This email discusses the need for adequate number of doctors to provide preventative medicine to detainees. The IG report found that doctors were not resources adequately and in some cases lacked adequate training or guidance to perform the detainee operation mission.
DeFraites, Robert F COL OTSG
b)(6)-2 MOR
From: t MAJ WRAIR-Wash DC Sent:t Wednesday. Auaust 18, 2004 3:26 PM
'b -2
To: t COL OTSG Subject:t RE: IG Report of. Army Detainee Operations Inspection S: 31 AUG 04, 31 AUG 05
Sir,
It may be worth a conference call to discuss this, but here's the bottom line from the IG
inspection:_ PM assets (FST.s + PM dets)-were-not resourced (manpower, equipment) and, in
some cases (mostly in FSTs44-lacked adequate training or guidance to perform the detainee
ops mission. Many PM deficiencies would probably have been avoided had units deployed
with fully trained and equipped FSTs -- this finding resulted in a recommendation to force
providers to fix the perpetual FST problem. Re: PM dets, given the distribution of forces
and the additional "burden" of a large detainee population, there were simply not enough
of them -- their training was fine, but none were aware of the detainee ops
policy/doctrine. Even without the large number of detainees, some PM dets couldn't keep
up with their "non-detainee" missions. Transportation & security issues certainly
Contributed to the problem.
Current force structure is.outdated and insufficient for operations such as OEF and OIF.
With units split up and scattered across a wide geographical area, and with lower echelon
units capturing and detaining individuals for long periods of time (in violation of
doctrine, but critical to obtain timely intel in a HUMINT-driven operation), support
elements are inadequately structured, to maintain the infrastructure and provide necessary
services. I don't think a denominator-based approach to PM det allocation is necessarily
ane best model -- it's overly simplistic and fails to address other factors (number of
camps/sites, geographical distribution of forces, etc) -- that, combined with population
figures, should be considered in developing a sound force structure model. It's time tc
scrap the WWII/Cold War doctrine and think asymmetric/non-linear battlespace, modularity,
and the different requirements of various operational phases (combat vs. SASO, etc).
The other piece of this is the failure of unit surgeons to understand and adequately
employ FSTaand PM dets. These physicians are critical and must be trained in basic PM
and detainee ops.
Let me know if I can help with anything.
jbX6)-2
Original Message
From: "R ICOL OTSG
Sent: Wednesday, August 18, 2004 1:09 PM
To: 0m)-2 IMAJ WRAIR-Wash DC
Subject: Fw: IG Report of Army Detainee Operations Inspection S: 31 AUG 04, 31 AUG 05
Original Messaas,-.
From: ICOL USACHPPM
)03)-2
XO)-2:bX13)-2
Sent: Wed Aug 18 12:57:54 2004
Subject: RE: IG Report of Army Detainee Operations Inspection S: 31 AUG 04, 31 AUG 05
bX13)-2
LTC
1
MEDCOM - 403
I am not personally aware of specific cases or complaints about the ability of PM assets
to support Detainee:Operations. However it stands to reason that the quality of any
support will depend upon the level of training- and experience possessed by the PM
personnel in the area as well as their ability to get around [travel] the area of
Operations.
When considering a BOA for any PM asset, we need to consider not only the number of
FP requirements, etc. I'm
Soldiers supported, bUt alsb the Size of the operational area,
not certain that one PM Detachment per 15, 000 soldiers is adequate. In fact, given the
growing expectations for preventive medicine support in any theater, we may determine that
an effective BOA is actually one PM Detachment per Unit of Execution (!). This will seem
unrealistic to some, but the BOA should NOT be constrained (at least at first) by
predetermined Xestrictions We should determine- what ianeeded, and-then-determine bo•to
pay the bill. We may decide ,that the Army ia,better served by using our available assets
to create more PM Detachments at the expente oaf-Bde-level PM cells that have littlareal,
capability and poor battlefield mobility-
VR,
04(0.2
CO L
bm-2
From: ILTC AMEDDCS
nt: Tuesclust u
7, 2009 4:38 PM
bX8}2
SACHPPM
- b)(6)-2 • (b)(6r2
J4 nw w
Subject: IG-Reportof Army Detainee Operations Inspection .11 ALA,
:1*(3)-2
COL
See bottom-email paragraph 2, a. im—regards to reviewing PVNTMED force structure-to support
Detainee"Operations. PVNTMED Assets are organic to Military Police Brigade, Battalions,
and detachments which support EPW/detainee operations. Additional PVNTMED assets in the
form of PVNTMED DetaChments ere augmented on the basis of one detachment per 17,000
population supported.
