DOJ Inspector General Report: Review of FBI Involvement and Observations of Detainee Interrogations at Guantanamo, Afghanistan and Iraq

<p>This document is the result of a review conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) involvement in and observations of detainee interrogations in Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Afghanistan, and Iraq. The focus of the review was whether FBI agents witnessed incidents of detainee abuse in the military zones, whether FBI employees reported any such abuse to their superiors or others, and how those reports were handled. The OIG also examined whether FBI employees participated in any detainee abuse. In addition, the report examined the development and adequacy of the policies, guidance, and training that the FBI provided to the agents it deployed to the military zones. It was concluded that the FBI had not provided sufficient guidance to its agents on how to respond when confronted with military interrogators who used interrogation techniques that were not permitted by FBI policies.</p>
<p>[This report was originally released to the ACLU on May 20, 2008, shortly after the ACLU filed a Freedom of Information Act request for it and other related documents. &nbsp;The government later released this less-redacted version of the report. This version shows the differences between the two released versions using highlights. &nbsp;See the second page of the report for a fuller explanation.]</p>

Doc_type: 
Oversight Report
Doc_date: 
Friday, October 30, 2009
Doc_rel_date: 
Thursday, October 29, 2009
Doc_text: 

 

Office of the Inspector General

A Review of the FBI's Involvement in

and Observations of Detainee

Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay,

Afghanistan, and Iraq

Oversight and Review Division

Office of the Inspector General

October 2009 (Revised)

UNCLASSIFIED

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.1

NOTE REGARDING REVISED VERSION

The OIG originally issued this report in May 2008. This revised

version, dated October 2009, contains previously classified material that

was redacted in the original version but that was subsequently declassified

by the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. The

following pages in this revised edition contain the declassified material,

which is highlighted on those pages, that was previously redacted:

Pages

3

21

35-36

41

43

61-62

68-70

74

96-97

100-101

216

226-227

233

256

284

288

318-320

323

328

330

332

341

351

361

369

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1

I. Introduction 1

II. The OIG Investigation 2

III. Prior Reports Regarding Detainee Mistreatment 3

IV. Methodology of OIG Review of Knowledge of FBI Agents Regarding

Detainee Treatment 5

A. The OIG June 2005 Survey 5

B. OIG Selection of FBI Personnel for Interviews 7

C. OIG Treatment of Military Conduct 7

V. Organization of the OIG Report 8

CHAPTER TWO: FACTUAL BACKGROUND 11

I. The Changing Role of the FBI After September 11 11

II. FBI Headquarters Organizational Structure for Military Zones 12

A. Counterterrorism Division 13

1. International Terrorism Operations Sections 13

2. Counterterrorism Operations Response Section 14

B. Critical Incident Response Group 15

C. Office of General Counsel 15

III. Other DOJ Entities Involved in Overseas Detainee Matters 16

IV. Inter-Agency Entities and Agreements Relating to Detainee Matters.16

A. The Policy Coordinating Committee 16

B. Inter-Agency Memorandums of Understanding 18

V. Background Regarding the FBI's Role in the Military Zones 19

A. Afghanistan 19

1. Military Operations and Detention Facilities 19

2. The FBI's Mission 21

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.3

3. FBI Deployments 22

4. Organizational Structure of the FBI in Afghanistan 23

5. FBI Activities in Afghanistan 24

B. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 27

1. Military Operations and Detention Facilities 27

2. The FBI's Mission 31

3. FBI Deployments 32

4. FBI Organizational Structure at GTMO 32

5. FBI Activities at GTMO 33

C. Iraq 35

1. Military and CIA Operations and Detention Facilities 35

2. The FBI's Mission in Iraq 36

3. FBI Deployments to Iraq 37

4. Organizational Structure of the FBI in Iraq 37

5. FBI Activities in Iraq 38

CHAPTER THREE: BACKGROUND REGARDING INTERROGATION

POLICIES 47

I. Pre-existing FBI Policies and Practices 47

A. FBI Interview/Interrogation Techniques 47

B. Working with Other Agencies 49

1. FBI Interaction with Other Domestic Law Enforcement

Agencies 50

2. FBI Interaction with Agencies of Foreign Governments 50

C. FBI Duty to Report 51

II. Department of Defense Interrogation Policies 53

A. Legal Background: the Geneva Conventions, the Convention

Against Torture, and Related Statutes 54

B. DOD Interrogation Policies Relating to GTMO 56

C. DOD Policies Relating to Afghanistan 59

D. DOD Policies Relating to Iraq 61

E. Recent Changes to DOD Policy 63

III. Reasons for the Differences Between the FBI and Military

Approaches to Interviews 63

CHAPTER FOUR: THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF FBI POLICIES

REGARDING DETAINEE INTERVIEWS AND INTERROGATIONS 67

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.4

I. The Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah 67

A. FBI Agents Interview Zubaydah and Report to FBI

Headquarters on CIA Techniques 67

B. FBI Assistant Director D'Amuro Meets with DOJ Officials

Regarding the Zubaydah Interrogation 69

C. D'Amuro Meets with the FBI Director, Who Decides that the

FBI Will Not Participate 71

II. Subsequent Decisions Regarding FBI Involvement with High Value

Detainees 74

CHAPTER FIVE: FBI CONCERNS ABOUT MILITARY INTERROGATION

AT GUANTANAMO BAY 77

I. Background on Al-Qahtani 77

II. Discovery of Al-Qahtani's Links to September 11 78

III. FBI Interviews of Al-Qahtani: August 2002 80

IV. FBI Supervisory Special Agents Foy and Lyle Observe Military

Interrogations of Al-Qahtani: Early October 2002 82

V. The FBI's MLDU Unit Chief and DOJ Counsel Nahmias Visit

GTMO: October 15 to 18, 2002 85

VI. FBI Continues Objecting to the Al-Qahtani Interrogation Plans:

November 2002 86

VII. Proposal To Al-Qahtani To Be Interrogated Using an

Alternative Debriefing Model of the Sort Used on Zubaydah 92

VIII The Military Proceeds with the Interrogation of Al-Qahtani, Over

FBI Objections 102

IX. Concerns about the Interrogation of Al-Qahtani and Other

Detainees Are Elevated at FBI Headquarters 104

X. Concerns Regarding Interrogations of Al-Qahtani and Others Are

Elevated by the FBI to the DOJ Criminal Division 107

XI. Concerns Regarding Efficacy of DOD Interrogations at GTMO Are

Raised to the Attorney General 113

XII. DOJ Efforts to Address Guantanamo Interrogation Issues in the

Inter-Agency Process 115

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.5

XIII. Al-Qahtani Becomes Fully Cooperative 117

XIV. The May 30, 2003 Electronic Communication 120

XV. Concerns Raised Regarding Slahi's Interrogation 122

XVI. Conclusion 128

CHAPTER SIX: THE FBI'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCLOSURE OF

DETAINEE MISTREATMENT AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON 131

I. Abu Ghraib Prison and the Development of the FBI's May 2004

Detainee Policy 131

II. The Horton Matter 135

III. FBI Employees Raise Concerns About the FBI's May 2004

Detainee Policy 137

A. The Iraq On-Scene Commander and the Meaning of

"Abuse" 137

B. The FBI Counterterrorism Division's Draft "Clarification" of

the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy 139

C. FBI OGC Concerns Regarding the Meaning of

"Participation" 140

D. FBI OGC and CTD Respond to Agent Concerns Regarding a

Facility in Iraq 142

IV. OIG Assessment of the FBI Policies Regarding Detainee

Treatment 144

A. FBI-Approved Interrogation Techniques 145

B. FBI Policy When Another Agency's Interrogator Uses

Non-FBI Techniques 146

C. FBI Interrogation of Detainees After Other Agencies Use

Non-FBI Techniques 147

D. Reporting Abuse or Mistreatment 150

E. Comparison: December 2002 CITF Guidance 152

V. FBI Internal Investigations 154

A. The Iraq Inquiry 154

B. The GTMO Special Inquiry 156

C. The Afghanistan Poll 158

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.6

D. The GTMO Review of FD-302 Forms and Development of a

Reporting Process for Detainee Abuse Allegations 159

CHAPTER SEVEN: TRAINING REGARDING DETAINEE TREATMENT

PROVIDED TO FBI AGENTS IN THE MILITARY ZONES 161

I. Training During the Period Before the FBI's May 2004 Detainee

Policy 161

A. FBI Training for Overseas Deployments 161

B. Training Topics Relating to Detainees 164

II. Expanded Training Provided to FBI Agents After Issuance of the

FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy 168

CHAPTER EIGHT: FBI OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DETAINEE

TREATMENT IN GUANTANAMO BAY 171

I. Introduction 171

II. Observations Regarding Specific Techniques 174

A. Beating or Physically Abusing a Detainee 174

B. Prolonged Shackling and Stress Positions 179

C. Sleep Deprivation or Sleep Disruption 182

D. Extreme Temperatures 184

E. Use of Working Dogs 185

F. Isolation 185

G. Mistreatment of the Koran 187

H. Touching or Acting Toward a Detainee in a Sexual Manner 188

I. Use of Bright Flashing Lights or Loud Music 190

J. Use of Duct Tape on Detainees 191

K. Forced Shaving 193

L. Withholding Medical Care 193

M. Forced Cell Extractions 195

N. Placing Women's Clothing on a Detainee 195

0. Transfer to Another Country for More Aggressive

Interrogation 196

P. Threatened Transfer to Another Country 197

Q. Threatening a Detainee's Family 198

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.7

R. Depriving a Detainee of Food or Water 199

S. Depriving a Detainee of Clothing 199

T. FBI Impersonation 200

U. Other Conduct 201

III. Disposition of FBI Agent Reports Regarding Detainee Treatment

at GTMO 203

A. Early Reports of Short-Shackling 204

B. Agent Reports to Their On-Scene Commanders 205

C. Detainee Allegations of Mistreatment 206

D. Referral Back to the Military 208

IV. Conclusion 209

CHAPTER NINE: FBI OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DETAINEE

TREATMENT IN AFGHANISTAN 213

I. Introduction 213

II. Observations Regarding Particular Techniques 216

A. FBI Knowledge of Detainee Beating Deaths 216

B. Beating, Choking, Strangling, or Other Abusive Handling

of Detainees 217

C. Using Shackles or Other Restraints in a Harsh or

Prolonged Manner 218

D. Sexually Abusive or Humiliating Contact 220

E. Abusive Body Cavity Searches 220

F. Stressful or Painful Positions or Calisthenics 221

G. Deprivation of Clothing 222

H. Hooding or Blindfolding 223

I. Sleep Deprivation or Interruption 224

J. Undocumented "Ghost" Detainees 226

K. Actual or Threatened Transfer to a Third Country 226

L. Isolation of Detainees 227

M. Impersonation of FBI Agents 228

N. Other Techniques 229

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.8

III. Disposition of FBI Agent Reports Regarding Detainee Treatment

in Afghanistan 231

IV. Conclusion 234

CHAPTER TEN: FBI OBSERVATIONS IN IRAQ 235

I. Introduction 235

II. Observations Regarding Particular Techniques 238

A. FBI Knowledge Regarding Detainee Deaths 238

B. Beating, Choking, Strangling, or Other Abusive Handling

of Detainees 238

C. Causing Burns by Placing Detainees on Hot Surfaces 241

D. Use of Electric Shock 243

E. Harsh or Prolonged Shackling 244

F. Using Military Working Dogs 246

G. Sexually Abusive or Humiliating Contact 247

H. Using Water To Prevent Breathing by a Detainee or To

Create the Sensation of Drowning 247

I. Stressful or Painful Positions or Calisthenics 248

J. Deprivation of Food and Water 250

K. Depriving Detainees of Clothing 250

1. Abu Ghraib Prison 251

2. 252

L. Hooding or Blindfolding Detainees 253

M. Sleep Deprivation or Interruption 255

N. Unregistered "Ghost" Detainees 256

0. Actual or Threatened Transfer to a Third Country 258

P. Threats Against Detainee Family Members 258

Q. Impersonation of FBI Agents by Other U.S. Government

Personnel 259

R. Other Findings Concerning Agent Observations 260

III. Disposition of FBI Agent Reports Regarding Detainee Treatment

in Iraq 261

IV. Conclusion 264

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.9

CHAPTER ELEVEN: OIG REVIEW OF ALLEGATIONS OF

I.

MISCONDUCT BY FBI EMPLOYEES IN MILITARY ZONES

Alleged Mistreatment of Moazzam Begg

265

266

A. Background 266

B. Begg's Allegations 267

C. OIG Investigation 268

D. OIG Analysis of Begg's Allegations 268

1. Alleged Threats and Psychological Ploys in

Afghanistan 269

2. Alleged Physical Abuse in Afghanistan 271

3. Alleged Threats and Coercion at GTMO 273

II. Allegations of Mistreatment of Saleh Muklif Saleh 276

A. Background and Allegations 277

B. OIG Investigation 281

1. FBI Special Agent Bennett 281

2. FBI Special Agent Howard 284

3. FBI Special Agent Rohr 285

4. FBI Special Agent Cisco 286

5. Other Witnesses 287

C. OIG Conclusions 288

1. Saleh's Allegations Regarding 288

2. Alleged Mistreatment of Detainees at 290

III. Allegations of FBI Mistreatment of Mohamedou Ould Slahi 295

A. Slahi's Allegations 295

B. OIG Analysis 296

1.

2.

Alleged FBI Participation in the "Boat Ride" Incident 296

Alleged FBI Predictions of Harsh Treatment by

Military 296

3. Alleged FBI Threat to Transfer Slahi to Afghanistan

or Iraq 298

4. Alleged Threat by a Task Force Officer 299

IV. Misconduct Involving Zuhail Abdo Al-Sharabi 300

A. OIG Investigation 300

1. Contemporaneous FBI Documents 300

2. Interview of Al-Sharabi 301

3. Interview of FBI Special Agent Demeter 301

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.10

4. Interviews of Other Agents 303

B. OIG Analysis of the Allegations 304

1. Analysis of Allegations of "Psychological Torture" 304

2. Analysis of Demeter's Conduct 305

V. Allegations Regarding FBI Participation in Interrogation of Detainee

Yousef Abkir Salih Al Qarani 306

A. Background 306

B. FBI Special Agents Brandon and Stephenson 307

C. The Alleged Short-Chaining Incident 308

D. Alleged Use of the "Frequent Flyer Program" on Al Qarani 312

E. Allegations by Al Qarani Regarding "Clint" 313

F. Allegations by Al Qarani Regarding "Daoud" 315

VI. Alleged Mistreatment of Mohammad A. A. Al Harbi 316

VII. Abuse Allegations Involving Abu Zubaydah 317

A. The FBI Investigation of the Allegations against FBI Special

Agent Gibson 317

B. FBI Interviews of Landis and Morehead 318

C. Gibson's Statement to the FBI 320

D. Gibson's Polygraph Examinations 320

E. Findings by the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility 321

F. FBI Special Agent Gibson's OIG Interview 321

G. OIG Interviews of FBI Special Agent Thomas and Acting

Deputy Assistant Director Frahm 323

H. OIG Analysis 323

VIII. Alle ations of Abuse at the

328

A. Background 329

1. The Facility 329

2. FBI Special Agent Adair 329

3. The Team of FBI Agents 330

4. FBI Special Agent Ryan 331

B. Allegations by Ryan 332

C. Prior Investigations 333

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.11

D. OIG Investigation 335

E. OIG Analysis of the Allegations 336

1. Alleged Inhumane Physical Conditions 336

2. Allegations Regarding Medical and Hygiene Conditions337

3. Alleged Deprivation of Food or Water 339

4. Alleged Sleep Deprivation 340

5. Allegations Regarding Harsh Interrogation Techniques 342

6. Allegations Regarding Use of Restraints 344

7. Allegations Regarding Blindfolding/ Goggles 349

8. Alleged Threats 350

9. Allegations that Detainee Was Subjected to Electric

Shock 350

10. Allegation Concerning Abuse of a Female Detainee 351

F. OIG Conclusions Concerning Allegations at

351

CHAPTER TWELVE: CONCLUSIONS 353

I. Background 353

II. FBI Policies Regarding Detainee Interrogations 354

III. Agent Observations Regarding Detainee Treatment 354

IV. The Disposition of FBI Agents' Reports Regarding Detainee

Mistreatment 357

V. OIG Analysis 361

A. FBI Conduct in the Military Zones 361

B. FBI Guidance 363

1. FBI-Approved Interrogation Techniques 363

2. FBI Policy When Another Agency's Interrogator Uses

Non-FBI Techniques 364

3. FBI Interrogation of Detainees After Other Agencies

Use Non-FBI Techniques 365

4. Reporting Abuse or Mistreatment 365

C. OIG Assessment of FBI Headquarters and DOJ Handling of

Agents' Reports Regarding Detainee Mistreatment 367

VI. Conclusion 369

APPENDICES

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.12

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY'

I. Introduction

This Executive Summary summarizes the results of the review

conducted by the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector

General (OIG) regarding the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI)

involvement in and observations of detainee interrogations in

Guantanamo Bay (GTMO), Afghanistan, and Iraq. The focus of our

review was whether FBI agents witnessed incidents of detainee abuse in

the military zones, whether FBI employees reported any such abuse to

their superiors or others, and how those reports were handled. The OIG

also examined whether FBI employees participated in any detainee

abuse. In addition, we examined the development and adequacy of the

policies, guidance, and training that the FBI provided to the agents it

deployed to the military zones.

As part of our review, the OIG developed and distributed a detailed

survey to over 1,000 FBI employees who had deployed to one or more of

the military zones. Among other things, the OIG survey sought

information regarding observations or knowledge of specifically listed

interview or interrogation techniques and other types of detainee

treatment, and whether the FBI employees reported such incidents to

their FBI supervisors or others.2

1 The OIG has redacted (blacked out) from the public version of this report

information that the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the Department of

Defense (DOD) considered classified. We have provided full versions of the classified

reports to the Department of Justice, the CIA, the DOD, and Congressional committees.

The effort to identify classified information in this report has been a significant factor

delaying release of this report. To obtain the agencies' classification comments, we

provided a draft report to the FBI, the CIA, and the DOD for classification review on

October 25, 2007. The FBI and the CIA provided timely responses. The DOD's

response was not timely. Eventually, the DOD provided initial classification comments

to us on March 28, 2008. However, we believed those classification markings were

over-inclusive. After several additional weeks of discussion with the DOD about these

issues, the DOD provided revised classification comments. The DOD's delay in

providing comments, and its over-inclusive initial comments, delayed release of this

report.

2 Although a major focus of our investigation was to collect information about

the observations by FBI agents of DOD interrogation practices in the military zones, the

OIG did not attempt to make an ultimate factual determination regarding the alleged

misconduct by non-FBI personnel. Such a determination would have exceeded the DOJ

OIG's jurisdiction. Moreover, the OIG did not have access to all of the witnesses, such

(Cont'd.)

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.13

The OIG also interviewed more than 230 witnesses and reviewed

over 500,000 pages of documents provided by the FBI, other components

of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of Defense

(DOD). OIG employees made two trips to GTMO to tour the detention

facilities, review documents, and interview witnesses, including five

detainees held there. We also interviewed one released detainee by

telephone.3

Our review focused primarily on the activities and observations of

FBI agents deployed to military facilities under the control of the

Department of Defense between 2001 and 2004. With limited

exceptions, we were unable to and did not investigate the conduct or

observations of FBI agents regarding detainees held at CIA facilities for

several reasons. First, we were unable to obtain highly classified

information about CIA-controlled facilities, what occurred there, and

what legal authorities governed their operations. Second, during the

course of our review we learned that in January 2003 the CIA Inspector

General had initiated a review of the CIA terrorist detention and

interrogation program. Therefore, our review focused mainly on the

conduct and observations of the approximately 1,000 FBI employees

related to detainee interviews in military zones.

A. Organization of Report

The OIG's complete report, which contains the full results of our

review, has been classified by the relevant government agencies at the

Top Secret/ SCI level. The full report contains 12 chapters. The first

three chapters provide introductory and background information,

including a description of the role of the FBI in the military zones and the

various FBI interrogation policies in place at the time of the September

11 attacks. Chapter Four discusses the FBI's involvement in the joint

interrogation of a "high value detainee," Zayn Abidin Muhammed

Hussein Abu Zubaydah, shortly after his capture, and the subsequent

deliberations within the FBI regarding the participation of its agents in

joint interrogations with agencies that did not follow FBI interview

policies.4 Chapter Five examines the dispute between the FBI and the

as DOD or CIA personnel, who would have been necessary to make such a

determination.

3 In addition, the OIG examined prior reports addressing the issue of detainee

treatment in the military zones. Among the most significant of those reports were the

Church Report, a review of DOD interrogation operations conducted in 2004 and 2005

by the DOD, and the Schmidt-Furlow Report, a DOD investigation in 2005 into

allegations of detainee abuse at GTMO.

4 When the OIG investigative team was preparing for its trip to GTMO in early

2007, we asked the DOD for permission to interview several detainees, including

(Cont'd.)

ii

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.14

DOD regarding the treatment of another detainee held at GTMO,

Muhammad Al-Qahtani. The dispute regarding Al-Qahtani arose from

the tension between the differing interrogation techniques employed by

the FBI and the military. This dispute was elevated to higher-level

officials and eventually resolved in favor of the DOD's approach.

Chapter Six examines the FBI's response to the public disclosure

of detainee mistreatment at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq and related

concerns expressed by FBI agents in the military zones. These responses

included issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, which

reminded FBI agents not to use force, threats, or abuse in detainee

interviews and instructed FBI agents not to participate in joint interviews

in which other agencies were using techniques that were not in

compliance with FBI rules. The FBI also conducted an internal review to

determine the extent of the FBI's knowledge regarding detainee

mistreatment. The seventh chapter discusses the communication of FBI

policies to FBI employees who were deployed in military zones, including

the FBI's efforts to provide training and guidance to its agents on

appropriate interrogation techniques.

Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten detail the results of the OIG's

survey and investigation into what FBI agents saw, heard about, and

reported with respect to detainee interrogations in GTMO, Afghanistan,

and Iraq.

Zubaydah. The DOD agreed, stating that our interviews would not interfere with their

attempts to obtain any intelligence from the detainees, including Zubaydah. However,

the CIA Acting General Counsel ob ected to our interviewing Zuba dah.

In addition, the CIA Acting General

Counsel asserted that the OIG had not persuaded him that the OIG had a

"demonstrable and immediate need to interview Zubaydah at that time" given what the

Acting General Counsel understood to be the OIG's "investigative mandate." In

addition, the CIA Acting General Counsel asserted that Zubaydah could make false

allegations against CIA employees. We believe that none of these reasons were

persuasive or warranted denying us access to Zubaydah. First, neither the FBI nor the

DOD objected to our access to Zubaydah at that time. In addition, neither the FBI nor

the DOD stated that an OIG interview would interfere with their interviews of him.

Second, at GTMO we were given access to other high value detainees. Third, we did

have a demonstrable and immediate need to interview Zubaydah at that time, as well as

the other detainees who we were given access to, notwithstanding the CIA Acting

General Counsel's position that we had not persuaded him. Finally, the fact that

Zubaydah could make false allegations against CIA employees - as could other

detainees - was not in our view a legitimate reason to object to our access to him. In

sum, we believe that the CIA's reasons for objecting to OIG access to Zubaydah were

unwarranted, and its lack of cooperation hampered our investigation.

iii

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.15

Chapter Eleven discusses our investigation of eight separate

allegations that FBI agents in the military zones were involved in

detainee abuse or mistreatment.

Chapter Twelve presents the OIG's conclusions and

recommendations.

B. Summary of OIG Conclusions

Our report found that after FBI agents in GTMO and other military

zones were confronted with interrogators from other agencies who used

more aggressive interrogation techniques than the techniques that the

FBI had successfully employed for many years, the FBI decided that it

would not participate in joint interrogations of detainees with other

agencies in which techniques not allowed by the FBI were used.

Our review determined that the vast majority of FBI agents

complied with FBI interview policies and separated themselves from

interrogators who used non-FBI techniques. In a few instances, FBI

agents used or participated in interrogations during which techniques

were used that would not normally be permitted in the United States.

These incidents were infrequent and were sometimes related to the

unfamiliar circumstances agents encountered in the military zones.

They in no way resembled the incidents of detainee mistreatment that

occurred at Abu Ghraib.

However, FBI agents continued to witness interrogation techniques

by other agencies that caused them concern. Some of these concerns

were reported to their supervisors, which sometimes resulted in friction

between FBI and the military over the use of these interrogation

techniques on detainees. Some FBI agents' concerns were resolved

directly by the agents working with their military counterparts, while

other concerns were never reported. Ultimately, however, the DOD made

the decisions regarding which interrogation techniques could be used on

the detainees in military zones. In our report, we describe the types of

techniques that FBI employees reported to their supervisors.

We also concluded that the FBI had not provided sufficient

guidance to its agents on how to respond when confronted with military

interrogators who used interrogation techniques that were not permitted

by FBI policies.

In sum, while our report concluded that the FBI could have

provided clearer guidance earlier, and while the FBI and DOJ could have

pressed harder for resolution of FBI concerns about detainee treatment,

we believe the FBI should be credited for its conduct and professionalism

iv

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.16

in detainee interrogations in the military zones and in generally avoiding

participation in detainee abuse.

The remainder of this unclassified Executive Summary

summarizes in more detail the factual background and findings

contained in our full report.

II. Factual Background

As a result of the September 11 attacks, the FBI changed its top

priority to counterterrorism and preventing terrorist attacks in the

United States. As a consequence of this shift in its priorities, and in

recognition of the FBI's investigative expertise and familiarity with

al-Qaeda, the FBI became more involved in collecting intelligence and

evidence overseas, particularly in military zones in Afghanistan, at

GTMO, and in Iraq.

Beginning in December 2001, the FBI sent a small number of

agents and other employees to Afghanistan to obtain actionable

intelligence for its counterterrorism efforts, primarily by interviewing

detainees at various facilities. In January 2002, the military began

transferring "illegal enemy combatants" from Afghanistan to GTMO, and

the FBI began deploying personnel to GTMO to obtain further intelligence

and evidence from detainees in cooperation with military interrogators.

Following the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the FBI also sent agents

and other employees to Iraq for the primary objective of collecting and

analyzing information to prevent terrorist attacks in the United States

and to protect U.S. personnel or interests overseas.

FBI deployments in the military zones peaked at approximately 25

employees in Afghanistan, 30 at GTMO, and 60 in Iraq at any one time

between 2001 and the end of 2004, the period covered by our review. In

total, more than 200 FBI employees served in Afghanistan between late

2001 and the end of 2004, more than 500 employees served at GTMO

during this period, and more than 260 served in Iraq. In each military

zone, FBI agents were supervised by an FBI On-Scene Commander.

III. FBI and DOD Interrogation Policies

A. FBI Policies Prior to the September 11 Attacks

Most of the FBI's written policies regarding permissible

interrogation techniques for its agents and for its agents' conduct in

collaborative or foreign interviews were developed prior to the

September 11 attacks. When these policies were drafted, they reflected

v

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.17

the FBI's primary focus on domestic law enforcement, which emphasized

obtaining information for use in investigating and prosecuting crimes.

These policies are designed to ensure that witness statements met legal

and constitutional requirements of voluntariness so that they would be

admissible in U.S. courts. In addition, the FBI has consistently stated its

belief that the most effective way to obtain accurate information is to use

rapport-building techniques in interviews.

Conducting Interviews The FBI's Legal Handbook for Special

Agents states, among other things, that "[i]t is the policy of the FBI that

no attempt be made to obtain a statement by force, threats, or promises."

The FBI's Manual of Administrative and Operational Procedures (MAOP)

describes the importance of FBI agents not engaging in certain activities

when conducting investigative activities, including foreign

counterintelligence, and specifically states that "[n]o brutality, physical

violence, duress or intimidation of individuals by our employees will be

countenanced . . . ."

Joint Interviews Prior to the September 11 attacks, the FBI had

policies for working with other government agencies, both domestic and

foreign, in joint or cooperative investigations. However, the FBI's work

with the military in GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq raised new issues

regarding which agency's interrogation policies would apply and how the

FBI would work with personnel from other agencies who operated under

different interrogation rules. FBI agents told us that they have always

been trained to adhere to FBI protocols, not to other agencies' rules with

respect to interview policies or evidence collection.

However, the FBI's expanded mission after the September 11

attacks gave rise to circumstances in which (1) entities other than the

FBI were the lead agencies and had custody of the witnesses, (2)

prosecution of crimes was not necessarily the primary goal of the

interrogations, and (3) the evidentiary rules of U.S. Article III courts did

not necessarily apply. As a consequence and as detailed below, existing

FBI policies were not always sufficient to address these circumstances.

Reporting Misconduct FBI policies prior to the September 11

attacks required FBI agents to report to FBI Headquarters any incidents

of misconduct or improper performance by other FBI employees.

However, the duty of an FBI employee to report on the activities of non-

FBI government personnel was limited to criminal behavior by other

personnel. We did not find any FBI policy prior to May 2004 imposing an

obligation on FBI employees to report abuse or mistreatment of detainees

by non-FBI government employees falling short of a crime.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.18

B. DOD Interrogation Policies

In our report, we summarize the detainee interrogation policies

adopted by the DOD after the September 11 attacks for prisoners and

detainees. These policies were generally developed for use in war zones

rather than in the law-enforcement context. The range of permissible

DOD techniques was expanded after the September 11 attacks and was

modified over time. These military policies permitted techniques that

were inconsistent with the FBI's longstanding approach towards witness

interrogations.

Although DOD policies were not applicable to FBI agents, they

were relevant to our report for several reasons. First, as detailed below,

the tensions between DOD policies and the FBI's interview policies

created concerns for some FBI agents in the military zones which

sometimes led to conflicts between FBI and DOD employees.

Second, FBI agents in the military zones had a unique opportunity

to observe the conduct of other agencies' interrogators, including conduct

related to alleged detainee abuse in GTMO, Iraq, and other detention

facilities. A significant portion of our review involved the FBI's

observations regarding the treatment of detainees by military

interrogators. Because military interrogators were governed by the

DOD's interrogation policies, these policies are relevant to the OIG's

report.

Third, in May 2004 the FBI instructed its agents to report to their

superiors any incidents of known or suspected abuse or mistreatment of

detainees by other agencies' interrogators. Some FBI agents were told

that they should report any abusive interrogation technique that the

agent believed was outside the legal authority of the interrogator. This

instruction required FBI agents to have some familiarity with other

agencies' policies, which we briefly summarize below.

DOD Policies for GTMO When interrogations began at GTMO in

January 2002, military interrogators relied on Army Field Manual 34-52,

Intelligence Interrogation, for guidance as to permissible interrogation

techniques. In additional to conventional direct questioning techniques,

Field Manual 34-52 permitted military interrogators to utilize methods

that, depending on the manner of their use, might not be permitted

under FBI policies, such as "Fear Up (Harsh)," defined as exploiting a

detainee's pre-existing fears including behaving in an overpowering

manner with a loud and threatening voice. On December 2, 2002, the

Secretary of Defense approved additional techniques for use on detainees

at GTMO, including stress positions for a maximum of 4 hours, isolation,

deprivation of light and auditory stimuli, hooding, 20-hour

vii

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.19

interrogations, removal of clothing, and exploiting a detainee's individual

phobias (such as fear of dogs).

On January 15, 2003, the Secretary of Defense rescinded his

approval of these techniques. On April 16, 2003, the Secretary of

Defense promulgated revised guidance approving 24 techniques for use

at GTMO, most of which were taken from or closely resembled those in

Field Manual 34-52. The April 2003 GTMO Policy also approved the use

of dietary manipulation, environmental manipulation, sleep adjustment,

and isolation. This policy continued in effect for GTMO until September

2006 when the U.S. Army issued Field Manual 2-22.3, discussed below.

DOD Policies for Afghanistan Prior to 2003, the only official

guidance regarding military detainee interrogation techniques in effect in

Afghanistan was that contained in Field Manual 34-52. In early 2003,

the military followed a policy that permitted techniques similar to those

approved under the December 2002 GTMO Policy, including isolation,

sleep adjustment, hooding, stress positions, sensory deprivation, and

mild physical contact. In February 2003, after a military investigation

into two detainee deaths at the Bagram Collection Point in December

2002, the military revised its approved interrogation tactics and

prohibited handcuffing as a means to enforce sleep deprivation and

physical contact for interrogation purposes.

In March 2004 the military issued a new policy for Afghanistan

interrogations that was based on the prior Afghanistan policies and the

April 2003 GTMO Policy. This policy added dietary manipulation and

environmental manipulation to the list of approved techniques and

relaxed the prior prohibitions on using stress positions as an incentive

for cooperation. In June 2004, in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib

disclosures, the military in Afghanistan adopted the same policy that was

issued for Iraq on May 13, 2004 (discussed below).

DOD Policies for Iraq For the first few months of the war in Iraq,

military interrogators were governed by Field Manual 34-52. In

September 2003, the DOD adopted a policy describing 29 permissible

interrogation techniques. Most were adopted nearly verbatim from the

April 2003 GTMO Policy approved by the Secretary of Defense, but

additional approved techniques included muzzled military working dogs,

sleep management, yelling, loud music, light control, and stress

positions for up to 1 hour per use.

On October 12, 2003, the Commander in Iraq rescinded approval

for several of these techniques. On May 13, 2004, in the wake of the Abu

Ghraib abuse revelations, the military further revised its policies to

specify that "under no circumstances" would requests for certain

viii

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.20

techniques be approved, including "sleep management, stress positions,

change of scenery, diet manipulation, environment manipulation, or

sensory deprivation." In January 2005, the military adopted an

interrogation policy for Iraq that approved only those techniques listed in

Field Manual 34-52, with additional safeguards, prohibitions, and

clarifications, including explicit prohibitions against the removal of

clothing and the use or presence of military working dogs during

interrogations.

Field Manual 2-22.3 In September 2006, the U.S. Army issued

Field Manual 2-22.3 in fulfillment of a mandate of the Detainee

Treatment Act, enacted in December 2005, requiring a uniform standard

for treatment of detainees under DOD custody. Field Manual 2-22.3

reiterated and elaborated on many of the techniques listed in its

predecessor, Field Manual 34-52, but placed much greater emphasis on

rapport-based interrogation techniques similar to those endorsed by the

FBI. It also identified several prohibited actions, including nudity, sexual

acts or poses, beatings, waterboarding, use of military dogs, and

deprivation of food or water. Field Manual 2-22.3 also placed specific

controls on the use of the technique of isolating detainees from other

detainees. However, Field Manual 2-22.3 was not in effect during any

part of the period that was the focus of the OIG's review.

IV. The Interrogation of Zubaydah and the Development of Early

FBI Policies Regarding Detainee Interviews in the Military

Zones

In the spring of 2002, the FBI began addressing the need for

specific policies governing the conduct of its agents during detainee

interrogations overseas. This need came to light in connection with the

interrogation of Abu Zubaydah, a "high value detainee" then being held

by the CIA. Zubaydah had been severely wounded when he was

captured, and two FBI agents were assigned to assist the CIA in

obtaining intelligence from him while he was recovering from his injuries.

The FBI agents conducted the initial interviews of Zubaydah, assisting in

his care and developing rapport with him. However, when the CIA

interrogators arrived at the site they assumed control of the

interrogation. After observing the CIA use interrogation techniques that

undoubtedly would not be permitted under FBI interview policies, one of

the FBI agents expressed strong concerns about these techniques to

senior officials in the Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters.

This agent's reports led to discussions at FBI Headquarters and

with the DOJ and the CIA about the FBI's role in joint interrogations with

other agencies. Ultimately, these discussions resulted in a determination

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.21

by FBI Director Robert Mueller in approximately August 2002 that the

FBI would not participate in joint interrogations of detainees with other

agencies in which harsh or extreme techniques not allowed by the FBI

would be employed.

However, the issue arose again in late 2002 and early 2003 in

connection with the FBI's efforts to gain access to another high value

detainee held in a foreign location. FBI agents assisted another agency

in developing questions for this detainee during a period when he was

being subjected to interrogation techniques that FBI agents would not be

allowed to use in the United States.5

V. FBI Concerns about Military Interrogations at GTMO

Late in 2002, FBI agents assigned to GTMO also began raising

questions to FBI Headquarters regarding harsh interrogation techniques

being used by the military. These concerns were focused particularly on

the treatment of Muhammad Al-Qahtani, who had unsuccessfully

attempted to enter the United States in August 2001 shortly before the

September 11 attacks, allegedly for the purpose of being an additional

highjacker. After his capture and transfer to GTMO, Al-Qahtani resisted

initial FBI attempts to interview him. In September 2002, the military

assumed control over his interrogation, although behavioral specialists

from the FBI continued to observe and provide advice.

The FBI agents became concerned when the military announced a

plan to keep Al-Qahtani awake during continuous 20-hour interviews

every day for an indefinite period and when the FBI agents observed

military interrogators use increasingly harsh and demeaning techniques,

such as menacing Al-Qahtani with a snarling dog during his

interrogation.

The friction between FBI officials and the military over the

interrogation plans for Al-Qahtani increased during October and

November 2002. The FBI continued to advocate a long-term rapportbased

strategy, while the military insisted on a different, more aggressive

approach. Between late November 2002 and mid-January 2003, the

military used numerous aggressive techniques on Al-Qahtani, including

attaching a leash to him and making him perform dog tricks, placing him

5 The FBI agents' accounts of the techniques they witnessed during the

interrogations of Zubaydah and the other high value detainee are described in our

classified full report. Although the CIA has publicly acknowledged using waterboarding

with three detainees, none of the FBI agents we interviewed reported witnessing this

technique.

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.22

in stress positions, forcing him to be nude in front of a female, accusing

him of homosexuality, placing women's underwear on his head and over

his clothing, and instructing him to pray to an idol shrine. FBI and DOJ

officials did not learn about the techniques used between late November

2002 and mid-January 2003 until much later. However, in early

December 2002, an agent learned that Al-Qahtani was hospitalized

briefly for what the military told the FBI was low blood pressure and low

core body temperature.

As a result of the interrogations of Al-Qahtani and other detainees

at GTMO, several FBI agents raised concerns with the DOD and FBI

Headquarters about: (1) the legality and effectiveness of DOD

techniques; (2) the impact of these techniques on the future prosecution

of detainees in court or before military commissions; and (3) the potential

problems that public exposure of these techniques would create for the

FBI as an agency and FBI agents individually. Some of these concerns

were expressed to FBI Headquarters in e-mails from agents at GTMO.

The informal response that some of these agents received from FBI

Headquarters was that agents could continue to witness DOD

interrogations involving non-FBI authorized techniques so long as they

did not participate.

During this period, however, FBI agents continued to raise

objections directly with DOD officials at GTMO and to seek guidance

from senior officials in the FBI's Counterterrorism Division. No formal

responses were ever received by the agents who wrote these

communications.

We determined, however, that some of the FBI agents' concerns

regarding the DOD's interrogation approach at GTMO were

communicated by officials in the FBI's Counterterrorism Division to

senior officials in the Criminal Division of DOJ and ultimately to the

Attorney General. FBI Headquarters officials said they discussed the

issue in meetings with senior officials in the DOJ Criminal Division. Two

witnesses told us that they recalled conversations with Alice Fisher (at

the time the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division)

regarding the ineffectiveness of military interrogations at GTMO, but they

did not recall discussing specific techniques with Fisher. Fisher told us

that she could not recall discussing detainee treatment or particular

interrogation techniques with the FBI, but that she was aware that the

FBI did not consider DOD interrogations at GTMO to be effective.

Concerns about the efficacy of DOD interrogation techniques also

reached then Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.23

Michael Chertoff, Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson, and

Attorney General John Ashcroft.6 The senior-level witnesses we

interviewed generally said they recalled that the primary concern

expressed about the GTMO interrogations was that DOD techniques and

interrogators were ineffective at developing actionable intelligence. These

senior DOJ officials did not identify FBI agents' concerns about the

legality of the techniques or their impact on future prosecutions as a

focus of these discussions.

In addition, we were unable to determine definitively whether the

concerns of the FBI and DOJ about DOD interrogation techniques were

ever addressed by any of the federal government's inter-agency

structures created for resolving disputes about anti-terrorism issues.

These structures included the Policy Coordinating Committee, the

"Principals" Committee, and the "Deputies" Committee, all chaired by the

National Security Council (NSC).

Several senior DOJ Criminal Division officials told us that they

raised concerns about particular DOD detainee practices in 2003 with

the National Security Council, but they did not recall that any changes

were made at GTMO as a result. Several witnesses also told us that they

believed that Attorney General Ashcroft spoke with the NSC or the DOD

about these concerns, but we could not confirm this because former

Attorney General Ashcroft declined to be interviewed for this review.

We found no evidence that the FBI's concerns influenced DOD

interrogation policies. Ultimately, the DOD made the decisions regarding

what interrogation techniques would be used by military interrogators at

GTMO, because GTMO was a DOD facility and the FBI was there in a

support capacity. Similarly, the DOD controlled what techniques were

used in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a result, once it was clearly established

within each zone that military interrogators were permitted to use

interrogation techniques that were not available to FBI agents, the FBI

On-Scene Commanders said they often did not elevate additional reports

of harsh detainee interrogations to their superiors at FBI Headquarters.

Eventually, the DOD modified its own policies as a result of its

internal deliberations. As noted above, on January 15, 2003, Defense

Secretary Rumsfeld rescinded his prior authorization of some of the more

aggressive DOD interrogation techniques. In April 2003, Al-Qahtani

became cooperative with military interrogators. Based on the

information we obtained in the OIG survey and our follow-up interviews,

we believe that around this time the military also reduced the frequency

6 Former Attorney General Ashcroft declined to be interviewed for this review.

xii

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.24

and severity of its use of many of the techniques that concerned the FBI

agents deployed at GTMO.

FBI witnesses almost uniformly told us that they strongly favored

non-coercive rapport-based interview techniques to the harsher

techniques used on Al-Qahtani and others due to the FBI's extensive

history of success with such techniques in the law enforcement context.

However, we also learned about a proposal advanced by certain officials

from the FBI and DOJ in late 2002 to change the circumstances of Al-

Qahtani's interrogation. A draft letter prepared for the purpose of

presenting this proposal to the National Security Council indicated that

this proposal involved subjecting Al-Qahtani to interrogation techniques

of the sort that had previously been used by the CIA on Zubaydah and

another detainee. DOJ and FBI officials involved with this proposal

stated to us that the rationale for this proposal was to bring more

effective interrogation techniques to bear on Al-Qahtani than the

ineffective interrogation techniques that the military had been using on

him up to that time. The techniques that had been previously used by

the CIA on Zubaydah included methods that did not remotely resemble

the rapport-based techniques that are permitted under FBI policy.

However, the DOJ and FBI officials involved in the proposal stated to the

OIG that they did not learn what specific techniques had been used by

the CIA until much later, and that they based their recommendation on

the fact that the CIA had been effective at obtaining useful information

from Zubaydah. Senior officials in DOJ and the FBI such as FBI Director

Mueller, former Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, current Assistant

Attorney General Fisher, and others, told us the draft letter never

reached them, that they were not aware of a proposal to subject Al-

Qahtani to methods of the sort that had been used on Zubaydah, and did

not take part in any specific discussion of such a proposal.

We also determined that the DOD opposed the proposal for Al-

Qahtani, and the proposal was never adopted. Moreover, Al-Qahtani

began cooperating with military interrogators in April 2003, obviating the

underlying rationale for the proposal.

We concluded that the proposal to subject Al-Qahtani to the type

of techniques that the CIA had used on Zubaydah was inconsistent with

Director Mueller's directive that the FBI should not be involved with

interrogations in which non-FBI techniques would be utilized, and with

the frequently stated position of DOJ and FBI officials that the FBI's

rapport-based techniques were superior to other techniques. We were

also troubled that FBI and DOJ officials would suggest this proposal

without knowing what interrogation techniques the proposal entailed.

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.25

VI. The FBI's Response to the Disclosure of Detainee

Mistreatment at Abu Ghraib

In January 2004, senior managers in the FBI learned about

allegations of prisoner mistreatment at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

Managers in the FBI's Counterterrorism Division agreed with the

recommendation of the FBI's On-Scene Commander that the military

should conduct the investigation into the alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib

without the assistance of the FBI, because the matter was outside of the

FBI's mission and the FBI's participation might harm its relationship

with the military.

However, as described below, public disclosure of explicit

photographs and accounts of detainee mistreatment at the Abu Ghraib

prison in late April 2004 triggered a significant effort within the FBI to

assess the adequacy of its own policies regarding detainee treatment in

the military zones and to determine what, if anything, its agents knew

about detainee mistreatment at Abu Ghraib, GTMO, and Afghanistan.

A. The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy

Following the Abu Ghraib disclosures, the FBI quickly determined

that although existing FBI policies prohibited FBI agents from utilizing

coercive interview techniques, no policy had ever been issued to address

the question of what FBI agents should do if they saw non-FBI

interrogators using coercive or abusive techniques. On May 19, 2004,

the FBI General Counsel issued an official FBI policy regarding

"Treatment of Prisoners and Detainees."7 This policy included the

following instructions for FBI agents in dealing with detainees:

• Agents were reminded that existing FBI policy prohibited

agents from obtaining statements during interrogations by

the use of force, threats, physical abuse, threats of such

abuse, or severe physical conditions.

• Agents were told that FBI personnel may not participate in

any treatment or use any interrogation technique that is in

violation of these guidelines, regardless of whether the cointerrogator

is in compliance with his or her own guidelines.

If a co-interrogator is complying with the rules of his or her

agency, but is not in compliance with FBI rules, FBI

personnel may not participate in the interrogation and must

remove themselves from the situation.

7 We refer to the policy as the "FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy."

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.26

• Agents were told that if an FBI employee knows or suspects

non-FBI personnel has abused or is abusing or mistreating a

detainee, the FBI employee must report the incident to the

FBI On-Scene Commander, who shall report the situation to

the appropriate official at FBI Headquarters. FBI

Headquarters is responsible for further follow up with the

other party.

B. Concerns Expressed by FBI Agents in the Field

Shortly after the public disclosure of the Abu Ghraib abuses,

several FBI agents in the military zones expressed significant concerns

about how the military's use of certain interrogation techniques could

affect the FBI. For example, in May 2004 an FBI supervisor stationed in

Afghanistan sent a series of e-mails to senior Counterterrorism Division

officials in FBI Headquarters stating that although the military had

temporarily restricted the use of aggressive interrogation techniques

such as stress positions, dogs, and sleep deprivation, military

interrogators were likely to resume such methods soon. The FBI

supervisor stated that even if the FBI was not present during such

interrogations, FBI agents would inherently be participating in the

process because they would be interviewing detainees who had either

recently been subjected to such techniques by the military or who would

be subjected to them after the FBI interviews were completed. He

questioned whether it would be ethical for FBI agents to be involved in

such a process and whether they would be held culpable for detainee

abuse. He recommended that the FBI move quickly to issue definitive

guidance to its agents in Afghanistan. By this time, the FBI Office of

General Counsel was in the process of drafting the FBI's May 2004

Detainee Policy (described above).

However, almost immediately after the FBI's May 2004 Detainee

Policy was issued, several FBI employees raised additional questions and

concerns. In late May 2004, the FBI's On-Scene Commander in Iraq

transmitted an e-mail to senior managers in the FBI's Counterterrorism

Division stating that the instruction in the FBI's May 2004 Detainee

Policy that agents report any known or suspected abuse or mistreatment

did not draw an adequate line between conduct that is "abusive" and

techniques such as stress positions, sleep management, stripping, or

loud music that, while seemingly harsh, may have been permissible

under orders or policies applicable to non-FBI interrogators.

In late May 2004, the FBI General Counsel stated in an e-mail to

the FBI Director that agents who asked about the meaning of "abuse" in

the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy were being told that the intent of the

Policy was for agents to report conduct that they "know or suspect is

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.27

beyond the authorization of the person doing the harsh interrogation,"

and that there was no reason to report on "routine" harsh interrogation

techniques that the DOD had authorized its interrogators to use.

Consistent with this interpretation, senior FBI officials in the

Counterterrorism Division drafted a "clarification" of the May 2004

Detainee Policy instructing FBI agents to report any techniques that

exceed "lawfully authorized practices." This clarification was never

formally issued, although the interpretation contained in it was

communicated to some FBI agents in the military zones.

In addition, in response to concerns expressed by agents and

attorneys in the FBI after the May 2004 Policy was issued, the FBI

General Counsel directed lawyers in the Office of General Counsel to

prepare legal advice that addressed, among other things, how long FBI

agents needed to wait after another agency interrogated a detainee so as

not to be considered a participant in the harsh interrogation. Several

drafts of supplemental policy to address this issue were prepared by the

Office of General Counsel, but none was ever finalized. However, as

detailed in Section VII below, this issue was addressed in training

provided to agents prior to their deployment in the military zones.

C. OIG Assessment of FBI Policies

As described below, our report concluded that while the FBI

provided some guidance to its agents about conduct in the military

zones, FBI Headquarters did not fully or timely respond to repeated

requests from its agents in the military zones for additional guidance

regarding their participation in detainee interrogations.

FBI Interview Techniques Although FBI agents were aware that

FBI policies regarding interviews prohibited the use of threats or

coercion, we believe that the agents had several reasons to be uncertain

about whether the rules were different in the military zones. Following

the September 11 attacks, the FBI announced a change in priorities from

evidence collection for prosecution to intelligence collection for terrorism

prevention. In addition, conditions at detention facilities in the military

zones were vastly different from conditions in U.S. jails or prisons. We

believe that under these circumstances FBI agents in the military zones

could reasonably have concluded that traditional law enforcement

constraints on interview techniques were not strictly applicable in the

military zones, particularly with respect to "high value" detainees.

Ultimately, senior FBI management determined that pre-existing

FBI standards should remain in effect for all FBI interrogations in

military zones even where future prosecution was not contemplated.

However, we determined that this message did not reach all FBI agents

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.28

in the military zones. We also found that a few FBI interrogators used

interrogation strategies that might not be appropriate in the United

States, such as extreme isolation from other detainees or other strategies

to undermine detainee solidarity. We concluded that FBI management

should have realized sooner than May 2004 that it needed to issue

written guidance addressing the question of whether its pre-

September 11 policies and standards for custodial interviews should

continue to be strictly applied in the military zones.

Joint Interrogations The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy stated:

"If a co-interrogator is in compliance with the rules of his or her agency,

but is not in compliance with FBI rules, FBI personnel may not

participate in the interrogation and must remove themselves from the

situation." Yet, the question of whether the FBI should participate in,

assist, or observe interrogations conducted by others using non-FBI

techniques was raised to FBI Headquarters well before the Abu Ghraib

scandal broke, and we believe that the FBI should have clarified its

guidance before May 2004.

FBI Interrogations Following Other Agencies' Interrogations

The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy also does not address the issue of

whether FBI agents may interview a detainee who had previously been

subjected to non-FBI interrogation techniques by other agencies.

Although the problem was diminished somewhat when the military

promulgated a new, uniform interrogation policy in 2006 for all military

theaters that stresses non-coercive interrogation approaches (Field

Manual 2-22.3), we believe this has not fully eliminated the need for

clearer FBI guidance with regard to this question. The revised military

policy still permits DOD interrogators to use some techniques that FBI

agents probably cannot employ. Moreover, to the extent that the FBI is

involved with interrogating detainees who have been interrogated by the

CIA, the issue remains significant.

We therefore recommend in our report that the FBI consider

completing the project that its Office of General Counsel began shortly

after the issuance of its May 2004 Detainee Policy and address the issue

of when FBI agents may interview detainees previously interrogated by

other agencies using non-FBI techniques. We also recommend that the

FBI address the circumstances under which FBI agents may use

information obtained in interrogations by other agencies that employed

non-FBI techniques.

Reporting Prior to issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee

Policy, the FBI did not provide specific or consistent guidance to its

agents regarding when or how the conduct of other agencies toward

detainees should be reported. Some agents told us they were instructed

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.29

to report problematic interrogation techniques, but the definition of what

to report was left unclear. Leaving this matter to the discretion of

individual FBI agents put them in a difficult position because FBI agents

were trying to establish a cooperative working relationship with the DOD

while fulfilling their intelligence-gathering responsibilities. Under these

circumstances, FBI agents had reasons to avoid making reports

regarding potential mistreatment of detainees. In addition, the agents

lacked information regarding what techniques were permissible for non-

FBI interrogators. It was therefore not surprising that some agents who

later told us that they observed or heard about potentially coercive

interrogation techniques did not report such incidents to anyone at the

time.

It is important to note, however, that despite the absence of clear

guidance, several FBI agents brought concerns about other agencies'

interrogation techniques to the attention of their On-Scene Commanders

or senior officials at the FBI. We believe these agents should be

commended for their actions.

In addition, in light of the recurring instances beginning in 2002 in

which FBI agents in the military zones raised questions about the

appropriateness of other agencies' interrogation techniques, we believe

that FBI management should have recognized sooner the need for clearer

and more consistent standards and procedures for FBI agents to make

these reports. If this issue had been more fully addressed by FBI and

DOD Headquarters officials, it would have reduced friction between FBI

agents in the military zones and their military counterparts. Such an

approach should have clarified: (1) what DOD policies were, (2) how the

DOD was dealing with deviations from these policies, and (3) what FBI

agents should do in the event they observed such deviations.

The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, while providing some

guidance, did not fully resolve these issues. The Policy requires FBI

employees to report any instance when the employee "knows or suspects

non-FBI personnel has abused or is abusing or mistreating a detainee,"

but it contains no definition of abuse or mistreatment. According to an

e-mail from the FBI General Counsel to the Director dated May 28, 2004,

agents with questions about the definitions of abuse or mistreatment

were instructed to report conduct that they know or suspect is "beyond

the authorization of the person doing the harsh interrogation." Agents

told us, however, that they often did not know what techniques were

permitted under military policies.

Going forward, the military's adoption of a single interrogation

policy for all military zones (Field Manual 2-22.3) may reduce the

difficulties for FBI agents seeking to comply with the reporting

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.30

requirement in the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy. Nevertheless,

military interrogators are still permitted to use some techniques not

available to FBI agents, and it is therefore important for agents to receive

training on the approved military interrogation policies and for the FBI to

clarify what conduct should or should not be reported.

As a result, in our report we recommend that the FBI consider

supplementing its May 2004 Detainee Policy or expanding predeployment

training to clarify the circumstances under which FBI agents

should report potential mistreatment by other agencies' interrogators. If

the FBI requires its employees to report any conduct beyond the

interrogator's authority, then the FBI should provide guidance to its

agents on what interrogation techniques are permitted under military

policy. If the FBI requires agents to report "abuse or mistreatment," it

should define these terms and explain them with examples, either in the

policy itself or in agent training.

VII. FBI Training Regarding Detainee Treatment

We also examined the training that FBI agents received regarding

issues of detainee interrogation and detainee abuse or mistreatment in

connection with their deployments to the military zones during the

periods before and after issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy.

A large majority of agents who completed their deployments prior

to May 19, 2004, reported in the OIG survey that they did not receive any

training, instruction, or guidance concerning FBI or other agency

standards of conduct relating to detainees prior to or during their

deployment. Most of the FBI agents who reported receiving training

regarding detainee mistreatment issues said they received it orally from

their On-Scene Commander or other FBI agents after they arrived at the

military zone.

By January 2004, the FBI had implemented a 5-day predeployment

training program for agents detailed to Iraq. The agenda

provided to the OIG included approximately 1 hour of training regarding

"Interviewing Techniques," but it did not specifically identify any issues

relating to detainee mistreatment.

Almost all the FBI agents who received training during this period

told us that they were instructed to continue to adhere to the same FBI

standards of conduct that applied to custodial interviews in the United

States. Most agents told us they did not receive any specific information

regarding which interrogation techniques were permissible for military

interrogators. Several agents told us the FBI did not provide specific

training about how to conduct joint interviews with the DOD, including

xix

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.31

whether agents could observe or assist in interviews led by other

agencies who were using techniques not permitted in the FBI. Several

agents told us they were instructed to leave the interview if they saw

anything "extreme" or "inappropriate." A few FBI agents also said they

were told to report detainee mistreatment by other agencies, but they

received little guidance on what conduct was sufficiently improper to

trigger the reporting requirement.

We determined that in the months following the issuance of the

FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, the FBI's Military Liaison and Detainee

Unit (MLDU) substantially increased the scope of pre-deployment

training provided to FBI agents who were being sent to the military

zones, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. After May 2004, the FBI began

addressing the issue of detainee treatment in a more systematic way

than it had prior to the Abu Ghraib disclosures. Agents received a legal

briefing that included training regarding the contents of the May 2004

Detainee Policy. Agents were also told to "attenuate" their interviews of

potential criminal defendants in cases where the detainee had previously

been questioned by a foreign government or other intelligence community

agency so as to enhance the likelihood that any resulting statement

would be admissible in a judicial proceeding, such as by allowing a lapse

of time and choosing a different location for the FBI interview.

We found no indication that the FBI devised a comparable predeployment

program for agents assigned to GTMO. However, in August

2004 the FBI Office of General Counsel attorney stationed at GTMO

began giving training to FBI personnel deployed there, advising them to

rely on the guidance provided in the Legal Handbook for Special Agents.

He told the newly arrived FBI employees that if they saw anything

"untoward" beyond what the FBI was authorized to do or outside the

scope of the military's authority, the agent was to remove himself from

the room and report the incident to the Office of General Counsel

attorney or to the FBI's On-Scene Commander at GTMO. The Office of

General Counsel attorney told us that he and the On-Scene Commander

instructed the newly arrived employees on the scope of the military's

approved techniques.

Although the quantity and quality of FBI training clearly increased

after issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, numerous agents

told us in survey responses and interviews that it would have been useful

to them to receive a more detailed explanation of what constituted

"abuse" and what techniques were permissible to military or other

government agency interrogators under their agencies' policies.

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.32

VIII. FBI Observations Regarding Detainee Treatment at GTMO

In this section we summarize our report's findings regarding what

more than 450 FBI agents who served at GTMO told us they observed or

heard about regarding detainee interrogations, any reports by these

agents concerning detainee mistreatment, and what the FBI did with

such reports. These findings, as well as our corresponding findings

relating to Afghanistan and Iraq that are also summarized below, were

based on our survey of FBI employees and numerous follow-up

interviews.

Our survey sought information about whether FBI agents observed

or heard about approximately 40 separate aggressive interrogation

techniques, including such techniques as using water to create the sense

of drowning ("waterboarding"), using military dogs to frighten detainees,

and mistreating the Koran.

A majority of FBI employees who served at GTMO reported in

response to our survey that they never saw or heard about any of the

specific aggressive interrogation techniques listed in our survey.

However, over 200 FBI agents said they had observed or heard about

military interrogators using a variety of harsh interrogation techniques

on detainees. These techniques generally were not comparable to the

most egregious abuses that were observed at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

Moreover, it appears that some but not all of these harsh interrogation

techniques were authorized under military policies in effect at GTMO.

The most commonly reported technique used by non-FBI

interrogators on detainees at GTMO was sleep deprivation or disruption.

Over 70 FBI employees had information regarding this technique. "Sleep

adjustment" was explicitly approved for use by the military at GTMO

under the policy approved by the Secretary of Defense on April 16, 2003.

Numerous FBI agents told the OIG that they witnessed the military's use

of a regimen known as the "frequent flyer program" to disrupt detainees'

sleep in an effort to lessen their resistance to questioning and to

undermine cell block relationships among detainees. Only a few FBI

agents participated in this program by requesting military officials to

subject particular detainees to frequent cell relocations.

