet you out there? 9 A. Right.
10 Q. And what was the subJect of that discussion? Why'd 11 they want to meet you? 12 A. They wanted to talK about what parts of the prison they 13 were look~ng at, getting the con~~actor ~n there to do the work 14 fer refu~bishment, and what parts of the prison grounds would be 15 available for troop liv~ng area. We walked the ground just so 16 we had a common feel for why they were only refurbishing a 17 portlon of the prison, how the hanglng chamber was going to be 18 segregated from the rest of ~he p~~son--reallYI their concept 19 of---­
20 Q. Was the 72~ still =here at the time? 21 A. They were.

DOD 000140
Q. And captainllllllllllfwas the commande~? 2 A. He was.. And by tha: time--no, it was in July that the 3 32C th MP Battalion moved up there. 4 Q. And why was the--was it you~ unit's decision to move 5· the 32 0t:h MPs there? Did the BOOt:h, you, decide to move the 320t:h 6 there? 7 A. The lay ciown of the ·.mits of where they were going to 8 move:o was made before I took over commanci. General Hill asked 9 the operations people to de that prior to my arrival. As:
10 said, before I eve~ took com~nd, some of the units had already 11 ""oved. 12 Q. And when yo~ the~ took over and you saw that there was 13 a plan In place and the 32ct~ movlng to Abu Ghraib was part of 14 that plan, did you object to ~t? D~d you say that's 15 u~~easonable or any issues w~th that? 16 A. I didn't object to that. I said: think we have to 17 keep a couple of battallons available for contingencies, because 18 I don't get a good feellng from C~TF7 that they know where 19 they're going to use us completely. And i: we spread them thin
20 and then have to ~elocate them agal~--: wanted min~mal 21 disruptlon to the soldiers.

DOD 000141
incidents take place. The largest one was the prisoner abuse at
2 Bucca, and he was not in the theater when that happened. He was
3 back in the United States. He has twin sons that were
4 graduating from high schoo: and were going off to Annapolis. He
5 had asked General Hill before he even deployec.' if he waul,} allow
6 him to come back for their graduation. General Hill lived up to
7 tha: promise. So while he was back in the states, tha~ incident
8 took place. According to ::lIT., there was an umbrella of
9 discrimination against the 320:~ th~t had taken hold at Bucca,
10 and he wa~ted to move to a different location.
11 Q. That sounds unusua:. W~at was your assessment of that
12 conversatl.on?
13 A. We':'l, I asked h::.r. \" ..a:--ne said--when he came back and
14 he fou~d out about those lnc::.den~s, the soldiers were telling
15 him that even though they weren't involved in that incident and
16 they did the right thing, they reported it, other soldiers that
17 ~hey had bee~ livi~g wlth a: Bucca were suddenly, "Oh, wait a
18 tnlnute, you're with the 320t:L : don't want to talk to you."
19 They felt that--he felt--anc: he felt tha: it was legitimate that
20 the soldiers were telling hlr.". tta::, you know / "The sooner we can
21 get out of Bucca, the better it will be for all of us."
22 Q. Other than this--the prior l.ssues relatlve to prisoner
23 cibuse at Bucca, was there any lssues that caused you to question
DOD 000142

Q. Now, the MPs that did that, were they members of the 2 320th MP Battalion? 3 A. They were. Of the headquarters. Yes, sir. 4 Q. And did Lieutenan: Colonel

take corrective 5 action--disciplinary action on those soldiers? 6 A. He did. He did a C:D report, an investigation was 7 done, he referred them for court-martial. The Article 32 was 8 done at Bucca. This was over months of time. 9 Q. Were there any o:her similar ~ncidents that happened
10 witt the that you are aware of, either before you took
11 command or after you took command?
12 A. No, sir.
13 C. That was the onlY ~ncident that occurred?
14 A. Rlght. Now, there were a couple 0: other incidents at
15 Bucca, bu: they didn": d:..rec:ly---­16 DO: :'m just referri~g to the 32Cth at th~s point.
17 WIT: Okay. But no prlsoner abuse cases--just disciplinary
18 cases.
19 DO: Right.

20 Q. Well, were any 0: those dlsciplinary cases involving

A. ~hey were not.
DOD 000144
Q. So the 320tn arrives at Abu Ghraib. And why were we
2 going from a company to a battalion? What was changing that?
3 You know, the company had a few detainees. So why were we now
4 sending a batta:io~? What was the plan?
5 A. Well, when the uecisior. was made to establish--General
6 Wodjakowski asked me to establish a location where we could hold
7 numbers of Iraq~ crim~nals, and Abu Ghraib looked like the
8 place.
9 c. Now, is that his assessment when you say that?

10 A. Sir, it had to have been either some information that 1] he hac e~ther got from COlcne~who was the Provost 12 Mars~al: on the staff, or :rom CClonelllllllP because he never 13 gOt a brlefing from me, and Genera: Wodjakowski was never out at 14 Abu Ghraib. So he had to be briefed by somebody. 15 Q. Did you decide to pUt all of those detainees there? 16 A. I did not.. 17 Q. YOL were told t.hat that's where t.hey were going to be 18 going? 19 A. He told me he didn't care---­
20 Q. General Wodjakowsk~?
2] A. General Wodjakowsk~ told me he didn't care if I
22 selec.ted a site in the middle of the highway, but he wanted it
23 quick and Abu Ghraib looked like the most likely location.

DOD 000145
Q. When did you have that conversation where he made that
2 statement?
3 A. That was before the 320~t came up to Baghdad. We knew
4 they were coming up to Baghdad, but before they.came up to

5 Eaghdad to move to Abu Ghraib, that conve~sation took place.
6 Q. In a time period, tha~ would've been July?
7 A. Later than that, s~r.
8 Q. August?
9 A. Probably.
10 Q. The 3220tt arrived? 11 A. September.
12 DO: I'm tr.ink~ng before that.
13 Do you remember wnen the 320th arrived?
14 RC: Sir, I think they arr~ved somet~me around the
15 September timeframe--September, October time:rame.
16 DO: WeI.:, i ~ was before October. I know that.
17 WIT: But we had to put them somewhere.
18 Q. They being?
19 A. The 320u. We weren't sure that they were actually
20 go~n9to build a internment fa~i~::. ty at Ab~ Ghraib at that 21 poi:-.t, when they first go: to Baghdad. But we knew we didn I t 22 have any place at Victory. We wan~ed them up in Baghdad to be
23. able ·to move, because it was safe at that time--relatively safe.
DOD 000146
RC: Would you like to take a break now, sir?
2 LA: I: this is a logical poin:.
3 DO: Yes. And, by the way, if, in fact, at any point in
4 time, if you become fatigued or if for any reason you need to
5 take a break, just raise your hand and say you need a brea~.
6 [The deposition recessed at 1561, 18 July i004.]
7 [The deposition was called to order at 1513, 18 July 2004.]

8 Questions by the deposition officer (continued): 9 Q. Going back to when you :~rst saw Abu Ghraib and you 10 firs~ showed up there and you saw its condition, and you briefly
II descr~bed to us its condit~on and I've been there--of course, I
12 was there wel: after the time per~od that you first visited
13 there. Cculd you just tell me who it was you told at CJTF7
14 abou~ the substandard 9r poor cond~tions that existed there?
15 A. I told General Wodjakowski and:: told General Sanchez,
16 and: also told Ambassador Bremer.
17 Q. And to the best of your recollection, when did you have
18 those specific conversations with :herr.?
19 A. I: had to be the firs: weeK of--probably around or

20 about the or the lOth_ -probably not the first formal week of atb 10th
21 July, but around the , the , ::he 12th_ -sometime after that 22 visit, because I--and I said to him, "Sir, come out and see it 23 ~f you wan:."
DOD 000147
He said, "Maybe I '11 get out there one day, but: :: '11
2 . take your word for it."
3 Q. And General Sanchez, when did you have a conversation
4 with him?
5 A. Well, the br~efin9--when j talked to General
6 Wodjakowsk~ about it, it was part of a briefing that was going
7 to be given tc General Sanchez, and the way that it worked was
8 you had to go and brief General Wodjakowski first, he'd make
9 some changes, and ther. you had to go and brief General Sanchez.
10 So it had to be within not ~ore than 48 hours after T talked to
11 General Wodjakowsk~ about It.
12 Q. And Ambassador Bre~er, when did you talk to hlm about
13 It?
14 A. Not just once. _ ta:kec to Ambassador Bremer a lot.
15 And: 've already talked about the conditions out at Abu Ghraib·.
16 So I wanted it to be fresh In their mind every time I spoke to
17 any of them. So it was around the same timeframe. And, as I
18 said, I had to brief Ambassadcr Bremer at least once a week on
19 how the prlsons were doinS and how the proJect was com~ng.
20 Q. And as the mission was progressing, there were more
21 detainees that were being sent to Abu G~raib beginning, I


DOD 000148
building materials up there. Again, went back to General
2 Wodjakowski and said, you know, we canlt even get building
3 materials up there. The train was looted, blah, blah, blah.
4 That kind of th~ng. I mean, we're just talking briefing him
5 about t~e delays, because he was pressuring us to gpt those
6 compounds built so they could take the prisoners out of the
7 division hold~ns areas and p-..:t them in Abu Ghraib. We knew that
8 we had expans~on capability at Abu Ghraib under tents in regular
9 detent~on compounds. Whe~ t~ose compounds were in~tially
10 fin~shed, we'd have ho-..:s~ng fc~ up two thousand, an expans~or.
11 capabi:~ty that we had noped wou~d never come up to eight
12 tho-..:sand addit~onal compo~~ds.
13 So we were hold~n9 p~obably eight hundred--four hundred
14 ·in each compound. And as the contractor work was completed and
15 that long hallway of cellb:ocks were open--we transferred
16 pr~soners out from under the tents ir.to the facilities.
17 Likewise, there was two fac~li:ies downtowr. called Tas Ferat and
18 Russafah, that were be~ng refurbished and we were transferr~ng
19 pr~soners down there as wel~. : mean, the plan that we had was
20 working. We were going tc get p~isoners out from under canvas
21 ~nto hard facilities. T~ey had a smaller compound constructed-­
22 and the outside compounds, the larger one was called Gancci and
23 then the smaller one was cal~ed Vigilant. We only used Vigilant
DOD 000149

fo:::­ housing crimes against -:he coalition or "security detainees"
2 as they were ultimately called. We had less than eighty in
3 V~gilant, and they had to be segregated from the Iraqi
4 prisoners. So s~ill had a very small population, but the
5 maj ority elf it was under canvas.

10 1 . we-...J....t
11 there

Q. Now that was in the beginning?
A. That was in the beginr.~ng?
Q. Up to what point?
A. Up to September, a~d I could be wrong on that date as but around the September timeframe, because that was when was more. I be:ieve ~hey had just caught the sons, Uday
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2] 22 23 and Qusay, and then there was renewed interest and far more a=tiv~ty in the effort to .get Sadaam. That was the thing they were holding out to--not o~ly CJTF7, but CPA--if they could get Sadaam then the insurgencies would reduce and we could get back on ~rack about going home. So there was a lot of activity. They'were running these ra~ds. The f~rst one, which was classifi.ed at the time, the t:.tle of it was called "Operation Victory Bounty." So whenever that operation was taking place, that was the f~rst. And they policed up those detainees, those people, those prisoners in raids. Ca:led them all deta~nees-­tagged theM all as deta~nees, transferred them all to Abu Ghraib, primarily from Fourth ID area, and--for example, we
AG0000062 DOD 000150

asked ehe military intelligence interrogators, and ehey were
2 only military people doing interrogations there at the time. We
3 asked them, you know, "How long are you going to keep them in
4 Vigilant?" Because we were right on the verge of closing
5 V~gilant down altogether. We had reached a poine where we had
6 transfe~red most of the Iraq: prisoners into hard facilities
7 whether downtown or out at Abu Gr.raib. And we were just maybe
8 days away from closing Vigilant completely. General Wodjakowski
9 said,"Keep it open, because we I re going to put the prisoners
10 from V~ctory Bou::1ty there."
11 So the first night that they brought prisoners in, they
12 brought in about 37 pr~sone~s. The interrogators did an in~tial,
13 lnterview, and they determl'ned that only two 0: the people had
14 any ~ntel valile that they cou:d exploit. The rest of them were
15 Just no value, wrong assoc~a~ion, whatever. At the Separate
16 Uni:: Update the next night. I briefed that we were about to
17 close V~gilant because--un:ess he gave us further instruct~ons,
18 because we only had ,two prisoners that the military intelligence
19 people wanted to keep because they had additional value.
20 He turned around and he said, "Who told you that?"
21 I said, "Sir, Colonel Pappas told me that it looked
22 like ,they were only going to ask to keep two."
DOD 000151

1 I said, "What are you sorry about?" And I said, "We'll
2 keep them. I'
3 He said, liMa' am, there's no value in keeping therr.. "
4 I said, "Well, apparently there is, because General
5· Wodj akowski was pretty clear. We're not going to release
6 anybody unti.l we get fu:::-ther instructions."
7 And he said, ":'his is why our population is growing out
8 there, because we can't ge: anybody released." And then he told
9 me a little bit about how the mobile interrogation teams worked
10 at the divisions if they workec the right way.
11 Q. wr.o are you referrins to? CaPtai~
12 A. Captai=--He sale., "But, we'll do what they tell
13 us to do."
14 So then two nlghts later, there was another forty that
15 were brought in. And the~ another one of the divisions brought
16 in fifteen. Then the populat~on started to grow and then they
17 outgrew Vigilant and we had to put them back ln to Gancci. And
18 we .had security detainees In some 0: the compounds and prisoners
19 in some of the compounds.
20 Q. And, ultimately, because 0: all of these operations, as
21 I understand it, the populat~on--and also because the numbers
22 being released did not match the numbers coming in, ultimately,
DOD 000153

the population grew to about five or six thousand. Is that your
2 recollection?
3 A. Yes, s~r. And quickly.
4 Q. Now, during that: ~ime, "quickly "--now, my time period
5 that I' Tn asking you about is between July and Januar}, so that
6 time per~od. During that tlme period, could you tell me how
7 £requen:ly YOL had conversations with General Wodjakowski
8 s?eci£ically about conditlons out there and your requests for
9 support ln order to address some of the short falls?
10 A. Every other night, at a minimum, I talked to him about
11 ~t. T talked to him be:ore the Su~ got under way. I talked to
12 hlm--I briefed him as an ~te~ fc~ my--I mean, he often said to
13 me, "Look, I don't want to hea~ that anymore. We're working on
14 ~t. "
15 Q. And what were the speci=ic things you were asking for?·
16 A. I talked about the ~orce protection. We still had no-­
17 it was the :irst item I a:ways briefed, that we had no force
18 protec~ion platforms ou~ ~here and the soldiers were becomlng
19 increasingly concerned. The mortars were not coming over the
20 inside wall, yet. but it was Just a matter of time. The
21 condltions for the prisoners and :or the soldiers, and with the
22 heat--he said, "Everybody is hot."
DOD 000154

"I understand that, but they've rationed wat.er, they
2 have no effective comms out there--"
3 "Well don't you have signal battalion?"
4 : said, "No, sir. -don't have a signal battalion. I
5 have s~gnal section, ant they are doing everything they can with
6 the equipment that they have. Again, we are a theater level
7 asset. We plug in to a mother ship.-And, sir, you're the
8 mother ship, and we're not gett~ng the support we need from
9 you."
10 He said, "Didn't: give you enough money to build those
11 compounds for ':wo thousand?"
12 Ar.d I said, "Yes / s:..r / you did, and I appreciate it.
13 But building the compounds and pU':t~ng prisoners in it mean that
14 you need equipment, you need water / you need food, you need a
15 lot of things to support the sold~ers who are guarding those
16 prisoners and the prisoners themselves, and we don't have any of
17 it. 1/ And I said the--"We're already taking care of the Iraqi
18 prisoners that we're hold~ng in the facilities that have been
19 refurbished because CPA isn't giving us any support, and now
20 you're not giving me any support." I said, "I'm going through
21 my commanders' emergency funds faster than I car. get the ink dry
22 on a piece of paper."
DOD 000155

1 He said, "We're looking at it. We're looking at it,
2 Janis. We're looking at i" II
3 And then the mortars came over the wall and killed six
4 prisoners. And they had nine med-evac flights that night.
5 Q. And when was that.?
6 DC : 1 7 August 2003.
7 A. So that's how lons those conversations had been taking
8 place. Now, when those mortars killed those prisoners, I called
9 General Wodjakowskl--I thlnk it was after midnight, and I said,
10 "Slr, mortars have come over the wall. It's killed prisoners.
11 We had nlne med-evac flights. -have no force protection out
12 there! : can't do much Wl:r. so::-side hummers and a few up­
13 armors. Theb::.ggest. p::.eceof equ:pment I have, as I've to~d you
14 before, is a 5-ton truck," and:: said, "We have one SO-Cal that
15 was borrowed from the MarInes." I said, "You have to give me
16 force protection platforms ou:. there. It's· First AD' 8 sector. II
17 And he said, "~hose are p::-isone::-s. We didn't kill any
18 soldie::-s. "
]9 And I said, "Sir, my soldiers are guarding those
20 r:=isone::-s. Soldlers are fly:ng those med-evac fl ights, and my
21 soldiers cons::.der those pr::.soners their responsibility, and
22 they're all out there at great risk. And you're not helping us
23 at all."
DOD 000156

1 And they still didn': help us. I will tell you that
2 the next day, because ~here was a lot of press inquir~es at the
3 briefing, they sent out two Bradleys, and they were at the entry
4 control point. Yo~ could see them from MSR Tampa. And when-­
5 they didn't want to go, and when they arrived, because they were
6 ordered from somebody from the CJTF7 operations section, I
7 don't --! think General Davis was still the 3--I don' ': know where
8 the order came from, honestly, sir, but they arrived, and that
9 was when the Royders [phonetic] team was out there and the
10 Royders [phonetic] camera mar. put 1:is camera up on his shoulders
11 a~~ through the w~ndow o~ the Bradley, it looked like it might
12 be a weapon, and they k~:led h~~. They shot him.
13 So, right after that, the force protection platforms
14 left and they didn't come back aga~n, because the--all of the
15 press attentio~, the med~a attent~on, died down again. About
16 two weeks later, more mortars came ~~, and it killed the MI
17 soldiers.
18 DO: You know, in my trc.~n~n9-.-our train~ng, relative to
19 protecting forward operat~ng bases, there are certain practices
20 and procedures that are mil~tary--Army approved: frequent
21 patroll~ng, preplanned arti:lery f~res, cutting off avenues of
22 approach and avenues of escape relative to the MSRs. All sorts
DOD 000157

of things that the Army teaches us need to be done to protect a
2 fo~ard operating base.
3 Q. Who's responsibility was it to make sure all of those
4 thi~gs were occurring a~ Abu Gh=aib?
5 A. First AD had tht"! s@ctor, but as I came to find out-­6 because I went to the currer.t ops section at CJTF7, and I said,
7 "W:..ll you sho",", me where t!1e sector lines are so I know who is
8 supposed to be providing force protection platforms?n
9 He said to me, "Or., ma'am. I know it's First AD, bu:

10 you're right on the seam and next to you will be the 62nd , but
11 rlght now------"
12 DC: Thi=d A::R.
13 A. ----ACR !"lad it. ':And theY're not providing anything

14 for you, so it·, 5 F1.rst AD' 5 re,5ponsibllity. There I s a curfew in 15 place, 5e the MSRs shou:'d bE: secure." And, "We don't know where 16 the mortars are coming from, but Flrst AD has a fan with----II 17 Q. Okay. But who's respons:..bil1ty lS it to make sure that 18 al: c: those things that : J~s: ment10nea were happening? 19 A. CJTF7. 20 Q. Not the forward operatlng base commander, whoever that 21 is? 22 A. First AD? We didn't---­
DOD 000158
Q. \'lho' s the fon'lard operating base commander? 2 A.. We didn't have one. 3 Q. SO it wasn't Lieutenant Col 4 A. 1\e . It was not. 5 Q. Okay. Who was the forward operating base commander in 6 the time period ~hat you are referring te? 7 A. Between July an~ January it =hanged. When they 8 declared Abu Ghraib a~ encur~ng camp. 9 Q. In Noverr~er we ~no~ that ~t changec, but before

10 Noverr.ber, when It--~n :::e ::r5: :llf,e perloc, which wO'..lld have II bee~ the :~ly, August. ~hen :~lS firs: attack o=curred. 12 September time period....... r.o was the forward operating base
13 commander? Who was responsible fer, if net co~trolling the
1~ patrolling and erderln~ the pa:r~lllng, making sure that someone
IS was doing that patroll:n;, ~ak:nS sure that there was pre­
16 planned flres? Who was responsible for those things?
17 A. COlonel_ who was the Provo V-arshall on the
18 staff, w~s--told General Wed3a~owskl that he was coordi~atlng
19 the support for Abu Ghrait, a~d he did not, or he didn't do it
20 the r igh: way.

DOD 000159

Q. But you didn't see Lie~~enant Colone
2 havi~g any responsibility in that area?
3 A. Sir, he was dOInq :or=e protectIon fer the un~t tha: he
4 had o-.:t there.
5 Q. On :he base ltself?
6 A. On :he base. He ~as no:---­7 Q. Die you see his responsibility goin9 ou~side the ~alls

8 and mak~ng sure that all o~ those things that should have
9 occurred--l 'm not say~ng :r.a: his units should have done it, but 10 that :-,e ha::i. the responsi:::::::y :0 make sure, or someone had the II respo~sibili:y to make s-.:re, that those things were, in fact, 12 occurr:ng o~:slde the walls. WhICh IS wh~re you really needed 13 :he ~crce prctec: lon?
15 c. Someone needed tc be cocrdlna:ing with, directly, wlth 16 el:her the Third ACR, 82"= AIrborne, Firs: Armored Division-­17 somebody haci ~o be Inter~~clng ~:~h :tcse people making sure-­18 "Wel: where are my patrols? v]hy is ::-,a: happen:ng?" Who was 19 cOlnS :hat? Who was having thc.: le.ve:' ccnversation? 20 ;... I: anybody was hav:n3 :nat level co~versa~ion, l: was 21 me wi:h Genera: Wodj akowski.

DOD 000160
Q. And that--that's the extent of it? It wasn't happening
2 below. you or General WodJakowski?
3 A. (The deponent indlcated a negative response.]
4 Q. How about the iss~e of clothing availability, which we

5 w:ll get into ln some de:ai: ~hen we get intolate~ portions o~
6 ocr inquiry here. B~: the :ssue of the lack of clothing was
7 mentioned frequently by ~e:h ~ilitary intelligence personne: a~d
8 ~illtary pollce perso~ne:. Can you tell me what you recall
9 abo~: your requests :or c~c:hln;?

10 w~~· For the priscners~

Yes. 12 l•. I: was--: brie:e~ :~e ch:ef of s:a:f--he was the Chief for CJTF:, t~: ~:5 eff:ce was down in CPA--General Hahn I';
I J so:

And I was ~=:e!-~9 n:~ en why we were short on 15 everyt.hJ..ng. The reason c~~:t:n9 beca~e such an ~ssue was 16 beccuse:: was ki~d o~ a ~:ddle 0: :~e ~oac ite~ where we 1i couldn't even get that. We cou:d~': even get bars of soap, 18 honestly, s:..r. We could~': ~Q-wash~as:ns. We couldn't. get 19 towels.
20 Bu: General Hah~ [pr.::::-.e::c) leaKed a: me in co:nplete 21 dlsbe:lef, and he said--he had a per. in his hand. He threw i: 22 dowr: or: hlS cesk, cnd he sa:d, "They are aski ng yo\.: to run an 23 en:i~e prison operatlo~ by ::-.e sea: of yo~= pan:s!" :-ie said,
DOD 000161
"I'm talking te these prisons people in CPA. They have funds. What's wrong with

It's ene of h~s s~bordinate
3 uni:s. ".
4 And there
5 those fa=ilities.
6 ':'hey were r.e:. If
"7 I they had over eight

was a line :or Iraqi prisons and prisoners i~
"It's a 2PA responsibility to fund -:hem." they were supposed to have--and they did,
rnillio~ ciollars--or~ginally they had about
8 twelve m~l!lcn dollars. and the~ the ~inistry of justice took
9 some o~ that back a~d le~: the~ ~ith just over eight million.
10 ':'he maJcr~:y c: that mo~e}·. a:lesedly, was spent on restor~ng
1 1 prisons and contract w~~~ 5~, when we asked for money for jump
12 s~~:.s, soap. t.:nderwe3.r. :.0",e:5-­
13 "vie're work::.nc on se:.:.::.ns a st.:pplemen:: to tr..e prisons
14 depar::-ne:-.:. "
J :'i I said, "t~ell. mean·.... r.:..le. yet.: have prisoners in there.
16 An:::' yo'...: h3.·;e :c pu: ther.-, :..n '...:~:..:orms." So! went to my fund.
17 And severa~ times we trled to ;.ave :-ny :unds increased because of
18 the exten: 0: our respons:~~:::.:~es. I asked A~assador 3remer,
19 he didn't have any problem w~:.t :..ricreasing i:., but General
20 Sanchez did no: approve ::.r:=reas:..ng ::.t. He told me that I was
21 only supposed :'c be provld1ng the equ1pmen: ar:d the 10g15ti::s
22 for the se=urity detalnees and, you know, he was funding me, or
23 I had enough ir: my emergency :unj to provide for that. Well, ~
DOD 000162

didn't, because I was using my emergency funds for every
2 prisoner we had. General Patrais [phonetic], up in 101st, a
3 couple of times s~pplemer.ted for the prisoners up in his sector,
4 but t~e other divisions d~d not. So there was never enough
5 money. And t!1en when we had the money, they'd send us --we'd put
(i in an order for a variety of s~zes, and we'd get the order 0:
7 Jump suits in and 300 of :.ne;,-, would be large and the rest of
8 the:n would be medium or -::':1y. Most of t;'em couldr.'t wear them.
9 I twas J us: one of numer:::-.,:s :.mpediments to success, but we were

11 Q. Wher. was the ::.rs: :.:.me that a military intelllgence
12 ur'.:' :. arrived at P.bu Ghra:.c :0 your recollect':'on?
A. interroga:lc~ teams were out there early--as soon
14 as tr.e;· starcea to :ake--::~a:. smal~ ::!roup of detainees that we
15 had, they were out ttere to interrogate them. Then Co:'onel
16 Pappas was out there ::0 che=~ on :~em and he stayed over nioh:
17 severa: t~mes.
18 C. This was in the beg:nn:.ng?
19 k. ~his was in the ~eg:.nnin9.
20 A~d t~en after his M: soid~ers were ~i!led by a mortar
21 a:tack---­
22 Q. Well, if we could ~us: go--back i: up a little bit
23 relative to the tlme line. Tne :':'rst M: unit, I belleve, was a
DOD 000163

contingent from the 519c~ M: Battalion. It was A Company o~ JUs:
2 a segmer.t of A Company, be:~g so~e of their i~~errogators.
3 arr:ved around July. I belleve.
;... Late July or Au~us:.
5 c. Did you meet w:l.~h any cf their leaders when they firs:
7 There ~as a lleu:e~a;.:. ! don': recall h~s ~ame. And
8 they were--: asked the~ l~ there was anyth:ng we could do fer
9 :he::-.. They said ~ha~ they ~ere ~~rkin9 w:th Cap:ai
10 Were there any lss~es 1~ the very beglnning rela:ive to
11 r-::/:.:? \vori-::.ng rela:lons~
1~ 1"'••
c. Any prctlems that ~ere =r~~ght :c your atten:lon, i~
IJ :he be;:.;.~:~;. ~he~ they ~:rs: s~owed up?
15 ,r.... ~c, s.:.r.
16 An:: ho~ o:te;., :he ~eg:nn1ng, in the :uly, A~gus:-­

1"7 no: In September, yet, the J~ly,
19 20 21 n. . • do~': wan: :c sa)' every day. was s:.:.:':' :nere. a;.d cO:'cne:._ the everyday, and: was out :;,e:::-e a ml.:::.mum because :.: was l.n Baghda~. _ mea~. i:

August timefra~e, how
but 1: waS­cepu:y. was out there of t~ree times a week, was the most accessible.

