Email expressing the FBI's concerns with the DHS' draft plan, which the DHS presented to the DoD as a DHS/FBI plan. The author writes that they are notifying the Major General of their strenuous opposition to the interrogation plan, describing the plan as having an "overall coercive nature," as being a "fear based approach" and possibly being illegal or as having illegal elements.
[The email possibly references Dr. Michael Gelles when it states "NCIS Chief Psychologist, Dr. [redacted] was scheduled to arrive on
21 November for the purpose of evaluating the DHS and FBI plans, the JIG did not solicit Dr. [redacted] professional opinion." Gelles was the Chief Psychologist at the time.].
[This document is less redacted than RDI 4880, particularly Pages 2-3].
On those pages, there is a discussion on the success of an incentive program, where detainees received judicial leniency for cooperation. It also discusses the success in tailoring interrogation strategies particularly to the detainee's vulnerabilities. Stating that "The FBI/CITF strongly believes that the continued use of diametrically opposed interrogation strategies in GTMO will only weaken our efforts to obtain valuable information."
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b6 -1.
b7C -1 From: FBI, Guantanamo Bay Subject: VTC 21 November -2002 To: Major General Miller
b6 -4 •b7C -4 The purpose of this corresponcence is to bring to the Commanding General's attention concerns the FBI has regarding representations that were made about the FBI's position, on the proposed operational approach to[ 1Iat the 21 November VTC 1
b6 -4 b7C -4 At the direction of the Commanding General and in an effort to find some methodological common ground with respect to an Interrogation Plan for detainee CD the FBI On-site Supervisor and Supervisors from the FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit met with JTF GTMO staff members on the evening of 20 November. During this meeting, DHS presented its draft Interrogation Plan. The FBI voiced misgivings about the overall coercive nature and possible illegality of elements of this plan. The FBI also voiced its strong objections regarding the efficacy of a fear-based approach.
The FBI offered in writing an alternative interrogation approach based on long term rapport-building. This approach was previously discussed extensively between FBI Behavioral experts and DHS and JTF staff members. At the 20 November meeting, DHS and JTF staff members recognized advantages of the FBI's approach, and decided to revise their plan by incorporating some of.the FBI's rapport-building aspects. Despite the close working environment of this consultation, JIG and OHS staff never advised FBI personnel that the revised plan would be presented the following day to the Pentagon . ff_ce of General Counsel. In fact, the FBI representatives stated clearly to the JIG and DHS representatives that the'techniques proposed in the plan must be reviewed and formally approved by FBIHQ and BAU officials prior to any implementation.
b6 -2 b7C Had the JIG advised the FBI of his intentions to present the revised DHS plan to DOD at the 21 November VTC as an FBI/DHS plan, FBI representatives woulc have strenuously objected. Additionally, although all agenciEs were aware that the NCTS Chief Psychologist, Dr.1 I was scheduled to arrive on 21 November for the purpose of evaluating the OHS and FBI plans, the JIG did not solicit Dr. 1 1 professional opinion.
This matter is brought to the Commanding General's attention for the purpose of setting an important record straight. The FBI remains committed to supporting the JTF GTMO mission.
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Drafted by FBI (BAU) personnel flay with on-site FBI operations supervisor and forwarded to
Commanding General. Joint Task Pori e-170 on 11/22/2002
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As we approach the one-year annivei sal), of the confinement of Al Qaedaffaliban
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detainees at GTMO, perhaps it is a good time to revisit our interrogation strategies which
may be in need of revision
Since last year, detainees have been interrogated by representatives of the Defense Human Intelligence Services (DHS) and by members of the FBI/CITF in an effort to obtain valuable intelligence In this sense, the missions appear to be identical However, both the FBI and the CITF have additional responsibilities While the FBI is working to obtain information to strengthen existing terrorism investigations for prosecution, the CITE is trying to ensure that incrimtnanng triformation gathered from the detainees is done in a manner acceptable for military tribunals
Central to the gathering of reliable, admissible evidence is the manner in which it is obtained Interrogation techniques used by the DHS are designed specifically for shortterm use in combat environments where the immediate retrieval of tactical intelligence is critical Many of DHS's methods are considered coercive by Federal Law Enforcement and UCMJ standards Not only this, but report:. from those knowledgeable about the use of these coercive techniques are highly skeptical as to their effectiveness and reliability Since nearly all of the GTMO detainees have been interviewed many times overseas before being sent here, the FBI/CrIT would argue that a different approach should be undertaken in terms of trying to elicit information from them The FBI/CITF favors the use of less coercive techniques, ones carefully designed for long-term use in which rapport-building skills are carefully combined with a purposeful and incremental manipulation of a detainee's en vironment and perceptions A model of this approach was offered recently in an FBUCITF interview plan for detainee
FBIJCITF agents arc well-trained, highly experienced and very successful in overcoming suspect resistance in order to obtain valuable information in complex criminal•cases, including the investigations of terrorist bombings in East Africa and the USS Cole, etc FB1/CITF interview strategies are most effective when tailored specifically to suit a suspect's or detainee's needs and vulnerabilities Contrary to popular belief, these vulnerabilities are more likely to reveal themselves through the employment of individually designed and sustained interview strategies rather than through the haphazard use of prescriptive, time-driven approaches The FBI/CITF strongly believes that the continued use of diametrically apposed interrogation strategies in GTMO will only weaken our efforts to obtain valuable information
A second problem with the current interrogation strategy is that detainees are smarter now than when they first arrived No longer are they susceptible to suggestions for early release or special consideration Indeed, no one seems to know when the military tribunals will begin As TIDY interiog,ators continue to interview and reinterview detainees utilizing every theme imaginable, detainees have become increasingly cynical of any offers of concession Moreover, they appear to have become better conditioned for almost alt interrogation approaches with many detainees simply refusing to answer any questions Complicating matters is the structural set-up of Camp
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Deka, which enables detainees to exchange couirter-interrogation resistance strategies with relative ease while at the same time strengthening their solidarity
Except for a recently enacted reward system offering minor creature comforts to cooperative detainees, there is a tack of major incentives which could encourage detainees torovide more information Major incentives are greatly needed Recently,
Li investigator ere. successful -in:ret-rie ,ving.valualale-infarmation and •-•••• --------------
t 1
cooperation from some detainees after they were provided with guarantees of judicial leniency
In addition to a review of interrogation strategies the F1311-1Q representatives wish to discuss with the Commanding General the fellowing issues
I Projected long term FBI Agent and Professional Support presence in support of
TIT G17/10 mission
2 FBI continued technical support
3 DOJ prosecutonal interest in GTMO detainees
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