Other FBI agents described observing military interrogators use a

variety of techniques to keep detainees awake or otherwise wear down

their resistance. Many FBI agents told the OIG that they witnessed or

heard about the military's use of bright flashing strobe lights on

detainees, sometimes in conjunction with loud rock music. Other agents

described the use of extreme temperatures on detainees.

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.33

Prolonged short-shackling, in which a detainee's hands were

shackled close to his feet to prevent him from standing or sitting

comfortably, was another of the most frequently reported techniques

observed by FBI agents at GTMO. This technique was sometimes used in

conjunction with holding detainees in rooms where the temperature was

very cold or very hot in order to break the detainees' resolve. A DOD

investigation, discussed in the Church Report, classified the practice of

short-shackling prisoners as a "stress position." Stress positions were

prohibited at GTMO under DOD policy beginning in January 2003.

However, these FBI agents' observations confirm that prolonged shortshackling

continued at GTMO for at least a year after the revised DOD

policy took effect.

Many FBI agents reported the use of isolation at GTMO, sometimes

for periods of 30 days or more. In some cases, isolation was used to

prevent detainees from coordinating their responses to interrogators. It

was also used to deprive detainees of human contact as a means of

reducing their resistance to interrogation.

In addition, a few FBI agents reported other harsh or unusual

interrogation techniques used by the military at GTMO. These incidents

tended to be small in number, but they became notorious at GTMO

because of their nature. They included using a growling military dog to

intimidate a detainee during an interrogation; twisting a detainee's

thumbs back; using a female interrogator to touch or provoke a detainee

in a sexual manner; wrapping a detainee's head in duct tape; and

exposing a detainee to pornography.

We also examined how the reports from FBI agents regarding

detainee treatment at GTMO were handled by the FBI. In addition to the

reports relating to Al-Qahtani described above in Part V of this Executive

Summary, we found that early FBI concerns about detainee shortshackling

were raised with the military command at GTMO in June

2002. However, FBI agents continued to observe the use of shortshackling

as a military interrogation technique as late as February 2004.

Reports to FBI Headquarters about these techniques led to the

instructions that FBI agents should stand clear of non-FBI techniques.

As time passed, other reports from FBI agents to their On-Scene

Commanders regarding military conduct were not elevated within the FBI

chain of command because the On-Scene Commanders understood that

the conduct in question was permitted under DOD policy.

FBI agents also reported to us that detainees sometimes told FBI

agents they had previously been abused or mistreated. FBI practices in

dealing with such allegations varied over time. Some agents were told to

record such allegations for inclusion in a "war crimes" file; others were

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.34

told to include the allegations in their regular FD-302 interview

summaries. As noted above, other FBI agents told us they were

instructed not to record such allegations at all. No formal FBI procedure

for reporting incidents or allegations of mistreatment to the military was

established until after the Abu Ghraib prison abuses became public in

2004.

IX. FBI Observations Regarding Detainee Treatment in

Afghanistan

In this section we summarize our report's findings regarding what

more than 170 FBI agents who served in Afghanistan told us they

observed or heard about with respect to detainee interrogations, any

reports by these agents concerning detainee mistreatment, and what the

FBI did with such reports.

FBI employees in Afghanistan conducted detainee interviews at the

major military collection points in Bagram and Kandahar and at other

smaller facilities. A majority of FBI employees who served in Afghanistan

reported in response to our survey that they never saw or heard about

any of the specific aggressive interrogation techniques listed in our

survey. However, some FBI employees reported witnessing or hearing

about certain techniques.

Like at GTMO, the most frequently reported technique used by

military interrogators in Afghanistan was sleep deprivation or disruption.

According to the Church Report, sleep deprivation was a prohibited

technique under military policy, but sleep disruption (in which the

detainee was permitted to sleep a total of at least 4 hours per 24-hour

period) was permitted prior to June 2004. FBI agents observed sleep

deprivation or disruption at the major detainee facilities in both

Kandahar and Bagram. Many FBI agents also described the use of loud

music or bright or flashing lights to interfere with detainees' sleep.

FBI agents in Afghanistan also told us about observing the use of

shackles or other restraints in a harsh, painful, or prolonged manner in

Afghanistan. However, most of the agents stated that these restraints

were used primarily as a military security measure rather than an

interrogation technique. In addition, several agents told us that they

observed or heard about the use of stressful or painful positions by the

military in Afghanistan.

Several FBI agents also described the use of prolonged isolation by

the military in Afghanistan, but not as a punishment for a detainee's

refusal to cooperate with questioners. Instead, the agents described the

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.35

use of isolation to prevent the coordination of stories among detainees

and as punishment for disruptive behavior.

Several FBI employees told us they had heard about two detainee

deaths at the military facility in Bagram, but none of the FBI employees

said they had personal knowledge of these deaths. According to the

Church Report, two detainees died at the Bagram facility following

interrogations in which they were shackled in standing positions and

kicked and beaten by military interrogators and military police.8

We found few contemporaneous reports by FBI agents to their

supervisors in Afghanistan regarding concerns about the potential

mistreatment of detainees. In several cases the agents believed,

sometimes incorrectly, that the conduct they saw or heard about was

authorized for use by military interrogators and therefore did not need to

be reported. Moreover, the need for FBI agents to establish their role in

Afghanistan and their dependence on the military for their protection and

material support may have contributed to their reluctance to elevate

their concerns about the military's treatment of detainees. In addition,

several agents told the OIG that they were able to resolve concerns about

the mistreatment of individual detainees by speaking directly to military

supervisors in Afghanistan.

X. FBI Observations Regarding Detainee Treatment in Iraq

In this section we summarize our report's findings regarding what

more than 260 FBI agents who served in Iraq told us they observed or

heard about regarding detainee interrogations, any reports by these

agents concerning detainee mistreatment, and what the FBI did with

such reports.

We received varied reports from FBI agents who were detailed to

Iraq. For example, several FBI agents said they observed detainees

deprived of clothing. Other frequently reported techniques identified by

FBI agents as used by military personnel in Iraq included sleep

deprivation or interruption, loud music and bright lights, isolation of

detainees, and hooding or blindfolding during interrogations. FBI

employees also reported the use of stress positions, prolonged shackling,

and forced exercise in Iraq. In addition, several FBI agents told the OIG

8 The Army's Criminal Investigative Division recommended charges against 28

soldiers in connection with these deaths. At least 15 of these soldiers have been

prosecuted by the Army, and at least 6 have pleaded guilty or been convicted of assault

and other crimes. Several have been acquitted.

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.36

that they became aware of unregistered "ghost detainees" at Abu Ghraib

whose presence was not reflected in official DOD records.

Although several FBI agents had been deployed to the Abu Ghraib

prison in Iraq, they told us that they did not witness the extreme conduct

that occurred at that facility in late 2003 and that was publicly reported

in April 2004. The FBI agents explained that they typically worked

outside of the main prison building where the abuses occurred, and they

did not have access to the facility at night when much of the abuse took

place.

Few of the FBI agents who served in Iraq made contemporaneous

reports to anyone in the FBI or the military regarding mistreatment of

detainees in Iraq. Almost all of the FBI On-Scene Commanders who

served in Iraq in 2003 and 2004 told the OIG that they never received

any reports from FBI agents regarding detainee mistreatment. We

believe this occurred at least in part because there was no formal FBI

reporting requirement prior to May 19, 2004, and some agents assumed

that the conduct that they observed was permitted under military

interrogation policies in Iraq. As in the other military zones, FBI agents

in Iraq generally did not consider their role to include policing the

conduct of the military personnel with whom they were working. Some

agents also told us that they were able to get their concerns resolved by

taking them directly to military officials.

XI. Specific Allegations of Misconduct by FBI Agents

We also investigated several specific allegations that FBI agents

participated in abuse of detainees in connection with interrogations in

the military zones. Some of these allegations were referred to us by the

FBI, and others came to our attention during the course of our review.

In general, we did not find support for these allegations. We found

that the vast majority of FBI agents in the military zones understood that

existing FBI policies prohibiting coercive interrogation tactics continued

to apply in the military zones and that they should not engage in conduct

overseas that would not be permitted under FBI policy in the United

States. To the FBI's credit, as noted above, it decided in 2002 to

continue to apply FBI interrogation policies to the detainees in the

military zones. As a result, most FBI agents adhered to the FBI's

traditional rapport-based interview strategies in the military zones and

avoided participating in the aggressive or questionable interrogation

techniques that the military employed. We found no instances in which

an FBI agent participated in clear detainee abuse of the kind that some

military interrogators used at Abu Ghraib prison. For this, we credit the

xxv

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.37

good judgment of the agents deployed to the military zones as well as the

guidance that some FBI supervisors provided.

The following paragraphs discuss the most significant allegations

against FBI agents that we reviewed.

Begg We investigated allegations made against the FBI by

Moazzam Begg, a British national who was arrested in Pakistan in late

January 2002 and detained in Afghanistan and at GTMO until his

release in January 2005. Begg alleged that an FBI agent and a New York

Police Department (NYPD) officer working with the agent participated in

interrogations at Bagram Air Force Base during which Begg was

threatened with rendition to Egypt and implied threats were made

against Begg's family. Begg stated he was also subjected to a ploy to

make him believe his wife was being tortured in a nearby room in the

facility. Begg also alleged that on one occasion he was hooded and "hogtied"

by military personnel as punishment for failing to tell the

interrogators what they wanted to hear, struck or kicked in the back and

head, and left in this position overnight. He stated that the FBI agent

and the NYPD officer directed or were aware of this treatment. Begg also

alleged that the same FBI agent and NYPD officer later coerced him into

signing a written statement at GTMO by threats of imprisonment and

execution.

We did not find sufficient evidence to support Begg's allegations

with respect to the FBI agent. Specifically, Begg stated that the CIA and

the DOD were in charge of his interrogations in Afghanistan. Begg's own

version of events did not establish that an FBI employee participated in

threatening Begg with rendition, threatening his family, or staging a

harsh interrogation of a female. There was also no evidence that the FBI

participated in, observed, or knew about the alleged "hog-tying" incident.

Saleh We investigated allegations that the FBI participated in

abusive interrogations of detainee Saleh Mukleif Saleh in Iraq in early

2004. Saleh claimed that interrogators tortured him, cuffed him in a

"scorpion" position, punched him, forced him to drink water until he

vomited, dragged him across barbed wire, and subjected him to loud

music. We did not find evidence of FBI involvement in most of these

activities. However, we found that four FBI agents were present during

an interview of Saleh and another detainee in March 2004 in which a

DOD interrogator poured water down the detainees' throat while the

detainees were in a cuffed, kneeling position, and in a rough manner that

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.38

would be considered coercive and would not be permissible conduct for

FBI agents conducting interviews in the United States.9

The FBI agents did not join actively in this conduct. In addition,

the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy requiring agents to remove

themselves from such situations and report them to their superiors had

not yet been issued. However, the FBI was the lead agency during this

interrogation and we believe that agents could have influenced the

techniques used by other interrogators during this interview, or at least

reported this incident to their On-Scene Commander. We also found

that the FBI participated in using duct tape to blindfold one of the

detainees in a potentially painful matter, but we were unable to

determine which FBI agent participated in this activity.

Slahi We investigated several allegations by detainee Mohammed

Ould Slahi relating to FBI agents at GTMO. Slahi alleged that an FBI

agent was involved in subjecting him to a harrowing boat ride as a ruse

for making him believe he was being transferred to a different location,

that another FBI agent implied that Slahi would be tortured by the

military if Slahi did not cooperate with the FBI, that another FBI agent

said Slahi would be sent to Iraq or Afghanistan if the charges against

him were proved, and that an interrogator told Slahi he would be sent to

a "very bad place" if Slahi did not provide certain information.

However, we determined that the FBI was not involved in the boat

ride ruse that the military used with Slahi. We concluded that an Army

Sergeant impersonated an FBI agent, without the consent of the FBI, in

connection with this incident.

We also concluded that although an FBI agent who was leaving

GTMO may have told Slahi that the military would treat him differently

than the FBI, he did not intend to threaten Slahi. The military

implemented a plan to use much harsher techniques on Slahi, but this

plan was not agreed to or condoned by the FBI. We also found

insufficient evidence to conclude that another FBI agent threatened Slahi

by telling him he would be transferred to Iraq or Afghanistan if convicted.

Al-Sharabi We investigated several allegations relating to FBI

agents who were involved in questioning GTMO detainee Zuhail Abdo Al-

Sharabi. We found that the military kept Al-Sharabi in an isolation cell

for at least 2 months in 2003 in order to break his resistance to

cooperating with interrogators. FBI agents participated in this tactic by

9 This activity was not equivalent to "waterboarding" as that technique has been

described in media reports.

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.39

repeatedly telling Al-Sharabi that he would only be removed from

isolation if he began to provide information. The FBI agents also

suggested to Al-Sharabi that he could win his freedom by speaking

openly. We found that although these tactics were fairly widespread at

GTMO, and several agents told us they understood that the FBI could

use these tactics at GTMO, these tactics would not be permissible for FBI

agents to use in the United States.

As discussed previously, the FBI policy reiterating that existing FBI

policies applied in the military zones was not issued until May 19, 2004.

We believe that the Al-Sharabi matter illustrated the inadequacy and

lack of clarity in the guidance provided to FBI agents regarding

permissible interrogation techniques in the military zones.

Al Qarani We investigated allegations regarding the FBI's

treatment of detainee Yousef Abkir Salih Al Qarani at GTMO. We

determined that in September 2003 FBI agents participated in a joint

interview with the military in which a military interrogator directed that

Al Qarani be short-chained to the floor. This technique would not be

permissible to FBI agents under existing interview policies. Al Qarani

was left alone in this position for several hours, during which time he

urinated on himself. There was no evidence that the FBI agents knew in

advance that the military interrogator would put Al Qarani in this

position. We found this incident to be a further illustration of the

inadequacy of FBI guidance. At the time, FBI policy was not clear about

what an FBI agent should do if another agency's interrogator utilized

such a technique.

We also found that at least one FBI agent participated in

subjecting Al Qarani to a program of disorientation and sleep disruption,

and that the On-Scene Commander at GTMO was aware that other FBI

agents participated in this technique.

Al Qarani told the OIG that he was abused by two FBI agents. We

investigated Al Qarani's allegations and found that the evidence did not

support the conclusion that the allegations related to any FBI employees.

Al Harbi We investigated an allegation in a written FBI interview

summary that detainee Muhammad A. A. Al Harbi claimed he was

beaten by unidentified FBI agents in Afghanistan. However, during his

interview with the OIG, Al Harbi told us that he had no complaints about

his treatment by the FBI and that he believed that the individuals who

struck him in Afghanistan were from another agency.

Zubaydah We investigated an allegation that an FBI agent who

was assigned to assist in the CIA's interrogation of Zubaydah at a secret

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.40

location participated in the use of "brutal" interrogation techniques.'°

The FBI agent was present when the CIA used techniques on Zubaydah

that clearly and obviously would not be available to FBI agents for use in

the United States. However, these interrogations took place in early

2002, before the FBI had determined whether its traditional policies

regarding interviews would apply to overseas interrogations of terrorism

suspects. The agent described these interrogations to his superiors at

the FBI. At the time of the interrogation, the FBI agent was told that the

other agency was in charge of the interrogation and that normal FBI

procedures should not be followed. The FBI's formal policy addressing

participation in joint interrogations with other agencies in overseas

locations was not issued until 2 years later, in May 2004.

We also examined the FBI's internal investigation regarding an

allegation that the same FBI agent disclosed classified information about

this interrogation and other subjects to persons not authorized to receive

such information. The FBI agent's ex-fiancé and a friend of hers alleged

that the agent told them numerous specific details about his

participation in the interrogation of a terrorism subject at an overseas

location. The FBI's Inspection Division investigated the matter, and the

FBI's Office of Professional Responsibility concluded that it was unable to

determine whether information alleged to have been improperly disclosed

was in fact classified or sensitive because of the vague descriptions

provided by the ex-fiancé and her friend.

However, we found that the information the ex-fiancé attributed to

the FBI agent was detailed, specific, and accurate, and appeared to

contain classified information about the Zubaydah interrogation.

Further, we found no indication that the FBI made any attempt to

determine whether the ex-fiancé's detailed account of the FBI agent's

activities was accurate and if so whether the information was classified

or sensitive. Consequently, we believe that the FBI's investigation of this

allegation was deficient.

Facility in or near Baghdad We addressed allegations relating to

FBI conduct during the spring and summer of 2004 at a DOD facility in

or near Baghdad. An FBI agent serving in his capacity as an active duty

officer in the U.S. Army was the officer in charge of the facility. Several

other FBI agents were detailed to the facility to serve as interrogators

during this period. The allegations included claims that detainees were

kept in inhumane conditions at the facility, were denied showers and

medical attention, were deprived of food and water, and were subjected

10 As noted above in footnote 4, because the CIA objected to our access to

Zubaydah we were unable to fully investigate these allegations.

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.41

to harsh interrogation techniques such as nudity and dripping cold

water, prolonged in-cell restraints, and threats.

In evaluating the conduct of the officer in charge, we recognized

that the officer was acting in his capacity as a military commander while

he was stationed at the detention facility, not as an FBI employee. In

this capacity, he was expected to comply with military regulations

relating to the treatment of detainees, not FBI policies. The other FBI

agents deployed to the facility were not military, however, and were

subject to FBI rules.

We found that conditions inside the cells in the facility were

primitive and likely extremely hot and uncomfortable during the

summer. However, we did not find that the officer in charge of the

facility was responsible for these conditions, which existed before he

arrived, or that he could control them. We also found insufficient

evidence to conclude that the officer was responsible for any

inadequacies in medical treatment at the facility.

We found evidence that the military used the following

interrogation techniques at the facility, which may have been prohibited

under military policies in effect at the time:

• Depriving detainees of food and water for the first 24 hours

after their arrival

• Sleep deprivation

• ."Harsh up" interrogation techniques such as nudity, stress

positions, dripping cold water on the detainee, and forced

exercise

• A categorization system in which detainees who did not

cooperate with interrogators were kept with hands cuffed

behind their backs while in their cells, while more

cooperative detainees were not restrained in the cells

• Use of blindfolds or blacked-in goggles during interrogations

• Threatening detainees with the arrest and prosecution of

family members

We recommend that the military make its own findings regarding

whether these practices at the facility violated military policies, and

whether the officer in charge was responsible for any violation.

We did not find evidence to substantiate that the other FBI agents

who served as interrogators at the facility from May to June 2004

engaged in most of the conduct described above, such as deprivation of

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.42

food and sleep and inhumane treatment. However, two FBI agents

knowingly participated in the categorization system for restraining

detainees in the cells who were not cooperative during interrogations.

We believe that this activity probably would not have been permitted in

the United States under FBI policies. The FBI's May 2004 Detainee

Policy, which reiterated the applicability of existing FBI interrogation

policies in the military zones, was issued near or during the time that

this conduct took place. We also believe that these incidents

demonstrate that the applicability of existing FBI policies in the military

zones was not made clear to all FBI agents prior to the issuance of the

May 2004 Detainee Policy.

XII. Conclusion

The FBI deployed agents to military zones after the September 11

attacks in large part because of its expertise in conducting custodial

interviews and in furtherance of its expanded counterterrorism mission.

The FBI has had a long history of success in custodial interrogations

using non-coercive, rapport-based interview techniques developed for the

law enforcement context. Some FBI agents deployed to GTMO

experienced disputes with the DOD, which used more aggressive

interrogation techniques. These disputes placed some FBI agents in

difficult situations at GTMO and in the military zones. However, apart

from raising concerns with their immediate supervisors or military

officials, the FBI had little leverage to change DOD policy.

Our review found that the vast majority of the FBI agents deployed

in the military zones dealt with these issues by separating themselves

from other interrogators who used non-FBI techniques and by continuing

to adhere to FBI policies. In only a few instances did FBI agents use or

participate in interrogations using techniques that would not be

permitted under FBI policy in the United States.

The FBI decided in the summer of 2002 that it would not

participate in joint interrogations of detainees with other agencies in

which techniques not allowed by the FBI were used. However, the FBI

did not issue formal written guidance about detainee treatment to its

agents until May 2004, shortly after the Abu Ghraib abuses became

public. We believe that the FBI should have recognized earlier the issues

raised by the FBI's participating with the military in detainee

interrogations in the military zones and should have moved more quickly

to provide clearer guidance to its agents on these issues.

In sum, we believe that while the FBI could have provided clearer

guidance earlier, and while the FBI could have pressed harder for

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.43

resolution of concerns about detainee interrogations by other agencies,

the FBI should be credited for its conduct and professionalism in

detainee interrogations in the military zones in Guantanamo Bay,

Afghanistan, and Iraq and in generally avoiding participation in detainee

abuse.

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.44

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

I. Introduction

On April 28, 2004, the television news program 60 Minutes II

broadcast photographs of detainee abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

In the days and weeks that followed, many more details of detainee abuses

at the prison were made public. Published photographs included images of

soldiers taunting naked Iraqi prisoners in humiliating poses, a hooded

detainee mounted on a box and attached to electrical wires, and military

dogs threatening or attacking Iraq prisoners. In addition, excerpts from a

secret U.S. Army Report were published, which detailed some of the abuse

as follows:

Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric acid on

detainees; beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair;

threatening male detainees with rape; allowing a military police

guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was injured after

being slammed against the wall in his cell; sodomizing a

detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick; using

military working dogs to frighten and intimidate detainees with

threats of attack; and in one instance actually biting a

detainee.11

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents had been deployed in Iraq

during October through December 2003, the period when many of these

abuses occurred. Some FBI agents spent time at the Abu Ghraib prison

during this time period. Within days of the Abu Ghraib disclosures

becoming public, the FBI began an internal inquiry to determine whether

any of its agents had "first hand knowledge of any abuses" at Abu Ghraib

and if so, how the FBI had responded. Within a short time the FBI also

initiated internal inquiries into whether agents had observed aggressive

treatment of detainees at the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

(GTMO) and in Afghanistan.

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (OIG)

became aware of these FBI investigations, and the OIG made a document

request to the FBI for the purpose of determining whether the OIG should

11 "Torture at Abu Ghraib," The New Yorker, May 10, 2004, quoting from Article 15-

6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade ("Taguba Report") at 17.

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.45

initiate an independent review of FBI activities in the military zones. The

FBI provided approximately 2,500 pages of documents in response to this

request. In addition, the FBI released a large quantity of documents relating

to detainee issues to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) pursuant to

a request under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Many of the

documents released to the ACLU were heavily redacted; unredacted versions

were supplied to the OIG. Taken together, the documents made available to

the OIG revealed that FBI agents deployed to GTMO had raised concerns to

their superiors about the military's interrogation practices as early as

October 2002.

The OIG decided to initiate a review relating to the conduct and

observations of FBI agents in the military zones with respect to the

treatment of detainees. Subsequent to the initiation of this review, the OIG

received several communications from members of Congress seeking

information about the OIG's investigation and urging the OIG to address

various issues and documents relating to the FBI's role in detainee matters.

II. The OIG Investigation

The focus of the OIG investigation was whether FBI agents witnessed

incidents of detainee abuse in the military zones, whether FBI employees

reported any such abuse to their superiors or others, and how those reports

were handled by the FBI. We also examined the development and adequacy

of the policies, guidance, and training that the FBI provided to the agents

that it deployed to the military zones. In addition, the OIG examined

whether FBI employees participated in any incident of detainee abuse. The

FBI referred several specific allegations of wrongdoing by FBI agents for

investigation by the OIG. In other cases, the OIG initiated an investigation

of particular FBI employees on the basis of information that the OIG

developed during the course of our review.

The OIG team investigating these issues included OIG attorneys,

special agents, and a paralegal specialist. The OIG developed and

distributed a detailed survey to over 1,000 FBI employees who had deployed

overseas to one of the military zones. Among other things, the OIG survey

sought information regarding observations or knowledge of specifically listed

interview or interrogation techniques and other types of detainee treatment,

and whether the FBI employees reported such incidents to their FBI

supervisors or others.

The OIG team also interviewed over 230 witnesses. We selected many

of these witnesses on the basis of survey responses indicating that the

respondent had information relevant to our review. Other witnesses were

selected on the basis of their positions or responsibilities within the FBI.

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We reviewed over 500,000 pages of documents provided by the FBI, other

components of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Department of

Defense (DOD). We made two trips to GTMO to tour the detention facilities,

review documents, and interview witnesses, including five detainees. We

also interviewed one released detainee by telephone.

Our review focused on the activities and observations of FBI agents

de lo ed to facilities under the control of the DOD.

With limited

exceptions, we did not investigate the conduct or observations of FBI agents

regarding detainees held at CIA facilities. We were unable, with limited

exceptions, to obtain highly classified information about these facilities,

what occurred there, and what legal authorities governed their operations.

Second, during the course of our review we learned that in January 2003

the CIA Inspector General initiated a special review of the CIA terrorist

detention and interrogation program. We understand that the CIA Inspector

General is currently conducting additional investigations relating to CIA

detention and interrogation of detainees. Therefore, our review focused

mainly on the conduct and observations of the approximately 1,000 FBI

employees related to detainee interviews in military facilities.12

III. Prior Reports Regarding Detainee Mistreatment

Several prior reports have addressed the issue of detainee treatment

in the military zones. Among the most significant of these are the following:

Taguba Report. In response to reports of detainee abuse at Abu

Ghraib prison, in January 2004 the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Central

Command directed an investigation into the 800th Military Police (MP)

Brigade detention and internment operations from November 2003 to

present. The report of this investigation (Article 15-6 Investigation of the

800th Military Police Brigade, also known as the "Taguba Report") was

completed in March 2004; as noted above, it found intentional abuse of

detainees by military police personnel. The forms of abuse included

punching and kicking detainees, photographing naked detainees in sexually

explicit and humiliating circumstances, and using unmuzzled military dogs

to intimidate detainees.

12 We did review the activities and observations of the FBI in connection with the

interrogation of Zubaydah and a few other detainees at CIA facilities overseas. As detailed

in Chapter Four, these activities and the FBI's reaction to them were important influence

on the development of FBI policies with respect to subsequent detainee interviews. The

conduct of one of the agents in connection with Zubaydah was also the subject of

allegations of agent misconduct that we address in Chapter Eleven.

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Fay and Jones Reports. Following the completion of the Taguba

Report, the Combined Joint Task Force Commander ordered an

investigation into the conduct of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at

Abu Ghraib. Two reports were issued as a result of this request: the "Fay

Report" and the "Jones Report." These two reports found numerous

instances in which detainee abuse was "requested, encouraged, condoned,

or solicited" by military intelligence personnel and that in some cases,

military intelligence personnel were directly involved. The reports identified

the primary cause of the abuse as "misconduct (ranging from inhumane to

sadistic) by a small group of morally corrupt soldiers and civilians." The

reports also identified systemic failures that contributed to the abuse, such

as inadequate interrogation policies and training, the intense pressure to

produce actionable intelligence, lack of clear lines of responsibility between

Military Intelligence and Military Police personnel, and inadequate

leadership oversight. The Fay Report and Jones Report also identified

interactions with non-DOD agencies (the CIA) that were perceived to operate

under different rules as a contributing factor that led to abuse.

Schlesinger Report. In May 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald

Rumsfeld chartered an independent panel chaired by James R. Schlesinger

to review ongoing or completed DOD investigations on detention operations

and to identify the causes and contributing factors to problems in detainee

operations. The Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review Detention

Operations (the "Schlesinger Report") was issued in August 2004. It

identified 66 confirmed incidents of detainee abuse in GTMO, Afghanistan,

and Iraq including five deaths. With respect to the Abu Ghraib prison,

which was the location of the vast majority of confirmed abuses, the

Schlesinger Report found that contributing causes included deficient and

frequently changing interrogation policies and inadequate resources,

training, leadership, and oversight.

Church Report. On May 25, 2004, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld

directed the Naval Inspector General to conduct a comprehensive review of

DOD interrogation operations. The resulting report (the "Church Report")

was submitted on March 7, 2005. The Church Report detailed the history of

DOD interrogation policies issued in each of the military zones. It reviewed

the interrogation techniques employed by military interrogators in GTMO,

Afghanistan, and Iraq. The Church Report was complimentary of military

operations at GTMO, but it found that dissemination of interrogation

policies in Afghanistan and Iraq was generally poor, and that unit-level

compliance with the policy was poor in Iraq even when the policies were

known. The Church Report found no evidence that the environment at Abu

Ghraib in the fall of 2003 related to detainee mistreatment was repeated

elsewhere. The Church Report found 71 instances of substantiated detainee

abuse, including 6 detainee deaths. The Church Report determined that

DOD interrogation policies did not cause detainee abuse. Instead, the

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Church investigators attributed instances of detainee abuse to episodic

breakdowns in discipline and oversight, particularly at the point of capture

in Afghanistan or Iraq.

Schmidt-Furlow Report. Following the FBI's release of documents to

the ACLU in December 2004, the U.S. Army Southern Command ordered an

investigation into several allegations about the conduct of military

interrogators contained in FBI communications released to the public. The

investigation was led by Lieutenant General Randall M. Schmidt and

Brigadier General John T. Furlow. The results of this investigation are set

forth in the AR-15-6 Report FBI Allegations of Abuse (9 June 2005) (the

"Schmidt-Furlow Report"). This report found that out of the 24,000

interrogations conducted at GTMO, there were a total of 3 violations of DOD

interrogation policies: (1) detainees were "short-shackled" to the eye-bolt in

the floor of an interrogation room; (2) duct tape was used to "quiet" a

detainee; and (3) military interrogators improperly threatened a detainee

and his family. The investigators also found that the interrogation of one

high value detainee resulted in degrading and abusive treatment, but did

not rise to the level of inhumane treatment.

IV. Methodology of OIG Review of Knowledge of FBI Agents

Regarding Detainee Treatment

In this section we describe the methodology of the OIG's investigation

relating to what FBI employees deployed to Afghanistan, GTMO, and Iraq

saw or heard about the treatment of detainees in those military zones. FBI

employees were deployed in significant numbers to assist with interviewing

detainees at many of the locations where abuses allegedly occurred.

Although the FBI generally had limited authority to control the conditions of

detainees in the military zones, FBI employees deployed to these locations

participated in interviewing detainees and were also potential witnesses to

incidents of detainee abuse.

The focus of this part of the OIG's review was to obtain information

from FBI employees who were detailed to the military zones during the

period our survey covered (from late 2001 until December 2004) regarding

the treatment of detainees in those zones. Our review relied primarily on

the results of a comprehensive survey sent to more than 1,000 FBI

employees in June 2005, and our follow-up interviews of FBI employees.

A. The OIG June 2005 Survey

On June 2, 2005, the OIG distributed a detailed survey to FBI

personnel who had deployed overseas. This survey was distributed to a

total of 1,031 FBI personnel who had been deployed at some time to one or

more of the military zones. The distribution list was compiled from FBI

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records and responses to an internal FBI e-mail instructing all employees

who were deployed to the military zones to identify themselves. The OIG

received a total of 913 responses, for a response rate of approximately 90

percent.13

The survey consisted of 76 questions, some with subparts, and some

with additional questions which were asked depending on the agent's

response. A copy of the survey is provided as Appendix A to this report.

The survey was divided into six parts: (1) basic contact information and

basic information concerning where and when the respondents were

deployed; (2) the nature and extent of training for agents prior to and during

their deployments; (3) respondent observations or knowledge of specific

interview or interrogation techniques and other types of detainee treatment;

(4) knowledge of incidents involving impersonation of FBI agents, sham

interviews, or denial of access to detainees; (5) information concerning

whether agents reported interview or interrogation techniques and other

types of detainee treatment, and any actions taken in response to such

reports; and (6) the extent and nature of any post-deployment FBI

debriefings.

The 37 questions we asked about particular interview or interrogation

techniques and other types of detainee treatment (Questions 27 through 63)

were based upon information indicating that such forms of coercive or

otherwise questionable treatment of detainees had occurred in one or more

of the overseas locations to which FBI personnel had been deployed. The

sources of such information included documents produced to us by the FBI,

interviews conducted prior to the survey, reports of military and other

investigations, and press reports. For each form of conduct, we asked

respondents to state whether they personally observed the conduct or

observed detainees in a condition that led them to believe the conduct had

occurred, whether detainees told them that this conduct had occurred,

whether others who observed the conduct described it to them, whether

they otherwise obtained information about such conduct other than from

media accounts, or if they never observed such conduct or heard about it

from someone who did. We also asked respondents to indicate whether they

had relevant information as to each form of conduct that was classified

above "Secret." Finally, we included several questions soliciting information

13 We did not or could not obtain responses from 118 individuals who were

originally identified as survey recipients for a variety of reasons. These recipients fell

primarily into the following categories: (1) agents who were posted to overseas locations

without the necessary software to complete the survey; (2) persons who had been identified

erroneously as FBI personnel but who were not; (3) persons who had been erroneously

identified as having served in the military zones when they never did; and (4) persons who

were no longer FBI employees by the time of the survey.

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concerning other interrogation practices about which the respondents had

knowledge, but which were not specified in our other questions.14

B. OIG Selection of FBI Personnel for Interviews

Using the survey responses as a screening tool, we interviewed

selected respondents who indicated they had information pertaining to

several interrogation techniques, or pertaining to the most serious forms of

alleged abuse. We also attempted to interview all of the On-Scene

Commanders (OSC) and Deputy OSCs who served in each military zone

because these agents had supervisory responsibility for FBI personnel and

were positioned to observe or receive reports regarding detainee

mistreatment.15 We interviewed almost all of the former OSCs and all of the

6 Deputy OSCs who served in Afghanistan between late December 2001 and

the end of 2004. We also interviewed all eight of the FBI OSCs in Iraq and

five of the seven Deputy OSCs who served during that period. We

interviewed 15 of the 16 OSCs who served in GTMO. (There were no Deputy

OSCs in GTMO.) We also interviewed several employees who did not

respond to the survey but who we otherwise determined had significant

relevant information.

Because OIG resources did not enable us to interview all of the FBI

personnel who served in the military zones, we generally did not interview

survey respondents who only described conduct clearly justified by concerns

for safety and security of U.S. personnel, or by the need for proper prison

order and discipline. We often chose not to interview those who said that

they had merely heard about conduct observed by others. We also excluded

some respondents who indicated in their survey responses that they had

information only about techniques such as sleep disruption, about which

we had substantial other information from other respondents and

witnesses. Finally, we excluded those respondents who provided

information that we concluded was in fact not within the scope of the

question or our investigation.

C. OIG Treatment of Military Conduct

We report the results of our investigation regarding what the FBI

agents observed in the military zones in Chapters Eight through Ten. Some

of the interrogation techniques reported by FBI agents in the military zones

are addressed in policies applicable to military interrogators. The question

14 The FBI Inspection Division provided valuable assistance to the OIG in

identifying appropriate respondents and designing and administering the questionnaire.

15 As detailed in Chapter Six, the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy required agents

serving in military zones to report known or suspected abuse of detainees to their OSCs.

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of whether military interrogators violated their own agencies' policies is

outside the jurisdiction and expertise of the DOJ OIG. Moreover, we did not

attempt to determine whether military witnesses would dispute the accuracy

of reports made to the OIG by FBI employees. An investigation of this scope

would have been beyond our jurisdiction and our available resources.

However, in this report, we identify potentially applicable DOD

policies in each discussion of a particular technique reported by FBI agents

based on the description of those policies supplied in the Church Report or

the Schmidt-Furlow Report. For comparative purposes, we also indicate

whether prior investigations found instances of conduct similar to that

reported by the FBI agents.

V. Organization of the OIG Report

This OIG report is organized into 12 chapters. Chapter One contains

this Introduction. Chapter Two provides background information relevant

to the issues addressed later in this report. It describes how the FBI

became involved in the military zones as a result of its changing emphasis

on preventing terrorism in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks.

Chapter Two also describes the organizational structure of FBI

Headquarters with respect to international terrorism and detainee

operations. It also discusses other DOJ entities involved in overseas

detainee issues, as well as inter-agency entities and agreements relevant to

this OIG investigation. In the last part of Chapter Two, we discuss each of

the three zones (GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq), including a brief review of

military detainee operations, a discussion of the FBI's missions and

deployments within the zone, a discussion of the FBI's organizational

structure as it related to the zone, and a detailed description of FBI

interview activities in cooperation with the military within the zone.

Chapter Three provides background information regarding the preexisting

interrogation policies of the FBI prior to the September 11 attacks.

These policies, which prohibit the use of coercive interrogation techniques,

are based on constitutional considerations regarding the voluntariness of

custodial confessions and the FBI's position, from years of law enforcement

experience, that rapport-based interview techniques are the most effective

and yield the most reliable information. In Chapter Three, we also address

the various interrogation policies that the DOD adopted for use in the

military zones, and we explain reasons for the dramatic differences between

the FBI's interrogation policies and those issued by the military for use in

military zones overseas.

Chapter Four examines the FBI's initial deliberations regarding how

its agents should conduct themselves in the context of the FBI's new

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terrorism prevention function overseas, and its unfamiliar role of being

subordinate to other agencies that controlled most detainees in the military

zones. These deliberations began in 2002 when the FBI sought to assist in

the interrogation of certain high value detainees in the custody of other

agencies. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III decided that the FBI would not

participate in interrogations involving aggressive techniques that were

approved for other agencies in the military zones.

Chapter Five examines the dispute between the FBI and the DOD

relating to Muhammad Al-Qahtani, a detainee held at GTMO who is widely

believed to have been an additional hijacker in the September 11 conspiracy

but who was prevented from entering the United States by immigration

officials at the airport in Orlando, Florida. We examine the treatment of this

detainee in detail because his interrogation became a focal point for tension

between the divergent interrogation models followed by the FBI and the

military. The dispute regarding the interrogation strategy for Al-Qahtani,

which was elevated to senior officials in the FBI and DOJ, was ultimately

resolved in favor of DOD's interrogation approach.

In Chapter Six, we examine the FBI's response to the Abu Ghraib

disclosures in the spring of 2004. We discuss the development of the FBI's

formal written policy addressing agent conduct with respect to detainees in

GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq: an Electronic Communication (EC) issued by

the FBI Office of General Counsel on May 19, 2004 (the "FBI's May 2004

Detainee Policy"). Chapter Six also examines how the FBI addressed the

concerns raised by agents in the field after the policy was promulgated.

These concerns related to whether the FBI agents would be deemed to have

"participated" in coercive interrogation techniques used by other agencies by

their presence alone, and the circumstances under which FBI agents would

be required to report interrogation tactics used by other agencies. We also

describe the internal investigations that the FBI conducted following the

Abu Ghraib disclosures.

In Chapter Seven we examine the communication of FBI policies to

agents who were deployed to the military zones. First, we describe the FBI's

early efforts to provide training or guidance to its agents regarding how they

should address detainee issues, including the question of what action they

should take in response to witnessing the use of aggressive interrogation

techniques by other agencies. Second, we describe the expanded training

programs that the FBI developed for agents deployed to the military zones

after the Abu Ghraib disclosures and the issuance of the FBI's May 2004

Detainee Policy.

Chapters Eight, Nine, and Ten detail the results of the OIG's

investigation into what FBI agents saw, heard about, and reported with

respect to detainee mistreatment in GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Each of

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these chapters follows the same organization. The responses to the OIG's

survey are summarized in tabular form. We then describe the FBI agents'

observations regarding specific techniques, with particular attention to the

harshest techniques and those techniques most commonly observed in the

particular military zone. In the last part of each of these chapters, we

examine the disposition of reports by FBI agents to their superiors or to

military personnel regarding their concerns about detainee treatment.

In Chapter Eleven we discuss our investigation of eight separate

allegations that FBI agents in the military zones were involved in detainee

abuse or mistreatment. While some of the allegations we investigated were

made by detainees, others allegations came from other FBI agents, in most

instances in response to the OIG's survey.

Chapter Twelve presents the OIG's conclusions and recommendations

regarding the FBI's involvement in detainee interrogations in the military

zones.

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CHAPTER TWO

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In this chapter we provide background information regarding the

FBI's activities in overseas military zones. In Part I we explain how the FBI

became involved in the military zones as a result of its changing emphasis

on preventing terrorism in the wake of the September 11 attacks. In Part II

we describe the FBI Headquarters organizational structure with respect to

international terrorism and detainee operations. In Part III we describe

other DOJ entities involved in overseas detainee issues, and in Part IV we

describe inter-agency entities and agreements relevant to this OIG

investigation. In Part V we describe each of the three zones (GTMO,

Afghanistan, and Iraq), including a brief review of military detainee

operations, a discussion of the FBI's missions and deployments within the

zone, a discussion of the FBI's organizational structure as it related to the

zone, and a detailed description of FBI interview activities in cooperation

with the military within the zone.

I. The Changing Role of the FBI After September 11

The FBI is the nation's lead domestic agency for the collection of

foreign counterintelligence information, which includes information relating

to international terrorist activities.16 Since September 11, the Attorney

General and the FBI Director have elevated counterterrorism and the

prevention of future terrorist attacks against United States interests as the

top priority of the DOJ and the FBI. In response to the attacks, Attorney

General Ashcroft directed all DOJ components to focus their efforts on

disrupting any additional terrorist threats. The Attorney General

summarized the Department's new mandate in a speech he gave on

October 25, 2001, in which he said: "Our single objective is to prevent

terrorist attacks by taking suspected terrorists off the street." This caused a

dramatic shift in the focus of the Department of Justice, including the FBI.

Former Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson described this change to

the OIG as a huge paradigm shift within DOJ from prosecution to

prevention. Similarly, other high-level DOJ and FBI officials told us that

after September 11, they worked to transform the FBI into an organization

that would prevent attacks as opposed to react to attacks.

16 The authority for the FBI's broad mission to act at the nation's lead domestic

intelligence agency is set forth most clearly in Presidential Executive Order 12333,

implemented on December 4, 1981.

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Part of the transformation of DOJ and the FBI focused on increasing

information sharing within DOJ and the FBI and among all the entities

involved in the collection of intelligence relating to terrorist activities.17

Previously, the FBI's overseas presence was primarily carried out by its legal

attaches (LEGAT), who were assigned to U.S. Embassies around the world

and who facilitated and supported the FBI's investigative interests in the

overseas arena that pertained to threats against the United States. While

the LEGAT system remains in place, after September 11 the FBI sought to

place significant numbers of agents directly in zones outside the United

States where first-hand intelligence relating to potential domestic terrorism

threats could be gathered.18 In particular, the FBI began sending agents to

Afghanistan, Guantanamo, and Iraq. While the activities of the agents

assigned to GTMO were directed for a short time by FBI field offices, the

responsibility for these overseas assignments quickly shifted to officials at

FBI Headquarters. In the next section, we describe the FBI Headquarters

entities relevant to international terrorism generally, and FBI agent

assignments to overseas military zones in particular.

II. FBI Headquarters Organizational Structure for Military Zones

To assess FBI observations of detainee treatment and how concerns

regarding detainee treatment made their way from line FBI agents up the

FBI chain of command, it is important to understand the various FBI

17 One effect of September 11 and the FBI's change in emphasis was the dissolution

of divisions between the "intelligence" and "criminal investigative" functions. Prior to the

September 11 attacks, procedural restrictions - known informally as the "wall" - were

created to separate intelligence and criminal investigations. These restrictions were created

in response to concerns that if intelligence investigators consulted with prosecutors about

intelligence information or provided intelligence information to criminal investigators, this

interaction could affect the prosecution of a case by allowing defense counsel to argue that

the government had misused its authority to conduct surveillance under the Foreign

Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). Although information could be "passed over the wall" -

shared with criminal investigators - this occurred subject to defined procedures. In late

2001 and 2002, the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the issuance of new guidelines on

intelligence sharing by the Attorney General, and a ruling by the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Court of Review combined to dismantle the "wall." In its ruling, the FISA

Court of Review wrote, "[E]ffective counterintelligence, we have learned, requires the

wholehearted cooperation of all the government's personnel who can be brought to the

task." In Re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (2002).

18 The FBI's merging of the intelligence and criminal investigative functions stands

in contrast to the military, which continues to have separate entities for its law enforcement

functions and its intelligence function, as we describe in Section IV.B.1 of this chapter.

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Headquarters entities responsible for counterterrorism, intelligence

collection, and detainee issues.19

A. Counterterrorism Division

In 1999, the FBI created a separate Counterterrorism Division (CTD).

At FBI Headquarters, CTD has been responsible for the deployments of

personnel and the management of information to and from Afghanistan,

Iraq and GTM0.20 In addition, the number of agents assigned to

counterterrorism nearly tripled between 1995 and 2002. Within CTD,

various entities had jurisdiction over, or management responsibility for, the

collection of terrorism-related counterintelligence information and the

agents collecting such information in Afghanistan, and Iraq. The primary

components within CTD with such responsibilities were the International

Terrorism Operations Sections (ITOS-1 and ITOS-2), and the

Counterterrorism Operational Response Section (CTORS). The Assistant

Director for CTD reports to the Executive Assistant Director for

Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism, who reports to the FBI Director.

1. International Terrorism Operations Sections

One of the four major components of the FBI's CTD is the

International Terrorism Operations Section (ITOS), which is responsible for

overseeing the FBI's international terrorism investigation, including both

criminal and intelligence investigations. The mission of the ITOS is to

prevent terrorist acts before they occur, and to mount an effective

investigative response to any terrorist attacks with the goal of prosecuting

those responsible. ITOS responsibilities are divided between ITOS-1 and

ITOS-2. With respect to the matters covered in this report, ITOS-1 played

an important role. In this regard, the focus of ITOS-1 has been operational

matters relating to Afghanistan and al-Qaeda within the United States.

ITOS-1 distributed information being sent back from FBI agents in

Afghanistan to the relevant FBI field offices, and similarly forwarded

requests by field offices to agents deployed overseas for further

investigation. ITOS-2, on the other hand, had "oversight responsibility for

all FBI counterterrorism operations in Iraq" including the handling of

intelligence gathered there, as well as for all other terrorism matters

elsewhere. The Section Chief for ITOS-1 reports to a Deputy Assistant

Director (Deputy AD) in CTD, who in turn reports to the AD for CTD.

19 Appendix B contains organizational charts for DOJ, the FBI, and the

Counterterrorism Division of the FBI.

20 Six different Assistant Directors were in charge of CTD in the slightly greater

than three-year period covered by this report - from late 2001 to the end of 2004.

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2. Counterterrorism Operations Response Section

The Counterterrorism Operations Response Section (CTORS) was

created in January 2003 as part of the FBI's reorganization and expansion

in counterterrorism efforts. CTORS now includes the Military and Liaison

Detainee Unit (MLDU), the Fly Team, and the FBI Headquarters portion of

the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The Section Chief of CTORS reports

to the Deputy AD for Operational Support, who reports to the AD for CTD.

a. Military Liaison and Detainee Unit

The agents who are sent on these overseas assignments are overseen,

for the duration of the assignment, by the Military Liaison and Detainee

Unit (MLDU) (initially called the GTMO Task Force). Since its inception, the

MLDU has focused largely on logistics and training. 21 It was originally

formed as an ad hoc task force within the FBI's CTD in late 2002 or early

2003 "to oversee the newly created FBI mission in Afghanistan." MLDU's

duties were been expanded to support agents deployed to Iraq, and it has

been responsible for the FBI's operations in GTMO as well. MLDU now has

liaison personnel with all of the major military combatant commands -

Northern Command, Central Command, and Southern Command. The Unit

Chief for MLDU reports to the CTORS Section Chief.

b. Fly Team

The "Fly Team" was originally established as part of the FBI's

counterterrorism effort on June 1, 2002. This unit's functions include

serving as the FBI's first rapid responders with investigative capabilities

whenever there is an incident overseas, such as the London terrorist

bombings in July 2005. The Fly Team's duties include assessing what the

FBI can contribute to such situations and recommending to FBI

management what resources should be directed to these incidents. The Fly

Team has roughly 30 investigators, many of whom have been deployed for

detainee interviews and other duties in Afghanistan and Iraq several times.

Many Fly Team members were formerly in the military and therefore

operated more easily in the battlefield environment. For these reasons, they

are often paired up for deployments in military zones with agents from field

offices. The Unit Chief for the Fly Team reports to the CTORS Section Chief.

c. Joint Terrorism Task Forces

The Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) are squads within FBI field

offices that focus primarily on addressing and preventing terrorism threats.

21 At the end of 2002 or beginning of 2003, the GTMO Task Force became the

MLDU.

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JTTFs include members from other federal, state, and local law enforcement

agencies, including local police departments. Before the September 11

attacks there were 35 JTTFs nationwide. As of March 2005 there were 103.

The National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF) is a unit within CTORS

that was created to support JTTFs and to enhance communication and

cooperation among federal, state, and local government agencies by

providing for coordination of terrorism intelligence collection activities.

Later in this report, we discuss a limited number of instances involving the

participation of non-FBI JTTF members in detainee interrogations. The Unit

Chief for the NJTTF reports to the CTORS Section Chief.

B. Critical Incident Response Group

The Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) facilitates the FBI's rapid

response to, and management of, crisis incidents. The CIRG includes a

Crisis Negotiation Unit, an Aviation and Surveillance Operations Section,

and a Hostage Rescue Team (HRT). Throughout the period covered by our

review, HRT has contributed a number of agents for FBI force protection

purposes in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) is

another branch of the CIRG that has played a significant role in the military

zones. The mission of the NCAVC is to combine investigative, operational

support functions, research, and training in order to provide assistance to

federal, state, local and foreign law enforcement agencies investigating

unusual or repetitive violent crimes. The NCAVC is composed of three

Behavioral Analysis Units and a Violent Crime Apprehension Program Unit.

Agents from Behavioral Analysis Unit number 1 (BAU-1), which focuses on

terrorism threats, were sent to GTMO to provide behavioral based

investigative and operational support. The CIRG also has a Chief Division

Counsel who provides legal guidance to the group, and who reports to the

CIRG SAC. The CIRG SAC reports to the Executive Assistant Director for

Law Enforcement Services, who reports to the FBI Director's Office.

C. Office of General Counsel

The FBI Office of the General Counsel provided staff to GTMO and

responded to detainee related inquiries from other FBI divisions, including

inquiries coming from agents assigned to GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

The Office of the General Counsel also assisted in developing policy and

preparing FBI Officials for congressional hearings. At GTMO an Associate

General Counsel provided legal advice. The General Counsel reports to the

Director of the FBI.

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III. Other DOJ Entities Involved in Overseas Detainee Matters

In addition to the FBI, other offices within DOJ were involved with

overseas detainee issues discussed in this report. The Deputy Attorney

General and his staff advised and assisted the Attorney General in providing

overall supervision and direction to all organizational units of DOJ,

including the FBI. As part of those duties, the Deputy Attorney General and

members of his office participated in intra and inter agency meetings at

which detainee-related issues were discussed. The FBI reports to the

Deputy Attorney General and the Attorney General.

In addition, DOJ's Criminal Division exercises general supervision

over the Department's enforcement of all federal criminal laws not

specifically assigned to other divisions. Included within the jurisdiction of

the Criminal Division are all criminal terrorism cases. The Criminal

Division is led by an Assistant Attorney General. Members of the Assistant

Attorney General's staff helped supervise and coordinate international

terrorism investigations. In that role, they collected information from the

FBI and U.S. Attorneys' offices and shared it with the DOD, the CIA, and the

White House. Other members of the Assistant Attorney General's staff

oversee the Criminal Division office that handles all criminal foreign policy

of the United States, including liaison with the Department of State and the

National Security Council (NSC). The Criminal Division receives criminal

referrals from the FBI. The Criminal Division was the entity responsible for

oversight of federal criminal matters relating to terrorism and acted as the

primary liaison to the FBI's Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU).22

The DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) assists the Attorney General in

his function as legal advisor to the President and all executive branch

agencies. The Office drafts the legal opinions of the Attorney General and

provides its own written opinions and oral advice in response to requests

from the Counsel to the President, various agencies of the executive branch,

and offices within DOJ. During the years covered by this report, OLC

generated written opinions and advice relating to certain detainee issues.

IV. Inter-Agency Entities and Agreements Relating to Detainee

Matters

A. The Policy Coordinating Committee

Officials from DOJ and the NSC told the OIG that many inter agency

discussions on a variety of overseas detainee matters, such as developing

22 The National Security Division of DOJ is now the entity responsible for oversight

of criminal matters relating to terrorism.

16

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.60

processes for sorting detainees and later for the repatriation or release of

detainees, took place in a Policy Coordinating Committee. The Policy

Coordinating Committee for detainee issues was led by a National Security

Council (NSC) staff member, and was composed of representatives from

DOJ, the Department of State (DOS) (including members of the DOS Office

of the Legal Advisor), the DOD (General Counsel's Office and sometimes

others from the Joint Chiefs), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). A

Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division was the official

DOJ point of contact for the PCC, and others from the Criminal Division,

the Deputy Attorney General's Office, and the FBI attended at various times.

By late 2001 or early 2002, there were regular (sometimes weekly)

PCC video conferences or meetings on detainee issues that were chaired by

the NSC legal advisor. Issues that could not be resolved at the PCC could

be "bumped up" to the "Deputies" meeting, which was attended by the

Deputy Attorney General or his designee (such as Patrick Philbin, the

Associate Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence/National Security). If a

resolution still could not be reached, an issue could be raised to the

"Principals" meeting, which included the Attorney General or his designee.

Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division,

David Nahmias, said that separate from the PCC meetings, a group of

individuals reviewed enemy combatant or potential enemy combatant cases

to evaluate the government's options on how to proceed. Nahmias and

Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division Alice Fisher

both described an informal working group, formed after the Jose Padilla

case arose, which included representatives from DOJ's Criminal Division

and OLC, as well as representatives of the CIA and the DOD.23 The group

was intended to promote inter agency coordination on certain detainee

matters. The role of DOJ at these meetings, according to Nahmias, was to

share information about people domestically who, in theory, could be enemy

combatants, and to see who were being held as enemy combatants who

potentially might be prosecuted. He told the OIG that the CIA

representative considered intelligence aspects of these cases, and the DOD

considered military aspects.

23 Jose Padilla was arrested by the FBI when he entered the United States on May

8, 2002, based on a federal material witness warrant. The President declared Padilla an

enemy combatant, and Padilla was transferred to military custody in June 2002. He was

subsequently transferred to DOJ custody and was convicted of conspiracy to murder,

kidnap and maim individuals in a foreign country, conspiracy to provide material support

to terrorists, and providing material support to terrorists on August 16, 2007.

17

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.61

B. Inter-Agency Memorandums of Understanding

There are several Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between the

FBI or DOJ and other government agencies that are relevant to detainee

abuse issues or otherwise relevant to this review.

In 1984 DOJ and the DOD entered into an MOU relating to the

investigation and prosecution of criminal matters over which the two

Departments have jurisdiction. The 1984 MOU provides that most crimes

taking place on a "military installation" will be investigated by the DOD.

When such a crime is committed by a person subject to the Uniform Code of

Military Justice, the DOD will also prosecute the matter. With respect to

"significant cases in which an individual subject/victim is other than a

military member or dependent thereof," the DOD must provide notice of the

matter to DOJ. Witnesses and documents indicate that pursuant to this

1984 MOU, the DOD has assumed jurisdiction over the investigation of

potential crimes relating to detainee abuse at DOD facilities in the military

zones.

In 1995, DOJ entered into an MOU with several intelligence agencies,

including the DOD and the CIA. This MOU requires each employee of an

intelligence agency to report to the agency's General Counsel or Inspector

General any facts or circumstances that reasonably indicate that an

employee of an intelligence agency has committed a crime. If the subject of

the allegation is an employee of a different intelligence agency than the

person making the report, the General Counsel of the accusing person's

agency must notify the General Counsel of the accused employee's agency.

The General Counsel of the accused employee's agency must then conduct a

preliminary investigation of the matter. If the inquiry reveals a reasonable

basis for the allegations, and the crime falls within certain specified

violations of federal criminal law (including crimes involving intentional

infliction or threat of serious physical harm and crimes likely to affect the

national security, defense, or foreign relations of the United States), the

General Counsel must report the matter to DOJ. The MOU also requires

employees of intelligence agencies to report to their General Counsel any

violations of specified crimes by persons who are not employees of any

intelligence agency (such as civilian contractors), and these crimes must

also be reported to the DOJ.

In 2003, the FBI and the CIA entered into an MOU concerning the

detailing of FBI agents to the CIA to assist in debriefing certain high value

detainees at "sensitive CIA debriefing sites." The MOU primarily addresses

how information obtained by FBI agents detailed to such sites will be used

and protected. The FBI agreed to observe strict need-to-know principles

and limit knowledge of the existence of the MOU. This MOU did not address

18

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.62

standards for detainee interrogations or how detainee abuse allegations

would be handled.

In late 2004, the FBI entered into an MOU with the DOD Criminal

Investigative Task Force (CITF). As detailed below, CITF is the military's law

enforcement arm with responsibility for gathering evidence for the military

commission process and possible war crimes prosecutions. The FBI's MOU

with CITF primarily addresses information sharing between the agencies in

the performance of law enforcement functions (not intelligence). It does not

address detainee treatment standards or reporting of detainee abuse

allegations.

We are not aware of the existence of any MOU between the FBI or

DOJ and the DOD or the CIA relating to standards for interrogation of

detainees in DOD or CIA custody.

V. Background Regarding the FBI's Role in the Military Zones

In this section we provide background regarding the FBI's activities in

each of the three military zones discussed in this report. FBI operations

began in Afghanistan in late 2001, shortly before the FBI began sending

agents to GTMO. The FBI sent its first deployment of agents to Iraq in

March 2003.

A. Afghanistan

The United States invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 in order to

remove the Taliban government from power, capture or kill al-Qaeda

personnel responsible for the September 11 attacks, and destroy or

diminish al-Qaeda's ability to mount further terrorist attacks.

1. Military Operations and Detention Facilities

The DOD conducted U.S. military operations in Afghanistan under the

DOD's Central Command (CENTCOM). Beginning in May 2002, senior

command in the military theater was vested in Combined Joint Task Force

180 (CJTF-180), later redesignated CJTF-76. Church Report at 6-7, 180-

183. The military's primary bases were located near the cities of Bagram in

the north and Kandahar in the south. Church Report at 181-83. As

operations in Afghanistan progressed, the military established several

forward operating bases, sometimes called firebases, in remote areas around

the country to support units operating in the field. These bases were

operated by DOD Special Operations Forces or conventional forces. Church

Report at 184. Several firebases were operated jointly by the military and

the CIA.

19

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.63

According to the Church Report, over 30,000 U.S. military personnel

were serving in Afghanistan as of August 2004, and U.S. forces had

detained, beyond individuals questioned in an initial screening process,

roughly 2,000 persons since late 2001. Church Report at 233.

We briefly summarize here the evolution of military detention facilities

in Afghanistan, a topic described in detail at pages 180-186 of the Church

Resort. Be innin in Ma 2002, a U.S. milit facilit in Ba ram

20

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.64

One of the firebases in Afghanistan - Firebase Salerno - was of

articular interest to our review because, be innin in late May 2004, I.

at that

location. The military detention facilities at Salerno included a makeshift

holding area built using cubic eight-foot wire-mesh containers filled with

sandbags that could not be penetrated by rocket propelled grenades, and

which were stacked like building blocks in order to create rows of about ten

individual cells with wire mesh doors across the front of each. Church

Report at 190-1.

The military had custody and control over the detainees throughout

Afghanistan, and FBI agents were required to arrange access to the

detainees through military police and military intelligence personnel.

