These two (2) memos are background and history of the Establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and Detention of POWs, Unlawful Combatants, and Other Detainees. The memos are designed to address concerns and questions about the legal authority of the U.S. to capture, detainee and try suspected Al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects.
UNCLASSIFIED LN
71-United States Department of State
RELEASED IN FULL
Washington, D.C. 20520
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INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/ES
UNCLASSIFIED
S/WCI - Pierre Prosper
TO:P
PA/HO - Marc Susser-t0(
FROM:P
SUBJECT: Detention of POWs, Unlawful Combatants, and Other
Detainees
U.S. Government strategy for detaining and prosecuting
prisoners of war, unlawful combatants, and other detainees
during military operations in recent years has involved three
broad types of military action: traditional military campaigns,
the pursuit of political leaders, and peacekeeping operations.
During the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, particularly the
ground invasion of Iraq in February 1991, U.S.-led coalition
forces encountered an enemy in a traditional combat setting. At
the time of the cease-fire, approximately 30,000 Iraqi troops
found themselves under allied control, in both Iraq and Kuwait.
U.S. and allied forces decided to confiscate the 700 Iraqi tanks
they had captured; however, they disarmed and then repatriated
the 30,000 soldiers. The allies thus avoided the complications
inherent in according the Iraqi soldiers formal POW status.
A second type of military engagement focused less on rank
and file soldiers and more on pursuing a nation's political
leadership. For example, the U.S. invasion of Grenada, in
October 1983, was precipitated by the overthrow and murder.of
Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. The U.S. had long criticized the
presence of Soviet and Cuban advisers on the island. After a
short military campaign, all but 17 of approximately 1,500
detainees were released under an amnesty agreement. These
remaining 17, consisting of the coup plotters, were tried and
convicted for Bishop's murder by a Grenadan court. They remain
in prison today.
In a variant of this second approach, U.S. forces focused
on capturing a single individual in Panama and Somalia.
Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega had long been accused
UNCLASSIFIED
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARRY R MELONS
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DATE/CASE ID: 06 OCT 2004 200303827
DOS-000324
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of drug trafficking and election fraud. In February 1988,
federal grand juries in Florida indicted him. Deciding against
a small Special Forces operation designed to capture Noriega
alone, the U.S. launched a 25,000-man invasion. Noriega was
quickly captured and taken to Miami, where he was tried ..and
convicted on federal drug charges. Unlike Panama, the operation
in Somalia ended without success. In an effort to defend a U.N.
humanitarian mission from terrorist attack, U.S: Special Forces
tried to capture the politically powerful Somali warlord,
Mohammed Aideed. However, Aideed escaped, U.S. forces suffered
serious losses, and President Clinton decided to withdraw
American forces from Somalia.
Finally, the third type of situation in which military
forces have dealt with the issue of combatants has been in
Balkan peacekeeping missions. In Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Kosovo, and Macedonia, however, international forces -- whether
U.N. or NATO -- have not encountered combatants directly. The
United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) mission, which
entered Croatia in 1992 and then moved into Bosnia-Herzegovina,
did not have a mandate that was broad enough to include military
engagements. UNPROFOR thus failed to stop the war. In 1995,
the Croatian offensive in the Krajina and NATO's bombing of
Bosnian Serbs finally induced the warring parties to negotiate
the Dayton Peace Accord. Thereafter, :a more heavily armed and
NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) -- later called SFOR,
Stabilization Force -- arrived to maintain the peace, encourage
displaced refugees to return to their homes, and capture
suspected war criminals. Building on the IFOR model, NATO sent
a peacekeeping force called KFOR to Kosovo, after the air
campaign against Serbia in 1999. Rather than pursue suspected
war criminals, however, KFOR has tried to create an
international police force.
Both KFOR and SFOR have construed their mandates as
including the authority to detain in certain circumstances,
e.g., force protection. However, there has been no widespread
attempt to take prisoners. Other than seeking some suspected
war criminals for the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (ICTY), their principal task has been to encourage
the reconstruction of a multi-ethnic society.
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DOS-000325
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Drafted: PA/HO: LWVanHook; JCVanHook
11/2/01
Clearance:PA/HO/SP: PClaussen-ok
PA.PReeker-ok
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DOS-000326