mo)-2
CPT signed in on 9 August and I've ut him to work on analyzing the Basis of
b)(6}2
left behind a PVNTMED work load model and a
recommendation that the PV B A should be changed to one detachment per 15,000
Ailbcation for PVNTMED units. MAJ
0(6)-2
is going over this material and has contacted Commanders
their workload and issues with EPW/detainee operations.
population supported. CPT
from returning units to determine
Are you aware of any problems with PVNTMED support to EPW/detainee operations from a force
structure or equipment standpoint?
'In paragraph 2.b., the Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) is underway. It is a year
long process and senior PVNTMED SMEs will be contacted in the future for their input in
that analysis. This is the first complete PVNTMED MARC since 1988.
Respectfully,
.b)(8)-2
LTC
LTC Ph.D.
•Force Protection, Branch ,
Concepts & Requirements Division
)i-rectorate of Combat and Doctrine Development
MOH
ATTN:
.2
MEDCOM - 404
b)(3)-1
Fort Sam Houston, TX 78234=5052
phone: 210-221?"H I
Fax: 210-221.w"
Oriainal Message_
F_ on:. • -. !Mr AMEDDCS.
Sent:. Friday, August 06, 2004 4:15 PM
fbx6y2
IcOL.AMEDDCS,;-ACEI::OPERATIONS.AMEDDOS
bX6)-2
.31 Al4.7.V4i 31 AW., V4
Subject: RE: IG Report of Army Detainee Operations. Inspection 5:
Sir--we cannot comply with para 2a below--Assess the preventive medicine detachment forces
structure to ensure sufficient quantities of PM detachments exist to support all
collecting points and internment/resettlement facilities--this is a resourcing issue--the
current ROA shows the PM Detachment allocatted on the basis of one per 17,000 population
supported. If the number of detainees in I/R facilities drives the numbers up, then
planners/operators should deploy a sufficient number of PM Det to support that increase-As we mentioned in the info paper, the I/R facilities have organic medical support.
(b)(8)-2
.rininal Messanl
0)4
COL AMEDDCS
Sent: Friday, August.06',-2004:3;25 PM.
Ar. WT APFRATTONS AmrnneS
From:
b)(6}2
bwiy2
my Detainee Operations Inspection S: 1 AUG 04, 31 AUG 05
Su :;ect: FW: iu xeport or A
pu: on our tasker sheets... DCDD IPM)
znanks.
13)(6)-2
Original Message
From: !.)°4'2 JCOL_AMEDDCS_
,
Sent: Friday,-August 6, 2004 2:51—PM
To:
b)(6)-2 Ms AMEDDCS; P)-2 .LT AMEDDCS Cc: Pm-2 p L AMEDDCS.
Report of Army Detainee Operations Inspection S: 31 AUG 04, 31 AUG 05
Subject: FW: IG
3,)(8)-2
Please put on your suspense file. Thanks
(b)(6)-2
Bozh belong to DCDD one with 31 Aug susp and one with 31 Aug 05 susp,
:hanks
(0(0-2
,bX6)-2
JCOL OTSG (mailto:
Sent: Friday, August 0 , 2004 2:40 PM
To• Kbxer2 ICOL AMEDDCS
Cc:PNw ,
From: "6Y2
ect: IG Report of Army Detainee Operations Inspection S: 31 AUG 04, 31 AUG 05
Sub
MO)-2
1.
Based on the input you provided, OTSG's response to the DAIG Detainee Operations
Inspection. Tasker is attached.
2.
Paragraph 1, tasker 9c, establishes two requirements for MEDCOM and AMEDDC&S:
3
MEDCOM - 405
Assess the preventive_medicine detachment forces structure to ensure sufficient
quantities of PM detachments exist to support all collecting points and
a.
internment/resettlement facilities in a non-linear battle space with 30-days. S: NLT COB
31 AUG 04.
Complete a manpower requirements criteria review for PM detachments following TAA
b.
11 in AUG 05 following TAA 11. S: 31 AUG 05.
COL, MS
re Operations, OTSG
WPH
COM: 703.681
STE: 703.681
FAX: 703.
:ASN: 761.
4
MEDCOM - 406