2. The FBI's Mission

In September or October 2001, prior to the invasion of Afghanistan,

FBI agents met with CENTCOM to discuss the military's and the FBI's

knowledge about al-Qaeda. Shortly thereafter, the military requested the

assistance of the FBI in Afghanistan. In December 2001, the FBI sent the

first group of eight agents to Kandahar, Afghanistan. According to the Team

Leader for this group, this deployment of FBI agents into a theater of war

working side by side with the military was unprecedented.24 In addition, as

a result of the Afghanistan deployment and the deployment to GTMO in

January 2002, the FBI had personnel at "both ends of the pipeline" for

counterterrorism information.25

The FBI mission in Afghanistan evolved over time. Initially, the

primary focus was interviews of al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees captured by

coalition forces and review of captured documents. FBI agents understood

from the outset that they would likely be interviewing detainees together

with U.S. military or CIA personnel. In addition, FBI agents assisted the

military with "sensitive site exploitation" missions, which involved the

collection of time-sensitive information at selected priority targets, such as

24 Similarly, an FBI Supervisory Special Agent deployed in Iraq told us that FBI

agents had not been deployed to a combat zone since World War II.

25 The Church Report stated that CENTCOM forces in Afghanistan first transferred

detainees to GTMO on January 7, 2002. Church Report at 182-183.

21

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.65

caves and homes that had been vacated by al-Qaeda personnel during

coalition attacks.

In February 2004, based on a DOD request, the FBI expanded its

contingent in Afghanistan and positioned investigators with more forward

deployed military units to assist in the collection of intelligence. In June

2004, the FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD) sent a team to Afghanistan

to assess the role of FBI personnel in that country.26 As a result of that

assessment, the FBI CTD issued an Electronic Communication (EC) that

clarified the FBI's primary mission in Afghanistan as "the collection of

actionable threat intelligence which may have a possible nexus to the

United States, its citizens and interests." The EC identified the following

priorities within this mission, including:

Interviewing detainees or Persons Under Custody (PUC) and

other individuals of interest at the detainee collection points

and other smaller facilities, using rapport-based strategies, to

obtain actionable intelligence in the war on terrorism.

Participating in "Sensitive Site Ex loitations" and "forward

sta• ed interro ations"

, with an emphasis on

collecting strategic intelligence with a nexus to the United

States. Establishing a liaison with all coalition forces to ensure

the collection and appropriate communication of information

with a nexus to the United States. Supporting the

in Afghanistan with FBI technical

and forensic assets. S ortin• s ecialized *oint FBI-CIA

o erations at

Afghanistan.

3. FBI Deployments

Providing training to the Government of

Based on the results of the OIG survey and other information, we

estimated that between 200 and 250 FBI agents served in Afghanistan

between late 2001 and the end of 2004. An FBI Deputy OSC stated that the

FBI personnel in Afghanistan "were there as a force multiplier, but it was

the [military's] show." Between late 2001 and the end of 2004, the number

of FBI personnel deployed in Afghanistan at any one time ranged between

10 and 25. These totals included agents who conducted interviews as well

as other FBI personnel who did not have detainee interview responsibilities,

26 This assessment followed several incidents in which FBI agents were involved in

ambushes or other violent actions. Because of these incidents, FBI participation in

sensitive site exploitations was temporarily suspended.

22

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.66

FBI a ents were de lo ed to

such as Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) personnel, bomb technicians, and

technically trained agents.

FBI agents who served in Afghanistan volunteered from FBI field

offices. FBI Headquarters personnel said they tried to recruit agents who

had previously served in the military or had special weapons and tactics

(SWAT) team experience. Sometime in 2004, the FBI increased the length of

these assignments from 60 days to 90 days for agents. Between December

2001 and April 2002, the tenure for OSCs in Afghanistan varied between

one and two months. Thereafter, most of the OSCs served in Afghanistan

for 90-day rotations.

FBI personnel in Afghanistan depended upon the military for

transportation, translators, supplies, housing, and protection.

4. Organizational Structure of the FBI in Afghanistan

During much of the period covered by our review, the rotations of FBI

agents deployed to Afghanistan were supervised by an experienced agent

serving as the On-Scene Commander (OSC). Thirteen agents served as the

FBI's OSC in Afghanistan at various times during the period covered by this

review. CTD established the position of Deputy OSC in Afghanistan in early

2004, and six agents served in that position through the end of 2004.

However, for most of 2002 and all of 2003, the FBI did not have any OSC

present in Afghanistan, and the FBI's Afghanistan operations were managed

from the New York Field Office or, beginning in June 2002, from FBI

Headquarters in Washington. In mid-2003, a senior agent was present in

Afghanistan.

OSCs and Deputy OSCs in Afghanistan and elsewhere served as the

direct representatives of FBI Headquarters. They assigned and supervised

the deployed personnel, served as points of contact and liaison with military

and intelligence personnel, kept FBI Headquarters informed about the

agents' work, the logistics issues, and the military personnel with whom

they were working, and arranged for the transfer of information, leads, and

requests to and from U.S. FBI offices and the military. To varying degrees,

OSCs and Deputy OSCs also participated in detainee interviews as time and

other duties permitted.

The FBI OSCs in Afghanistan supervised the preparation of Daily

Situation Reports that were transmitted to FBI Headquarters. The OSCs

23

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.67

and Deputy OSCs also maintained daily contact with FBI Headquarters by

satellite telephone.

5. FBI Activities in Afghanistan

FBI agents' activities in Afghanistan consisted primarily of detainee

interviews, participation in military sensitive site exploitations (comparable

to domestic execution of search warrants and crime scene processing),

collection of detainee biometric information, and traditional FBI criminal

investigation work as a result of bombings against U.S. citizens or

facilities.27 Because the primary focus of this report is detainee

interrogations, we describe the FBI's interview/interrogation activities in

more detail below. The FBI's other activities in Afghanistan are summarized

in the second part of this subsection.

a. Detainee Interviews by FBI Agents

Most of the detainee interviews conducted by the FBI in Afghanistan

took place at military facilities, such as the detainee collection facilities at

Bagram and Kandahar. Due to the small number of FBI personnel in

Afghanistan, it was not possible for them to interview all of the detainees

that came through U.S. military facilities. Several agents told us that FBI

personnel focused their efforts primarily on Arabic-speakers and al-Qaeda

personnel, rather than the Afghan locals such as the Taliban. As a result,

FBI agents had contact with only a small percentage of the detainees who

were interrogated in Afghanistan by military personnel.

The number of detainees each FBI agent interviewed while in

Afghanistan also appears to have been small, often fewer than 20 detainees

during an agent's deployment. Agents frequently interviewed the same

detainee several times. In addition, many FBI agents also briefly

interviewed "Persons Under Control" (PUC). (According to the Church

Report, all captured persons were initially considered PUCs. If they satisfied

screening criteria set by the Secretary of Defense, they became "detainees."

Church Report at 191-192.)

The FBI Daily Situation Reports from May through December 2004

(which were the only Situation Reports produced to the OIG) indicated that

during that 8 month period the total number of FBI custodial detainee

interviews was 681 and the total number of field interviews of PUCs was

303.

27 The written work product from those deployed generally consisted of interview

FD-302s or ECs, After-Action Reports for sensitive site exploitations, and Daily Situation

Reports.

24

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.68

such

As explained in Chapter One, we are not addressing

FBI activities at these sites.

The FBI deter mined who it wanted to interview b various methods,

FBI interviews of detainees, at least at Kandahar from late 2001 into

early 2002, were conducted in the same tents and rooms used by the

military interrogators. We were told that before the FBI could conduct its

lengthier detainee interviews, military interrogators completed their priority

interrogations to obtain time-sensitive tactical battlefield intelligence. For

the FBI interviews, detainees were brought in by the Military Police, and sat

down with the FBI agents at a table with folding chairs. Some detainees

were brought in hooded or blindfolded, depending on their level of

compliance or security risk, and most detainees were restrained with hand

shackles. According to an after-action memorandum from a former OSC to

FBI Headquarters dated March 5, 2002, during the early months of FBI

deployments in Afghanistan, agents in Kandahar "were limited" in their

ability to conduct "in depth interviews due to limitations with translators,

lack of available intelligence, space restrictions, and prioritization of

interviews to the military."

b. Joint Interviews with Military Investigators

FBI agents often worked jointly with military personnel in Afghanistan

in planning, preparing for, and conducting detainee interviews, particularly

until mid-2004. Of the roughly 200 agents who served in Afghanistan and

responded to the OIG survey, 86 stated that they jointly interviewed

detainees with military or intelligence agency personnel.

25

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.69

FBI participation in sensitive site exploitations be an durin the first

rotation of agents at the re uest of a

Other agents told us that FBI agents only conducted interviews with

other FBI agents. Some agents told us they avoided joint interviews because

they knew the military was operating under different rules. The FBI OSC in

Afghanistan in the spring of 2004 told us that as of approximately April

2004, the military would not invite FBI personnel in to interviews in which

they thought there would be a conflict between FBI rules and military rules.

He stated that if there was a joint interview, it was understood from the

start what the FBI could and could not do. However, the evidence indicates

that the FBI's practice of conducting joint interviews with other agencies

continued at least occasionally after April 2004. Other information

indicates that military observers were often present during FBI interviews in

Afghanistan.

c. Other FBI Activities in Afghanistan

Substantial FBI resources were also devoted to other aspects of its

counterterrorism mission, such as participation in military "sensitive site

exploitations" and the collection of detainee biometric data.

The FBI also collected and disseminated to other agencies detainee

biometric information such as fingerprints, DNA samples, and standard

26

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.70

identification photographs. As groups of detainees were captured on

battlefields throughout Afghanistan and brought to detention facilities, FBI

agents worked with military personnel in the initial fingerprinting, DNA

sample collection, and photographing of the detainees. This work was done

largely by FBI Criminal Justice Information Services Division CJIS

ersonnel at various locations in Af hanistan.

The FBI also conducted traditional criminal investigations of

bombings and other crimes against American citizens, companies, and

facilities in Afghanistan. For example, an FBI agent told us that in

September 2004 he interviewed several detainees in Kabul who were in the

custody of the Afghan National Directorate of Security, in connection with

the bombing of the Dyncorp building in which three Americans were killed.

B. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1. Military Operations and Detention Facilities

In October 2001, soon after the start of the United States' military

operations in Afghanistan following the September 11 attacks, the United

States began detaining suspected al-Qaeda operatives and Taliban fighters.

The President declared these detainees "illegal enemy combatants" and the

United Stated decided to detain them at the U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo

Bay, Cuba. Church Report at 99. After receiving the order to establish

detention operations at GTMO, the military was directed to have detention

facilities up and running within 96 hours.

The first planeload of 20 detainees arrived at GTMO on January 11,

2002, less than 5 days after the order was given to build a detention facility

to house 100 captured enemy combatants. Church Report at 99. According

to FBI documents, agents from the FBI and the DOD Criminal Investigative

Task Force (CITF) began formally interviewing detainees on February 4,

2002.

a. GTMO Camps

(1) Camp X-Ray

The first camp to house detainees was called Camp X-Ray. Camp XRay

was the site of an old detention facility that had housed Haitian

refugees. Cells at Camp X-Ray were temporary 8 foot by 8 foot by 10 foot

units constructed of chain-link fencing. The cells did not have solid walls;

the military used tarps to keep out the sun and rain. Detainees slept on flinch

thick mattresses on cement slabs. The roof of each cell was

27

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.71

constructed of metal and wood. Portable toilets and showers were available

for the detainees outside of their individual cells. The interrogation rooms

were also very primitive, although the walls were plywood rather than chain

link. Camp X-Ray was used to house detainees for 3 months until more

permanent detention facilities could be built.

(2) Camp Delta

Construction on Camp Delta began almost immediately after Camp XRay

was completed. Detainees were moved to Camp Delta starting on

April 28-29, 2002. Camp X-Ray was closed when the last detainees moved

out.

Camp Delta consists of multiple detainee cell blocks or "camps"

numbered consecutively in the order in which they were built. Detainees

are assigned to the camps based on an assessment of their cooperation or

potential for violence.

Camps I through III house detainees considered to be less compliant

than the most cooperative detainees at GTMO. The living conditions at

these three camps are almost identical. The individual cells or detention

units are 8 feet long, 6 feet 8 inches wide, and 8 feet tall and are

constructed of metal mesh material on a solid steel frame and a metal roof.

Each unit has its own floor-style flush toilet, a metal bed frame raised off

the floor, and a sink and faucet with running water. There are two

recreation yards and four showers per block. Exhaust fans mounted in the

ceiling ventilate the cell blocks.

Camp IV houses the more compliant and cooperative detainees at

GTMO. Camp IV received its first detainees in February 2003. The

detainees live in communal living areas that resemble dormitories. The

camp has a common recreational area to which the detainees have access 7

to 9 hours a day.

Camps V and VI house detainees who are considered to be the most

dangerous detainees at GTMO and those that have the most valuable

intelligence. Camp V is a 2-story maximum security complex made of

concrete and steel designed to hold 100 detainees. Completed in May 2004,

it was modeled after the Miami Correctional Facility in Bunker Hill, Indiana.

The camp is composed of five wings. Each cell is 7 feet six inches long and

12 feet 10 inches wide and is made of cast cement containing a cement

formed bed, stainless steel sink, toilet, and window. The cells have cement

floors. Camp V has its own interrogation facilities, which are two rooms per

floor with video and audio capability that can be monitored from a central

control room. Church Report at 103. Camp VI, the most recent addition to

Camp Delta, is another concrete and steel structure modeled after a jail in

28

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.72

Lenawee County, Michigan, designed to hold approximately 200 detainees.

It was initially planned as a medium security facility for GTMO, but was

later modified to be a maximum security facility.

Camp Delta also includes a 20-bed hospital dedicated to providing

medical care to the detainees. It has an outpatient clinic, two operating

tables, a dental clinic, a physical rehabilitation area, and quarantine

chambers for contagious arrivals.

(3) Other GTMO Facilities

Camps Echo and Iguana are located just outside Camp Delta. Church

Report at 103. Camp Echo is a small camp that houses detainees who have

been segregated from the general detainee population for a variety of

reasons, such as disciplinary issues, meetings with counsel, or preparation

for departure from GTMO. Each wooden building in the camp has two cells.

A cinder block wall separates the cells. Each cell has a toilet, a sink, and a

bed. A shower is adjacent to each cell. Outside each cell is an area for a

guard to sit or for use during an interrogation.

Camp Iguana was originally designed as a lower security detention

facility to hold a small number of juvenile detainees believed to be under the

age of 16. Camp Iguana is now generally used to house detainees who are

no longer deemed to be enemy combatants, or who are awaiting transfer to

their home country.

The Navy Brig, a small detention facility at GTMO outside the camps

described above, that has been used to house detainees for various

purposes, such as disciplinary reasons or for special interrogations. A

control center located at the end of the communal living area operates all

doors and cells within the facility and two rows of metal segregation cells. A

cell is approximately 6 feet long, 8 feet wide and 8 feet tall. Each cell has a

window located on the cell door facing the communal living area. The

control center has a view of all cell doors and all detention areas.

b. GTMO Organizational Structure

The United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), located in

Miami, Florida, is one of nine unified Combatant Commands in the

29

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.73

Department of Defense. It is responsible for providing contingency

planning, operations, and security cooperation for Central and South

America, the Caribbean, Cuba and the Bahamas, and their territorial

waters, as well as the force protection of U.S. military resources at these

locations. SOUTHCOM is also responsible for ensuring the defense of the

Panama Canal and the canal region. GTMO falls within the jurisdiction of

the SOUTHCOM.

According to the Church Report, the command organization at GTMO

"evolved significantly over time." Church Report at 103. The original

organization had separate chains of command for intelligence operations

(JTF-170) and detention operations (JTF-160). Id. at 104. These two

separate joint task forces created a bifurcated chain of command that,

according to the Church Report, impeded cooperation between the military

intelligence and military police units responsible for GTMO. Id. These

separate chains of command were combined on November 4, 2002, and

were re-designated JTF-GTMO. Id. at 104-05. JTF-GTMO is responsible

both for operating the detainee detention facility at GTMO and for

conducting interrogations to collect intelligence in support of the United

States' efforts to combat terrorism. Major General Geoffrey Miller was

appointed on November 4, 2002, to lead this new joint task force. Id. at

105. He was succeeded by Brigadier General Jay Hood.28

JTF-GTMO is composed of three groups, each of which reports to the

JTF-GTMO commander and deputy commander, who in turn report to the

commander of SOUTHCOM. The Joint Detention Operations Group (JDOG)

includes six military police companies and is responsible for security at the

various camps. The Joint Interrogation Group (JIG), discussed in more

detail below, is responsible for the collection and dissemination of

intelligence from all the detainees in the custody of the DOD at GTMO. The

Joint Medical Group (JMG) is responsible for the detainee hospital.

The JIG combines military intelligence elements to pursue its

interrogation mission. According to the Church Report, the centerpiece of

the JIG is the Interrogation Control Element, which coordinates and

supervises the efforts of the military intelligence interrogators, analysts,

linguists, and civilian contract personnel who work on interrogations.

Church Report at 105. The collection of intelligence at GTMO is sursued

.1 through detainee interrogations, but also through

. The Interrogation

Control Element at GTMO includes members of the Defense Intelligence

Agency (DIA). Throughout this report, members of the DIA, Defense

28 As of October 2007 the current Commander of JTF-GTMO is Rear Admiral Mark

H. Buzby.

30

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.74

31

29 As it turns out,

HUMINT Service, and other military intelligence gathering entities will be

referred to as "military intelligence." The JIG at GTMO also included a

"Special Projects" team that focused on detainees believed to be of high

value.

The interrogation operations at GTMO included some entities that did

not fall within the Interrogation Control Element, including the FBI and the

DOD Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF). Unlike the FBI, in which

intelligence gathering and criminal investigative functions are now merged,

the military has kept its law enforcement groups separate from its

intelligence collection groups. The law enforcement groups that make up

the CITF are the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS), the Army

Criminal Investigation Command (CID), and the Air Force Office of Special

Investigations (OSI). CITF conducts interrogations in order to gather

evidence for the military commission process and possible war crimes

prosecutions. Church Report at 107.

2. The FBI's Mission

In a December 2001 Electronic Communication (EC), FBI

Headquarters directed the Miami Field Office to coordinate with the U.S.

military and establish an FBI presence on the U.S. Naval base at GTMO.

Accordin: to the EC, the Miami Field Office was to

On January 7, 2002, the first FBI agents arrived at GTMO. This first

group of agents consisted of one Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), one

Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC), and two Special A• ents (SA from

the Miami Field Office. These a ents were assi ned to

. When they

arrived there were only cells at Camp X-Ray that were left over from the

Haitian refugee operation of many years past. Navy personnel were building

more chain link cells to house the incoming detainees whose arrival was

imminent.

29 On January 11, 2002, the first

plane load of 20 detainees arrived at GTMO. Church Report at 99.

FBI Director Mueller told the OIG that he visited GTMO in early 2002.

He said he then decided to reorganize how the FBI managed its operations

at GTMO because it appeared that a much larger FBI component would be

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.75

participating in the FBI's mission there than previously anticipated. He also

stated that to better manage GTMO staffing and oversight, the FBI's

activities should be handled from FBI Headquarters. The entity established

to do that, as described above, was first called the GTMO Task Force and

was later named the Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU). Director

Mueller said he was told at that time that the FBI was working closely with

the military.

3. FBI Deployments

Between January 2002 and December 2004 over 400 FBI agents were

deployed to GTMO. Approximately half of these agents were assigned to

conduct detainee interviews. Others were sent to GTMO to fulfill roles

relating to detainee interviews, such as behavioral analysis of detainees,

that could be used to develop interview strategies, translation of detainee

interviews, and photographing or fingerprinting of detainees for

identification purposes. The remainder were sent to GTMO in more eneral

su sort roles such as administrative su ort, computer support,

FBI personnel in GTMO primarily used FBI-supplied equipment and

transportation, but sometimes relied on military equipment when FBI

equipment was unavailable. The housing used by the FBI was supplied by

the military and was at first very limited, which in turn limited the number

of FBI personnel who could be on the island at any given time.

4. FBI Organizational Structure at GTMO

As noted above, the first group of FBI agents sent to GTMO consisted

of one SSA, one ASAC, and at least two technically trained agents from the

Miami Field Office. Shortly thereafter, the SSA and his replacements began

to act as the FBI's "On-Scene Commanders" (OSC). From January 2002 to

August 2003, the FBI assigned 16 different temporary OSCs, some of whom

served multiple deployments. These OSCs were deployed to GTMO on

temporary duty assignments for terms ranging from 2 to 6 weeks. By

August 19, 2003, the FBI created a longer-term position at GTMO for the

OSC, and from that point on the OSCs have served for terms of up to 2

years.

The FBI generally assigns a "case agent" to each of its major

investigations. The Miami Field Office assigned a case agent to coordinate

all GTMO-related investigative activities. Although, as noted above,

responsibility was subsequently transferred to FBI Headquarters, this case

agent initially assigned by the Miami Field Office remained assigned to

GTMO for over a year in that position. This case agent told the OIG that the

FBI's chain of command was not as clear cut on GTMO as it would be back

32

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.76

in the United States. He said there was a high turnover of agents and

temporary supervisors at GTMO, and that personnel worked long days on

many different tasks. He said that this atmosphere did not lend itself to a

regimented system in which everything was done in "lockstep" with SAC

authority.

In March 2002, the FBI contingent at GTMO had grown to

approximately 25-30 people on the island at any given time , and the

number of FBI personnel remained relatively constant until approximately

September 2003, when it dropped to approximately a dozen people.

By August 2004, the FBI had sent a representative from its General

Counsel's office to work at GTMO and provide legal assistance to FBI

personnel at GTMO. The first legal advisor served at GTMO for nearly 3

years.

5. FBI Activities at GTMO

a. Detainee Interviews by FBI Agents

FBI documents reflect that FBI agents, along with agents from the

CITF (in some cases) and military intelligence (in other cases), began

formally interviewing detainees on February 4, 2002. The FBI's first GTMO

case agent told the OIG that early on the interview process at GTMO was

not very systematic or organized. He said the process was driven by the

limited space available for interviews and that each agency assigned to

GTMO vigorously competed for that space. He said FBI agents generally

were given very short notice of when they would get a 4-hour block for

interview time. It was up to each agent to determine which detainee was

most important to interview when space became available. In addition, due

to the high turnover in OSCs noted above, FBI interviewing practices varied

widely. Some OSCs permitted agents to conduct joint interviews with the

military and others instructed agents only to conduct interviews with other

FBI agents.

Initially, the FBI separated the detainees at GTMO by "activities" or

"themes." This system soon became cumbersome and inefficient because

the military was categorizing the detainees geographically. Accordingly, the

FBI's initial system was eventually abandoned and the FBI adopted the

military's system of separating the detainees by geographic region. Later,

the FBI agents who were sent to GTMO to conduct detainee interviews were

divided into two groups, one for detainees from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf

States, the other for detainees from North Africa, Europe, and Central Asia.

Each of these two groups was led by an SSA and was staffed by FBI special

agents and intelligence analysts.

33

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.77

Early on, the military and intelligence components at GTMO were,

according to FBI officials, unclear as to what the FBI's role at GTMO would

be. Art Cummings, Section Chief of CTORS and later ITOS-1, was sent to

GTMO by FBI headquarters to address some of the initial start-up issues,

and he served as GTMO's fifth OSC. He told the OIG that when he first

arrived, the Commander of JTF-170, Major General Dunlavey, and the

military's intelligence task force thought the FBI was there "to put handcuffs

on people." Cummings said he explained to Dunlavey and his Executive

Officer that the FBI were experts in conducting adversarial interviews and

getting people to talk to them when it is not in their interest to do so.

According to Cummings, Dunlavey seemed surprised when Cummings

explained that the FBI could offer this service at GTMO. The original FBI

case agent for GTMO also said that early on the military and CIA at GTMO

were worried that the FBI was going to "gum up the works" by "collecting

evidence" instead of just collecting intelligence in order to stop the next

terrorist attack. Cummings said that initially there was no disagreement

with the military about interview techniques. He also said that during this

period most interviews were done separately. However, if a detainee was

very important for both groups then the interview would be conducted

jointly.

In May 2002, the military and the FBI adopted the "Tiger Team"

concept for interrogating detainees. According to the first GTMO case agent,

these teams consisted of an FBI agent, an analyst, a contract linguist, two

CITF investigators, and a military intelligence interrogator.30 He said that

the Tiger Teams continued for about the next 4 or 5 months. Each Tiger

Team conducted two detainee debriefings a day. There were several reports

from each debriefing because each agency participating in an interview

produced a report. The first GTMO case agent said that in his opinion the

Tiger Teams were successful, from the FBI's perspective, mainly because the

FBI agents were usually the most experienced members of the team.

Therefore, he said, most Tiger Teams were essentially being run by the FBI

agent on the team. However, the FBI withdrew from participation in the

Tiger Teams in the fall of 2002 after disagreements arose between the FBI

and military intelligence over interrogation tactics. Several FBI agents told

the OIG that while they continued to have a good relationship with CITF,

their relationship with the military intelligence entities greatly deteriorated

over the course of time, primarily due to the FBI's opposition to the military

intelligence approach to interrogating detainees. This conflict is addressed

in detail later in this report.

30 An FBI On-Scene Commander said that the CIA was invited but rarely came

because they were upset with how the detainees were assigned to the teams. According to

the OSC, there were detainees of interest to the CIA that were off limits to the Tiger Teams.

34

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.78

b. Other FBI Activities in GTMO

As noted above, the first FBI a ents sent to GTMO in January 2002

were assigned to . It was only after

February 4, 2002, that FBI agents began to participate in interviews. In

addition, from 2002 - 2004, the FBI sent agents to GTMO to take

fingerprints and photographs of detainees.

C. Iraq

In late March 2003, the United States and other coalition military

forces invaded Iraq. Within a few weeks, these coalition forces defeated the

Iraqi military, deposed Saddam Hussein and his government, and

established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Baghdad. On

June 28, 2004, responsibility and authority for governing Iraq was formally

transferred to the Iraqi interim government, while coalition forces continued

to support Iraqi security and reconstruction.

1. Military and CIA Operations and Detention Facilities

As in Afghanistan, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was

responsible for military operations in Iraq. Beginning in May 2003,

Combined Joint Task Force Seven (CJTF-7) assumed responsibility for

coalition military operations. In June 2003, CENTCOM transferred the title

and authority of CJTF-7 to the U.S. Army V Corps. Church Report at 243,

249-250.

Operations in Iraq resulted in the capture of large numbers of "enemy

prisoners of war" (EPW) and civilian detainees. One of CJTF-7's missions

was to interrogate detainees for intelligence relevant to the Iraqi insurgency

and other matters. Church Report at 250. The Church Report described the

evolution of military detention facilities in Iraq at length.

We determined that FBI agents conducted interviews at the following

facilities in Iraq, which are described in greater detail in Section 5.a. below:

• The Abu Ghraib prison, which was the primary civilian

detention facility in Iraq.

• Camp Cropper, a small military facility located within the

Baghdad International Airport complex,

35

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.79

• CCaamm Bucca,

in the southeastern Ira. i desert, used for the ion:-

term internment'

• Camp Ashraf, a facility operated by the

near the Iranian border to house captured members of the

Mujahedin-E-Khalq (MEK), an anti-Iranian paramilitary group.

• Other locations.

2. The FBI's Mission in Iraq

On February 10, 2003, FBI Director Mueller signed Operations Order

1015, which stated that the FBI's mission in Iraq was to "deploy a taskorganized

exploitation unit to fully exploit all Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS)

sites and personnel for information regarding planned terrorist attacks in

the United States, or against U.S. personnel or interests outside the Iraq

theater of operations (ITO), and to gather intelligence related to other

matters of U.S. national security." In furtherance of this mission, the order

authorized the FBI to conduct operations in Iraq with the military and other

U.S. government intelligence agencies. Operations Order 1015 described

CTD's "plan for integration of FBI assets with" the military and the CIA in

Iraq once U.S. ground combat forces had secured areas and facilities in

Iraq, and to collect and interview or analyze Iraqi Intelligence Service

personnel, documents, and electronic media.

The FBI's primary objective in Iraq was collection and analysis of

information to help protect against terrorist threats in the United States and

protect U.S. personnel or interests overseas, rather than waiting for the

military and other agencies to pass on such information to the FBI. The FBI

was particularly concerned about terrorist sleeper cells within the United

States, and believed that information from Iraq could be relevant to

uncovering those cells. More specifically, CTD stated in a January 2004

briefing packet for agents that the mission of the FBI's Baghdad Operations

Center was to "take deliberate and carefully planned actions to protect the

United States against terrorist attack and espionage activity by engaging in

intelligence gathering activities, including high value detainee interviews,

document exploitation, biometric processing and other activities as

directed."

The FBI also supported Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) efforts to

address terrorist acts within Iraq, including the processing of bombing and

other crime scenes, and to share intelligence information with other U.S.

agencies and military units. The FBI's objectives in Iraq also included the

investigation of Saddam Hussein and his personnel for crimes against the

Iraqi people.

36

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.80

3. FBI Deployments to Iraq

FBI agents who served in Iraq volunteered from FBI field offices. In

2004, the FBI increased the length of the assignments for agents deployed

to Iraq from 60 days to 90 days. The FBI also increased the tenure for On-

Scene Commanders (OSC) in Iraq from 3 to 6 months as of January 2004,

and their Deputies served for at least 90 days.

The number of FBI personnel deployed to Iraq increased significantly

during 2003 and throughout 2004. The FBI Daily Situation Reports

indicate that between 13 and 24 FBI personnel, including technical

personnel and analysts, worked in Iraq at any given time between June and

August 2003, and that between 23 and 44 FBI personnel worked there at

any given time from September through December 2003. From January

through December 2004, the number of FBI personnel in Iraq usually

ranged between 50 and 60.

Most FBI personnel deployed to Iraq worked in the FBI's Baghdad

Operations Center (BOC), which was located first within the Baghdad

International Airport complex, and starting in mid-2004 within the Green

Zone downtown.

FBI agents and interpreters conducted detainee interviews and

athered detainee biometric information .rimaril at the Abu Ghraib .rison,

4. Organizational Structure of the FBI in Iraq

The FBI agents deployed to Iraq were supervised by an FBI On-Scene

Commander (OSC). Between March 2003 and the end of 2004; eight FBI

OSCs and five Deputy OSCs served in Iraq. We interviewed most of the

OSCs and Deputy OSCs who served in Iraq during 2003 and 2004.

As in Afghanistan and GTMO, the FBI in Iraq had a subordinate and

dependent role to the military. Several agents told us that FBI personnel

considered themselves guests of the military, who established the rules to

be followed there by other U.S. agencies. The FBI also depended upon the

military in Iraq for critical services and materials, such as protection,

transportation, housing, and food. All detainees in Iraq were in the custody

and control of the U.S. military. The FBI was not designated as the lead

agency for any purpose in Iraq, and the scope of the FBI's activities in those

37

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.81

zones, including its access to detainees, was at the discretion of the military

or the CIA.

5. FBI Activities in Iraq

During the early stages of the Iraq conflict, from March through July

2003, FBI agents were deployed to Kuwait and Iraq to focus on the

collection, analysis, and exploitation of documents collected from many

former Iraqi Intelligence Service sites in Iraq. We found no evidence that,

during this early period, any of these FBI personnel interacted with

detainees or worked at military sites where they were held.

After this early period in 2003, the other primary FBI

counterterrorism activities in Iraq included: (1) detainee interviews; (2) the

collection of biometric information from detainees; and (3) participation in a

limited number of military sensitive site exploitation missions. FBI agents

have also devoted significant time and resources to conventional criminal

investigations of bombings, murders, and kidnappings involving American

citizens in Iraq.

a. Detainee Interviews by FBI Agents.

FBI agents in Iraq generally focused their interview efforts on al-

Qaeda personnel, foreign fighters, and detainees who had also been in

Afghanistan. These groups together constituted only a small part of the

detainee population. As a result, FBI agents interviewed only a small

percentage of the detainees in the custody of the military at its various

detention facilities. The Church Report stated that between March 2003 and

March 2005, over 50,000 detainees were held in Iraq. Church Report at 292-

302.

Many of the FBI agents told us they interviewed only a small number

of detainees - sometimes 10 or fewer - durin their de lo ment to Ira. FBI

a ents at

. FBI documents give a sense of the volume of interviews

that the agents conducted in Iraq. In July 2004, the FBI reported in a

classified statement for the record to a congressional committee that

between Janu and March 2004 FBI agents in Iraq

. The FBI Situation Reports

in late 2004 indicate that FBI agents conducted interviews in October

and interviews in November 2004 at the various military facilities in

Iraq.

The nature of FBI agent activities and interactions with military

personnel varied with the different military detention and interrogation

38

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.82

facilities in Iraq. These are described below for each of the major Iraq

facilities.

Abu Ghraib Prison. The Abu Ghraib prison was selected by the

Coalition Provisional Authority as the primary civilian detention facility in

Iraq, despite its Saddam-era history and poor condition, when the CJTF-7

commander concluded there were no other suitable facilities available.

Church Report at 248. Detention operations began at Abu Ghraib in

approximately September 2003, and the prisoner population there,

including criminals, insurgents, and detainees with potential intelligence

value, soon grew to an estimated 4,000 to 5,000. Id. at 248, 250. As of

January 2004, over 7,000 detainees were held there in September 2004,

Abu Ghraib held approximately 3,000 detainees, a number which held

steady as of February 2005. Id.; The Washington Post 2/21/05 at Al, A22.

Abu Ghraib consisted of three sections: the main compound and

prison building from the Saddam Hussein era; a make-shift concertina-wire

detention area in the interior courtyard; and facilities within the courtyard

walls for interviews by FBI and other non-military personnel, comprising

two or three tents and at other times two trailers. One former OSC

described Abu Ghraib as dismal, run down, medieval, and "grossly

understaffed." Another agent who conducted interviews there stated that

the situation was "borderline chaotic," and that the prison was understaffed

and frequently attacked by insurgents.

FBI interviews of detainees at Abu Ghraib began in September 2003.

Our review found that FBI agents seldom interviewed detainees within the

main stone prison building at Abu Ghraib, and seldom went into that

building for other reasons. Instead, FBI personnel conducted most of their

detainee interviews in the military tents or trailers within the larger prison

compound.

FBI Agents made arrangements with military personnel for access to

detainees for interviews. Military guards delivered handcuffed detainees to

the FBI and returned them to their cells after the interview. Typically, two

FBI agents conducted the interview with an interpreter. One FBI agent who

served at Abu Ghraib in 2003 stated that the military officer assigned to the

particular prisoner was always required to be present and observe the FBI

interview.

According to an FBI agent who served at Abu Ghraib in November

2003, FBI agents who wanted to conduct interviews were instructed by

Military Police (MP) personnel regarding detainee interview procedures, and

were given a form to read and sign in which the agents acknowledged that

certain interrogation techniques were permissible, others were not, and still

others required command level approval before they could be used.

39

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.83

However, the FBI agent said that this form "was of no importance to me

because I had no intention of using any of [the listed techniques]." He

stated that the only interrogation techniques that he recalled being

described on the form were leaving lights on and sleep deprivation.

Another FBI agent stated that in 2004 the military described

permissible interrogation practices in a standard printed fog in of not more

than one or two pages that military intelligence personnel at Abu Ghraib

gave agents to review and sign. She stated that there was nothing on the

form that surprised her as being allowed for use by the military, but there

were a number of techniques that the FBI does not use. The form identified

the techniques with labels such as "Fear Up" or "Ego Down," and the

practices on the form related to sleep deprivation, diet manipulation, and

intimidation tactics31.

Several FBI agents told us that, for the security and safety of FBI

personnel, they did not work or stay at Abu Ghraib at night, but left at the

end of each day to go back to the FBI's Baghdad Operations Center. An FBI

OSC said that he established this policy because Abu Ghraib was being

mortared every night by insurgents, and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED)

were found nearby every morning. As a result, FBI personnel did not go to

Abu Ghraib until mid-morning, and left well before dark.

The abuse of prisoners by military personnel at the Abu Ghraib prison

has been the subject of several investigations, including the Taguba and

Jones investigations, the Church Commission, and the Schlesinger Pane1.32

Press reports and prior investigations have indicated that many of the

detainee abuses at Abu Ghraib occurred inside the main stone prison at

night. As detailed in Chapter Ten, FBI agents told us they observed some

aggressive or abusive conduct at Abu Ghraib, but with a few exceptions they

said they generally did not observe or otherwise learn about conduct as

extreme or abusive as that described in the published reports. The fact that

FBI agents worked at the prison in the daytime and conducted interviews

outside of the detention areas in the prison is the likely reason that the

agents did not observe this more extreme conduct.

31 A third agent told us about the use of such a form at the

(discussed in the next section) in early 2004.

32 VADM A.T. Church, III, Review of Department of Defense Detention Operations

and Detainee Interrogation Techniques (March 2005); 2004 US Army, LTG Anthony R.

Jones, Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib, AR 15-6; Honorable James R.

Schlesinger, Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review DoD Detention Operations

(August 2004); MG Antonio M. Taguba, Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police

Brigade (2004).

40

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.84

FBI agents began interviewing detainees, assisting military

interrogators, and receiving assistance from military personnel at in

the fall of 2003, and by mid-2004 FBI agents were working in

. The decision to send FBI personnel to work with

later in 2004 stemmed from the conclusion that

interviewing agents would be best positioned there to obtain information

that was fresher and more useful than what they were obtaining at Abu

Ghraib. According to a former Deputy OSC, however, he met with the TSF

commander in the spring of 2004 in connection with the decision to involve

FBI agents, and told him that the FBI could not and would not participate in

interviews in which techniques or tactics beyond those permitted for FBI

agents were used. According to the Deputy OSC, the commander told him

this would not be a problem.

Another FBI agent told us that the military used a form at the III

detainee interrogation facility that was similar to the form used at Abu

Ghraib. The a ent told us that before he was allowed to enter the III

in the first half of 2004, the military required him to sign a

pre-printed form indicating that this was a classified facility and that the

types of methods used to ather information from detainees included the

use of

33

41

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.85

From the time the military moved in mid-2004

through the end of the year, the FBI deployed between 8 and 14 FBI

ersonnel at at any one time. The FBI contingent working at

included agents, language specialists, a Computer Analysis and

El

Response Team (CART) examiner, a reports officer, a Criminal Justice

Information Systems Division (CJIS) biometric processing technician, and a

supervisor.

ents would sometimes wait

until the detainees were sent to or Abu Ghraib, before

interviewing the detainees at those facilities. As elsewhere in Iraq, FBI

agents who worked at considered themselves as visitors or "guests"

on 1•1111=11"turf." They said they were instructed by the FBI to

conduct themselves as FBI agents in detainee interviews and otherwise.

FBI afiritilso told us that the military commanders were always

present at , were actively engaged to ensure that control was

maintained over the detainees, guards, and interrogators, and participated

in the twice-daily shift-change staff meetings. FBI personnel participated in

the 24-hour per day operations at the facility, which were divided into two

12-hour shifts seven days per week.

After the

, the detainees were

made available to FBI personnel. The FBI focused on selected detainees

believed to have some U.S. connection or information regarding potential

terrorism threats to the United States, such as friends or famil living in the

. Beginning in 2004, the FBI agents' work expanded to

include assistance to the milit debriefin detainees for locall useful

milit. information

Church Report at 249. Between July

and September 2003, for example, FBI agents conducted one or two

interviews of such detainees per week at . An OSC told us

that the military brought in and set u air-conditioned trailers, which were

used for various purposes at , such as housing, offices, mess

42

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.86

hall, and detainee interview rooms. The FBI primarily sought to interview

detainees who had been members of the Iraqi intelligence services,

particularly those who may have traveled to the United States. The military

also asked for FBI assistance in questioning former Iraqi political leaders

held there. In general, the military personnel escorted the detainees to the

trailers and back to their cells after the interviews were completed.

Camp Bucca. Published re orts and FBI documents indicate that

Cam Bucca was a

'n the southeastern Iraqi desert near the Kuwaiti

border.

The Church Report stated that the U.S. military assumed

responsibility for the detention facility at Camp Bucca in April 2003.

Church Report at 249. The March 2004 Taguba Report of the military's

investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade mentioned allegations of

detainee abuses, including abuses by four soldiers at Camp Bucca in May

2003, but did not describe the alleged incidents. Taguba Report at 6, 7.

The bulk of the FBI's work at Camp Bucca related to collecting

detainee biometric data. However, FBI agents also conducted a significant

number of detainee interviews at the camp. A team of FBI agents was first

deployed there during the first half of 2004 and conducted approximately

120 detainee interviews during that period. During the second half of 2004,

other FBI personnel traveled to Camp Bucca for short periods to interview

specific detainees.

Camp Ashraf. Camp Ashraf, which is located in eastern Iraq near the

Iranian border, was operated by . As of early 2005,

the camp housed approximately 3,800 members of the Mujahedin-E-Khalq

(MEK), an anti-Iranian paramilitary group designated as a terrorist

organization by the State Department in 1997. Church Report at 249. The

MEK members held there were Iraqi defectors who had been allied with

Saddam Hussein in an effort to overthrow the current Iranian government.

FBI personnel told us that the FBI started interviewing MEK

personnel at this camp sometime during the fall of 2003. In 2004, FBI

agents continued to interview detainees there to support potential criminal

cases in the US. During 2004, between 10 and 17 FBI personnel worked at

Camp Ashraf at any one time. In addition, between November 2003 to

January 2004, FBI personnel biometrically processed some 3,600 MEK

detainees there.

43

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.87

Mosul and Other Iraqi Cities. The FBI's counterterrorism operations

in Iraq included detainee interviews during the period of September 2003

through March 2004 in and around the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. The

FBI contingent in Mosul varied from seven to nine people. Their work

included assistance to military intelligence and Iraqi personnel with

detainee interrogations. FBI agents also went to Fallujah and Ramadi

during this period to gather information and documents from high value

targets after they were captured by the military and the Iraqi police.

b. Joint Interviews with Military Investigators

Many FBI agents who served in Iraq told the OIG that they worked

jointly with military personnel in planning, preparing for, and conducting

detainee interviews, particularly in 2003. Of the approximately 275 FBI

personnel who served in Iraq and responded to the OIG survey, 125 stated

that they jointly interviewed detainees with military or intelligence agency

personnel. In some of these cases, however, the non-FBI participant was a

contract interpreter or was merely observing the interview rather than

participating in it.

The practice of conducting joint interviews with other agencies

appears to have been more common in the early part of the Iraq conflict

than in later years. A former Deputy OSC told us that in late 2003 and

early 2004 it was not unusual for both FBI and military personnel to

question a detainee together, and several other agents described conducting

joint interviews during this period at various detention facilities.

As 2004 progressed, however, it appears that FBI agents teamed up

with each other as much as possible for detainee interviews.34 A former

OSC told us that in the first half of 2004, his agents generally did not jointly

interview detainees with military personnel, and that to the extent that they

did the FBI agent controlled the interview and FBI rules were followed.

Some agents stated that they never jointly interviewed detainees with

military interrogators in the second half of 2004. Moreover, another former

OSC told the OIG that during his work in Iraq between July 2004 and

January 2005, the general rule for FBI personnel was that all FBI interviews

were to be done with a team of two FBI agents in the room at all times.

An FBI supervisor at told us that he established guidelines

for detainee interviews at the facility with guidance from the OSC and FBI

Headquarters, including the rule that the interviews were to be conducted

34 This evolution in practice may have been related to the Abu Ghraib disclosures in

April 2004 and the issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, which reiterated that

agents should not participate in interrogations involving techniques not approved under

FBI policies (see Chapter Six).

44

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.88

by teams of two FBI agents only, ending a practice of joint interviews with

the military at the facility. However, one of the De uty OSCs during the

second half of 2004 told us that at it was not unusual for

FBI agents to be teamed up with military interrogators for particular

interviews of detainees, and that he was not aware of any policy that FBI

agents had to work only with other agents.

Other FBI agents said they worked in close coordination with the

military. For example, one FBI agent told us that he conducted joint

interviews with a military analyst who sat in and took notes, and that the

military analyst would make suggestions to the FBI agent for further

questioning based on his experience in Afghanistan and his understanding

of the information needed. The FBI agent also stated that there was a

military interrogator who was assigned to interview the same detainee. The

military interrogator would interview this detainee during the day while the

FBI agent interviewed the detainee at night. In between shifts, the two

would share the info 'nation they had received and develop strategies for

further questioning of the detainee.

Another FBI agent noted that in Mosul there was no established

prison, and FBI agents deployed there conducted more joint interviews of

detainees with military interrogators than elsewhere in Iraq.

c. Other FBI Activities in Iraq

The FBI also devoted significant resources in Iraq to collecting

biometric data from large numbers of detainees, and conducting a small

number of military sensitive site exploitations.

The FBI's CJIS agents collected biometric information from more than

8,000 detainees in Iraq during the latter part of 2003 through the end of

2004. 35 For example, in September through December 2003, CJIS agents

fingerprinted, photographed, and collected DNA from approximately 2,000

detainees at Abu Ghraib, , Mosul, and other

35 At Abu Ghraib Prison, CJIS personnel did not process the detainees inside any of

the interior brick and mortar structures, but instead worked in tents within the walled

prison compound.

45

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.89

locations. The FBI also participated in military sensitive site exploitations in

Iraq, but to a much lesser extent than in Afghanistan.

In addition to counterterrorism work, the FBI allocated substantial

resources during 2003 and 2004 to criminal field investigations of bombings

and murders in Baghdad and other locations. FBI resources were also

focused in large measure on the recovery and analysis of Improvised

Explosive Devices (IED) and vehicle borne IEDs. This FBI activity included

extensive work on the bombings of the Jordanian and Turkish Embassies,

the Red Cross and United Nations buildings, and the mosque in an Najaf, as

well as several high-profile murder investigations of U.S. or CPA personnel.

46

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.90

CHAPTER THREE

BACKGROUND REGARDING INTERROGATION POLICIES

In this chapter we describe the interview policies of the FBI and the

interrogation policies adopted by the military for questioning detainees.

These policies, and the tensions between them, provide essential context for

the rest of this report. First, we describe the FBI's policies for conducting

custodial interviews that were in place when the FBI began participating in

the questioning of detainees in military zones. These policies were based in

large part on constitutional requirements of voluntariness and legal

admissibility of witness statements in subsequent prosecutions, together

with the FBI's belief that rapport-based interview techniques are the most

reliable and effective means of obtaining accurate information. Second, we

summarize the vastly different interrogation policies adopted by the

Department of Defense (DOD) for use in the military zones. The DOD

policies approved many methods that were prohibited for use by FBI agents

under FBI policies.

I. Pre-existing FBI Policies and Practices

Most of the FBI's written policies regarding permissible interview

techniques for agents and for agent conduct in collaborative or foreign

interviews were developed prior to the September 11 attacks. When these

policies were drafted, they reflected the FBI's primary focus on domestic law

enforcement, which emphasized obtaining information for use in

investigating and prosecuting crimes. These policies are designed to assure

that witness statements meet legal and constitutional requirements of

voluntariness so that they are admissible in court and do not undermine the

admissibility of any other evidence developed in the investigation as a result

of the witness interview.

However, constitutional and evidentiary considerations were not the

only rationales for the FBI's prohibition on the use of coercive interview

techniques. On various occasions, the FBI has asserted its belief that the

most effective way to obtain accurate information is to use rapport-building

techniques in interviews.

A. FBI Interview/Interrogation Techniques

The FBI's interrogation policies are set forth in the FBI's Legal

Handbook for Special Agents ("the LHBSA" or "the Handbook"), the Manual

of Investigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG), and the Manual of

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Administrative and Operational Procedures (MAOP).36 Section 7 of the

Handbook relates to "Confessions and Interrogations." Section 7-1 of the

Handbook states: "The most important limitations on the admissibility of

an accused's incriminating statements are the requirements that they be

voluntary; that they be obtained without the government resorting to

outrageous behavior; and that they be obtained without violating the

accused's right to remain silent or to have a lawyer present." Section 7-2

states: "A conviction based on an involuntary statement, without regard to

its truth or falsity, is a denial of the accused's right to due process of law. A

coerced confession will undermine the legitimacy of a conviction." Section

7-2.1 of the Handbook states, among other things, that "[i]t is the policy of

the FBI that no attempt be made to obtain a statement by force, threats, or

promises."

The Handbook discusses the factors affecting judicial assessments of

voluntariness, including: (a) notification of charges; (b) age, intelligence,

and experience of the accused; (c) physical condition of the accused; (d)

physical abuse, threats of abuse, use of weapons, number of officers

present; (e) threats and psychological pressure; (f) privation: food, sleep,

medication; g) isolation, incommunicado interrogation; (h) duration of

questioning; (i) trickery, ruse, deception; (j) advice of rights; and (k)

promises of leniency or other inducements. The Handbook notes that

courts use a "totality of circumstances" test when determining the

voluntariness of a witness's statement, and that the presence of any one or

more of the factors mentioned above will not necessarily render a statement

involuntary. LHBSA at 7-2.2. FBI training materials also focus on the

"totality of the circumstances" standard and give examples of circumstances

under which courts have held that confessions are coercive and

36 Although some FBI agents told us that they conduct "interviews" rather than

"interrogations," several FBI policies use the latter term. An FBI Unit Chief described the

distinction: "An interview is the process of obtaining information from an individual willing

to provide information about themselves or others. An interview is also usually the first

step prior to moving to an interrogation phase with someone believed to be unwilling to

provide accurate or truthful details about information they have. When the interview is

done immediately prior to an interrogation it is used to obtain the information the person is

readily willing to provide, biographical info and 'their version of events,' and is used to build

rapport and identify themes that can be used during the interrogation. The interrogation

phase is the process used to obtain the information that the person does not want to

provide for any number of reasons. . . . The interrogation phase will typically involve the

interrogator accusing, directly or indirectly, the interrogee of something, such as

withholding information or having provided false information." FBI training materials make

a similar distinction. E.g. FBI Law Enforcement Communication Unit, "Interviewing and

Interrogation" (10/14/04) at 72. However, the FBI and DOD policies discussed in this

section regarding the use of potentially coercive techniques do not distinguish between the

interview and interrogation phases with respect to preserving the voluntariness of a

statement. In this report, we generally do not distinguish between interviews and

interrogations for purposes of discussing compliance with FBI or DOD policies.

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inadmissible, including: a confession made to avoid a credible threat of

physical violence; a confession induced by an explicit promise of leniency;

and a confession induced by misleading the subject to believe that failure to

confess will result in adverse consequences for others.37

In general, prior to a custodial interrogation in a criminal

investigation, an accused individual is entitled to be warned of his

constitutional rights, typically by receiving a Miranda warning. LHBSA 7-

3.1. If, after being advised of his rights, a suspect in custody indicates that

he wishes to remain silent or that he wants an attorney, all interrogation

must cease at that time. LHBSA 7-2.1(1). Section 7-15 of the Handbook

states: "Persons interviewed by Agents while in police custody in a foreign

country must be given the usual warning of rights under American Federal

law as fully as possible."

The FBI's MAOP also describes the importance of FBI agents not

engaging in certain activities when conducting investigative activities,

including foreign counterintelligence. MAOP Part 1, Section 1-4. The MAOP

states that "[n]o brutality, physical violence, duress or intimidation of

individuals by our employees will be countenanced...." MAOP, Part 1,

Section 1-4(4). The MAOP also stresses that "[a]s member of a federal

investigative agency, FBI employees must at all times zealously guard and

defend the rights and liberties guaranteed to all individuals by the

constitution." MAOP, Part 1, Section 1-4(2). According to the MAOP,

violations of these policies must be reported to FBI Headquarters. MAOP,

Part 1, Section 1-4(5); see also MAOP, Part 1, Section 13-1(2) ("It is

imperative that any information pertaining to allegations of misconduct or

improper performance of duty coming to the attention of any Bureau

employee be promptly and fully reported to FBIHQ.")

Although the FBI's involvement in intelligence gathering functions

expanded significantly after the September 11 attacks, the FBI often

participated in intelligence-gathering activities before that date. Before the

September 11 terrorist attacks and the change in FBI priorities, the FBI had

not established a different set of procedures for interviews or interrogations

for situations where no prosecution in U.S. courts was contemplated.

B. Working with Other Agencies

Prior to the September 11 attacks, the FBI had policies in place for

working with other government agencies, both domestic and foreign, in joint

37 A. Louis DiPietro, "Lies, Promises, or Threats - The Voluntariness of

Confessions," reprinted in FBI Academy training manual "Interviewing and Interrogation"

(10/14/2004) at 92-96.

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or cooperative investigations. However, the FBI's work with the military in

GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq raised issues regarding which agency's

interrogation policies would apply, and how the FBI would work with

personnel from other agencies operating under different interrogation rules.

1. FBI Interaction with Other Domestic Law

Enforcement Agencies

The FBI has extensive experience working jointly with other federal,

state, and local law enforcement agencies. FBI agents often conduct joint

interviews in the normal course of their duties. FBI agents told us that they

are trained to always adhere to FBI protocols, not to other agencies' rules

with respect to interview policies or evidence collection.

Yet, the FBI's experience working with other domestic agencies

provided limited precedent for the FBI's work with the military overseas on

detainee interviews. In past cases, the other agencies were usually other

law enforcement organizations (such as state or local police) that were also

focused on prosecuting crimes in domestic courts and were subject to

similar concerns about voluntariness that drive the FBI's established

interrogation policies. Typically, there was not a major conflict between the

policies and practices of these agencies and those of the FBI. Moreover, in

most cases prior to September 11 the FBI was the lead agency and therefore

positioned to direct which interrogation policies would apply.

After the September 11 attacks, the FBI's mission expanded to

include working jointly with the military frequently. This mission gave rise

to circumstances in which (1) entities other than the FBI were the lead

agencies and had custody of the witnesses, (2) prosecution of crimes was

not necessarily the primary goal of the interrogations, and (3) the

evidentiary rules of U.S. Article III courts did not necessarily apply.

2. FBI Interaction with Agencies of Foreign

Governments

Even prior to the September 11 attacks, FBI investigations required

agents to work abroad. For example, the FBI regularly investigated terrorist

attacks that occurred abroad but that involved U.S. targets. These activities

required the FBI to cooperate with or assist the law enforcement agencies of

foreign governments. The FBI has an extensive system of Legal Attaches

(LEGAT) stationed in U.S. embassies to coordinate FBI work in foreign

countries.

FBI policy states: "Agents have no jurisdiction in foreign countries,

hence, cannot exercise the power of arrest, search or seizure in such

places." LHBSA 3-11; see also MIOG, Part 2, Sections 1-2.3.3 and 23-

8.2(3)(a). The FBI's Legal Handbook further states that agents cannot

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participate in interviews with prisoners except in places of incarceration and

in the presence of foreign authorities. It also states, "Agents are not to

participate in any unauthorized or unlawful actions even though invited to

do so by a cooperating foreign officer." Id.

In some cases, the FBI worked with agencies of foreign governments

that were governed by a different set of rules for interrogations. In such

cases, for example, an FBI agent might observe a foreign agent using a

technique in a foreign interrogation that was lawful for the foreign agent but

that would be prohibited for an FBI agent. This scenario provides a

potential analogy for the issue of FBI cooperation with U.S. military

investigators conducting interrogations using techniques permitted by the

military but not by the FBI.

As detailed in Chapter Six of this Report, on May 19, 2004, the FBI

issued a policy specifically relating to the treatment of prisoners and

detainees (the "FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy"). The Policy includes the

following statement, which the FBI's Office of General Counsel characterized

not as a new policy but rather as "reaffirm[ing] prior FBI policy":

FBI personnel who participate in interrogations with non-FBI

personnel . . . shall at all times comply with FBI policy for the

treatment of persons detained. FBI personnel shall not

participate in any treatment or use any interrogation technique

that is in violation of these guidelines regardless of whether the

co-interrogator is in compliance with his or her own guidelines.

If a co-interrogator is complying with the rules of his or her

agency, but is not in compliance with FBI rules, FBI personnel

may not participate in the interrogation and must remove

themselves from the situation. (Emphasis in original.)

However, we did not find any pre-September 11 FBI written policies

specifically addressing the scenario of FBI agents working with agencies of

foreign governments who were governed by a different set of rules for

interrogations, or that defined what constitutes "participation" in an

interrogation controlled by another entity.

C. FBI Duty to Report

Another set of FBI policies in place prior to the September 11 attacks

that are potentially applicable to the FBI's activities in GTMO, Afghanistan,

and Iraq related to the duty of FBI personnel to report allegations of

misconduct by FBI employees and other government employees. The FBI's

MAOP requires FBI agents to report allegations of misconduct by FBI

employees to FBI Headquarters:

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As the government's primary investigative service . . . [i]t is

imperative that any information pertaining to allegations of

misconduct or improper performance of duty coming to the

attention of any Bureau employee be promptly and fully

reported to FBIHQ, and it is the continuing responsibility of

Bureau officials to see to it that the employees under their

supervision are properly indoctrinated regarding this

requirement so that they not only will fully understand it, but

will comply with it.

MAOP Part 1, Section 13-1 (1) and 13-1(2). Part 1, Section 263-2 of the

MIOG provides similar guidance, stating that all allegations of "criminality

or serious misconduct" on the part of FBI employees must be reported to

FBI Headquarters.

The Legal Handbook for Special Agents specifically addresses the

obligation of agents to report misconduct during witness interviews. The

Handbook's Policy for Confessions and Interrogations states:

If, during an interview with a witness, suspect, or subject,

questions are raised by such persons or if anything transpires

which gives reasonable grounds to believe that subsequently

such questions or incident may be used by someone in an effort

to place an Agent or the FBI in an unfavorable light, an

electronic communication regarding such questions or incident

should be immediately prepared for the SAC. The SAC is

responsible for promptly advising FBIHQ and the USA of such

questions or incident and FBIHQ must be promptly informed of

all developments. LHBSA 7-2.1(2).

Thus, the duty of an FBI employee to report on activities of other FBI

employees goes beyond reports of criminal conduct. This duty includes an

obligation to report on misconduct, improper performance, and events that

may reasonably be used to place an agent or the FBI in an "unfavorable

light."

In contrast, prior to the issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee

Policy, the duty of an FBI employee to report on the activities of non-FBI

government personnel was limited to criminal behavior. This limited duty

arose not from any FBI policy, but from federal law, which requires all

government employees, including those of the FBI, to report criminal

behavior by any government employees, including employees of the DOD, to

the Department of Justice. See 28 U.S.C. § 535. We did not find any FBI

policy prior to May 2004 imposing an obligation on FBI employees to report

misconduct by non-FBI government employees falling short of a crime, such

as conduct that might violate other agencies' own interrogation policies.

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IL Department of Defense Interrogation Policies

In this Section we provide a brief summary of the detainee

interrogation policies adopted by the Department of Defense (DOD) after the

September 11 attacks for prisoners and detainees.38 These policies are

relevant to the OIG's review for several reasons. First, the tension between

DOD policies and the FBI's interview policies was an important factor in the

FBI's efforts to provide workable guidance for its agents in the military

zones. FBI agents in the military zones faced difficulties as a result of the

stark differences between the FBI's conventional law enforcement

techniques and the more aggressive interrogation techniques of military and

intelligence agencies.

Second, a significant portion of our review was directed at

determining what information FBI agents acquired during their deployments

in the military zones regarding the treatment of detainees by any U.S.

government personnel, not just by FBI agents themselves. The vast majority

of the incidents that the FBI agents reported to us involved the conduct of

interrogators from the DOD and the CIA. However, interrogators from other

agencies were governed by their own agencies' interrogation policies, not the

policies of the FBI.

It is generally beyond the jurisdiction of the OIG and the scope of this

investigation to make determinations regarding whether particular conduct

by non-FBI interrogators violated their agencies' policies. However, as

detailed in Chapter Six, beginning in May 2004 FBI policy required FBI

agents to report to their superiors any incidents of known or suspected

abuse or mistreatment of detainees by other agencies' interrogators. As

explained in Chapter Six, some FBI agents were told that, under this policy,

they should report any interrogation technique that the agent believed was

outside the legal authority of the interrogator. Under this interpretation,

FBI agents would need to have some familiarity with other agencies' policies

in order to comply with the FBI's policy.