DOD 000164
Q. And you had seventeen different sites, but yet you were
2 visiting Abu Ghraio very freque::.tly when you consider the
3 numbers 0: sites that yeu h3C responsibility for. Why? Why vias
4 Abu Ghraib so high on your l~st ~o see so frequently?
5 A. There was construction work goin~ on o~t there. There
6 was still this ongoi~g dlS:ussio~ about whether we were eve::.
7 gOlng ~o be al:owed to ~se ~:f so we had a conti~gency plan--i:
8 t~e h~ma::.~taria::. organizatlCns wo::., we weren't even going to be
9 able tC use it part tlme. ~j there was prob:ems with gett:ng
10 the bu~ljing ma~er:al tnere. Sc we were gOlng to start--so
11 there was a fecus. There was a let of activity going on out
12 theY"e. A~d lt was also e::. t~e way to other facilities. :i: ::::ould
13 over to Cropper and the::. a::.::::ner J.5 or 20 IT.inutes, -could be
14 o'...:t at A..... " Gnraib.
15 Now, when t~e 519:~ showed u~--they were there from the
lh beg:~nlng. And the::. yo~ had ~e~t:oned the Victory Garden, I
17 belleve it was?
IS A. V1Ctory Bounty.
1 Y Q The Victory Bounty cpeY"a:io~ which was the first o~e
20 where they believed that they wer~ gOlDg to crlng in all o~
21 these .aY"ge numbers 0: SadaaD ?aydayeen, and they were gOlng to
22 interrogate them there at Abu G~raib. And at some point the
23 pop~latio~ of the ~~llta~y l~:e::igence u~its grew. W:-:at was
DOD 000165

1 the next significant fac~ tha~ you remembe~ afte~ the July,
2 August timeframe~-and Sep~ember? Do you remember who was the
3 next MI leader ~o show up?
4 A. She was on site.
5 Q. And did YOL1 have a conve~sation wit_when
6 she:irst showed up?
7 p.•. -talked :c he~ seve~al times. She had been the~e--she
8 was a nev; :::ace, and she speci::::cally came to see me. She said,
9 ":;:'m ~unJj:"::g the interroga~l:J:-.s, and I'm goi:19 to be living ot:'C

I 0 ne~e . ' 11 ~ sa.:.::L "Is there ?;.~':hlng we can do for you? Anything l~ :/o~ need? P
13 She sa::.::::, "Nc. We have Just about everything we need
14 ::::::.;::-: r.ov:. i'ie'~ like tc see :r.cre 0: the det.alnees released." _ sald, "So woule. :::. Sc would everybody." Sut, t~ey were keep:n9 the~ separate, you know, just

17 k:'nd 0: ":his is w::'at we're cio:ng, this 1S what o'...!r plans are." 18 A:".d she had--I th:.nk she hac abO'..:: s:...x or eigh-: teams. So :hat 19 woulc be abeut eighteen cr twen:y-!ive lnterrogator teams. T:-.ey 20 ::'ad a separate interrogaticn fa=i~ity--a couple 0: them, under 21 ca:1vas. They were all set up. They nade that arrangement with 22 He save t::ern the area where they could 23 ope·rate.
DOD 000166
Q. And ini:ia2.1y :hey .....e:-e ope:-ating in tents?
2 A. Right. Yes, sir.
3 Q. D:J Y:JU remembe=-y..·her. :he--w::at 's known as the ha=-d s:..:e
4 was open? Also known as the lA, IE portion c~ the hard site.
5 Do you remember when that .....as opened?
6 A. Well. the lA and lE--they were ready first, because
7 t!1ev were a:: t he end of the : r::. r.; . and t1-:ey were the maximum

8 secur:..ty cel:s a~d everyth:~;. but that's w!1ere the contractors
9 sta=-ted at CPA's urging a~d desig~, and then they were gcing :c 10 wo:-k dOVlL tie ha11way. Il So. we didr.': w~~:: to put detainees in there--we did~': 12 war.: to put prisone:-s ~r. :~ere u~:i::" after the press conference, 13 ar.d they wanted to have p=-ess =cr.~erence so that all of these 14 repcrters could walk tr.=-cu~~ t!1€ ~acilities. And. it wasn't l~ only--: :nean. it was,,': o:-.~y ::-e:"lblock lA and B. but several
, --
16 c:.he::-ce:'ls na... !Jeer. a~sc. So had ttem setup like
stat:e dlsplays w:..:h the ~a::resses ar.d everything. The rr.edia 18 people ca~e cut there--there m~s: have been several hundred c~ 19 :he~--and looked thrcugh the faei::ty. sa~d that it was 20 cc~p:"e:ely different than =e:ore. There used to be--there was 21 reForts cr.at tierc was a hu:-.cred cramr;ted ~n a cell, and now
there's going to be twelve O~ fOl.;~::eer" "where a:::-e yo'...! going to 23 keep the popu2.a:ic:1." ".....e':::-e openlns mo:-e racillties, " that kind
DOD 000167
I said, "l know. We're 901n9 to start to cl".arge yo\.:
:2 rent. II
3 She said, "fo!;a' am, we need more."
4 And I said, "How many more? ,.
She sa~d, "well, we'd like all of them."
6 Q. Now when s:-.e sai:: "all 0: them," was she referring to
7 jus: :'A?
8 A. 1;".
9 I said, "=?A--:hose ~~isons guys are going to scream,"
10 :;: sal::, ": aor:': ':hlnK :r.':;':·s :. sood icea. They jus: ope:-.ec :.:,
11 ::hey' re ::he cnes :ha: ':l'..;: :::e :i.::ney ::.:-, there."
So, 0: those ral::s, c: :~ose operaticns like Vi=tcry
l ~ .' BO'.::'.:y, . & ycu arres: ]-ce==le a:-::i :Jr.ly tWO of t.hem have inte}
l~ ,value, yo~ wan: to se9re~~:e :he~ from the general popula~ion,
15 o:herwlse :~cse two wen': have any value either. ;c that' 5 wnat
1(, :~ey were using those lnci!~!ciua: cells fcr. And t::ey did,
1'7 aSKec Ma:cr_: :::-.:nK 15 the g'JY : as:'ed, "Tell me how
18 many they have ir: :here."
19 He sa:d, "!'12 9c n.3=K a!"1c ::!-.e=k :he numbers."

21 22 ")­--' :hey really ~eedec to :a~e co~=rc: of celln!cck lA. That would be 5e~tember. And I wer.: :dlllllllllllllland : as~ed them if t~ey would be ~greeable. Before I could even E]
DOD 000169

finish the request _asshaking his head "no."
2 said, "Let me explain to you why. This is nor. permanent, okay? 3 These are the ones that have value. If we ca~ put t~em lr. 4 there, then they can ge~ the lr.formar.ion and then they'll make Sup their mi~d whether they're gcing to release them or if 6 they I re Iraqi cr:.rni:-.als or ",'natever, b''':''C this is not per:nane::.::." 7 _al::, "::: de;:.'t agree with it. They 8 did::. ':: :i i f:: one finger." So ::here was oppositior:. 9 Eu

a:.o., "I think we should do this. I 10 ::h~~k we shoul6 go anead a~6 relinquish control. Bu'C you th.:.nk 11 it's te".pcrary?" 12 ]..:::d ::: scid, "1 rea_~y ac. Kow, : don't know what 13 'temporary I mearlS, but ::: :::-.:~k :.: 's :etr.porary." So I told h:~.

15 hlm wher. ::: told hin whenever it was, a week later. A:-.d ::: said.
; +­
16 so ycu can--ycu car. have ce::~~ock lAo They've agreed ::c
17 Q. ':'he er.::lre lA?
18 A. lA.
]9 Q. Sc, lD your :nir.d, w~er. ::ha~ decislOr. was nade, 20 ccr.::'..lr:-ed with by CPA, at .~hat pc:.r.t in time, MI would !-lave the 21 authorlty to plac~ their deta:nees :n lA? The entire cellblock?
A. Yes, 51:-.
DOD 000170
Q. ~~d that would s~i:: be ~r. September?
A. That would be :n Septer.ber.
3 Duri~g that conversa~io~, whe~tllllllllllllllas
4 objecting, he said, "This :s only the beginning. Mark my words:
5 T ..... 9 is cn:y tr.e beginning" AIld sure enough, a weei. or te~
6 days later, ~hey're ask::,~g ~or ce:lblock lB.
7 Kow, what was IB--a: this point ~n t.ime, what was 13
8 lntended for?
9 A. Well, :te h:gher--:he more violent crimes. Tr.e :::raqi
10 cr:m:.nals that wer-e gu:.::':y c: r:;8re--:ha: had been in 1". were
11 ~rans~er-rej ever to lB.
1~ v:her. was l t t:'at ttl':: dec:.s::"on was r.1ade, and who made
13 the decis:.or. that the luve~:.:es and the female detainees weuld
1 " .... :.~. :0 IE?
15 A. When we had a fa=ili=y--we had a facili~y downtown th~t
16 they were usi~9, Russafa~ an~ ~as Fera:. and they were hous:.ng
17 the :emale detainees dcwn there anc scme juveniles, because the
18 juvenile facility wasn't re:urb:shed yet. So when they said we
19 car. get mere r.1ale prisoners :~ ~as Fera:. ar.d Russafah if you
20 have a place to transfer the females and the Juveniles to. So
21 we sald the enly place we cou:c transfer :he~ :0 wculd be lB.
'"'I'" So, s:.nce IB--:he upstairs :ler was vacar.:, we =r-ansferred tte
DOD 000171

females ~p there and--we didn't have very many juveniles a: the
2 cime. I think they only transferred seven or e~gh:.
3 Q. SO the top par: was Juveniles---­
4 A. It was females and Juveniles.
5 Q. fl..nd 1B, the bott.orr. part, was serious cri:nina:'
6 offender-s?
7 .'!\ • C~lmi~al offender-so B~t we t.r-ansferred those serious
8 cr-~rel~a_ offender-s to Tas Fer-a: and R~ssafah in downtown because
they had serre lndiv~dua: c~:lclocks. Not like .~u Ghraib--no:
II) ~axi~u~ secur-i:y, bu~ they ~eye i~dividual and they suited che
I] pur-pose. ~~e only people :~a: ~e had that were really violent
12 offender-s wer-e ~ot guilty c~ t~ose ~iolen: offe~ses when they
we-::e b-::GuSh: ':::. They we-::E c:cked up loo:lng er­steal:ng a ca-::'
14 or­ItJ!'1a:eve:­thel!' C:.... lne It:as. 3~: -::arely was an Iraqi pr-isoner
15 brought i~ that was arrested for a vlole~t crime. The cops knew
16 who they wer-e and they said, "On, we:':', thlS guy has a history.
17 Yo\,;. know, ;)e she: 60 people," c:::­wha:eve-::. And ic may have
18 ul:1mately worked out that ttey were guil:y of a v10lent CrlITe
]9 this time and fleei~g 1~ a s:ole~ vehicle, but 1: was--the
20 snallest .percentage of our popu_a:10:: was really violent !r-aql
11 ::r-lrr.l.nals.


DOD 000172
Q. You began to :e1l ~e that ~here was a request abou: a
2 week l&:e~ for lB. Did M: the~ g~t authorlty ~or 15?

A. Yes, s.:.r .
4 Q. What was your des=~lptio~--or what is your descrip:io~

5 0: wha:'~: actually mean: that ~I--what did MI get as far as
6 c:::-.::-o1? :: near., d.:.:j they :'ave co:;.:::-01? I near.. who was·

actually runn:ng lA and :5~

He was ass:gned out there by C) Gcne:-a: ?as;:. 11
1"0 •

~.~ assigned i~ the mid to later II pa::: __ Se;:-:e;,o.be:-.

13 ass:~ned ~nde:­ -:ne who was the
14 . ::;.:::.:.:-,:: :::
15 ::::: no: _had o:-.ly arr"-vcd i:1
16 cou:;.::-\." a ::e....· days be:::n-f:­ he ~as se:-.: to Abu Ghraib.
v::T: : :n~nk he ~:g~: nave ~e~~ :ne:-e befo:-e that, s!r,
IS ~~ was~'t asslgned. r.E Bos~ia or A~ghanistan,
1:; He came f~om h~~e. He ~as ac:~al~~' aSSigned ~rom the

21 he .....as se!".: to Abu Ghra~i:;. He was :~ the very buildln~ that -.J€ ':-e :r..

DOD 000173
WIT: : know tha~ in SeFterrbe~, when cellblock lA and :5
wen: u~de~ the contro~ 0: the ~I, as the!:"e. He
3 arrive~. So! never really encountered him before that, exce;~
4 maybe seve~al times ove~--b~~ [pho~etic) talked
5 about :um.
6 DC: Yes. VJhen he : 1 ::::-s: got into coun:.~y, he was c.ssl.gnec
7 and [phonetlC: ~as the person who actually sen: ~i~
8 out to .n.b!.: Ghraib.
9 Q. • l:-.te~n;p:ed Yo~ we~e telling me who was it that
10 was--:-:olt,,' 'was .:.t belng ::o:-:::::-o~~ed"
11 We~l, cellblock :~ a:-:d IE was neve~ intended. and it
12 was :;.eve:::-l7ly thought. -­:-::::J:::::i;: eve::­ salCi. we 1 re goi!:g to do

14 mean, It ~as neve:::­ disc~sse~, neve::::­ suggested. Nothi:-:g.
15 Because at tha~ tlme they :-:ad the engineers building Facili~y
16 Wood, cu:.side of lA anc 1=. That was an interroga:.ion facilIty.
17 I do know' t ha idered himsel: to be
IS charge of t:-:e operat.:.cns :..n :;.. and lB.
19 We'll get ::0 who ~as .:.:-: charge relative co M:. but as
20 far as the cellblocks t:-:emselves, ho~ d.:.d It act~al:y operate?
21 Who was controlling the entry, the eXlt? Who's respo~sible for

DOD 000174

would go and get the priscner, tr~ng :hem back to the MI persc~, 2 they'd sisn for :hen and take them out for interrogation. 3 Q. Dld you actually ever visit lA and 137 4 A. Yes, sir. 5 Q. Wr..en was the f irs: ·-=:~rr.e that you remember?

(j A. Well, wher. it was 8elng refurbished, sc : could see 7 what :~e naximum secur:ty cel:s--I wanted to make sure the 8 hlnges were cr. the r:.gh: Slee. And :hen the day with the press 9 cc~£ere~=e. of course, we took them in there. And then the cay'
10 whe~ we actually tra~sferred prlscners :nside. And ~hen,
11 :::-ou::l~ely. =:very time ~ ..C_ = v:.s:.tec Abu G::ra~b, I d~d r.c: go
12 in::o cell::lock lA an:: _
13 Q. Bu: how !reGue~::v woulj yeu go in to lA and IS?

14 J.•. Well, :: was one ~~ the ~ew cellblocks that was 15 operatlonal out :~ere, sc : wou~d go, probably, safely, one o£ 16 eve:::-y three visits.
17 And wO".lld :ria: na\'e s:5.r:ec in September and lasted all

1'1 20 21 22 A. :\0. Slr. Q. Fro~ what perlod .:~ what period, then? p'" .?rom September ·..:r:t i~ t;:e I.uddle of l\ovember. trans:e:::­of the prison we;.~ u;.der ~I. W::en the
AG0000088 DOD 000176

Q. So from Septe~£er ~~rough Nove~be~, when the ?RAGO was
2 issued, you were coming ar.a you were vis':'ting maybe one tc three
3 times per week and were actual:y go~ng to lA a~d :B most of ~hat
4 t::..me?
5 A. Right. And there were several reasons for that.
6 That's where the females were. That's where the juveniles were.
7 That's where the mas: dangerous detalnees were. And then after
8 the handg~~ ~ncident l~ ce:lblcck 1A--: was there a day before
9 cr two days be:ore. So : sa~d,--: mear., we talked to the Iraqi
10 guards t~at were there, they Knew \..:.s, they knew tr.e. I just
II coulj nc: believe :ha~ there had been such a breech of security.
12 And ::: i-:no...; tha cc~~:dered h:mself to be :n
13 charae c: cellbloc~ lA a~c -0 at the time, because he is the or.e
14 whc haj ca:led ~e an~ tc}d me why he had silenced the MPs.
15 c c~ a:1 of those v~s~ts. and we'll go back to the

17 ~hose v~sits that you made, did yo~ ever see anything that could
. IS be considered or was, :n fact, atuse, such as naked detainees i~
19 :heir cells?
20 ;... !\8, sir.


DOD 000177
Q. Did anybody eve~ tell you--any of your MPs ever tell 2 you about any o~ .those ~ssues, s~ch as naked detainees in ~he 3 cells or any of those o':her :.:-.ings? 4 A. In the cells? No. But the MPs would say to me 5 'some~ines, you know, this prisoner wanted to be on a hu~ger 6 s:~ike, but tha:. lasted for a day, and then he heard the ra~cle 7 of the MREs, as they saic, so instead of being on a hunger 8 strike, ~e decided tha:. he was going to :ake his clothes off. 9 So he's ref~sing to wear ~~s clothes and the M: people took them
10 away so ~e does~'t hang r.:mself. 3ut we gave ~im an ex~ra 11 l::lanke::. 12 ! spec:flcally talked :0 the juveni~es, beca~se after 13 e~e time that they brought so~e :n, I saw a kid that was--he 14':'ooked like he was 8-years ole.. He' :.o::'d me he was almos'C 12.r 15 asked hi~ where he was =rom. He :o:d me his orother was there 16 wlth hi~, but he rea~ly wantee. ~o see his mether, could he 17 please call his mother. 'He was crylng. 18 Se, I never sa~ anything tnat was abuse or could be 19 considered abuse. When a prlscner was re:using to cat, he was-­20 he W3S "men:'ally ill," he was re:uslng tc cat, they took
21 everything--the ~Ps took everything out cf the eel: etat co~ld 22 ~ossi.blJ' hurt him or that: he co·..:.ld use, a.nd :.hey were JUs';. --they 23 were consider~ng taking OUt ~is bunk fo~ fear t~at he would
DOD 000178
really find some way to harm h:mself wi:h that. So t:hey were 2 doing· all 0: the right thin3s to the extent tha: you can In a 3 deten:ion operation. They had showers. They had--sorne 0: the~ 4 ~ad jump suits and they'd refuse to wear their jump su~tSi 5 they'd tle there to the bars. so they'd be in their boxer shorts 6 or t~eir u~derwear or whatever in :~eir cell, but T never sa~ 7 anything that was even close to what--. 8 Q. The flrst MP unlt that had responsibility for lA and
9 13. as I understand it. was the 72~ci MPs. The unit that you 10 sal::i--:!1e ~evada P.rmy Natlordl Guard, as I recall?
12 c· And t~ey were a s:e:~ar ~nit?
13 A. :~ey were to me.
14 Q. Any lssues wlt~ :he~ that you knew of. whatsoeve~.
15 rela:lve to J.P. or lB?
16 A. Ko, Slr.
17 C. Jl0 they ever brlng anything :0 your attEnt~on re~ative
18 to their concerns about ho~ was being run. elther by
19 themselves. the MPs, cr any ~_ tne thlngs that the milltary
20 :ntell:ge::ce personnel ""ere dcing?

21 A. Never an issue atout--nothing. J mean, r.othlng.
DOD 000179


Q. A."1d 'they we::=-e followed, in Oc':ober, by the 372:1': MP
2 Co:npany?
3 A. Correc'L.
4 Q. And the 372nd came i;. approxlmately 1 October and there
5 was a t::=-?::siti'-'l": period between 1 October and around the 15th 0:
6 October. Is ~hat accura'Le tc yo~r recollection?
S Q. Now, ~he 372r.~, w~ere dld 'Lhey come from?]
9 J... :'hey were clOwr. ::-. ;,6. Dlwaniaah. T::ey were with ::he
10 ~ultina:lona: ci.ivislon, t~a: ~as the one ~hat was origina:ly lD
11 supper: e~ the MEF, and then the ~~~ left, and they though: they
12 were gOln3 ~eme wl:h the VEF, and ~~TF7 shortstopped that, kept
13 the~ there, sald that the ~~!tlnatlonal division was com:ng in,
1~ and that they were ge:n~ tc de detention operations until the
15 pollee or lav,J enforceme::: cOT.pcnent c: the rr.ultinationals got
]0 So they re~a:ned dowr: there. They were aligned under the
17 310:h MP Battallon and' they ::l:d dete::tion operations.
18 C' Any proble~s wit~ t~effi that you ~new of before they
19 showed ~p at J.~u Ghraid?
2U A, No, Slr.
21 C. Any reason to questlo:: their assignment there as a
22 mi:itary police unit respcns:ble ~or that section?
23 A. Xo, si::=-.

DOD 000180
I visited them. I visited with the Iraqi police
2 officer that was there. He braggedabo~: the ~Ps and the
3 support and the trainins that they were giving them--the 372r.c MP
4 Company. I talked to
5 f..".n t ~nformation about
6 --.,as ::he f'.1P Battal~o:-: comrr.ander down there. I talked :0
7 hirr. and::: said, "372~d is t.:p here. The::-e I s some allega:.ions.
8 'You t:ave ar.y problems wi t!": therT'.?"
9 "Absolutely no:.' Kane."
10 When they came to ~jc Gtraib, t~ough, they came one
II p:'a:oon short. because :~e =?~ ~as working on getting a contract
1~ for perscna:' security de:a~:'s do~:-: there. and they had not been
13 able to do that s~ccess!~::y--they were draggIng their feet 0:-:
14 ho~estly, because they ::kej the X?s. So the CJTF7 lr. the
15 ops shop said, "i(eep tr.e p:"atccr. dm·;n there for another two
16 week." :: ojJected. No: as vIgorously as I should have.
17 ;Jerhaps, but I Knew that the 372 r.:: was going in behind the 72 T • d MP
1~ Com;Jany and they wou:"d get lt 900d o;,ce they arrived. Two weeks
19 jecame a montt. and the:1 : i.na:'} y so:::ebody :rom the CJTF7 sta::
20 :rom the ops shop had tc go down there an~ talk to the CPA So~th
21 to get those MPs releasee a~d sent un to Ab~ Ghraib.


