This email forwards information concerning the UN-KFOR experience in Kosovo and the lessons learned from that military engagement as it pertains to training soldiers on handling detainee operations, and the proper way to recognize and report detainee and civilian abuse. The original message states “Detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan echoes the incidents reported in Kosovo, with the clear exception of the more dangerous and stressful conditions of combat versus peace enforcement operations.” The Officer receiving the email responds that “this is the first that I have heard of the KFOR incidents referenced below. If others here were aware, afraid that institutional knowledge was lost as our SFOR/KFOR AOs have PCS'd or retired over the last 4-5 years. Second, such training would not have had bearing on the incidents under investigation with OIF. The OIF units involved were not originally mobilized, trained, and deployed to conduct detention operations.”
•.Message Page 1 of 2
-ttre
EY eiv bon 3 ILIT4-Nheic
11111110111111111111111111¦11
From: al11.10-LTC G3
Sent: Tuesday, August 17, 2004 6:24 PM - ofk2---
To: -LTC G3; LTC - G3
Cc: C - G3; OL
Subject: FW: Hearing Tasker 21 - 22 July 2004 SASC on the DAIG Report on Deten tion Operation Doctrine and Training (UNCLASSIFIED)
Importance: High
Tracking: Recipient Delivery Read
LTC G3 Delivered: 8/17/2004 6:24 PM Read: 8/17/2004 6:30 PM
TC - G3 Delivered: 8/17/2004 6:24 PM Read: 8/18/2004 7:46 AM
C - G3 Delivered: 8/17/2004 6:24 PM
OL Delivered: 8/17/2004 6:24 PM Read: 8/17/2004 6:52 PM
RFI from HQDA G3 reference Detention Operations Training. Attempting to determine whether or not and to what degree lessons learned from detainee abuse in KFOR during 2000 were integrated into the Army's Detainee Operations Training Programs. Believe these question should be principally addressed with TRADOC and USAMPS.
From a FORSCOM perspective, I believe the answer to be - "Not at all." First, this is the first that I have heard of the KFOR incidents referenced below. If others here were aware, afraid that institutional knowledge was lost as our SFOR/KFOR AOs have PCS'd or retired over the last 4-5 years. Second, such training would not have had bering on the incidents under investigation with OIF. The OIF units involved were not originally mobilized, trained, and deployed to conduct detention operations. This was a remissioning in theater based on the evolving environment as the operation transitioned from combat operations to SASO.
Look into and provide me your thoughts and input.
Original Message From Mr HQDA DCS G-3/SY Tech [mailto Sent: ugust 17, 2004 4:13 PM To: ' -G Cc: LTC HQDA DCS G-3; LTC HQDA Army G-3 &due • earing Tasker 21 - 22 July 2004 SASC on the DAIG Report on Deten tion Operation Doctrine and Training (UNCLASSIFIED)
eCan you help with these questions? I just need any related information you can provide (like how you update pre-deployment training requirements or use CALL lessons learned databases). I will format it properly here.
Background. The NSA, CSA, & TIG testified on 22 July 2004 before the SASC on the Inspector General's Report on Detention Operation Doctrine and Training. There are 2 inserts for the record and 12 questions (attached) for the record for this hearing. I need FORSCOM help with questions 8, 9, and 10. Specifically, ...
8. Secretary Brownlee and General Schoomaker, I recall press reports of detainee abuse involving an Army battalion participating in peace enforcement operations in Kosovo from September 1999 to March 2000.
? 2 1
000868
11/5/2004
DOD-046077
: Message Page 2 of 2
Apparently soldiers and some leaders of this battalion were involved in misconduct and abuses of authority including unauthorized interrogations, inappropriate' handling of females, threatening detainees with the use of weapons, and, although not a detainee incident, one soldier committed a rape and murder. Investigations by the Army suggested that the chain of command failed to appropriately train the unit for a peacekeeping mission, exceeded their authority in aggressively favoring one faction over another, and tolerated misconduct by members of the unit. According to investigators, the battalion's command climate fostered actions by troops that, "violated the limits and terms of their military assignments by intimidating, interrogating, abusing, and beating Albanians."
Detainee abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan echoes the incidents reported in Kosovo, with the clear exception of the
more dangerous and stressful conditions of combat versus peace enforcement operations. This begs questions,
however, about how the Army may have used the lessons of Kosovo and will use the lessons of Iraq and
Afghanistan to better prepare leaders and soldiers for the realities of military operations today and tomorrow.
Press reports at the time of the Kosovo situation indicate that the Army ordered detainee treatment training for U.
S. based units. Can you determine if this training specifically used the incidents in Kosovo as an
illustration of what soldiers should not do and what leaders should not allow to happen? (G3-37/TR)
a.
Secretary Brownlee
b.
General Schoomaker
9. Secretary Brownlee and General Schoomaker, if specific examples were not used, can you explain why
not? ? (G3-37/TR)
a.
Secretary Brownlee
b.
General Schoomaker
10. Secretary Brownlee and General Schoomaker, was the detainee treatment training directed by the Army in 2000 integrated into long-term Army training requirements and plans? If not, why not? ? (G3-37/TR)
a.
Secretary Brownlee
b.
General Schoomaker
«22 Jul 04 SASC QFRs.doc»
000869
11/5/2004
DOD-046078