Third, FBI agents in the military zones had a unique opportunity to

observe the conduct of other agencies' interrogators. The public allegations

of detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib prison, GTMO, and other detention

facilities mainly related to the conduct of non-FBI personnel. Therefore,

while we do not make determinations regarding whether the conduct of

other agency personnel reported to us by FBI agents violated their agencies'

38 As detailed in subsequent chapters, some of the interrogation techniques that

caused the most concern to the FBI were used by the CIA, not the military. However, as

stated in Chapter One, our review generally did not cover activities at facilities used by the

CIA. Moreover, the vast majority of FBI agent observations discussed in this report relate

to DOD interrogations.

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policies, we refer in this report to potentially applicable policies of other

agencies.

However, it is important to note that we did not review all DOD

policies regarding interrogation of detainees. Our summary of the

interrogation policies of DOD is based primarily on information contained in

the Church Report.

A. Legal Background: the Geneva Conventions, the

Convention Against Torture, and Related Statutes

The legal background for DOD policies regarding the interrogation of

detainees includes the United States' obligations under the Geneva

Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T. 3316,

and the Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons

in Time of War, 6 U.S.T. 3516 (collectively "the Geneva Conventions").39

Additional relevant authorities include the Convention Against Torture and

Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 23 I.L.M.

1027, and the Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340. The applicability of these

authorities to various categories of detainees, as well as the meaning of

"torture" as the word is used in these authorities, have been the subject of

extensive debate and controversy. It is beyond the scope of this report to

address these legal issues. Rather, we briefly summarize these authorities

to provide context for the more specific DOD interrogation policies that are

relevant to our review.

In general, the Geneva Conventions require that enemy prisoners of

war and certain captured civilians be treated humanely at all times. The

Geneva Conventions also prohibit the use of physical or mental torture, or

other forms of coercion, to obtain information from prisoners of war, and

prohibit the use of physical or moral coercion to obtain information from

protected civilians. The provision known as "Common Article 3" protects

detainees from cruel treatment, torture, and outrages upon personal

dignity, "in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment." The War

Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2441, criminalizes under U.S. law certain breaches

of the Geneva Conventions, including breaches of Common Article 3.

On February 7, 2002, President Bush issued a memorandum

declaring that none of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions apply to

members of al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere. The memorandum also

stated that members of the Taliban are "unlawful combatants" and do not

qualify as prisoners of war entitled to the stronger protections of the Geneva

39 The Geneva Conventions also include Geneva I and II, which relate to treatment

of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field or at sea.

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Conventions. However, the President stated that al Qaeda and Taliban

detainees were to be treated "humanely and, to the extent appropriate and

consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the

principles of Geneva." Church Report at 187.

The United States also has obligations under the Convention Against

Torture. The Convention Against Torture defines torture as "any act by

which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally

inflicted on a person" for certain purposes. The United States conditioned

its ratification of the treaty on an understanding that in order to constitute

torture, an act must be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or

mental pain or suffering, and that mental pain or suffering refers to

prolonged mental harm from:

(1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe

physical pain or suffering;

(2) the administration or threatened administration of mind

altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt

profoundly the senses or the personality;

(3) the threat of imminent death; or

(4) the threat that another person will be imminently subjected

to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the

administration of mind-altering substances or other procedures

calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.

The Convention Against Torture also prohibits cruel, inhuman, or

degrading treatment or punishment. However, the Bush Administration has

taken the position that the Convention Against Torture does not apply to

alien detainees held outside of the United States.

The Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340, prohibits torture outside the

United States. Its definition of torture tracks the language of the U.S.

understanding on which the Convention Against Torture was ratified,

summarized above. Citing a DOJ Office of Legal Counsel Opinion (6 Op.

OLC 236 (1982)), the DOD has stated that GTMO is within the special

maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and, as such, is

not "outside of the United States" for purposes of the Torture Statute.

Therefore, according to this interpretation, the Torture Statute applies in

Afghanistan and Iraq but does not apply in GTMO.

On December 30, 2005, the President signed into law the Detainee

Treatment Act, Pub L. No. 109-148. Section 1002 of the Detainee

Treatment Act established the U.S. Army Field Manual as a uniform

standard for detainee treatment and interrogation techniques available for

use on detainees in DOD custody. Section 1003 provided for a global

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prohibition on the use of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment on all

persons in the custody or effective control of the U.S. government. This

provision responded to the Administration's argument that the Convention

Against Torture did not apply to alien detainees held outside U.S. territory.

In July 2006, the Administration announced that, pursuant to the

Supreme Court's decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S.Ct. 2749 (2006),

the U.S. government would henceforth apply Common Article 3 of the

Geneva Conventions to all detainees.

B. DOD Interrogation Policies Relating to GTMO

When interrogations began at GTMO in January 2002, military

interrogators relied on Army Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation,

for guidance as to permissible interrogation techniques. Field Manual 34-

52 listed the following techniques as permissible:

• Direct questioning.

• Incentive - use of luxury items to reward cooperation, with the

implication that the items will be withheld for failure to

cooperate. No withholding of any basic human need such as

food or medicine.

• Emotional Love - playing on detainee's emotional attachments

to create a psychological burden that might be relieved through

cooperation.

• Emotional Hate - playing on detainee's emotional hate, such as

desire for revenge.

• Fear Up (Harsh) - exploiting a detainee's pre-existing fears,

including behaving in an overpowering manner with a loud and

threatening voice.

• Fear Up (Mild) - using a calm, rational approach to exploit the

detainee's pre-existing fears.

• Fear Down - the detainee is soothed and calmed to build

rapport.

• Pride and Ego-Up - use of flattery to prompt cooperation.

• Pride and Ego-Down - goading the detainee by challenging his

loyalty, intelligence, etc., to induce the detainee to provide

information disproving the interrogator.

• Futility - rationally persuading the detainee that it is futile to

resist questioning.

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• We Know All - convince the detainee that the interrogator is allknowing

and resistance to questioning is pointless.

• File and Dossier - preparing a decoy dossier that convinces the

detainee that everything is already known, so resistance is

pointless.

• Establish Your Identity - insist that the detainee is someone

else to induce him to reveal information to clear himself.

• Repetition - induce the detainee to break the monotony by

answering.

• Rapid Fire - questioning in rapid succession, without permitting

detainee to answer.

• Silent - staring at detainee for extended period to induce

nervousness.

• Change of Scene - engaging the detainee in a different

environment to ease his apprehension or catch him with his

guard down.

Church Report at 35-37, 107.

On December 2, 2002, in response to a request from the Commander

of the intelligence task force at GTMO for approval of additional counterresistance

techniques not specifically listed in Field Manual 34-52, the

Secretary of Defense approved the following techniques for use at GTMO:

• Yelling

• Use of multiple interrogators

• Deceiving the detainee by having the interrogator present a false

identity

• Stress positions ("like standing") for a maximum of four hours

• The use of falsified documents or reports

• Isolation for up to 30 days, with any extensions beyond the 30

days requiring approval from the JTF-GTMO Commander

• Interrogation of the detainee in an environment other than the

standard interrogation booth

• Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli

• The use of a hood placed over the detainee's head during

transportation and questioning

• The use of 20-hour interrogations

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• The removal of all comfort items (including religious items)

• Switching the detainee's diet from hot meals to Meals, Ready-to-

Eat (MRE) (American military field rations)

• Removal of clothing

• Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc.)

• The use of a detainee's individual phobias (such as fear of dogs)

to induce stress

• The use of mild, non-injurious physical contact such as

grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing.

Church Report at 4-5, 116-7.

On January 15, 2003, however, the Secretary of Defense rescinded

his approval of all of the techniques he had approved in December 2002;

except the first three (yelling, multiple interrogators, and false identity).

Church Report at 5, 118-121. According to the Church Report, this decision

was made in response to concerns raised by the General Counsel of the

Department of the Navy and others. Id. at 120. The Secretary of Defense

then obtained recommendations from a working group he established to

assess interrogation techniques for use in the war on terror. On April 16,

2003, he promulgated guidance (the April 2003 GTMO Policy) approving 24

techniques for use at GTMO, most of which were taken from or closely

resembled those in Field Manual 34-52. The April 2003 GTMO Policy also

approved the following additional techniques:

• Mutt and Jeff - using a team consisting of a friendly and a

harsh interrogator (i.e. "good cop/bad cop").

• Change of Scenery Down - placing detainee in a less

comfortable setting (not a substantial change in environmental

quality).

• Dietary Manipulation - changing detainee's diet (no deprivation

of food or water).

• Environmental Manipulation - creating moderate discomfort

such as by adjusting temperature or introducing unpleasant

smell (avoid injury to detainee; detainee accompanied at all

times).

• Sleep Adjustment - adjusting the sleeping times of the detainee

(not "sleep deprivation").

• False Flag - convincing detainee that the interrogator is from a

country other than the U.S.

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• Isolation - isolating the detainee from other detainees while

complying with basic standard of treatment.

Church Report at 137-39.

The April 2003 GTMO Policy specified conditions for the use of these

techniques, including the requirement that the techniques be used as part

of a specific interrogation plan with appropriate supervision, limits on

duration, and the availability of medical personnel. Church Report at 140.

It also required an advance determination of military necessity from the

SOUTHCOM Commander and notice to the Secretary of Defense for the use

of techniques called Incentive/Removal of Incentive, Pride and Ego-Down,

Mutt and Jeff, and Isolation. Id.

The April 2003 GTMO Policy continued in effect for GTMO until

September 2006, when the U.S. Army issued Field Manual 2-22.3,

discussed below in part E of this Section.

C. DOD Policies Relating to Afghanistan

According to the Church Report, from October 2001 until January

2003 the only official guidance regarding military detainee interrogation

techniques in effect in Afghanistan was that contained in Field Manual 34-

52, which is described above. Church Report at 186.

On January 24, 2003, an Assistant Staff Judge Advocate sent a

memorandum to CENTCOM that described the interrogation techniques

being used in Afghanistan and recommended that that these techniques be

approved as official policy. The memorandum listed many techniques

similar to those approved under the December 2002 GTMO Policy. The

memorandum divided the techniques into "battlefield" techniques and

techniques being used at the Bagram Collection Point. The listed

techniques included:

Battlefield Techniques

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Bagram Collection Point Techniques

Church Report at 196-99.

In addition, the January 2003 memorandum requested approval for

several additional battlefield techniques:

Church Report at 198-99, 202.

According to the Church Report, neither CENTCOM nor the Joint Staff

responded to the January 2003 memorandum, and the Combined Joint

Task Force legal staff concluded that the techniques then in use were

unobjectionable to military superiors and could be considered an approved

policy for Afghanistan. Church Report at 201.

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In February 2003, after a military investigation into two detainee

deaths at the Bagram Collection Point in December 2002,

issued several changes to approved interrogation tactics:

Church Report at 203-04.

In March 2004, the military issued a new policy for Afghanistan

interrogations (the "March 2004 Afghanistan Policy"), which was based on

the prior Afghanistan policies and the April 2003 GTMO Policy. The March

2004 Afghanistan Policy added dietary manipulation, environmental

manipulation, and "false flag" to the list of approved techniques, and relaxed

the prior prohibitions on hooding and using "safety positions" as an

incentive for cooperation. Church Report at 205-09.

In June 2004, in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib disclosures, the

military in Afghanistan adopted the same policy that was issued for Iraq on

May 13, 2004 (discussed in the next section). Church Report at 209-11.

D. DOD Policies Relating to Iraq

For the first few months of the war in Iraq, beginning in March 2003,

military interrogators were governed by Field Manual 34-52, described in

Section B above. Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez issued the first

CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy on September 14,

2003, describing 29 specific permissible interrogation techniques (the

"September 2003 Iraq Policy"). Church Report at 257, 263-264. The first 24

techniques were adopted nearly verbatim from the April 2003 GTMO Policy

approved by the Secretary of Defense. Id. at 265. The additional five

techniques were:

• The presence of muzzled and controlled military working dogs to

exploit Arab fear of dogs.

• Sleep management (limiting detainee sleep to as little as 4

hours per 24 hour period for up to 3 days).

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• Yelling, loud music, and light control.

• Deception through false representations, documents, and

reports.

• Stress positions for up to 1 hour per use.

Church Report at 265.

The September 2003 Iraq Policy also required that military

interrogators obtain approval from the Commander of CJTF-7 for the use of

certain techniques on enemy prisoners of war. Church Report at 265.

On October 12, 2003, the Commander of CJTF-7 issued a revised

Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (the "October 2003 Iraq

Policy"). Church Report at 268. This policy superseded the September 2003

Iraq Policy and removed 12 of the techniques that had been approved in it,

including "Sleep Adjustment," "Sleep Management," "Presence of Military

Working Dogs," and "Stress Positions." Nevertheless, the October 2003 Iraq

Policy included a "General Safeguard" that "should military working dogs be

present during interrogations, they will be muzzled and under the control of

the handler at all times . . . ." Church Report at 257, 267-269. Like its

predecessor, the October 2003 Iraq Policy required Commander approval for

techniques not specifically listed. The policy was limited in application to

interrogations of "security detainees," thereby excluding enemy prisoners of

war and criminal detainees. According to the Church Report, however, the

policy contained no specific guidance to assist soldiers in making the

practical determination as to how standards of treatment varied for each

category of detainee. Church Report at 268.

On May 13, 2004, CJTF-7 adopted a new Interrogation and Counter

Resistance Policy for Iraq, which was issued in the wake of the Abu Ghraib

abuse revelations. The list of approved techniques did not change from the

October 2003 Iraq Policy, but the revision further specified that "under no

circumstances" would requests for the use of "sleep management, stress

positions, change of scenery, diet manipulation, environment manipulation,

or sensory deprivation . . . be approved." Church Report at 270. In January

2005, the military adopted an interrogation policy for Iraq which, according

to the Church Report, approved only those techniques listed in Field Manual

34-52 and which provided additional safeguards, prohibitions, and

clarifications. It added explicit prohibitions against the removal of clothing

and the use or presence of military working dogs during interrogations. Id.

at 271.

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E. Recent Changes to DOD Policy

In September 2006, the U.S. Army issued Field Manual 2-22.3

regarding Human Intelligence Collector Operations. This manual responded

to the mandate of the Detainee Treatment Act, which was enacted in

December 2005, for a uniform standard for treatment of detainees under

DOD custody. Id. at 5-74. Field Manual 2-22.3 reiterated and elaborated

on many of the techniques listed in its predecessor, Field Manual 34-52, but

placed much greater emphasis on rapport-based interrogation techniques

similar to those endorsed by the FBI. It also identified several prohibited

actions, including:

• Nudity, or sexual acts or poses

• Hooding or duct-tape over the detainee's eyes

• Beatings, shock, burns, or other pain

• Waterboarding

• Using military working dogs in interrogations

• Inducing hypothermia or heat injury

• Mock executions

• Deprivation of food, water, or medical care

Id. at 5-75. Field Manual 2-22.3 also placed detailed controls on the use of

the technique of "separation," which is the isolation of detainees from other

detainees. Id. at 8-71.

However, Field Manual 2-22.3 was not in effect during any part of the

period that was the focus of the OIG's review.

III. Reasons for the Differences Between the FBI and Military

Approaches to Interviews

Several witnesses explained the reasons for the differences between

the interview philosophies of the FBI and the military, which resulted in the

dramatically different interview policies adopted by each organization during

the period of this review and eventually led to a dispute between the FBI

and the DOD over the interrogation of a high value detainee.

FBI witnesses and documents described the rationale for the noncoercive

rapport-based techniques traditionally used by the FBI in

combination with purposeful and incremental manipulation of a detainee's

environment and perceptions. As explained by FBI agents and described in

FBI documents, these techniques are designed to obtain reliable cooperation

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on a long-term basis, even from individuals who have been repeatedly

interviewed and may have become cynical of any offers of early release or

special consideration. FBI agents told us that the FBI's approach, coupled

with a strong substantive knowledge of al Qaeda, had produced extensive

useful information in pre-September 11 terrorism investigations and were

also successful in the post-September 11 context. Many FBI witnesses also

stated that they believed that FBI agents had skills and expertise that would

enable them to make a significant contribution to the government's overseas

intelligence gathering mission.

FBI agents and documents indicated that the FBI understood that the

more aggressive or coercive techniques used by military intelligence were

originally designed for short-term use in a combat environment with

recently captured individuals, where the immediate retrieval of tactical

intelligence is critical for force protection. Some military techniques were

based on methods used in military training known as SERE (Survival,

Evasion, Resistance, and Escape), which prepares U.S. soldiers and airmen

on methods to resist interrogation. For example, a former FBI Section Chief

in CTD asserted that the military's view was: "You have your way and we

have our way. You have the luxury of time; we have force protection and

need info fast."

Department of Justice officials also told the OIG that they agreed with

the FBI's viewpoint regarding the best approach to take with the detainees.

For example, David Nahmias, Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for

the Criminal Division, stated that this view, which was "shared strongly by

those of us in the Criminal Division and . . . in the Department generally,"

was that the FBI's approach to detainees had been very successful with

terrorism subjects in criminal cases. This approach, according to Nahmias,

is to establish a rapport, treat the people with respect, and try to make them

into long-term strategic sources of information "in the way we flip bad guys

all the time." Nahmias told the OIG the he understood that the military's

aggressive approach was rooted in military intelligence training designed to

obtain time-sensitive battlefield information, but that these techniques do

not work in the long run. Similarly, David Ayres, Chief of Staff to Attorney

General Ashcroft, told the OIG that DOJ's view was that long-term

cooperation leads to better cooperation and leads to better protection of the

country.40

DOJ witnesses told us that from the outset, there was an operating

viewpoint dictated at a very high level that this was a military situation and

40 Several witnesses told us that the dispute over the best approach was

exacerbated by the fact that the DOD interrogators were often inexperienced and not

particularly well trained about al-Qaeda.

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the military approach should prevail, in part because the military controlled

the detainees and locations. As detailed in Chapter Five, this dispute came

to a head during the interrogation of a particular high value detainee at

GTMO.

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CHAPTER FOUR

THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF FBI POLICIES REGARDING

DETAINEE INTERVIEWS AND INTERROGATIONS

In this chapter we describe the early development of the FBI's policies

governing the conduct of its agents who participated in interviews or

interrogations in foreign military zones. This process began in 2002, when

FBI Director Mueller decided that the FBI would not participate in

interrogations involving aggressive techniques that were approved for other

agencies in military zones. The issue came to a head when the FBI sought

to participate in the interrogation of a high value detainee, Abu Zubaydah,

who was under the control of the CIA.

I. The Interrogation of Abu Zubaydah

The first major incident involving the use of aggressive interrogation

techniques on a detainee that was reported to senior executives at FBI

Headquarters was the case of a detainee known as Abu Zubaydah.

Zubaydah was suspected of being a principal al Qaeda operational

commander. In late March 2002, he was captured in Faisalabad, Pakistan.

There was a gunfight during the arrest operation and Zubaydah was

severely wounded. He was then taken to a secret CIA facility for medical

treatment and interrogation.

Initially, the FBI and the CIA planned a joint effort to obtain

intelligence from Zubaydah regarding potential future terrorist attacks. The

FBI selected SSAs Gibson and Thomas to travel to the CIA facility to

interview Zubaydah.41 Gibson and Thomas were selected for the

assignment because they were familiar with al-Qaeda and the Zubaydah

investigation, were skilled interviewers, and spoke Arabic.

A. FBI Agents Interview Zubaydah and Report to FBI

Headquarters on CIA Techniques

Gibson and Thomas were instructed by their FBI supervisor, Charles

Frahm (Acting Deputy Assistant Director for the section that later became

the Counterterrorism Division), that the CIA was in charge of the Zubaydah

matter and that the FBI agents were there to provide assistance. Frahm

told the agents that Zubaydah was not to be given any Miranda warnings.

Frahm told the OIG that he instructed Thomas and Gibson to leave the

41 Thomas and Gibson are pseudonyms.

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facility and call Headquarters if the CIA began using techniques that gave

the agents discomfort.

Gibson said that he and Thomas initially took the lead in interviewing

Zubaydah at the CIA facility because the CIA interrogators were not at the

scene when Zubaydah arrived. Gibson said he used relationship-building

techniques with Zubaydah and succeeded in getting Zubaydah to admit his

identity. When Zubaydah's medical condition became grave, he was taken

to a hospital and Gibson assisted in giving him care, even to the point of

cleaning him up after bowel movements. Gibson told us he continued

interviewing Zubaydah in the hospital, and Zubaydah identified a

photograph of Khalid Sheik Muhammad as "Muktar," the mastermind of the

September 11 attacks.

Within a few days, CIA personnel assumed control over the interviews,

although they asked Gibson and Thomas to observe and assist. Gibson told

the OIG that the CIA interrogators said Zubaydah was only providing

"throw-away information" and that they needed to diminish his capacity to

resist.

Thomas described for the OIG the techniques that he saw the CIA

interrogators use on Zubaydah after they took control of the interrogation.

Thomas

said he raised objections to these techniques to the CIA and told the CIA it

was "borderline torture."42 He stated that Zubaydah was responding to the

FBI's rapport-based approach before the CIA assumed control over the

interrogation, but became uncooperative after being subjected to the CIA's

techniques.

During his interview with the OIG, Gibson did not express as much

concern about the techniques used by the CIA as Thomas did. Gibson

stated, however, that during the period he was working with the CIA, the

CIA shaved Zubaydah's head, sometimes de rived Zuba dah of clothing,

and kept the temperatures in his cell cold.

42 Zubaydah's capture and initial detention are also described in a report by the

CIA Inspector General dated May 7, 2004 (the CIA OIG report). The CIA OIG report made

no mention of the FBI's role in the initial interview of Zubaydah and stated that the CIA

deferred questioning for "several weeks" after Zubaydah was captured on March 27, 2002,

pending Zubaydah's recovery from his severe wounds. According to the CIA OIG report, the

CIA initially interrogated Zubaydah using "non-aggressive, non-physical elicitation

techniques."

, although several of the techniques (loud music and sleep

deprivation for up to 72 hours) are described in the report as "standard interrogation

techniques."

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Gibson said

that the CIA personnel assured him that the procedures being used on

Zubaydah had been approved "at the highest levels" and that Gibson would

not get in any trouble. Gibson stated that during the CIA interrogations

Zubaydah "gave up" Jose Padilla and identified several targets for future al-

Qaeda attacks, including the Brooklyn Bridge and the Statue of Liberty.

Thomas communicated his concerns about the CIA's methods to FBI

Counterterrorism Assistant Director Pasquale D'Amuro by telephone.

D'Amuro and Thomas told the OIG that D'Amuro ultimately gave the

instruction that Thomas and Gibson should come home and not participate

in the CIA interrogation. However, Gibson and Thomas provided the OIG

differing accounts of the circumstances of their departure from the CIA

facility where Zubaydah was being interrogated. Thomas stated that

D'Amuro instructed the agents to leave the facility immediately and that he

complied.

However, Gibson said he was not immediately ordered to leave the

facility. Gibson said that he remained at the CIA facility until some time in

early June 2002, several weeks after Thomas left, and that he continued to

work with the CIA and participate in interviewing Zubaydah. Gibson stated

that he kept Frahm informed of his activities with the CIA by means of

several telephone calls, which Frahm confirmed. Gibson stated the final

decision regarding whether the FBI would continue to participate in the

Zubaydah interrogations was not made until after Gibson returned to the

United States for a meeting about Zubaydah.

Gibson stated that after he returned to the United States he told

D'Amuro that he did not have a "moral objection" to being present for the

CIA techniques because the CIA was acting professionally and Gibson

himself had undergone comparable harsh interrogation techniques as part

of U.S. Army Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training.

Gibson said that after a meeting with the CIA, D'Amuro told him that he

would not be returning to the Zubaydah interview.

B. FBI Assistant Director D'Amuro Meets with DOJ Officials

Regarding the Zubaydah Interrogation

D'Amuro said he discussed the Zubaydah matter with Director

Mueller and later met with Michael Chertoff (then the Assistant Attorney

General for the Criminal Division), Alice Fisher (at the time the Deputy

Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division), and possibly David

Kelley (who was then the First Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Southern

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District of New York), in Chertoff's office in the Justice Department.

D'Amuro said his purpose was to discuss how the FBI could "add value" by

participating in the interviews of "highvalue detainees" because the FBI

already knew the subjects so well. D'Amuro told the OIG that during the

meeting he learned that the CIA had obtained a legal opinion from DOJ that

certain techniques could legally be used, including sleep deprivation, noise,

and constant light, and that the CIA also had sought approval for a

technique involving placing a cloth over a detainee's face and dripping water

so the detainee could not breathe. D'Amuro stated that Chertoff and Fisher

made it clear that the CIA had requested the legal opinion from Attorney

General Ashcroft.

Based on DOJ and CIA documents, we believe that the meeting that

D'Amuro described took place in approximately late July or August 2002.

DOJ documents indicated that the CIA requested an opinion from the DOJ

Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) regarding the proposed use of 10 "Enhanced

Interrogation Techniques" on Zubaydah, including stress positions, sleep

deprivation for up to 11 days, and waterboarding. On July 24 and 26,

2002, the OLC provided oral advice that use of these techniques would not

violate the prohibition against torture in 18 U.S.C. § 2340A. The OLC

memorialized this advice in a memorandum dated August 1, 2002.

According to a CIA OIG report, pursuant to this advice the CIA interrogated

Zuba dah usin "Enhanced Interro ation Techni ues" in Au st 2002.

Fisher told the OIG that it is possible that she attended a meeting in

Chertoff's office with Kelley, D'Amuro, and Chertoff, which concerned who

would take the lead (FBI versus another agency) on the interviews of a high

value detainee. However, she said she had no specific recollection of such a

meeting. Fisher also stated that she did not recall discussing with the FBI

specific techniques for use with detainees. Fisher said she vaguely

remembered a meeting with then FBI General Counsel Kenneth Wainstein

in which they discussed the FBI not being present at CIA interrogations,

and she stated that the meeting would have related to interrogation tactics,

but she said she did not recall any specific techniques being discussed.43

Wainstein, who joined the FBI in July 2002, told us he recalled a number of

discussions relating to the issue of FBI participation in CIA interrogations,

43 Fisher stated that at some point she became aware that the CIA requested advice

regarding specific interrogation techniques, and that OLC had conducted a legal analysis.

She also said she was aware of two OLC memoranda on that topic, but they did not relate

to the FBI. Fisher also told the OIG that Chertoff was very clear that the Criminal Division

was not giving advice on which interrogation techniques were permissible and was not

"signing off" in advance on any techniques.

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but he did not recall this issue arising in connection with a particular

detainee.

Kelley told the OIG that he had numerous conversations with Fisher,

Nahmias, and other DOJ attorneys about topics relating to the

September 11 investigation, but that he could not recall any specific

meetings or conversations regarding the interrogation methods to be used

on high value detainees. Kelley stated that D'Amuro was present during one

or more of these discussions.

Chertoff told us that he could not recall specific conversations about

Zubaydah, but that he did generally recall discussions about whether the

FBI could preserve the admissibility of detainee statements by interviewing

detainees some period after other agencies had completed their

interrogations using non-FBI techniques. Chertoff also told us that he did

not think this approach would successfully prevent the statement from

being "tainted" by any prior enhanced interview techniques.

C. D'Amuro Meets with the FBI Director, Who Decides that the

FBI Will Not Participate

D'Amuro told the OIG that after his meeting at Chertoff's office he met

with Director Mueller and recommended that the FBI not get involved in

interviews in which aggressive interrogation techniques were being used.

He stated that his exact words to Mueller were "we don't do that," and that

someday the FBI would be called to testify and he wanted to be able to say

that the FBI did not participate in this type of activity. D'Amuro said that

the Director agreed with his recommendation that the FBI should not

participate in interviews in which these techniques were used. Based on

D'Amuro's description of events and the dates of contemporaneous

documents relating to the CIA's request for a legal opinion from the OLC, we

believe that D'Amuro's meeting with Mueller took place in approximately

August 2002. This time frame is also consistent with Gibson's recollection

that the final decision regarding whether the FBI would participate in the

Zubaydah interrogations occurred some time after Gibson left the location

where Zubaydah was being held and returned to the United States in June

2002.

D'Amuro gave several reasons to the OIG for his recommendation that

the FBI refrain from participating in the use of these techniques. First, he

said he felt that these techniques were not as effective for developing

accurate information as the FBI's rapport-based approach, which he stated

had previously been used successfully to get cooperation from al-Qaeda

members. He explained that the FBI did not believe these techniques would

provide the intelligence it needed and the FBI's proven techniques would.

He said the individuals being interrogated came from parts of the world

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.115

where much worse interview techniques were used, and they expected the

United States to use these harsh techniques. As a result, D'Amuro did not

think the techniques would be effective in obtaining accurate information.

He said what the detainees did not expect was to be treated as human

beings. He said the FBI had successfully obtained information through

cooperation without the use of "aggressive" techniques. D'Amuro said that

when the interrogator knows the subject matter, vets the information, and

catches an interviewee when he lies, the interrogator can eventually get him

to tell the truth. In contrast, if "aggressive" techniques are used long

enough, detainees will start saying things they think the interrogator wants

to hear just to get them to stop.

Second, D'Amuro told the OIG that the use of the aggressive

techniques failed to take into account an "end game." D'Amuro stated that

even a military tribunal would require some standard for admissibility of

evidence. Obtaining information by way of "aggressive" techniques would

not only jeopardize the government's ability to use the information against

the detainees, but also might have a negative impact on the agents' ability to

testify in future proceedings. D'Amuro also stated that using the techniques

complicated the FBI's ability to develop sources.

Third, D'Amuro stated that in addition to being ineffective and shortsighted,

using these techniques was wrong and helped al-Qaeda in

spreading negative views of the United States. In contrast, D'Amuro noted,

the East Africa bombing trials were public for all the world to see. He said

they were conducted legally and above board and the world saw that the

defendants killed not only Americans but also innocent Muslims. D'Amuro

said he took some criticism from FBI agents who wanted to participate in

interviews involving "aggressive" techniques, but he felt strongly that they

should not participate, and the Director agreed.

Andrew Arena, the Section Chief of the FBI's International Terrorism

Operations Section 1 (ITOS-1), confirmed that D'Amuro argued against the

use of aggressive procedures. Arena told the OIG that he attended a

meeting involving Mueller, D'Amuro, and other FBI employees in 2002

regarding the FBI's participation in aggressive interrogation techniques.

Arena stated that the issue arose when FBI agents became aware that

another government agency was using specific techniques on high value

detainees. Arena stated that there were discussions within the FBI

regarding "should we also go down that track?" Arena told the OIG that

during the meeting D'Amuro predicted that the FBI would have to testify

before Congress some day and that the FBI should be able to say that it did

not participate. Arena said he was present when Director Mueller stated

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.116

that the FBI was not going to get involved with other agencies in using these

techniques at any location.44

We interviewed Director Mueller, who recalled that the FBI wanted to

interrogate someone held by the CIA because the FBI's agents were

knowledgeable about the detainee from prior investigations. Director

Mueller told us he did not know what techniques the CIA would be using

but that he understood they would go beyond techniques that FBI agents

were authorized to use. He stated that he and D'Amuro discussed the fact

that the FBI could not control the interrogation, and they decided that the

FBI would not participate under these circumstances. Director Mueller told

the OIG that although his decision initially did not contemplate other

detainee interrogations, it was carried forward as a bright-line rule when the

issue arose again.

Director Mueller's former Chief of Staff, Daniel Levin, told the OIG

that in the context of the Zubaydah interrogation, he attended a meeting at

the National Security Council (NSC) at which CIA techniques were

discussed. Levin stated that a DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) attorney

gave advice at the meeting about the legality of CIA interrogation

techniques. Levin stated that in connection with this meeting, or

immediately after it, FBI Director Mueller decided that FBI agents would not

participate in interrogations involving techniques the FBI did not normally

use in the United States, even though OLC had determined such techniques

were legal. Levin stated he agreed with this decision because FBI agents

were not trained to use such techniques, using such techniques might

create problems for FBI agents who needed to testify in court, and other

agencies were available to do it.

D'Amuro also described another meeting after the Zubaydah incident

among himself, Director Mueller, a CIA agent, and CIA Director George

Tenet. D'Amuro said that during this meeting, an effort was made to find a

solution that would permit the FBI to interview detainees in CIA custody.

D'Amuro proposed that the FBI be permitted to interview the detainees first,

before the CIA would use its "special techniques." D'Amuro said that the

FBI recognized that it would have a "taint problem" if the FBI conducted its

interviews after the CIA had used the more aggressive techniques. However,

no agreement was reached with the CIA at that time. Director Mueller told

us that he did not specifically recall such a meeting, but that such a

44 Arena stated that FBI Deputy Director Bruce Gebhardt also attended this

meeting. Gebhardt told us he did not recall specific discussions regarding the use of non-

FBI interview methods but stated that neither he nor the Director would have ever allowed

agents to use such techniques.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.117

discussion may have happened in connection with some lower-level

detainees.

II. Subsequent Decisions Regarding FBI Involvement with High

Value Detainees

The issue of whether the FBI would participate in interviews in which

other agencies used non-FBI interrogation techniques arose again

repeatedly, as new high value detainees were captured. For example,

D'Amuro said that the FBI wanted to participate in the interrogations of

these detainees because its agents had been investigating them for a long

time and had a lot of knowledge and experience that would be useful in

gaining information from the detainees. Each time, however, the result was

the same: the FBI decided that it would not participate.

We determined that the issue arose again in late 2002 and early 2003,

in connection with efforts to gain access to Ramzi Binalshibh. Binalshibh

was captured in September 2002. According to the, Assistant Chief for the

FBI's Counterterrorism Operational Response Section (CTORS), he and

several agents, including Thomas, traveled to a CIA-controlled facility to

conduct a joint interview of Binalshibh with the CIA.

The Assistant Chief said that the detainees were manacled to the ceiling and

subjected to blaring music around the clock. He said the FBI agents worked

with the CIA in developing questions for Binalshibh, but were denied direct

access to him for 4 or 5 days, until Thomas was given 45 minutes with him.

Thomas stated that Binalshibh was naked and chained to the floor when

Thomas was given access to him. Thomas told the OIG that he obtained

valuable actionable intelligence in a short time but that the CIA quickly shut

down the interview. According to the notes of FBI General Counsel Valerie

Caproni, Deputy Assistant Director T.J. Harrington told her that the FBI

a ents who went to the CIA site saw Binalshibh

The Binalshibh matter indicates that a "bright line rule" against FBI

participation in or assistance to interrogations in which other investigators

used non-FBI techniques was not fully established or followed as of

September 2002. FBI agents assisted others to question Binalshibh during

a period when he was being subjected to interrogation techniques that the

FBI agents would not be allowed to use. According to former FBI General

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.118

Counsel Wainstein, the FBI ultimately decided that its agents could not

interview detainees without a "clean break" from other agencies' use of non-

FBI techniques. Wainstein told us he thought this conclusion was reached

in 2003.

As discussed in subsequent chapters of this report, the FBI continued

to wrestle with interpreting the mandate not to "participate" in

interrogations involving non-FBI techniques, particularly with respect to the

circumstances under which FBI agents wanted to interview detainees who

had previously been subjected to coercive interrogations by other agencies.

The disagreements between the FBI and the military focused in particular

on the treatment of another high value detainee, Muhammad Ma'ana Al-

Qahtani, which we describe in the next chapter.

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CHAPTER FIVE

FBI CONCERNS ABOUT MILITARY INTERROGATION AT

GUANTANAMO BAY

In this chapter we describe the response of the FBI and DOJ to the

military's interrogation of Muhammad Ma'ana Al-Qahtani at GTMO in 2002

and 2003. Al-Qahtani is a Saudi Arabian national who was allegedly sent to

the United States to be one of the September 11, 2001, hijackers.45 The Al-

Qahtani interrogation became the focus of a major disagreement between

FBI agents and the military regarding interrogation techniques. As detailed

below, FBI agents at GTMO became concerned that the DOD's approach

was ineffective and possibly illegal, that they would complicate or preclude

any effort to prosecute Al-Qahtani, and that the agents' exposure to these

techniques would create problems for the agents and the FBI in the future.

We determined that some of these concerns reached senior officials at the

FBI and DOJ. However, these officials focused primarily on the issue of

whether the DOD's techniques were effective at obtaining intelligence from

Al-Qahtani and other detainees. Ultimately, the military prevailed in the

inter agency dispute resolution process and the military's methods were

pursued over DOJ's objections. We also determined that at one point

officials from the FBI and DOJ ar • • d in ing a proposal to

for interrogation

usin: techniques of the sort that had been used on Abu Zubaydah and

. This proposal was never finalized or acted upon.

In this chapter we also describe how the FBI handled reports

regarding the alleged mistreatment of another high value detainee,

Mohamedou Ould Slahi (#760). Some of the FBI agents' concerns about

treatment of this detainee were communicated to senior officials at DOJ.

I. Background on Al-Qahtani

Al-Qahtani was captured by Pakistani forces on December 15, 2001,

while trying to enter Pakistan from Afghanistan. He was turned over to U.S.

custody, and on February 13, 2002, was transferred to GTMO. When Camp

Delta was set up at GTMO in April 2002, Al-Qahtani was moved there along

with the rest of the detainee population, as described in more detail in

Chapter Two.

45 Church Report at 115. Al-Qahtani has also been known as: Mohammed Ma'ana

Ahmed Al-Qatani, Muhammad Mani' Ahmed Al-Shal-lan Al-Qahtani, and Mohammad Al-

Kahtani.

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Records provided to the OIG indicate that Al-Qahtani was interviewed

by the FBI and the DOD four or five times between February and June of

2002. In these interviews, he provided basic biographical information and a

"cover story" that he had traveled to Afghanistan to buy and sell falcons.

One military interrogator described him as "obtuse and confrontational" and

another noted that he "refuses to give any traceable detail for any part of his

story." During this time the military and the FBI did not suspect that Al-

Qahtani was directly linked to the September 11 plot.

II. Discovery of Al-Qahtani's Links to September 11

During the investigation after the September 11 plot, the Immigration

and Naturalization Service (INS) determined that a person who fit the

pattern of some of the September 11 hijackers had been denied entry at the

Orlando, Florida, airport as he attempted to enter the United States in

August 2001. In July 2002, the FBI identified Al-Qahtani from fingerprint

records as the person who had been turned away by the INS.46 The FBI also

determined that hijacker Mohammed Atta's calling card was used at a pay

phone in the Orlando airport to call a September 11 financier at precisely

the time Al-Qahtani was being detained by the INS.47

On July 15, 2002, FBI Headquarters provided this information to FBI

agents in GTMO, who in turn provided it to the military. The MLDU Unit

Chief told us the information about Al-Qahtani's connection to

September 11 was briefed to Attorney General Ashcroft and President Bush.

The MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that after Al-Qahtani's link to the

September 11 attacks was discovered, he learned from David Nahmias,

Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division, that

someone had made a determination that "not one single [detainee] will see

the inside of a courtroom in the United States." The Unit Chief stated that

Nahmias told him that after information about the potential intelligence

46 Al-Qahtani was denied entry to the United States by a U.S. Customs and Border

Protection officer who was suspicious because Al-Qahtani spoke no English and when

questioned by Customs officials became defensive and evasive in his responses. In

addition, Al-Qahtani had no return ticket, no credit cards, and less than $3,000 in cash.

Al-Qahtani was "excluded" from the U.S. and put on a return flight to the United Kingdom

and eventually back to his original departure city of Dubai. Before Al-Qahtani was

excluded from the U.S., he was photographed and electronically fingerprinted by an INS

Inspector who entered this data into an INS database.

47 The link between Al-Qahtani and the September 11 attacks was confirmed after

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, who has been described as the mastermind of the

September 11 attacks, was captured on March 1, 2003, and started providing intelligence.

Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was transferred from CIA custody to the U.S. military base at

Guantanamo Bay in 2006.

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value of Al-Qahtani had been briefed to the White House and possibly the

National Security Counsel, the answer came back that there was no interest

in prosecuting Al-Qahtani in a U.S. court at that time.

Nahmias told the OIG he could not specifically recall telling the FBI

Unit Chief that a decision had been made that Al-Qahtani would not be

prosecuted in an Article III court, but he noted that, at that time, DOJ was

in the midst of difficulties in the Zacarias Moussaoui case and DOJ thought

that the military commissions would be an effective way to handle these

detainees. Nahmias added that he did not think he advocated for Al-

Qahtani to be brought to the United States to be tried. He said that it would

have been difficult to prosecute Al-Qahtani in the United States because the

decision had been made much earlier not to give Miranda warnings to

detainees, which would have precluded the admissibility of any detainee

statements in an Article III court.

Bruce Swartz, Deputy Attorney General for the Criminal Division, told

the OIG that he consistently took the position that detainees should be tried

in Article III courts, but that he was not aware of how Al-Qahtani had been

interrogated until publication of a TIME magazine article about it in June

2005. Swartz said he understood that the Criminal Division initially

thought there was a possibility of prosecuting Al-Qahtani in an Article III

court for his role in the September 11 attacks, and that Nahmias argued in

favor of that, but Swartz later heard Nahmias make comments to the effect

that "we won't be able to use him [in an Article III proceeding]."

Former Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff told the OIG that

there was discussion of bringing Al-Qahtani to the United States to be tried

in an Article III court. He said the ultimate decision on that question would

not have been made by the Attorney General alone. According to Chertoff, it

would have been decided at a higher level. As a general matter, he said

those kinds of issues would be resolved at the National Security Council

(NSC) level, though he said that he does not have any specific recollection of

discussion of this issue at the NSC.

Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice Fisher, FBI Director

Robert Mueller, and Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson all said they

could not recall any specific discussion as to whether Al-Qahtani would be

prosecuted in an Article III court. Former Attorney General Ashcroft

declined to be interviewed by the OIG for this review.

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III. FBI Interviews of Al-Qahtani: August 2002

Special Agent Demeter was the case agent for GTMO from February

2002 until April 2003.48 Demeter told the OIG that once the FBI learned of

the connection between Al-Qahtani and the September 11 attacks, the FBI

sought to take the lead in interviewing him. The FBI's argument for seeking

the lead was that the FBI had discovered and initially investigated the

connection between Al-Qahtani and the September 11 attacks, and the FBI

was leading the investigation into the attacks. Demeter said the person in

charge of the DOD's Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF) gave the FBI

access to Al-Qahtani.

After learning in mid-July 2002 of Al-Qahtani's connection to the

September 11 attacks, the milit. moved Al-Qahtani to a cell in Cam

Delta

Over the course of the next week,

A1-Qahtani was interviewed daily by FBI and military personnel. He first

denied ever traveling to the United States, but when confronted with

evidence of his trip to Florida he claimed he came to the United States to

sell used cars. He continued to maintain the same cover story in

subsequent interviews. On July 27, he was transferred to the Maximum

Security Facility at Camp Delta to minimize influence and social support

from other detainees.

Demeter told the OIG that, at this point, he requested that FBI Special

Agent Thomas interview Al-Qahtani, because Thomas was in Demeter's view

the FBI's "strongest interviewer."49 According to one of the first FBI On-

Scene Commanders (OSC) at GTMO, Thomas had already obtained

confessions from several detainees at GTMO and Major General Dunlavey,

the Commander of Joint Task Force 170, called him "a national treasure."

After his initial interviews of Al-Qahtani, Thomas recommended that

Al-Qahtani be moved to a more remote location at GTMO so that he would

not get social support from the other detainees in resisting the interviewers'

questions. Demeter said that sending someone to isolation is not normally

employed by law enforcement agencies because of concerns about the

voluntariness of any subsequent statements. However, Demeter stated that

isolation can be a very effective technique, and that in this instance the

government's interest in getting the information outweighed any potential

concerns of voluntariness. Demeter said the FBI agents reported the

recommendation up their chain of command, through the MLDU Unit Chief,

48 Demeter is a pseudonym.

49 Thomas is a pseudonym. Thomas was one of the agents who also interviewed

Zubaydah, as described in Chapters Four and Eleven.

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and that he obtained the necessary approvals from senior officials above the

Unit Chief. Demeter told us that the military had to approve the transfer

because the military controlled GTMO.

On August 8, 2002, Al-Qahtani was transported via military

ambulance from his cell in Camp Delta to the Navy Brig in GTM0.50

Thomas continued to interview Al-Qahtani after he was moved to the Brig.

Demeter said that Thomas urged the guards at the Brig to refrain from

speaking with Al-Qahtani to increase his isolation. He stated that the

guards covered their faces or ordered Al-Qahtani to face away when they

were present to further isolate Al-Qahtani from human contact.51

The OIG interviewed Al-Qahtani at GTMO on February 27, 2007. Al-

Qahtani told the OIG that the Brig was "the worst place I was taken to." He

said he did not know when to pray because the window was covered up and

he could not tell what time of day it was. In addition, he said that he did

not know the direction of Mecca. Al-Qahtani told the OIG that the entire

time he was at the Brig the guards covered their faces when they dealt with

him. He also said he was not allowed any recreation, and while he was

allowed into the hallway outside his cell, he never saw the sun. Al-Qahtani

said the lights in his cell were left on continuously for the entire time he was

there, which he said was half a year. Al-Qahtani also described the Brig as

very, very cold. He said he sometimes had a mattress, but if the

interrogators did not like his answers, they would take things like that

away.

Al-Qahtani described an FBI agent who spoke Arabic. This was

Thomas. Al-Qahtani said Thomas had "some sense of humanity."

According to Al-Qahtani, Thomas never used aggression or physical violence

on him. According to Al-Qahtani, Thomas said things such as "you will find

yourself in a difficult situation if you don't talk to me" and "if you're not

going to talk now, you will talk in the future." When asked if he took this as

a "warning or a threat," Al-Qahtani replied that it was "a little bit of both."

5° As described in Chapter Two, the Navy Brig is located on the grounds of the U.S.

Naval base at GTMO, separate from the detainee camps. Before Al-Qahtani was moved to

the Navy Brig, the FBI set up a closed-circuit television so that the FBI could monitor him.

51 We note that severe isolation of the type used on Al-Qahtani for interrogation

purposes rather than as a disciplinary or security measure would likely be considered to be

coercive and contrary to FBI policies for custodial interviews in the United States. The

same may be true of the actual or implied threats that Thomas made, as described later in

this chapter. However, these incidents took place very close to the time concerns about the

Zubaydah interrogation were being raised within the FBI, as described in Chapter Four. It

is clear that the Director's instruction had not yet been communicated to Thomas or those

in his chain of command that approved Al-Qahtani's isolation.

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Al-Qahtani told the OIG that he had been removed from his cell by

force, prior to being taken to the Brig. He said the day after the move to the

Brig, Thomas came and sat next to him and said something like "this is

your place until you change your story." Al-Qahtani said he did not recall

meeting with anyone from the FBI at the Brig other than Thomas and one

civilian who took his picture and fingerprints. However, FBI records and

witnesses indicate that Al-Qahtani was interviewed by several different FBI

agents during the period when he was confined in the Brig, including

Thomas, Demeter and members of the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit.

As additional intelligence entities learned about the connection

between Al-Qahtani and the September 11 attacks, interest in the

information he might provide increased. Demeter said that within 2 weeks

of confirmation of Al-Qahtani's role, the military decided they "wanted a

piece of Al-Qahtani" but the FBI had "beat them to the punch" and was

taking the lead on the interviews. According to Demeter, the military began

pressing the FBI for results. Demeter said that Thomas's view at this point

was that the FBI's interview approach would take a long time to work, given

Al-Qahtani's mindset.

After the FBI had been interviewing Al-Qahtani at the Brig for

approximately 30 days, Demeter said, the military told the FBI to "step

aside" and took over. According to Demeter, the military's decision to

pursue a more aggressive approach was the "beginning of a real schism"

between the FBI and the military regarding detainee interrogation

techniques.

IV. FBI Supervisory Special Agents Foy and Lyle Observe Military

Interrogations of Al-Qahtani: Early October 2002

After the military determined that it would take the lead on the Al-

Qahtani interrogations, a military intelligence "special projects" team put

together a proposed interrogation plan. During this time, the FBI continued

to attempt to influence his interrogation. From September 13, 2002, until

October 29, 2002, FBI SSAs Foy and Lyle from the Behavioral Analysis Unit

(BAU) were deployed to GTMO to provide behavioral analysis of detainees to

help develop interview strategies.52 On September 30, 2002, Foy e-mailed

his superiors at the BAU about the latest military intelligence plan for Al-

Qahtani, which included moving him from the Brig to Camp Delta for a

short stay to see if he would cooperate, followed by transferring him to

Camp X-Ray for an indefinite period of 20-hour interviews. Foy's e-mail

stated that when he asked for guidance from the MLDU Unit Chief, the Unit

52 Lyle and Foy are pseudonyms.

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Chief told him that as long as there was no "torture" involved, he could

participate in the interrogations. The Unit Chief told the OIG that he did

not recall this exchange, but that it could have occurred.

The next day Foy e-mailed the MLDU Unit Chief that he and Lyle

would only "observe" the Camp Delta portion and the first 6 hours at Camp

X-Ray. In addition, Foy recommended that if FBI Headquarters were to

send FBI employees to GTMO to question Al-Qahtani, the FBI interviewers

should wait at least a week after military intelligence had completed their

interrogation.

On October 3, 2002, Foy and Lyle observed the Al-Qahtani

interrogations. After interviewing Qahtani for a few hours at Camp Delta -

where he continued to refuse to cooperate - the military moved him to a

plywood but in Camp X-Ray. Al-Qahtani was interrogated by another

military interrogation team from October 3 until the early morning hours of

October 4. Lyle said Al-Qahtani was "aggressively" interrogated and that the

military interrogators yelled and screamed at him. Foy told the OIG that the

plan was to "keep him up until he broke."53 Foy said he did not know if that

ultimately is what happened, because he and Lyle stopped observing the

process. Foy stated in an e-mail to The FBI Unit Chief and the OSC at

GTMO the next morning that an FBI approach to Al-Qahtani the following

week would not be worthwhile "due to the current mental/physical status of

the detainee."

Foy and Lyle returned to Camp X-Ray in the late afternoon of

October 4 to continue their observations. Lyle told the OIG that one of the

interrogators, a Marine Captain, had been interrogating Al-Qahtani by

yelling at him and calling him names. Lyle stated that the Captain got up

on the table in the room to yell at Al-Qahtani in a more intimidating fashion,

at which point he squatted over a Koran that had been provided to Al-

Qahtani. This action incensed Al-Qahtani, who lunged toward the Captain

and the Koran. Al-Qahtani was quickly subdued by the military guards in

the room. Foy gave a similar account of this incident. He stated that he

and Lyle heard a commotion coming from the interview room where the

Marine Captain and another military interrogator were interviewing Al-

Qahtani. Foy said that it appeared that the Captain and the other

interrogator were playing "good cop, bad cop."54

53 Foy told the OIG that the technique being used was sleep deprivation, not sleep

disruption, because the military interrogators were keeping him awake rather than letting

him fall asleep and then waking him up. Foy said they used bright lights and music to

keep him awake.

54 Foy and Lyle gave consistent accounts of this incident to the FBI Inspection

Division in September 2004. Foy stated that the Koran incident took place on October 4,

(Cont'd.)

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Lyle and Foy also described an incident the next day in which a guard

received a signal to bring a working dog into the interrogation room where

Al-Qahtani was being interrogated. Lyle said that the use of dogs as an

interrogation tool was exclusively the military's idea, based on their belief

that Arabs feared dogs because they viewed dogs as unclean. Lyle said that

the guard handling the dog first agitated the dog outside the interrogation

room, and then brought the dog into the room close to Al-Qahtani. Lyle said

that the dog barked, growled, and snarled at Al-Qahtani in very close

proximity to him, but was never allowed to have contact with him.55 Foy

gave a similar account of the incident, and told the OIG that he and Lyle

were not comfortable with the situation with the dog so they left the

interrogation.56

On October 8, 2002, Foy e-mailed the GTMO On-Scene Commander

and the MLDU Unit Chief to describe other "techniques" used on Al-

Qahtani, including sleep deprivation, loud music, bright lights, and "body

placement discomfort." Foy reported that the technique had "negative"

results and that Al-Qahtani remained "as fervent as ever" in not

cooperating. Foy stated in the e-mail that Al-Qahtani was "down to 100

pounds" and that military intelligence personnel planned to initiate another

phase in the interrogation in the coming weekend.57

Although "aggressive" techniques had already been used on Al-

Qahtani, it was not until October 11, 2002, that Major General Dunlavey,

the Commander of Joint Task Force 170, requested that the Commander of

SOUTHCOM approve 19 counter-resistance techniques that were not

specifically listed in Field Manual 34-52. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 5. Those

counter-resistance techniques were listed in three categories. Category I

2002. Also, the Schmidt-Furlow Report described an incident in December 2002 similar to

the incident described by Lyle and Foy, in which an interrogator "squatted down in front of

[Al-Qahtani] in an aggressive manner and unintentionally squatted over the detainee's

Koran."

55 Lyle and Foy provided consistent accounts of this incident to FBI Inspection

Division interviewers in September 2004. The Schmidt-Furlow Report also found that a

military working dog was used in connection with the interrogation of Al-Qahtani on one or

two occasions in October to November 2002.

56 Al-Qahtani told the OIG that during one interrogation at Camp X-Ray, a dog with

a soldier was in the room with him. He said the soldier did not order the dog to attack Al-

Qahtani. Rather, he said the dog was used as a tool to intimidate him during interrogation.

Al-Qahtani said that the dog tried to bite him but it was restrained by its handler. Al-

Qahtani added that the dog was walked around the interrogation room and the handler let

the dog get very close to him and it was barking and growling the whole time.

57 In commenting on a draft of this report, the DOD stated that Foy's comment

regarding Al-Qahtani's weight was irrelevant because it did not provide his beginning

weight. However, the OIG did not receive information about Al-Qahtani's initial weight.

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included strategies such as yelling and deception. Category II included

stress positions (maximum of 4 hours), deprivation of light, removal of

clothing, and using individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce

stress. Category III included "use of scenarios designed to convince the

detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him

and/or his family" and "use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the

misperception of suffocation." Church Report at 111. Along with the list of

techniques, Dunlavey provided SOUTHCOM two memoranda he received

from the Staff Judge Advocate stating that the proposed strategies "do not

violate applicable federal law."58

V. The FBI's MLDU Unit Chief and DOJ Counsel Nahmias Visit

GTMO: October 15 to 18, 2002

Friction between the FBI and the military intelligence entities over the

best way to handle the Al-Qahtani interrogations increased during October

and November 2002. During that time, the FBI's MLDU Unit Chief and

Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division David

Nahmias traveled together to GTMO for a visit during October 15 to 18,

2002.

According to Nahmias, at some point prior to his trip to GTMO, the

DOD claimed to have "broken" Al-Qahtani and gotten him to cooperate.

Nahmias told the OIG that he learned that Al-Qahtani had been interrogated

for many hours and blurted out the name Mohammed Atta, which the DOD

interrogators considered a breakthrough. The reaction of the FBI's

Behavioral Science people, according to Nahmias, was that Al-Qahtani was

just giving the interrogators what they wanted so that they would let him

eat or go to the bathroom.

Nahmias stated that when he was at GTMO, Al-Qahtani was being

held in isolation and the interrogators were getting no information

whatsoever from him. Nahmias stated that the DOD was using "aggressive"

techniques and there was a "heated debate" with the FBI and CITF on one

side and military intelligence on the other about what to do with Al-

58 Schmidt-Furlow Report, Exhibit 14. According to the Church Report, on

October 25, 2002, the SOUTHCOM Commander, General Hill, sought Secretary of Defense

approval for the use of "additional techniques beyond those specifically listed in FM 34-52."

In the SOUTHCOM Commander's request, he stated that he believed the Category I and II

techniques are "legal and humane," but that he was unsure regarding Category III. As

noted below, Secretary Rumsfeld gave formal approval for some of the techniques on

December 2, 2002.

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Qahtani.59 Nahmias said the FBI wanted to talk to Al-Qahtani during this

period but the DOD refused.

The MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that during this visit to GTMO he

participated in a video-teleconference discussing Al-Qahtani's interrogation

plan. The other participants in the teleconference included Nahmias, Major

General Geoffrey Miller (the new Commander of

JTF-GTMO), the Lieutenant Colonel who was in charge of the GTMO

interrogations at that time, the Chief CITF Psychologist, and a

representative of the CIA. The Unit Chief stated that DOD personnel at the

Pentagon were also on the call. During the teleconference, the Unit Chief

said, the Lieutenant Colonel presented the DOD's plan to use aggressive

interrogation techniques. According to the FBI Unit Chief, the Lieutenant

Colonel gave an explanation of all the information the DOD had obtained

from Al-Qahtani using aggressive interrogation practices. At that point the

FBI Unit Chief said he spoke up and said "look, everything you've gotten

thus far is what the FBI gave you on Al-Qahtani from its paper

investigation." The Unit Chief said the conversation became heated.

According to the Unit Chief, the Chief CITF Psychologist and Nahmias

agreed that the information the Lieutenant Colonel presented had been

provided by the FBI and that the Lieutenant Colonel's suggested

interrogation methods were not effective and were not providing positive

intelligence. The Unit Chief stated that the meeting ended because of the

controversy. The Unit Chief said he did not believe the legality of the DOD

techniques was discussed during the teleconference.

Although he did not describe the specific conference call mentioned

above, Nahmias told the OIG that plans for the Al-Qahtani interrogation

were discussed at meetings which included the FBI, the military at GTMO,

military officials at the Pentagon, and others. He told the OIG that it was

the general view of the FBI, DOJ and CITF that the proposed plan would not

work and that the military were "completely ineffective in getting any kind of

intelligence out of [Al-Qahtani]."

VI. FBI Continues Objecting to the Al-Qahtani Interrogation Plans:

November 2002

From late October to mid-December 2002, a new set of FBI BAU

agents, SSA Brett and SSA McMahon, were stationed at GTM0.69 During

59 As noted in Chapter Two, CITF conducts interrogations in order to gather

evidence for the military commission process and possible war crimes prosecutions. The

law enforcement groups that make up the CITF are the Naval Criminal Investigative Service

(NCIS), the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) and the Air Force Office of Special

Investigations (OSI).

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this period, the FBI and CITF continued to object to the approach military

intelligence officials sought to take with Al-Qahtani.

On November 12, 2002, General Hill orally approved the use of

Category I and II techniques on Al-Qahtani. The next day, he approved an

interrogation plan for Al-Qahtani against the FBI's objections.61 The plan

described 20-hour interrogation sessions, followed by 4-hour rest periods.

It stated that Al-Qahtani had been "segregated with minimal human

contact" for several months, and that this appeared to be having an effect

on his mental state. The plan stated that "[i]t is believed that with an

intense interrogation cycle where he is not allowed to speak and is then

suddenly allowed to speak, he may tell all." The plan called for Al-Qahtani's

head and beard to be shaved, "for psychological and hygiene purposes." In

addition, the plan stated that if he was uncooperative, he would be placed in

stress positions and blindfolded. The plan further stated that the

blindfolding and the presence of dogs had been approved by the

Commanding General.

Another portion of the plan called for telling Al-Qahtani about how the

"rules have changed" since September 11. The plan contained a description

of four different "phases" for the interrogation, which would begin on

November 15, 2002. If a phase was unsuccessful within the time allotted,

then the interrogation would move to the next phase. The phases were

described in the military's interrogation plan as follows:

• Phase I: the military would permit the FBI access to Al-Qahtani

until November 22. The FBI would present him with a "window

of opportunity" to cooperate, and the FBI would explain that

this was his "last chance" before he was returned to the

military. After that, interrogators would increase the pressure

on Al-Qahtani while preventing him from speaking for one week,

so that when he was presented with the opportunity to talk, he

would "provide his whole story."