DOD 000181
Q. You hac mentioned ea~lier
2 When was the first time yO'U me
3 your recollect:on?
4 A. I--afte~ I me~ h:~--I Met him, officially, I guess, at
5 Abu Ghra·ib. I was ovt the~e visiting. I wer.t lnto cellblock lA
6 and all of the s~ciden hE was there. I said, "Where did you =o~e
7 from?" ~e :ntroduced h:~se2~. And said--we had a visit

8 sched~led with Con9resslo~a: Delegationer [sic] Wolfowitz
9 [phcne~.:.cl. And we were o'~:: there the day before to walk the 10 ground 0: wh:c~ way we wer~ go:ng ::0 go, where we were goinS to II take ~l~, an~ he ap~eare~. : was :n cel:block lA and he 12 ap?eared. 13 Q. When was tha::~ 14 :: ~ had 'e.G ce. Sep:e:nney. 15 C And what d:d ~e te:: yo~ his role was when he saw you? l() Did he :.el._ you what his ro~e was? 17 He did. WeI:, a: ::rs: he told me what he did in the 18 ci,.-i1ian wor2.d. He said, "So, -know a lot of ;eo;le." And I'm ]9 sure ne said to me, "And :: ....;as 1:-.," BOS::la or A:ghanistan. " I
20 have a 10: of expe~ience .......:.:.:: lr.terrogat:on." 21 I said, "Are yO'U 1.0::::-. clvil affairs out here?" 22 Be said, "Jo, no, i..a'al'.. :'m go:ng ::0 do the 23 interroga:ion. So the prlsoners that they're putting in lA and
DOD 000182
lB will be my responsibility . If they're gcing to take them fc~ ., interrogation, we '11 be responsible for getting them out there." 3 Tha= was his function. That's what he told me. 4 Q. So, did he tell you he was ir. charge of the 5 1~cerr~9ation operation? 6 A. He told me he was the l~nk or the co~neCtor be~ween
, ~
7 :hen ..... the cellblOCK and ~he~ they would be moved out for g in=errogation. He was net doing the ::.nterrogation. He was very 9 c~ear cr; tha::.
10 Q. Alrig::::.. So he wcsr;'t doing ar;y ~nterrogation?
11 Right.
12 Q. But did he say t:-.a::., t': 'T, ::.n charge of all of the
13 ::.~t erroga:crs?"
14 ri, Yes. That he was respcnsible for the iDterrogaticn
15 effort. He said, "You me: C2.Ptal~ She'll be answeri~g'

10 t.o me," 17 'Q. And earlier you ::ad s~ld cr made a refereDce to him 18 being resp6nsible for the :A area. What was that responsib~lity 19 that you were referr::.ns :0, because we've established that the 20 M?s had warde~ respons~bi~::.t::.es C~ jaile~ responsibilities--what

DOD 000183
were the responsibilities that MI personnel 2 ~hadrelative to lA and lB? 3 A. Well, in a regu:a~ detention operation, sir, if yo~'re

4 bringing in a new priso~e~ and the cellblock is ful~, the MPs, Sor whoever's in charge 0f the cellblock on that shift, ca~ make 6 a determir:ation that you ca:-: put--"Oh, put him in cellblock 16-­7 pu~ hlm in cel~ ~6. Eve:-: ~hou~~ there's one in there, he's
S going to be released tOffiorro~ o~ he's going out to ge~eral pop
9 t0r:10rrow, whatever it 15. S:J that was no longer the MPs'

10 decis1or.. 7hat was~ecision.---­1 1 :co: r see.
12 A. ----If he was b~i:-:S:r.~ a new det~inee for so~e
13 ~eaSC:1, he'd say, "':'aKe the o:-:e :':1 iso::"ation out, put r.im in 1';,
14 ar.d this guy in 1s01at:.o:-:." S:'!1".ila~ \-litt lB.
15 Q. Is :t your imp~esslon tha~ lA 3r.d ~B remained under the

and he had that autho~ity
17 18 19 20 21 22 a:1d respcnsibillty to assig;. M: holds to those cells within lA and lE? 1--.. Right. C. Are you aware that ::~ere we~e othe~s, eve~ afte~ the time pe~iod that you referred to ea~lie~, which was the beginnlng--are you aware that cri~ina:s ~nd proble~ per:ormers-­
AG0000096 DOD 000184

problem detainees were being placed i:: lA and lB by mi.litary ") polic~ personnel? vJere you aware that that was occu=ring? 3 A. I was::'t aware, s?ec:fically, b~: I know that a coup~e 4 of tines they had to put an Iraqi criminal tha: they bro~gh: ir. 5 on susp~cjon of a vlolent cr~me and they put him into lA, into a 6 cellblock.
Q. Were you aware that :~e MPs were putting detainees that 8 were caus:n~ problems :n the other par~s of ~he prison: ~hose 9 that were starting riots, :tose :hat were--as an example, ~hose
10 :ta: were acc~sed of rap:~s c:her detainees--were you aware that
II :!ce MP ;:ersonne2. were us:':1~ _.. ane. lB to house those prisoners?
12 A.. _ was ".C:.
13 ~:7: Cid they go :hrc~;~

1.1 =0: ~o. WeI:, :':'5 nc: e~r understanding that they were
go:.n~ :!crcug:-
It's our understanding
16 fro~ ::::erv:ewlng beth the ~~:::ary :n:elllgence personnel ar.d
17 the rr.i:':tary police personne::

18 19 20 21 23 the NCOs that were ac:ua2.ly doing the jaillng respcns~bilities. It's base~ en what they have testified to us on lS that the MPs were, i:1deec, taking these problem perforrr.ers, problem detainees, and plecing then in lA and :B, because they had no p2.ace else :c p~: :hem. They tad to De :ake~ out of the ge~eral p~lson pepulatlon for dlsciplinary
AG0000097 DOD 000185

then designated as "MI !:olds." SoMI holds were ~eally a
2 .subcategory of the securi!:y detainees. So the people that were
3 going into lA and 1B--'Jery sho~tly after the beginni:-:g,
4 according to the testimony that we have--was a mixture of all
5 three 0: those categ0ries: there was security holds, that is
6 people t~at were bei~g held ~ut didn't nave a~y MI interests
7 anymoye, and there weye peop~e that were in there for
1) specl: ically Ml reasons where ~: said, "We want :::'i5 person
9 segregated for thlS reaSQ::." So al2. ttree ca':egories were in
10 there from, pretty r.1UC::, :::e '!ery beginning.
11 h'I:-: Fro~ the beginning; sure. 3ecause
12 ce2.:block 1A and lB--ce:2blcck lA, especially, had ':he ~solatlon
13 ce:':"s and the maxi~u".-.seC'..lr:~'.' ce:':"s. I: was the only cellblock
14 where yo~ cculd hGld lndl~ldcals or two people i:: a cell. Wher:
15 i: was under o~r co~:rol, that'S who we put in there. I den I t
16 kr,ov.::..: they D' ,­troublerr.ar:ers or --I dor:':: know, but when t:-.e MI
17 pe:Jple, like from Victory 30l.:~.ty, they had two of that inltlal
18 group that t::'ey wanted to ~~: .~:: :nere. So we had the cell
1C) space and we p~: them 2n tnere. So there was a mix of prisoners
20 , . a: ~:-~a: :'lme. Bu: it wasn't unt:..l these raids a~d these
21 specl:lc cperat~ons where the secur~ty detainees were be~ng
brought l~ tha~ that populQ:~on started to increase. ! looked
..,., --~ at :he populatlo~ breakdown gave it to me, and it

DOD 000187
showed ~he vas~ rnajori~y of those cellblocks upstairs and
2 downstai~s, in cellblock lA, were occupied by M~ holds. Sc i:
3 made se~se to a~gue thei~ case to get that put under the~~
4 control. But we had eithe~ transferred those prisoners out 0::--­
5 the Iragi crimi~als--they hac been transferred into other
6 p~isons, other cel:s, C~ lr.:C lB. I was not aware that they
7 were--a: seme point, then. went back to mixing the categories of
8 priscners.
9 co: Yeah. They were. And we've actually done an analysis
10 o! w~c amo~gst those tha~ are ~lalmin9 abuse and those that,
1 I :.n:::ieec, we knollJ we~e ab-..:se:::i :rcr.. the pictures, whc was who and
12 whet~e~ o~ ~ot they we~e i~ a security hold, c~iminal, O~ an MI
13 hold. And se we can ver:.:y eve~ by the pictures that, "Yeah,
14 th:s ~ne was done speclf:=a::y cn th:3 pe~son and that ?e~so~.
15 There's nc MI ~nterest. TheY've been placed there strictly from
16 a cr::;,::..n:.1 standp0l.,.t." or "'::-.::"5 perso:-. was an MI !"lold and 1.S
17 tnere . "
18 WIT: We dlst~nguishe~ the ca:eg~ries by where they had to
19 90 :or a ~elease board.

DOD 000188
Q. You did?
2 A. Yes, we did.
3 And the ones that were in that cell were not going
4 before my release board for Iraqi criminals. They were all
5 .waiting for release by ~he ~I Security Detainee Release Board.
6 DO: !'rr sorry. Yo~ were go~ng ~o--?
7 DC: Were the security detainees the trou~lemakers? I'm
8 just con~used as to why they would be mixed in to lA and IE
9 based on :he oral conversa:~on that you jus~ had.
10 DO: Sec~rl:y holds was :he category of all of t~ose that
11 were picked u; on all o~ t~ese. and co~sidered to ~e thread :0
1~ the c:::a2.ltion.
13 Dr. Corre:::.. ! understan~ :~a~ part.
1~ W·-· So if a reg~lar one !rcr the general popula~ion·ended
15 up 1:-. there----
Dr.'-. :: '[:" tryi.ng to :lgure au: where :he group of people
17 that ·are the :roublemakers come :ro~.
18 co: They come from both :he criminal group and from the
19 :;roup of security holds .
.20 DC: So fror.1 both?
~I DO: From both. And they very weI: mlght have oome--I
~2 don't know this for a fact, b~: they mlgt: have come from the MI
23 holds also. So if you have an MI hold guy wr.c starts a riot:
DOD 000189

not an MI issue. The MPs are concerned with starting a riot.
2 So the MPs could~ve taken that MI hold and put them in te this
3 isclation area.
4 [The deposition recessed at 1613, 1B July 2004.)
5 [The deposition was ca:led to order at 1635, 18 July 20QQ.j
6 Questions by the deposition of!icer (continued):
7 Q. Can you tell ~e, again. what you believe

Ie was? Was there anyth~ng in addition te
9 asslg~ing ~tc was going lnto :~ose particular cells and who was 10 geing to be assigned there: D10 ~e have any ocher broader II respcnsibl:itles? 12 J-... ~t was all re:a:ec te :~:errogation, sir. I don '": know 13 the depth c~ ~t. but! de kno~ that he was the one who reported 14in:errogatlo~ progress baCK to General Fast. 15 o. ~ho die L~eutenanttlllllllllllllleport to? 16 A. Ge~era: Fast. 17 Q. And how did you know that? 18 A. He to~d me that. Slr. And Celonel Pappas told me that. 19 Q. What di tel: yo~. as specifically as
20 yo~ canreca::, abo~t ~is repcrt~n9 relatlonship with General 21 Fas':? 22 A. The only reason :t came up was because of the handg~n 23 in· the ce:lblock, and so ! said to
DOD 000190

"I want a statement from each one of those ~Ps. I want ':0 kn:J.....
2 what happened. And get it wiile it's fresh. He called me back
3 real::'y pretty guickly.
4 He said, "The MPs are:;'t making statements.
5 tllllllttOld them not to talk :0 anybody. He told them not to
6 make a s:atemer,:."
7 I said, "Wel:., .,·;:iY ~ elling therr to do
8 any::hing?"
9 He salO, "I: hao::,e::ec In his cellblock. He said that
10 ~~ ~ :::.s respcnsib:.':":.ty."
II ::: sa:.d, "Those !·:?s ~::-e goi::g to make statenents for
12 you. They're or.e of your ,,:? co::".pan~es."
13 s cc-.:'lec ne back
14 saic.. "Ma '0.::"., the reasc:-. ::: t:.::ld tie !v':Ps no:: to make any
15 s':.at:e~ent:s:.s because I wanted them to get the story straigr.t."
16 And 1: said, "We:::'. :ha: 's .:nteresting, but I want the
17 :. ru~:-... And the best way to ge: that :.s :0 capture it
I 8 ~IT.me d l a:ely. "
19 And ~e saic, II:: de:; I: 3cree. I'
20 ! sa~d, "That's ::.ne. ':'hey'rc ny r-I:?s, a:-.d they're
21 gOlng to ~ive statements to There's goi::9
tc be investigation. " I sa!:!, IITI_ looking out for them and

DOD 000191
for getting the truth. n Sol said, "Have Colonel ?appas call
2 me."
3 He said, "Well, mS'a~, I don't work fo= Colonel
4 Pappas."
5 A~d :;: said, "Well tha:' s kind of interesting. Who do
6 you work :or?"
7 A:-:d he saic, "Well, I work for General F3.s'C.." That's
8 how I know tha: he worked fo~ General Fast.
9 So I called Calone: Fappas, and he wasn't in the

10 c::ice, but ~is XC,

12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 And I said, "y.;ho' s_work fer? uoesn' t he IlJOrk :or Y:::l·...:?" He sald, "No, rna' ar.. He v:o=ksfor General Fast. Why? vlhat die ::e do !"lOW?" I SElle, "This ::'9 0.1:;0'..1: the ha".dgun ir:cident." He said, "\'lha: :-.andgu::?" Sc he hadn't hea=d any:ting--or he acted like, on the telephone, he nadn't heard any:hi::g abo~t the handgun. So I :o::'d :-:i~. A~d:;: said, "Ar:c J ·'Ja.~:e:i s:.ate'1lents froIT', the MPs, an~olethe ~?s !l0: to tali to anybody. Now, relucta:::ly, he's backing 0::, ~ guess, because: told him that
AG0000104 DOD 000192

I wanted statements and ~hat theY're going ~o glve staterr.ents :0

3 He said, "When did this happen?"
4 I said, "Today. ':'hey're arresting Iraqi guards or
5 something, beca~se allegedly one of them smuggled it in to the
6 prisoner."
7 He sa:.d, "!'ll ca __ yeu back." So he came to me.
8 Q. "He" belong?
9 A. Co:"one:' Pappas.
10 501 he said, III :a:ked t Ma'am," he
11 sale.:," I th:.nk lle was sln::ere."
12 _ SalG, "You car. never be si::cere if your first
13 statement :.s, 'I wan: :.,e:'"' ::0 get :lleir stories straig!1~.'" I
14 sald, ",:,na:. does:1': ri.:19 \·;e:l ...:i::: me, wnich is \I.'hy I \Vas
15 lnsisten: abot.:: get:.ing :~e statements, because it's the right
16 ~hl:-.9:0 do."
17 He S3.1d,_UncerSt.:!ndS, no..... "
18 ]: said, "uid yo"...: go and talk :0 h:.m?"
19 !-!e said, "Ac::..:.a::":'y, r.e came to see me."
20 I saic., "How come ne doesn't worK for you?"
21 He said, "We:'l, I do~':: have a position for him. But
22 he really ~orks fer General Fas: and keeps her informed on the
23 interrogat:.ons."
DOD 000193

That's how I found out about these differe~~ pieces 0:
1 the parts of the--the opera~10n out ~here. Not throug~ grilling
3 anybody, but through those klnds of conversations.
4 Q. Did General Fas~ ever talk to you abou

A. Never.
6 Q. S~e never talked ~o yeu about the =elationship that she

8 A. )Jo, Slr.
C) J. Dld General Fas: ever talk to you about Colonel Pappas 10 and wha~ ~lS responslbi~l:les were relative to Abu Ghraib? 11 A. ~o: speci:ica::y, rea:ly. She said ~hat she had 12 d1rected Cclonel Pappas :0 ~ove ~:s headquarters out there. 13 She salo t~a: she d~re=:ed that? 14 A. Yes. That'S what s~e told ~e. 15 And the reason fer that was because the focus o~ che-­16 with a::":' of these raids and everyt!":ing, that there was so much 17 interrogatio~ work goin~ on out there. He needed to be out 18 there. 19 Q. Wh~ Old 201onel Pappas report to~
20 A. General Fast.
21 ~. ~as--do you know ; ~ General Fast was hlS rater?
22 A. I have no ldea.

DOD 000194

when they got over to the I~E facility. Bu~as
2 wit:: her most of that tirr.e. That was November--November 23, ~
3 thin~ it was. That's one 0: the few itineraries that I actua!ly
4 have.
5 Re: Was tha.t hefore the shooting or after the shooting?
6 ~:T: O~, after. Tha: was long after the shooting.
7 Kovember. The shooting took place, I ~hink---­8 R:: ~he 24th 0: Noverrber.
9 WIT: Oh, it was?

1() R:: Yes, ma'am.
11 W·~· The handgu~ l~ tne ce!lnlock?

1:2 RC: Yes, ma1am. 13 w:~: ~e::, thlS wa~--: ca~ !80~ at tte itinerary--but it 14 waS--lt must have been be~ore. They dldn't talk about the 15 handgun at tte brief~ng. A
as back. He 16 was ~ore relaxed, but he ~ad~'t enhanced his skills at brie~lng. 17 You tad discussec earller abou~ the review boards and 18 the different reVlew boards that eXlsted, and one of those that 19 existed was the detainee reVlew coarct for security holds? 20 A. Right. 21 Q. You were a melT'~er 8: that board? 22 A. I was. Yes.
DOD 000197
Q. And, as I understand the o~her two members were
2 General Fas:. and

Is that accurate? 3 A. Yes, sir. It 1.5. 4 Q. Could you tell me t~e m1.5sicn of that review board? 5 A It was to rev.:.ew the files of security detainees once 6 theY've been nominated for poss~ble release. Then we would 7 review the file--~here wasn't very much in the file--and make a 8 recomr:Lenca::.:.o~. General Fas:: was the Presiden: of the Board and 9 she cculd overrule us or she co~ld agree with us--or, if we
10 disagreed, she could have overruled us on that too. I mean, she 11 had ::he : i:-.al say. 12 'JJas ::nere wr::::er. r~::'es c: this--YO'...l know, is there 1 " =:..IS:, "Here ,-is." --Yo',:, ~ '..!s: descri:ted t;,e way it wor!ed. 'das
, j
14 there some SO? or :nemorar:d'..!71 ::.oa.: c::Jc'..lmented that that's ::he way 15 i:: ,..:orked? 16 A. tb, s.:..r. 17 Q. Eut that's ~;,e way i: worked? 18 A. That's the way i:: worked. 19 Q. To yo'..!r recollec:.:..o~, Ge~eral Fast had the ult.:.mate 20 dec.:.sion-:naking a'..lt.horit:: :or those cetainee review b:::ards? 21 A. Yes, sir. She die..
DOD 000198


Q. Whe~ did they begin? When did you actually star~ed
2 sit:ting en those boards?
3 A. Actually, the review boards were fashiened after t~e
4 :raqi cr~minal release boards that I was running at General
I;-' Sanchez's request. So wher. they formed the Security Detainee
6 ~elease board, General Fas: said she didn't want to be the
7 single person tc review anj re:ease these people--she would
8 prefer a pane~. That's how t;'e board was formed. ~je had the
9 ;:c..rs: :::-eles.ses, prebably, .:.::-: Oc-cober.
10 :,). How :ong--it wen: ;:ro~ October until when? Whe~ was
11 :r.e :"as".: O:1e that yo:... were sl".:t::':-:9 on?
12 A. The day before t~e--cr a ccuple c: days before the
13 ::::-a:-:sfe:::­c~ authority, we were s:::.:: sitting on those beards, t
1-1 be::'J.eve.
15 ·0. Whict would have ceen--?
16 A. The end of January.
17 C. p~d how e:ten did these boards meet?
IS A. Initially, they me: twice a week. And initially they
]9 were painful because they were he~rs. Most of the people that
20 were recorr.mended and thel::­files became oefore the board, if we
21 reviewed, say 0:-: one day, because we'd meet for four or f~ve cr
22 more ho~rs, and we woult see wna: was in there--Like I said, the
23 files weren't very complete. Sometimes they had a picture that
DOD 000199

said what they ere ar~estec :or. So if we reviewed forty,
2 probably 30 of the~ were ;.ever released--and that's high--~aybe
3 35 were not released. It was a very s~all percentage. It was
4 II releasaphobia." General Fast did not wan': her--and I don't
5 blame h~r--I mea~. she didn't want to put her signature on a
o release recommendation 0: t~e next high jacker.
7 ~. When one of the files would come 1n front of you with
8 limited lnformat:on: this person was arrested at such anc such
9 a poi~: in time anc alleged to have had a weapon in their
10 possesslon. or some su=~ a::ega:lon. little more than that was
II in the :~le?
12 A. We:l. :or the seccr~:y detainees it said they were a
13 suspected associate of SajoaT an~ was arrested in a car with
14 weapons in the trunk anc three other pe0ple in the vehlcle were
15 k~own associates of Sadaa~. So it was more than just a small
16 :.niractlon. ~hey were shoc:i~S at a coalition checkpoi;.t and
17 when they were stopped. they found ~PGs i~ the trunk.
18 Q. rle:'l, that exar.lple ,,'ould say to me, non-releasable.
19 A. Well, actually, wnat they would do is--1 have to give
20 c~edlt:o the people that reVlew the~: the interrogation teams,
21 the Crt. and the arresti~g dlvlsion--that was very, very
22 :.nportant to the dec:.sion. They would cross-natch. like if
23 there was an RPG attack that nigh: and then this car was stopped
DOD 000200

and there were RPGs in the :=unk, then it was not likely t~at
2 they were going to be released. But if it was RPGs and the g~y
3 :hat we were reviewing made a claim, very quickly when he was
4 arrested, that he was trying to turr. them in to one of the
5 .arrn3sty boxes or trying to get fifty dollars or whatever. But
6 those same indIviduals co~ld have been held for months, even·
7 thoug~ they were trying tc do the right thing. So, upon
8 i~terr09ation, they would dlscover that that was sincere, This
9 guy ceu::'d take then-. to the POl:': where he col:ected them, was
10 ta~in3 ther to an a~~esty box, was trying to make a hundred

Eut we'd hold them for
12 13 14 15 10 17 IR 19 20 21 22 23 months wa:ting fo= that recc=d :0 ~e: to the release board. Very o:te~ what would ~appen, especlally in that first--I'd say the :l~S: mo~th or six weeKs whe~ we were reviewing the ~~cords, very o:ten what would happen is General Fast would look at the re=ord and--l can site one exa~ple that migtt be an exception, b~t net so mu=h in those . . l:11:1a..:. ""eeks: "HIS middle name is Qsa:ra. He might know Osama Eln Lade~. Put him back in box." And no: in an interrogation 0= military intelligence mindset, yot.: say, 1I1tJe::'::', we just Trade anothe= enemy." Because of hIS name? Kame associatio~ doesn't necessarily work in the middle east, be=ause eve~ybody's so: a ffiiddle name 0: Osama. And the M: people who reviewed :he records before they even came to the
AGOOOOl.13 DOD 000201

board wO'...l.ld almost plead wi tr. her in some cases that --"I'm
2 telling yo~, ma'am, this guy tas no tr.ore value. We've dra~neci
3 everything we could from hirr.. We've had him for four mont.hs.
4 This is a release one." So~e~imes they lost.
S Q. Can you explain t.o me t.he dynamics of how that worked?
() Because as you're explainin::; lei if I was or. the board, I'd Be
7 argui~g Wlt:: General Fast. So, te:l me about the argumer.ts that
8 you, ~!:en, would have Genera~ F~st to ~ry to get these peo~le
9 releasee, as 1 describe It.
\0 A. Well. I--lik~ I sa:d . .:: always deferred to her if it
11 were--~~ m~s: cases, ~f she had a so~nd direction. She would
12 say to the MI people w~tt the :~:erroga~ion folder--she'd say.
13 "P\.:l: ou': the file. I ca~ see some kind of a :attoo in this
14 ?!:o:ograp::. Tell me what ~hey found out about the tat:oo."
15 We:}, if they pulled out the i~terrogation record and found out
16 that tha~ partlcular tattoc was never exp~oited, she'd say put
17 hi~ back in the hox. 50,1 'd say. maybe there's something
18 there; maybe he :at.t.ooed hlmself :n p~iso:-:--':: never said that to
19 her. but I thought. you ~~ow. she's gc~ a pretty sharp eye.
20 RC;There was a reascn why some people were tattooed t.ha:
21 . resembled they were part of an c~san~za:ion. I don':: know i~
22 yo\.: knew that back the...


DOD 000202

g01ng ~o be released to task force and they were going to be
2 used as sources. So it kind of flourished as the system got
3 more developed. ~as kind of in=eresting. We'd
4 review the file and it didn': l~ke there was anything there,

whether there was a phc,=ograph or
6 c~rc~mstan~e w~th che ta:tco--i:
7 anyth::19 there, and then Ge:1eral
8 If : li~e the way thlS guy looks.

not or t!1e unusua: just didn't look like there was Fas.t would say, "I don't know
Put him back :n the box."
9 Occaslonaliy, we'd object. II) therffio~eter--a:1 automatic thermometer for the direction that 11 Genera: Fast was go~ng and the :e~perature of the water. If she l~ prese:1tec a~y Kine of an urg~~En:, he wo~ld back down I J lmne:::i:..ately and say, "~c-..:'::-e :-::.gr.t, :na'an. You're right." 14 ~. So he waS:1't puttl~g up ~uch of a----? 15 J... No. 16 Q. So why have a boar:::i? 17 W:7: Why have a board? IS co: Yeah. I mean, at this board there's a general officer 19 there that's, the way l hear it, she's call1ng all of the shots.
20 1'1::-: Right.
21 DJ: And we've get ancther general officer, of lesser rank,
22 b---ar.otter genera: officer, and:;. co:cnel who's the chief lega2
23 advl sor to the commanding ge:leral.

DOD 000204

Q. Why have a board?
2 A. I'll tell you why they had a board, sir. Be=ause~­
3 the few cases--sma:lest percentage of the cases where we
4 released them, she wanted concurrence or other people's opi~ions
5 to fall ba=k on. But more than that, it was arequireme~t under
6 Geneva/Hag~e, that when Fr~so~ers are held, they're entitled :c
7 kno~ their charges, every six mont~s you review their cases, a~d
8 you don/L necessarily have ~o g~ve them legal advice again, but
9 that's the Geneva/~ague req~:rement. So
10 one who pushed :or some k:.r.d 0: boarc.s to be taking place. A::d
II :ney were speci::.cally unde~ cur control, u.s. control, and
12 ~ould rema:.n ~~der U.S. contra:, sc they wanted to do every:hlr.g

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 WeI: :.: sounds l~ke t~e :etter 0: the law rather than the in-cer.:: of the law. 1-.. Rlgl::.. :: was a 10: 0: time spent for little results. DO: We've spoken to and as~ed her questlons rela:lve to the release boards, and she's prov~ded us with statistlcs that show, accordi~9 to ~er reports t~at she's prcvlded, that between when the boards were firs: set up in October ar.d, I believe the tlr.le:rame was :.n--January, where they had t~lS tra~~itio~ to a lower ranking court, that, in fact, of all 0: :hose that were rev~ewed, seven:y-th~ee percent were
AGOOOOl17 DOD 000205

~eleased. That's significantly d~fferent from wha~ you have
2 told us today.
3 vlIT: I don't believe that s:at:stic, sir.
4 Q. Do ycu have records to show how many people were
-5 re~iewed a~d how many pecp~e of those that were reviewed
6 ac-:ua::"ly were released?
7 A. Persona~ly, I do~'-: have the records. but I know -:hat
kept those records. He
9 kec: the list of the reccrds we were going to review for each
10 boa~d, a~d the markings -:0 the side: ~release. release,
1: re~ease."
12 r '.t • Where wo~ld those reccrds be now?
J3 A. _~ ~~ ~~iondaie. ; ~e:~eve. They were in the connex in
14 ship, b-...:: the ccr.nexes have arrived.
15 Q, :'~ sorry, Ca~ we have his ~ame again?

