Emails between Army Officers re: Taguba Report with Highlighted Training Issues

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3Hn4a
From: Ammor LTC G3
Sent: Frid 2004 12:32 PM
To: PT - G3
Subject: : "training" extract

Follow Up. Flag: Follow up Flag Status: Flagged
11111111 .. more information on the MP training guidance

LTC
G3 --

fining
DSN 367411111 Comm 404-4640M

Ori inal Message

-From: COL - G3-TR
Sent: 2, 2004 6:20 AM
To: LTC G3
Sub ec :

: "training" extract

maw

See recommendations from MG Taguba report below

Ensure our new guidance is consisitent

. Thanks,

Original Message
From: Burns, Julian H. MG - DCS G-3/5/7
Ma 11, 2004 9:10 AM
COL - PAO
OL - G3-TR; COL; - SJA
'training" extract

Recommend cross talk with the conusa, cc'd here
Burns

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

From COL - PAC 411111111111111111@=J_orscom.army.mil
To: Burns, Julian H. MG - DCS G-3/5/7 Julian.Burnsl@us.army.mil
Sent: Tue May 11 09:08:11 2004
Subject: RE: "training" extract

Roger. I am coordinating at light speed. Note the comment by General Helmly below. This
helps.

"I believe that members of this unit had the requisite training to ensure that they were
aware of and competent in the task needed to secure enemy prisoners of war, and to ensure
that they were aware of the requirement for humane treatment of prisoners," Gen. Helmly

said.

The Army also has said that all soldiers, regardless of job assignments, learn about the
Geneva Conventions prohibiting mistreatment of prisoners of war and others.

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Original Message
From: Burns, Julian H. MG - DCS G-3/5/7
Sent: Tu 1, 2004 8:04 AM
To: OL - PAO
Cc: COL - G3-TR - G1 OL -
SJA
Subject: Re: "training" extract

Tx

Sent from my BlackBerry Wireless Handheld

Ori ina
From COL - PAO 411111111111111@forscom.army.mil
To: B lian H. MG - DOS G-3/5/7 J .Burnsl@us.arm

CC: COL - G3-TR rm .mil
forscom.army.mil›;

@us.army.mil
Sent: Tue May 11 0900:16 2004
Subject: FW: "training" extract

Sir, FYI only. The Taguba report w/ specific training issues highlighted.

Original Mes
From AO
Sent 11, 2004 7:23 AM
To:
Cc:

u jec : "training" extract
Importance: High

These are taken out of the various sections and thus the numbering is not.in order. I am
printing the entire report minus annexes.

411.1111111111P

Deput Chief of. Public Affairs
404-/ dsn 3674110111

(U)
The 800th MP (I/R) units did not receive Internment/Resettlement (I/R) and corrections
specific training during their mobilization period. Corrections training is only on the
METL of two MP (I/R) Confinement Battalions throughout the Army, one currently serving in
Afghanistan, and elements of the other are at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. MP units supporting
JTF-GTMO received ten days of training in detention facility operations, to include two
days of unarmed self-defense, training in interpersonal communication skills, forced cell
moves, and correctional officer safety. (ANNEX 19)

(U)
The 800th MP Brigade has experienced challenges adapting its task organizational
structure, training, and equipment resources from a unit designed to conduct standard EPW
operations in the COMMZ (Kuwait). Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee
population ratio and facility layout templates are predicated on a compliant, self-
disciplining EPW population, and not criminals or high-risk security internees. (ANNEX
19)

12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the
320th MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company had received no training in detention/internee
operations. I also find that very little instruction or training was provided to MP
personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, FM 27-10, AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find that few, if any,
copies of the Geneva Conventions were ever made available to MP personnel or detainees.

(ANNEXES 21-24, 33, and multiple witness statements)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION:

1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an integrated multi-discipline Mobile

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Training Team (MTT) comprised of subject matter experts'in internment/resettlement
operations, international and operational law, information technology, facility
management, interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques, chaplains, Arab cultural
awareness, and medical practices as it pertains to I/R activities. This team needs to
oversee and conduct comprehensive training in all aspects of detainee and confinement
operations.