• Phase II: the military would place a government translator with

Al-Qahtani. The translator would act and be treated as like a

detainee, and he would engage Al-Qahtani in conversation and

ask targeted specific questions to extract the sought-after

information.

60 Brett and McMahon are pseudonyms.

61 We reviewed several versions of the Al-Qahtani interrogation plan and we have

been unable to determine which one was actually approved. The elements described above

appear in all versions, however, including the version attached as an exhibit to the Schmidt-

Furlow Report.

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• Phase III: The plan referred to "Level III techniques." (This

appears to be a reference to the techniques listed in the

October 11, 2002, memorandum in which Major General

Dunlavey requested that the Commander of SOUTHCOM

approve 19 counter-resistance techniques that were not

specifically listed in Field Manual 34-52). SERE and other

counter interrogation resistance training techniques would be

employed.62

• Phase IV: Al-Qahtani would be sent "off Island" either

temporarily or permanently to "either Jordan, Egypt or another

third country to allow those countries to employ interrogation

techniques that will enable them to obtain the requisite

information."

FBI agents McMahon and Brett examined the military intelligence

interrogation plan and concluded that it was deeply flawed. For example, in

connection with the strategy of preventing Al-Qahtani from speaking for a

week in the hope that he would then "tell all," the agents noted that they

were aware of no such recognized interrogation technique. In a report to

FBI Headquarters, they stated: "It is our information that this interrogation

technique was recommended by . . . an ARMY Linguist, who claims to have

a number of years of Agency' experience. Other than the word of this

linguist there has been no data proffered which justifies the use of this

technique." With respect to Phase IV, the agents stated simply, "Unless this

plan is modified to exclude aspects that have not been approved for FBI

personnel, we cannot be a signatory on this plan."63

The CITF officials at GTMO raised similar objections to the military

intelligence plan. A memorandum from the CITF legal advisor to the

Commander of JTF-GTMO, dated November 15, 2002, stated that CITF had

raised "formal legal objections" to the plan, and asserted that the

SOUTHCOM Command's approval could not be considered authoritative

given that the matter was "currently under legal review" by the DOD

General Counsel's Office. With respect to Phase IV, this memorandum

stated that the plan "implies that third country nationals . . . could be used

62 As noted in Chapter Three, SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape) is

a training program which prepares U.S. soldiers and airmen on methods to resist

interrogation. SERE techniques include dietary manipulation, use of nudity, sleep

deprivation, and waterboarding.

63 However, as detailed in Section VII of this cha ter, some FBI and DOJ officials

did advocate during this period.

As detailed in footnote 71, there were significant differences between this proposal and the

military's plan.

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to convey threats to person or family or inflict harm" contrary to the

Convention Against Torture.

Similarly, in a November 14, 2002, e-mail from the Commander of

CITF to Major General Miller, the Commander expressed his strong

objections to the use of Category III and some Category II techniques and

stated his opinion that they would be largely ineffective, would have "serious

negative material and legal effects" on the investigation, and that the use of

such techniques could "open any military members up for potential criminal

charges." The Commander also stated that the DOD General Counsel's

office has "instructed DOJ that any plan with #63 will be a DOD plan, since

DOD [law enforcement] and Intell have the lead." The Commander then

proposed the creation of a "joint working group" through which CITF, JTFGTMO,

FBI and CIA would all participate in the development of a detailed

interrogation plan for Al-Qahtani.

Brett and McMahon also attended an "interrogation strategy session"

in mid-November at which military intelligence officials discussed aspects of

the interview of Al-Qahtani in great detail, including the "questionable"

techniques which were of concern to Brett and McMahon. According to the

FBI, Brett and McMahon had concerns not only about the proposed

techniques, but also about the "glee" with which the would-be participants

discussed their respective roles in carrying out these techniques and the

"utter lack of sophistication" and "circus-like atmosphere" within this

interrogation strategy session.

An FBI/CITF plan prepared in consultation with Brett and McMahon,

in contrast, emphasized a long-term rapport-building interrogation

approach.64 Under this plan, Al-Qahtani would have contact with only one

interviewer. The plan proposed "periodic stressors" such as removing

comfort items, with the expectation that Al-Qahtani would look to the

64 FBI e-mails also discussed a "hybrid" plan that apparently combined elements of

the military intelligence's plan with elements of the FBI/CITF plan, and was created to

fulfill a request by General Miller for the FBI and military intelligence to "determine if there

is any middle ground" between their two approaches. McMahon opposed the idea of

blessing the hybrid plan, because, according to the OSC, it essentially contained "rapport

building" for 5-7 days (in "phase I"), then reverted to the military intelligence plan for

"phase II." Brett suggested that the FBI give its "blessing" to the hybrid plan because it was

the "lesser of two evils." Brett thought that military intelligence would likely immediately

institute their original plan for Al-Qahtani if the FBI did not give its "blessing" to the hybrid

plan. Brett hoped that instituting the hybrid plan would put off the harsh treatment of Al-

Qahtani for a least a week during which time the FBI and CITF could work toward changing

the future plans for this detainee. Both Brett and McMahon adamantly objected to the

remaining phases of the hybrid plan after phase I. The OIG was not able to obtain a copy of

the hybrid plan.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.133

interviewer for help, thereby increasing the interviewer's status. The FBI

also recommended the introduction of "visual stimuli" designed to invoke

sympathy and weaken his sense of loyalty to al-Qaeda associates.

Major General Miller met with Brett, McMahon, Demeter, and the FBI

OSC to discuss the plans for interrogating Al-Qahtani.65 McMahon told the

OIG that although Miller acknowledged positive aspects of the rapportbased

approach, Miller favored military intelligence's interrogation methods.

According to McMahon, the FBI's arguments against the coercive techniques

were met with "considerable skepticism and resistance by senior [military

intelligence] officials in GTMO."

According to Demeter, Major General Miller wanted to take a much

more aggressive approach with Al-Qahtani than advocated by the FBI.

Demeter said that Miller used military phrases such as "relentless" and

"sustained attack" to describe the military's proposed approach. Demeter

told the OIG that he argued with Miller that by using proven law

enforcement interview tactics such as rationalizing the conduct along with

the subject, joining the subject in projecting blame for the conduct on

others, or minimizing the severity of the conduct with the subject, the

barriers to confession are reduced and cooperation becomes more likely.

Demeter told the OIG that these tactics may sound "touchy-feely" or

"counterintuitive," but they had been very successful with hard core

criminals in the past. Demeter said he explained to Miller that, when

dealing with a person who believes that his suffering will be rewarded by

God, causing more suffering is not effective in the long term. Demeter said

he told Miller that the aggressive approach would simply create an

additional obstacle, because the interrogator would still have to get the

subject to confess to something that may not be in his best interest, and the

interrogator would also have to overcome the detainee's personal animosity.

Despite Demeter's arguments, however, the military decided that its

aggressive approach had a greater chance of success, and DOD

interrogators began using harsher techniques on Al-Qahtani.

In mid-November, 2002, FBI agents at GTMO continued their efforts

to influence the military's Al-Qahtani interrogation plan, without success.

On November 20, at Miller's instruction, the FBI met with JTF-GTMO staff

in an effort to find some "common ground." Military intelligence presented

its plan and the FBI objected based on concerns regarding efficacy,

coercion, and possible illegality. Brett told the OIG that it became apparent

to him that the military could not agree to a plan that did not include the

application of SERE techniques and a phase which involved sending Al-

65 We are not certain of the date of this meeting but we believe it took place in late

November or early December 2002.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.134

Qahtani to a third country where he could be tortured to get information,

two things the FBI would not agree to do.

The FBI offered its alternative plan which used rapport-based

techniques and military intelligence and JTF-GTMO staff members agreed to

revise their plan by incorporating some of the FBI's techniques. The FBI

personnel present said the revised plan would have to be reviewed and

approved by FBI Headquarters and BAU before the FBI could agree to

pursue the plan. Military intelligence officials at GTMO did not advise the

FBI that a revised plan would be presented to the General the next day.

Nonetheless, according to McMahon, the FBI's MLDU Unit Chief, and the

OSC, during a video teleconference the next day at which the interrogation

of Al-Qahtani was discussed, the same Lieutenant Colonel who had falsely

claimed in the October 2002 teleconference that the DOD had obtained

information from Al-Qahtani using aggressive methods (as described above)

"blatantly misled the Pentagon into believing that the BAU endorsed

[military intelligence]'s aggressive and controversial Interrogation Plan." The

OSC stated that one of the FBI agents in attendance wanted the OSC to

interrupt the Lieutenant Colonel to correct the record during the

teleconference, but the OSC said he chose not to do so because he did not

want to embarrass General Miller and he wanted to address the matter with

the Lieutenant Colonel privately. The next day, the OSC sent a letter to

Major General Miller to correct the Lieutenant Colonel's

misrepresentation.66

In addition to raising concerns to military officials, Brett and

McMahon sought assistance and guidance from FBI Headquarters. FBI

Assistant General Counsel Spike Bowman told the OIG that in late 2002 he

requested that the concerns about interrogation techniques raised by

McMahon and Brett be documented in a written report for him to use in

raising concerns to the DOD. Six months later, on May 30, 2003, McMahon

received the necessary approvals for this EC and transmitted it to Bowman,

the FBI's MLDU Chief, and the Acting CTORS Section Chief.67 Bowman's

actions in connection with this EC are discussed later in this chapter.

66 Sometime in early December, the FBI's MLDU Unit Chief traveled to GTMO and

participated in a teleconference with Pentagon officials in which he challenged military

intelligence's assertion that the FBI had endorsed military intelligence's interrogation

techniques.

67 Brett told the OIG the delay was due, in part, to the controversial nature of the

EC. Brett said that he believed the controversy centered around the fact that the FBI were

guests of the military at GTMO and that this EC was actually telling the military that they

should not be doing what they were doing because their tactics were both ineffective and

possibly illegal.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.135

VII. Proposal To Al-Qahtani To Be Interrogated Using an

Alternative Debriefing Model of the Sort Used on Zubaydah

We also determined that at one point during the controversy regarding

the interrogation of Al-Qahtani, U.S. government officials, includin officials

from the FBI and DOJ, advanced a ro osal to

. At least some DOJ and FBI

officials understood that this .ro.osal involved subjecting Al-Qahtani to

interrogation using the same used on Zubaydah,

although these officials told the OIG that they did not know specifically what

interrogation techniques would be involved.

The OIG obtained a draft document describing such a proposal

during this investigation. The only two officials we interviewed who told us

they were familiar with the document were David Nahmias (then Counsel to

the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division at DOJ) and an FBI

agent who was the Unit Chief for the Military Liaison and Detainee Unit

(MLDU) at the time the document was drafted. The Unit Chief said it was

written to solicit assistance in dealing with A1-Qahtani.

Nahmias told the OIG that the document was a draft of a letter to be sent by

the Attorney General to the National Security Council.

Nahmias stated that he is certain that the document was drafted by

the FBI - either by the FBI Unit Chief or someone in MLDU. The "header"

information on the document reflects that it was printed from Nahmias' FBI

computer. The FBI Unit Chief said the FBI provided the facts in the

document, but that someone at DOJ may have reformatted them into a

draft. None of the other witnesses the OIG interviewed about this issue

could identify the author.

The document described the connection between Al-Qahtani and the

September 11 attacks, and stated that preliminary interrogations had led to

"some success" with Al-Qahtani. The draft further stated:

There has been significant discussion regarding the relative

safety and comfort of the detainee facilities at GTMO. Among

the issues discussed is the lack of a multi-tiered system of

physical holding areas which could employ varying degrees of

privilege and interaction with others. It is the collective opinion

of FBI investi ators, FBI Behavioral Anal sis Unit BAU ,

and the Department of Defense (DOD) Criminal Investigative

Task Force (CITF) that this environment has created

complacency in [AL-QAHTANI].

It is firmly believed that AL-QATANI traveled to the U.S. in 2001

for the purposes of committing or supporting a terrorist act. It

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.136

To improve the productivit of further intelli loitation,

AL-QATANI should be

is further believed that AL-QATANI possesses critical

intelligence regarding the identification of individuals also

involved in planning, supporting, or committing terrorist acts

against U.S. interests. Althou h some ro • ress has been made

with AL-QATANI at GTMO, being

used with subjects including ABU ZABAIDA

1111111111111 could greatly enhance his productivity.

The FBIHQ GTMO Task Force has discussed the following

proposed strategy with representatives of the De artment of

Justice DOJ , FBI investigators, FBI-BAU,

and with DOD-OASD (SOLIC). Further

debriefings of AL-QATANI at GTMO are unlikely to result in

actionable intelligence. As long as AL-QATANI remains in law

enforcement or military custody, he does not at this time pose a

continued threat to U.S. interests.

AL-QATANI would be debriefed by highly knowledgeable

personnel, and disseminations regarding the results of these

debriefings would be released to the a riate U.S.

intelli ence entities ex editiousl

The document is undated, and neither Nahmias nor the FBI Unit

Chief could recall exactly when it was drafted, although both agreed that it

was probably created in the fall of 2002 or early in 2003.68

68 The document refers to the interrogations of Binalshibh, who was not captured

until September 11, 2002. The document makes no mention of Khalid Sheikh

Mohammed's interrogation, which began after his capture on March 1, 2003. Therefore,

the OIG believes this document was created between October 2002 and March 2003. The

MLDU Unit Chief estimated that the document was written in mid-November 2002. In

addition, a November 14, 2002, e-mail from the Commander of the Criminal Investigative

Task Force (CITF) to Major General Miller (discussed below) appears to make a reference to

this proposal.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.137

Nahmias provided to the OIG contemporaneous notes and other

documents from this period that contain several general references to a plan

being actively pursued to change the circumstances of Al-Qahtani's

interrogation. Although these documents describe a .lan for Al-Qahtani

that involved

they do not specifically discuss what techniques would be used to

interro ate Al-Qahtani and there is no specific reference in the notes to •

or to methods used with any other detainee,

including Zubaydah. Nahmias' notes from a meeting with the FBI Unit

Chief on September 27, 2002, state that the FBI Unit Chief met with a

Principal Deput Assistant Secret of Defense and with regarding

the proposal to . The notes also indicate

that the DOD's Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) (Fort Belvoir) was

"on board" with the proposal. In an October 2002 e-mail to DOD officials

with a copy to Alice Fisher, Nahmias stated that the FBI Unit Chief had

recently met with an official from CITF in Fort Belvoir regarding the proposal

for Al-Qahtani. The e-mail stated: "I also advised [the FBI Unit Chief] that

the write-up of the proposal should be discussed by us first...." We believe

that the reference to a "write-up of the proposal" concerns some version of

the draft letter quoted above.

An e-mail dated November 14, 2002, sent by the Commander of CITF

to Major General Miller, makes an a arent reference to the proposed

strategy . In the e-mail the Commander

stated: "There has been repeated discussion by several agencies that they

wanted to take [Al-Qahtani] to another location to try other techniques to

get him to talk . . . FBI in particular has made several requests thru DOJ to

allow them to execute a plan whereby #63 would be taken to alternate

locations . . .. So far, DOD had refused approval until both JTF-GTMO and

CITF both agree. What you need to know is that apparently, several times it

has been represented that we at CITF HAVE agreed to this plan, but in fact

we have not done so . . . ." Although the e-mail refers to the use of "other

techniques" with Al-Qahtani, the e-mail does not specify the techniques or

directly connect them to the techniques that had previously been used on

Zubaydah.

It appears that in early 2003 DOJ formally raised the issue of the Al-

Qahtani interrogations at the NSC. Nahmias provided the OIG with an

agenda for a January 8, 2003, NSC meeting, including an attachment

entitled "Detainee Issues (1/8/03)" which stated:

Interrogations of Al Qatani in Afghanistan and at GTMO have

produced little information. Since September, his

interrogations have been conducted by [Defense Intelligence

Agency]. Since late September, FBI, DOJ, , and some

elements of DOD have been proposing

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.138

Very recent and unevaluated re

be providing intelligence; if so,

orts suggest that he may now

may not be appropriate.

Other than the draft letter itself, the contem oraneous documents

rovided to the OIG do not make reference to

or to Zubaydah and therefore do not reveal which if any of the

participants was aware of the specific interrogation methods that were

involved. The do, however, establish that a roposal

was actively pursued by

certain officials from DOJ and the FBI in late 2002 and early 2003.

As detailed in Chapter Four, the interrogations of Zubaydah

included interrogation techniques that cannot be characterized

as "rapport-based" and that clearly would never have been permitted for FBI

agents in the United States under any FBI policy. Indeed, when the FBI

originally learned about some of the techniques that had been used or

approved for use on Zubaydah, Director Mueller gave instructions that FBI

agents should not participate in any interrogations in which such

techniques would be used. In addition, the CIA has acknowledged that

Zubaydah was waterboarded, although there is no evidence that FBI agents

observed or were aware of this conduct at the time. Although the proposal

as described in the draft letter did not include direct FBI participation in the

implementation of alternative debriefing models of the sort that were used

with Zubaydah, advocating that others use such an approach with Al-

Qahtani appears to conflict with the spirit if not the letter of Director

Mueller's instructions.

However, both the FBI Unit Chief and Nahmias told the OIG that

although they advocated for the plan described in the draft letter, they did

not know specifically what techniques had been used on Zuba dah.

Nahmias's contem oraneous notes 1 t. to the osal to

do not reflect any

discussion of particular techniques to be used with Al-Qahtani. Both the

FBI Unit Chief and Nahmias told the OIG that their belief that

approach would greatly enhance Al-Qahtani's productivity was based not on

any familiarity with the specific interrogation techniques that had been used

on Zubaydah, but instead on the quality of the intelligence the CIA was

providing to the FBI and DOJ from high value detainees in CIA custody.

Given the statements b the FBI Unit Chief and Nahmias that they

did not know what the entailed, the OIG

sought to determine what the ht would happen to Al-Qahtani under

the proposal . The FBI Unit Chief said he

wanted Al-Qahtani to be in an environment with native

Arabic speakers, where he would be "drinking tea" instead of eating "MREs,"

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.139

and where he would let his guard down. The Unit Chief said he believed

onl

.69 He said he thought the

techniques the military wanted to use on Al-Qahtani at GTMO might

preclude trying Al-Qahtani in court or in a tribunal and would produce

statements that would be "suspect, at best."

Similarly, Nahmias said that he presumed was legal,

but said he did not know the details of the program and did not see the

authorizing memoranda (which are discussed in Chapter Four of this

report). Nahmias told the OIG that he did not think that the proposal in the

draft letter involved waterboardin Al-Qahtani. Nahmias said he believed

interrogation practices than the FBI, but

he had never even heard of the term "waterboardin at that time.

He stated that he

believed the He

said the milit 's interro ation model was lar el to scream at the

detainees,

Nahmias also told the OIG that conditions at GTMO were not

promoting successful interrogations of Al-Qahtani. He said that at GTMO

there was no way to "separate" someone, so people who had been

cooperative prior to their arrival became uncooperative when mixed in with

the general detainee population. He said there was no system of rewards or

protection for those who cooperated or penalties for those who did not.

Nahmias told the OIG that Al-Qahtani had "shut down" after the DOD took

over the interrogations, and the DOD's tactics were "completely ineffective."

He also stated that at the time the letter was drafted the military had

stopped interrogating Al-Qahtani due to legal issues over whether military

69 The evidence regarding what the FBI Unit Chief knew about CIA techniques at

the time is limited. The Unit Chief stated he did not know what techniques the CIA used on

Zubaydah at the time of the proposal for Al-Qahtani. One FBI a ent told us

that in late 2001 or early 2002 he told the Unit Chief about visiting a

. The FBI agent said he did not witness any torture at the facility, but

that he heard loud music and saw wall restraints in the facility.

. The FBI agent said told him

to avoid the facility in the future unless he wanted to be subpoenaed by a congressional

committee to testify. The agent said he described this experience to the FBI Unit Chief.

However, the Unit Chief told us he did not recall hearing about this incident from the FBI

agent. We also note that the FBI Unit Chief reported to Arena and D'Amuro, who were

aware of at least some of the techniques the CIA employed on Zubaydah. However, Arena

told us he could not recall if the Unit Chief was involved in the discussions he had about

the CIA's use of SERE-type techniques on Zubaydah.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.140

orders were being accurately followed. Nahmias also stated that he had

"significant concerns" that the DOD was not "accuratel re • ortin what they

were • ettin • "

We also attempted to determine the extent to which the proposal for

Al-Qahtani described in the draft letter was known to other officials in the

FBI and DOJ. The FBI MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that the proposal in

the draft letter was briefed and discussed with his chain of command, and

that approval of the FBI Director and the Attorney General ultimately would

have been required to put this proposal into effect. However, the other FBI

officials we interviewed told us they had not seen the draft letter and had

not heard of the proposal described in it.

The OIG asked ITOS-1 Section Chief Andrew Arena about the draft

letter because his section of the Counterterrorism Division had

responsibility for intelligence issues relating to GTMO. Arena told the OIG

that he had never seen the document before the OIG provided it to him and

he was unaware of any proposal for Al-Qahtani along the lines described in

the draft letter. In addition, Arena said he was "shocked" to learn that any

officials from the FBI and DOJ ever advocated for such a measure. Arena

said he believes the referred to in the draft

proposal refers to the SERE-type techniques the CIA was using on

Zubaydah . He said that in discussions with the FBI the

DOD would often cite a DOJ legal opinion, which Arena had not seen, that

said the use of SERE-type techniques on detainees was not torture.

However, Arena could not recall if the FBI MLDU Unit Chief was ever

involved in discussions about the CIA's use of such techniques.

Pasquale D'Amuro was the Assistant Director for CTD and was

promoted to Executive Assistant Director in November 2002, near the time

this draft proposal was prepared. D'Amuro told us that he never saw the

document before his OIG interview and never heard of a proposal to

for employment of an alternative

debriefing model of the sort that had been approved for use by the CIA on

Zubaydah. D'Amuro stated that he would have opposed such a strategy

because he believed that FBI interview techniques were superior at

developing reliable information. D'Amuro told us he could not recall having

any discussions with the FBI Unit Chief regarding strategies for obtaining

information from Al-Qahtani.7°

7° The OIG also attempted to interview former Counterterrorism Division Assistant

Director Larry Mefford regarding this proposal. Mefford was in the FBI Unit Chief's chain of

(Cont'd.)

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.141

FBI Director Mueller told the OIG that the proposal regarding Al-

Qahtani described in the draft letter was never discussed with him and

never reached him. He said he did not know the circumstances under

which the document was written. Similarly, Mueller's Chief of Staff at the

time, Daniel Levin, told us that he did not recall seein the draft letter,

althou h he va ely recalled discussion of

We also sought to determine whether the •ro osal was discussed

within DOJ. Nahmias stated that a proposal to

was discussed in the informal working group (described in Chapter

Two) which included Nahmias or Fisher from the DOJ Criminal Division, a

member of the DOJ Office of Leval Counsel, someone from the DOD Office of

the General Counsel, and

MM. However, Nahmias told the OIG that these discussions did not

address the idea that the techniques that had been used on Zubaydah

would be used on Al-Qahtani. Fisher confirmed that the case of Al-Qahtani

was discussed at these informal meetings, but she and Nahmias said that

the topics of mistreatment, abuse, and voluntariness were not discussed in

connection with Al-Qahtani. Fisher told the OIG that she does not recall

ever seeing the draft letter and she does not recall discussing the strategy

described in it. Fisher said she had a vague recollection that there mi ht

have been a discussion with the CIA about whether

. However, Fisher said she does not believe it was

within the Criminal Division's jurisdiction to "sign off' on something like

that. Fisher said she does not believe anyone thought it was a good idea

and that she does not believe that it was done.7'

Nahmias told the OIG that the draft letter was created as a means for

the Attorney General or the Assistant Attorney General to suggest that if the

command, but had left the FBI by the time the OIG became aware of the draft letter. We

were not able to obtain an interview with Mefford.

71 We also note that Phase IV of the military's plan for Al-Qahtani, described in

detail earlier in this chapter, proposed sending him "off Island" either temporarily of

permanently to "either Jordan, Egypt or another third country to allow those countries to

em lo interro ation techni ues that will enable them to obtain the re uisite information."

Some witnesses, however, were only

able to recall a proposal to send Al-Qahtani and were

not able to recall further details, so it was not possible for the OIG to determine in those

instances whether the witnesses' recollection related to the military's plan or to the draft

letter described here.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.142

FBI could not interro ate Al-Qahtani that he should be

. Nahmias said he thought the DOJ officials

involved in the development of the general strategy to

may have included Assistant Attorney General Chertoff, Deputy

Attorney General Thompson, Attorney General Ashcroft, and his Chief of

Staff David Ayres.72 Nahmias told the OIG, however, that his discussions

with these people related to a general strategy for Al-Qahtani, did not

include sharing the draft letter, and did not address the specific concept

that interrogation techniques of the type used on Zubaydah would be used

on Al-Qahtani.

Assistant Attorney General Chertoff told the OIG that he does not

recall an s ecific discussion of 1111111111111111111MMIM

. Chertoff said he did not recall whether he had

specific knowled e at that point of the specific techniques used on

Zubaydah . However, he said it would not surprise him if,

wen Al-Qahtani's serceived value, there was some discussion as to whether

In contrast, he said, the information obtained by the

DOD was not very good. He also said he understood that while a detainee

was at GTMO, the DOD controlled who would have access to that detainee

and the FBI might be allowed to participate, but only as a guest. Thompson

and Ayres both told the OIG that the did not recall the draft letter or an

ro osal to for interrogation using

Nahmias stated that he is not aware that a final version of the letter

ever reached Attorney General Ashcroft, but that he believed that the

Attorney General was aware of the concerns about Al-Qahtani and was

aware that the general strategy to change the circumstances of Al-Qahtani's

interrogation was being considered. As previously noted, former Attorney

General Ashcroft declined to be interviewed for this review.

The OIG also interviewed the Chief of the BAU unit primarily

responsible for sending FBI agents to GTMO regarding the draft letter,

72 Deputy Assistant Attorney General Swartz told the OIG that neither the draft

letter nor the proposal outlined in it were discussed with him at the time, and that he was

unaware of such a proposal prior to being questioned by the OIG.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.143

because the draft letter states specifically that the proposed strategy had

been discussed with representatives of the FBI-BAU. The BAU Chief told

the OIG that he had never seen the proposal contained in the draft letter

and would not have supported such a proposal had he been consulted

about it. He said the BAU advocated exclusively for a long-term rapportbuilding

approach by a qualified interviewer, and he believed such an

approach could be effective in gathering intelligence from detainees at

GTMO. He said he suspects the methods used with Zubaydah as referred to

in the draft consisted of techniques that the BAU would not support.

As noted above, the FBI Unit Chief and Nahmias said they did not

know what techniques the CIA had used on Zubaydah. We attempted to

determine the extent to which other officials in the FBI and DOJ had

information about such techniques at the time of the draft letter, even if

they were not aware of the specific proposal to use such techniques with Al-

Qahtani. We found that by the time the draft letter proposing transfer of Al-

Qahtani was written, some other counterterrorism officials at the FBI were

aware that the CIA's interrogation methods included aggressive SERE-type

interrogation techniques. Agents with whom the FBI Unit Chief worked as

head of the GTMO Task Force and officials in his chain of command at the

FBI were aware that techniques had been used on Zubaydah II

that involved treatment that did not remotely resemble the

rapport-based approach embodied in FBI policy. At the time of this

proposal, Special Agents Thomas and Gibson, ITOS-1 Section Chief Andrew

Arena, FBI Counterterrorism Assistant Director D'Amuro, and others at the

FBI had learned about some of the types of techniques that had been used

or proposed for use by the CIA on Zubaydah, as described in Chapter Four.

In addition, the Assistant Chief of the FBI's Counterterrorism Operational

Response Section (CTORS) (of which MLDU was a unit) and Special Agent

Thomas told us that they observed the CIA's interrogation of Binalshibh in

late 2002. However, none of these FBI officials told the OIG that they were

aware of any proposal to use the same techniques with Al-Qahtani.

There is also some evidence that some officials in the DOJ Criminal

Division were aware of some of the techniques involved in the CIA's

in the fall of 2002. As noted in Chapter Four,

in July 2002 the DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) gave oral advice that the

use of certain specific CIA techniques would not violate statutory

prohibitions on torture. D'Amuro stated that he had attended a meeting

with Chertoff, Fisher, and others in which he learned that the CIA had

obtained a legal opinion from the DOJ that certain techniques could legally

be used, including sleep deprivation, noise, and constant light. Chertoff and

Fisher told us they did not recall this meeting. Chertoff told the OIG that he

was aware that the CIA had requested DOJ approval for certain

interrogation techniques and that the CIA had obtained a general opinion

from the OLC relating to its interrogations. Chertoff said that the Criminal

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.144

Division was asked to provide an "advance declination" in connection with

the CIA's use of some techniques, but that he had refused to provide it. In

testimony before the U.S. Senate on February 2, 2005, Chertoff stated that

he was asked to review a draft of an OLC memorandum that eventually

became the August 1, 2002, OLC memorandum regarding "Standards of

Conduct for Interrogation," which is sometimes referred to as the "Yoo

memorandum."73 Chertoff stated in his Senate testimony and his OIG

interview that at least some of the CIA "techniques" were described to him at

the time.

Nahmias said that Al-Qahtani because the

strategy was "overtaken by events." As detailed below, in the spring of 2003

Al-Qahtani began to provide significant amounts of intelligence and he has

subsequentlyremained at GTMO. Although Al-Qahtani

, we are not aware of any CIA

being used with him. In addition, by mid-December 2003

the FBI was provided sporadic access to Al-Qahtani and the FBI has

interrogated him on multiple occasions since then.

It is important to note that the .lan to

for interrogation using an did not come

to fruition. We also note, however, that advocacy of a plan that included the

use of an approach such as the one used on Zubaydah was not consistent

with the Director's determination that the FBI should not participate in

interrogations in which non-FBI techniques would be used.

We did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that the FBI Unit Chief

or Nahmias knew specifically what techniques had been used on Zubaydah

at the time they advanced this proposal. We found it

troubling, however, that officials in the FBI and DOJ would advocate for

usin the interrogation approach that was employed with Zubaydah -

without knowing what techniques that approach included. We

do not believe that this proposal would have been approved by the other FBI

officials in the FBI Unit Chief's chain of command who were aware of the

nature of these techniques during the time frame the proposal was drafted

and who also were aware of Director Mueller's determination that the FBI

should have no part in such techniques.

73 This general opinion did not describe any specific interrogation techniques, but

did include an examination of "possible defenses that would negate any claim that certain

interrogation methods violate the statute" prohibiting torture. A separate DOJ opinion

issued the same day stated that the specific techniques approved for use on Zubaydah

included waterboarding, "walling," (pushing the detainee into a specially constructed wall to

shock or surprise him), facial slaps, and stress positions.

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VIII. The Military Proceeds with the Interrogation of Al-Qahtani, Over

FBI Objections

Despite the FBI objections, the military proceeded with its

interrogation plan for Al-Qahtani. Between November 23, 2002, and

January 15, 2003, Al-Qahtani was interrogated by a "special projects" team

of military intelligence personnel. We believe that during this period Phase

II and Phase III of the interrogation plan were executed without the

involvement of the FBI or DOJ.

Special Agent Demeter told the OIG that the military employed Phase

II of the plan (placing a government translator with Al-Qahtani who would

act like a detainee and would engage Al-Qahtani in conversation) briefly, but

it was unsuccessful. It appears that the military then moved on to Phase III

(use of the 19 counter-resistance techniques listed in Major General

Dunlavey's October 11, 2002, memorandum).

According to the Schmidt-Furlow and Church Reports, as well as other

military records, the techniques used on Al-Qahtani during this time period

included

• Tying a dog leash to detainee's chain, walking him around the

room and leading him through a series of dog tricks

• Repeatedly pouring water on his head

• Stress positions

• 20-hour interrogations

• Forced shaving for hygienic and psychological purposes

• Stripping him naked in the presence of a female

• Holding him down while a female interrogator straddled the

detainee without placing weight on him

• Women's underwear placed over his head and bra placed over

his clothing

• Female interrogator massaging his back and neck region over

his clothing

• Describing his mother and sister to him as whores

• Showing him pictures of scantily clothed women

• Discussing his repressed homosexual tendencies in his

presence

• Male interrogator dancing with him

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• Telling him that people would tell other detainees that he got

aroused when male guards searched him

• Forced physical training

• Instructing him to pray to idol shrine

• Adjusting the air conditioner to make him uncomfortable

The Schmidt-Furlow Report concluded that many of these techniques

were authorized under the military's Field Manual 34-52, Intelligence

Interrogation, which we describe in Chapter Three of this report.

Schmidt/ Furlow Report at 20. For example, according to the Schmidt-Furlow

Report, holding Al-Qahtani down while a female interrogator straddled the

detainee was determined to be within the scope of the "Futility" technique

(an act used to highlight the futility of the detainee's situation). Id. at 16-

17. Other techniques used on Al-Qahtani by the military during this time

period, such as use of cold temperature to make the detainee

uncomfortable, were deemed by the Schmidt-Furlow Report to be

"unauthorized" at the time they were employed. Id. at 18.

As noted in Chapter Three, on December 2, 2002, Defense Secretary

Rumsfeld formally approved a new policy for GTMO (the "December 2002

Policy") listing additional counter resistance techniques that were not

specifically listed in Field Manual 34-52. The new policy specifically

approved several of the techniques that had been or were being employed on

Al-Qahtani, including stress positions, 20-hour interrogations, forced

nudity, and military working dogs. Church Report at 4-5, 116-7.

In early December 2002, Al-Qahtani was hospitalized as a result of

the DOD interrogations. Demeter told the OIG that a U.S. Navy nurse

informed him that Al-Qahtani had been admitted to the base hospital for

hypothermia. During a daily staff meeting, Demeter inquired about this

incident, and the Lieutenant Colonel who was in charge of GTMO

interrogations at that time stated that Al-Qahtani had not been diagnosed

with hypothermia, but rather low blood pressure along with low body core

temperature.74 Apart from FBI's knowledge of this incident, we have no

evidence that members of the FBI or DOJ were aware that the specific

techniques described above were used on Al-Qahtani during this time

frame.

74 In commenting on a draft of this report, the DOD stated that "[a] footnote from

review of the medical records . . . would lend credibility to either the agent's or the

lieutenant colonel's comments." However, the DOD did not provide a copy of the referenced

records.

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IX. Concerns about the Interrogation of Al-Qahtani and Other

Detainees Are Elevated at FBI Headquarters

During late 2002, several FBI agents attempted to raise their concerns

about the interrogation techniques the DOD was using on Al-Qahtani with

FBI Headquarters and requested guidance for agents exposed to such

interrogation activities.

On November 22, 2002, after having returned from GTMO, FBI BAU

SSA Lyle sent an e-mail to the Chief Division Counsel in the front office of

the Critical Incident Response Group (of which the BAU is one unit)

requesting documentation of the military's authority to engage in

"extraordinary" interrogation techniques and inquiring whether there were

any orders providing authority or guidance to FBI agents exposed to such

techniques. The Chief Division Counsel responded that, absent human

rights violations "such as physical torture, rape, starvation and murder,"

the authority of the military to engage in such techniques was not the FBI's

concern, but that FBI agents should not be "involved in" such

interrogations. Lyle raised the issue of agents being "exposed" to such

techniques utilized by others and suggested the development of written

guidelines from the FBI's General Counsel. The Chief Division Counsel

responded that he was not concerned about FBI agents witnessing such

techniques as long as they did not participate, because the techniques were

"apparently lawful" for the military. The Chief Division Counsel also

emphasized during his interview with the OIG that Judge Advocate General

Corps officers were present at GTMO. He told the OIG that the fact that the

techniques continued to be employed led him to conclude that they were

lawful. However, he said he advised the FBI agents that if they were

uncomfortable in such a situation, then they should leave.

Also on November 22, 2002, Foy wrote an EC to senior officials at the

FBI, including CTD Deputy Assistant Director John Pistole, ITOS-1 Section

Chief Andrew Arena, and the MLDU Unit Chief, providing his observations

and recommendations regarding the FBI mission in GTMO. Foy told the

OIG that the Unit Chief had instructed him to draft the EC during the

MLDU Unit Chiefs visit to GTMO in October 2002. Among other things, the

EC stated:

[Military Intelligence] interrogators are routinely utilizing nonlaw

enforcement tactics in their interview tactics. NCAVC

personnel witnessed sleep deprivation, duct tape on an

individual's mouth, loud music, bright lights, and growling dogs

in the [Military Intelligence] detainee interview process.

The use of these tactics put FBI personnel in a tenuous

situation that will perhaps necessitate FBI representatives being

utilized as defense witnesses in future judicial proceedings

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against a Detainee. Additionally, the aforementioned tactics

may preclude law enforcement from successfully obtaining

valuable intelligence from these Detainees in future interview

scenarios. 75

Foy's EC was reviewed by the BAU Chief before it was finalized. Foy

told the OIG that there was no response from anyone who received the EC,

and that he had no other discussions with the MLDU Unit Chief about the

EC. The BAU Chief said he did not recall ever seeing any response to Foy's

EC.

The MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that he raised the issues described

in Foy's November 22, 2002, EC with ITOS-1 Section Chief Arena, and

Arena said the FBI should stay away from the kinds of techniques Foy

described. Arena told the OIG he did not recall receiving the EC. However,

he said the general issues raised in the EC were brought to the attention of

the FBI Office of the General Counsel (OGC). He also said that he spoke

with his superiors about the fact that the military intended to use SERE

techniques on Al-Qahtani. Arena said he assumed his superiors raised

these issues up to Director Mueller.

CTD Deputy Assistant Director Pistole told the OIG that although he

did not specifically recall Foy's EC, at some point he became aware of the

DOD techniques described in the EC, such as the use of growling dogs.

Pistole told the OIG that he recognized that the FBI needed to provide clear

guidance so that agents did not become a party to or a beneficiary of these

techniques. However, he said he did not recall asking for an assessment or

requesting any recommendations to address the matters raised in the EC.

We determined that reports regarding the treatment of other detainees

at GTMO were also elevated to MLDU in 2002 and 2003. An SSA who was

temporarily detailed to this unit during 2002 told us that the MLDU Unit

Chief or another agent in the unit received reports of military interrogation

techniques such as yelling at the detainees and throwing objects in the

interrogation rooms such as chairs or other small pieces of furniture. An

agent who served two rotations as OSC at GTMO in 2002 and 2003 stated

that he was aware that techniques such as sleep deprivation, shackling,

stress positions, and cold temperatures were being used at GTMO and that

he sent e-mails to the MLDU Unit Chief to let him know what was going on.

The Unit Chief confirmed to the OIG that he received reports from agents at

GTMO regarding their concerns about various techniques the military was

75 The EC, which does not mention Al-Qahtani by name, covers a broader range of

mistreatment allegations and GTMO-related management issues than those presented by

the dispute over the Al-Qahtani interrogations.

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using. The Unit Chief said he recalled hearing about sleep deprivation, a

female interrogator exposing her breast to a detainee, and an interrogator

rubbing vegetable oil on a detainee while telling him it was "pig's oil." The

Unit Chief stated that he relayed any such reports to his superiors (CTORS

Section Chief Frankie Battle and CTD DAD T.J. Harrington).

Some of the agents' concerns reached the FBI's OGC. In late

November 2002, Special Agent Brett wrote a legal analysis of the

interrogation techniques being proposed for use by the military, and

forwarded it to Spike Bowman, head of the National Security Law Branch in

the OGC. In his analysis, Brett stated that hooding, use of phobias (such as

fear of dogs) to induce stress, use of "scenarios designed to convince the

detainee that death or severely painful consequences are imminent,"

exposure to cold weather or water, and waterboarding may violate the

Torture Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2340. Brett also stated that the technique of

sending .a detainee to "Jordan or Egypt or another third country to allow

those countries to employ interrogation techniques that will enable them to

obtain the requisite information" was a "per se" violation of the Torture

Statute if done with the intent that the third country would use techniques

that violate the Torture Statute. Brett's memorandum stated that even

"discussing any plan which includes this category could be seen as a

conspiracy to violate [the Torture Statute]." Brett included an urgent

request for guidance regarding these issues.

In early December 2002, the Chief Division Counsel of the CIRG

forwarded several documents to Bowman, including Brett's legal analysis.

Bowman responded:

I do not feel that the FBI should be perceived to approve this

and continue to believe that a [Behavioral Analysis Program]

evaluation is needed - both to aid in documenting an FBI

position and to help FBI policy-makers in evaluating this

situation.

I concur that we can't control what the military is doing, but we

need to stand well clear of it and get as much information as

possible to [CTD Assistant Director] D'Amuro, [Deputy Director]

Gebhardt and [Director] Mueller as soon as possible. . . .

The Chief Division Counsel for CIRG stated that he forwarded

Bowman's advice to members of the CIRG.

Bowman told the OIG he may have talked to CTD Assistant Director

D'Amuro, FBI Deputy Director Gebhardt, and FBI General Counsel

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Wainstein about these concerns.76 However, none of these officials could

specifically recall being told any details regarding DOD techniques during

this period. Wainstein told the OIG that he did not recall any specific

discussions about the effectiveness of military interviews at GTMO until

after the Abu Ghraib prison scandal broke in May 2004. D'Amuro said he

did not recall BAU agents communicating concerns about DOD techniques

or any discussion with Bowman about this subject. However, he told the

OIG that he learned at some point that the military was using aggressive

techniques at GTMO, and that the FBI had reiterated its instruction to

agents that they should not participate in such techniques. Gebhardt said

he recalled Bowman or CTD Deputy Assistant Director Harrington bringing

these issues to his attention, though he was not sure when this occurred.

He said he did not recall the specific techniques in question or any specific

instructions being given to FBI agents as a result.

Director Mueller told the OIG that, in general, he did not recall being

aware of a dispute between the military and the FBI over interrogation

techniques at GTMO prior to the spring of 2004, after the Abu Ghraib

disclosures.77 He said he did not recall seeing either the November 2002 EC

written by Foy or the May 2003 EC written by McMahon (described below in

Section XIV). He also said he had no discussions with military officials

about these issues, and he was unaware of any FBI input on DOD

interrogation protocols apart from input that might have been given at

GTMO by FBI personnel working there. With respect to Al-Qahtani

specifically, Director Mueller said he had no recollection of weighing in on

how he should be handled.

X. Concerns Regarding Interrogations of Al-Qahtani and Others Are

Elevated by the FBI to the DOJ Criminal Division

We determined that the FBI's concerns about the DOD's approach

reached high levels in the DOJ Criminal Division during 2002 and 2003.

The issue was initially reported by the MLDU Unit Chief to Criminal Division

76 Bowman also told the OIG that he thought he could influence the military by

bringing these issues directly to his counterparts in the DOD Office of General Counsel.

His efforts in that regard came several months later, however, and are described in Section

XIV of this chapter.

77 We also interviewed Daniel Levin, Director Mueller's former Chief of Staff. Levin

left the FBI in September 2002, before many of the agents' concerns about the Al-Qahtani

interrogations had been raised with Headquarters. However, he said he was aware of

general concerns regarding the effectiveness of the techniques the DOD and others were

using at GTMO. He stated that the FBI's assessment was that the detainee interviews at

GTMO were not eliciting much useful information, and this led to a debate about whether

there was a better way to handle these detainees.

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officials during weekly meetings that the Unit Chief later described in an email

to CTD DAD T.J. Harrington dated May 10, 2004, as follows:

In my weekly meetings with DOJ we often discussed DoD

techniques and how they were not effective or producing Intel

that was reliable. Bruce Swartz (SES), Dave Nahmias (SES),

Laura Parsky (now SES, GS15 at the time) and Alice Fisher

(SES Appointee) all from DOJ Criminal Division attended

meetings with FBI. We all agreed DoD tactics were going to be

an issue in the military commission cases. I know Mr. Swartz

brought this to the attention of DoD OGC.78

The MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that in the course of weekly

meetings with David Nahmias, the counsel to the Assistant Attorney General

for the Criminal Division, he made Nahmias aware that the military was

using aggressive techniques on Al-Qahtani and others at GTMO.79 The Unit

78 The MLDU Unit Chief later indicated that the he did not intend to imply that

Fisher was present during discussions of specific DOD interrogation tactics. In a letter

dated July 26, 2005, which was sent in response to a request from the United States

Senate Committee on the Judiciary for clarification of this e-mail, Assistant Attorney

General William Moschella stated that the "author of the e-mail" (the MLDU Unit Chief)

stated that:

He did not have conversations with Ms. Fisher nor does he recall discussions in Ms.

Fisher's presence about the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay. He did

participate in conversations with Ms. Fisher and other Department and FBI

representatives about a specific detainee and that detainee's links to law

enforcement efforts. These discussions focused on the information gathered

regarding the individual and his associations, but not on his treatment or

interrogation.

In the July 26 letter, Moschella stated that:

As set forth in the email, the author [of the e-mail] attended meeting with

Department representatives about detainees generally; there was no discussion of

DOD techniques at the couple of those meetings that Ms. Fisher attended. Ms.

Fisher was not part of the group referenced in the portion of the e-mail regarding

DOD tactics as an issue in the military commission cases. He does not recall any

conversation with or in the presence of Ms. Fisher regarding interrogation

techniques or the treatment of detainees. His conversations with her focused on the

particular detainee described above and pre-dated the broader conversations about

DOD techniques with other Department representatives.

The MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that although there may have been some meetings about

Al-Qahtani at which Fisher was present, those meetings were focused on discussions about

investigative information relating to Al-Qahtani, not interrogation tactics. He said he does

not think Fisher knew about particular interrogation tactics used against Al-Qahtani.

79 The MLDU Unit Chief said these meetings were primarily for the purpose of

keeping DOJ officials informed on intelligence gathered at GTMO, not to discuss detainee

treatment.

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Chief said he was confident Nahmias was also aware of the details of the

observations set out in Foy's EC of November 22, 2002. He told the OIG

that he recalled telling Nahmias in October or November 2002 that one of

the planned or actual techniques used on Al-Qahtani was simulated

drowning.80 Nahmias denied that the Unit Chief ever mentioned this

technique. In addition, the Unit Chief said he provided Foy's November 22

EC along with Foy's e-mails (described earlier) to Nahmias, and that he may

have also given Nahmias a copy of the interrogation plan for Al-Qahtani.

Nahmias stated he did not receive this EC from the Unit Chief.

The MLDU Unit Chief told the OIG that Nahmias said the FBI should

stay away from this approach, and that he or others at DOJ would raise the

issue with their DOD counterparts. He told us he expected Secretary

Rumsfeld would have the final say because Al-Qahtani was the DOD's

detainee. The Unit Chief said he later asked Nahmias what the DOD's

response was, but he told the OIG he could not recall Nahmias' response.

Andrew Arena, the Section Chief of the FBI's International Terrorism

Operations Section 1 (ITOS-1) and beginning in March of 2003, the Special

Assistant to the Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and

Counterintelligence, told the OIG that he also brought FBI concerns about

military interrogation approach to the attention of DOJ Criminal Division

officials. Arena said that every other week Nahmias, Fisher, and other

Criminal Division attorneys attended a meeting Arena held with his FBI unit

chiefs. Arena said that he did not recall particular techniques being

discussed at these meetings, but that the FBI's general concern that the

military's techniques at GTMO would not be effective was discussed. Later

in his interview, Arena stated that there were numerous occasions when he

had discussions with his chain of command and with attorneys at DOJ

regarding allegations or rumors of aggressive techniques being used at

GTMO or by the CIA at other locations. He recalled, as an example,

discussing the use of humiliation by having a naked detainee being

interrogated by a female. Nahmias and Fisher told the OIG they did not

receive a report of this nature.

In his OIG interview, Nahmias confirmed that he participated in

meetings with the FBI and others about the military's Al-Qahtani

interrogation plan. Nahmias said the military had a graduated plan that got

more "severe," but he did not think the actual interrogation ever got that far.

He said that parts of the plan were "clearly over the top," but he was told

that the interrogators would not implement the more severe techniques

80 Although Major General Dunlavey requested permission to use the technique of

"a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation" on October 11,

2002, we found no other evidence showing that technique was actually used on Al-Qahtani.

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unless everyone "regrouped" for further discussion. He said he could not

recall anyone raising concerns about the legality of the military's

techniques. 81 Nahmias also told the OIG that he raised concerns about the

DOD's interrogations approach with the the DOD Office of the General

Counsel and with the head of the DOD group that dealt with issues of

whether detainees were enemy combatants.

It appears that the MLDU Unit Chief sent Nahmias a copy of a CITF

legal advisor's memorandum dated November 15, 2002, that objected to the

Al-Qahtani interrogation plan. Among other things, the memorandum

stated that CITF has raised "formal legal objections" to the plan, including

that the plan potentially violated the Convention Against Torture. The CITF

memorandum also stated that the focus of the questioning of Al-Qahtani

related to a "historical event" (his participation in the September 11 attacks)

and that the interrogation methods used should be designed to preserve the

statements for use in a military commission proceeding. The MLDU Unit

Chief told the OIG that he also discussed this memorandum with Nahmias.

Nahmias said he had no recollection of this memorandum.82

The FBI's MLDU Unit Chief also described other incidents at GTMO to

officials in the DOJ Criminal Division. For example, Nahmias said that

during the summer of 2003 the MLDU Unit Chief told him anecdotal stories

about incidents at GTMO such as a female interrogator baring her chest to a

detainee, someone using an Israeli flag during an interrogation, and

dropping a Koran on the floor. Nahmias told us that he never heard reports

of actual physical mistreatment, but that he and the FBI were concerned

that the techniques the military was using were stupid, demeaning, and

ineffective.

Bruce Swartz the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal

Division who was responsible for international matters, stated that he and

Laura Parsky (then Counsel to Assistant Attorney General Chertoff) were

assigned to attend the NSC-led Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) to deal

with international requests regarding detainees. Swartz told the OIG that

81 Nahmias told the OIG that he did not recall having seen Brett's Legal Analysis

document at the time, but that it was possible he had seen it after the Criminal Division

started investigating other alleged detainee abuses.

82 Upon reviewing the CITF memo during his OIG interview, Nahmias said the

legality concerns are "buried" in the memo, and that he did not recall seeing the discussion

of the Convention Against Torture in the memo at the time. Nahmias added that he

disagreed with the statement in the memorandum that the focus of the questioning of Al-

Qahtani was an "historical event." Nahmias said that the focus was on gathering

intelligence regarding others who posed an ongoing threat and on preventing future

planned attacks.

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he was never part of any formal meetings with the MLDU Unit Chief or

others at the FBI regarding interrogation techniques or plans at GTMO or

elsewhere. However, Swartz said he had conversations with the MLDU Unit

Chief about the ineffectiveness of DOD interrogations on the way to or from

PCC meetings. Swartz recalled the Unit Chief expressing concerns about

the military posing as FBI agents and interrogating people in a room with

the flag of Israel. According to Swartz, the MLDU Unit Chief was

particularly concerned that the military was inefficient at getting valuable

intelligence, because the DOD was using inexperienced interrogators.

Parsky also told the OIG that she did not participate in formal

meetings with the FBI regarding interrogation techniques.83 Parsky said

that the MLDU Unit Chief told her some "offhand anecdotes" about DOD

interrogation methods at GTMO, such as a female interrogator who removed

her top and rubbed her breasts in the detainee's face, an interrogator who

wrapped himself in an Israeli flag in an interrogation, and an interrogator

who rubbed himself with oil that he told the detainee was "pig's oil." She

said the Unit Chief did not identify any particular detainees in connection

with these anecdotes. Parsky stated that these techniques were not

criminal but were "disgusting and highly inappropriate" for a U.S. official,

and that she described the Unit Chief's anecdotes to Swartz.

Nahmias told the OIG that he usually briefed Fisher on his meetings

about GTMO, and that Fisher certainly knew about the issue of the

effectiveness of the military's interrogation techniques at GTMO. Nahmias

said he recalled that Fisher was present during conversations in which the

interrogation methods were described in a general way, but that he did not

recall discussing specific techniques with Fisher.

Fisher told the OIG that she did not recall discussing detainee

treatment or interrogation techniques with the FBI during this time period.

Fisher told the OIG that she became aware "at some time" about an issue

relating to the FBI's concerns about the effectiveness of the DOD's

interrogations at GTMO, but she could not recall how or when she learned

about these concerns. She said she heard that the FBI was concerned that

GTMO was not set up as an effective place to get intelligence information

from detainees because there were no incentives available ("carrots") to

induce better cooperation. She also stated that the FBI believed it got

cooperation and good intelligence in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing

83 Parsky told the OIG that the May 10 e-mail was incorrect in that she did not

participate in weekly meetings in which particular detainees and interrogation techniques

were discussed.

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case through rapport building, an interview technique that was "tried and

true . "84

Fisher also told the OIG that she did not learn about allegations of

detainee abuse by the military until information about mistreatment at Abu

Ghraib became public. Fisher stated that she did not recall discussion of

DOD interrogating detainees with techniques of the type that are used in

training U.S. Special Forces. She said she recalled learning about the use of

such techniques on detainees in a context that had nothing to do with the

FBI.85

Fisher said she did not recall the FBI MLDU Unit Chief raising these

issues nor does she recall being aware of any other interrogation methods or

plans for Al-Qahtani.86 However, Fisher told the OIG that someone told her

(she did not recall who) that there was a strategy to stop interrogating a

detainee for 20 or 30 days, and that theoretically once the interrogators

went back in the detainee would reveal all the desired information. She said

the FBI said such a technique would not work. Fisher did recall, however,

hearing that the FBI did not consider DOD interrogations at GTMO to be

effective at obtaining useful information because GTMO was not set up to

provide incentives for cooperation.

Nahmias said that he and Fisher raised the FBI's concerns about the

ineffectiveness of the military's interrogations with Chertoff, who was then

the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. Chertoff told the

54 We sought to interview former Attorney General Ashcroft about this and other

matters, but he declined our request. Larry Thompson, who was Ashcroft's Deputy

Attorney General during 2001-2003, told the OIG that the FBI's position was that the other

agencies do not really know how to conduct interviews, but that FBI agents were trained in

it and that this is what they did for a living. Thompson said he recalled getting reports of

"clumsy" interrogation by CIA or the military.

55 Fisher stated she became aware at some point, she could not say when, that the

CIA requested advice regarding the legality of specific interrogation techniques, and that the

Office of Legal Counsel worked on that issue. She said she was aware of the "Jay Bybee"

memo and another memo on that topic, but they did not relate to the FBI. Fisher also told

the OIG that Assistant Attorney General Chertoff was very clear that the Criminal Division

was not giving advice on which interrogation techniques were permissible and was not

"signing off' on techniques. She said she recalled there was an investigation based on a

CIA referral that may have related to detainee treatment or interrogation techniques, and

that she became aware of some facts relating to CIA interrogations. She did not say when

DOJ received the CIA referral, though she noted that it was sometime "later." Documents

reflect a total of five referrals by the CIA OIG to DOJ. These referrals were made between

February 6, 2003 and March 30, 2004.

86 As described earlier in this chapter, Fisher told the OIG she had a "vague"

recollection that there mi ht have been a discussion about whether

for this purpose.

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OIG that the Criminal Division had an interest in the efficacy of DOD

interrogations at GTMO because its prosecutors were looking for

"actionable" information. Chertoff said he understood generally that the FBI

did not have a high opinion of the skills of the DOD interrogators, though he

said he did not have any recollection of the FBI's view of the military's Al-

Qahtani interrogations. Chertoff said he shared the FBI's concerns, and

that he had a very high opinion of the FBI's interrogation skills. In contrast,

Chertoff said he did not get the sense that the DOD interrogators had

significant experience with interrogations outside a battlefield context.

However, he said he does not recall anyone suggesting that the DOD was

doing something illegal.

XI. Concerns Regarding Efficacy of DOD Interrogations at GTMO Are

Raised to the Attorney General

Chertoff and Nahmias told the OIG that general concerns about the

efficacy of the DOD's GTMO interrogations were brought to the attention of

Attorney General Ashcroft. Chertoff said these concerns were brought to the

attention of Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson as well. Chertoff said

that Thompson and Ashcroft both shared his concern about whether the

DOD was doing the best possible job in questioning the GTMO detainees.

Nahmias said that concerns specific to the DOD's interrogations of Al-

Qahtani were brought to the Attorney General's attention. Nahmias told the

OIG that after being briefed, Ashcroft had questions about whether Al-

Qahtani was being effectively interrogated. Former Deputy Assistant

Attorney General Alice Fisher told the OIG that she does not recall ever

seeking Attorney General Ashcroft's input on what strategy to use with Al-

Qahtani. Fisher said she does not know if anyone discussed the Al-Qahtani

interrogations with the Attorney General's office or the Deputy Attorney

General's office.

Nahmias also told the OIG that "pretty much everyone" involved in

counterterrorism issues at DOJ, including the senior leadership of the

Department, was aware of concerns about the effectiveness of DOD

interrogations. He said that concern about ineffectiveness generally, as well

as concerns about ineffectiveness of interrogations of specific detainees,

were "a repeated issue during my entire time at Justice."

Former Deputy Attorney General Thompson told the OIG that while

there was some friction between the FBI and the DOD, he thought it related

mostly to a different detainee, Jose Padilla. While Thompson described the

DOD's techniques as "clumsy," he said he did not recall specific concerns

about Al-Qahtani. He said he had a general recollection of one instance in

which the CIA or the military had a plan to leave a detainee alone for a long

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period of time with the expectation that the detainee would then open up

and begin providing intelligence.

We also interviewed David Ayres, the former Chief of Staff to Attorney

General Ashcroft, who stated that as a general matter DOJ did not feel that

the quality of the intelligence being collected by the DOD at GTMO was high.

Ayres told us that the dispute between DOJ and FBI on one side and

elements of the military on the other was the subject of "ongoing, longstanding,

trench warfare in the inter agency discussions" between the FBI

and the military, including at the Principals Committee, the Deputies

Committee, and the line-level. However, Ayres said he did not recall any

discussion of what interrogation approach to take with Al-Qahtani.87

The OIG received a copy of a memorandum dated November 6, 2002,

from Michael Chertoff (then Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal

Division) through the Deputy Attorney General to the Attorney General, with

a copy to the FBI Director. In the memorandum, Chertoff provided a

detailed summary of the Al-Qahtani investigation and efforts to elicit

information from Al-Qahtani. With respect to Al-Qahtani's "Current

Status," he stated:

This memorandum indicates that concerns about the effectiveness of DOD

interrogation tactics at GTMO were raised to the Attorney General as early

as November 2002.

As noted above, former Attorney General Ashcroft declined our

request for an interview.

87 Ayres said he did recall inquiring repeatedly about what intelligence Al-Qahtani

was providing, and being told that Al-Qahtani was "not talking."