16 A. B'..:t : don I t belleve he
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 is wi:h the BOOt! anyn:ore. But his files would be there for sure. is :he----Q, So whoever is the JA3, now, at the soot;' should have those records? A. Right. ~hey were ~cth with me in Baghdad. DO: Because it is somethl~3 we're obViously interested in. We've heard a 10: of peo~le belng reviewed, not very ma~y people
AGOOOOl18 DOD 000206

get:tingout. Then we hear a lot of people getting reviewed, a
lot of people ge~tin9 out: seventy-three percent.
3 Q. So, you k~ow, as inves~igators, we're--wtere are the
4 records?
5 DC: Obviously somebody's wrong.
() [:0: Somebody's wrong here. Yeah.
7 W:T: We:l, ~he boards that I sat on, like I said, if we
8 reviewed forty, we wouldn't release ten. Now, sometimes the
9 recommenda:lon was "no: release; p~t him back in the box," and
10 maybe that person was ul:lma:e!y released, but it didn't come
11 before t~e board agair.. ~: JUs: went to her. And there was
12 sign~fican:J.y rr.ere n-.:rr.bers .ln De=errber and Ja!:uary than there
13 ::ad beer. prlor.
14 Q. =~ what mo!::h was :tat?
15 A. :~ ~ecember and January. So i~ you roll ~p all o£ the­
16 -seven:y-:~ree percent? I don': believe it. I don't believe
17 that --we dld.n':: release fi:ty percen~ by the end of the--when I
18 left in Jan~ary, theater-wlde, we had a!mos: fourteen thousand
19 prlsoners.
20 DO: She's not referr.lng :0 the nunbers of prisoners. Ar.d
21 we tave to ~ake sure we have the dlstinction clear in mind,
II here. It's no~ the numbers 0: people that were coming in; i:'s
23 only those numbers that the board was reviewlng. of course, I
12 )
DOD 000207

HIT: I will tell you that in an effort to get mo~e people
2 recommended before the board, they increased the--this pre­
3 review review board made u::; of ::ID, MF, M:, the divisions--::hey
4 we~e reviewing a lot more a:1c we were getting more -:0 the board,
but we weren'~ recom~en~i~9 the release of more. And, when
6 Ambassador Bremer, arounc Ranadan or December timef~ame, he saie
7 that they were gOl:1g tc je re:eas:n3.500 prisoners over the next
8 mont::: 100 a week and tten at the end, it would be a bigger-­
9 whatever t~e bala~ce waE 'r acdit:on to the 100. He said,
10 star::1ng ":his" Friday c~ ':':1:.lrsday, "toJe're going to release the
1 1 ::: irs:: 1 0 0 . "
12 Well, we did~': have 100 ready fran the release board.
13 :;eneral Fas:: called me a:::::: scud, "¥-;e have to release some
14 prlsoners. "
15 : said. "We have scmecr:mlna1s that have Deen approved
16 for release."
17 She sa:.d, "Any prlsc:ters will due." Eecat.:se the media
18 was going to cover 1t, so they ....'ere all out at Abu Ghraib.
19 I: ~as a near ric: out there outside ::he wa:l with the
20 med:aand famLy members. Tney ::ho~9ht that all 500 priscners-­
21 tho~sands of pr1soners' fa~illes were at.:: there and the media

22 and i~erybody else. So,

13 [phonetic] were able to come up with 83 crim:.nals that were 123
DOD 000209
RC: So was it a conse~sus that they were all yes, release
2 or no, release?
3 WIT: It had to be a~ agreement to release them.
4 RC: So all three had ':0 vote the same?
5 T.TT~ • ..,.L ... Right.
6 ::JC: But that's only for release.
7 HIT: For hold, we coula recommend release and she co·~lci.
8 override U -;=,.
9 RC: 50 how of:en did ~ha: happe~ where she overrode?
10 w"',;,· Often. Espec:..a::'l~· :..:-. :he first fO'J.r weeks of the
11 proc:ess. She was ~ook~~g a: :: :rom a responsibility
J:2 perspec:ive. If ar:ybody :-.ac a ques:ion when the reconme:-.dat~o!1
13 go: ~o S2N':'C0!'1, they ca:::"e:i ::e:­ back. They didn't call me, they
l~ did:: 1:,­ cal: :hey dldn't ask us to get cogether
15 and review the f1le aga1n: :hey called her.
16 Q.. f'o:aJ or General f'o::.ller ar.d ras visit --w:'en was the f lrst
17 :l~e tha: you met Major Gener~: ~i:ler 1!1 country there in Iraq
18 :hat you recall?
1C) A. Whenever he vis:.:ec Iraq, at the in brief--that was the
20 £.1r=:: t:.me I had---­


DOD 000211
Q. So that would have been--he first arrived in the lat:er
2 part of August. He was there the last week 0: August, the :irs:
3 week of September. Is that when you--?
A. Right. That was the first time: ever met him.
5 Q .. And were vo'] a: V~ctory when you met him or did yo'..:.
6 meet h~m at Abu Ghraib?
7 A. ~O. _ met hi~ a: V~ctory.
C. A~d what did he te~~ you his m~ssion was when he
9 appeared there in Iraq?
10 " ..-. . He cave a~ in brle:. : really don': know i: that was
11 the :~rs: day he was there cr .& that was the day of the i~
12 cr~e:, ~u: ~t was very ClOSE to :,-e beginn~ng 0: his tr~p. He
13 saId that he was there to help witt the interrogation e~fort to
14 .see what ~e co~ld do tc help Barbara Fast improve the
15 ~n:errogations and the resultlng actionable intelligence--he
16 maae his ow~ inve~:ed ex~resslor.. And he said he was gOlng to
17 take a look at our differer.: pr~son facilities.
18 He k~ew for sure he was go~ng up to the MEK, he was
}9 gcing up to Abu Ghraib, mIght go Gown to Bucca, he was goi~g to
2Cl go down :0 Cropper--unless .i: wasn't necessary. ::f they fO'..lnd
21 someplace early on that served the Furpose. I said--I made a
II comment about the MEK COI-:,-pounc. But that was outside of
23 Baghdad, that that was actually the property of the people who
DOD 000212

we were securing up there, and there would be a lons discussio~
2 about putting any kind of Guantanamo Bay ~ype of an operatio~ up
3 there.
4 Other people were k1nd of in~erjecting or aski~g
5 questions during these 1n briefs, 90 1 just made a couple 0:
6 points the sa~e way. And i: takes a little bit of time to
7 understand the M~K mlssion, and 1: he didn't ~eed to know that
8 and he wasn't going to ~se tha= :a=ility--I was actually trying
9 to d1sco~rage him, I suppose. 2u= it was under U.S. co~tro:, so
10 that was an advantage unli~e some 0: the other fa=ilities. He
11 said they would see; they were 901n9 to viSit them. I asked i:
12 he was there to take a ~oo~ a: detention operations. He said,
13 "~o, but i: ~e're look:~g at detention facilities, then I have a
14 2.0: 0: people that do tho.:. kl.1d 0: work 1n their civilian job,"
15 and he pOlnted out a cou~le 0: ?eople on the team and he said
It) tna: they might make reco~mer.da:ions. Ee said that they would
17 work w1th the l~terrogators. It was klnc of like a gener1c
IS It was clear, to me, d~rina that in brief, th3t he was
19 really there to work w1t~ the C-2. 9ut you couldn't do any of
20 those--you couldn't setup an operation anywhere 1n the existing
2\ faci:~ty, because they all belon9 ~o me. So that's why they
..,.., included us in the in b=ie:. And he ~ade a comment about--one
23 of the lnte=rogato=s as~ed the question about what made
DOD 000213

Guantanamo Bay so different--or so good ~hat they were goi~g to
2 import those te=hniques. He said that it was the pla~ to
3 "GITMOize" the operation. That they had developed tech~iques
4 and they had so much success in Guantanamo Bay that they were
S'asked to come in and app.:.y ':hose t.echniques and teaC'::'
6 ~nterrogation teams how to apply those techniques.
7 And I said, "Sir, = was dow~ in Guantanamo Bay very
8 quickly, but I do know that t.he situation in Guantanamo Bay ~s
9 vastly di~~gren: than the s~:ua:1on here in Iraq. All of our

10 =a=il~:les are rout~nely attacked. Contrary to wise judgment, II you dc~'~ r~n a det.entlo~ opera:~on in the middle 0= a hostile 12 =~restone, which 15 what A~u Ghraib 15 right now." And he said, 13 yOu know, t.hat they would ~a~e the determination and it really 14 was~l: so much different. : mean, I see completely different-­15 b~ack and white differences between Guantanamo Bay and--but I 16 thought., you know, when ym.: drive arou~d :::raq a lit':le bit and 17 you ca~ see and you =an fee: and you can sense the tension, 18 you'll understand that 1t'5 j~::ere~~ here. 19 And another ~nterre9atcrasked him abeut ~he--I don't
20 remember the exact Quest:c~, tu~ 1: was something abeut 21 maintaini~g con':ro:. And 1: m:gh: have ~een the subsequent 22 gues~ion to my commen~ that 1~ Guantanamo Eay they 800 MPs to
guard 610 prisoners, and: had--at Abu Ghraib, I had 308 MPs to
DOD 000214
guard more than 7,000 prisoners. Then he said, "You have to
2 have full ccntrol, and the MPs at Guantanamc 3ay know what--t~ey
3 know what that means. A detai~ee never leaves the cell i: he'E
4 not escorted by two MPs :r. leg i=ons, and hand irons, and a
5 belly ch:~:.n. And ttere was no mi stake a·...)out who's in charge.
And yOJ have to trea~ these detainees like dogs. If you treat
7 ttern any d~££erently and they get the idea that they're ma~ing a
8 decis:.on cr they're ir. char~e, YOJ've lost con:=ol of your
C) ince=rog5tJ.on."
10 Q. ~as that a quote? J1Q he specifica:ly say to treat
11 them 2.:..ke cogs?
12 A. A.:)scl'..ltely.
13 Q. Anc who else was prese"-t at that time when he ~ade that
14 statement·?
15 A. Everybody that wa~ In t~at In brief.
16 Can you give me so~e names?
17 A. General Fast, Colc"-el Pappas, maybe -I
1 S belle was tnere, ane I--he was there when
19 ~ene=al Boikan [phonetic] wa~ tnere. I dC:-l't really rerr.ember i:
20 he was there whe:-. General r-::':ler was in b!:'iefing. '!here were a
21 couple of people in civillar. clcthes that were interpreters--I
22 thousht that they were interpreters. Now I don't know i: they

DOD 000215
A. ----Okay. So, you know how that's configured. He was
2 seated on the side by the :lreplace with his ba~k to the
3 fi replace I and there was ~:r.:::-ee places set right across fror.1 h:;-:-'
4 with a pad and a pen or some~hlng. So we sat down, and I
5 remember th:"nking ther., wher. I sat down, "We loo}~ like we're
6 outr,umberec:i." But:I. didn't. get. any sense that this was going t:J
7 be baa news 0:::­ confronta:.:ona: or anything. So, he said, ·Okay.
8 We finishec our tour and we've seen a lot of your facilities. -...
9 want ycc.: to g:ve me Abu Gnral!:."
10 : said, 11 Sir-I is not mine to give you."
11 A..'1d r.e---­
11 \~ha:. dld he IT,ear. ==':: 01 "'e :. t to h.:m? \1hat was hlS
13 :.uss::.on triat he wanted ::?
\4 r.... -aidn':' ask him, b~: : :r.ough:, you know, in
15 connectlon 0: what he had DeeD 20ok::.ng at and what he had been '
16 saYlngabc~: interrogation and "G:TMOizing" everything, that he
17 war::e::i Abu Ghraib :'0 Gua;-.::ana:-::c Bay, Iraq.
18 Q. Was he going to st.ay on as an assigned officer there?
19 A. ::: had no ldea. I ~ean, he had no authorl~y--well, I
10 shoL:2dn': say that., because he told me that he had the
21 author::.y. But what he sald was, ,,: want. you :0 give me Abu
22 Ghraib."
.,..,--' hnd : said, "Abc.: Ghraib is not mlne to give you, sir."
DOD 000217

And before I could say another word, he said, "Okay.
2 Everybody out. Out. I want to talk to the gene::.-al." And
3 almos~ In u~ison, his whole tea~ stood up, as if this had bee~
4 planned. And my guys ---­
5 Q. About how many--we have a lj~t of a:1 the members of
6 h~s ~ea~, b~~ about how ~any peo~le were there?
7 A. Slxtee~, eig~tee~, twenty. Thei::.­ whole side o~ the
8 table and wal~ husgers.
9 That :r.any? And you--with you was you::.­ sergeant major?
10 A. P.r.d my ops
11 c· Jus~ the ~h::.-ee of you? You and two others.
11 A. R:gt.t. So t~ey go~ up. I said, "Go ahead." ~hey were
13 con.:e::.-ned,
14 So he closed the door a~d he said to me, "Look, we Cdn
15 do :h1s my way or we .:an do :h~s the hard way."
Ib I saicj, "Sir, -dc~':: kno"" "'-:::0 told you I was going to
17 I'n no: be:ns d~::lcu:t. I'm telling you Abu
1 S Ghraib is not m~ne to give to you. I don': own it. We ::.-un t~e
19 detention operations au: :nere. It belcngs tc CPA. They're
20 puttIng tte noney ~nto ::.-efurolshins ~t. It's the only :acility.
21 It was a difficult :::-oad :0 ge:: to this pain:."
22 He said, "Rick Sanchez said = could nave whatever
23 fa.:illty ... wanted, and'" wan: Abu G:-.raib."
DOD 000218

::: said, "Sir, if fl.rr.bassador Bremer tells me or tells
2 the p~iscns people to give yo~ Abu Ghraib, I am ~ct goi~g to
3 stand in the way. What I'm te:li~g you is I don't have the
4 authority to give it to Yo:.J."

5 ~e said, "Look. We're going to run an 1nte=rcgatio~
6 operation. We're gOln9 to get value O~t of these pecp:e that
7 they're brlng:ng in. We're gOlng to be able to release ffiore.
8 A~d that will make life better for everybody. And that's what
9 I'D gOlng to do. And I'm go~~g to go and brief Rick San=hez ana
10 tel: h~rr. that that's w::a: : ';r, gOlng to do."
II There was ~o reason:n? ~:th hi~. There was no reason

me ,
12 :0 argue wlth nl;: a: a~~. He was or. a mission. He told 13 me he had perm:ss~on :~on Sar.~nez--General Sanchez. 1~ Q. And then what happened? 15 A. ,'l.!'1d he left. 16 Q. He left the coun:rv~ 1'7 A. He took ~us tearr, he wen: ~ .. and briefed General 18 Sanchez, and tr-.en Ie::.. 19 Q. And then left country? 20 A. Le:t the country. 21 Q. What happe~ed next? Slr.ce he left country, who was 22 then to take Abu Ghraib 1n his words? I mean, how did that all
. 133
DOD 000219
come about? What impact did his visit have relative to Abu
2 Ghraib?
3 A. What happened was there was more aC':ivity with
4 interrogations o~~ there. Anc by more activity, I mea~ the
5 engineers got there, :hey started constr~cting the "Wood.~--And
6 he said to me, during one 0: the--it must have been during the
7 lr, tr:..e:, = said to him ab:::r..:: our frustrations with getting
8 uniforms a~d everyt~ing for prisoners.
) A::d·he said, "It coes:;': :nake any d:fference. Funding
10 :"5 nc:. ar. :"sS'.le. ] ~ave a hundred and :wenty-five mil~ion
11 dollars a year, and :'m ~cnna transfer the funds to Colonel
Pappas, and he :'oKe ca,=-e -: :~e requirements."
A::d : saiei, "S:::, we jc~':: even r.ave cons::ruc::io::
14 l.::nder,oJay to accommoda:e."
15 Ar.d he said, "We have CO:1nexes that ,,!e' re going to
16 br:nc 1::, we'll reC0:1:1gu::e :herr, and the englneers are already
17 on board with t::is. They kno~ ~ow :'0 do it. I'll bring up the
18 Sea Bees from Guantanamo Bay."
II) I sa:d. "SirI we can':: eve=-. get a train up frotT', the
20 ~or: ~o Eaghdad successfu!!y. How are you gOlng to brin3 all of
21 these connexes in? :'m jus: concerned that you're gOlns to p~:
22 a plan together and you're :1ct going to be able to execute it."
DOD 000220

He said, "I'l~ bring 'e~ in from Turkey and ~rom
Jordan". We den't have to COr.1e ::::-Or.1 Kuwait from t!":e po:::-:."
3 Well, after he le:t--~ mean, hones~ly, sir, i~ was
4 al~ost laughable, but, you know, with a hundred and twenty-flve
5 mi:lion dolla:::-s a year, r :houg~~ maybe he could actually do a:l
6 of these things he was plannln~ on doing.
7 Q. So did you see any c: those changes after he left?
8 A. Well, we saw the engineers were working fur~ously on

9 ~ha: woode~ lnterrogatic~ :ac~:ity.
10 Q. Rl~h:, but that 's no: a ~a)or reconstruction project.
11 :-a:k::. :-.9 t r::-ee, maybe : 0'..: r ---.
12 S:x :::-ooms" ~hree O~ eac~ side of the hallway.

And then they as~ed :or :h:s­14 ~a:othat they nee~ed t~lS ot~er building out at Abu 15 Ghraib oe=p-use they needed ~8 se~ ~D the IC£ facility as General 16 M~ller told them tC de. and :he~ wanted that room--you were au: 17 there. You know wnere the:r ICE fa~ility was? 18 DC: I don't know where :: was. I know where it is now. 19 WIT: Where it is. ~ha: was the only place it ever was. 20 DO: Oh. okay. 21 WIT: They have like c~b:cles or rooms where they work o~ 22 coordinating the interrogation results and everything. Then the 23 int:errogation facility "tr.etal" started. The engineers went over

DOD 000221
chere and started to work en tha~. So there was a lot of work
2 gOlng onto make it a--and rr.ore people started to show up. A:1::l
3 the people that started to show up were coming from either
4 Guantaname Bay or from Bosnia or from Afghanistan. Sc you get
5' the sense -::.hat the.te was ---­
6 cc: When you say peeple, you mean--what kind of peopl~?
7 Def::;e "people."
S ~IY: WeI:, t~ere were so~e military people that came :n.

10 v;IT: No.
11 RC; How do you kno~ :~ev were coming !rom Afghanistan and
12 82s:-:1a, ~a' a:::?
13 W:T: They said, yeu kno~---­14 R:: "1hey" wno?
15 ~-_: These peep:e that were arriving there.

16 R:: They were talk:~g to yeu?
17 ~I~: Yeah. O=cas:ona~:y :~ey'd =ome over and introduce
] S :he~selves and they'd say, "-~~st arrived. I'm coming in fron
]lI . Afshanistan," or, "I ';n cor..:':lg '..:.:: because Genera: M:.ller sen: me

~(I ~F ':ror'. G!.lantanamc Bay."
DOD 000222

DC: So when you mea:-: [s~c] "people," you mea", they were
2 part of ~he i~terrogation process?
3 WIT: Ri9ht . .P.nd I'll tell you, I never--: mean, if they
4 were military, some c~ them were in uniform: DCU. But SOrT'.e of
5 tbem :hdn' t have any ins~g:-:1.a on their co2-lars and they
identlfied the~selves as a special age:-:~. Most cases they would
7 say, "T'rr. in the r:1il1.tary, c'Ut T con't wear any insignia." And
8 the cIvilians that were there--: thought that they were all
9 lr.terpreters, because interrogation teams need interpreters,
10 'Ur.less they're lucky enou~~ to have a lingulst that's an
1 1 So, the clv~llans that : saw arriving there.
12 _ tho:..:g:::, you Know---­
1...-' So the soldlers ~ere lje~::fying themselves as special
1~ ager::s?
15 w-:--· Rlgr:t.
Interrogators ~_..... 1­~'-'.. -identify themselves as spec~al
17 ager.ts.
18 v,':T: Oh, yeah. A:-:c. the:,: were 1:1 the ::'nterrogation--i;. the
19 I:E ~acility. a:-:d they were--and :ten there was also a--well,
20 that was in Noverrber. but a ~RRSD team we;.: out there--the
21 bat:.allon.
22 DO: That corr.es a:te:::­ we go ~hrough the FRAGO, a:;c we'll
get to the FRAGO. Maybe shortly we'll get to the FRAGO.

DOD 000223

Q. Did he ever men~lon to you ~he use of dogs at
2 Guantanamo?
3 A. No, Slr.
4 Q. How they used them or how they didn'~ use ~hem i~
5 anyway?_
6 A. No, sir.
7 Any c: those spe::l::':: 2.reas of interrogation
8 procedures?
9 A. ,--Jc, Sl:-. The o~ly refere:-,ce he ever made to me was
10 ~ha~ ~hey were going ~o i~e~=i~y specific MPs that would be

1:2 saHi, "Sir, ~hey've never =c:le :::as. O~r prisoners are not 13 ~ovei ~i~t leg :ron5 or ~a:l~ :rons or anything." 14 '!ne:v' said, "~O. :::'5 no: a p:-oblem. I'~ leaving a CS 15 a:ld prl~=ed mate:-:.al. The~: people are going to give them all 16 of the trair:lng that they npn "'; -:'hat 's wha= he told me.
17 Q. Did you ever see -:h==.:, C~ 0= p:'-l.r.:"ed mate=ial?
18 A. 1'\0, sir.
19 Q. : think t~e term has Oee~ used tha~ General Miller sald
20 tha: the ~?s were going to create tte envlionme:l= for ~hich


DOD 000225
interrogations wo~ld be conduc:ed or something to that effect.
2 Do you reember him using a:1ythJ.ng to that effect?
3 A. He :-lever even saio--he may have used the expressior:.

4 abo~t enhancing :he interr03a~ion ef=ort, but I couldn't eve:1
5 swear to that. He said that t~ey were going LO give them
G speciElc train:'ng.
7 Q. But you never had any specific conversations about what
8 that actually meant, Olj ycu?

9 A. ;';c, s~r.
10 R:: Ma'ar.1, you ~ent~oned t~at General Miller said they
II were 90:'n3 :0 ~der:.:!fy spec~~!c M?s. What do yo~ ~ean by
1~ "spec~:i.c r1Ps s~ppcr::..r:.g"?
1~ wr~: Tta: that woul~ be :~e:..r spec:'fic ~ission. That they
1-+ wou:dn': be--you knovl !--.C\.: \'~. ge:--like t::e first sergeant will
15 tasked:c 00, cn a duty r85:e~, you know, force protectlon, you
16 know,.::.n a :O\oJer or so:ne:h:..ng--that they were goir:.g to be just
17 s?eclfically tralned tc do tne :..n:errogation support.
1 S RC: So now ~I is now gCln~ :0 tell you that theY're going

10 to gc and take M?s aside ar:.d ~:..ve :~em the tasks?
20 WIT: Rlgh::.
21 RC: So now MI :'5 tasklng ~Ps?

22 WIT: Well, I do,-'t th~nk that they'd be tasking them
23 directly. You know, if :~e :asklng had come down, it would have

DOD 000226
gone throu o p~ovide these soldiers--these MPs tc
2 run de.t.ention operations i:: :::ellblo~k lA and lB.
3 This is jus: pure spe=ulation on My part, but I wo~~d
4 imagine that jid not want new fa=es in there
5 every nlgh:. he w2nted a cens~stent roster of MFs.
6 RC: And this is t~e A~?~st, Septenber t~meframe?
7 v7I T: Correct.
8 c. Dld you--when yeu me: Major General Ryder, he came
9 a~te~ 3eneral ~~ller--whe:: d~d 3eneral Ryder ccme in to the
10 eOL:::ry -~ de h~s----?
1 1 h. At :~e end of 8:::tc~er--~aybe at the beginning of

13 hnd ...:hat was the r;.lSS::::-. that he was given? Why was he
15 1(, 17 18 ]) 20 21 22 23 J.... He was d:rectcd ~c =or~ in and do an assessment of dc:e~tien operations. Sc, 6n::e agai~, sorry to say this, but ~ad--we had lots of people ccmlnc In dOlng assessments and r:ebocy helping us. O. And when Majer Ge~era: Rlder stewed L~ to do hlS assessment, did yeu talk tc h:r; about whose idea was this--I mean, w::c gave him this IT1SS~on? A. He sald that he was d~rected to de this at Genera: Sanchez'8 request, but the request came throLsh SENTC8M to do we
AG0000139 DOD 000227

none~heless, they wanted so~ebody that could de:ain o~ secure,
1 whatever, and tha:'s typically MPs. And general Ryder
3 unders-:ood that, so there wasn': that strong learr:ing c'..!rve t!1a.:
4 we were subJecting everybocy else to. And his opinion co~r.ted.
5 His report would have beer. extremely hel~~ul if we had had it as
6 soo~ as he left or soo~ after, and we didr.'t get h~s ~r.til
7 mO:1~:""1S a':te::­ e':'t.her.
8 Q. Whe~ d~d yo~ get !".:. s report?
9 , h, Shortly aft.e;::­ we the two bullet comments from the
Then we go: ~ost o~ the report--the Ryder
11 ~epc.:-:. We d:d~lt get the oomp:e:e repor: until January.