2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence personnel involved in any
aspect of detainee operations or interrogation operations in CJTF-7, and subordinate
units, be immediately provided with training by an international/operational law attorney
on the specific provisions of The Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10, specifically the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained
Personnel, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees, and AR 190-8. .

10. (U) Camp Bucca, operated by the 310th MP Battalion, had a "Criminal Detainee In-
Processing SOP" and a "Training Outline" for transferring and releasing detainees, which
appears to have been followed. (ANNEXES 38 and 52)
Several detainees allegedly began to riot at about 1300 in all of the compounds at the
Ganci encampment. This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3 detainees, 9 wounded
detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers. A 15-6 investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th
MP Brigade, Deputy Commander) concluded that the detainees rioted in protest of their
living conditions, that the riot turned violent, the use of non-lethal force was
ineffective, and, after the 320th MP Battalion CDR executed "Golden Spike," the emergency
containment plan,'the use of deadly force was authorized. Contributing factors were lack
of comprehensive training of guards, poor or non-existent SOPs, no formal guard-mount
conducted prior to shift, no rehearsals or ongoing training, the mix of less than lethal
rounds with lethal rounds in weapons, no AARs being conducted after incidents, ROE not
posted and not understood, overcrowding, uniforms not standardized, and poor communication
between the command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART THREE)

(U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command policies, internal
procedures, and command climate in the 800th MP Brigade, as appropriate: (Names deleted)

(ANNEXES 45-91) REGARDING PART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE FOLLOWING SPECIFIC
FINDINGS OF FACT: 1. (U) I find that BG Janis Karpinski took command of the 800th MP
Brigade on 30 June 2003 from BG Paul Hill. BG Karpinski has remained in command since
that date. The 800th MP Brigade is comprised of eight MP battalions in the Iraqi TOR:
115th MP Battalion, 310th MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 324th MP Battalion, 400th MP
Battalion, 530th MP Battalion, 724th MP. Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion. (ANNEXES 41 and
45) 2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking command, members of the 800th MP Brigade believed
they would be allowed to go home when all the detainees were released from the Camp Bucca
Theater Internment Facility following the cessation of major ground combat on 1 May 2003.
At one point, approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees were held at Camp Bucca. Through
Article-5 Tribunals and a screening process, several thousand detainees were released.
Many in the command believed they would go home when the detainees were released. In late
May-early June 2003 the 800th MPBrigade was given a new mission to manage the Iraqi penal
system and several detention centers. This new mission meant Soldiers would not redeploy
to CONUS when anticipated. Morale suffered, and over the next few months there did not
appear to have been any attempt by the Command to mitigate this morale problem. (ANNEXES
45 and 96) 3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements of numerous witnesses that
soldiers throughout the 800th MP Brigade were not proficient in their basic MOS skills,
particularly regarding internment/resettlement operations. Moreover, there is no evidence
that the command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted to correct them in any
systemic manner other than ad hoc training by individuals with civilian corrections
experience. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal Observations of the
Investigation Team) 4. (U) I find that the 800th MP Brigade was not adequately trained
for a mission that included operating a prison or penal institution at Abu Ghraib Prison

Complex. As the Ryder Assessment found, I also concur that units of the 800th MP Brigade
did not receive corrections-specific training during their mobilization period. MP units
did not receive pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization and during the post
mobilization training, and thus could not train for specific missions. The training that
was accomplished at the mobilization sites were developed and implemented at the company
level with little or no direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade levels, and
consisted primarily of common tasks and law enforcement training. However, I found no
evidence that the Command, although aware of this deficiency, ever requested specific
corrections training from the Commandant of the Military Police School, the US Army
Confinement Facility at Mannheim, Germany, the Provost Marshal General of the Army, or the
US Army Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and 76) 5. (U) I