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XII. DOJ Efforts to Address Guantanamo Interrogation Issues in the

Inter-Agency Process

The OIG sought to determine what efforts, if any, DOJ officials made

to raise concerns about DOD interrogation techniques with officials outside

DOJ through the inter-agency process.88 Nahmias said that he did not

know "in detail" what former Attorney General Ashcroft did with the

concerns brought to him about the Al-Qahtani interrogations, but said he

was "fairly confident that the military's handling of Al-Qahtani" was raised

by DOJ officials at the Principals or Deputies committee meetings about

GTMO. Nahmias also told the OIG that Attorney General Ashcroft spoke

with someone at the NSC, most likely National Security Advisor Condoleezza

Rice, about DOJ's concerns about the approach the DOD was taking in the

Al-Qahtani interrogations.89 Nahmias also said he believed there were

meetings, though he was not certain with whom, in which Ashcroft and

Chertoff expressed two concerns: first, that Al-Qahtani was a very valuable

detainee and DOJ did not think it was getting the intelligence this detainee

had; and second, that reported intelligence from Al-Qahtani was not always

accurate, either because he may have been lying or because the DOD may

not have accurately reported what he said. When asked if anything ever

happened as a result of these meetings, Nahmias said that DOJ officials

were continually frustrated by their inability to get any changes or make

progress with regard to the Al-Qahtani matter.90

Parsky, Nahmias, and Swartz all told the OIG that they recalled

discussions of DOJ's concerns about detainee interrogations at GTMO with

the legal advisor to the National Security Council. Parsky stated that it was

not uncommon for DOJ to raise various issues of concern to the NSC legal

advisor, as he had the lead at the PCC. Parsky recalled a conference call

with the NSC legal advisor in November 2003 that included herself, Swartz,

and Nahmias. Parsky stated that Swartz decided to make the call after

Parsky relayed the offhand anecdotes the FBI MLDU Unit Chief had told her

about DOD interrogations at GTMO (described in the previous section). She

88 As described in Chapter Two, there are structures in place for resolving inter

agency issues, including the Policy Coordinating Committee, the "Principals" Committee

and the "Deputies" Committee, all chaired by the NSC.

89 Nahmias told the OIG that the issue of treatment of people was rarely, if ever,

discussed at the Policy Coordinating Committee itself, and he noted that he would not

expect to discuss issues such as detainee treatment in such a large group. Nahmias said

that DOJ would "weigh in on the FBI's behalf' on the "margins" of the PCC meetings, when

talking to the NSC legal advisor or in talking directly to CIA OGC or DOD OGC

representatives.

98 Nahmias stated that he also raised these matters with a counterpart at the DOD

who headed a group that dealt with detainee issues, though he did not see any changes or

progress as a result of his raising these matters.

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said that another concern behind the call was the concern that the DOD's

interrogation methods were making GTMO detainees unusable in U.S.

cases. She said that during the call they discussed the difference between

the FBI approach (rapport building) and the confrontational DOD approach

(SERE method). In the call, the DOJ participants suggested that the FBI

either be in on the interrogations from the beginning with the DOD, or that

the FBI start the interrogation process so that if the detainee cooperated the

information could be used in a legal proceeding. Parsky said she does not

believe the details of the MLDU Unit Chief's anecdotes regarding particular

detainee incidents were described to the NSC legal advisor during the call,

but that they told the legal advisor that DOD interrogators were doing a

terrible job and were doing things that the FBI agents would never do.

Nahmias said that in the latter part of 2003 he told the NSC legal

advisor about techniques the MLDU Unit Chief had brought to his attention

over time, such as female personnel exposing their breasts and use of "pig

oil" on detainees. Nahmias told the NSC legal advisor that they did not

know for a fact that these things happened. Nahmias told the OIG that he

was not referring these matters as specific incidents or allegations of

misconduct, but rather attempting to relate the kinds of stories that were

going around about the military's tactics. Nahmias told the OIG that DOJ

raised the matter as an "effectiveness" issue, and that he believed the NSC

legal advisor shared their concerns regarding effectiveness.

Swartz also told us that he recalled discussing interrogation issues in

meetings at the NSC-chaired PCC meetings regarding the return of GTMO

detainees. He said that he raised the ineffective and wrongheaded practice

of the military interrogations at GTMO as a continuing theme of these PCC

meetings. Swartz said that from GTMO's inception he took the position

within DOJ and in inter-agency meetings that GTMO was doing grave

damage to the United States' position internationally and in particular with

regard to law enforcement and the rule of law.91 However, Swartz stated

that he did not raise any reports of abuse of a particular GTMO detainee,

because he did not become aware of any such reports until he heard about

an alleged helicopter incident (discussed below in Section XV of this

chapter).

The DOJ officials who discussed the issue of GTMO interrogations

with the NSC legal advisor told us that they generally did not recall learning

of any follow-up or change in policy as a result of these discussions. For

example, Nahmias told the OIG that he did not hear more about these kinds

91 Documents provided by Swartz indicate that as a result of media reports, he

became concerned about detainees were being subjected to abusive treatment, and that in

March 2003 he raised this issue during a PCC meeting.

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of concerns until the materials that the FBI released to the ACLU were

published in the press. Nahmias described the issue of detainee

interrogation approaches as "an ongoing fight." He said "DOD always won

the fight because they controlled the locations and they had ultimate

control, which we acknowledged, of the [detainees]."

The OIG also sought to determine whether high-level DOJ officials

were aware of efforts to raise concerns about the Al-Qahtani interrogations

at inter agency meetings. Fisher said she does not recall if high-level DOJ

officials raised the issue outside the DOJ. Assistant Attorney General

Chertoff said he believes that, over time, Deputy Attorney General

Thompson and Attorney General Ashcroft had discussions with DOD

officials about the efficacy of its interrogations, but he said he does not

recall the specifics of those discussions and is not aware of the specific

outcome. He noted that DOJ also urged the DOD to move forward with the

Military Commission process to provide the possibility of plea bargaining as

a method of obtaining cooperation, but DOJ had little success.

Director Mueller told the OIG that he had no recollection of a dispute

over Al-Qahtani and how he would be interrogated, and he had no

recollection of the matter ever being raised at inter agency meetings.

Deputy Attorney General Thompson told the OIG he is not aware of

discussions of the Al-Qahtani interrogations except discussions internal to

DOJ. David Ayres, the former Chief of Staff to the Attorney General, told

the OIG he did not recall the Attorney General raising any issue at the

Policy Coordinating Committee regarding the interrogation techniques

planned for Al-Qahtani. As noted above, former Attorney General Ashcroft

declined the OIG's request for an interview in this matter.

XIII. Al-Qahtani Becomes Fully Cooperative

We determined that some point in early 2003, Al-Qahtani became

cooperative with DOD interrogators, although the available evidence does

not make clear exactly when or why this happened. According to the

Church Report, Al-Qahtani's resistance "began to crumble" after the DOD

began the application of "Category II" techniques in the DOD interrogation

plan.92 Church Report at 121. The Church Report stated that these

interrogations took place between November 23, 2002, and January 15,

2003, and produced "tangible results." Id. In addition, a January 21, 2003,

memorandum sent by Major General Miller to the Commander of

92 A comparison of the Al-Qahtani interrogation plan with the list of techniques

included in "Category II" reflects that the use "Category II" techniques corresponds with

Phase III of the plan.

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SOUTHCOM stated that the use of the techniques had allowed the military

to obtain "significant intelligence of enormous long term operations and

strategic value." Schmidt/ Furlow Report, Exhibit 66. The memorandum

contained examples of "high value" intelligence obtained from Al-Qahtani:

he admitted being al-Qaeda and said Bin Laden sent him to the United

States in August 2001 for a mission; he described where he obtained a visa

to enter the United States; he gave the location of the passport office; and he

provided the names of associates and three possible terrorists who could be

in the United States. Id.

On January 15, 2003, after the General Counsel of the Department of

the Navy, Alberto Mora, and others raised concerns about the authorization

of aggressive techniques in the DOD's December 2002 Policy; Secretary

Rumsfeld officially rescinded his approval of the Category II techniques and

one Category III technique. Church Report at 118-121. According to a

subsequent memorandum from General Hill to the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, when the interrogators suspended use of the Category II

techniques, Al-Qahtani reverted to his cover story and the interrogations

"became noticeably less effective." Church Report at 121-22.

On January 21, 2003, Major General Miller wrote to the Director of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Category II techniques were "essential to

mission success" and should be approved for future use (except stress

positions, removal of clothing, and use of detainee's individual phobias to

induce stress). Church Report at 122. He also stated that "none of the

Category III techniques are necessary to accomplish this mission and are

not requested." Id. On March 21, 2003, General Hill noted in a

memorandum to General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, that without

the use of the recently rescinded Category II and Category III techniques, "it

is likely that these high-value detainees will be capable of holding out

indefinitely, depriving the US of valuable intelligence." Id. at 121-22.

However, as described below, other evidence indicates that Al-Qahtani did

not become fully cooperative until April 2003.

After the approval of Category II and III techniques was rescinded, the

military reverted to a less aggressive approach with Al-Qahtani. This

included the administration of a polygraph examination on March 31, 2003,

which Al-Qahtani had been requesting for over 4 months. After failing to

pass the polygraph, according to the military's "memorandum for record"

(MFR), Al-Qahtani's attitude began to shift dramatically, and he began to

inquire about whether he would be able to return to Saudi Arabia if he told

the truth.93 The MFR for April 7, 2003, stated that Al-Qahtani "is concerned

93 An MFR (Memorandum For Record) is a military intelligence document that

generally summarizes interaction with a detainee. MFRs usually include what types of

interrogation methods were used on the detainee and how the detainee reacted to those

(Cont'd.)

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with cutting the best deal possible for him, evading US prosecution for his

crimes, and avoiding incarceration in Saudi Arabia once he is returned

home." The next day, Al-Qahtani began to describe his knowledge of al-

Qaeda in great detail, and the subsequent MFRs reflect that from that point

on he provided a significant amount of detailed information about al-Qaeda

and its pre-September 11 operations.

An analysis of the Al-Qahtani case written by military interrogators

and analysts pointed to a number of factors that contributed to his decision

to finally cooperate. According to this analysis, the major factors were:

• Polygraph. Al-Qahtani was "shocked" to learn that he had

failed the polygraph, and he became very flustered and nervous

when confronted with the fact that the examiners detected him

employing techniques to counter the polygraph's accuracy.

• Perception of betrayal by other al-Qaeda members.

Following the polygraph, he was confronted with the fact that

other al-Qaeda members were being apprehended and were

providing valuable intelligence. He was both surprised and

upset when interrogators used a "kunai" [nickname] with him

that he had not told them he had.

• Segregation and lack of contact with others. Al-Qahtani was

described as a "narcissist" who thrived on being the center of

attention. Interrogators ceased seeing him daily and explained

they had less and less interest in him because they were getting

what they needed from other sources.

• Incentive of being returned to Saudi Arabia. Interrogators

told him he had no hope of being released or transferred back to

Saudi Arabia unless he cooperated and told them all he knew.

The analysis stated that Al-Qahtani was hopeful that he would

eventually be returned to Saudi Arabia and believed the

interrogators would make recommendations in his favor if he

was truthful.

The analysis did not cite the application of harsh interrogation

techniques prior to January 15, 2003, as a factor in Al-Qahtani's changed

behavior.

methods. MFRs may also include details about the physical treatment of the detainee,

such as whether he was offered food or water, bathroom breaks, exercise periods, and

sleep. Also, MFRs report any information that the detainee provides pursuant to the

interrogator's questions and the interrogation team's analysis of the information provided

by the detainee, as well as an assessment of the detainee's truthfulness and level of

cooperation.

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Al-Qahtani told the OIG that he changed his story because the

military tortured him. He said the military engaged in physical torture, but

the FBI used psychological torture. However, as noted above, during other

parts of Al-Qahtani's interview he described the FBI agent who interviewed

him as having "humanity."

On April 16, 2003, more than a week after Al-Qahtani became

cooperative, the Secretary of Defense approved 24 "Counter-Resistance

Techniques" for use in interrogations of unlawful combatants. Church

Report at 137. In May 2003, Lieutenant Colonel Moss, the Commander of

the JIG/Interrogation Control Element, wrote to Major General Miller that

Al-Qahtani had been "fully exploited" and his continued presence at GTMO

for questioning was "no longer necessary." However, as of May 2008, Al-

Qahtani remains at GTMO and a variety of law enforcement and military

intelligence officials have interviewed him during the past few years.

XIV. The May 30, 2003 Electronic Communication

A separate FBI effort to raise the issue of detainee mistreatment with

the military took place in June 2003. By that time, the DOD had ceased

using its more severe techniques on Al-Qahtani and he had become

cooperative, but the individuals who elevated their concerns apparently

were not aware of these developments.

As previously noted, in late 2002 FBI Assistant General Counsel Spike

Bowman requested that concerns raised by Special Agents McMahon and

Brett about interrogation techniques be documented in a written report for

him to use in raising concerns to the DOD.94 Six months later, on May 30,

2003, McMahon completed this report in the form of an Electronic

Communication (EC) and transmitted it to Bowman, the MLDU Unit Chief,

and the Acting CTORS Section Chief.

McMahon's EC described in detail the history of the dispute at GTMO

between the FBI and military intelligence regarding the comparative merits

of rapport-based interview techniques and the aggressive SERE techniques

advocated by military intelligence, particularly with respect to Al-Qahtani.

The EC referenced 12 attachments relating to the dispute, including SA

Brett's legal analysis of the military's interrogation techniques and the

BAU's critique of the military interrogation plan for Al-Qahtani. The EC

concluded that "it is essential that FBIHQ, DOJ and the DOD provide

94 Before joining the FBI, Bowman had a long career with the military. He was an

instructor at the Naval War college teaching rules of armed conflict and rules of

engagement.

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specific guidance to protect agents and to avoid tainting cases which may be

referred for prosecution."

On July 1, 2003, after reviewing McMahon's EC and interviewing one

of the military's Judge Advocates General (JAG) who had worked with the

FBI interrogators in GTMO, Bowman sent an e-mail to CTD Deputy

Assistant Director Pistole, Executive Assistant Director D'Amuro, and

others, alerting them that the military had been using techniques of

"aggressive interrogation," including "physically striking the detainees,

stripping them and pouring cold water on them and leaving them exposed

(one got hypothermia), and similar measures." Bowman opined that:

"Beyond any doubt, what they are doing (and I don't know the extent of it)

would be unlawful were these Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW). That they are

not so designated cannot be license to do something that you cannot do to

an EPW or a criminal prisoner." Bowman expressed concern that the FBI

would be "tarred by the same brush" and sought input on whether the FBI

should refer the matter to the DOD Inspector General, stating that "[w]ere I

still on active duty, there is no question in my mind that it would be a duty

to do so." He also offered to prepare guidance for FBI agents who are

exposed to these aggressive techniques as requested in the McMahon EC.

Neither D'Amuro nor Pistole said they could recall McMahon's EC or

Bowman's e-mail. Bowman told the OIG that he did not recall any response

being sent to McMahon regarding his EC of May 30, 2003.

In addition, Bowman said that once he received the EC, he discussed

it with the DOD. Bowman told the OIG that he also contacted the DOD

Deputy General Counsel responsible for intelligence issues. Bowman said

that the DOD Deputy General Counsel assured him that they knew about

the FBI's concerns and the matter was being handled. A member of the

DOD General's Counsel's office came to FBI Headquarters approximately

one week later to review the EC and its attachments. According to Bowman,

the person who reviewed the documents seemed "disturbed" by what he

read. Bowman said that when he called to follow up, however, he was

unable to obtain any information about what actions the DOD planned to

take, if any, in response to the information in the EC. Bowman said he even

called the DOD General Counsel to inquire, and the response he received

was that the Deputy General Counsel was handling it.

Documents reflect that McMahon's EC and its attachments were

provided to officials at DOJ Headquarters in May 2004, after the Abu Ghraib

prison scandal became public. One reason that we believe this EC did not

receive much attention in the FBI was that many of the concerns expressed

in it had been mooted by events during the months between McMahon's

deployment to GTMO and May 30, 2003. As detailed above, by May 30,

2003, Secretary Rumsfeld had rescinded his approval for the harshest

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interrogation techniques, the DOD had ceased using such techniques on Al-

Qahtani, and Al-Qahtani had become fully cooperative. However, Bowman

apparently was not aware of these developments when he contacted the

DOD about the allegations in McMahon's EC.

XV. Concerns Raised Regarding Slahi's Interrogation

The case of Mohamedou Ould Slahi (#760) presents another example

in which FBI agents raised concerns through their chain of command about

rumors of detainee mistreatment at GTMO. In this case, some of these

concerns were communicated to senior officials at DOJ.

Slahi was an al-Qaeda operative who is believed to have recruited

several of the September 11 hijackers in Germany. Church Report at 159.

According to FBI records, Slahi was arrested in Mauritania at the request of

the United States, held in Jordan for several months, and then transferred

to U.S. custody in Afghanistan (Bagram). He was taken to GTMO in August

2002.

The FBI sought to interview Slahi immediately after he arrived at

GTMO. FBI and task force agents interviewed Slahi over the next few

months, utilizing rapport-building techniques.95 An FBI agent who was

assigned to Slahi told us that the military disagreed with the FBI's approach

and wanted to use interrogation techniques similar to those employed on Al-

Qahtani. One of the FBI's OSCs at GTMO told us that a military contract

interrogator was extremely critical of the friendly tenor of the FBI's interview

strategy. In late May 2003 the FBI agents who were involved with Slahi left

GTMO, and the military assumed control over Slahi's interrogation. One of

the FBI agents told us that before he left GTMO he saw a draft of special

interrogation plan that the military was preparing for Slahi, and that it was

similar to Al-Qahtani's interrogation plan.

According to FBI documents, on July 1, 2003, General Miller signed a

request from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) seeking "Special Projects

Status" for Slahi and approval of a 90-day special interrogation plan that

included "techniques not specified the Secretary of Defense guidance

document, 'Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism' dated

16 April 2003." The plan stated that Slahi would be hooded and flown

around Guantanamo Bay for one or two hours in a helicopter to persuade

him he had been moved out of GTMO to a location where "the rules have

changed." According to the Church Report, the interrogation plan for Slahi

95 Allegations of misconduct by two of these agents are addressed in Section III of

Chapter Eleven.

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also included isolation, interrogations for up to 20 hours, sensory

deprivation, and "sleep adjustment." Church Report at 159. The version of

the plan provided to the OIG called for 15-hour interrogations (during which

Slahi would be prevented from sleeping) followed by 4 hours of rest, as well

as using continuous sound to hinder Slahi's concentration and establish

fear. We did not find any evidence of FBI involvement in the development of

this interrogation plan or in the interrogations of Slahi during the summer

of 2003.

According to the Schmidt-Furlow Report, the military used a masked

interrogator called "Mr. X" to interrogate Slahi. Schmidt-Furlow Report at

25-26. On August 2, 2003, a different military interrogator posing as a

Navy Captain from the White House gave Slahi a fake memorandum from

the "Joint Staff, U.S. Army Director for Intelligence," indicating that because

of Slahi's lack of cooperation, his mother would be apprehended for

interrogation by U.S. and Mauritanian authorities, and that if she was

uncooperative she might be transferred to GTMO. The letter referred to "the

administrative and logistical difficulties her presence would present in this

previously all-male prison environment." The interrogator told Slahi that

his family was "in danger if he (760) didn't cooperate." Schmidt-Furlow

Report at 26 and Ex. 72. On August 3, military interrogators told Slahi to

"use his imagination to think up the worst possible scenario he could end

up in," that "beatings and physical pain are not the worst thing in the

world," and that unless he began to cooperate, he would "disappear down a

dark hole." Id. at 26 and Ex. 75.

Secretary Rumsfeld approved the interrogation plan for Slahi on

August 13, 2003. The movement plan for Slahi was amended, however, to

utilize a several-hour boat ride rather than a helicopter to deceive Slahi.

According to the Church Report, on August 25, 2003, Slahi was removed

from his cell in Camp Delta, fitted with blackout goggles, and taken on a

disorienting boat ride during which he was permitted to hear pre-planned

deceptive conversations among other passengers. He was then placed in

isolation in Camp Echo. Church Report at 160.

The extent to which the harsher elements of the interrogation plan

approved by Secretary Rumsfeld for Slahi were ever implemented is not

clear to us. The Church Report states that the special interrogation plan

was implemented in early September 2003 and Slahi soon began providing

useful information. Church Report at 160. The Special Projects Team Chief

stated that "once the [interrogation plan] for 760 was approved in August

2003, we started the [interrogation plan] in earnest." However, he also

stated: "Most of the [plan] was not executed. The only thing we ever did

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was the direct approach."96 Schmidt-Furlow Report Ex. 20. The Schmidt-

Furlow Report concluded that the "techniques" in the plan were never

implemented because Slahi began to cooperate prior to the approval.

Schmidt-Furlow Report at 23.

According to military documents, Slahi began cooperating with

military interrogators on September 8, 2003, and immediately began

providing intelligence. A military report on that date stated that the

interrogator told Slahi: "After interrogators are finished with all our

questions, only then would his family be returned and Detainee's overall

situation would improve."

Over a year later, Slahi made allegations to military interrogators that

he had been mistreated during the summer of 2003. He made similar

allegations in interviews with the 01G.97 He alleged that:

• He was left alone in a cold room known as "the freezer," where

guards would prevent him from sleeping by putting ice or cold

water on him or making noise;

• He was subjected to sleep deprivation for a period of 70 days by

means of prolonged interrogations, strobe lights, threatening

music, forced intake of water, and forced standing;

• He was deprived of clothing by a female interrogator;

• Two female interrogators touched him sexually and made

sexual statements to him;

• Prior to and during the boat ride incident he was severely

beaten; and

• During the boat ride incident he overheard an Egyptian and

Jordanian arguing over who would get him.98

96 Military documents indicate that techniques other than direct questioning were

used on Slahi during this period. For example, a memorandum dated July 17, 2003, stated

that on July 8, Slahi had been exposed to "variable lighting patterns and rock music, to the

tune of Drowning Pool's 'Let the Bodies Hit the Floor,"' which kept Slahi "awake and in a

state of agitation." It further stated that on July 17, the interrogators employed a "Fear Up"

approach on Slahi in which he was deprived of some clothes and yelled at. Schmidt-Furlow

Report, Ex. 73.

97 The OIG provided a list of questions to Slahi's U.S. Army assigned interrogator,

which she then posed to Slahi. This unusual step was taken at the behest of JTF-GTMO

Commander General Hood in an effort to avoid compromising in any way the significant

progress that the interrogator had made in obtaining information from Slahi. The OIG was

later given permission to interview Slahi directly.

98 The only allegation of improper conduct with respect to Slahi that the Schmidt-

Furlow Report found to be corroborated was the use of threats against Slahi and his family.

(Cont'd.)

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Schmidt-Furlow Report, Exs. 5 and 6. During Slahi's OIG interview,

he stated that he had never been in a helicopter since he has been at

GTMO.

We determined that FBI agents became concerned about the potential

mistreatment of Slahi in the fall of 2003. In October or November of 2003, a

special agent from the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) who was

assigned to CITF contacted two FBI agents who were on temporary duty

assignment to CITF at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The NCIS agent told the FBI

agents that he was concerned that tactics being utilized by the military on

Slahi at GTMO would jeopardize the military commission's prosecution of

Slahi. He showed the FBI a copy of an e-mail containing a second-hand

report that Slahi was pulled off a helicopter at GTMO, was led to believe he

was going to be executed, and urinated on himself. The NCIS agent also

told the FBI that he had received reports that a military interrogator had

displayed a letter to Slahi on State Department letterhead threatening to

have Slahi's family taken to Morocco for possible torture, which caused

Slahi to "crack."

The FBI agents who received this report then reviewed numerous

Memoranda for Record (MFR) regarding Slahi maintained in CITF files, and

determined, among other things, that on several occasions in early June

2003 an Army Sergeant on the DIA Special Projects Team at GTMO

identified herself to Slahi as FBI SSA "Samantha Martin" in an effort to

persuade Slahi to cooperate with interrogators. The FBI agents prepared a

draft EC dated November 25, 2003, that summarized the MFRs, with

particular emphasis on the threats against Slahi's family. It also described

the alleged helicopter incident and the impersonation of an FBI agent by a

military interrogator. The draft EC indicated that the military was repeating

its techniques on other detainees.

On December 5, 2003, an SSA assigned to the FBI's Military Liaison

and Detainee Unit (MLDU) sent an e-mail forwarding the draft EC up the

chain of command in the FBI Counterterrorism Division (CTD). His e-mail

was addressed to CTD Deputy Assistant Director Gary Bald, CTORS Section

Chief Frankie Battle, and ITOS-1 Section Chief Arthur Cummings. The email

stated:

The Schmidt-Furlow Report concluded that placing Slahi in cold temperatures was an

approved technique under DOD's April 2003 GTMO Policy. It found Slahi's claims of

having been subjected to sexual behavior could not be corroborated, and that although he

was treated for "edema of the lower lip" and a small head laceration, his allegation of having

been beaten "very hard all over" during his transfer from Camp Delta to Camp Echo was

"not substantiated." Schmidt-Furlow Report at 23-27.

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MLDU requested this information be documented to protect the

FBI. MLDU has had a long standing and documented position

against use of some of DOD's interrogation practices, however,

we were not aware of these latest techniques until recently.

Of concern, DOD interrogators impersonating Supervisory

Special Agents of the FBI told a detainee that the "FBI" could

protect him from prosecution. These same interrogation teams

then took the detainee on a helicopter ride and threatened to

execute him. The detainee was also told by this interrogation

team that the detainee's family was detained in Mauritania by

the USG and that things would get worse for his family until he

cooperated.

These tactics have produced no intelligence of a threat

neutralization nature to date and CITF believes that techniques

have destroyed any chance of prosecuting this detainee.

If this detainee is ever released or his story made public in any

way, DOD interrogators will not be held accountable because

these torture techniques were done [by] the "FBI" interrogators.

The FBI will [be] left holding the bag before the public.

The draft EC was not immediately finalized and disseminated because

there was concern within the FBI regarding whether it was appropriate to

document this information and whether it was adequately supported.

Special Agent Scott, one of the FBI agents who drafted the EC, told us that

the contents of the EC were briefed to Battle, Deputy Assistant Director T.J.

Harrington, the MLDU Unit Chief, and an attorney in FBI-OGC. 99 Scott

also discussed the matter with the FBI's OSC at GTMO.

Battle told the OIG that he could not recall how the FBI followed up

on the issues in the draft EC. He said he did not recall any communications

with Scott or with the MLDU Unit Chief. Harrington told the OIG that he

instructed the OSC at GTMO to raise the issues in the EC with the military.

He also said he discussed the EC with Bald. Bald and Cummings told the

OIG they recalled hearing about an incident in which a detainee was taken

up in a helicopter and was threatened to be dropped out. Bald said he

thought the matter was referred to the military.

The FBI's OSC at GTMO told us that he did not think the FBI

impersonation issue was as serious as Scott and the MLDU Unit Chief were

making it out to be. He said they were concerned that if military

interrogators tortured Slahi and were impersonating the FBI, then if Slahi

were later released he could say that the FBI tortured him. The OSC said

99 Scott is a pseudonym.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.170

he did not consider this scenario realistic, and he declined Scott's

recommendation that he see General Miller about it immediately. Instead,

the OSC discussed the matter with the GTMO Interrogation Control Element

Chief, who told the OSC he was not aware that the FBI had not been

consulted about the impersonation ruse, and agreed that in the future this

type of approach would be strictly coordinated with the FBI.

The OSC also discussed the alleged helicopter incident with military

personnel at GTMO. He said he was told that a helicopter was never used

in conjunction with the movement of Slahi or in the implementation of the

special interrogation plan for him. The Interrogation Control Element Chief

told the OSC that they did not use a helicopter because General Miller

decided that it was too difficult logistically to pull. off, and that too many

people on the base would have to know about it to get this done. The MLDU

Unit Chief told us that he thought the OSC reported to him that the alleged

helicopter incident did not happen.

The FBI's MLDU Unit Chief communicated his concerns about the

rumored helicopter incident to Bruce Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney

General in the DOJ Criminal Division. Swartz said that based on the Unit

Chief's description, Swartz did not believe that any FBI agents had

witnessed the incident, and he did not ask the Unit Chief to get any more

details about it. However, Swartz stated that in his opinion the alleged

conduct amounted to torture, and he discussed the incident with Deputy

Attorney General Larry Thompson, someone in the FBI General Counsel's

office, and a legal advisor to the National Security Council (NSC). Swartz

told us that he later learned from the NSC legal advisor that Navy Criminal

Investigative Service (NCIS) looked into it and had concluded that no such

incident took place. Swartz said it was "unfortunate" that he had chosen to

elevate an allegation that had proved to be false, since it suggested that

Swartz was "crying wolf" when he continued to raise questions about

whether detainees were being treated humanely.

Other senior officials at DOJ told us that they could not recall the

allegation about a helicopter incident. Former Deputy Attorney General

Larry Thompson told us he did not recall anyone raising an allegation of this

nature to him, and he did not recall DOJ raising these types of concerns

with the NSC. He said the only thing he remembers along those lines was a

proposal to give a detainee the illusion that he was going to be buried alive,

but he said a decision was made that DOJ would not permit that. Former

Deputy Assistant Attorney General David Nahmias told us he heard about a

detainee being taken up in a helicopter by FBI, but was confident that no

one ever presented it to him as a fact, because otherwise he would have

taken it up the "chain." Former Deputy Assistant Attorney General Alice

Fisher said she did not recall an allegation about a detainee being taken on

a helicopter ride. Similarly, former Assistant Attorney General Michael

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Chertoff told us that he did not remember hearing about such an incident.

As detailed above, the concerns about Slahi's treatment were first elevated

within the FBI in December 2003, which was after Fisher and Chertoff had

left DOJ.

The draft EC prepared by Special Agent Scott identified three

concerns about military interrogation tactics: the impersonation of an FBI

agent, the helicopter incident, and the use of threats against Slahi's family

to induce him to cooperate. The first two issues were addressed relatively

easily when the OSC obtained a promise that the impersonation tactic

would be coordinated with the FBI, and when it was determined that the

helicopter incident never took place. It does not appear that the question of

the use of threats against Slahi's family created any significant concerns

among senior officials in the FBI, or that the issue ever reached DOJ. We

believe that the FBI likely considered this tactic to be within the scope of

permissible techniques under military policy. Furthermore, the FBI was

generally reluctant to become involved in issues relating to the scope of

military policies with respect to tactics (like threats) that did not clearly

constitute torture or physical abuse.

XVI. Conclusion

The Al-Qahtani interrogation was the focal point of the dispute

between the FBI and the DOD regarding interrogation techniques at GTMO.

Several agents who observed the interrogation of Al-Qahtani at GTMO

became deeply concerned not only about the efficacy of these techniques,

but also about their legality and the complications it would create for FBI

agents in the future to be involved in or even witness interrogations where

such techniques were used. The agents requested guidance from FBI

Headquarters regarding these issues.

We found that as concerns regarding the Al-Qahtani interrogations

filtered upward within the FBI and in DOJ, the focus shifted almost

exclusively to the question of whether the DOD techniques were effective at

obtaining information from the detainee. Officials at all levels of the FBI and

DOJ recognized, however, that the DOD ultimately had the final call on the

interrogation of Al-Qahtani, who was in military custody at a military

facility. Nevertheless, as result of their concerns about the efficacy of DOD

interrogations, certain officials in the FBI and DOJ develo ed a .roposal to

. At least

some officials understood that under this proposal Al-Qahtani would be

subjected to an alternative debriefing model of the sort used on Zubaydah

and . This proposal was never adopted, possibly because other

factors led the military to change its interrogation policies in January 2003

and Al-Qahtani began cooperating within weeks thereafter.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.172

Agents also expressed concerns about the military's treatment of

Slahi, including rumors that military personnel threatened to throw him out

of a helicopter. When senior officials learned that Slahi was never taken up

in a helicopter they largely dropped the issue, although questions remained

about a boat ride that the military took Slahi on as a ruse.

FBI Headquarters officials responded to the requests from agents for

guidance by orally advising agents at GTMO not to be involved in coercive

techniques used by the DOD. We found, however, that these instructions

did not address several important issues raised by the reported incidents

involving Al-Qahtani, Slahi, and other detainees, including: (1) what agents

should do if confronted with DOD techniques that would not be permitted

under FBI policy; (2) the circumstances under which agents could interview

detainees who had previously been interrogated with coercive techniques; or

(3) whether and how to report incidents of detainee mistreatment. As

explained in Chapter Six, the FBI began confronting these issues more

directly after the Abu Ghraib detainee abuse incidents became publicly

known in 2004.

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CHAPTER SIX

THE FBI'S RESPONSE TO THE DISCLOSURE OF DETAINEE

MISTREATMENT AT ABU GHRAIB PRISON

The public disclosure of explicit photographs and accounts of detainee

mistreatment at the Abu Ghraib prison triggered a significant effort within

the FBI to assess the adequacy of its policies regarding detainee treatment

in the military zones and to determine what, if anything, its agents knew

about detainee mistreatment at Abu Ghraib, in GTMO, and in Afghanistan.

In this chapter we discuss this effort, which included an expedited

undertaking to codify FBI interview procedures in a written policy to address

ambiguities and other problems identified by agents in the field, and an

effort to quickly assess the knowledge of FBI agents regarding detainee

mistreatment by other agencies.

Section I of this chapter describes the development of the FBI's formal

written policy addressing agent conduct with respect to detainees in GTMO,

Afghanistan, and Iraq: an Electronic Communication (EC) issued by the FBI

Office of General Counsel (OGC) on May 19, 2004 (the "FBI's May 2004

Detainee Policy"). Section II describes how the FBI addressed one agent's

urgent concerns, raised at the time that the policy was being developed, that

the FBI would be deemed to have participated in coercive interrogation

techniques used by other agencies in Afghanistan. Section III describes

additional concerns raised by FBI employees about the practicality of the

FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, and describes the FBI's efforts to address

these concerns. Section IV discusses the internal investigations that the

FBI conducted following the Abu Ghraib disclosures. Section V describes

the expanded training programs that the FBI developed for agents deployed

to the military zones following issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee

Policy.

I. Abu Ghraib Prison and the Development of the FBI's May 2004

Detainee Policy

In April 2004, public disclosure of detainee abuses at the Abu Ghraib

prison in Iraq prompted an expedited effort by the FBI to develop a written

policy regarding detainee interviews.

FBI Headquarters received notice of the mistreatment of prisoners at

Abu Ghraib several months before this information became public. On

January 21, 2004, a U.S. Army Captain informed the FBI Team Leader for

high value detainee interviews at Abu Ghraib that "the recent allegations of

prisoner mistreatment at [Abu Ghraib] Prison are founded . . . . [T]here is

video taped evidence of the mistreatment, which includes beating and rape."

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The Captain told the FBI Team Leader that the incident was being

investigated by the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID) and that

the FBI was being advised for informational purposes. On January 22,

2004, the FBI Team Leader communicated this information to the FBI's On-

Scene Commander (OSC) and Deputy OSC in Iraq by e-mail.10°

On January 24, 2004, the OSC forwarded the e-mail to FBI Deputy

Assistant Director Gary Bald and other senior managers in the

Counterterrorism Division at FBI Headquarters. The OSC told Bald:

Abu G is a Saddam-era prison being utilized by the Coalition to

house detainees. It is over-crowded and my recent force

protection memorandum spoke of the dangers there.

Nonetheless, our access to detainees at the prison is a central

part of our mission and very important to our ability to get the

job done. Therefore, the allegations contained in the attached

e-mail, if true, or even if not true but heavily publicized, could

make life difficult for us. I met yesterday on another subject

with [two Assistant U.S. Attorneys]. . . . I told [one of the

AUSAs] that the FBI will not enter into an investigation of the

alleged abuse, that it would be outside the scope of our mission,

and that I believed CID should handle it without our assistance.

I will maintain this position unless instructed otherwise by

FBIHQ. First, the matter truly is outside our mission and

would squander resources. Second, we need to maintain good

will and relations with those operating the prison. Our

involvement in the investigation of the alleged abuse might

harm our liaison.

On January 25, 2004, Bald responded: "Agreed. Lets let [Army] CID

handle it."

The Abu Ghraib abuses began receiving intense media coverage on

April 28, 2004.101 On May 9, 2004, FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni

loo During their interviews with the OIG, the Team Leader, the OSC, and the

Deputy OSC did not recall specifically what "recent allegations" of prisoner mistreatment

were being referred to in the Team Leader's e-mail in January 2002. The OSC told us that

he thought that he had heard allegations about beatings at the prison, but nothing like the

prisoner abuse that was eventually revealed.

101 The Abu Ghraib disclosures also triggered a temporary suspension of FBI

interviews in Afghanistan. A message to FBI Headquarters from an FBI agent in

Afghanistan dated May 13, 2004, stated that "due to the issues at Abu G prison in Iraq, all

interrogations have been suspended at [a particular facility] until further notice." Two

former FBI OSCs told us that the military stopped detainee interviews by all non-military

agencies in Afghanistan in order to develop controls and procedures to ensure that the

problems in Iraq did not occur in Afghanistan. Several agents also said that in July 2004,

(Cont'd.)

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.176

made an e-mail inquiry within the FBI regarding the existence of relevant

written guidances:

Has there been any written guidance given to FBI agents in

either GTMO or Iraq about when they should "stand clear" b/c

of the interrogation techniques being used by DOD or [Defense

HUMINT Service] or the Agency?

Has there been any written guidance given to FBI agents along

the lines of: DOD/DHS/CIA is authorized to use a, b and c

techniques when interrogating detainees. To the extent you

become aware (either personally or through subsequent

interrogation of a detainee) of anyone using techniques other

than a, b and c, you should notify Mr. X?

Caproni said she determined that no such written guidance had ever

been prepared. On May 12, Caproni and CTD Deputy Assistant Director

T.J. Harrington agreed that CTD and OGC would work together in preparing

such written guidance.

Caproni assigned the task of drafting the policy to an FBI OGC

attorney. That attorney told the OIG that he reviewed the MIOG, the MAOP,

and the Legal Handbook, and concluded that existing policy already

addressed how FBI agents should conduct interrogations. He stated that

Caproni instructed him to add an explicit requirement addressing when

agents should report incidents of prisoner abuse.

Caproni told the OIG that she believed there was always an

"expectation" that an agent would report incidents of torture or other

egregious conduct by another agency's interrogator, but that no written

requirement existed at that time.

Within CTD, an Assistant Unit Chief was assigned to help develop the

guidance. On May 14, 2004, the Assistant Unit Chief transmitted a draft

"temporary guidance" to the OGC attorney, stating that Deputy Assistant

Director Harrington had approved it in order "to allow our people some

ability to continue working over the weekend. They had been ordered to

`stand down'."102 The "temporary guidance" provided:

FBI agents were again stopped from conducting detainee interviews in Afghanistan for a

week to 10 days because a military officer insisted that the FBI agents provide their FBI

Academy interview training syllabus in order to demonstrate their interviewing

qualifications. We did not receive any evidence of similar moratoriums on FBI interviews in

GTMO or Iraq.

102 We believe that the "stand down" reference related to the temporary suspension

of interviews discussed in footnote 101 above.

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Re: Interviews / Interrogations

Our people will continue to conduct interviews of detainees

(PUC's) at secure locations only.

If, during the conduct of any interview, events occur that, in the

opinion of the FBI agent(s) present, exceed acceptable FBI

interview practices, the agent(s) will immediately remove

themselves from the scene and will report their concerns to the

Afghanistan On-Scene Commander.

The OGC attorney forwarded the e-mail to Caproni, stating that he

thought it looked "ok." FBI documents indicate that temporary guidance

containing the Assistant Unit Chief's language or language like it was

disseminated to the field on approximately May 16, 2004.

The official policy, "Treatment of Prisoners and Detainees," was issued

by the FBI General Counsel on May 19, 2004, to all FBI Divisions. (We refer

to the policy as the "FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy.") The synopsis in the

beginning of the policy explained why the policy was being issued:

In light of the widely publicized abuses at the Abu Ghraib

Prison, Iraq, this EC reiterates and memorializes existing FBI

policy with regard to the interrogation of prisoners, detainees,

or persons under United States control (collectively "detainees").

These guidelines serve as a reminder that FBI personnel may

not obtain statements during interrogations by the use of force,

threats, physical abuse, threats of such abuse or severe

physical conditions. In addition, this EC sets forth the

reporting requirements for known or suspected abuse or

mistreatment of detainees.

FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy at 1.

The second paragraph, labeled "Details," stated that FBI personnel

posted abroad can come into contact with detainees in a variety of

situations, and that persons who are detained or otherwise in the custody of

the U.S. are:

entitled to varying levels of procedural rights depending upon

their situation or category of detention (e.g. unlawful

combatant, prisoner of war.) Although procedural rights, such

as Miranda rights, do not apply in all situations overseas,

certain minimum standards of treatment apply in all cases. 103

103 As support for the basic guidelines, the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy quoted

the policy set forth in the Legal Handbook, Section 7-2.2.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.178

Horton told us that he became concerned during the initial milit

briefin his team received immediatel after arrivin at the facili

Id. at 1. The Policy also stated:

FBI personnel shall not participate in any treatment or use any

interrogation technique that is in violation of these guidelines

regardless of whether the co-interrogator is in compliance with

his or her own guidelines. If a co-interrogator is complying with

the rules of his or her agency, but is not in compliance with FBI

rules, FBI personnel may not participate in the interrogation

and must remove themselves from the situation.

Id. at 2 (emphasis in original). We believe that the instruction to agents to

"remove themselves" from interrogations involving non-FBI techniques was

not previously articulated in any founal FBI guidance or policy.

The final paragraph of the policy discussed a new reporting

requirement:

If an FBI employee knows or suspects non-FBI personnel has

abused or is abusing or mistreating a detainee, the FBI

employee must report the incident to the FBI on-scene

commander, who shall report the situation to the appropriate

FBI Headquarters chain of command. FBI Headquarters is

responsible for further follow up with the other party.

Id. at 2.

II. The Horton Matter

During the same period that the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy was

being developed, urgent requests for guidance were being communicated to

FBI Headquarters by SSA Horton, who was the su ervisor of a team of four

FBI a ents assi • ned to a

104 Horton is a pseudonym.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.179

Horton sent a series of e-mails to senior CTD officials, including

Executive Assistant Director Gary Bald and the MLDU Unit Chief , on

May 13, 16, 18, and 20, 2004. Horton's e-mails predicted that although the

military had temporaril restricted the use of a ressive interrogation

techniques such as , military

interrogators were likely to resume such methods soon. Horton stated that

even if the FBI was not present during such interrogations, FBI agents

would inherently be participating in the process because they would be

interviewing detainees who had either recently been subjected to such

techniques by the military or who would be subjected to them after the FBI

interviews were completed. He questioned whether it would be ethical for

FBI agents to be involved in such a process and whether they would be held

culpable for detainee abuse. He stated that the FBI's only existing guidance

was for agents to use their "best judgment" in interviews, which he found to

be inadequate. Horton recommended that the FBI move quickly to issue

definitive guidance to its agents in Afghanistan. He proposed that FBI

agents be given exclusive access to the detainees they would be interviewing

quickly after capture, and that the detainees be turned over to military

interrogators only if FBI methods proved unsuccessful.

In late May 2004, Horton was recalled by FBI Headquarters from

Afghanistan.105 ITOS-1 Section Chief Arthur Cummings sent an e-mail to

several Headquarters officials in the CTD instructing them to meet with

Horton. Horton told us that at the meeting he emphasized the need for a

policy in the unique environment of a war zone, but he said he received the

impression "these guys did not want rules, because they might have to

follow" them, and that they preferred a looser, less restrictive situation.

los Accounts differ as to the underlying circumstances of Horton's recall. Horton

told us that the MLDU Unit Chief called and told him he was coming home to brief senior

management because they valued his opinion." However, several senior CTD officials told

us that Horton was recalled at least in part because of concerns about whether he was

emotionally suited to the Afghanistan assignment.

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Horton said he spent most of the meeting on the defensive, and left feeling

that he had been treated very poorly.

Several CTD Headquarters agents who attended the Horton meeting

told us that they believed Horton was overreacting because he had not

actually observed any instances of detainee abuse and that other FBI agents

in Afghanistan did not share Horton's concerns.

Cummings instructed CTD officials to work with the National Security

Law Branch in FBI OGC to develop written guidelines "which we can defend

legally regarding our presence either directly or indirectly during

interrogations conducted by the DOD." In fact, OGC was already in the

process of drafting the document that was ultimately issued as the FBI's

May 2004 Detainee Policy. However, we did not find any evidence that the

issues raised by Horton beginning on May 13 had any impact on the

development or final wording of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy.

III. FBI Employees Raise Concerns About the FBI's May 2004

Detainee Policy

Almost immediately after the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy was

issued, several FBI employees raised questions and concerns with it. As

discussed below, the primary issues of concern were what constituted

"abuse" within the meaning of the policy, how the agents would know what

techniques had been approved for use by the military or the CIA, and

whether the FBI would be considered to be "participating" in unauthorized

techniques if it interviewed a detainee who had previously been subjected to

aggressive interrogation by another agency.

A. The Iraq On-Scene Commander and the Meaning of "Abuse"

On May 22, 2004, the FBI OSC in Iraq transmitted an e-mail to senior

managers in CTD raising questions as to how the FBI's new policy could be

applied and asking for further guidance. The OSC wrote that while none of

the FBI employees he worked with during his three rotations at Abu Ghraib

witnessed the abuses recently publicized, he was fairly certain that FBI

employees were in the general vicinity of interrogations where tactics were

being used that were outside FBI policy but allowed by "applicable Executive

Order," such as loud music, yelling, and hooding. The OSC's questions

related to the instruction in the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy to report

known or suspected "abuse":

This instruction begs the question of what constitutes "abuse."

We assume this does not include lawful interrogation

techniques authorized by Executive Order. We are aware that

prior to a revision in policy last week, an executive order signed

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.181

by President Bush authorized the following techniques among

others: sleep "management," use of MWDs (military working

dogs), "stress positions" such as half squats, "environmental

manipulation" such as the use of loud music, sensory

deprivation through the use of hoods, etc. We assume the OGC

instruction does not include the reporting of these authorized

interrogation techniques, and that the use of these techniques

does not constitute "abuse."

As stated, there was a revision last week in the military's

standard operating procedures based on the Executive Order. I

have been told that all interrogation techniques previously

authorized by the Executive Order are still on the table but that

certain techniques can onl be used if ve hi _h-level authori

is • ranted.

[Unless advised to the contrary by the FBI], we will still not

report the use of these techniques as "abuse" since we will not

be in a position to know whether, or not, the authorization for

these tactics was received from the aforementioned high-level

officials.

We will consider as abuse any physical beatings, sexual

humiliation or touching, and other conduct clearly constituting

abuse. Yet, there may be a problem if OGC does not clearly

define "abuse," and if OGC does not draw a clear line between

conduct that is clearly abusive and conduct that, while

seemingly harsh, is permissible under applicable Executive

Orders and other laws. In other words, we know what's

permissible for FBI agents but are less sure what is permissible

for military interrogators.

These are issues that must be addressed and resolved, with

specific guidance being crafted and communicated to our

personnel. We cannot have our personnel [working] with

military units abroad which regularly use these interrogation

techniques without more explicit and specific guidance.

On May 25, Bald forwarded the OSC's email to FBI General Counsel

Caproni, asking for her thoughts. On the same day, Caproni responded:

Does it answer his question to say that conduct that is known

to be authorized need not be reported. However, most agents

may be unaware of the parameters of the rules that govern

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someone else. In that situation, they should rely on their

judgment as FBI agents/employees to determine whether a

detainee is being abused or mistreated to an extent that

someone should be notified....

Bald's e-mail reply stated, among other things:

Although I don't know the best way to characterize the types of

techniques we want reported, I do understand [the OSC's]

concern. We hold our employees to a high standard. We expect

them to follow through on what they are instructed to do. I

suspect that if we are not clear on the types of techniques we

want reported, we will have all techniques beyond our own

reported, out of an abundance of caution. In addition, we may

be setting our employees up (and ultimately the FBI) if someone

fails to report what others think they should. Can we have

someone draw up clear language that will further guide our

troops?

No further written guidance was ever issued in response to Bald's request.

In late May 2004, Caproni sent an e-mail to Director Mueller that

raised the issue of the definition of "abuse":

So you know, some agents have asked what it means that a

prisoner is being "abused or mistreated". We have said our

intent is for them to report conduct that they know or suspect

is beyond the authorization of the person doing the harsh

interrogation. While the agent may not know exactly what is

permitted, an agent would suspect that pulling out fingernails

or sodomizing the detainee is beyond the level of authorization.

On the other hand, there is no reason to report on "routine"

harsh interrogation techniques that DOD has authorized their

employees/contractors to use.

Director Mueller told the OIG that the general purpose of the reporting

requirement was for agents to err on the side of caution and to ensure that

incidents such as those that occurred at Abu Ghraib came to the attention

of FBI management. He stated, however, that he did not want agents to be

put into the position of having to determine whether particular techniques

used by other agencies were lawful under their policies.

B. The FBI Counterterrorism Division's Draft "Clarification" of

the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy

A draft EC dated May 26, 2004, attempted to "further clarify" the

FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, which had been issued a week earlier.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.183

According to the May 26 draft EC, this clarification was drafted for approval

by FBI Executive Assistant Director Gary Bald. Thus, the May 26 draft EC

appears to be the CTD's attempt to further clarify the guidance provided in

the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy.

The primary difference between the May 26 draft EC and the FBI's

May 2004 Detainee Policy is the guidance regarding when FBI personnel

should report the interrogation practices of another agency's employees.

The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy stated that "[i]f an FBI employee knows

or suspects non-FBI personnel has abused or is abusing or mistreating a

detainee, the FBI must report the incident to the FBI on-scene

commander...." (Italics added.) The May 26 draft EC states that "[i]f, in the

opinion of FBI personnel present, interview techniques being applied exceed

lawfully authorized practices, it is his/her responsibility to report this fact to

the [USC]." (Italics added.)

Thus, the "clarification" in the May 26 draft EC is consistent with

Caproni's e-mail to the Director equating "abuse" under the FBI's May 2004

Detainee Policy with "beyond the authorization of the person doing the

harsh interrogation." However, in order to make the determination required

under this clarification, the agents would be expected to know what

techniques were "lawfully authorized" for use by employees of other

agencies. As detailed in Chapter Seven below, we found that few if any

agents received specific guidance on what techniques were authorized for

use by other agencies, and many agents told the OIG that this omission was

a significant problem. We found no evidence that the May 26 "clarification"

was ever finalized or disseminated. The Assistant Unit Chief told the OIG

that he participated in drafting the May 26 draft EC and that although he

did not know why it was never issued, it was consistent with the

instructions he later gave to FBI agents in Afghanistan.

Caproni told the OIG that her office continued working on another

advice memorandum long after the OSC raised the question of what

constituted reportable conduct, but that none has ever been issued. She

said her problem as a lawyer was that she could not list every interrogation

technique or scenario that the agents might face, so the FBI must rely on

the agents' judgment.

C. FBI OGC Concerns Regarding the Meaning of

"Participation"

Within a short time after issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee

Policy, attorneys within the FBI Office of General Counsel began discussing

a different problem from the issue of what conduct would trigger the

reporting requirement of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy. FBI agents

and attorneys began asking whether an FBI agent who questioned a

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detainee after another agency had used aggressive techniques on the

detainee would be deemed to have "participated" in the techniques. On

May 27, Caproni e-mailed Deputy Director John Pistole regarding this issue:

A detainee who is bounced back and forth between DOD where

he is subjected to harsh techniques and FBI where he is given a

cup of tea and nice treatment is essentially being subjected to

"mutt and jeff" with us being Jeff. When does that amount to

FBI participating in techniques that are not authorized?

Later on May 27, Caproni solicited the thoughts of others within OGC

regarding the practicality of the GTMO "stand clear" advice in theaters like

Afghanistan and Iraq. This stimulated further discussion of the "mutt and

jeff" issue, including the observation by one OGC attorney that:

1-So long as the DOD interrogation techniques used were

lawful, I do not believe it is unlawful for FBI agents, consistent

with FBI guidelines, to question detainees after DOD techniques

are used.

2-FBI is participating (or certainly will be viewed as

participating) in aggressive but lawful DOD techniques where.

FBI agents are [working] with the military interrogators and

merely as a policy absent themselves from the rough stuff and

then come back in (minutes, hours or days later) to question

the detainee;

3-If there is a decision that the FBI's continued involvement in

the interrogation of detainees is in the best interests of the

Nation, that decision must be confirmed at the highest levels of

the Department in order to give the men and women of the FBI

the comfort that down the road they will not be hung out to dry.

4-Without a clear statement of benefits versus the risks, I

believe that extreme forward deployment of FBI must be

reconsidered.

Other attorneys in OGC similarly stressed the need to obtain senior

management assurance that agents were authorized to question detainees

who had previously been subjected to other agencies' techniques.

On May 28, 2004, OGC received an inquiry from CTD regarding

whether the FBI should interview a detainee who had previously been

interrogated by the DOD using techniques believed to be consistent with

DOD guidelines but not FBI guidelines. After consulting with General

Counsel Caproni, an OGC attorney advised CTD that "so long as the DOD

offers the detainee to us and FBI is following FBI guidelines in [its]

interviews and is unaware of violations of law in DOD's questioning, we

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should proceed to interview the detainee." The OGC advice did not address

the issue of how an FBI agent in the field would know what was a violation

of "law" (by which OGC apparently meant "military policy").

Caproni eventually requested that an OGC lawyer prepare legal advice

for FBI agents in Iraq and Afghanistan. In October 2004 she sent an e-mail

explaining that the advice should address the issue of:

what does it mean to "not participate" in aggressive

interrogation (outside our guidelines) when you are in forward

positions. What happens if the Army beats the stuffing out' of a

detainee, gives him to the FBI, he starts talking to the FBI and

then the Army wants him back. Have we just "participated" in

good cop - bad cop with the Army? How long after Army does

its thing do we need to wait to not be viewed as a "participant"

in the harsh interrogation.

An OGC attorney began work on the requested legal advice and in

October 2004 he interviewed several agents with overseas experience,

including Horton. From November 2004 through April 2005, the attorney

drafted several proposals to address the "participation" issue. Ultimately,

he proposed a "totality of the circumstances" test, suggesting that an FBI

interrogation of a subject that was "distinctly apart in time from an

interrogation by non-FBI personnel where methods which could be

reasonably interpreted as abusive or inherently coercive were employed"

could be found as having occurred in accordance with FBI policy. Although

this draft was extensively edited and was the subject of subsequent

communications within OGC, no final version of it or of any other formal

clarification of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy was issued.

D. FBI OGC and CTD Respond to Agent Concerns Regarding a

Facility in Iraq

In November 2005 FBI agents deployed to

transmitted written questions regarding their mission in

Iraq and requested responses from the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) and

Office of General Counsel (OGC). The issues posed by the FBI's activities at

this facility once again raised the question of what constituted FBI

"participation" in interrogation practices used by other agencies. The FBI

a ents in Ira ointed out that the detainees at this facili were

The agents added: "With the

current issues involving secret detention facilities, we as FBI agents . . .

want to ensure that the full scope of our duties here are known by upper

management." They posed several questions about the legal status of

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The OGC's EC of May 25, 2006, also addressed whether FBI a•ents

should interview detainees who had been

106 The FBI OGC observed that

although the DOD sets the conditions of confinement,

detainees at this facility, the knowledge of FBI management and the FBI

Office of General Counsel (OGC) of operations at the facility, and whether

FBI employees or the FBI as an institution might be liable for actions at the

facility.

The FBI CTD issued an electronic communication (EC) in response to

the issues raised by the agents within days, on November 29, 2005. This

EC emphasized the importance of the FBI's involvement at this facility and

stated that FBI executives, including the Director and the Deputy Director,

had been "fully briefed on the CTD mission" at this facility. It added a

"reiteration and clarification of the standing FBI policy regarding the

interrogations in Iraq," which included the following points:

• Detainees at the facility are not "enemy prisoners of war" and

therefore the provisions of the Geneva Conventions do not apply

to them. However, "certain minimum standards apply" and the

military "raises its level of treatment of the detainees to levels

outlined in the Geneva Conventions."

• Because the provisions of the Geneva Conventions do not apply,

there is no re•uirement that detainees at the facilit

• The requirements of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy

continue to apply to all FBI personnel in Iraq.

On May 25, 2006, the FBI's OGC issued an EC providing "Legal

Advice and Opinion" that also addressed the issues that FBI agents had

raised the prior November. This EC was issued following a tour of the

facility by the OGC Assistant General Counsel. This EC summarized the

DOD's • ositions re ardin

. The EC emphasized that OGC was not offering an

independent legal position on the DOD's position.

106 We address the issue of FBI participation in the at this facility

in Section VIII of Chapter Eleven.

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the FBI's role in interrogation is inextricably intertwined with

the treatment of detainees outside of the actual interrogation

room. There is no time gap between the time the detainee is

held in certain conditions and the period of time the detainee is

being questioned by the FBI, and there is no time after

questioning by the FBI before the detainee is returned to those

conditions. In short, any reasonable person would view the

interview as inseparable from the harsh conditions of

confinement for detainees being held

The OGC concluded that "the FBI cannot, consistent with our Ma

olic on interro ation, interro ate detainees who have been

because such detainees are

being subjected to 'severe physical conditions."' (Footnote omitted.) The

OGC therefore recommended that CTD .rohibit its em lo ees from

interrogating detainees who had been

1111111 until completion of a "cooling off" period (typically at least 12 hours)

following removal of these conditions.107

IV. OIG Assessment of the FBI Policies Regarding Detainee

Treatment

We found that the FBI did not respond to repeated requests from its

agents in the military zones for guidance regarding detainee treatment. No

formal policy was issued until a crisis arose as a result of the Abu Ghraib

disclosures in late April 2004. At that point, the FBI's Detainee Policy was

quickly prepared and released on May 19, 2004.

We found it understandable that the FBI did not revise or supplement

its interrogation policies immediately after the September 11 attacks. The

FBI was conducting a world-wide investigation into the terrorist attacks and

was taking on its new counterterrorism responsibilities, as described in

Chapter Two. But during the 21/2 years between the attacks and the Abu

Ghraib disclosures, FBI Headquarters received multiple expressions of

concern from its agents about detainee treatment issues and should have

recognized that a review of difficult policy questions was needed.

As described in our report, FBI agents sought guidance on at least

four separate issues: (1) what interrogation techniques should FBI agents

be allowed to use in the military zones; (2) what should FBI agents do at the

107 OGC also recommended that a formal Memorandum of Understanding between

the DOD and the FBI be drafted and that a legal review and modification of the nondisclosure

agreement signed by FBI personnel assigned to this facility be instituted.

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moment that other agencies begin using non-FBI approved interrogation

techniques during joint interviews; (3) when should FBI agents be allowed to

interview detainees who have previously been subjected to non-FBI

techniques; and (4) when and how should FBI agents report harsh

interrogation techniques used by other agencies. We assess the FBI's

response to each of these issues separately below.

A. FBI-Approved Interrogation Techniques

As detailed in Chapter Four, as a result of the Zubaydah incident in

the summer of 2002 senior FBI officials confronted the issue of whether the

FBI would be involved in the use of "enhanced" interrogation tactics.

Andrew Arena, the ITOS-1 Section Chief in CTD at the time, stated that

there were discussions within the FBI regarding "should we also go down

that track?" According to several witnesses, this incident ultimately led to a

decision by Director Mueller that the FBI would not be involved in such

interrogations.

As explained in Chapter Two, following the September 11 attacks the

FBI shifted its emphasis with respect to terrorism from prosecution of

completed acts to prevention of future attacks. One result of this shift has

been to give primacy to the collection of intelligence for terrorism prevention

over the collection of admissible evidence for terrorism prosecution.

Consequently, the message within the FBI, as in many other agencies of

government, was that "September 11 changed everything."

However, existing policies were based on the law enforcement and

prosecution model that emphasized constitutional considerations and

evidentiary admissibility. A reasonable inference from the FBI's announced

change in priorities was that these considerations might not drive FBI policy

in detainee interrogations to the extent that they had in the past driven law

enforcement interviews. We believe that in this changing environment it

would not be unreasonable for agents and their supervisors to conclude that

traditional law enforcement constraints on interview techniques were not

strictly applicable in the military zones, particularly with respect to "high

value" detainees.