~ ;,. ,
14 And, 0: co~rse, ~ l~-naG occ~r~ed relative t Ab~
15 G~ra~b a~d :.~ sure other places ~~ that interi~ time?
16 Yes, sir,

17 ':'he com:'nand of A.tu G::ra:b r.aci a ronvard operating base, 18 and we had briefly discussed th:s earlier in ~h:s interView. lY When the pr~son :lrs: opened and :here was only one unit t~ere, 20:he 72r.::, .:..: '"as clear tha: :ha: I 5 who was in charge of Abu

Q. Then the 72~--then a battalion is sent frem the
:2 military police, the 32Qtt,?
h. The 400 tb was t~eir flrsr headquar:ers--:heir first
4 battalion, D~t that was brie~.
5 Q. And they, the 72n~, a~ :lrst reported was a ~nit nf the
-; n. . Ccrrec:.
8 Q. Eut, :~en. as : understand it. when :he 320t~ showed up.
9 i: was 6 change in tne re?cr=~ng relationshlp when the 72~

11 .r.. . Yes, si~ .

1~ ~ewas the se~~cr c:::cer on board. Correct?
\4 r " . Yes, Slr.
15 Q. A~d was he. t~e~, ~~ your cp:nion, the forward
16 :::;?era:l:.~ base ccmr:1ander:
17 A. He was the P.bu Gr.rcll~ c:::;rnrr.ander. Yes, sir.
18 Q. And a= what po:n: l~ tlne ale =he Abu Ghraib co~~ander

20 J:.•• 'I'he comma:!oer c!1ar.ged ,,'hen the ~RJ,GO was cut ana

22 abou: the 19t~ or somcth::-::! c:: November.
DOD 000231
Q. You mear. Colo~el Pappas?
A. Colenel Pappas. 3 Q. So on 19 November, C~Tr7, Ge~eral Sanchez, 4 specifical2.y o~de~ec the rRAGC to be issued, changing the FOB

6 yigh:?
7 "r-. • Co~rec,:.
8 Q. Dld you read t:ha: rRA~O when it ca~e out?
9 A. No, sir. I didn':.
lCJ Q. :lid a:-:ybody -­merr.ber c: yo'..:r sta:: read tha: FRAGO whe;..
11 l: firs: :-ame au:?
12 A. ~o, sir. ~he ~irs: :lme :hey read it was like :wo days
13 ii:,,:er ::1e ?RAGO was re2.eCise::

15 i-.. ~igh: . Abo'...!t ::he ::: 5: .
16 Q. Die you read i: :her.?
j7 A. : was JUs:: :'ODlr.S ba:-K to 3agndad. I was out of the
18 =ou~t~y for flve days. So : JUS: got back to Baghdad and I
19 thi:1k they told ~e :he day at::er--:he morning after they saw the
10 FRAGO, they tol:i me.

DOD 000232
--'---_...... -.. _.-..._---_."
Q. And what did the ~RAGO say to :he best of you~
:! recollection:
3 A. It .said tha:. effec:1VE: lmmediately the operatlona2.
4 control of Abu Ghraib would be--was redi~ected to the 20St:t. 1;:::
5 B~lgacle and further that the commanc1E':r of the 20::;t:h MI Brlgade 6 wou:d be dec:ared the F05 co~~ar.der. That's what it said. 7 \.e. There was ven::.age ,,'1 thl:: that FRAG:J ':ha': talks abct.:t 8 the 20S~r. hav1ng responsib1ll:Y f"''''' the FOB, Abu Ghraib, for

1J '" No: specifically.
1:: :;;e FO?· ar.::: force c;rctec:::.c~ :r. :::a: FRAGO.

14 shov,: 1t spec1:::.ca-:ly :':0 yc'..:, :::::'.:: ;-:-,1' reco~lectior; is "the 205~r. M:::
15 3r:'qaae CO!T'::1ar;der 15 hereby appointed FOB commander for force
1(, pr::;o:ec:::.o:-. and securl:':y C: Oe:a1nees." W!':.a:.: dld that constitute

18 19 21 factors fer force protec:::.o:-: and secur::.:y of de:alnees? What did rna: :nean in you~ ;r,lnd") r-. . Whe;: = read the ~K.;'::;C, : remer..be~ my :n::':lal react.:..or: vJas tho: r.ow t::ey' re cut:lr.~ a FRACe and !T,aJ.:.lns h::.rn responsii:::le for ferce pretectlen, se that J~st:fles the~ sendlng o~: extra
AG0000145 DOD 000233

units :ha: we have bee~ ask:~5 for months fo~ a~d neve~ go::e~.­
" -Anc :ha:. !-':i.::~er go: wr.a: he wan:.e:i.
c. Genera: . .. .. ~l..... .l.e~ ."
... A . General Mi.:le~ gc: w~a: he wanted.
That's wna: waS :~ yc~~ mind?
i-... :r.a: was :ha: Abu G~ra::'b is what he wa~:e~
a:-.::: :s wha: r.e
. --.. ~ ..... -"'-... -.. -" s:a:E7e:-.: :;:a: i:. salel
de:a~!1ee~l\: t·,'::',' have :ha: s:a:eme:-.: 1::
::-.a:. s:a:emer.:?


.. -,... .. _.--­

yo'~ know,
1':' :::'0.:; __ ,:v.:~. v-' knov", a ::c..::.... c: ::lays, and salC I "I~here' s

~.-........... ~.. -. sa

~, ,
!s he b'.ls~· c··-a: Ab~ ~hraib or is he of
1'" he sale, "He:;. 7.=. a­

20 .... sc_:c~::; : r:a: Cc:;' o:-.e':' Pappas' 21 lr.:er?re:a:lc~ was that ~~ =~::s :ne whole :hl::g~

An~ :ha: ~e ;0: that gUldan:e from General Fas:.

asked hln how was

::e 2.iking detention operations, and he said, "You know,_ 2 ~sreally be~ns very patient wit:: me. He' s teac::lr.~ 3 ~e m8re abo~: dete~tlor. o~eya:ions than = ever thought :'0 wa~~ 4 to kr:ow." 5 C. That's what Colone~ Pappas sai.d? 6 P.. ~~~a: IS what :::olone~ :appas said.
7 Jl.:ld said, ":"oo}: , -oor.': th~nk 1t's necessary, " 0:-I
S "are we going to changE," D:"::' :nere was a question either stated
) or l~plleci, "are we going '::: c:;ar.ge the rating for these g:..;ys?" 10 3eca~se rather thar. glve :;;E~ a ra:lng and then go through the 11 'v\';:C::' e t:-:'i r:g

I think it's jus: better 1:
12 : :-.e way .1. t :.. =' .
13 s:) ~"e saiG I " -~=rrled about the adminis:ra:~ve

por:l or.. :::: you war.: co~::~ue :0 rate him--.lf there's a 15 prCDi.e::-" ce:::-:al.n:'y le: yo:.... k::o....;. II You know, that klnd of 16 cor.vers,a:. 10;-;'. So we 1_......... --:.: ·was.
-'" ,,-. ~
Ii 18 DO: Sure. !9 She'S mak~ng co~me~:s some:~.lng :.~a: she's say1ng ~o fro~, ::1e:ncry, ~l [-:'he aepcs:':lO:-: recessed a: ~738, 18 July 2004.;
DOD 000235
(The deposition was called ~o order a~ :756, 18 ~~ly 2oo~.1
2 Questions by the deposition officer (continued):
3 You have now re'newec the speclfic FRAGO?
4 " h. Righ::.
5 Q. ~oes that refrest yo~~ recollection relative to what
6 was l~ vc~~ m:nc when yG~ read that back when you were deployed?
, K. does;;':: c:-.ar.ge : recalled :t as being--bercre
S ::::olc:1e: Pappas. \\:as FRAGOec :c de :tis, I trled t.o bring somebody
9 :10".:: there t:J establisr. a ~ase­-3. planner cell and kind of serve
]0 as ::he FCB c:::rnr::ander !cr :;:e::':':i? :r:1S ::hing organlzeei Slnce i:

12 :or a:--. C'-6 :c r-..:r. J..~-..: G;-.r~:.~ as :ne FOB ccm::1ander, because--I~ \\:ork:~5 w:.:t Cclcnel Pappas a;;c ~e d:dn':: wan:: to give us people

15 sa:.:::, ,,­ do::': have ar-yoc:::::e s:ve yen.:."
16 K:---.. :::':: sa:.c, II: car: ' : .-.:eer: j!"il::.ns in:o rr.y brisade
1-: take people and p . ..:: :herr c-..:: :::ere."

19 1U 21 sa.... ::r;e werd "'l'ACO~" ::::ere, _ as'.ed C:llcnel Pappas ai:::out ::, and ~e salei that he h2.~ aa-..:es:~cr: about i: h:msel!, and the reason they weren't asslgnej :c ~l~, ~he uni:s ou: there, is because we were no: asslgned :c =~TF7.
AG0000148 DOD 000236

understanding tnat he had ope~ationa: control--tactical =on~~o:
2 c: them.
3 Even though tha: sale TAC8N. yo~ ~hough: he had
4 ope~ational con~~ol? Because there's a difference i~ the
5 ~e:::-7Hnology, nere, as yO'J v;e::'::' know.
6 Yes, Slr. But he co~::'d de:ine their work or their
7 asslgnme~=s or use 0: :he~ ~~ :crce protectlo~ and those ki~ds

How about security of de~ainees? 10 He nad that ~nders=a~d~~~.

1~ Pappas co~:d do o~ wha: ~p ~efer~ed :0 earlier as the warden or
13 J:~.:.er reS::lCDS1Di::'lt1Es a::e:' :.::~::: :RAGO was issued?
14 r .. : k:-:ew tha:. he nc:'--:: was my understanding, my

111 17 IS 19 2() 21 22 co;.::"dn':. take a warde:-. 0'.1: c: a c'2::':b:"ock and say, "You' re ~clng :0 be a arlVer of E. vet:lc~e," '''::'c~' ~e ~oing to be an interrogator," bu:. he co...::"d "':5E :he:-71 to do the detention If he though: :hey Deeded ~ore MPs out on the ~rison conpou:-:ds--tte genera~ pcp;.::atlor. co~pounds, then he COL.:.ld go ::hrcugh the tf:P ta:ta:" 10:; , talk :~andsay, "::: thl:1K :.ha: wi ~h a~: c: :::e pr.: soners gC1ng out to the ger.eral
AG0000149 DOD 000237

population comp8~nds, you need to pull more people out of the
J lnside ce11. II
3 Q. What YOG're des=r1bing t8 me would be operational
4 C8~~~O~ in my understanding o~ operational contro: and how the
5 Ar~y normally operates and its usual ~efinitlons of those terms.
6 Whereas TAeON, which is what the order says, tactical control,
7 would be that Cclonel Pappas WOGlt glve a speci!ic mission to

anc then it wo~ld be up to 8 figure out how to do that with
10 !-.lS available forces.
1 I ...... Well, .,-w8;;ld a:.;-:-ee \0;1 t.:-. yo'..:, sir. Only fo~ the Iraqi
12 correctlons--:he deten::cn5 c~era::ons--the Iraql c~imlnals tha~
13 we were stlll hoidl~g O~: :he:-e. And there was no: that many

There were a~~ lns:je lr. the hard site in the 15 d:::~rent cellblocks, an2 that wasn't Colonel Pappas' l~ne, ane 16 he would give t.he ~lSSlO~ to hl~, whateve:-it ~igh: be, as 18n5 17 as i: wasn'~ the Iraq: Ccr:-ect1cns or affecting the lraqi 18 corrections offlcers that we :-lac or; slte 0"-there. 19 C. ~i~ you ever dlSC~SS :h:~ lSsue W1t ~O ~ndsee how hlS ml~dset changed after all of thlS? 21 A. Actually, ~ did.

DOD 000238


2 A. He talkeci abou~ how there was no disconnect--~hat hl~
3 and Colonel Pappas were mee:lns every day a~d they had these
4 ~pdates 1n the morning, anc he didn't ~otice any diff~culties or
5 any questions, and I :o~d hirr several times that the rating
6 scheme wo~ld still be 1n :h~ aoo th MP Brigade and the UCMJ and it
7 would--it would be less disru~:ive to all of the units o~t
8 ::here. : never got any l~d~ca:ion from him that he was having
9 a~y problems with Colenel ?a~pas.
10 ~O: And ~hat's cons~s:e~: wi:
~old us when we :al~ed to hiD. In fac~, he ~eld us
12 that :-.e d~::i::': percelve 0 ... oay-:o-day changes regardlng his
13 warde~ responsibilitles a~~ that :olonel Pappas did not really
14 beccme l~volved with those warden responsib~li'.:ies. The only
15 cha::ge th:;.: saw was ln the force protection
16 area, where there were c~anges relative to additional units
17 being ass:.gnec..
IS Q. So, do you have anyth:.n? that would contradict what

20 21 22 23 A. No, --.,.....,--. And I s::.ll--and 1 ccntinued to go o~t there. I was~': out there nearly as c:ten as I had been be:ore, but I ccntinued to go OUt there-~nd continued to go--I mean, visit all of the MPs, the units :ha: were out there.
AG0000151 DOD 000239

Q. Why was that? What changed in your mind that caused
2 yo~ to ~o out there less often if, in fact, the wardee
3 responsibilities remained ~he same? The force protect~on issues
4 changed and beca~e Colo~el Pappas' responsibilities. Were the
5 force proL.ecti.on issues your main reason for going ct;'; there
6 most of the time? I mean, why did yo~ stop going there as
7 frequently?
8 A. Because I did not want to be disruptive to Colonel
9 Pappas' plan as the FOB corrmander. Ar.d I went out there a 10:
10 prior to that trans~tion because the FOB was still considerec
11 our respcnsibility, and all of these contractors coming in, more
12 mertars every nigh~, they were becoming more accurate, and the
13 ferce protectior. p:'ece--tha: ....;hole equation was primarily being
I~ handled by the MPs.
15 I know t~at yo~ had discussions with General Sanchez at
16 various pcints in time relatlve to force protection of that
]7 site: Cae you tell me the f~rst tlme you had a discussion wlth
18 General Sanchez on the force protection issues?
19 h. I went to hirr. when L.ne--there was an incident out at
20 Abu G::raib ln the Au~st timefrarr.e, ar.d an KPG came in and hit-­
11 or it was a--they didn't know if it was an RPG or an IED that
22 was on the ground, and the 5-ton that was out there drove over
23 i: and it darraged the back of the vehicle and--there weren't any
DOD 000240

soldie~s that were injured, but hearing was affected. So I
2 talked to General" Wodjako\olski about it and told him that I
3 didn't--I know that they were telling me that the First Armored
4 Division was covering it ",i':n force protection, but I didn' ~ see
5 i~ at any ti~e that I was out ~here with one exception, and tha:
6 was around lU:1chtime, and :.hey carrie on':o the compound to eat
7 thelr MREs. That was the cn::'y time I saw any of their platforms
8 out there. And I told General Wodjakowski that I was scheduled
9 to brief 3eneral Sanchez on t~e timeline of the restoration of
10 the prisons, and I was gOlnS :'0 mention that that was my number
J1 one concern, that the fcrce prctec:.ion issue was ~ore pronounced
12 o~t at Abu Ghraib be=ause :~ey h5d no effective comms out there,
13 and lt was a big facility, and was well k:1own that on three
14 sides of the prlson, the civilian pop~latio:1 did not :ike us
15 bei.ng there. So I did brie: him on that. That would have been
16 Augus:.. Then wher. we hac the incider.t where the mortars came
17 over and killed ~hose six priscners, ! tal~ed to General
18 vlodjakollls:li immediately. ::"-iKe: sCiid, I'd hate to say it, but: I
19 was almost pleading with hlIT. to ge: force protection platforffis
20 0:1 station out there. And then when the M: soldiers were
21 kil:ed, General Sanchez came ou': :'0 the prison, tooK a walk
22 around, just by the torture chambers and by ~he cellblo=ks, and
DOD 000241

the ~elephone, he was acknowledging and confirming tha~ we 2 didn't have the s~pport that we needed. And then when we wal~ed 3 around on the grou::-:d, he said tc me, "If you don't get force 4 prote::':ion, yeu come to me." "Yeu come to me." 5 Q. When was that? 6 A. That was when he vis~ted after the MI soldiers were 7 killed. 8 Q. Se that would have been after Sep~en~er 20:h ? 9 A. If ~hac:'s ~he :-:ig:::: that they were--that would be-­
10 beca~se he came the next day or two days la~er or whatever. A~d 11 then we had--about a week later, we had an MP and a sergeant 12 frof:"'. the 82r.d that were ki :":"ed. A:,j the soldiers are the ones 13 whe saH:, "Mayne he wasn': e'Jen ta:"k~ng to anybody on that phone 14 when he was car~ying on.W 3ecause they were e~couraged that 15 Genera: Sanchez was taking control cf this and getting the 16 Armored Divis:'on ~e come au: there. 17 Q. So a~ter that ::onversa~10n, which was after the M! IS soldiers were k:lled and yo~ ha= that ccnversat10n out there at 19 Abu Ghraib, correct? W~th the General?
20 A. Correct.
DOD 000243


Q. And he told you if fo~ce protection issues continue,
2 for you to go tohirr.. Force protection continued to be an
3 issue, did it not?
4 A. It continued to be an issue.
5 Q. Dld you go to him?
6 A. I we~~ to General Wodjakowski, and I told General
7 Wodj akowski., "I'm going to go to General Sanchez.
8 Q. And what did General Wodjakowski say?
9 A. "I'::'l talk to hi'" about i~ "

10 F.nd : said, "::e tolc me at Abu Gh~aib -:hat if force
11 protection con~lnued to be a problem to come to him. So : 1m
12 go::.ns to go t.o him. "
13 Q. Dld you 90 to hl~?
14 A. = did.

15 Q. And when was the tlme that YD''': went to him after that 16 conversation at Abu Ghraib? 17 A. It hac to be at least a week later. 18 Q. And was that at Vi:=tory that yo:.: went to him or was---­19 A. I twas. It was in ~is o:fice. 20 C. And what occurred? What did you say? 21 A. I said, "Sir, you tolc me to come to you. Force 22 IJrotec,-ion is continuing ~o be a problem." 23 He said, "They're out there on slte."
DOD 000244
I said, "No, sir. They are not." And he looked up at 1 me li~e--I mean like I was obviously lying to him. And I sa~d, 3 "Sir, I don't have force p=otection--I don't have platforms ou: 4 there. The battalion doesn't--" 5 "I know what the battalion doe'3n't have." 6 Q. Did you have ano~her conversation with him af~er that?
7 A. I tad a conversa~ion with him before he sent the B2~c__ 8 General Swa::nack, ~he B2r:.:: comrr.ander out there. 9 Q. ~hen was ~hat?
10 A. 3::':::-,: believe ::ha-c that was down at CPA. 11 Q. i'll-.en?
r;. . A~~e:::-the conversa::~~ In his office that was---­13 c. G:ve ~e, i: yo~ co~lj, a timeframe, here. You we=e 14 talking to him prob~bly some tIme in October? Because I'm just 15 taki::g the dates !-.ere: !:: was a few days after the 20r.t:. the:-. it 16 was the 22"d , tl.... en a fe",· days or a week after that I then we I re up 1"7 to the 2"7:.h, 29~h--sorr.ewhere after that. So SOTt",e days after that, 18 we're ~n to the fi=s: week In October? 19 A. We were In Octoeer. 20 C. We \,;ere in Octoeer somet Ime? Okay. 21 A. A::d I told hi~ that--I told him the same th::'ng, that 22 the force p=otection--tte platforms were tte:::-e--the Bracleys
DOD 000245
were there, but the only reason they came in to Abu Ghraib is
2 was if they stopped i~ to have lunch."
3 .And he said, "You know, tha: was my division, and they
4 know the rules. And I'm not going to tell them how to--," he
5 used an exp~ession. He said, "I'm not soing to tell theTTl how
6 to,"--"I'rn no: going to tell them how to suck eggs. You have
7 ::orce protec:ion."
8 ! said, "Sir. : have snipers, who are people with
9 racios that are ca:king to the people firing the mortars, ar.d

10 they have elevation. If it's cn the bridge,----OI 11 He sa~d, "Securi::g your bridges and roads? Sou:1ds like 12 a rr.i:"~ tary pol ice fU:1ction ::c me." 13 I sa~d, "S:'r, i: ~s. But it's no: my M?s tha:: are 14 doin9 that miss~on. -can't get the roads secured. I'msLll
15 gett~ng ~ortars."
16 He said, "We are ta~ing care of you." He jus: was net
17 the k~nd cf a person that you challer.ged repeatedly.
18 Q. So was that the last ti~e you challenged him on that
19 S'.lDject?
20 A. And t.he::1t.he--General Swan:1ack came out to Abu Ghraib.
21 Q. He was the com~ander of the 82r.d Airborne Div~sion?
A. Correct.
DOD 000246
Q. Okay. And when did he come out?
2 A. He came out after ~he incident with the--it had to be
3 after the MI soldiers were killed, because the--he came o~t--I
4 met him at his helicopter. It was the first ~irne I met hi~. He
5 took a look around. Ee said, "So, what platforms do you have
6 now?"
7 And I said, "\-Je don't, sir."
8 And he said the same th~ng about being on a seam, that
9 chey would go back ~o C~TF7 and ~e:l them to push ~he seam out
10 so they were responsible for it, 50 that line was clear, ano he
11 \lJoule:: pu: a platoon out there. Ar.d he said, "vlhat do you have
12 r.ow?"
And! told hl~ ~he same tting: we had as-ton, that
l~ was o~r :argest vetic:e, and a couple of buses to transport
15 prisoners, and a 50-cal tha= was loaned from the Marines.
16 He sald--he looked around and he said, "They really,"
17 in very colorful la:1guage, "they really screwed you on this
IS mission." Then he hit me on :he back and he said, "vie' re going
19 to ta~e care of you." Tna: af:ernoon, the platoon arrived. Two
20 days later, through a series 0: calls, I think through his--to
21 his company i~ the battalion, they sent tte company out, and
22 then a counter-mortar battery. And it still didn't stop.
DOD 000247

Q. And that would have been what time=rame, agair:, wher. 2 all of' that occurred? 3 A. Late October. 4 Q. Ar.d that was before the change over of ~he FOB relative 5 to the security detainees ar.d the forc:e protection? 6 A. Correct. But it was after--J believe, it was after 7 they declared 1t an endurlng camp. And General Wodjakowskl told
8 ~e, whe~ they declared !t a~ enduring camp, ~The reason we
9 haven'= been able to take care of you er provide you any support 10 is because you're OPCON to us; you're not assigned to 11 headquar~ers. So we can't legltimately, according to my ~oney J2 man, the bagman--we can': g:ve yeu any funding for the things 13 yo:.;.' ve been aski::g :or." 14 Of course, that was severa: months later, but--so they 15 declared it an enduring camp,a.nd I said, "It's only an interim }6 fa:::il:..:y." 17 He said, "W:-:at does t:hat mean? Two or three years?
11\ I '11 take t::a:."
19 Q. And that changed :hc category of :undir.g
20 funchng and---­
21 A. And amour.t of fundlng, and contrac::s, and
22 they could be exercised. Bu: it also brought mere
23 OUt there.

and authorized
how quickly
DOD 000248


Q. When the FRAGO was issued that changed the FOB 2 corr,mander for force protection ana for the security of 3 detainees, and we had ou~ discussion rela~ive to that, did you 4 believe that that had any impac: on what was occurring or what 5' did occur relative to t;.le abuses a'C Abu Ghraib? 6 WI~: C:--of ~aking the MI brigade commander in charge? 7 Q. Yes. Did that have anY:.hing· to do with the abuses?

8 A. ~l.r I I would say no: d~rectly. But I've always--more
9 informat~on has come out abou~ the instructions or the alleged 10 i~struc:.ion from so~e of t~e ~n'Ce~=ogation tea~. 1:-. my ow~ 11 mlnd,: t~cught that t~at was a~: i~ the works, and they wanted 12 to effectlvely remove Genera: Karp:nski from--not necessarily D from a blaf"\e line, b·..l: £ro~ c.:.rec: knowledge. They wanted :0--1 14 nea:: t.he i;'1(.ent was to reduce IT'y rec::uirement.s to be out there. 15 Q. You be;"ieve that's why the FRAGO was issued? 16 A. Yes, sir. 17 Q. I thought we had--you didn't th~nk the FRAGO was issued 18 because of the force prorec:'lon issues o~ the security 19 detalnees?
20 A. No. ~ think tha: that was a benefit. It would be 21 di f:::.cul t to release a FRAGO that says, "Trans fer of the prison 22 responsibilit~es because the focus is going to be on
DOD 000249
1 interrogation and SOffie of ~hose ~hings might not sit well with
2 General Karpinski and ~he 800:h MP Brigade."
3 Q. So do you ~hink ~hat ~hose abuses only s~arted after
4 ~his FRAGa? When did the abuses start?
5 WIT: When did the photographs?
6 Q. W~en did the abuses s~art, at Abu Ghraib?
7 WIT: In terms of--~aybe you need to ~ell me what you're
8 looking a:: as abuses.
9 DO: Abuses would be any~h:ng ~hat we would consider a~

10 ac:iona~lE clause under :he Geneva Convention or the UCMJ; a 11 vlolat::.o:-: of the rights and F~:'v:lleges of detainees. Any of the 12 uSJal mis:~eat~en: that we ~cu:d consider: physicial abuses, 13 h·..lmiliation, you know---­14 vlIT: Okay. The acts -:ha: are depicted in those 15 p~otographs. 16 D~: Not only those acts. Well--some of those acts that 17 are depicted in those photographs are certainly abusive, but it 18 goes beyond what's dep:cteo in t~ose p~ctographs. There are 19 abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib that go beyond those
20 pictures.
DOD 000250


Q. So my question is, to yo~r knowledge, when did the
2 abuses begin at Abu Ghraib?
3 A. The reason I'~ asking is because the prisons in all of
4 t~e prison facilities were very austere. Logistics was not
5 working very well because of t!1C lcng lines of supply. And the
6 prob~ems associated with getting convoys and equipment to
7 Baghdad and then out f~om those operating bases. So there were
8 ti~es w~en--when you keep p~isoners under canvas, under ten~s,
9 i:: b2.1ster:ns heat, without any sense of relief where they can
10 get i:: ~nder the shade of a tree cr anything else, it is close
11 tc ~e~ng in vielatio:: o~ Geneva/Hague. And. often. we discussed
12 that with the ICRC. B~: t~ey saw it consistently in all of our
13 fac:'l.ities, a::c they knev: th.:lt t::e soldiers were facing the same
14 cendlt ions. Se, I know tha.: that was going on throughout the
15 :heRter =o~ as long as we were tr.ere, oecause it was something
16 :hat--! don't want tc say that it's a ccndition of war, but--it
17 is. But, the acts that we~e deplcted in those photographs, I
J8 OC:1' t believe that they we~e occu~rln9 anywhere else than in
J9 cellblock lA and B. And tnere we~e abuses ea~ly on down at
20 Bucca­--­
21 DO: Not--I'm real.ly cnly re:erring to Abu Ghraib, now.
22 A. ----But 1 don't believe those activities or those
23 abuses were taking plac~ ~nt~l the interroga~ion operation
DOD 000251

became so significant and the attention focused on the
2 interrogation operations.
3 Q. So, in regard to the ~alendar, when do yo~ believe th~~
4 the abuses began?