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find that without adequate training for a civilian internee detention mission, Brigade
personnel relied heavily on individuals within the Brigade who had civilian corrections
experience, including many who worked as prison guards or corrections officials in their
civilian jobs. Almost every witness we interviewed had no familiarity with the provisions
of AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40. It does not appear that a Mission Essential Task List (METL)
based on in-theater missions was ever developed nor was a training plan implemented
throughout the Brigade. (ANNEXES 21, 22, 67, and 81) 6. (U) I also find, as did MG
Ryder's Team, that the 800th MP Brigade as a whole, was understrength for the mission for
which it was tasked. Army Doctrine dictates that an I/R Brigade can be organized with
between 7 and 21 battalions, and that the average battalion size element should be able to
handle approximately 4000 detainees at a time. This investigation indicates that BG
Karpinski and her staff did a poor job allocating resources throughout the Iraq JOA. Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) normally housed between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was operated by only
one battalion. In contrast, the HVD Facility maintains only about 100 detainees, and is
also run by an entire battalion. (ANNEXES 19, 22, and 96) 7. (U) Reserve Component units
do not have an individual replacement system to mitigate medical or other losses. Over
time, the 800th MP Brigade clearly suffered from personnel shortages through release from
active duty (REFRAD) actions, medical evacuation, and demobilization. In addition to
being severely undermanned, the quality of life for Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
was extremely poor. There was no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or MWR facilities. There were
numerous mortar attacks, random rifle and RPG attacks, and a serious threat to Soldiers
and detainees in the facility. The prison complex was also severely overcrowded and the
Brigade lacked adequate resources and personnel to resolve serious logistical problems.
Finally, because of past associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the Brigade, it
appears that friendship often took precedence over appropriate leader and subordinate
relationships. (ANNEX 101, Multiple Witness Statements, and the Personal Observations of
the Investigation Team) 8. (U) With respect to the 800th MP Brigade mission at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF), I find that there was clear friction and lack of effective communication between

the Commander, 205th MI Brigade, who controlled FOB Abu Ghraib (BCCF) after 19 November
2003, and the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, who controlled detainee operations inside the
FOB. There was no clear delineation of responsibility between commands, little
coordination at the command level, and no integration of the two functions. Coordination
occurred at the lowest possible levels with little oversight by commanders. (ANNEXES 31,
45, and 46)

9. (U) I find that this ambiguous command relationship was exacerbated by a CJTF-7
Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108 issued on 19 November 2003. Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment of
205th MI Brigade Commander's Responsibilities for the Baghdad Central Confinement
Facility, states as follows:

3.C.8.
A. (U) 205 MI BRIGADE.

3.C.8.
A. 1. (U) EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY COMMANDER 205 MI BRIGADE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY
FOR THE BAGHDAD CONFINEMENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS APPOINTED THE FOB COMMANDER. UNITS
CURRENTLY AT ABU GHRAIB (BCCF) ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR "SECURITY OF DETAINEES AND
FOB PROTECTION."
Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAGO 1108 made all of the MP units at Abu Ghraib
TACON to the Commander, 205th MI Brigade. This effectively made an MI Officer, rather
than an MP Officer, responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that
facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions and agendas
assigned to each of these respective specialties. (ANNEX 31)
10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10 July 2001 defines
Tactical Control (TACON) as the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers
within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. (ANNEX
42)
"TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands or military
capability made available for tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and
control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish
assigned missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in OPCON and may be delegated to and
exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant commander."

11.
(0) Based on all the facts and circumstances in this investigation, I find that there
was little, if any, recognition of this TACON Order by the 800th MP Brigade or the 205th
MI Brigade. Further, there was no evidence if the Commander, 205th MI Brigade clearly
informed the Commander, 800th MP Brigade, and specifically the Commander, 320th MP
Battalion assigned at. Abu Ghraib (BCCF), on the specific requirements of this TACON
relationship. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)

12.
(U) It is clear from a comprehensive review of witness statements and personal
interviews that the 320th MP Battalion and 800th MP Brigade continued to function as if
they were responsible for the security, health and welfare, and overall security of
detainees within Abu Ghraib (BCCF) prison. Both BG Karpinski and COL Pappas clearly

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behaved as if this were still the case. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)

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