In addition, conditions at detention facilities in the military zones

were vastly different from conditions in U.S. jails or prisons. In Afghanistan

and Iraq, the available detention facilities were sometimes in or near battle

zones, and security considerations might trump or at least influence the

conditions under which interviews were conducted, including concerns

about the voluntariness of custodial interviews. In addition, U.S. officials

were dealing with detainees who had sworn allegiance to groups dedicated

to the violent overthrow of the United States and who worked cooperatively

with other detainees in preparing cover stories and resistance strategies.

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This dynamic is not present to the same extent in more diverse populations

of criminals and criminal defendants in U.S. jails and prisons.

Consequently, as described in Chapters Eight through Eleven, some FBI

interviewers used strategies that might not be necessary or appropriate in

the United States, such as extreme isolation from other detainees or other

strategies to undermine detainee solidarity.

The FBI's position as guest of the military and, in the battle zones, the

agents' dependence on the military for protection placed FBI agents in an

awkward position to refuse to participate or assist in joint interviews in

which non-FBI techniques were employed. FBI agents in the military zones

knew the FBI was attempting to carve out a major new role in the war on

terror. Refusing to assist the military in a particular interview because of

disagreements about techniques potentially undercut that goal.

We believe that factors such as these at least raised a legitimate

question of whether conventional FBI law enforcement interview policies and

standards continued to apply to FBI interviews of detainees in the military

zones. Ultimately, senior FBI management determined that pre-existing FBI

standards should remain in effect for all FBI interrogations in military

zones, even where future prosecution is not contemplated. The FBI affirmed

this position because its extensive interrogation experience showed that

rapport-based techniques are simply more effective at obtaining reliable

information than more coercive interrogation techniques.

Yet we believe that FBI management should have realized much

sooner than May 2004 that it needed to issue a written policy addressing

the question of whether its pre-September 11 policies and standards for

custodial interviews should continue to be strictly applied in the military

zones.

B. FBI Policy When Another Agency's Interrogator Uses Non-

FBI Techniques

The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy states: "If a co-interrogator is in

compliance with the rules of his or her agency, but is not in compliance with

FBI rules, FBI personnel may not participate in the interrogation and must

remove themselves from the situation." As detailed in Chapter Three, the

issue addressed by this requirement was not addressed in pre-

September 11 FBI policies, primarily because in most scenarios encountered

by FBI agents the FBI was in charge of the interrogation or the other agency

was subject to rules similar to the FBI. In the military zones, however,

where the FBI was not in charge and had no law enforcement jurisdiction

over other agencies, FBI agents were not in a position to prevent other

agencies from using harsh interrogation techniques.

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In light of this dynamic, we believe that the FBI should have clarified

this issue before May 2004.108 The issue was raised to FBI Headquarters

well before the Abu Ghraib scandal became public. For example, as

discussed in Chapter Four, FBI agents were exposed to severe interrogation

techniques at the CIA facilities where Zubaydah were

detained. Although the FBI did not directly participate in interrogations

where these techniques were used, its agents did not "remove themselves"

but rather assisted in the interrogations. Similarly, in October 2002 an FBI

agent e-mailed his superiors for guidance regarding his continued

participation in a program of 20-hour interrogations of Al-Qahtani that were

scheduled to continue for an indefinite period. The agent was told that as

long as there was no "torture" involved, he could participate. In November

2002 another FBI agent raised the issue of agents being "exposed" to harsh

techniques utilized by other agencies; his FBI Chief Division Counsel

responded that he was not concerned about FBI agents witnessing such

techniques as long as they did not participate, because the techniques were

"apparently lawful" for the military.109

C. FBI Interrogation of Detainees After Other Agencies Use

Non-FBI Techniques

Even if an FBI agent "stands clear" from another agency's interview in

which potentially coercive non-FBI techniques are used, the question

remains: under what conditions may an FBI agent conduct a subsequent

interview of a detainee who has previously been subjected to techniques

that the FBI cannot itself use? A related issue is whether an FBI agent may

use information derived from another agency's interrogation in which non-

FBI-approved techniques have been used.

The FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy does not address these issues.

As detailed in Chapter Six, agents and attorneys in the FBI raised these

problems before and after the FBI's policy was issued. The FBI General

108 As detailed in Chapter Seven, some agents said they were told to leave

interrogations if they saw anything "extreme," "inappropriate," or that made them

"uncomfortable." However, many FBI agents who were deployed to the military zones

before the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy was issued told us they received no training or

guidance on conducting joint interviews with military or other agency officials.

109 As detailed above, SSA Horton pointed out in May 2004 that even if the FBI

agents avoided being present during coercive interrogations conducted by other agencies,

the agents might inherently be participating in the process and later be held culpable for

their involvement at facilities in which such coercive techniques were used. We found that

CTD supervisors at FBI Headquarters did not address the substantive issues raised by

Horton, in part because they became distracted from the substance of his legitimate

concerns by his circumvention of the chain of command, and because they suspected him

of overreaction.

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Counsel directed her subordinates in OGC to prepare legal advice that

addressed, among other things, "[h]ow long after [the] Army does its thing

do we need to wait to not be viewed as a 'participant' in the harsh

interrogation." Several drafts of supplemental policy to address this issue

were prepared by OGC, but nothing was ever finalized.

As noted in Section III.D. of this chapter, in May 2006 the FBI OGC

issued legal advice that addressed the "participation" issue, recommending

that FBI agents at a particular facility in Iraq abstain from interrogating

detainees until a "cooling off" period had elapsed after the detainees had

been subjected to certain DOD activities. This advice was limited to a

particular facility and a particular DOD activity, but it recognized and

squarely addressed the issue of when FBI agents should interrogate

detainees who had been subjected to non-FBI techniques by other agencies.

As described in Chapter Seven, after the May 2004 Detainee Policy

was issued the FBI expanded its pre-deployment training for agents being

deployed overseas to address some of these issues. Training materials

provided to the OIG indicate that agents who were being deployed to Iraq

were given a "legal briefing" that addressed how to "attenuate" their

interviews of potential criminal defendants in cases where the detainee had

previously been questioned by a foreign government or other intelligence

community agency. According to the FBI, the purpose of attenuation is

both to enhance the likelihood that any resulting statement would be

admissible in a judicial proceeding and to assure the credibility and

accuracy of statements obtained from detainees who have previously been

subjected to non-FBI techniques, regardless of whether the goal is to use

the statement in a judicial proceeding. The training instructed the agents to

consider multiple means of "attenuation," including changing the interview

location, allowing a lapse of time, and avoiding the use of information

derived from previous interrogations.

This attenuation training focused on balancing factors identified by

judges when ruling on the admissibility of evidence in domestic criminal

prosecutions. We note, however, that after the September 11 terrorist

attacks, FBI agents in the military zones conducted many detainee

interviews solely or substantially for intelligence purposes and not for

criminal prosecution. In these cases, an approach based on U.S. case law

that walls an FBI agent off from relevant intelligence previously derived by

other agencies may not be appropriate or productive.110

ilo The materials provided by the FBI do not indicate whether training addressing

these particular issues was prepared for agents deployed to Afghanistan or GTMO.

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The FBI has described its current training regarding FBI interviews

that occur after aggressive interviews by other agencies as follows:

First, we train that this is a facts and circumstances

determination, and we recommend seeking advice from

supervisors when in doubt. We continue to train agents on

intelligence versus criminal interviews and on the need to

attenuate and to establish so-called "clean teams." We

extensively cover FBI participation in environments in which the

detainees are under the control of other agencies, since these

detainees are never in the custody of the FBI. We cover FBI

policies, including reporting requirements and the requirement

of FBI personnel to remove themselves from situations in which

they know or suspect that detainees may be subjected to severe

conditions or abusive treatment as provided in the May 2004

policy EC on treatment of detainees. And we give them a

generalized discussion about severe conditions and abusive

treatment, referencing guidance provided by the General

Counsel in May 2006.

We recognize that there are several factors complicating any effort to

devise policies addressing these issues. For example, in cases in which a

detainee interview is being conducted for purposes of a future prosecution

(as opposed to pure intelligence collection), it may be appropriate for the FBI

to keep its agents walled off from any intelligence previously derived by

other agencies who used non-FBI techniques. But at the time of some FBI

interviews it is not yet known whether the U.S. government would ever seek

to prosecute a particular detainee. In addition, it is still not clear how the

military commissions will rule on the admissibility of statements obtained

by non-FBI interrogation techniques. The FBI has no control over these and

other related matters.

The FBI has wrestled with this problem from the beginning of the time

that it sought a major role in detainee interrogations. As discussed in

Chapter Four, several witnesses told the OIG about an unsuccessful FBI

proposal that its agents be permitted first access to newly captured

detainees to allow the FBI to use a rapport-based approach before the

detainees became "tainted" by other agencies' interrogation techniques.

More recently, the FBI OGC's May 2006 EC provided useful guidance with

respect to a particular facility and a particular DOD practice, as described

above.

The problem has been diminished somewhat by the fact that the

military has promulgated a new, uniform interrogation policy (Field Manual

2-22.3) for all military theaters that stresses non-coercive interrogation

approaches. However, this development has not obviated the need for

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improved FBI guidance with regard to these questions. The revised military

policy still permits DOD interrogators to use some approaches that FBI

agents probably cannot employ, such as the methods known as "fear up" or

"pride and ego down."

To the extent that the FBI is or becomes involved with interrogating

detainees who previously have been interrogated by the CIA, the problems

remain significant and unresolved. This issue is particularly acute with

respect to the CIA, because CIA interrogation rules apparently diverge from

FBI rules much more dramatically than does current military policy.

Despite these difficulties, we recommend that the FBI consider

completing the project that OGC began shortly after the issuance of its May

2004 Detainee Policy to address not only participation by FBI agents in

subsequent detainee interrogations, but also the FBI's use of information

obtained by the use of non-FBI techniques.

D. Reporting Abuse or Mistreatment

Prior to issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, the FBI did

not provide specific or consistent guidance to its agents regarding when or

how the conduct of other agencies toward detainees should be reported.111

Leaving this matter to the judgment and discretion of individual FBI

agents put them in a difficult position. Neither the FBI as an institution nor

individual agents wanted to police the military. The FBI was trying to

establish a cooperative working relationship with the DOD while fulfilling its

important intelligence-gathering responsibilities. Agents in the military

zones were sensitive to the need to maintain day-to-day relationships with

their military counterparts and were highly dependent on the military for

access to the detainees. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the agents were also

dependent on the military for their personal safety in a war zone. Under

these circumstances FBI agents had many reasons to avoid making reports

regarding potential mistreatment of detainees. We were therefore not

surprised that some agents who said they observed or heard about

potentially coercive interrogation techniques told us that they did not report

such incidents to anyone.

The difficulty in deciding whether to report such concerns was

exacerbated by FBI agents' lack of information regarding what techniques

were permissible for non-FBI interrogators. For example, as discussed in

Chapter Eight, one agent at GTMO told us that she understood that

111 As detailed in Chapter Seven, some FBI agents told us they were instructed to

report problematic interrogation techniques, but no specific definition of what to report was

provided.

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prolonged short-shackling was allowed under DOD policies and therefore

she did not report it at a time when, according to the Church Report,

permission to use "stress positions" had been rescinded. (The Church

Report found that short-shackling constituted a "stress position.")

Furthermore, the Church Report found that in some theaters permissible

DOD interrogation policies were inadequately communicated to military

personnel. FBI agents cannot be criticized for failing to know DOD policies

that were not fully or clearly disseminated to their military counterparts.

In light of the recurring instances beginning in 2002 in which FBI

agents in the military zones raised questions about the appropriateness of

other agencies' interrogation techniques, we think that the FBI should have

recognized sooner the need for clear and consistent standards and

procedures for FBI agents to make these reports. When agents began

expressing concerns to senior officials at the FBI, CTD should have clarified

the standards for reporting detainee mistreatment. We believe that the

matter could have been best addressed by FBI Headquarters and DOD

officials to minimize tensions between FBI agents in the military zones and

their counterparts. A cooperative approach could have clarified: (1) what

DOD policies were, (2) how the DOD was dealing with deviations from these

policies, and (3) what FBI agents should do in the event they observed

deviations.

Instead, the FBI issued its Detainee Policy in May 2004 after less than

two weeks preparation. We found that the Policy did not give clear guidance

on when agents can resume interviewing detainees who have previously

been interrogated with non-FBI techniques and when agents should report

abusive interrogation techniques used by other agencies. The policy

requires FBI employees to report any instance when the employee "knows or

suspects non-FBI personnel has abused or is abusing or mistreating a

detainee." It contains no definition of abuse or mistreatment.112

As noted above, FBI General Counsel Caproni sent an e-mail to the

FBI Director dated May 28, 2004, nine days after the Detainee Policy was

issued, which stated that "our intent is for [FBI agents] to report conduct

that they know or suspect is beyond the authorization of the person doing

the harsh interrogation." We found that this approach did not resolve

difficulties for agents who did not know what the DOD had authorized its

interrogators to do.

112 As detailed above, the shortcomings in the policy were identified almost

immediately by the FBI's OSC in Iraq, who composed a lengthy e-mail explaining the

practical difficulties with this standard and requesting "more explicit and specific

guidance."

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Going forward, we believe the military's adoption of a single

interrogation policy for all military zones that focuses more on rapportbased

techniques (Field Manual 2-22.3) will likely reduce the difficulties for

FBI agents seeking to comply with the reporting requirement in the FBI's

May 2004 Detainee Policy. Nevertheless, as noted above, military

interrogators are still permitted to use some techniques unlikely to be

available to FBI agents, and it will therefore be useful for agents to receive

training on military policies or to otherwise clarify what conduct should be

reported.

We recommend that the FBI consider supplementing its May 2004

Detainee Policy or expanding its pre-deployment training to clarify the

circumstances under which FBI agents should report potential

mistreatment by other agencies' interrogators. If the triggering event

continues to hinge on conduct that exceeds the interrogator's authority,

then the FBI should train agents deployed to military zones on available

military techniques. Training of OSCs regarding these military techniques

should be even more detailed, so that they can answer FBI agent inquiries

in the military zones and determine whether a report should be elevated to

FBI Headquarters or to the other agency.

If the triggering event for reporting is something more than merely

exceeding the interrogator's own agency policies, the FBI needs to give more

meaning to terms such as "abuse or mistreatment" either in the policy itself

or in agent training. We do not agree with the suggestion made by some

senior FBI officials that a more detailed list of reportable techniques would

result in agents underreporting other abusive techniques that do not appear

on the list. We believe FBI agents are capable of understanding that such a

list is illustrative and not exclusive. Consequently, any policy or training

should use words such as "including but not limited to the following

techniques" before providing examples.

E. Comparison: December 2002 CITF Guidance

The DOD Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) generated a policy

for its agents in December 2002 that addressed several of the issues raised

by FBI agents in the military zone in a timely and specific manner. We

believe that the CITF policy demonstrates that it would have been feasible

for the FBI to produce such a policy in response to its agents' repeated

requests for guidance significantly earlier than May 2004.

As discussed in Chapter Two, CITF is the military's law enforcement

arm with responsibility for gathering evidence for the military commission

process and possible war crimes prosecutions. CITF was involved in many

of the disputes regarding detainee treatment at GTMO, often siding with the

FBI regarding the superiority of rapport-based techniques and the problems

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created by harsh interrogations of detainees. (See e.g. Parts V and VI of

Chapter Five.)

On December 16, 2002, within a few weeks of the time that the

dispute regarding the treatment of Al-Qahtani (#63) had come to a head,

CITF issued ALCITF Memorandum 004-02 (the "CITF December 2002

Guidance"), the purpose of which was "to provide guidance to [CITF]

personnel on the conduct of interrogations of detainees or persons under

custody." A copy of the CITF December 2002 Guidance is provided in

Appendix C. This guidance addresses for CTIF agents many of the same

issues on which FBI personnel repeatedly and unsuccessfully sought

guidance from FBI Headquarters. The CITF December 2002 Guidance

provides that:

• Physical torture, corporal punishment, mental torture, and the

withholding of basic human needs such as food and water as a

means to obtain information are prohibited.

• CITF will not arbitrarily limit the duration of interrogations, but

"excessively lengthy interrogations are discouraged."

• CITF personnel must immediately disengage from any joint

interrogation in which another agency uses tactics that are

"inhumane," report the incident to the CITF chain of command,

and document the incident.

• The "Maximum Confinement Facility" (isolation) will not be

employed as an interrogation tactic. (An exception is made for

using isolation as a positive incentive for detainees who desire

to be isolated from other detainees.)

• Deceptions and ruses may be employed as an interrogation

tactic.

• CITF agents will not participate, provide support for, or advise

on interviews utilizing any non-law enforcement techniques,

and will not observe any such interviews where it is known

such techniques will be used.

• In the event of a dispute with JTF-GTMO or another agency

regarding interrogation approaches, CITF agents should make

their objections in a professional manner and report the matter

to CITF-Headquarters, but should also continue participating in

discussions.

• Promises to detainees (such as promises of release or transfer)

may not be made without authority and pre-approval.

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In October 2003 a virtually identical version of this guidance was

issued by the CITF that reiterated that the same requirements applied to

CITF personnel deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan.113

The CITF guidance did not resolve every issue discussed in this

section. For example, the guidance requires CITF agents to report tactics

that are "inhumane," with no explanation of that term or examples given.

However, it did provide specific guidance regarding CITF agents' use of

particular techniques such as deception (allowed) and isolation (prohibited).

The CITF guidance compares favorably with the FBI's Detainee Policy in

terms of its timing (December 2002 rather than May 2004) and specificity.

The CITF effort demonstrates that the FBI could have done a better job, far

sooner, at providing guidance to respond to its agents' repeated requests.

V. FBI Internal Investigations

In addition to issuing the 2004 Detainee Policy, the FBI responded to

the Abu Ghraib prison disclosures by conducting its own internal

investigations to determine what its agents witnessed in the three military

zones.

A. The Iraq Inquiry

Shortly after the Abu Ghraib abuses became public, FBI Director

Mueller ordered an internal review of what the FBI had known about abuses

at Abu Ghraib. He assigned FBI General Counsel Caproni to collect the

information. The inquiry was conducted in anticipation of a previously

scheduled appearance by the Director before the Senate Judiciary

Committee in May 2004. The inquiry was initiated by an e-mail dated

April 30, 2004, from the ITOS-2 Section Chief to most of the OSCs and

Deputy OSCs who had served in Iraq up to that time. The e-mail stated:

The Director wanted to know (by the end of the day) if anyone

from the FBI had first hand knowledge of any abuses at Abu G

prison. If so, how did we handle it. I know that we have been

made aware of allegations in the past, but I do not know of any

113 Documents made available to the OIG do not make it clear whether the

December 2002 CITF Guidance was formally issued or merely circulated for comment or

reference at that time. The October 2003 version of the guidance was signed by the CITF

Commander and therefore appears to have been formally issued.

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instance where we had to make a referral.114 Please advise as

soon as possible.

The OSCs and Deputy OSCs who responded to the e-mail indicated

that they had never observed or heard of any such abuses at Abu Ghraib.

The Deputy OSC in Iraq at the time of this e-mail reported that he had

spoken to two agents who had spent much of their time overseeing FBI

interviews at Abu Ghraib, and that none of the agents on their teams had

observed any abuses. The Deputy OSC also noted that in January 2004 the

military had advised the FBI that an investigation of alleged abuses of

detainees at Abu Ghraib was underway, and that "we advised all agents

working at the prison to watch for any activity they considered abusive."

The results of this survey were relayed up the chain of command in CTD

and reached the Director on May 3, 2004.

The FBI also conducted a document review, including detainee

interview summaries (FD-302), managed by ITOS-2 personnel in May 2004,

seeking any document in CTD files indicating any questionable detainee

treatment. The ITOS-2 Section Chief told us that this "complete scrub" of

files was as comprehensive as possible, and that while they had an

impossibly short deadline, he nevertheless considered the review to be

thorough. Several agents told us that the file review produced no evidence

of detainee mistreatment by U.S. personnel.

The FBI also attempted to identify and interview its own agents who

had conducted interviews at the Abu Ghraib prison during October through

December 2003, which was the period of the abuses described in the

Taguba Report. On May 17 and 18, 2004, the FBI Inspection Division

interviewed 14 FBI employees who had conducted interviews or otherwise

had been present at Abu Ghraib from October through December 2003.

The results of these inquiries were summarized in an Inspection

Division report to CTD, the Director's Office, and the FBI Office of General

Counsel, dated May 19, 2004 (the same day the Detainee Policy was issued).

The Inspection report stated that none of the 14 FBI personnel interviewed

said they had seen misconduct or mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib

similar to that which had been reported in recent media accounts.

However, the report stated that several of the FBI employees had observed

other actions concerning detainees, such as: (1) detainees hooded with a

sand bag and draped in a shower curtain while handcuffed to a waist-high

railing and kept awake by light slapping on the back; (2) the "spread eagle"

114 "Allegations in the past" may have been a reference to the Zubaydah incident

discussed above or to issues that had been raised inside the FBI with respect to the

treatment of Al-Qahtani or other detainees at GTMO, which are detailed in Chapter Five.

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restraint on a mattress on the floor of a detainee who was yelling and

flailing, and who appeared to be mentally ill; (3) a detainee, either naked or

only in boxer shorts, lying on a wet floor; (4) stripping of detainees who were

then placed in isolation without clothes; (5) shouting by an MP at a detainee

who did not understand the MP's directions; and (6) hooding of detainees

while being escorted on prison grounds. The Inspection Division report also

concluded that all FBI interviews at Abu Ghraib comported with DOJ/FBI

protocols and that none of the 14 FBI personnel "possessed or were aware of

any photographs, videotapes or notes depicting misconduct or inappropriate

behavior by U.S. personnel."

As detailed in Chapter Ten, the OIG found a significantly larger

number of incidents in which FBI agents observed or saw evidence of the

use of harsh interrogation techniques in Iraq than was described in the

Inspection Division report. We believe that this difference is due to the fact

that the Inspection Division inquiry was not intended or designed to be a

comprehensive investigation of what FBI agents observed throughout in

Iraq. It was limited in scope to observations at a single location - the Abu

Ghraib prison - during a 3-month period at the end of 2003. The OIG's

review of what FBI agents saw and reported regarding the treatment of

detainees in Iraq was significantly broader in scope, addressing all locations

in Iraq and the period from the spring of 2003 when FBI agents were first

deployed to Iraq through the end of 2004.

B. The GTMO Special Inquiry

On May 6, 2004, during the time that information was being collected

about Abu Ghraib, the FBI OGC Senior Counsel for National Security

Affairs, Spike Bowman, sent an e-mail to FBI General Counsel Caproni

alerting her to a potential problem relating to the prior allegations of abuse

at GTMO. Bowman's e-mail referenced an EC dated May 30, 2003, written

by an SSA who had been deployed to GTMO, which detailed concerns about

aggressive interrogation tactics employed by the military at GTMO in late

2002. (This EC and the incidents described in it are addressed in more

detail in Chapter Five.) Bowman's e-mail also stated "I guess I am a little

concerned that we [are] sitting here with records of misconduct, not

knowing if the military ever did anything to correct matters in GTMO."

In early May 2004, in response to Caproni's inquiries, CTD conducted

an informal poll of OSCs who had served at GTMO up to that point. On

May 10, 2004, CTD Deputy Assistant Director Harrington sent an e-mail to

Caproni stating that "[e]ach of the OSC[s] has been polled re: abuse

allegations and each has been negative."

At Caproni's request, the Inspection Division conducted a "Special

Inquiry" into whether FBI personnel had observed any mistreatment of or

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aggressive behavior toward detainees at GTMO. According to an Inspection

Division report describing the Special Inquiry, FBI-CTD generated a list of

493 FBI employees who had served at GTMO in some capacity since

September 11, 2001. On July 9, 2004, the Inspection Division transmitted

an e-mail to those individuals still employed by the FBI, requesting that the

employees state whether they "observed aggressive treatment,

interrogations, or interview techniques on GTMO detainees which was not

consistent with Bureau interview policy/guidelines."

According to the Inspection Division report, 434 employees responded

to the e-mail request.115 Twenty-six FBI employees responded that they had

witnessed "aggressive treatment, interrogations, or interview techniques on

GTMO detainees which was not consistent with Bureau interview

policy/guidelines"; the rest gave negative responses. An Inspection Division

e-mail states that FBI General Counsel Caproni and an agent from the

Inspection Division reviewed the 26 responses and "were able to determine

that most were not violations of DOD rules and regs pertaining to

interrogation procedures." For example, Caproni determined that some

reported practices did not violate DOD policy, such as loud music, strobe

lights, cold temperatures, prolonged shackling, and draping a detainee in an

Israeli flag.

However, OGC determined that 9 of the 26 respondents should be

interviewed. These interviews were conducted during the first 2 weeks of

September 2004. The agents who were interviewed reported a variety of

observations regarding detainee mistreatment, including:

• A detainee was shackled in a stress position.

• Detainee #63 (Al-Qahtani) was subjected to "special

interrogative techniques" and later admitted to the base

hospital for hypothermia or "low body core temperature." He

was also subjected to a growling military working dog and

disrespectful treatment of the Koran.

• Female interrogators were rumored to have wet their hands and

touch a detainee's face to make him feel "unclean."

• A detainee was observed "crumpled over" and crying, with an

apparent bloody nose, during an interrogation.

115 An Inspection Division e-mail dated August 17, 2004, stated that the July 9 email

was sent to 530 employees and that 478 responded. We do not know the source of the

discrepancy between these numbers and the numbers in the final INSD Special Inquiry

report.

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• A detainee claimed he sustained injuries, including facial cuts

and injured fingers, from military police.

• A detainee's entire head was duct-taped to stop him from

chanting the Koran.

• Detainees were subjected to sleep deprivation by means of 16-

hour sessions of strobe lights and loud music.

• A DOD interrogator was rumored to have subjected a detainee

to "satanic black metal music," then dressed as a priest and

baptized the detainee.

• A female military interrogator was rumored to have put female

clothes on a detainee and performed a lap dance on him.

• Detainees were shackled "hand and foot" to the floor for

prolonged periods in uncomfortable temperatures and defecated

or urinated on themselves.

As detailed in Chapter Eight, the OIG survey and follow-up interviews

uncovered a much larger number and wider variety of aggressive techniques

used at GTMO. We believe that the difference was primarily attributable to

the OIG's use of a detailed survey instrument that sought information about

numerous specifically identified techniques rather than an e-mail seeking

general reports of "aggressive treatment, interrogations, or interview

techniques . . . which [were] not consistent with Bureau interview

policy/guidelines."

C. The Afghanistan Poll

In early May 2004, at the same time that CTD was surveying the

OSCs who had served at GTMO, CTD conducted an informal survey of the

four OSCs who had served in Afghanistan to that point. One of these OSCs

described the survey as a conversation of less than five minutes, in which

he was asked whether there was anything he did not report before and was

told that if there was any doubt, the information was needed immediately.

The OSC said he was asked whether he knew about anything inappropriate

or in violation of rules or policy by FBI, military, or intelligence personnel,

not just what had been disclosed in the media. The OSC told us that this

was the only occasion he could recall having been questioned by the FBI

regarding this subject.

Another OSC told the OIG that he thought the poll arose out of

concerns raised by Special Agent Horton when he was assigned to a

in Afghanistan, as described above in this chapter. The OSC

said he was probably contacted by telephone, and he reported that he was

aware of nothing.

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On May 10, 2004, CTD Deputy Assistant Director Harrington e-mailed

Caproni and reported that the poll of the Afghanistan OSCs had been

completed and "each has been negative." We found no evidence that the FBI

conducted any additional or more formal inquiry into what its agents saw in

Afghanistan with respect to detainee mistreatment or abuse.

As detailed in Chapter Nine, however, the OIG found that FBI agents

in Afghanistan observed interrogation techniques that were not consistent

with FBI policy.

D. The GTMO Review of FD-302 Forms and Development of a

Reporting Process for Detainee Abuse Allegations

In October 2004, in the course of collecting documents responsive to a

Freedom of Information Act request from the American Civil Liberties Union,

the FBI Office of General Counsel noticed that an FBI document stated that

detainee Mohamed A.A. Al Harbi (#333) had alleged he was assaulted by FBI

agents in Afghanistan.116 FBI General Counsel Caproni sent an e-mail to

the MLDU Unit Chief and to the Assistant General Counsel stationed at

GTMO stating: "I know that once these are released the question is going to

be what did we do upon learning of such allegation against FBI agents. So,

what did we do?" The MLDU Unit Chief told Caproni that no investigation

had been conducted. Caproni sent an e-mail to the Assistant General

Counsel at GTMO stating: "Seems to me there needs to be a system so that

when we learn of allegations against our agents, even if we believe them to

be untrue, someone needs to run it down so we have a record that we did

so. If the military is investigating allegations against the FBI, I would want

to know that as well."

The Assistant General Counsel at GTMO was tasked with reviewing all

FBI interview summaries produced at GTMO for use in DOD-initiated

administrative proceedings for detainees. He found several documents

containing allegations by detainees of mistreatment by U.S. officials. The

FBI at GTMO reported these allegations to FBI Headquarters and to the

military's legal and command elements at JTF-GTMO.

In light of these developments, the FBI developed a memorandum

setting forth a "Reporting Process for Detainee Abuse Allegations -

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba," dated February 28, 2005 (the "GTMO Reporting

Process Memo"). The memorandum instructed FBI personnel who identified

abuse allegations by detainees in FBI documents such as Situation Reports,

FD-302 summaries, or ECs to provide notification and a copy of the

116 As detained in Section VI of Chapter Eleven, Al Harbi subsequently recanted his

allegation regarding the FBI.

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documents to the Assistant General Counsel and to the OSC at GTMO. If

the Assistant General Counsel and the OSC determined that the allegation

had not previously been reported, a summary of the allegation and a copy of

the document were to be provided to:

• The FBI Inspection Division

• With respect to allegations incriminating FBI/DOJ personnel,

the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility and the DOJ Office

of the Inspector General

• The Staff Judge Advocate at JTF-GTMO

• The CTD-CTORS chain of command

• The Commander and Chief of Staff at JTF-GTMO

The GTMO Reporting Process Memo also stated:

All incoming personnel to FBI GTMO are briefed to report any

and all incidents of Detainee mistreatment to the FBI GTMO

management team. Any incident related to the Guards

mishandling/mistreating Detainees or aggressive interrogation

techniques employed by any agency, witnessed by FBI

personnel should be reported. FBI personnel witnessing

incidents should make every effort to note the time, place and

personnel involved.

We are not aware of any corresponding memorandum having been

issued for FBI agents in Afghanistan or Iraq.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

TRAINING REGARDING DETAINEE TREATMENT PROVIDED

TO FBI AGENTS IN THE MILITARY ZONES

In this chapter we describe the training that FBI agents received

regarding issues of detainee interrogation and detainee abuse or

mistreatment in connection with their deployments to the military zones.

Our information is derived from the agents' responses to the OIG survey,

our interviews of agents and their supervisors, and documents from FBI

files. In Part I we focus on the agents who completed their deployments

before May 19, 2004, when the FBI issued its first written policy specifically

addressing agent conduct toward detainees in military zones. In Part II we

discuss the issue of training in the period after May 19, 2004.

I. Training During the Period Before the FBI's May 2004 Detainee

Policy

A. FBI Training for Overseas Deployments

A large majority of agents who completed their deployments prior to

May 19, 2004, reported in the OIG survey that they did not receive any

training, instruction, or guidance concerning FBI or other agency standards

of conduct relating to detainees prior to or during their deployment. Of the

419 agents whose deployments to GTMO, Afghanistan, or Iraq were

completed before May 19, 2004, when the FBI issued a formal policy, 267

(64 percent) told the OIG that they received no training on the standards of

conduct to be applied to their interactions with detainees. n7 The lack of

training during the early period was similar across military theaters. Of the

survey respondents who were deployed to GTMO, 63 percent said they

received no training. The corresponding percentages for Afghanistan and

Iraq were 75 percent and 59 percent, respectively. Many of the agents we

interviewed confirmed they received no training at all on these standards of

conduct.

Of the FBI agents who reported receiving training on these issues, 20

percent stated that written training materials were provided; the remainder

said written materials were not provided (44 percent) or that they could not

recall whether written materials were provided (36 percent). One of the first

FBI agents deployed to GTMO told the OIG that "the question of how to

117 It is important to note that some agents who deployed to the military zones did

not have responsibilities relating to detainee interviews, and therefore logically might not

have been expected to receive training on these issues.

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handle working at GTMO as an FBI Agent while possibly being exposed to or

drawn into non-law enforcement techniques was primarily answered by the

Agents on the ground." This agent also said that the FBI stayed out of

trouble on these issues by relying on the good judgment of its agents rather

than any edict from FBI Headquarters.

Most of the FBI agents who reported receiving training regarding

detainee mistreatment issues said they received it orally after they arrived at

the military zone. They said this training was part of a briefing that the FBI

On-Scene Commander (OSC) or other senior FBI agent provided either

shortly after the agent arrived in the zone, or in the case of GTMO during

weekly meetings among FBI agents. Several agents deployed to GTMO

reported being briefed by DOD Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF)

personnel or a combination of FBI and DOD CITF personnel. According to

the agent who served as OSC during October and November 2002, by the

time he arrived at GTMO a weekly training program was already in place,

put on by CITF personnel, the OSC, and agents from the FBI's Behavioral

Analysis Unit (BAU).

Several FBI OSCs told us they devised their own training or briefing

for new agents coming to the military zone.118 Two of the early OSCs at

GTMO said they received no clear guidance from their superiors regarding

detainee issues, such as what circumstances would trigger the obligation to

report conduct by a non-FBI interrogator. Both said that they did not think

they needed such guidance because they already knew how agents should

conduct themselves at GTMO based on their training, experience, and

judgment as FBI agents.

The early OSCs in Afghanistan described varying amounts of predeployment

training. Two of the OSCs said they received no training at all

regarding the standards of conduct for interrogating detainees. Another

said he received general instructions from the New York Field Office to the

effect that FBI agents should continue to comply with FBI standards in

Afghanistan so as to preserve the admissibility of evidence that they

collected. A third OSC said he received 2 or 3 days of briefing at FBI

Headquarters prior to his deployment, where he was told to follow FBI policy

concerning interviews of detainees, to use common sense and good

judgment, and that if other agencies used non-FBI techniques he was to

take "forward motion toward the door." The OSC in Iraq during the fall of

118 We received a document from the FBI titled "Proposed GTMO Training Package,"

which outlined topics for preparing agents to conduct detainee interviews at GTMO. The

outline, which we believe was prepared by the FBI's BAU, includes topics relating to

rapport-based interview techniques and themes. It does not specifically address the issue

of non-FBI interview techniques. We could not determine whether this outline was actually

used in training agents at GTMO.

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2003 told us that he did not receive specific training about the military's

standards of conduct for detainee treatment issues as part of his predeployment

briefing.

During 2002 and early 2003, agents from the FBI's Behavioral

Analysis Unit (BAU) within the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG)

provided training on interviewing techniques to the FBI interviewing agents,

CITF investigators, and Defense HUMINT Service personnel at GTMO. The

first BAU agent deployed to GTMO told us that she prepared a PowerPoint

presentation that she used at GTMO beginning in September 2002. The FBI

provided the OIG with several PowerPoint presentations that appear to be

detainee interview/interrogation training materials, but we were unable to

determine precisely when each of these presentations was used. Most of

these materials focused primarily on rapport-based interview techniques

and background material regarding detainee culture and training. The

materials did not address the use of coercive techniques, other than general

statements that they are not effective. No similar presentations for Iraq or

Afghanistan were provided to the OIG.

The amount of time devoted to training of new agents sent to GTMO

apparently declined over time. As of early 2003, the training provided to

newly-arrived agents regarding interview techniques at GTMO was limited to

approximately 30 minutes.

Several of the BAU agents told us that before they went to GTMO they

attended training provided by the military at Fort Belvoir. These BAU

agents stated that the training they received provided orientation to

operations at GTMO and instruction on Islam and the mindset of terrorists,

but the agents said there was no discussion of what interrogation

techniques were permissible.

The FBI considered requiring all FBI interviewing agents to attend the

training at Fort Belvoir prior to deploying to GTMO. On October 1, 2002,

one of the first BAU agents who served at GTMO made the following

recommendation to the Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU):

Include the FBI interviewing agents in the pre-GTMO training

that is currently being provided for the CITF interviewing agents

at Ft. Belvoir. This training includes instruction in Islam,

appropriate legal issues and interview strategies. Having this

training before departing for GTMO would save valuable time for

the agents, who now have to undergo this training on-site

before they begin the interview process.

However, it does not appear that this recommendation was ever

implemented. As noted above, most agents who reported getting any

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training for their military zone assignments told us they received it after

arriving in the military zone.

By January 2004, the FBI had created a 5-day pre-deployment

training program for agents detailed to Iraq. The agenda included

approximately 1 hour of training regarding "Interviewing Techniques."

However, the agenda does not specifically identify any issues relating to

detainee mistreatment for training.

FBI documents suggest that the pre-deployment training for agents

detailed to Afghanistan was brief. An EC dated April 18, 2004, prepared by

the FBI OSC described the current training as "a 30-minute CD-ROM photo

collage by CTD, which serves as the totality of the briefing provided by

FBIHQ/CTD." The EC recommended that personnel deploying to

Afghanistan go through a 2-week pre-deployment course of instruction at

Quantico, although it did not identify detainee treatment issues as a

proposed topic for more in-depth training.

B. Training Topics Relating to Detainees

We also attempted to determine the content of FBI training with

respect to detainee treatment in military zones prior to May 2004. In our

survey of agents deployed to the military zones, we focused on four aspects

of potential training or guidance: (1) the standards of conduct regarding

detainee interviews applicable to FBI agents in military zones; (2) standards

of conduct applicable to personnel from other agencies, such as military

interrogators; (3) what agents should do if an agent from another agency

used a non-FBI technique during a joint interview with the FBI; and (4)

under what circumstances an agent should report the conduct of personnel

from another agency.

Standards of Conduct for FBI Agents. FBI agents told the OIG that

they understood that they were required to continue to adhere to the same

standards of conduct for detainee interviews that applied to custodial

interviews in the United States. Those agents who received training almost

unanimously reported that this instruction was included in the training.

Moreover, those agents who told us that they did not receive specific

training regarding detainee treatment overwhelmingly stated that they

nevertheless understood that the same standards applicable in the United

States continued to apply to their conduct at GTMO. Several agents stated

that they were attempting to gather information that would be admissible in

later prosecutions, so they had to comply with ordinary standards of

conduct for interviews. These agents' accounts are consistent with the

statement by the MLDU Unit Chief in an e-mail dated May 10, 2004, that

the GTMO supervisors were told that, except with respect to Miranda

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warnings, "follow FBI/DOJ policy just as you would in your field office. Use

common sense...."

Some agents told us that they received specific instructions not to use

certain techniques that might have been employed by the military. For

example, one agent whose deployment began in February 2002 told the OIG

that early in his deployment his OSC emphasized that if he had "any doubt"

about a particular technique being used by the military, "we are not in that

business." Other agents told us that they were specifically instructed not to

use particular techniques, such as cold temperatures (air conditioners set

high), leaving a detainee alone in the interrogation room for a long time, or

forcing a detainee to stand or sit in an uncomfortable position. One OSC

cited "forcing a detainee to watch gay pornography" as an example of a nonlaw

enforcement technique that he instructed FBI agents to avoid. An agent

who deployed to GTMO in March 2003 said that FBI personnel were told

during a closed-door briefing that the FBI did not condone or participate in

certain interrogation techniques utilized by military intelligence personnel.

Standards Applicable to Non-FBI Investigators. Most agents told

us that they did not receive any specific information regarding which

interrogation techniques were permissible for military interrogators. An

OSC at GTMO told the OIG that he was never briefed on what interrogation

techniques were available to the military, and he was not interested to know

this information. The OSC stated that there was no way for the FBI to

determine whether a military interrogator had obtained the necessary

authorization to use a particular military technique.

When asked how the FBI could improve training for future

deployments, several agents responded that information should be provided

regarding the parameters applicable to non-FBI interrogators.

Only a few agents reported that they received detailed information

regarding which interrogation techniques were approved for the military.

Some reported that this information was provided in writing. It appears

that they were usually referring to information provided by the military, not

the FBI. For example, several agents who served in Iraq told us the military

required them to sign a form acknowledging the types of methods used to

gather information from detainees, such as using working dogs and sleep

deprivation.

Joint Interviews. As discussed in Chapter Two, at various times and

locations the FBI worked jointly with the military in planning and

conducting detainee interrogations. This practice raised the potential for

FBI agents to be involved in interrogations in which methods might be

planned or used that the FBI did not permit for its own agents. The

mandate that FBI agents continue to adhere to FBI policy did not

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necessarily resolve the issue of what agents should do if another agency's

investigator planned or used non-FBI techniques in an interview at which

an FBI agent was present, or in which he was otherwise involved, such as

by assisting the interrogator with questions for the detainee or using

information derived from the interrogation in subsequent interviews.

T.J. Harrington, the FBI's Deputy Assistant Director for Operational

Support in the Counterterrorism Division beginning in December 2002,

confirmed for the OIG that the FBI did not provide specific training about

how to conduct joint interviews with the DOD. He stated that existing FBI

policies remained in effect and pointed out that the FBI had no jurisdiction

over the military investigators. However, as noted in Chapter Three, existing

policies did not clearly address joint interrogations in which other U.S.

agencies with different rules were in charge.

Several agents also noted that the FBI did not provide guidance

addressing joint interviews with the DOD. For example, an FBI SSA who

served as OSC in GTMO for 2 months in 2002 and from August 2003 to

August 2005 told the OIG that he knew that his agents were not allowed to

engage in some conduct that was permissible for military interrogators, but

that it was unclear whether the agents could observe interviews in which

such techniques were used by other agencies or utilize information derived

from interviews in which such techniques were used. This question was not

merely hypothetical, because FBI agents sometimes relied on military

interrogators to obtain information for them from particular detainees. The

OSC told the OIG that the guidance he provided to agents at GTMO was to

conduct themselves like FBI agents, but that the guidance never went

further than that.

Some FBI agents told the OIG that they received training or

instruction to the effect that they should leave any interview in which non-

FBI techniques were being utilized. For example, one agent who served at

GTMO during the summer of 2003 told us that he was instructed to leave

any joint interview in which the other interviewer was using any non-FBI

approved technique. Another agent who served at GTMO in early 2003

stated in his survey response that he was told to leave the interview if Army

personnel used any "extreme interrogation techniques." Another said he

was instructed to leave if he saw anything "inappropriate" or that made him

"uncomfortable." One of the first agents deployed to GTMO said that the

"stand clear" policy "devolved from leadership on [the] ground."

Reporting Mistreatment. We also sought information regarding

training about the circumstances under which an FBI agent should report

on the abuse or mistreatment of a detainee by another interrogator. Again,

most agents reported receiving no guidance on this issue prior to May 2004.

A few agents told us they were instructed to report detainee mistreatment by

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other interrogators, but they gave varying descriptions of the triggering

criteria for making such a report. The OSC at GTMO in October and

November 2002 told us he instructed his new agents to let him know if they

heard or saw abuse. Some agents said they were instructed to make a

report if they saw any interrogation technique that would violate FBI

guidelines if used by an FBI agent, even though the agents were aware that

military interrogators were governed by more permissive standards. Other

agents used a variety of adjectives to describe this criterion, ranging from

"abusive" to "inappropriate," "questionable," or "unprofessional." However,

as one agent who was deployed to Iraq stated:

The Asst. On Scene Commander . . . merely said if you see

anything inappropriate you should report it. However, no one

ever defined what was inappropriate. For example, we had been

informed that [a particular Task Force] had legitimately received

special permission to conduct interviews using techniques that

were not available to the FBI. There was never any indication at

the time whether those techniques used by [the Task Force]

were appropriate. In fact, the [FBI's] on scene senior command

staff in Baghdad as well as AD Bald who visited the [Baghdad

Operations Center] were aware of the techniques available to

[the Task Force] and condoned their use.

An agent who served as OSC in Afghanistan during February and

March 2002 stated that prior to deployment, DOD personnel indicated that

if FBI agents saw "inappropriate" conduct by DOD personnel, they should

report it to appropriate officials in the DOD.

Several agents recommended to the OIG that the FBI provide more

specific training regarding standards of conduct applicable to military

interrogators. We believe these recommendations reflected the difficulty the

agents encountered in knowing when to report the conduct of military

interrogators. In addition, several agents told the OIG that the issue of

whether non-FBI interrogators were violating their own agencies' rules

created tensions for the FBI, because the FBI was the guest of the military

and the FBI's purpose in being in the military zones was not to police other

agencies. Other agents suggested that training be provided to clarify the

FBI's "policing" role with respect to other agencies' interrogators.

Some agents who served at GTMO told the OIG that they were told

that they should write up any potential "war crimes" allegations in an FD-

302 for inclusion in the "war crimes" case files in the FBI office at GTMO.

At some point in 2003, however, the OSC at GTMO received instructions not

to maintain a separate "war crimes" file. The OSC stated that the MLDU

Unit Chief told him that investigating detainee allegations of abuse was not

the FBI's mission. The OSC stated that he was told that the agents could

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continue to memorialize such allegations in their FD-302 interview

summaries, but that the FBI would not segregate such allegations into a

separate file.

In sum, prior to May 2004 the FBI provided only limited training,

instruction, or guidance to FBI agents concerning standards of conduct

relating to detainees. Most FBI employees understood that they should not

participate in abusive treatment of detainees, consistent with FBI policies in

the United States. However, there was considerable uncertainty about how

FBI personnel should interact with military interrogators using non-FBI

techniques and whether to report suspected abuse.

II. Expanded Training Provided to FBI Agents After Issuance of the

FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy

In the months following the issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee

Policy, the FBI's Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU) substantially

increased the scope of pre-deployment training provided to FBI agents who

were being sent to the military zones, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan.

Much of this enhanced training related to the unique conditions

encountered by FBI agents in foreign military zones and addressed issues

such as logistics, weapons, force protection, and convoy procedures. The

FBI began addressing the issue of detainee treatment in a more systematic

way than it had prior to the Abu Ghraib disclosures.

For example, beginning in approximately October 2004, the FBI began

periodically conducting a formal pre-deployment training program at

Quantico for agents being deployed to Iraq that lasted approximately 5 to 7

days. An attorney from the FBI's Office of General Counsel (OGC) prepared

a "Legal Briefing" as part of this training. The briefing addressed several of

the issues discussed in the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy, including: (1)

reiterating that the long-standing FBI prohibitions on coercion and abuse of

persons in custody also applied to detainees in the military zones; (2)

instructing FBI employees not to participate in any interrogation technique

in violation of FBI guidelines regardless of whether the co-interrogator was

in compliance with his or her own guidelines; and (3) telling each agent to

report any instance in which he or she "knows or suspects non-FBI

personnel has abused or is abusing or mistreating a detainee."

The training also instructed agents to "attenuate" their interviews of

potential criminal defendants in cases where the detainee had previously

been questioned by a foreign government or other intelligence community

agency so as to enhance the likelihood that any resulting statement would

be admissible in a judicial proceeding. The training instructed the agents to

consider:

168

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.212

• Allowing a lapse of time from the prior interview and the FBI

interview

• Choosing a different location for the FBI interview than the prior

interviews

• Assuring that previous interrogators are absent from the FBI

interview

• Avoiding the use of material obtained from previous

interrogations

• Concentrating on the criminal facts versus intelligence facts

gathered by intelligence community or military

• Using a new investigative team who have been isolated from

previous interview material, but not necessarily from preinterrogation

intelligence on the subject

• Getting the detainee on record as to his current status (as

potential defendant) versus previous status

The OGC attorney who prepared the training told us that in order to address

the issue of what constituted FBI "participation" in an interview conducted

by a non-FBI employee, he discussed five to seven hypothetical scenarios.

Beginning in December 2004, the FBI also periodically conducted

expanded multi-day pre-deployment training for FBI employees who were

being sent to Afghanistan. In developing this training, MLDU and CTD staff

noted the differences between training for Iraq and for Afghanistan, since in

Afghanistan FBI personnel "often operate as part of military units widely

dispersed throughout the theater." Detainee interview and treatment issues

were not covered in the original syllabus, but this issue was later added into

the training program.

We found no indication that the FBI devised a comparable predeployment

program for agents assigned to GTMO, most likely because

GTMO was not a battle zone. However, in August 2004 the FBI OGC

attorney stationed at GTMO began giving training to FBI personnel deployed

there, advising them to rely on the guidance provided in the Legal Handbook

for Special Agents. He told the newly-arrived FBI employees that if they saw

anything "untoward," beyond what the FBI was authorized to do or outside

the scope of the military's authority, the agent was to remove himself from

the room and report the incident to the OGC attorney or to the FBI's OSC at

GTMO. The OGC attorney told us that he and the OSC instructed the

newly-arrived employees on the scope of the military's approved techniques

as they were set forth in the April 2003 Policy approved by the Secretary of

Defense.

169

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.213

As previously noted, the OIG survey sought information regarding the

content and adequacy of training for FBI employees deployed to Iraq,

Afghanistan and GTMO. Most FBI agents whose foreign deployments began

after the issuance of the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy told us that they

received specific instruction as to the major elements of the Policy. Most of

them told us they were instructed to comply with FBI policies applicable to

custodial interviews in the United States, and to report any abuse or

mistreatment of detainees by non-FBI employees.

However, numerous agents told us in survey responses and interviews

that it would have been useful to them to receive a more detailed

explanation of what constituted "abuse" and what techniques were

permissible to military or other government agency interrogators under their

agencies' policies. For example, one agent who served in Iraq in early 2005

stated: "A clear explanation of definitions of [permissible non-FBI]

interrogation techniques, [e.g.] 'pride and ego up,' fear up, etc. would have

been helpful." Another agent who served in Iraq during May through July of

2005 stated:

I believe better guidance could be provided as to what the FBI

defines as "mistreatment" of detainees. In addition, the manner

in which such mistreatment should be reported can be better

articulated and disseminated to predeployment FBI

employees.... [T]he lack of specific definitions as to what is or is

not detainee mistreatment, made any determination of

perceived mistreatment—outside the obvious, rather subjective

and ambiguous and therefore argumentative.

Because the OIG survey was conducted in 2005, most of the responses we

received regarding training issues did not reflect the expanded training

programs described above.

The policies and training that the FBI provided to its agents both

governed the agents' conduct toward detainees and informed their decisions

regarding what action to take when they observed personnel from other

agencies using interrogation techniques not available to the FBI. In the next

three chapters, we address in detail what nearly 1,000 agents who served in

the military zones told us they observed or heard about with respect to

detainee mistreatment, what if anything they did to report such conduct,

and what the FBI did with such reports.

170

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.214

CHAPTER EIGHT

FBI OBSERVATIONS REGARDING DETAINEE TREATMENT IN

GUANTANAMO BAY

I. Introduction

During the course of our review, we contacted over 450 FBI employees

who were detailed at various times to GTMO. More than half of these

witnesses - approximately 240 - reported that they never observed nor

heard about potentially abusive treatment of detainees at GTMO.

Nevertheless, over 200 FBI agents who served at GTMO reported that

they observed or heard about various rough or aggressive treatment of

detainees, primarily by military interrogators. The most frequently reported

techniques included sleep deprivation or disruption, prolonged shackling,

stress positions, isolation, and the use of bright lights and loud music.

Table 8.1 summarizes the survey responses to our questions regarding the

use of particular interrogation techniques at GTMO.

In presenting these results in summary form, we emphasize the limits

to the interpretation of this data. The numbers in the Table indicate how

many survey recipients gave positive responses to particular questions. We

determined during the interviews, however, that some respondents gave

overly inclusive responses, sometimes describing conduct that they

observed or heard about that did not meet the definitions within the

survey.119 We believe that some agents may have responded this way out of

an abundance of caution, to be sure that they had responded fully and were

not excluding any information of potential relevance. In addition, we believe

that in some cases multiple agents were reporting on the same incident.

Merely counting the number of positive responses therefore would overstate

the number of incidents that may have actually taken place.

On the other hand, we also cannot exclude the possibility that some

respondents did not report all incidents of detainee mistreatment of which

they had knowledge. Moreover, the FBI agents were only present at a small

percentage of detainee interrogations in the military zones, most of which

were conducted by personnel from other agencies. For all of these reasons,

119 For example, Question 49 sought information regarding the use of military

working dogs other than during detainee transportation, such as for purposes of

intimidation of detainees during interrogations. We determined that several agents who

responded positively to this question were in fact describing the use of dogs as a security

measure during detainee movement and not during interrogations.

171

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.215

physical pain or injury, or causing

— :I disfigurement or death

9 I Placing a detainee on a hot surface or

burning a detainee

10 I Using shackles or other restraints in a

• ,

11 I Requiring a detainee to maintain, or

restraining a detainee in, a stressful or

painful position

prolonged manner

12 I Forcing a detainee to perform demanding

physical exercise

13 1 Using electrical shock on a detainee

14 I Threatening to use electrical shock on a

detainee

15 I Intentionally delaying or denying detainee

I medical care

16 I Hooding or blindfolding a detainee other

_ ._ ,........._ _

17 1 Subjecting a detainee to extremely cold or

hot room temperatures for extended periods

than during transportation

18 I Subjecting a detainee to loud music

the survey results should not be interpreted as an estimate of how often a

particular technique was employed within a particular military zone.

TABLE 8.1

Survey Results Concerning

Interrogation Techniques Observed in Guantanamo

1 .t1 a)

n: j

I

.• a)

i o Z o i o

I 14 .0 i 4

i VI ° i w v4

1 0 0 i1 E0-1 0 ..."1 i

:15

o

-la

RS 0 I 0 Ces 1 (L) 44.4

I g t 1 t c) i0

0

a., VI 1 VI '.CiOi r0 1 0

Al 1 42 4) -' 0 I .1.J 0 I 0

1 I Depriving a detainee of food or water 1 I 1 I 4 I 3 I 433

2 I Depriving a detainee of clothing 3 I 1 I 4 I 5 I 433

3 I Depriving a detainee of sleep, or interrupting 13 I 10 I 17 I 54 I 354

I sleep by frequent cell relocations or other :• :• I .

..

: t

.

4 I Beating a detainee .• I 11 I 1 I 430

5 I Using water to prevent breathing by a :

• 1 I 441

detainee or to create the sensation of :••

drowning , • ••••••

6 I Using hands, rope, or anything else to choke 1 I 444

or strangle a detainee 1 : : ....•..

t :

8 I Other treatment or action causing significant 2 I 1 I 3 I 437

Interrogation TechnicLue. 0 CL401021 A i0E-4! Z

methods

..•: .• i .•

i

7 I Threatening other action to cause physical 2 I 1 I 4 I 435

pain, injury, disfigurement, or death

445

. ,

15 2 1 8 I

t

9 1 3 I 12 I

• :

:

3 I 1

I.•

:•

9 I 1 I 2 I

I i :

3 I 2 I 6 I 15

:• .•

27 61 271

420

421

444

444

442

431

420

384

172

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.216

1

6

0

:524

• k

4.)

U7 0

.0 0

Jo

0 Z

19 403

o

)4

• -00o ->0 .?..

0g t › ta CD 4.)

i4 ta Ea

CI) r0 r0 0

Interrogation Technique ' 0 0

19 Subjecting a detainee to bright flashing • 19

lights or darkness

5 1

8 9

20 Isolating a detainee for an extended period I 30

21 Using duct tape to restrain, gag, or punish a 2

detainee

22 Using rapid response teams and/or forced I 11

cell extractions •

23 Using a military working dog on or near a 3

detainee other than during detainee

.•

• transportation ••

22 384

4 438

43 376

6 434

24 Threatening to use military working dogs on

or near a detainee

440

25 Using spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other

animals on or near a detainee

26 Threatening to use spiders, scorpions,

snakes, or other animals on a detainee

27 Disrespectful statements, handling, or

.• actions involving the Koran

28 Shaving a detainee's facial or other hair to I 3

embarrass or humiliate a detainee •

29 Placing a woman's clothing on a detainee •

30 Touching a detainee or acting toward a

detainee in a sexual manner

31 Holding detainee(s) who were not officially

acknowledged or registered as such by the

agency detaining the person.

32 Sending a detainee to another country for

more aggressive interrogation

33 Threatening to send a detainee to another

country for detention or more aggressive

interrogation

34 Threatening to take action against a

detainee's family

35 Other treatment or action causing severe

emotional or psychological trauma to a

detainee

36 Other religious or sexual harassment or

humiliation of a detainee

37 Other treatment of a detainee that in your

opinion was unprofessional, unduly harsh or

aggressive, coercive, abusive, or unlawful

2

2

1 441!

444

19 10 414

4 6 6 427

2 4 441

2 2 11 4261

1 1 438

2 2 434 I

1 5 433

2 439

4431

2

4

5 437

433

Observation Totals I 173 39 108 282 15,824

173

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.217

In Part II of this chapter, we describe the FBI agents' specific

observations regarding particular interrogation techniques.120 In Part III, we

examine the handling of reports by FBI agents to their superiors or to

military personnel regarding their concerns about detainee treatment at

GTMO.

II. Observations Regarding Specific Techniques

A. Beating or Physically Abusing a Detainee

Several FBI agents told the OIG about incidents involving the alleged

beating or other physical abuse of detainees at GTM0.121 However, in only

one case did any agent report having directly witnessed such conduct. The

other reports involved allegations from detainees regarding incidents that

the FBI agents did not themselves witness. Beating and physical violence

were never approved interrogation techniques at GTMO. The Church

investigators reported that a small number of "minor" cases of assault of

detainees at GTMO were substantiated, and noted that other, more serious

allegations were under investigation by the military. Church Report at 175-

178 .

Brett/McMahon. The only report by an FBI agent regarding the

direct observation of physical abuse at GTMO was an incident in November

or December 2002 reported by SSAs Brett and McMahon.122 As noted in

Chapter Five, Brett and McMahon were agents from the Behavioral Analysis

Unit (BAU) of the FBI's Criminal Incident Response Group (CIRG) who were

assigned to observe and assist with interviews of detainees at GTMO.

Brett provided the following details to the OIG. On one occasion while

Brett and McMahon were in an observation booth at GTMO observing an

FBI interview, they saw a female military interrogator and her partner bring

a detainee into a vacant interrogation room. After a few minutes the female

interrogator ordered a Marine guard to duct tape the curtain in front of the

two-way mirror, blocking the view into the interrogation room. The second

military interrogator then came into the observation booth and sat in front

120 Many of the incidents described below have previously been discussed in press

accounts of FBI documents that were released to the American Civil Liberties Union

pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request.

121 The OIG's survey asked separate questions regarding beatings and other

treatment causing significant physical pain, but the responses were sufficiently similar that

we have combined these categories for purposes of describing agent responses.

122 Brett and McMahon are pseudonyms.

174

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.218

of the monitor, and the Marine guard went into the interrogation room.

However, Brett said he could see most of the interrogation by looking at the

monitor. The female interrogator sat close to the detainee with her back to

the camera. Her left knee was in the detainee's crotch area, and she was

rubbing the detainee's arms from his shoulders down past his elbows into

his crotch area.

Brett told us that several times he could see the detainee turn his

head away, grimace in pain, rear back and make noise consistent with a

response to pain. The female interrogator leaned in and apparently

whispered in the detainee's ear from time to time. After the military

interrogators were finished with this detainee, Brett asked the Marine guard

what the female interrogator had done to the detainee. The guard told Brett

she was bending his thumbs back and grabbing his genitals. Brett asked

why she was doing that, and the guard replied, "to cause him pain." The

guard added: "If you think that is bad, I have seen her having guys on the

floor crying tears in the fetal position." Brett said that the Marine guard's

name tag had been taped over, and so he did not see his name. Brett also

said that the guard seemed uncomfortable about his questions, and Brett

did not want to press the issue by asking his name.