5 A. When cellbl~ck 1A went under the control of the
6 ~i~itary ~ntellige~ce, a~d whe~ these other interrogation tea~s
7 started to come in a~d wer~ the interrogation effor~s. That
8 wo-.:ld be October.
9 DO: vlell, it actually started in early September--I mea::,

10 :he actual l~ and 19. M! started assigning people :0 lA was
11 ac:ua:'ly w Se?:ember.
11 A. Septe~ber. Bu: :here were some things :hat took place
13 gradually :rorr. Septerrber e::::, that rna:ie it, '..:.nfortunately,
14 easier, fer them to do those :h~n9s ~n exclusion trom the res:
15 of the cellblock. They p~: u? the exclusionary panels on the
16 doors, so you d~dn't have v~sual access, like you did in all of
17 the other cellblocks. Anj :hey---­18 Q. That was in lA or lB?
19 A. First in lA and then in lB.

10 Q. And who put those ~ane15 up?
21 A. The M! people sa~d that they needed something put up.
22 They.were going to talk to the engineers and that was the
23 engineers' design.

DOD 000252
Q. Who were the MI people that---­2 A. Colonel Pappas~ 3 Q. Colonel Pappas? 4 A. Yes. And the reason he did was because. you know tha~ 5 door ~na~ you come in on ~hat end of ~he cellbl6ck. that was 6 where ~he Iraqi guards came in ~o work. And because those 7 particular ~risoners in cellbl~cK lA and the juveniles and the 8 females in lB, they didn't want the Iraqi corrections officers 9 to then become a source of info~mation outside of the prison by
10 saying, "Hey, I saw

So--it's plausible. 1 I Q. Yes. When did he order t~at? Was it a=ter the Iraqi 12 sh:;oting? 13 A. No. I~ was--t~ey wa~~ed t~e exclusionary panels, as 14 they ca~~ed them, on the ce:l doors--they wanted those urgently 15 on lA, so they put it there--they were in control of both lA a~d 16 3, b~t they wanted i~ done in lA. so that would have been the 17 :. i~st week of October tlfne:rame. And then they got 'em to do 18 l:;. but they P"Ut. the plyw::lDd ove:-the windows a:ter the ha:1ogun 19 incident. 20 Q. Which would have been November 24t~. 21 A. Right. So yo~ have e:£ectively excluded anybody that
22 would walk that long hallway, checking on guards or any~hing--it 23 wasn' ': that they wouldn't open t.he door f.~r you, but you had to
DOD 000253
announce by knocking tha~ you were there and you wanted to come
2 ir:.
3 r;c: I just want to po~nt out, and I'm think she said, b~:
4 I just want to make sure it's clea~, she had no personal
5 knowledge of any instru=tions that any of the MPs were given :n
n regards to ~nte~roga~ion tech~~q~es.
7 WI":': Right.
8 DO: Rigr.~. I did no: perceive her as saying that, but -
9 understand your clarificat~on.
10 Q. So, as far as the abuses. you don't have a~y direct
11 knowledge of the abuses, bu: yeu believe that the abuses began
12 somev,here .:.r: the Se?:.ember /Oc:.obe:::­ t imeframe. Is that correct?
13 A. Co~rect. And I woule say. IT.ost likely, late October,
14 '::lecause I had--I mean the 72nj V-F Company had served t.here and
15 had run :~ose cellblocks for many months, and the pictures tha~
16 I saw, anyway, were people--soldiers fro~ the 372~, and they
17 did~'t get there until--or ta~e over the operations until mid­
18 October.


DOD 000254
Q. And the change of the FOB ~hat we discussed was
2 November 19~r.. So the abused began before that and continued 0::
3 after that?
4 A. I think it was a gradual increase on wha't was being
5 done e:­how tney being used to enhance t·.le interrogation
6 e!forts.
7 Q. Are you of the belie: tha~ it sign~ficantly increased
8 after the FeB command was char.ged?
9 A. I am of that bel~e~. r.ow. Yes, sir.
10 Q. Wha~ leads you to bel~eve that?
11 A. Ttere was a ba~tal~c~ out there that was-~it mayor may
12 not be ~n this FRAGO as we-::. b\.:: ~he LRRSD battalion was sent
13 ou~ there--now they were a subordinate unit of the 20Sth anyway,
14 but they we:-e at a d~ffe:-ent--I thir.k they were up at Anaconda ..
15 So they got dowr. there a~d they were kind of. generally, they
16 were a little bit more aggressive and adventurcu9--mc~e creative
1i witn what they did. And they caused some problems. Now, I have
18 no knowledge that ~hey we~e ever in the cellblocks or anything,
19 but:: was that whole shi:: in ~entality that they were doing
20 some of tl:e ferce protect~o~ and -­.
21 Q. Yeah. That LR~SD--was ~t a conpany or a battalion?
22 A. It was a battalion.
23 DO: To my knowledge, they never---­
DOD 000255

to be at Bucca. But from a detention perspective, not 2 interrogation, but from a detentien perspective, that was on the 3 timeline that we would close--move towards closing Bucca. And 4 we did not--we never closed Bucca. We were getti~g close and 5 then they said to keep :t ope~, and tha~ was part of ~~e 6 problem. CJTF7 was--I mean t~ey were getting conversation and 7 complaints from the division commander that there was no--and 8 Bucca was too far away fo~ t~em to take prisoners, so this was-­9 I ~eaL, that's wha~ I'm talklng about: this prevailing attitude
10 c~ange o~t at Abu Ghraib after the of November. 11 c. '~kay. I hea~ you say t.hat, but I have a hard ~ime 12 dea~ln9 w~t.h what fact.ua2 naS1S yeu have to say that, in fact, 13 there was a diffe~ence in preva~:ing atti=ude. Because, there 14 abuses before and there we~e abU3es after. What causes you to 15 believe ~hat things go~ wor~e? Because r haven't found it. 16 haveL't seen anything--I haven't seer. any evidence of things 17 gett1ng worse. Bad 1S bad. 18 A. But I can tell you, s~r, that I cidn't know i: was bad. 19 The condit iOLS were bad. And w~er. yo:...: put more prisoners into
20 bati cond1tions, conditions get worse. 21 Q. I'm just referring to the abuses---­22 A. But I didn't know there was any abuse. So I can't tell 23 you what I thought--IIWell, 1t was bad now, and how in ~he world
DOD 000259
did it get worse?" With the information that's come out since
2 then, in all of the staterr.ents and the reports--I can't say the
3 Taguba report, because he made no reference to--really, ~o ~he:r
4 involvement except made a couple of recommendations. But when I
5 saw the pictures, for example, in JanualY, I said, you know, the
6 72:,·d left in October, and 'Chey had a consistently good track
7 record a~d wide-open com~unications with me, and we were in
8 control of tha,: facility l~ke every other detention operation.
9 So, I was shocked by ~he pho'Cos, b~t I didn't see them until
10 January, and I was tryin~ to figure out what happened to make
11 therr. lose their minds, and ::0: only commit these acts, but take
12 pictures of 'Che~selves cO~~~ttlng them. I cen't think I've
1.3 reso2.ved 'Chat corr.pletely, b''':: : c",:-:'t suggest to you it was bad
14 and what made it change to worse, because I didn't have any
15 knowledge that it was tad, let alone that it was changing to
16 worse. : '~ tallong about the 'whole environment out there: this
17 prevalli~g attl:ude of--what I sensed on Chr~stmas day when I
18 was o~: there was a recklessness wlth the direction that the
19 interrogation teams were going, ana this battalion that was
20 do~ng the capabilities demcnstra~ion and antagonizing the
21 prisoners by hovering over their compounds and blowing the tents
22 out 01 the way. And meanwhile, Colonel Pappas being concerned
DOD 000260

abo~t MPs saluti~g him when he was inside the wire. And I
2 talked to him about tha~. I ~alked to him about my concerns.
3 Q. And I'd like to go into the--into what you're referrlng
4 to, relative to the helicopters and the demonstration. :'m just
5' having a difficult tlme rela:lng what you're saying to the
6 specific incider::s of specific abuse of detainees and what
7 specific infor~a:ior: you have that would lead you to say tha:
8 things--relatlve to that lssue; no: about their condi:ions,
9 thelr living cor:ditlOr:5, or the helicopter demonstration; b~t
10 those specifics relative to the abuse of detainees: the
11 hi:ting, the kicking, the S:~ipPlr:9, the humiliation, the use of
12 dogs. all of ttose types of thlngs. Wha: makes you say that you
13 t::ink it got worse after ~~,ar: ._ ""as before?
14 A. I ~an't say that 1 ~now that.
15 DO: Alright. Alright. Yo~'ve answered the q~estion.
16 [The deposition recessed at 1834, 18 J~ly 2004.J
17 [The deposition was called to order at 1836, 18 July 2004.]
19 Questions by the deposition officer (continued):
19 Q. We were talking about t~e helicopter incident and the
20 demonstration. Could you tell ~e what was the circumstances
21 surrounding that?
22 WIT: Do you want me to rr.ake a corr.ment about what we were
,'"--' :alking about beforehand, first?

DOD 000261

DO: I don't need any, but if yo~ want to, you certainly
2 can.
3 WIT: r just wanted to make the comment that when I did see
4 the photographs, I did ask the erD cOffimande:::-when these took
5 place and he said that they believed that they took place in
6 November. The:::-e werE' SOlT'.e date stamps on some of the film, but
7 they found out that tha,: was ea·:::-2.~er at an earlie:::-assignment,
8 and that was October, ~i.lt the date stamps on a lot of the
9 p~cti.l::-es t!1at were wide~y published was the end of Noverr.ber.
10 CO: Okay. And yo~ ynde~stand we've done quite an
11 extens~ve investigation we~l beyond that.
12 C:: WeI:, we--we assume that you have.
13 Q. Sc, anyway, if we c::l~ld--:::::ould you tell me about the
14 helicopter?
15 A. I: was on Chrlstmas day. vie went out to Abu Ghraib to
16 visit the ~Ps ou:: there. vle--the group that was the "we" was

17 the act~n9 command 18 l.1y--we2.l, my bat':le captai!"'.

19 she's now a major, and Try driver--my aid and driver team. And
20 when we go: out of the vehl:::::le, 1': ~as about 9 o'clo:::::k or 9:30
21 ln the morning. And I sa~ these soldiers gettlng ready to 90--1
22 looked like they were or. a range :::-over or something. I said,
23 "What are you g'..1ys doing?"

DOD 000262
They said, HWe're going to do a capabilities
2 demonstration. We just got done with the rehearsal on the
3 ground, and we I re going to rehea~se again."
4 I said, "Wha~ ti~e is it going to be?"
5 They said, "Twelve o'clock. We just wanted ::he
6 prise ne'rs to know that we havehelj.cbpters and we're very gUlck
7 to respond i~ case they have a~y ideas consistent with sorr:e
8 rumors about riot1ng cr attempted breakout. So we just want to
9 reinforce our capabili::ies."
10 So, = said, "Wel':', I'll be nere. I'll make sure tha~ I
II see you." So, • was.
12 I walKed through 01':' 0: ::he u~its and several of ~he
13 living areas. :;: went ,.... , ~­~~­::: tne ::orr.pound. I had been thro~gh
14 nos: of the compound, so : was up i~ the towers. I could hear
15 . the heli=opters coming. They ~old me. when I saw ~hem oucs!de
16 when we first got there, that they were going to be--they had
17 the spot marked over by the wall. So they came in over the
18 tents and one helicopter went rlght to the ffiark by the wall.
19 The otr.er helicopter hovered over a compound, and it blew three
20 of the tents allover the place. Now, there tad been a lo~ of
21 rain, so there was water--tha: particular day, it was beautiful:
sunny, blue sky, but there was a lot cf standing water in the
23 compou:1ds because, you kno...·, the ground doesn't drain that well.

DOD 000263
So these prisoners--all of their clothes were going flying all
2 over the place, and, of course, landing in the water. And then
3 he moved--i~ does~'t take long to screw with the prisoners along
4 their way, and they moved back over to the wa:l, and they d:d
5 ~heir repel, and it was a successful operation.
6 So I called Colo!'1el Pappas and I said, "I clrm' t
7 apprec~aLe this." You kn8w, I had told him what had happened.
8 An.d he said, "Well, I'm sure they didn't do it
9 in':entlonally. "
10 AI1d ::: said, "Well, I'm sure they did. And it's the t'.Ps
II that have to deal with the a:termat~ of that kind of screwlng
12 arou~d, anj ~hey have to be told the fallo~~ is more da!'1gerous
13 thar. t.he:'r toyir.3 with the det.ainees."
14 A;.j·Colonel Pappas d:~ come and see me the next day or
15 called me or whatever it was--: think I saw him ove~at CJTF7,
16 actually, and he said to ~~ that te spo~e the battalion
17 commander and he sald that ~E Just missed the mark somehow. He
18 did:-.'t--he made some mistake.
19 Ar:d : said, "Well, year., :0110..:ing that other
20 hellcopter was really di:::cul: to do, : g~ess. He managed to
21 do lt a:ter the fact.." And: said, "You know, you have :0 deal
22 with it. You're going to have a r:ot on your hands next time.

DOD 000264
The detainees were o~ly behaving because they knew i~ was a
2 holiday for the U. S. "
3 He said. "Okay. ma'a~. I'll make sure that i~ doesn'~
4 happen again." And tha;: was the end of i::.
5 Q. The :CRC visit ~hat has gained so much notorie:y--I
6 believe tha~ happened in Octobe~?
7 IJ... I~ did.
8 Q. Wher. was the f~~s;: :ime that you became aware of that
) ICRe v:..sit?

10 A. When I saw tne ~e~c:::-:.. a:-.a that would have been t:-.e 11 las:. day c: Nove~be~ or ;:he fi~s:. 0:::-second of Decembe:::-. 11 Q.. So when the IeRe sho.....ed up. my understanding, :rom

15 ~:::-Offi the JeRe found naked de:ai~ees i~ their cells and then were
16 tOld all of ttese o:he~ allegations that: ttink you're now
17 aware of. ~ha: happened ~~ Octobe:::-. yet you did not know about
18 i:. unt~l the report came ~n in Noverrbe~?
19 A. Right.

22 traditionally be--the ba:ta:~on commanders would escort the IeRe
23 ~epresentatives or :eam around. and he was with the people when

DOD 000265
they were looking at the compo~nds o~~side--the general

DOD 000266
2 3
5 6 7 8
9 10 II 12 13 14
15 Hi 17 J8 lY

I i

21 A. That's correct.

c. And you learned t~at ~ro~ speak1ng with---­
23 A.

DOD 000267

2 A. Right.
3 Q. After Novernbe~?
4 A. Right.
5 Q. But when it first happened in October. my question is

7 call YO'u abot.;': it?
8 A. Well. you know, 51.=, he told me tha,: the ICRC was
9 com~ng out to Abt.; Gh=alb, because that was the standard

10 procedure. And when he escorted .them in the outside compounds,

DOD 000268
Q. Well, the reason for ou~ questions is because

8 to the cellblock. But you did~'t know any 0: tha~, and I'm
q 'donde~lng why your battalicr: c~mrnander didn''.:---­
10 A. I don'~ kn~w.
11 Q. ----talk to you ab8~: Why didn't he call you ar:d
I~ tell ycu if this was an unusual Incident?
13 A. ::t was. Ar.d ::':-1'1 su~p:-lsed, because, again--I'm
14 ~eferencing the IeRe repc:-:, and there was no reference to

15 ing in cellb:;:ck---­
16 Q. Did you ever tal~, afte:-wards, t
17 ~about the IeRe visit?
18 A. When ~e were putting the ~esponse toge:her--o:-the
19 £1:-5: o~ second draft, I didn't talk to him, but they were out
20 at Abu Ghraib. "They" being my JAG 8:ficers. 7hey were out at
21 Abu Ghraib fo:­ this meeting'or: how they were gOIng to word cheIr
response. And they talked to riefly. And


DOD 000269

5 6 d i dn 't know. DO: Yes. :. I'm findin~r:a~ ou~, nOli. It's just su~prising
7 to me.
8 DC: ~ell, it surprises me, too,· sir.
9 DO: Whi=h is why I've asked these questions. Because it

10 "lasr.'': a sma:!.l incident 1

11 So there:or---­12 W;T: Why didn't--we::, yc~ do~'t know, certainly. My 13 ques-:ion :s, orl-Jhy didn't r.e ca:l n~e?" l-l DO: Yeah. That's my F-:..:estlo:; as well. I don't know w::y
."-'"' ---­
15 he did~'t call you. 16 WIT: In 02,:ober, he did not have a--I don'~ thin~ 17 ~[PhonetlcJ was o:..:t there yet. ]8 DC: Sir, were you aware cf the problems t::at_ 19 ~asundergoing? 20 DO: Cn:y what I read i~ the General Taguba reports,

DOD 000270

WI,!,: Wel:', But, you know, si~, I
.., didn It
8 I

12 ;


. 15! I
)(5 ,i
18 j

19 !


DOD 000271

Q. And this was :he tlme period, that you're referring ~o

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 basis to cc:nman:: Ab..: Ghrail:? h. R:gh:. Q. How long was he at Abu Ghraib? A. Probably ten days. Ee mig~~ have stayed a couple of days lo;.ge~, ever. afte~ot back, because he was helping wlth :he base defense plan. He was :he commander of the bat~alion over at Cropper, an:: Croppe= had already closed down. The HVu fac:lity was ~he only thlng that was operational, a;.d he had a full battalion, so--. And they were gett~ng ready to transfer back to the Unlted States.
AG0000184 DOD 000272

But, now we get the IeRe report,

2 has taken place, I see the repor: at this 3 wasr-'t even a meeting. It was after SUU, I was sitting there 4 getting ready to leave, "Oh, ma'am, can we talk about IeRe 5 repo:-t?" 6 "What !eRe report are you talking about:?" 7 Q. s told us--testified to us 8 that ~e talked to you abo'...:!: the IeRe visit tne Sunday afte:-.:t 9 occurred. Do you rememeer having that conversation with

II A. Kc, sir. -...

had had a conversation with 12 ~e--abou: the IeRC vis~t o~t at Abu Ghraib? 13 DO; 7hat'3 what ~e tes::::e~ :0. 14 WIT; I would ~ave reca:led that. No, sir. I don't :-ecall 15 that at all. 16 ~O: Okay. That's w~at he told -..:s. He testified that, in Ii fact, he did have a conversation with yo~ and he informed you 18 about the JeRC Visit, before the repo:-: was wrltten, after the

21 DO: About :he entire :r-cidents as they occurred--I can't
22 remerr.ber speci:::.cally what it was that he said he tol-d you, but
23 it was the essence of what occurred at the !eRe.

DOD 000273
Q. But you don't remembe~ any conversatio~ Wit~ 2 n that subject? 3 A. And he, when he was at Cropper, he would make sure ~ha~ 4 he--reliably, when an ICRe visit came there, he would call me 5 and tell me the good, the bad, and the ugly, and then I 'e wal~ 6 fo~ the report. 7 Q. When you were informed about the visit, whic~ was the 8 receipt of the repert, c:r..ere was a response that was prepared. 9 Could you tell me how that response was prepared?
10 A. Yes, sir. And: have to :el~ you that I didn't receive
11 the report ~hroug::: the nc:::-ma':" channels.
11 Q. How did yo~ recelVC the :::-eport?
13 A. A~ter :he update ~~at I was attending, I was getting

10 there, I bel~eve, anc they said, "r-:a' am, can we talk about :he
J7 ICRC report?"
18 I said, "What ICRC repo:::-t are you talking about?"
)9 They said--the_umped right in. He
20 said, "Ma'am, we'~e already wc~k~ng en the response. We'11 have
21 it ready fer your rev~ew before your----"
22 I saie, "What, the pr~son transfers --" ::: said to
ho was s:'tting right nex: to me, I said, lilt

DOD 000274
figures, the prison transfer that's under your responsibility,
2 and now you have a whole tea~ of people writing the response.
3 I: was usually my batta~ior. com~ander and my JAG officer dOlr,g
4 the response for me. Things ::hanged." And I said, "I haven':
5 eve:1 seen ::he report."
6 aic" "I have a copy right here for
7 you."
8 And: said, "W~ere did this'come from?" I started to
9 read 1:, just glancing through lt, and I turned back and I said,
10 "1.Jhere has this thing been?" Because i:: talked about October.
II "WeI::', we ::-eceived i:."
12 Anc : said, "WeI:. , ',,'hy are yo'..! talking -':0 me about i::?"
13 A."1~al=' "Ma'am, we're working on the
14 ~espo~se. Tte prison was unde~ your centrol at,the time :hat
15 this ::-epor:--this team came i:1. And ::-ather than explain that
16 we've transferred the control of the priscn, now, we just want
17 you::.o be able to sign the:-eoo:-:."
18 So, when I went back :e the TOC--I shouldn't have
19 :um~ed ahead tha:. way. Becat:se: read the remark, I said to

:20 11 22 23


DOD 000275

A.r.d .,. said, "You know, I don't think tha~

6 Ag~in, plausible resFonse. Jumped right in th~re and 7 said--I dO:1't know o_but

17 So, I mean, I c.cr.' t know ho...; int:errogat ion teams work.
18 I ~now mere now than I d~j ~hen, but it wasn't my lane. I hate
19 to say that, but--but J k:1oW tna: they kept the~ in isolat~on 20

DOD 000276
Q. Is there a difference be~ween isolation and
2 segregation?
3 A. There is.
4 Q. What is the difference between isola:ion and
5 segregation?
(j A. Ir. segregation, you segregat.e the prisoner, bu-c t.hey
7 can s~ill have access c~ visua:--they might be in a cell wi~h
8 ce':'l ba~s on ~he doo~, an~ ~hey can still talk or com~unicate i~
9 whatever way, but they are segregat.ed. In isolation, the

10 isola~io~ cells have sc:~d jocrs with a sma:l window--I thi~K it 11 was a flip-down window, ane ~hat's where they were isolated. 12 Q. And what was o2cur~~~g in 1A and IE? Was it 13 segregatior. o~ iso2.ation? I~ A. That was where the ~sola~ion cells were, ~~~ 15 occasionally they would segregate a deta~nee as well, in a 16 separa-ce facility--segregate them from maybe a brother or ]7 sorrebojy they brought in with them--put distance between the~. 18 Q. So was the intent really to ~se 1A and IB, from the IY ~ili:ary i~:e:ligenceaspect, not t~e females or the j~ven~les-­
20 was the intent there :0 use then as isolation cel~s?
21 A. :n lA, yes, s~r. It was. And, they also--that rem:nds
22 me. They also said ~n the response how this was a distortion of
23 the troth. They said, "You ~now, ma 'ani, isolation is the same
DOD 000277

no matter if yo~lre a security detainee or a regular criminal.
2 You get value o~t of the isolation process. So if the ICR2
3 wants unrestricted access and feel that ~hey should be able to
4 drop in on any of these

Q. Who was cClng toe ba2kgrounc information on the
8 response, if you know? Who was act~al~y going ar.dchecking to
9 see if the~e was accuracy t8 ~he ICRC statements or no:, and

10 ve~ifyin9 that these we~e the r:ah: things to say in the
II response?
12 A. ~hey relied ve~y ~eavily on the 20S:h

3u: the team

)4 put together W1 th :-.is JAG c~:i2e;:-s, a::d botl: of my JAG offi cers 15 wen: out t~ere and par:i=lpatec in that, that was out at Abu 16 Ghraib In the magistrate cell out t~e~e. So they wanted to be 17 on the ground i~ case ~here was any questions abeut what )S lsolatio~ cells lookec like o~ whatever. )1) Q. ~ld your JAG offlce~s pa~ticipa:e 1n that backgrou::d 20 in~ormatio~ before the respor.se was written? 21 ."t.... They did.
Q. Did they ever com~ to yeu and talk to you speciflcally 23 about any of the findlngs about, you know,

DOD 000278

A. Ne, sir. The epposi:e. They came back and said to me­

9 10 II 12 13 141 , .... ..'.
1 151

Q. Did a~y of these o::lcers that yeu JUs: named mention
20 21 to you--come to you and say that abuses :hat have occ'..:rred?" A. No, si::-. we have--"We have verified
AG0000191 DOD 000279

·0. It was the opposite?
2 A. !t was.--No~ that it was the opposi~e, but they weren't 3 foctlsing on---­4 O. They weren't focusing on that? 5 A. Right. Because they had Colonel Pappas, and I ~hink 6 they said~sltt.ing in with them explaining how

1 1 Q. ~cw about othe~ gove~nnen: agencies? What do you ~~ow
12 al::ot.::. o:.he:­ go'.rernmer.t a3e:-.c i es i nvolvea ~n Abu Ghraib?
13 W!~: Do you want me to :~ansport myself back to t~en--what
14 I knew ~~out othe~ 30verr.me~:. age~cles ~~en?
15 ;)0: Yes.
16 A. The first t.i!TIe I "las introc.uced to an OGA was out at
17 Al::u Ghralb. They brough~ out a c.etalnee that was not an Hv~,
18 but they haa interrogated ~lm at a separate :acility. Not one
19 8f ~y facilities, but ove~ at the task fo~ce and of no further
20 lntel value. cut they stil! wanted to ho:d hi~, so they turned
21 him over to us. And they co:ne out in these SUV' 5, and none of
22 them·had unifor~s on. They a:l had their black shirts or khakis
23 or w~atever, and you JUSt know theY're different. It could be
. 194
DOD 000280

some:hing tc do wi~h the armament allover themselves and the:= 2 veh:..cles, but t:hey were very professional. They made sure that 3 t:he prlsoner was handled correctly. I watched ~hem. He had 4 :lexi-cuffs on him, and :hey--:hey c~t them, and made s~re ~ha:­5 -you know, they asked h:"m in Arabic if his arms were okay. And 6 t hey in':roduced :hernse1ves --L'lree 0 f them did anyway. And t::ey 7 sa:'::l :ha~ they were w:tl-. :he :ask force, I said, "What are yo-..: 8 bringlns hir:l here for?"
C) Ar.d he said. "We!:' .....·e need somebody to detain him, but )0 we're pretty much finlshe~ w~tt any kind of exploitable
11 T~ey were very ;=~~ess:onal, but :hey all iden:i!ied D ::hemselOJes as eGA, So, ~ aSKed :::,e--I th:nk I asked..2••••

)9 20 21 .,., saw the:n--one ':lme they bro'..:gr.: somebody OU:, and they got him :0 the gro~nd, then they tooK ~~e bag off 0: his head--it was a sandbas, you ~now. But, y:::t..: kno";. they '::-ea':ed them, as I would expect sOIT'.ebody LO ~reat :hem. ; :-:ever saw bruises, blood.
DOD 000281

broken arms. I seem to recall a prisoner one time that had a 2 gunshot ~ound, but it had been treaced, and it was wrapped.
Q. Were you aware that the OGA mos~ly was

4 detainees to Ab~ Ghraib and ~et going through the normal
5 inprecessing procedures, creating what was known out there as
6 "the ghost detainees?" Were yeu aware of all of that?
7 A. : only became aware of it one time, and I addressed 1t
8 i~medlately. ~hey brough~ a decainee out te Abu Ghraib, and
is tte one who called the operations center fro~
10 eu: a': A.t'...l G:::::-aib. He said, "OGA i.s here. They want to drop
11 ~h~s prisoner off, and he's beat up really bad. They said that
12 ne was caught in the cross:lre. There doesn't seem to be any
13 bulle: wcunds, but he's :::-eally black a~d blue and everything,
14 a~d they wan: :0 leave hlm ~ere. And 1 don't want to take hiM.
15 : ~an~ them to :ake him." And 1t ~as a matter of three phone
16 calls, a~d chey took him away. They go: him medical attention
17 an~ then they released hin. I don': know, two days later, 24
IS hours later, whatever i: was. But he was cleaned up, and the~
19 they troug~t him back out. B"­br:~ging prisoners out and
20 hldi~g thet:1? No.
21 B"" we did get a FRAGO one time chat told us
22 specifically to hide a prlsoner--or to not reglster him and to
DOD 000282

not allow the ICRC to see him, to know he was there, to move !:1 rr. 2 around if we were going to ge: a visit from the :CRC. 3 Q. Was that prisor:er detained at Abu Ghraib? 4 A. No, sir. He was detained at Cropper. 5 Q. A~ Abu Ghraib, did you ever get any such order? 6 A. To hide prisoners cut at Abu Gh=aib? No, sir. 7 Q. B-..!t at Abu Ghraib--well, were yo'..! aware at Ab-..:. Ghraib, 8 that, in ract, OGA were bring~ng out de:a~nees and leaving them, 9 and chey were being detained :here without being put through :be
10 ~crmal inprocessing? 11 A. W~c was ~elling the~ to--were they saying don't process 12 this g~y? Is that what the sto=y was? r do know, now, that we 13 had sone t~ird country na::.onals d:Jwn at Bucca. There were l4 ::hree .3audl I s that we:::-e dQ",n :here. Ar.d, I mean, we had o:hers. 15 We :'ad

but when prisoners were transferred 16 f:::-on B~cca up to Ab~ Ghraib in a~ attempt to close Bucca down, 17 ever.tually, they--the p=isoners tha:: left Abu--that left Bucca 18 to be transferred, were all p=ocessed out of--what was in place 19 at the time was BAT [p~cneti21 system. T~ey processed them out 20 of the database, and they sent a =ecorc up to Abu Ghra~b. Now, 21 .:f i: was a large transfer: 150, 120, whatever the number was; 22 they would give them a roster or--the database was maintained 23 dowr. at Bucca, so they would coordinate by saying, you know,
we had

DOD 000283
you'll see them show up o~ the roster tomorrow, so you don't 2 have to inprocess them when they get there. If the prisoners 3 were under the control of the MPs the whole time, it just saved 4 time. And, apparently, they included three Saudis in that one 5 transfer, and they were never inprocessed or in any database 6 down at Bucca or up at Abu Ghraib as a result of how that was-­7 that particular transfer was done. But I didn'~ know about it 8 at the time. 9 Q. So, at the time, yo~ didn': know that that was
I 0 oC::·"::~:T':'ng?
I 1 A. No, s~r. 12 C. None of your MP--non=-o~ yo-ur--your batt.alion commander or any of those people brought that to your
14' atten:ion that that was occurring?
15 A. No, sir.
16 Q. You made frequent visits out there. Did you look at
17 their board of how they accounted for deta~nees?
18 A. And went through the procesSlng line.
19 Q. And went through the process~ng line?

20 A. Absol"...ltely.
21 Q. Did you not ever see the Doard listing of OGA's just by
22 numbers?
23 A. No, sir. Never.

DOD 000284

Q. You weren't aware that the MPs were keeping that
2 ac.count for lA and lB--they were accounting for how many eGA
3 ghos~ detainees there we=e ~n place at anyone point i~ time?
4 A. I was not awa=e 0: that, and it never showed up o~ the
5 detainee report.
6 DO: No. It wouldn't, because--they were ghosts.
7 WIT: But they neve= told Me that they were holding
S unknowns 0:":: there.
9 Q. DD yo:..: know anytl:i~g about the death of the OGA ghost
10 deta~nee a-c Abu Ghraib?
11 A. ~he o~ly thi~g : kr.ow lS what I heard a:terwa=ds.
12 c. W~er. tha:: occt.:==ed a~d the death occurred, did anyone
13 :ro~ your ~p command call yo~ ar.d tell you about ~hat?
14 J:... :. ':n :ry:'ng not ~o~:use what I ?~now !:hat
15 now':'s alleging, but---­
16 Q. I'm talking about w~a: happened while you we=e there,
17 before all o~ this has r.ow corne out.
IS A. They brought a detalnee to :l:e gate one night, and the
19 M?s ref~sed ttem entrance. They called over to the Toe and

21 22 23 detainee that they were refuslng entrance to deceased. But they refused to take hi~, and aut the one tl:at was inside? No. was already they left with him.
AG0000197 DOD 000285

DO: I think we're getting close to ~he end of-­2 Q. When did you first become aware of the abuses at Ab~
3 Ghraib?

4 A. On the of January.
5 Q. bnd how did that occur?
(, A. I was uF at the MEK compound coming back from a meeting
7 late at night.. It was a:ter twenty-~hree hundred. I opened my
8 email. and my SIDPER. T~ere was an email from
9 so that. was an unusual e~a~l. so I opened it up. It said,

10 "Ma'arr.,: J~st want you t:J J:10W I 'rr. goi:1g in tc brief General
11 Sa~chez o~ the progress of the investigation out at Abu Ghraib.
12 ~his is the allegation c~ detainee abuse and the photographs."-­13
1 .. JC: Just to clar:fy. s~r. she dio already know abou~ the
15 I CRC repcrt.
16 DO: Yes.
17 DC: However. she Old nc: view that as abuse.
18 DO: Yes.
19 DC: The reasons have already been explained.
20 DO: I u:1derstand.

21 A. ----A:1Q :;: se:1t. hl:r. cne line back. said, "I don't
22 kno\: what to say."
. 200
DOD 000286
And the next day I went down to Abu Ghraib. We were an
.., hour and about forty minutes away. We went down to Abu Ghraib,
3 went au: to the prison, and of course, all of the primary
4 players were all out of their positions, so ! talked to the
5 "second $tring" that was ln there, a:-.d--"What's going 0:: out
6 here?"
7 And t~e NCO said to me, "Well, ma'am, what I'm doi~g
8 rig~~ now is rewriting al~ of the SOPs, because they took all of
9 ours, so we don't have a~y references or anything, and I don't
10 even have a Slg~-out sheet, so I'm not letting any prisoners go
II ou:. "
12 A~d 1 said, "W~y were :hey suspended from their jobs?"
13 And he saici, "vlel:, s:m,ebody said that there was some
14 pris:::mer abuse."
15 I sale, "I'm :"7.ct, you know, I didn't read your rlghts
16 or 3nyth~n9. I'~ just try:ng to fig~re out where to start in
17 all of :.his."
IS And he sa:d, "Ma'am, I d:m't know any rr.ore than what
19 I'm :elllng you. They told us that we were coming over here to
20 work. They asked ~s not :0 rilSCUSS it with anybody. Do not
21 speculate. And to go back ln to detention operatlons, and
22 that's what. we're doing."
DOD 000287


So I said, "Let me have a look at the books. What 2 procedures are you following now? If somebody wants to come and 3 ge~ a priso:1er, what do yot.: do? And if the MI want to take 4 sOr.Jebody out for i:1terrogation," those kind of things. 5 And went over to the operations center, to the TOe, and 6 people were not--: mean it was--I think there was a lot of 7 rumors :lying arou:1d. Some were saying that they heard there 8 was going :0 be a healtt and welfare, and, I mean, you could ) hear all of that rumbling.
10 r left, tried to pt.:t some of this together, asked in II the cps center, you know, "3~ve :r.e when the units arrived OUt at 12 A~u Ghralc, who was OLt there, Who had been working in the 13 different cell blocks," a:.d they were asking what was going on, 14 and SO'"1e pE:ople were suspe:1d.ec out there. Did I know anytr.ins? 15 A~d I saici, "I know some things, but I don't want to talk about. 16 it yet, beca~se a few details is dangerous, and just get me so~e 17 informatiD~.· They dld, and then
arne out to 23ro
18 t~e TDC--my ?DC, on tte 0: January,
and showed me the 19 plctures. A~d, whatever I coule. have imaglned on the 13::1; \I'her:. I 20 read that email, I never imaglr.ed what ~ saw in those 21 photographs. Not even a worst-case sce:1ario. And I looked at 22 abo.ut three of them, and 1 couldn't look at ther.1 ar.ymore _ And

DOD 000288
he insisted that I had to look at them, because I had to ge~ the 2 full picture. Bu~ it really made me sick. 1 went over to see General Sanchez and I told him that
3 4 I had seen the pictures and I would make a statement. I had a 5 lot of credibility' in tr.e Middle East, and I--froffi working with 6 the Iraqis as =losely as we were, ~ thought that it was 7-importar.:. And I would make the statement in Arabic, in 8 English, and he said, "Nc. Absolutely no~. And if you have any 9 inqulrles, you dlrect the:r t.o__And he never 10 spoke t.c me abcut.--c:her ~~a~ t.ha:. He took the letter that he II had writ:e~ and put his ha~= C~ 1: like this [making a gesture I~ w~tr. her right ha~dJ an~ :urne~ .• around and pushed it that way 13 [gesturing away frorr. hersel:::
14 Q. Why do you tr.'ny. t~e ~ndlvlduals that were ir.volv~d 15 took the p:"01:os? 16 A, Whe~ I firs: saw the photographs, I couldn't lmasine
17 w~y. I mean, when I ~lrst saw therr and I saw that they were 18 MPs--excep: that. I sa'ld--! hac a ques:~on about ~ando:le 19 of the other male soldiers.B~: !

20 the expressions on their faces
21 22 23 their thumbs up. I what makes somebody sure you capt~~e it was JUs: c~fended by :hat. I said, "What-­do t~at?· You comm:'t a :::n.me and then make in a p~ctograph to make su~e that people 203
DOD 000289

know you were involved in it! But I think, now, that these
2 were--for lack of a better expression right now, souvenir
3 photos ..ll.nd 1--1 mean that--they understood that photographing
4 prisoners was no~ acceptable, and I know they understood that,
5 because whenever we had congressional delegations or visitors
6 out there, they were very quick :0 say, no photographs.
7 Q. \.yeren ,~ there signs?
8 A. Posted everywhere. And the Geneva/Hague was posted
9 everywhere, and given to the prisoners in their language. So
10 they knew. Bu: if t~e~e was somebody directing--set~ing up
11 pho:ographs for official pu:-poses, the official purpose being
12 use during interrogat~on, i: would be very temptir.g--obviously
13 :hey gave ~n to the :empt5:~Or., to slip one of those digital
14 cameras out of a pocket and SLart tak~ng pictures. Ar.d when-­
15 when one of them c-~ away w~thtwo or three of them without
16 being stopped by the official photographer or that team, then
17 twenty or thlrty seemed like a great idea.
I ~ Q. Do you have any infcrmatlor. about this official team
19 that you're referring to? That you know that there was any such
20 off ic~al team?
21 A. ~o, sir.
22 Q. That's speculation on your pa:-t?
23 A. Pure speculation.
DOD 000290

DC: Hearsay.
2 ~O: Who's the hearsay from?
3 DC: We've heard from some of the people that have been
4 accused.
5 DO: Who have you heard from?
6 DC: Thei~ attorneys.
7 DO: Their attorneys tol-d yo"..! that there were official
8 photographs?
9 WIT: That the photographs were intended to be used :or
10 interrogat10n_ New arrivals_
1 1 DC: I do:::'t knov.' i.f 'o::i.=ial" is :.he right word, but we
12 had been told tha::---­
13 DO: Thac they were :aK~ng, as opposed to ano~her team of
)4 MI personnel or other pe~sonnel?
15 DC: Let me clarify_ T~e clari:ication is that we have
16 been told that there we~e photographs being taken for
17 interrogation purposes. I can't te~l you that any of these
JR soldiers were directed to take photographs for interrogatio:::
19 purposes. That I do not know. Nor do I know what the truth of
20 the s:a:.eme:::: that we JUS: nade. Only that we had been :.01d
21 that there was--there was a~ offiCial purpose behind taki~g
22 photographs for interrogatio:::.
DOD 000291

DO: And that i~formation comes from the attorneys
2 representing those that are already charged?
3 DC: Charged. I car. als~ =ell you that I have bee~ to~d ~j
4 the Staff Judge Advocate at Fort Bragg, that none of the people
5 in the photographs, at least the ones that were made public,
6 were oeing interr~gated. So, therefor, there would be no reason
7 to have a photograph for i~:err09ation purposes.
8 WIT: These were all old arrivals. The intent---­
9 :JC: Again, I don't /(r.~'v/ the truth of the statement, !'m
10 only telling you what the S:a:f Judge Advocate at Fort Brag9
11 tala me.
12 DO: ~here did he get h:s lr.:ormation from?
DC: He tells ~e--he said he got his lnformation fro~ their
14 inveStlgation OUt there. Anc: dor.'t know the truth of it, but
15 :::hiswas all in reference General Karpinski testifying at an
Hi Art:'cle 32 lnvestiga:ion,
17 DO: i::o YO''': remember the name c: that SJA at: Fort Bragg?
18 ~C: Sir, I have n~tes.
19 DO: I'd like the na~E o~ the---­
20 DC: I do know the name c: the attorneys--o: the
21 prosecDtors.
22 'DO: Okay. I've got
, 206
DOD 000292

Q. In you~ opinion, based o~ everything that you knew :rom
2 the beginning of when you were there to the things that you have
3 lear~ed since, whaL is your c~rrent opinion regarding what
4 happened at Abu Ghraib? What broke down? Who were the
5 respcmnibl"e pa~ties at Ab...: Ghraib?
6 DC: That led LO the phoLographs---­
7 Q. That led to the abuses in th~ photographs?
8 J..... Sir, I th~nk that there was a tremendous--I know, not I
9 Lhink--thls is fact. I know t~e~e was tremendous press~re bei~g
10 placed o~ the lnterrogatlon teams and on Colonel Pappas,
II especlally, to get ~ore sooner, to :ind 3adaam, to--I mean,
12 amongs~ all o~ those pressures, there was never any pressure
13 exerted, to my k~owledge, to re~ease prisoners. But, to get
1~ ~ore soo~er, and the rea: ~oc~s was finding Sadaam. And there
15 was a lot of--a lot of conversat1cn and a lot of Iraqi press
16 w:th hopefulness of finding Sadaam, and then people would be
17 co~vinced Lhat they could come back LO work, get underway with
18 runn:ng their own co~ntr)r, ~nd t~at k:nd of thing. So that was
19 the objectlve, and it wasn't eno~gr.. It wasn't fast enough. At
20 one time I asked Colonel P~ppas--no.,.; this was before he took
21 over, butl askedhlm, "How many interrogatlon teams do you
22 have?"
DOD 000293

And he said, "I have sixt.een inte!:'rogation teams, a:1d
2 three of them are up at the MEK, two are at A."1aconda." So, I
3 mean, with thousands of prisoners and General Fast saying, you
4 know, put them back in the box, you know, it delays the new
5 ones, i: jumps the line--he sal.d, "We don't have enough."
6 I said, "Well, it's no: like the school is so easy to
7 get through. You know, you don't run them through in two weeks
8 and br~ng them over here."
9 And he said, "T::ere ::Iren' t enough in the Army. So we

10 have to work on releases an:::i housi~g." And he said, "Now 11 they're starting to put pressure on me about ~he MEK, and I'm 12 not even up there like! am at Abu G::raib." He was under 13 tre~endo~s pressure to ge: more an~ get better and get faster. 14 Q. Did he tell you frcn who~ that pressure was coming? 15 A. He said that Genera~ ?ast was pressuring him. 16 Q. A~ybody else? 17 A. He didn't say spec~flcally. b~t he did get teat up 18 routinely by General Sa::chez. 19 Q. How do you kr.ow that? 20 A. : saw hl.m come o~t of there several tines, and we had 21 this commu~ication between us. He would talk about time Wl.th
22 Sanchez being like a root canal. One time I saw him, he came 23 holding the side of h:'s head. I sal.d, "Bad?"
DOD 000294
And he said, ":' d rather have a root canal." And then
2 he came out one time and ~e was holding both sides of his head.
3 Q. Staying with the pressu~e, did you ever speak with
4 General Fas~ abou~ a pressure being exerted on colonel Pappas
5 .and Abu Gt:raib personnel?
6 A. I did ~ot talk to her .abo~t Colonel Pappas,
7 spec~fical~y, because I did~'~ wa~t to create a difficult
8 situation between the two 0: them, but I talked about the
9 presst.:re out at Ab''': Ghraib, and the facility was never designed
10 to be a large detention fac~li:y, ever. Ana, you know, ~he way
11 that the cond:tio~s were gOl~~, and growi~g populat:on and the
12 ineffective release boards, : sa:j al~ of them are contributing
13 to--you know, we're so c:ose to the :ine of being in vio:atio~
14 of humane treatment of detalnees aut th~re, that, you know, they
15 could have mt.:d--and hot o~ly that, but the rain washed away the
16 top leve: of the soil, a~d 1: exposed the ~ore rOCKS, the ~ore
17 pieces of glass--it was on a landfill. So we had concerns abot.:t
18 the safety of the MPs, about is :: ~ractical--what I said to ~er
19 was, "Is it practical :0 use :e~ 1~terrog3tlon ~eams for
20 ttousands of prisoners?"
21 Q, D:d you ever have a conversation with General Sanche:
22 about the interrogation pressures at Abu Ghraib?
p... No, Slr.

DOD 000295
Q. That was part of Yo:.lr answer relative :0 what was the
2 cause of. the abuses that occurred at Ab:.l Ghraib. So preSS:.lre
3 was one. Are there other reasons?
4 A. They were short people. They were shortpersor.nel like
5 we were. We were--~t was an enduring camp. It was in the
6 middle of a hostile fire zone, so the shortage of people becomes
7 very pronouncedwher. you ~ave contractors and contract work
8 going cn o~= there. everyone of those people has tb be cleared
9 befo:::-e they can come or. to ·t:;'e :.nstallation, every vehicle has
10 to be exam~ned. ~hey got dogs to use--sniffer dogs fo:::­
11 veh).::les. I te~ieved that that's what they were out there for.
12 That's where I saw them. : never saw them a:::-ound prisoners or
13 any=h~n3. So they were short people to do what =hey needed to
14 de... There was th:.s 100r.1:'1'~ lr.ission up a:: the MEK that wac:; nct
15 go~ng =0 be going away. Nobody se€med to be concerned about the
16 real·intelligence va:ue a! what they were giving us.
17 Let me just give yo:..: a for example on ttat very
18 qLickly.--on Fridays, seven. e_even. fO:.lrteen buses of Iranlans
19 wou:d come across the border to visit some of their relatives at
20 the M~K compound. Nobody stopped them on tl:e borde:::-. Very
21 often they didn't get into the MEK compound. but it was a
22 priv~lege, because they weren't prisoners. They were just
23 barely detainees. if you want to call ther.1 ttat. but they were
DOD 000296

entitled to have visitation. 3ut they had to be cleared,
~ sometimes they weren't clea~ed, so they had to wait outside the
3 ga~e, but the fact that the Iranian borde= was so wide open, i:
4 seems 1 ike it would have been a very big concern, but they ki::ci
5 of dismis~ed it. "They" being- General Fast and the task force
6 that was assembled, led by General Sergeant, for the MEK
7 mission. And--pe=sonnel resources, couldn't get prisoner
8 unifo~ms stil~, u::der pressure from General Miller to get that
9 new co~pound stood ~p, the one that is now called Redemption, I
}O t~ink, out there at Abu Ghraib.
11 Q. General ~iller? Ok5Y· YD~'ve lost me, now, because
12 Ger:eral Mille::­ left the ccur:try lor: September, and he goes back
13 :'0 Gc:.a:::.anam8 Bay.
14 A. Right.
15 C. So when did he start exertir.g pressure?
16 A. Well, he was follcw~ng ~p on the development or the
17 e::hancement of the interrogation ef:o=ts.
18 Q. Sven from Gua~tanamo Bay?
19 A. Even from Guantanar:1o Bay .. Novy, he never called me,
20 that's what they were sayir:g, whether it was in the release
21 reVlew board or just in conversation wlth Fappas or'IIIIIIJor
22 any 0: ther:l. They said :hat, yeu know, he is following up and
23 he 1S pursui::g their progress. That's why--te had discovered


DOD 000297
very early on that getting connexes shipped dow~ :rom Turkey and
2 Co~dan was not going to wor~, and he was talking about 3 airlifting them in. And, I mean, I did--I just felt sorry fo~ 4 Colonel Pappas, because, you know, it was--it was a losing 5 situation.· 6 Q. How about individua: responsibi:~ties as fa= as 7 individuals are concerned, who was responsible for what happe~ed S down a't Abu Ghraib? l) A. Well, certainly, ::he MPs belo:1ged to me, sir. A!1d, for
10 whatever reason, t!iey dicn . -: ::OTT'e and tell me. I didn't know.
11 Q. Who else?
12 A. The battalion commanders.
13 opera:~or.s center,~:he co~pany commander of the
14 372''''. They lived--t:"e soldiers llved i;;. the same area. I fTlean,
15 the company was in one par-:lcular a~ea out there. They had
16 several d~fferent groups. If soldiers who slep: next to these
17 guys and ate with these guys a:1d showered with these guys didn't
18 know any:~ing about it, then you s:urt to move up the chain-of­
J9 COTTir:1anc and u:1derstand how it is possible. When--if __

20 knew,
_"'J ht e ICRC report
22 they.co·.J.ld tell

as you indlcated earl~er, that he knew about
or wa:ever, or............, did. they knew that me. And t!iey knew that I would have been
. 212
DOD 000298
screaming louder than anybody else. I don't think that that's
2 whey ~hey didn't tell me. I don't k~ow why they didn't ~ell me.
3 DC: Sir, le~ me just add ~o ~r.at, we worked under the
4 assumption, until the news papers reporte~
5 statemen~ about what his knowledge, we wo=ked on the assumption
G that no cfficers were aware 0: ttis. And that was the
7 assumption that we had w8rked under. Obviously, that's a false
8 ass~mption.
9 DO; That's why asked, based on everything you know.

10 DC; We don't have an explanation for whX we weren't told. 11 Q. How about outside of the M? community? Who do you 12 ~elieve were responsible parties? Was MI or both of you? 13 A. General Fast cerca:n:y knew about all of this. 14 Q. N8W, what do Y~u ~ean by that? 15 A. She was with General Mil:er ~hen General Miller was---­16 Q. 3u: 08 you speci::cally mean that you think she knew 17 the abuses were occurring? 18 A. No. I can't speculate about that, and I wouldn't. But 19 what I mean is she was :ikely aware of one of the techniques to
20 break new arrivals sooner was showing then a photograph of 21 l:'kely scenarios ttat cOl:ld be:::-orr.e YoL.:r fate unless you 22 cooperate.
DOD 000299
Q. So you have no direct knowledge?
2 A. No, I do not. But I do know that General Fast was o~~
3 the~e, that she was visit~ng the ICE facility often. I k:lOW
4 that General Sanchez was out there and visited Abu Ghraib very
5 often. Especially---­6 Q. Do you know how many times?
7 A. In one mor.th--or after they took control of the
8 compound, in one week he was there three times--or in the course
9 of ten days he was there three tlmes. Tha:'s often for one MI

10 brigade o~: at Abu Ghraib when you're the comma~der of the whcle 11 theater.
Q. So that three tlmes w~:hin ten days, what ~onth was 13 tha~? 14 A. Noverr.ber. I kno.... that--at least in my mind, everything 15 that was ta~ing place out at Abu Ghraib, at least the progress, 16 seemed to be falling in line with the p:an that General Miller 17 made reference to. Tha: was my perceptlon. I do know that the­18
19 DC: And ~y that, she me.ans the "GITr-10tizing" of Abu 20 G~raib, whatever that means. 21 h. ----I don't thi~k that :he--even though all soldiers 21 know about Geneva/Hague a,-d fair treatment and hu~ane treatment 23 and everything, t~e corr~inatio,-of the environment, the mortar
DOD 000300

He said, "Ma'am, we haven't even sited !t yet. We
2 have:l't even broken the grolnd."
3 . I said, "So would you be opening that in two or three
4 days?"
5 He said, "No, ma' am. She just made a mistake."
But ~t was an in-prcmpt-two--: saw her cften over a·t
7 the C~TF7. She might ask me a question. In tha~ particular
8 case, Colo~el Pappas was walking out of her office, and she made
9 that canmer::. t.o him abo'...!':. some:hing do with Cambone and t:hen t.ne
10 res: c: us went i~ and sa: :iow~ :or the release board.
11 DC: Sir, we tave been 5lven :nfcrmation that the Iraq~
12 survey group, whose orlgir.a: rr.1SSlcn was ~N [phone:.ic], was
13 heavi:y involved i~ interr=gat:o~ techniques and get.ting
14 informa:ion on the whereabou:s 0: Sddaam ~usse~n and/or anybody
15 who was involved in the killing of Americans, and that they
16 cla:med t.hat they repcrted Qlrectly to ~cctor Cambone. Again,
17 the t.ruth of these statemen:.s, we den't know.
18 DO: Okay. Who gave yo~ that ::.nfcrrt:ation?
19 DC: : don't know i: : can tell you, sir, but I will ask
20 the people if I can tell ye'...l. :t's informat~on gained through
21 attorney/client privilege.
22 'DO: TheY're your clients?
23 I:e: Some of t.he pecple­--­
DOD 000303

DO: How many clients do you have?
2 DC: I actually have mo=e clients than anybody in the whoie
region. I think I'm up to about forty. But, in part 0: that,
4 my t.eam has over two hundre:i clients, so 1'm aware of what goes
5 on with all of the other a:legations with all of the other
6 clie~ts that. my team re?rese~ts. I can just say that this is
7 wha~ we've been told. Asain, I have no idea if any of i: is
8 ~rue or no:: because--: do:--.':: know. Ar:d::: 'm supposed to meet
9 with the person nex: week who is supposed to fill me in o~ that
10 l.n::or:r,a:l.on.
1J D8: Okay. Well. we're obvious::'y interest.ed in anything
12 relat.~ng to Ab~ Ghraib's D~::'l::ary lntelligence operations and
13 any connec::ions t.ha:: your so~rces may have that would relate t.o
14 allegatl.0:25 that have been :nacie.
15 DC: ~ike I said, I do~':: know i~ any of l.t is true or not.
16 The other thing :~at ! would-~and this is just conversations
17 that me and General Karpl~sk~ have had. that we believe that the
18 ~orale and conditions at At~ Ghraib sort of led into what I
19 would call a fraterr:ity type of a::mosphere, or I'll call it
20 hazing of the detal.nees. So~e 0: these pictures really do look
21 like college fraternity hazl~gs. as opposed to--the images you
22 might see cn TV, as opposed to what professional soldiers should
23 be dOing.
DOD 000304

DO: Yeah. Those issues that yo~ raise relative to hazln9
2 and the camaraderie that ~ight have been developed---­
3 DC: Well, it appears to be that way. I mean, again, we're
4 not there. I'm looking at these photographs and it looks like
5 they're having f~n.
6 DO: There's bee~ some talk a~d allegations regardlng
7 liquor being present at Abu Ghraib.
8 Q. Do you have any dl~ect knowledge of any liquor being--?
'I h.. :: do--the only di~ect k:1owledge I have is not really
10 direct. ::t'S :rom a guy bl the name a who was the
II chief contractor for u.s. ccntractors out there for services for
12 the detention operations: ':0:Jc. se:::-vices, r\;nning water, that
13 k~nd c: :tlng. A~d he ~ad a scld~er ask him one time to brln9
14 some beei" cu,:, a~d he salCi,~ "r-;c. Absolu::ely not." And then he
15 repcrted it to me. He wouldn't tell me who the soldier was, but
16 :: made sure tha: was aware of that, and he
17 said that they did--~i:::-st se:::-geant and sergeant major did health
18 a~d welfare inspections or ~hen they wal~ed through tne billets,
19 they weren't afraid :0 open boxe=, footlockers, or anythlng that
20 didn't have a lock on it. They Just didn't see any evidence of
21 it.

DOD 000305

Q. Did you have a~y knowledge that drinking was a
2 significant problem out a~ Abu Ghraib by either MI soldiers o~
3 MP personnel?
4 A. No. There was a unit that showed up out there tha~ was
5 a RAOC unit. I believe ~hey were a National Guard unit. ':'hey
6 came sometLne in November and theught that they were goi:!g to be
7 work~ng fer the BOO tr . MP Bri.gade, and then ended up working for-­
8 bu~ tha~ inc~de~t did~'t take p~ace at Abu Ghraib.
9 Q. It was a drinking ~ncident?
]0 A. I~ was i~ :raq, but it was at their previous
]] locatio~, whatever i: was. You k~ow, and whe~ there isn't any
12 alcohol around anywhere i~ Iraq--: mean, you could cer~ainly get
13 it from the Ead]is (pho~e:~cJ or whatever, but when nobody ~s
14 drlnking and you're no: accustom to smelling alcohol, not that
15 you would anyway--J just seemed to be very sensitive to it. I
16 could detect it. And I asked my brigade surgeo:! one time did I
17 smell alco~ol, and he dld. He sa~d te had a cold and he had had
18 some Nyquil shipped in fro~ the s~atesand ttat that's all it
]9 was. BL:i:: was never aware c: any dr~nking or consumpt.;.on of
20 alcohol. We had a problen down at Bucca with it, but--.
21 DC: Sir, I'd like to adci--I'm not sure how it plays into
22 anythlng that you're do~ns, but in terms of at :eas~ one of the
23 soldiers involved in ~hese pictures, and that'

DOD 000306
2 3 4 5 6

7 RC: That's what yo~ mea~~ when you mentioned that you had
8 a CO!1cern a;:;cut
9 ~C: And already received an
10 A!:"t:'cle 15---­
11 vIII:. And was reduced :::-or:: Spec~alist to PFe.
12 DO: That might ~ave bee~ :~ :he reports, but I wasn't
13 s?eci:~cally aware of 1: as .,,'f: Sl: :-.ere now.
14 W!T: We had a cieLalnee--sorry. He ~as not a--He was
15 T1tan--hired under Titan. And ne was at Bucca as an EPW and
16 :ormer rr,ember of the !raqi Republican Guard. And the regulation
17 is very clear about hir~n9 former EPWs. EspeCially around u.s.
18 operations or feod or like an ad~i~istra:ive office or anythIng.
19 And he ended up be:'ng hired by ~ltan, and he was out at Abu
20 Ghraib, working as a translatc::-. ~~d! asked him where did he
21 come from, and he said that he knew all of the MPs down at
22 Bucca.
DOD 000307

I said, "Were you from ':hat area?" I was trying to
2 make the connection.
3 Then he told me, no, that he was a prisoner. So:
4 asked what is he doing up here. You know the reg'.llations--Tita::

hired him. So I aske

6 to call Titan and find out what: hlS file said, because then we
7 could get r~d of him for lYlng on an application. They said
8 they had no :~le on him and that he was hired on somebody's
9 recomme~da:lO:: down at Bucca. Ane we couldn't get rid of him.
10 = wen: to :he MI people and as~ed them to--actually, I went to
11 one 0: ~he g~ys that was frcn 03A, and I asked them if they
12 wo~ld put. him on the polygrap:-:, . ~ they would in':erview him, and
13 he saiti they would. They never tild ge': around to doing it, but
14 = couldn': get rid of :his guy. = though': we had him gene one
15 :.i.me, accor::hng to""'-[phonetic), an~ the next .
16 tiree: was out at Abu Ghralb, :here he is. Called him~
17 the Pirate," because he converted to Christianity when he was
18 down at 3ucca. Here's a :ormer Iraqi Republlcar: Guard, former
19 EPVI, and now you're going to COn'l1.!:ce TT'.e tha': you've converted
20 to Chris:ianlty and now you're interested in us? The ~I people
21 kept us:ng him as an interrogator .


DOD 000308
1 Q. As an interpreter?
2 A. Interpreter. Sorry. And then--I'm just trying to
3 cove~ some of the other things that I thought maybe yo~ might
4 have questions about it.
5 Q. Was that an interpreter in interrogations or an
6 interpreter in what we call ca~ 1, which would be a non-cleared
7 interprete:r?
8 A. He was supposed to be.
9 C. .r... cat I?

10 A. .r.. cat 1. 11 Q. A non-cleared inte~preter? 12 A. Right. But they were us~ng hin because he spoke 13 English. 14 C. T~ey were us~ns h~m ~~ interrogations anyway? 15 A. [The deponen: i ..dicated an af:':'rmative response.J And· 16 the o~her thing t~at seemed to be a subject of inte~est last 17 week, and that's the only reason :'~ going to mention it 18 b~~efly: I was escorting General DeLong [p~cnetic) and his 19 gro~p when they were goi~g ~hroug~ Iraq. He was getting ready 20 to ready. He was a four-star frcm SENTCOM. I th~nk he was the 21 deputy--he was a Ma~ine fc~r-star. And he Went over to--we wen:
22 towards the task fo~ce. So we stopped there. They had an 23 interrogation underway. Ee wanted to go back and see it. He
DOD 000309
asked me if I wanted to go back. and I said. no. I would stay in
2 the foyer-~ype of area of this one building. There were these
3 three guys that were there :hat were in--one of them had Dec
4 pants on. two had blue Jeans o~. and t-shirts. ~~d they said.
5 ""'Jow. A fer.1ale general officer. You know. how is that?"
6 And I said. "It's a 10:: of fun. It's really
7 interes~i~g. What are you guys doi~g here?"

And the guy that ......as sltting up on the coun::er--like a
9 counter-level thi:-.g---­10 Q. ThlS was at Abu Ghraib? 1 1 A. Ttis was Task ?orce 121. Yo~'re just focusing on Abu
13 Q. Yes. But I'l~ hea~--='ve r.1ade other reports abou~ 14 other areas, so what do you have :8 :~:! me about Task Force 15 122.? 16 A. l'iell, this par:icu.i.ar indlvidual. I said. "What are you 17 doing here? Are you an In:erpreter?" 18 And he said. "Well. : de some interpretation, because I 19 speak severa~ different lang~ages, bu: I'm really 20 interrogations. " 21 A:-:d : said. "Are you :::rorn Iraq? /l.re you a Kuwait'::'?" 22 He was clearly from the Middle Eas:. 23 And he said. "No. = 'm ne:ther. I 'rr. an Israeli."
DOD 000310
I said, "I visited your country a couple of years ago. 2 I was amazed at how much we :ook alike. I mean there's a lot of 3 pecple ir. the cities :hat are speaking English." 4 He said, "Yes. We're not terrible people." A~d that 5 seemed to be a subject of interest. 6 Q. Did he ever tell you what he was specifically dOlng in 7 Iraq and w~o he was working :or? 8 A. He did not. And I d~dn't ask him. 9 Q. Did he say, "I'm a~; Israeli citizen," or did he say,
10 "1':11 a neTT'.:Jer of :he lsrae:::. lr:':elligence Agency?" 11 A. No, sir. ~e saic--whe;; I asked him if he was a Kuwaiti 12 or an Iraqi, he said, liNe:. :!":er. l'rr. ar. Israeli."
c. So you took tha: :~ be c::izenship? 14 .r:.. . : dio. He look€= like and Israeli back when he said 15 that. 16 c· A~d that was a: Task Perce 121. And what time period 17 ",as :!1at? 18 A. ~hen General DeLeng [phcne:lc] ca~e to visit on his---­19 Q. Car: you tell me what mcn:h? 20 A. August, September.
21 Q . August ,September tl.rr.eframe?
22 A. Probably late A~gust. I have his visit written in my
23 books.

DOD 000311

Q. I: we could just go back for a second to the other
2 incident you told me about, which was that cat 1 inte=prete=
3 thae you believed was bei~g used in interrogations. Did you
4 actually see him in the interrogation booth?
5 A. I did not: :: did not.
6 Q. How do you know tha':~ he was being used in
7 ir.te=rogatlcns?
8 A. I saw him over at the :CE facility with some of the
9 people that worked for and I said to her--whe~ I
10 sav.: hlr.1 there, I sald, "Yot.: ~no....', that guy used t.o be an EPW."
II ALd she tur~ed aroL:r.C ar.d she looked up, and she said,
12 "He's :-:C':--he doesn't have access to a"ythlng. I'
13 : said, "He's suppose~ to be controlled and just doing
14 tran,slatlon."
15 S!:e sald, ": don't k:lOv.: how -chey're using him."
16 B~t, to be ir. the ICE :acility alone, you needed
17 clearances, and there he was.
18 [Tr:e deposItion recessed at 195:, 18 July 200~.J
19 [The deposltlo~ was called to order 1957, 18 July 2004.]
20 Questions by the deposition officer (continued):
21 DD: -have a couple of follow-up questions, and then we'l!
22 end this by asking whatever it is that you'd like to add.

DOD 000312
Q. Were you personally aware of what interrogators were
2 allowed to do and what they were not .allowed to do as part of
3 their mission?
4 A. I was not. I did see an in~erroga~ion one time when
5 the i~t:.errogation facEity'-first opened, and they said
6 that they were about to get an ~nterrogation underway. I we~t
7 into the hallway and watched it =rom the one-way mirror. It
8 looked perfe::tly normal.
9 Q. But. no one ever talked to you or gave you any

10 instr~ctions re~ative to these are the lanes of road, this is 11 t:-_e exte::.t 0: what a:1 i.nterrogator can or cannot:. do? 12 A. Absolutely not. 13 Q. Eow about your t-i?.::? Were they aware of what M:;: ::oulci 14 and could not do? 15 A. There was some rules for ~nterrogation that were posted 16 i::. the cellblock, in ::he~r of::'ce--their admin place where they 17 sig::1ed prisoners in and eL:.t and chec!.c on--keep the records and 18 everything. It was like a::. ad~~::. room, and there were the rules 19 for interrogation posted there. 20 Q.But those were fer MI person~el?
21 A. They were. But no rules for the MPs. 22 Q. No rules. ~hey didn't tell the MPs what to do? 23 A. No.
DOD 000313
Q. Do you think it should have occurred? That, in fact,
2 MI should have known what MPs could do a~d MPs should know what
3 MI could do?
4 A. Absolutely. I ~h~nk one of the big lessons from this
5 should be how do we Make :hat lash up better. The MI people
6 have to understane the diffe~ent rr.indset of an MP--particularly
7 ir.:errogatior. operations. That they--they have rules. And if
8 interrogation gives them per~ission to operate o~tside those
9 rules, that's their lane, but the MPs are no longer going to be
10 involved unless they are tralned ~lth the interrogations teams
11 a -: the M: sch:Jcl.
12 Q. Are yo~ ~arniliar wlth sleep management methods that
13 were occurrlng in Abu 3hralb?
14 f:.•. I did not know that they were--I know that one of the
15 interroga:~on techniques ttat they were using was sleep
16 depr~VatlOn, b~t : didn't k~ow that they were using them in any
17 of the cellb:ocks. They had a regular regimen for when lights
18 went out, and sleep, and--there was always chatter afterwards,
19 but t~at was in the general pop~lation cornpo~nds.


DOD 000314
Q. Did any of your MPs ever come to you and tell you about
2 what me.thods MI were using--were instructing them, the MPs, to
3 use as to how to keep detainees awake?
4 A. No, sir. I am aware tha~ one night they finished ~he
5 interrcgation at inte:!:'roga:ion facility~and the
6 interrogation people d~d not want to escort tr.e detainee back to
7 Vigilant, so they called t~e MPs to esco:!:'t the prisoner bacK to
8 Vigilant. I: was late at n~ght, and one of the MPs on duty that
9 n~ght was a female, and sne didn't feel confortable with that

10 :!:'espo~sibili:y. And that ~as not a responsibility--:he 11 inte~rGgato~s were supposed to nick them up at one point and 12 retu~~ them :0 that po~nt. So t~is was an exception. BU~ 13 IIIIIIIIItptonetiC], who was the XO au: there, went to Colonel 14 Pappa.s and :old him, "We I re not doin3 ~hat anyrr.ore," because 15 it's almost like mixing apples and ora~ges at that point.
19 A. No, sir.
20 Q. Yo~lre no: aware that ~e was :he cap:a~n that was in
21 charge of tte mili:ary police personnel withln the 1A and 1B
22 sectlon? Ir. other words,

and the sergeant
DOD 000315

Q. You never saw him when you went down to all of those
2 areas?

3 A. No, sir.
4 Q. You never had any discussions about what was going or.-­5

6 A. The name isn't even fam:liar to me. What General
7 Sanchez, ~n his letter, w~a~ he ordered me to do was to evaluate
8 the chaln-c~-command, and---­9 DO: He was miss~n3 ~lthl~ all of that chain ~hat was---­
10 WIT: Nobody ever me~::cned his name, either. I even asked 11 everyone of them, "Is there ar.ybody else that I should talk 12 t.o?" Nobody ever mer:t::.one:::' h:s !"lame. But, visually, ! might 1~ recogn:'ze him. 14 DO: : don't have a~y further questions. I believe that 15 yo~ have some addit.ional ccmments that you--I'm sorry. Did you­16 -d:d e.:..t.her of you---­17 RC: No, sir. 18 LA: No, sir. 19 WIT:: Just wa!"lted t~ ~ake two, I think theY'll be brief,
20 comments. One was, you, know, because: thlnk there's millions 21 of lessons to be learned l~ a'l of this, but 22 waS a smart guy, but he was not a leader. He was selected for 23 co~mand of that battal~on oy my predecessor. Whatever the

DOD 000317
ti:is is your ticket out of here." It was a carrot used in a lot
2 of different si~uations.
3 Down a: CPA,~toldme that if I gave ni~
4 a company to work down at CPA, tha~ was my ticket out of there,
5 but otherwise we were going to be there for years. I said, "I'm
6 not go~n9 to give you a corr.pany, sir. I don't have a company to
7 give you. You can hire people to do the work in the ministry of
8 jus::ice. I'm not going to use MPs to do that." Well, he left;
9 we stayed. ! think there was broken parts.
10 DO: Wel2-, you've caught rry ~nte=:-est ....·ith a number of those
II co:-nments. The fi=:-s: beH,g :he assig;:rr.ent of military police
11 personnel. You were sU9sestlng some pre-arranged' plan o~ the
13 selec::ion of those mil::ary p~llce personnel for this
14 asslgnment.
15 Q. : !:eard f=:-om whet you s-.:ated a "p:r-opensity" for :he
16 ones selectee to be con::ro~led or manlpulated at some pain:. Is
17 that what yo~'re sugges::~g?
IR ~. That's what I'~ suggesting.
19 Q. .h.nd what leads yo·~ to believe :hat there was that type
20 0: process actually used? Who do you believe did that?
21 A. Well, there's other possibilities, but they all focus
22 o~ the 5a~e co;:clusio~. How do you end up with seven soldier
23 assigned to a corr.pany thut were successful and in compliance, to
DOD 000320

the best of our knowledge, formcnths when they were deployed ~~
2 Ad Diwaniaah--and then they come up to Ab·L.! Ghraib, they take
3 over a mission, following a visit by Major General Miller whe
4 obviously has a plan of some sort to enhance actionable
5 intelligence at Abu Ghraib in his "GITMOizing" Abu Ghraib
6 efforts, and you take those techniques and those ideas and t~ose
7 plans, and you put those i~ the hands of relatively-­
8 comparat:vely, not re~ative~y, but comparative~y inexperienced
9 ir.terroga':ion tearr.S, u:loer : aT less supervision than what
10 General Mi:ler would have Guantanarro Bay, and it's like a powder
11 keg. And yo"..: apply press·.:.re t8 ::he person responsible for
12 applying t~ose techn~ques. In t~~s case, Colonel Pappas,
13 perhaps. And you keep h:~ under pressure, and he is trying to
14 get ~ore, faster, soone~, ~e:ter, and--a clear and cri.t~cal step
15 in t~lS ~s find:ng MPs w~o wlI: be cooperative. So if you're·
16 not telling them, "':'his i== your only t:'eke-: out of here, II or
17 yeu' re net telling tr.err., "You talk about this outside of this
18 ce::'lbleck, and you have corr.promised national intelligence," or
19 you tell them, that, "Lock, Secretary Rumsfeld signed this
20 le:ter," now they don't kno·..... .:.f that's his signature or not,
21 Dut, "Secretary Rumsfe':'c signed this le':ter. We have h:'s
22 authorl.ty," or you tel.l thel.l, "We know what your record is in
:23 yo·..:r civilian job, and ..:e wiL:. take everything away from you."
DOD 000321

there? A truck driver.
How did a guy li

2 Because they knew affair at some point with a marrled 3 wonar.. I don't know. Who would have access :0 their sec~rity 4 clearance data? That wo~ld be ~he MI people. Did they go to 5 the database and say, "These are the people we have in -:he 372nd • 6 Who are the ones we would li~e to assign to this kind 0: 7 0Feratio~? Who are

8 their mouths Everybody
10 DC: She go: an Ar:ic~e 15 for it.

12 are respcnsible soldiers--or they were. What made them go
13 wro~g? I mean. tha:'s the ~i::icn dollar question, cbviously.
1~ DC: It's o~e e! th~~, 3"­ you're Lheory--you're
15 sugges':.i~g a theory. here---­
16 D:: A hy?othesis.
17 DO: Your hypot:;es:'s st;gges::s tha:: ~:hen various MP
18 personnel. s~ch as a~d that they were the ones
19 that ass~gned the milltary pollee persc~nel. They were the ones
2U that chose who would ma~ that faclli:y. anc they did that based
21 on civll1an experience, beca~ ·and__had
22 civilian experience. So that's w:-:y they--l 'm net sure if it was
23 lmself or the sergeant unde de the selecticn of

DOD 000322

those two individuals. ~hat would seem to be contrary to yo~r
2 hypothesis.
3 WIT: Unless somebody said tO~knOWir.9 that ~here
4 were two of that selecticn that had years of experience ir. a
5 civilian facility, said that is one of the likely fills fcr--:
6 mea!l, wher.. you hedge the be:.
7 ~O: Ge~eral, I hear yo~r ~ypothesis, b~t I have to tel:
8 you, .=.fte:::­t~":e very signif:cant investigatior. involving a let of
9 people and thousands ef d6c~mer..ts, : see no ir.dication of that
10 Kind 0: a conspiracy er hy?c~r.esis.
11 D:: S:r, cbviously, yeu have access to a lot more
11 infornaticn tha~ we do.
13 DO: .J.. do.
14 Q. Okay. Are there any cthe~ points or issues that you
15 would :'~ke to make?
16 I can't think of any right now.
D8: T~ere is cne co~c:'udi~g poi~t. This ~s still an open
18 and a=:~ve i~vestigation. Il is not closed. I do not actually
19 even ~ow wher.. it will be closed. We a~t~cipate presenting a
20 report scmetime this coning week to Genera:' Kern. That's very
21 tenuous, because Genera: Jo~es has to complete his further
22 inqu~ries into other indlviduals at hlgher levels, and, in fact,
23 it st:ll has to go through a legal review. As a result of that
DOD 000323

legal review, it's frequent that lawyers look and say, "Well,
2 you've got to go back and ask this perso~ this question.~ I
3 have to give yot: the same oree=­ : am giving everyone that I iave
4 inte=-v~ewed, and that's well over or.e hundred ane :ifty people.
5 And that order is: Y~u are not to discuss what.! have asked
6 you, today, or any of the spe::ifics of what I have asked you
7 today w1th anyone outside cf this room, except for your
8 attcrney.
9 WIT: Yes, sir.
10 D~: You can tell people that I have interviewed you, but
II t~a:'s wte=-e it has to stop. And that's an order.
I:! WIT: Yes, sir.
I~ :c~: Is there anyt~ing that you don't understand abcut tha~
14 0 .,..-...4 0 ",,-": ............... -.
15 WIT: No, sir.
16 D~: Co~nselo=-, is the~e anytt~n~ you don't understand
17 acot:: t.ta: oreer?
1 S D:::::: No, sir.
19 D~: The same oreer app~~es to you, counselc~. Do you
:!O understanc that order?
21 :cc: Yes, sir.


DOD 000324
WIT: Sir, do you want me to get in :ouch with Major
up at the Booth M? Brigade for those--? You'll do that?
3 DO: No. \ole I 11 do that. If we need your furthe::­ help and
4 assistance--I appreciate your help. But we'll get a hold cf him
5 for ~hat for those records ._j!'-lright. Unless there are any
6 further questions?
7 LA: No, si::-.
8 [The deposit.ion closed at 2014, 18 July 2004.1

. 239
DOD 000325