Brett also stated that the female applied some sort of lotion on the

arms of the detainee prior to bending his thumbs back and grabbing his

genitals. Brett stated that this interrogation occurred during Ramadan and

that he understood that if a Muslim male is touched by a woman who is not

his wife he would be considered unclean and could not pray. Brett also said

he had heard that Army interrogators would use perfumed lotion to make it

obvious to the other detainees that the particular detainee had been

touched by a woman.

McMahon stated during his OIG interview that both he and Brett

observed the female interrogator bend back the thumbs of a detainee.

McMahon said that he could not really see what was happening in the

interrogation room, but that another military interrogator confirmed what

the female interrogator was doing to the detainee.

Brett and McMahon reported this incident to the FBI On-Scene

Commander (OSC) at GTMO, and to the CITF-DOD Supervisor. Brett stated

that at some point he, McMahon, and the OSC called the Critical Incident

Response Group (CIRG) to report this incident. Brett told the OIG that he

and McMahon were instructed to report any similar incidents to BAU

management at Quantico. Brett said he got the impression that his

superiors definitely did not want him to raise this kind of issue with General

Miller, the military commander of JTF-GTMO at the time. However, Brett

told us that he, McMahon, and the OSC did bring up this issue during a

meeting with General Miller a few days before Brett left the island, in

175

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.219

connection with their attempt to persuade General Miller that the FBI's

rapport-based approach was superior to the military's interrogation

techniques. Brett said that General Miller responded with words to the

effect of, "thank you gentlemen, but my boys know what they're doing."

We determined that Brett's concerns regarding this incident and other

incidents were elevated within FBI Headquarters, and from there the matter

was eventually referred back to the DOD. This incident was described in

general terms in one of the attachments to SSA McMahon's EC to the

Counterterrorism Division and the FBI Office of General Counsel dated

May 30, 2003, which was described in Chapter Five.

Brett told the OIG that he believed that the U.S. Army interrogators

were being encouraged by their superior officers to engage in aggressive

interrogation techniques. He gave as an example a "pep rally" meeting he

attended, conducted by the Chief of the DOD's Interrogation Control

Element, in which the interrogators were encouraged to get as close to the

torture statute line as possible. Brett said he did not feel that the incident

he witnessed involving the female interrogator was a case of a rogue

interrogator acting on her own.123

Brett gave an account of this incident to the Schmidt-Furlow

investigators, who also interviewed the female interrogator and her

supervisor. Schmidt-Furlow Report Exhibits 21, 24 and 32. The interrogator

and her supervisor stated that she did rub perfume or lotion on a detainee's

arm in order to make him stop praying because he would be "unclean," and

that when the detainee attempted to attack the interrogator he fell and

chipped a tooth. The Schmidt-Furlow Report found that the interrogator's

conduct was an authorized technique under Field Manual 34-52 (mild noninjurious

touching), although the report did not address Brett's allegations

regarding bending the detainee's thumbs back. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 8.

Another FBI agent told the OIG about an incident that occurred

during his deployment at GTMO between October and November 2002,

which could have been the same incident. The agent said he observed three

U.S. military personnel picking a detainee up off the floor of the

123 A different FBI agent gave an account of what might have been the same

incident or a similar incident involving the same female military interrogator. He stated

that on one occasion he observed a military interrogator who was "invading the space" of a

detainee and speaking into his ear. She was also trying to hold hands with the detainee

and he was resisting. The agent said the interrogator seemed to be speaking seductively

and may have put her hand on the detainee's leg. The agent said that it did not appear

that the detainee was in any pain or physical distress. He said that the interrogator and

the detainee looked like they were "hand wrestling" but it did not appear that she was

bending back his thumbs. The FBI ageht described these actions as "non-standard," but

said he definitely did not consider them abuse.

176

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.220

interrogation room, and that the detainee was bleeding from the nose. The

agent said there was a female interrogator who appeared to have her hands

on the detainee. The agent identified the interrogator by the same name

that Brett provided to the OIG in connection with the thumb-bending

incident. The agent reported that he overheard other military personnel in

the observation booth say that the female interrogator had been rubbing

perfumed lotion on the detainee, including on his genital area, and that

when the detainee began yelling and tried to stand up he immediately fell

because his handcuffs were shackled to the floor. The agent stated that he

spoke to the CITF Commander about this incident.

SA Siebern.124 SA Siebern told the OIG that on one occasion while he

was conducting an interview at Camp Delta with an Army Sergeant and

Major, they heard a loud noise down the hall and stopped their interview to

investigate. What they found was a detainee on the floor of a different

interview room, on his knees. The detainee was leaning forward with his

forehead touching the floor and he was moaning. Siebern asked the military

personnel in the room what had happened and they replied that the

detainee had gotten upset and thrown himself to the floor. They also said

that they had already called for a medic to treat the detainee. Siebern told

the OIG that there was a small amount of blood on the floor in front of the

detainee that was consistent with a nose bleed. Siebern said that the Major

began to question the other military personnel in the room about this

incident and Siebern then left with the Sergeant.125

Siebern said he felt that the explanation he received regarding the

detainee was both plausible and credible. He said that such an action by

the detainee seemed consistent with behavior that Siebern had observed

from other detainees at GTMO. Siebern said that the military personnel in

the room did not seem to be agitated and nobody was being restrained away

from the detainee as if there had been some sort of confrontation. Siebern

believed this was a military issue that. most likely would be handled by the

Army Major, who was a field grade officer. Siebern said he did not report

this incident to his OSC because he did not "feel that it was an issue," and

he thought the Major was doing what appeared to be a sufficient albeit

superficial investigation. Siebern stated that he did not document the

incident or tell anyone else about it at the time. 126

124 This name is a pseudonym.

125 This incident may be the same incident that Brett related regarding the chipped

tooth.

126 Siebern later reported this incident on August 18, 2004, in response to the email

inquiry from the FBI Inspection Division regarding observation of aggressive

techniques. He told the OIG he reported it out of an abundance of caution.

177

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.221

Allegations made by detainees to the FBI regarding physical

abuse by military personnel. Several FBI agents deployed to GTMO noted

that detainees had complained to them about beatings or other physical

abuse by military personnel. Some of these complaints were recorded

contemporaneously in FBI FD-302 interview summaries and others were

reported to the OIG in survey responses and interviews. No FBI agents

reported that they witnessed these events and none were alleged to have

participated in them.

For example, according to FBI documents and two agents interviewed

by the OIG, an allegation regarding a beating by military personnel was

made by detainee Juma Muhammad Abdul Latif Al-Dosari (#261). On

May 22, 2002, Al-Dosari told an FBI agent that three or four weeks earlier

an unknown number of guards had entered his cell unprovoked and began

spitting and cursing at him. Al-Dosari said that a soldier named Smith had

jumped on his back, beat him in the face, and choked him until he passed

out, and that a female guard named Martin beat him and banged his head

against the cell floor. According to the FD-302 interview summary prepared

by the FBI agent, Al-Dosari had a recent wound on his nose. Two other FBI

agents told the OIG that they heard allegations from detainees of beatings

by military guards which we believe related to the same incident, but

neither agent witnessed the alleged beatings. The agents told the OIG that

Al-Dosari's allegations were well known at GTMO and that they understood

that the allegations had been reported to military officials.

Another agent told the OIG about allegations made by detainee

Mamdough Ahmed Habib (#661). Habib alleged that "Mike," a private

contract interrogator with Lockheed Martin, had hit him during an

interrogation approximately a year before the agent arrived at GTMO. The

agent said she found Habib's allegation "very hard to believe" based on the

agent's experience of working with the interrogator at GTMO.127

We also received FD-302 interview summaries prepared by FBI agents

at GTMO that indicated detainees had reported other incidents or rumors of

beatings or other physical abuse. According to an FD-302 prepared by

special agents from the FBI and the CID, on October 4, 2002, detainee Allal

Ab Aljallil Abd Al Rahman Abd (#156) told FBI interviewers that he had

127 According to another FBI agent, Habib also made allegations about beatings of

other detainees during an interview with the FBI agent on January 8, 2003. The agent

reported these allegations in an FD-302 interview summary that he prepared at the time,

which stated among other things that Habib claimed that detainees were beaten when

guards searched their cells. According to the Church Report, Habib has been released and

has made widely-publicized claims of torture that are the subject of an ongoing

investigation by the NCIS. The OIG has requested updated information regarding this

investigation from the DOD, but to date it has not been provided.

178

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.222

witnessed U.S. guards shoot another detainee and throw him in the ocean,

and that four or five Camp Delta guards had hit him (#156) in the head

about two weeks earlier. Another FD-302 prepared by the FBI states that

on January 21, 2003, detainee Abdel Wahab (#37) told the interviewer he

had heard that a detainee had been severely beaten by a guard and had

died as the result of an altercation that began when the guards treated the

Koran disrespectfully.

An FD-302 summary prepared by an FBI agent stated that on May 31,

2003, detainee Abdallah Aiza Al Matrafi (#5) claimed that some detainees

were being beaten during late night interrogations. Another FD-302

prepared by an FBI agent stated that on July 19, 2003, detainee Zahir Shah

(#1010) complained that he was shackled and hooded by U.S. Forces in

Bagram and was subsequently beaten by guards during transfer to GTMO.

B. Prolonged Shackling and Stress Positions

Over 30 FBI agents told the OIG in survey responses or interviews

that they saw or heard about the use of prolonged shackling or stress

positions on detainees at GTMO.128 Many described a particular practice

known as "short chaining" or "short-shackling" in which the detainee's

hands and feet were chained close to a bolt on the floor so that the detainee

could not stand or sit comfortably. Several agents described detainees

being short-shackled overnight or while being subjected to cold

temperatures, loud music, or flashing lights. We describe the more severe

examples of short-shackling and stress positions reported by the agents

below.

According to the Church Report, "[t]hroughout interrogation operations

at GTMO, interrogators have made a practice of chaining detainees' hands

and feet to an eyebolt in the floor of the interrogation room, ostensibly as a

matter of safety." Church Report at 168. The Church Report found that this

practice prevented seated detainees from standing up straight, and forced

standing detainees into a stooped or hunched over position. Id. The

Church investigators observed that the practice of "short chaining"

(intentionally placing a detainee's hands even closer to the eyebolt) caused

"moderate physical discomfort" and was employed "to intimidate and

establish control over resistant detainees." Accordingly, they classified this

practice as a "stress position." Id. Stress positions were approved for use at

GTMO by Secretary Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002, but permission to use

128 The OIG survey asked separate questions about prolonged shackling and stress

positions. However, respondents described incidents of short-shackling under both

categories. In addition, as mentioned above, the Church investigators have classified shortshackling

as a type of stress position. We therefore combined the categories in this

discussion.

179

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.223

stress positions without advance approval from the Secretary was rescinded

on January 12, 2003. Id. at 117-120. The military at GTMO apparently did

not consider short-shackling to be a prohibited "stress position," at least

until May 2004 when the military commander at GTMO specifically

prohibited this practice. Id. at 168.

Direct observations. The OIG interviewed 23 FBI agents who

personally observed prolonged shackling or detainees in stress positions.129

For example, one FBI agent stated that during her deployment from

December 2003 to September 2004, she personally observed detainee

Mohammad Mehdi (#166) "short-shackled" in an interrogation room. Mehdi

was also being forced to listen to loud music with flashing strobe lights, and

later placed in a hot room. The agent did not know how long Mehdi was in

the hot room, but she thought it was for several hours. She also estimated

that the room temperature was about 90 to 95 degrees. She stated that two

Lockheed Martin contract interrogators most likely ordered that Mehdi be

short-shackled. The agent told the OIG that she understood that shortshackling

was a permitted interrogation tactic for military personnel, and

that she therefore did not report this activity to anyone in the FBI until

July 9, 2004, when she responded to the Inspection Division's survey of

agents deployed to military zones. In her e-mail she stated that Mehdi was

short-shackled for approximately 15 hours.

Another FBI agent indicated in her OIG survey response and her OIG

interview that on a few occasions during her deployment to GTMO in

February and March 2003 she observed detainees that were "short chained"

to the floor for extended periods and subjected to extreme temperatures.

She said that the first time she encountered this was when she walked into

an interview room and encountered a detainee whose hands and feet were

shackled to the floor so that the detainee could not stand. She said that the

room was stifling hot, there was a strong smell of urine and feces, and there

was a small pile of hair next to the detainee's head. The MPs on duty told

the agent that the detainee had been there since the day before and that the

MPs were told by his interrogators to leave him there and not bring him any

food or water until the interrogators came back. The MPs also told the FBI

agent that they had been instructed to do this for other detainees.

The same FBI agent told the OIG that approximately two weeks later

she encountered another detainee who was shackled to the floor of an

interview room. She said the air conditioner had been set to make it very

cold in the room and the detainee was shivering. Also, the detainee had

129 In addition to the incidents described in this Section we also address an incident

involving the short-shackling of detainee Yousef Abkir Saleh Al Qarani (#269) in Chapter

Eleven.

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urinated in his pants. The MPs advised her that the detainee had been in

the room since the previous day with the air conditioner left on the whole

time, and that they were told not to bring the detainee food, water, or

anything else until the interrogators returned. The agent said the MPs told

her that the interrogators were trying to "break down" detainees through the

use of temperature manipulation, loud music, and immobility.

The FBI agent stated that she did not report either incident to her FBI

OSC, but she believes that she did discuss this with her FBI colleagues at

GTMO, some of whom told her that they had heard about this sort of thing

being done at GTM0.130

Two other witnesses also told the OIG about another incident

involving use of a stress position on detainee Salman Yahya Hassan

Mohammed Rabeii (#508). One FBI agent said that early in his deployment

at GTMO in 2002 he observed two young soldiers laughing and snickering

at a detainee who was in what appeared to be a stress position on his knees.

The detainee was rubbing his leg and the Arabic translator in the room was

yelling at the detainee. The agent asked the soldiers if what was taking

place was authorized activity. One soldier told the agent that the activity

was authorized, but the agent was not convinced and he sought out a CITF

legal advisor. The two of them brought this incident to the attention of the

Commanding General's JAG.131 We interviewed the former CITF legal

advisor (who has since left the military and is now an Assistant General

Counsel for the FBI), who provided a similar account to the OIG and

identified the detainee as Rabeii. The former CITF legal advisor also told the

OIG that on another occasion near that time he observed a detainee being

short-shackled to the floor in a squatting position during an interview for

the purpose of using the offer of a chair as an incentive for cooperation.

Second hand reports and detainee allegations. Several FBI agents

told the OIG that they heard about incidents of prolonged shackling or

stress positions from other agents or from detainees.132 For example, the

FBI OSC at GTMO during June 2002 said that he heard that some

detainees had been shackled to the floor for prolonged periods in a manner

that put some stress on the lumbar region of the back as a way to induce

130 The agent later reported these incidents in an e-mail response to the FBI

Inspection Division survey and in an interview with the Inspection Division.

131 The disposition of this report to military superiors is discussed below in Section

III of this chapter.

132 In commenting on a draft of this report, the DOD stated that "short shackling" is

also a technique used to control violent or belligerent detainees to ensure the safety of

others, and that this use could explain some of the agents' observations and second-hand

information on the use of this measure.

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the detainees to talk. The OSC said he told his staff "we're not going to do

that anymore," and to the best of his knowledge most agents stopped using

this technique. The OSC stated that he heard that two task force officers

from New York (not FBI agents) continued to use this technique, however,

and that the OSC threatened to have them removed from GTMO if they

continued to use this technique. The OSC said he could not recall the

names of the New York task force agents or of any FBI agents who had

employed this technique. None of the approximately 440 other FBI agents

who served at GTMO that responded to the OIG in this review reported in

their survey responses or interviews that they ever observed FBI agents use

short-shackling or other stress positions at GTMO, and we were unable to

determine the identity of any agents that the OSC said had used this

technique.

Another FBI agent said that detainees Shafiq Rasul (#86), Asif Iqbal

(#87), and Ruhel Ahmed (#110) told her that they had been "short-shackled"

by the military on occasion to get them to cooperate in interrogations. The

agent told the OIG that she understood that these detainees were shortshackled

to wear down their resistance to interrogation. She stated that the

alleged incident happened about 6 months before she arrived at GTMO, and

it was used in conjunction with loud music, strobe lights, and temperature

manipulation.

The same agent told the OIG that another detainee, Ahmed Ould

Abdel Aziz (#757), complained that he was shackled for an extended period

of time in conjunction with other aggressive interrogation techniques. The

agent stated that during her time at GTMO, from December 2003 to

September 2004, she was a member of a multi-agency interrogation team

that had been building rapport with Aziz over a long period of time. She told

us that another interrogator told her that Aziz had alleged that in February

2004 he had been subjected to yelling, short-shackling, lowered room

temperature, strobe lights, and music. Aziz also alleged that he was left in

the interrogation room for over 12 hours with no food, bathroom breaks, or

breaks to pray. The agent told us that she and her team believed that the

CIA had conducted this interview. She said she and the other interrogators

on her team were angry because the incident undermined their lengthy

effort to build rapport with this detainee, and because there had been no

coordination with them prior to interrogating the detainee. She said she

reported this incident to an FBI SSA and the FBI OSC, and the problem did

not recur.

C. Sleep Deprivation or Sleep Disruption

Over 70 FBI agents deployed to GTMO told the OIG that they had

information regarding the use of sleep deprivation or sleep disruption on

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detainees. This was the single most frequently reported interrogation

technique.133

According to the Church Report, "sleep adjustment" was utilized

frequently throughout the period of interrogation operations at GTMO.

Church Report at 155, 170. The Memorandum approved by Secretary

Rumsfeld on April 16, 2003, explicitly approved the use of "sleep

adjustment," which it defined as "[a]djusting the sleeping times of the

detainee (e.g. reversing sleep cycles from night to day." It further stated that

this technique is not "sleep deprivation." According to the Church Report,

the distinction between permissible "sleep adjustment" and prohibited

"sleep deprivation" was imprecise and "blurry." Id. at 171, 174.

Many FBI agents described a program of sleep disruption employed by

the military at GTMO designed to disorient detainees and thereby obtain

their cooperation, which was known as the "frequent flyer program."

According to military documents, this program consisted of frequent cell

movements for a detainee in order to disrupt his sleep patterns and lower

his ability to resist interrogation. The length and frequency of the cell

moves varied with each detainee.

An FBI agent who was deployed to GTMO from December 2003

through September 2004 told the OIG that she was briefed by the U.S.

military about this program, which consisted of moving detainees every few

hours in order to disrupt their sleep pattern and to undermine any

supportive relationships on their cell block. She stated that under the

program detainees were moved every 4 hours, but that that the program

could only be continued for about a week or two. The agent was not told by

anyone in the FBI that this program was not available for her to use, and

she believed that this technique would not be prohibited by any FBI policy.

She told the OIG she never utilized this program, because she felt there

were much more effective ways to accomplish the same goals.

Another FBI agent stated in his survey response that several Uighur

detainees were subjected to sleep deprivation or disruption while being

interrogated at Camp X-Ray by Chinese officials prior to April 2002.134 The

133 In addition to the incidents described in this Section, several FBI agents told us

that sleep deprivation or sleep disruption was a technique that the military employed with

detainee #63, Al-Qahtani, in 2003. This information is described in Chapter Five. Also, as

discussed in Part IV of Chapter Eleven, FBI agents participated in subjecting detainee

Zuhail Abdo Al-Sharabi (#569) to extended isolation in 2003 at GTMO.

134 Uighurs are an ethnic minority in China who are predominantly Muslim. While

the Uighurs were detained at Camp X-Ray, some Chinese officials visited GTMO and were

granted access to these detainees for interrogation purposes. The agent stated that he

understood that the treatment of the Uighur detainees was either carried out by the

(Cont'd.)

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agent said that one Uighur detainee, Bahtiyar Mahnut (#277), claimed that

the night before his interrogation by Chinese officials he was awakened at

15-minute intervals the entire night and into the next day. Mahnut also

claimed he was exposed to low room temperatures for long periods of time

and was deprived of at least one meal.

The FBI agent who served as OSC at GTMO from June to August

2003 also told the OIG about a program at GTMO called "Operation

Sandman," which involved sleep interruption and frequent cell relocations.

He said he was briefed on this operation at a command staff meeting at

which General Miller and all the department heads at GTMO were present.

The OSC stated that at this time the military was concerned that the Saudi

detainees were exerting too much influence over the other detainees and

encouraging them not to cooperate with U.S. officials. As the OSC

understood it, Operation Sandman was designed to keep some of the Saudi

detainees mentally off balance, to isolate them either linguistically or

culturally, and to induce them to cooperate.

D. Extreme Temperatures

Approximately 29 agents provided information to the OIG regarding

the use of extreme temperatures on detainees at GTMO. Some agents

simply observed that most interview rooms were cold. In a few cases

however, it appears that detainees were intentionally subjected to extreme

temperatures by unknown interrogators in an apparent effort to break the

detainees' resolve to resist cooperating. As noted above, several agents

reported the use of extreme temperatures in conjunction with prolonged

short-shackling.

FBI agent observations regarding this technique were confirmed by

the Church Report, which found that "environmental manipulation has been

regularly employed throughout interrogation operations at GTMO. By far

the most common version of this technique involved turning the air

conditioning up in the interrogation room to induce moderate discomfort in

the detainees, most of whom are accustomed to warm climates." Church

Report at 171. According to the Church Report, environmental manipulation

was not specifically addressed in a military interrogation policy for GTMO

until it was listed as an approved technique in the April 16, 2003, Policy.

Id. at 138, 155.

Chinese interrogators or was carried out by U.S. military personnel at the behest of the

Chinese interrogators. He said he also heard from the Uighur translator that other Uighur

detainees experienced this same treatment.

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Although temperature manipulation was an approved military

technique, FBI agents told us that they avoided using this technique in

connection with their interviews. One agent stated that the FBI OSC at

GTMO told agents deployed to GTMO that the FBI was "not in that

business."

E. Use of Working Dogs

We found no evidence of any FBI employees involved in the use of

military working dogs in any fashion. Several agents described the use of

dogs by the military, however. Secretary Rumsfeld's December 2, 2002,

memorandum explicitly approved the exploitation of a detainee's individual

phobias (such as fear of dogs) as an interrogation technique at GTMO.

Church Report at 116. This technique was one of those for which approval

was rescinded on January 12, 2003, however. Id. at 118-121.

Several FBI agents reported that military dogs were used at GTMO for

purposes other than interrogations, including for the purpose of controlling

or intimidating detainees when they arrived at GTMO.

In addition, as detailed in Chapter Five, SSAs Lyle and Foy from the

FBI's Behavioral Assessment Unit (BAU) reported that they witnessed the

use of a military dog to interrogate Al-Qahtani during the fall of 2002.135

Several other agents stated in survey responses or interviews that they

heard about the incident with the dog and Al-Qahtani, but that they did not

witness it personally. The information they provided was generally

consistent with the accounts given by Lyle and Foy. No other FBI agents

reported the use of dogs during interrogations of any other detainees.

F. Isolation

GTMO had several areas that were used to segregate or isolate

detainees, including the Navy Brig, certain sections of Camp Delta, Camp

Echo, and Camp X-Ray.

Over 50 FBI agents provided the OIG with information regarding the

use of isolation at GTMO. Some agents reported the use of extended

isolation as part of an interrogation strategy to wear down a detainee's

resistance. Others described the use of isolation by the military for

disciplinary or security purposes. Different FBI agents had different

understandings regarding whether the FBI could participate in the use of

isolation as an interrogation strategy: some told us that they participated in

135 Lyle and Foy are pseudonyms

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the decision to put a detainee in isolation, while others stated that they

understood that FBI agents were not authorized to employ this technique.

Secretary Rumsfeld explicitly approved the use of isolation for military

interrogation purposes at GTMO on December 2, 2002. The December 2002

Policy provided for isolation up to 30 days, with any extensions requiring

approval from the JTF-GTMO Commander. This approval was rescinded on

January 12, 2003, but approval for this technique at GTMO with prior

notice to the Secretary of Defense was reinstated on April 16, 2003.136

Isolation as an interrogation technique. Several FBI agents told us

that the FBI participated in using isolation as an interrogation technique.137

For example, one agent stated in his survey response that detainee Ghassan

Abdullah Al-Sharbi (#682) was believed to have knowledge of a potential

terrorist cell in the United States. Despite efforts to build rapport with this

detainee, he remained uncooperative and even started to incite trouble

within his cell block. The agent stated that the military and the FBI agreed

that Al-Sharbi should be isolated for a period of 30 days in Camp Echo

before the interview process resumed.

Two SSAs from the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) who were

deployed to GTMO in early 2003 told the OIG that isolation of detainees was

a common practice at GTMO and was not considered abusive. These two

SSAs encouraged the use of isolation with respect to certain detainees'

interview strategies. One stated that if a detainee was behaving like a leader

and gaining status, power, and momentum with other detainees, sometimes

it was helpful to isolate him to make him more dependent on the

interrogator. The agent stated that this practice was not necessarily in

conflict with rapport building. The other BAU agent said that isolation of

detainees was an appropriate practice, and said she never saw or heard of it

being used improperly.

Another FBI agent said that while at GTMO she was aware of three

detainees, Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, and Ruhel Ahmed, who were isolated

within Camp Delta for an extended period of time as part of a concerted

plan to gain actionable intelligence from them. She stated that the term

"segregation" might be a more appropriate term than "isolation" for the

conditions she observed.

136 Church Report at 117-121, 138. According to the Church Report, isolation was

used by the military throughout interrogation operations at GTMO. Id. at 155.

137 In addition to these incidents, 11 agents also described the use of isolation as

an interrogation technique on Al-Qahtani (#63) as described in Chapter Five.

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Another agent who was deployed to GTMO during June and July

2003 told the OIG that isolation was an allowable interrogation technique

available to both military and FBI interrogators at GTMO, and that an

interviewer could request that a detainee be put into isolation. He said he

never used this technique and was not aware of any other FBI or military

interrogators using it. The agent said that isolation was used for only a

short period of time and that the Commanding General of GTMO had to

approve the request.

Other agents reported the opposite, and said that FBI agents were

prohibited from using isolation as an interview technique. Similarly, the

legal advisor to the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF) from March to

July 2002 stated that the law enforcement agents of the CITF were not

permitted to recommend that a detainee be placed in isolation and that

CITF avoided even being consulted on the decision. One FBI agent

expressed frustration that detainees could be isolated in Camp Echo for

disciplinary reasons but not for intelligence gathering, because she thought

it would be an effective technique.

Isolation for Disciplinary or Security Purposes. Several agents

described incidents in which the military isolated detainees for disciplinary

or security purposes, which sometimes complicated the agents' interview

efforts. For example, one agent indicated in his survey response that

detainee Shaker Abdul Raheem Mohammed Aamer (#239) was put into

isolation at Camp Echo by the military for the maximum of 30 days because

he was causing trouble at Camp Delta. The agent stated that although this

may have served some behavioral purpose, it was counterproductive to the

agent's efforts to get Aamer to provide information. In addition, agents told

us the military would segregate detainees who were about to be released in

order to ensure their safety just prior to release, and that detainees were

isolated immediately before and after they met with the Red Cross.

G. Mistreatment of the Koran

Thirty-one FBI agents told the OIG they were aware of allegations

regarding disrespectful statements, handling, or actions involving the Koran

at GTM0.138 However, the only two agents who said they personally

witnessed such an incident during an interrogation were the SSAs who

reported the incident with detainee Al-Qahtani, as previously described in

Chapter Five. The remaining witnesses reported allegations they heard,

138 We are not aware of any military interrogation policy that explicitly addressed

conduct designed to provoke a detainee by showing disrespect to a religion or religious

item, although it is possible to characterize such conduct as part of a "pride and ego down"

or "futility" technique.

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mainly from detainees, of guards disrespecting the Koran in noninterrogation

contexts, such as during cell searches.

Several agents identified a particular detainee, Ghassan Abdullah Al-

Sharbi (#682), as having complained about disrespectful treatment of the

Koran. According to these agents, Al-Sharbi claimed that the Koran would

sometimes be knocked on the ground during detainee cell searches and that

guards handled it disrespectfully. One agent told us that Al-Sharbi said

that the simple act of a non-Muslim handling a Koran was considered

inappropriate, which sometimes resulted in detainees being encouraged by

block-mates to throw water or urine on the MPs. Al-Sharbi told the agent

that a compromise was reached in which detainees would flip through their

Korans while the MP watched to ensure nothing was hidden inside. Then

the detainee would put the Koran down while the MP searched the rest of

his cell. Other agents reported similar claims by detainees that military

personnel had mistreated the Koran. We did not find any allegations or

evidence that any FBI agents mistreated a Koran.

H. Touching or Acting Toward a Detainee in a Sexual Manner

Over 20 FBI agents reported in interviews or survey responses that

they had seen or heard about female interrogators touching or acting toward

a detainee in a sexual manner. We determined that several of these reports

related to one interrogator and possibly to the same incident. In most of the

other cases, the agents did not have personal knowledge of the incident and

were reporting detainee allegations or information they had heard from

others at GTMO. We describe the most specific and significant of these

reports below.

According to the Church Report, sexual acts and mock sexual acts

have always been prohibited interrogation techniques. The Church

investigators found a single incident of an interrogator violating this

prohibition, involving sexually suggestive comments and body movements.

Church Report at 174-176. The Schmidt-Furlow Report stated that some

conduct by female interrogators "designed to take advantage of their gender

in relation to Muslim males" were authorized under military policies as

"futility," and "mild non-injurious physical touching." Schmidt-Furlow

Report at 7-9, 16-17.

As discussed in a prior Section of this chapter, SSA Brett told the OIG

that during his deployment to GTMO in November or December 2002 he

observed a female military interrogator apply lotion to the arms of a

detainee, bend the detainee's thumbs back, and grab his genitals. As also

discussed in that Section, another agent reported an incident involving the

same female interrogator in which a detainee fell when he sought to evade

the female rubbing lotion on him.

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Another agent who was deployed to GTMO during March through May

2003 described a claim by detainee Adel Fattough Ali Algazzar (#369) that

Algazzar had seen another unnamed detainee return from an interrogation

with blood on his face and head. Algazzar told the agent that when the

other detainee did not cooperate with a female interrogator, she called four

guards into the room to restrain him, removed her blouse, embraced him

from behind, put her hand on his genitals, and wiped menstrual blood on

him. The agent said he did not know the identity of the female interrogator

and that at the time he suspected that the story was a lie or had been

embellished. The agent said he reported the allegation to the FBI OSC, and

that at the OSC's instruction the agent put the information in an FD-302

report dated April 21, 2003. We interviewed the OSC, who stated that he

had no recollection of the agent or the fact that any agent reported such an

allegation to him.

However, the Schmidt-Furlow investigation found that in March 2003

a female military interrogator retaliated against a detainee who had spit on

her by showing him red ink on her hand and saying she was

menstruating.139

According to an FBI FD-302 interview report that was dated April 8,

2003, detainee Abdul Latif Nasir (#244) made allegations of possible rapes of

more than one detainee by either a military guard or interrogator during the

1:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. shift. The FD-302 also stated that Nasir described

instances when detainees were searched in the groin area and touched

sexually by male guards in the interview rooms. Nasir also described the

possible attempted suicide of a Saudi detainee who had allegedly been raped

and beaten by guards. Neither of the agents identified in the FD-302 stated

in their OIG survey responses that they had heard these allegations. As

previously noted, the FBI did not have a formal procedure for

communicating allegations of this type to appropriate military officials until

February 2005. According to the FBI, Nasir's allegations were transmitted

to military officials at GTMO.

Several FBI SSAs told the OIG that they received reports about

military interrogators behaving in a sexually provocative manner toward

detainees. An SSA who served as OSC at GTMO from June 2003 to August

2003 stated in his survey response and interview that while he was at

GTMO FBI agents told him that they observed female military interrogators

139 The Schmidt-Furlow Report found that the interrogator wiped the ink on

detainee's arm after showing him her hand and telling him that it was menstrual blood.

The report found that this technique was authorized under military policy as an act to

demonstrate the "futility" of the detainee's situation, but faulted the interrogator for using a

technique that was not approved in advance and recommended that she be formally

reprimanded. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 9.

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straddling detainees, whispering in their ears, and generally invading the

detainees' personal space. The SSA stated that one agent told him a female

military interrogator unbuttoned her blouse while straddling a detainee.

The SSA said he could not recall the agents who provided this information

to him.

Two other FBI SSAs told the OIG that an FBI Intelligence Analyst told

them that a female military interrogator named "Sydney" had exposed her

breasts and performed sexual lap dances on detainees to make them

uncomfortable and ashamed, although the analyst had not witnessed this

conduct personally.

Also, one FBI agent indicated in his survey response that he had

information that detainees Slahi (#760) and Al-Qahtani (#63) were subjected

to sexual conduct or touching. The agent was not specific about the actual

techniques that were employed on Slahi and Al-Qahtani. Further

information regarding the interrogation of Slahi and Al-Qahtani is provided

in Chapters Five and Eight.

I. Use of Bright Flashing Lights or Loud Music

Approximately 50 FBI agents told the OIG that they had witnessed or

heard about the use of bright lights on detainees, sometimes in conjunction

with other harsh non-law enforcement techniques. Many agents stated they

observed or heard about the use of loud music. These were among the most

frequently reported techniques at GTMO. None of the witnesses we

interviewed described the use of this technique by an FBI agent.140

According to the Church Report, these techniques were never

specifically addressed by military interrogation policies for GTMO, although

some interrogators consider them a form of "environmental manipulation"

approved by the Secretary of Defense on April 16, 2003. Church Report at

138, 172. The Church investigators found that bright lights and loud music

were used "occasionally" throughout the interrogation operations at GTMO.

Id. at 155, 172. The Schmidt-Furlow Report found that this technique was

used on "numerous occasions" between July 2002 and October 2004, and

that this technique was authorized by Field Manual 34-52, "Incentive and

Futility." Schmidt-Furlow Report at 9-10.

Many FBI agents witnessed the use of these techniques while walking

through the interrogation trailers at Camp Delta. For example, one FBI

agent told the OIG that approximately halfway through his tour at GTMO,

140 In addition to the incidents described in this section, bright lights and loud

music were apparently employed by the military against detainee Al-Qahtani (#63), as

described in Chapter Five.

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which was from June 25, 2003, through August 14, 2003, he observed a

detainee alone in a darkened interrogation room, apparently bolted to the

floor in a kneeling position, with a strobe light close to his face and loud

music blaring in the room. The agent described the music as hard rock

music, similar to the music performed by the group Metallica, played at a

volume equivalent to a rock concert. The agent stated that he and another

agent reported this activity at a meeting with their OSC. Other agents

reported similar incidents during the same general time period.

The SSA who served as the OSC at GTMO from June to August 2003,

when most of these incidents apparently occurred, told the OIG that he

heard from his agents that military interrogators were using loud music as a

pre-interrogation technique. He stated that although he did not think this

technique was effective, he also did not think that the music was ever

played at a level that would have been damaging to someone's hearing. The

OSC stated that he may have mentioned this activity in a phone call with

the Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU) Unit Chief, but that by that

time it was well established that the military was employing this

technique.141

J. Use of Duct Tape on Detainees

Five OIG survey respondents stated that they observed or heard about

the use of duct tape on a detainee. We believe that most or all of these

agents were likely referring to the same incident.

As noted in Chapter Five, SSAs Lyle and Foy were agents from the

FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) who were deployed to GTMO in

September and October 2002.142 Lyle told the OIG that one evening while

he and Foy were observing a law enforcement interview at Camp Delta,

Andrews, the Chief of the the DOD's Interrogation Control Element at GTMO

at the time, came into their observation room and said to them: "Hey come

here I want to show you something."143 Lyle followed Andrews to another

observation room that was "packed" with military personnel, and pointed to

one of the interrogation rooms that contained a detainee with duct tape

wrapped around his head. Lyle said that two bands of tape went entirely

around the detainee's head, one that covered his eyes and one that covered

his mouth. Lyle said that the detainee had a full head of hair and a beard.

The detainee was sitting on the floor handcuffed to the I-bolt in the floor.

141 Several of the survey respondents described the use of loud music over the

public address system at Camp X-Ray in 2002 rather than as a specific interrogation

technique. We received no reports that this practice occurred outside of Camp X-Ray.

142 Lyle and Foy are pseudonyms.

143 Andrews is a pseudonym.

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There were two interrogators and two guards in the room with the detainee,

and one of the interrogators was yelling at the detainee. Lyle asked

Andrews, "Was he [the detainee] spitting on someone?" Andrews responded,

"No, he just wouldn't stop chanting the Koran."

Lyle told the OIG that he left the room and described the incident to

Foy and to the FBI OSC. Lyle stated that he then briefed the CITF

commander and the chief JAG officer at GTMO.

SSA Foy and the FBI OSC provided accounts of the incident that were

consistent with Lyle's description. The OSC told us that Foy told him about

the duct tape incident and that he in turn reported the incident to his JAG

counterpart and to FBI Headquarters. Foy also included a description of the

duct tape incident in his EC to senior officials at FBI Headquarters dated

November 22, 2003, which is discussed in Chapter Five. As also discussed

in that chapter, around the time the MLDU Unit Chief learned of this

incident, he raised the larger issue of aggressive military interrogation

tactics - particularly in the context of the al-Qahtani interrogations - with

DOJ officials.

The duct tape incident was addressed in the Schmidt-Furlow Report,

which stated that duct tape was wrapped around the detainee's mouth and

head in an effort to quiet the detainee. According to that report, Andrews

claimed that he ordered the detainee to be duct taped because the detainee

was screaming resistance messages and was potentially provoking a riot.

Andrews claimed that at the time there were from seven to ten other

detainees in the interrogation facility at the time and he was concerned

about losing control of the situation. The Schmidt-Furlow investigators took

statements from SSAs Lyle and Foy in which the FBI agents provided

essentially the same information that they provided to the OIG. Schmidt-

Furlow Exhibit 6. The Schmidt-Furlow Report found that Andrews's conduct

was "unauthorized."144

144 There were differences between the statements provided by Andrews and the FBI

agents, which the Schmidt-Furlow Report did not attempt to resolve. For example, Lyle and

Foy stated that there were only one or two other interrogations underway at the time.

Andrews, however, asserted that there was anywhere between seven and ten other

interrogations taking place at the time of the duct tape incident, and that his action was

necessary to prevent the possible incitement of other detainees. Yet, both Lyle and Foy

described Andrews's demeanor as laughing or giggling. Lyle also indicated he was certain

that Andrews said the reason he had the detainee duct taped was because he would not

stop chanting the Koran.

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K. Forced Shaving

Approximately 20 FBI agents provided information to the OIG

regarding the forced shaving of detainees' heads and faces. One agent

described the use of shaving to undermine a detainee's standing within the

cell block, while others reported the use of forced shaving as a disciplinary

or hygiene measure.

"Forced grooming" (shaving of hair and beard) was specifically

approved as a military interrogation technique by Secretary Rumsfeld on

December 2, 2002, but this approval was rescinded on January 12, 2003.

Church Report at 117-121. According to the Church Report, military

interrogators sometimes used this technique at GTMO, including during the

period after the Secretary's approval had been withdrawn. Id. at 155.

A former FBI OSC at GTMO said that in 2002 the FBI agent

interviewing detainee Ghassan Abdullah Al-Sharbi (#682) told him that Al-

Sharbi should have his beard shaved. The agent told the OSC that Al-

Sharbi's beard was down to his waist and he was getting too much respect

on the cell block for this. The agent recommended that Al-Sharbi be shaved

in order to reduce his influence and the level of respect he was receiving

from the other detainees on the cell block. The OSC said he thought that

the agent had already consulted with the military about having Al-Sharbi's

beard shaved. The OSC gave his consent and shortly thereafter Al-Sharbi's

beard was shaved. However, the agent told the OIG said he neither

observed nor heard about subjecting a detainee to forced shaving, except for

hygiene purposes.

Two FBI agents reported to the OIG allegations from detainees that

guards were shaving some of the detainees' beards half off in an effort to

embarrass them, although neither agent observed this conduct. Several

other agents described incidents of shaving as a punishment for detainee

misconduct, such as attacking a member of the military.145 Other agents

reported that the shaving of detainee's heads and their facial hair was

usually done for hygienic or health reasons.

L. Withholding Medical Care

We questioned the FBI agents about allegations that medical care was

withheld from detainees. One agent described an incident that caused her

to question whether adequate care was provided to a detainee, and several

145 During the OIG's visit to GTMO in February 2007, military personnel stated that

cutting a detainee's hair and beard was a standard punishment for certain disciplinary

infractions. At least one of the detainees interviewed by the OIG in 2007 had recently been

subjected to such punishment.

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other FBI agents told us about complaints from detainees that their medical

needs had not been addressed. However, we received no reports that

medical care was ever intentionally delayed or denied to a detainee.

One agent told the OIG that in early April 2004 she observed an

interview of Mamdough Ahmed Habib (#661) in which he repeatedly vomited

during the course of a lengthy interrogation.146 She said she did not

observe Habib receive any medical treatment, but that she heard that Habib

was given Motrin to help alleviate his condition at some point during the

interrogation. The agent reported that a Lieutenant Colonel who was a

medical doctor was present at the time. The agent told the OIG that Habib's

condition did not bother her at the time, but in retrospect she questioned

whether the treatment of Habib was appropriate. However, she said she

was certain that there was no plan or intention on the interrogators part to

make Habib sick or take advantage of his condition.

Another FBI agent told the OIG that he interviewed a detainee at

GTMO who complained that he needed to see a doctor about treatment for a

wound he received in a shootout with the U.S. military in Afghanistan. The

agent stated that the detainee did not appear to be in pain or distress at the

time. The agent said that the guards told him that they were aware of the

detainee's condition, and that military officials later told him that this

detainee said that he needed to go to the base hospital every time he was

interviewed.

Another agent told the OIG that one detainee at GTMO complained to

her several times about what appeared to be a gastro-intestinal problem.

The agent said she thought that the detainee in question should have been

evaluated by military medical staff, and that she believed that the military

was not taking this detainee's complaints seriously because he complained

about many things. She said it took several complaints by her to the MPs

before the detainee was evaluated, and that it turned out the detainee did

have a real medical problem that required treatment. However, she stated

that language barriers and limited availability of translators may have

contributed to the delay in getting him treatment.

We found no evidence of any FBI agent who intentionally or otherwise

delayed or denied a detainee's access to medical care. In fact, some agents

told us that interceding on a detainee's behalf regarding a medical issue was

extremely helpful in building rapport.

146 The agent said that she observed two interview sessions with Habib and that

both lasted 15 hours with only a short break in between. She said that that she did not

schedule these interviews but that FBI management at GTMO knew that she was

participating and nobody ever told her not to be a part of it.

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M. Forced Cell Extractions

During an OIG visit to GTMO in April 2005, military officials advised

that detainees held at GTMO were not allowed to refuse to report to any

interviews or interrogations scheduled by any of the intelligence agencies.

OIG investigators were told that if a detainee refused to attend an interview,

he was subject to being forcibly removed by a special team of soldiers from

the Joint Detention Operations Group (JDOG). In April 2005 the noncommissioned

officer in charge of detention operations told the OIG that the

extraction would be performed by a seven-man team consisting of one

medical person, one person designated to video tape the extraction, and five

people to perform the extraction. However, during an OIG visit to GTMO in

February 2007, military officials advised that this policy had changed and

that detainees are no longer required to attend interrogation or interview

sessions with the various intelligence and law enforcement agencies.

Several FBI agents confirmed that forced cell extractions were used

when detainees refused to comply with guard instructions. None of the

agents we interviewed reported that forced cell extractions were used as an

interrogation technique to break down a detainee.

N. Placing Women's Clothing on a Detainee

Four FBI agents deployed to GTMO reported that they heard about

military personnel placing women's clothing on detainees, although none of

them personally witnessed this conduct.

One agent described an incident involving detainee Yussef Mohammed

Mubarak Al-Shihri (#114) during March to May of 2003. The agent stated

that he and another FBI agent were building rapport with Al-Shihri over the

course of three interviews, but that during their fourth interview Al-Shihri

told them that "the mean ladies" came and got him from his cell in the

middle of the night and interrogated him for hours. Al-Shihri said that

during this interrogation he was also forced to listen to a recorded loop of

the "meow mix" jingle for hours, was sprayed with perfume, and had a

woman's dress draped on him. The agent told us he confronted a young

female military intelligence contract interrogator whose name was unknown.

She admitted to "poaching" his detainee and subjecting him to the

treatment that he had alleged. The agent told us that after this incident Al-

Shihri became uncooperative and that the techniques employed on Al-Shihri

were counterproductive. The agent said he did not report this incident to

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the OSC at GTMO at the time or describe it in his FD-302 interview

summaries for Al-Shihri."47

Other FBI employees told us they heard rumors of the use of women's

clothing on detainees. An FBI Investigative Support Specialist said that

while at GTMO he heard rumors that a detainee was forced to wear women's

clothing and makeup during an interrogation and that this same detainee

was also given a "lap-dance" by a female guard. An FBI Intelligence Analyst

told us that while at a social function at GTMO she was told that a female

military interrogator placed women's undergarments on a detainee during

an interrogation. The analyst said that it was obvious to her that this was

done to humiliate and demean the detainee. The analyst was also told that

the female military interrogator performed a lap dance on this same

detainee during the same interrogation.148

0. Transfer to Another Country for More Aggressive

Interrogation

A few FBI agents who served at GTMO reported hearing about claims

that detainees had been sent to another country for more aggressive

interrogation by foreign interrogators.149 However, it appears that these

agents were likely describing an allegation relating to the same detainees.

One agent stated in his survey response that detainees Mohamadou

Ould Slahi (#760) and Mahmdouh Habib (#661) told him that they had been

sent to different countries before they were sent to GTMO: Slahi from

Mauritania to Jordan, and Habib from Afghanistan to Egypt 's° Another

agent told the OIG that Habib told her that when he was in Afghanistan he

was turned over to Egyptian authorities. The agent said that although

Habib had been born in Egypt, he was a citizen of Australia. Habib told her

that prior to his transfer to Egypt he met with both Australian and U.S.

Government officials, and that while he was in Egypt he was subjected to

several forms of torture. A third agent described hearing a second-hand

report about an Australian detainee (likely Habib) who had been sent to

147 Another detainee told us that an FBI agent made him put on a woman's coat

that had perfume on it, and that when he took it off he smelled like the perfume. We

address this matter in Part IV of Chapter Eleven.

148 As noted in Chapter Five and confirmed in the Schmidt-Furlow Report, in late

2002 military interrogators forced Al-Qahtani to wear women's clothing in an attempt to

humiliate and embarrass him.

149 The military policies for GTMO did not explicitly address actual or threatened

rendition.

159 Military and FBI documents indicate that Slahi was arrested in Mauritania and

interrogated in Jordan for several months before he was transferred to GTMO.

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Egypt and interrogated by the Egyptian intelligence service prior to being

transferred to GTMO.

P. Threatened Transfer to Another Country

Several FBI agents told the OIG that they had information about

threats to send detainees to another country for detention or more

aggressive interrogation. According to the Church Report, threat of transfer

to another country was never specifically listed as a pre-approved

interrogation technique under military policy for GTMO, and beginning in

January 2003 prior notice to the Secretary of Defense was required before

using it. The Church investigators identified one incident involving the use

of this technique in a June 2003 interrogation of a high value detainee.

Church Report at 168-69, 173.

SSA Lyle stated in his OIG survey response that military interrogators

threatened Al-Qahtani using this technique.151 Lyle said that at some point

during the military's interrogation of Al-Qahtani at Camp X-Ray military

interrogators threatened to send him to another country. Lyle believes that

the country they threatened him with was Jordan. Lyle paraphrased what

the interrogators said to Al-Qahtani as "we are going to send you to a place

where the people aren't as nice as we are."

An SSA who served at GTMO in 2002 told the OIG that he was

present at a GTMO staff meeting where this technique was discussed

concerning Al-Qahtani and other detainees. The SSA said that the military

wanted to handcuff Al-Qahtani, put a hood over his head, and fly him

around in a helicopter and then an airplane. The plan was to return Al-

Qahtani to GTMO but completely isolate him so that he would believe he

was somewhere else. The agent said the goal was to make Al-Qahtani

believe that they were just about to turn him over to officials from another

country. We believe that this SSA may have in fact have been referring to

interrogation plan for Slahi (#760) rather than Al-Qahtani. This plan is

discussed in Section XV of Chapter Five. The SSA said that after he

objected to this plan, he was not invited to any more staff meetings.

Another FBI agent who served at GTMO from December 2003 until

September 2004 said that some detainees at GTMO were threatened with

the prospect of being returned to their home countries which could go badly

for the detainee. She indicated that this could be threatening to some

detainees depending on where they were from, and that she probably used

this technique herself. She stated that she did not consider this a threat

because it was a real possibility for some of the detainees. As an example,

151 Lyle is a pseudonym.

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she said that the Russian detainees did everything they could to be as

valuable as possible in order to avoid returning to Russia. However, the

agent stated that eventually these detainees were repatriated to Russia

despite their cooperation.

Another FBI agent stated in his survey response that he asked certain

uncooperative detainees if they would like to be sent back to their home

countries for interrogation. He stated that some of the detainees may have

perceived this as a threat and that some of them acknowledged that they

were being treated better at GMTO than they would be in their home

countries.

Other agents reported that they heard about the use of this technique

from others. One agent reported that he heard that some detainees were

threatened with being sent to Israel for interrogation. In addition, a

Detective from the Phoenix Police Department who was deployed to GTMO

as part of the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force stated in his survey response

that a New York City Detective posed as an Egyptian Intelligence Officer,

and the detainee involved was told that he would go back to Egypt with this

Intelligence Officer unless he was cooperative.

Q. Threatening a Detainee's Family

Four agents told the OIG that they were aware of threats to take

action against a detainee's family. According to the Church Report,

threatening harm to others was a prohibited technique for military

interrogators at GTMO. The Church investigators found one incident of

threats made against the family of detainee Slahi (#760). Church Report at

174.

A police officer from California who served at GTMO as a member of

the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force stated in his survey response that

detainee Ahmed Esmatullah Fedah refused to give truthful answers in his

interviews and that the officer told Fedah that he would attempt to deport

any of Fedah's relatives living illegally in the United States.

Several FBI agents indicated that they had second-hand information

about threats to detainees' families. Two FBI employees reported that they

read or heard from others that military interrogators threatened detainee

Slahi (#760) with the possible mistreatment of his family, including his

mother, unless he cooperated with interrogators.152

152 The military's use of threats with Slahi is discussed in more detail in Section XV

of Chapter Five.

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R. Depriving a Detainee of Food or Water

Six FBI agents reported that they saw or heard about detainees who

were deprived of food or water, although some of them were citing instances

in which detainees simply said they were hungry. According to the Church

Report, denial of basic human needs such as food was always prohibited at

GTMO. The Church investigators did not find any violations of this

prohibition at GTMO. Church Report at 35, 106, 155, 173-4.

Two agents stated that detainees were likely deprived of food or water

during periods of extended shackling. The incidents they reported are

described in detail in Section II.B above. In addition, an FBI Intelligence

Analyst said that she heard from agents at GTMO that water and certain

food items were used as bargaining tools in interviews. She said that she

heard that in some interviews if the detainee asked for water the agent

would say "first you have to give me some information then I will get you

some water.' She added that agents would let the detainees have snacks or

cigarettes if the detainees would first give them some information. She also

stated that this technique was used by the FBI, NCIS, CID, CIA, and the

U.S. military.'53

S. Depriving a Detainee of Clothing

Several agents told the OIG that they saw or heard about detainees

who were deprived of clothing. Removal of clothing was an explicitly

authorized interrogation technique at GTMO between December 2, 2002,

and January 12, 2003. Church Report at 117-121. As described in Chapter

Five, two witnesses stated that Al-Qahtani (#63) had been at least partially

deprived of clothing during part of his interrogation by the military.154 The

other incidents reported by the agents did not involve the removal of

clothing as an interrogation technique, but rather as a disciplinary measure

in response to detainee misconduct.

For example, one agent reported that the DOD's Joint Detention

Operations Group confiscated the long pants from a segment of the detainee

population that was notorious for throwing urine and feces on the guards,

leaving the detainees with only short pants or underwear. The agent said

that there were no other comfort items left to confiscate from these

153 The FBI has stated that this technique falls short of "depriving" a detainee of

food or water.

154 The Schmidt-Furlow Report found that in December 2002 interrogators forced Al-

Qahtani to stand naked in front of a female interrogator, and used strip searches as an

interrogation technique. Schmidt-Furlow Report at 20-21. This contradicted a finding in

the Church Report that removal of clothing was not a technique used in the interrogation of

Al-Qahtani. Church Report at 158.

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detainees. She said the incident was referred to as "Pants Jihad" because

other detainees protested by refusing to come to scheduled interrogations

and generally being very uncooperative. Another agent stated in his survey

response that detainees told him that the guards took away a detainee's

clothing due to repeated suicide attempts.

T. FBI Impersonation

Approximately 20 FBI agents told the OIG that they had information

regarding non-FBI personnel impersonating FBI agents. However, only one

agent reported that she personally observed this conduct. In many cases

FBI agents reported that detainees told them they had already been

interviewed by the FBI, when the agents knew otherwise.

An FBI agent who was deployed to GTMO from December 2003

through September 2004 told the OIG about two occasions when a CIA

interrogator represented herself as an FBI agent in a detainee interrogation.

The agent stated that she reported this activity to her immediate supervisor

at GTMO and also to the OSC. She also described another incident in

which a detainee told her that he had been polygraphed by a female African-

American FBI polygrapher. She said she could not confirm that the FBI

ever had an African American female polygrapher on the island, and that

she concluded that someone from another agency was impersonating FBI

personnel.

Several other FBI agents reported to the OIG that detainees told them

they had previously been questioned by other FBI personnel under

circumstances that led the agents to believe that they had in fact been

questioned by personnel from other agencies posing as FBI agents. Two

agents told the OIG that they heard that intelligence personnel from the

Defense HUMINT Service and the CIA started to dress like FBI agents at

GTMO in order to either confuse detainees or to outright impersonate FBI

agents during interrogations.

The FBI OSC at GTMO from June 2003 to August 2003 said that

before he arrived at GTMO he was aware that U.S. military interrogators

had been representing themselves as FBI agents by dressing casually and

telling detainees they were FBI agents. He stated that he knew that some

military and CIA interrogators would tell detainees that they were FBI as a

ruse in an interrogation, and that it was a common practice for CIA agents

to say they were FBI so as not to reveal their presence.'55

155 The OIG also determined that a U.S. Army Sergeant falsely identified herself to

detainee Slahi (760) as an FBI agent. This incident is discussed further in Section XV of

Chapter Five.

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U. Other Conduct

A small number of FBI agents at GTMO told the OIG that they

observed or heard about various other interrogation or detention techniques

not addressed above. Some of this information was provided in response to

the "catch all" OIG survey question regarding other interrogation techniques

that were unprofessional, unduly harsh or aggressive, coercive, abusive, or

unlawful.

Using water to simulate drowning. No FBI employees reported

witnessing the use of water to simulate drowning (including

"waterboarding") or similar techniques at GTMO. Out of the approximately

500 FBI employees who were deployed to GTMO, only 2 told the OIG that

they had even heard of the use of such a technique. The first agent's

information is described above at page 109. The second agent told the OIG

that he once heard a discussion at GTMO when someone mentioned using

water as an interrogation tool and someone else in the group said, "Yeah I've

seen that." The agent told the OIG he doubted that anyone he talked to

actually saw such a technique being employed at GTMO.

Hooding or Blindfolding. We sought information regarding the

hooding or blindfolding of detainees for reasons other than the

transportation of detainees at GTMO. Several agents indicated that they

were aware of the use of hoods during the transportation of detainees, but

not situations involving interrogations or detention operations.

Using Snakes. One FBI employee reported in his survey response

that a detainee, whose name or number he could not recall, told him that he

found a snake in his cell and he suspected that his "interrogators" had

something to do with it. The employee indicated in his survey response that

he too suspected that an interrogator from another agency might have been

responsible for placing the snake in the detainee's cell.

Use of Pornography. Several FBI agents reported incidents involving

the exposure of a detainee to pornography. For example, one SSA told the

OIG that on July 30, 2003, he observed two military intelligence

interrogators showing homosexual pornographic movies to a detainee and

using a strobe light in the room. The SSA reported this incident in an email

to his Unit Chief.'56 Several other FBI agents also reported hearing

156 This incident was the subject of a "Commander's Inquiry" at GTMO in which

Major General Jay W. Hood found no credible evidence to support" the agent's claim that a

homosexual pornographic movie was used during a military interrogation. However,

General Hood did find that from August 2002 through July 2003 pornographic photos were

used in 14 instances as an interrogation technique during military interrogations. As of

March 20, 2006, General Hood prohibited the use of pornography in any form as part of an

(Cont'd.)

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allegations that detainees had been exposed to pornography at GTMO, but

they did not themselves observe this conduct.157

Mistranslation. One FBI agent who served at GTMO from late

December 2002 until early February 2003 told the OIG that on one occasion

he and a translator listened in on an interview being conducted by an FBI

agent and a translator named George (last name unknown). The observing

agent said his translator told him that George was mistranslating what the

interviewing agent was attempting to communicate to the detainee, and that

what George was telling the detainee was considerably more inflammatory

than what the interviewing agent was saying. The agent said that at some

point much later he wrote an EC documenting this incident.

Draping a detainee in the flag of Israel. One agent reported an

incident during the summer of 2003 in which a detainee was draped in an

Israeli flag. The agent said that after finishing an interview he walked into

an observation room where he heard loud music, saw a strobe light, and

saw a detainee sitting on the floor with an Israeli flag draped over his

shoulders.158 There was no one in the interview room or in the monitoring

room, but there were one or two men in the hallway wearing olive green

fatigues with tape over their name badges. The agent said he reported this

incident to the OSC, who responded that he would raise the incident with

the General at the next staff meeting. The OSC told the OIG he had no

recollection of being told about an incident involving an Israeli flag.

Performing a mock baptism. One agent told the OIG that he tried to

establish rapport with detainee Yussef Mohammed Mubarak Al-Shihri

(#114). The agent said that prior to his attempts to interview Al-Shihri, he

heard that the military had someone dress up as a Catholic priest and

pretend to baptize Al-Shihri. However, he said he never verified that this

actually happened. The OSC at the time told the OIG said he did not recall

the agent telling him about this incident.

interrogation plan or as an incentive without prior approval of the Joint Task Force

Commander.

157 Two SSAs described circumstances surrounding the alleged treatment of a

detainee Zuhail Abdo Al-Sharabi (#569) by another FBI agent. Among other things, they

alleged that the agent placed pornography in Al-Sharabi's cell. The OIG's investigation of

this incident is discussed in Chapter Eleven of this report. In addition, during an OIG

interview on February 28, 2007, detainee Muhammad Al-Qarani alleged that an FBI agent

exposed him to pornographic pictures. This incident is addressed in Chapter Eleven.

155 A different agent said in his survey response that detainee Juma Mohammed

Abdul Latif Al-Dosari, #261 told him that an interrogator wrapped an Israeli flag around Al-

Dosari and then urinated on the flag.

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Sham interviews. The OIG survey also asked respondents to report

any information they had concerning any "sham" or "staged" detainee

interviews or interrogations conducted for Members of Congress or their

staff. Two agents reported that they saw interviews that were being

observed by congressional staffers. (From the dates and descriptions given,

we believe that they may have been reporting the same incident.) In neither

case did the agents consider the interview to be a sham. Another agent

reported that she heard a second-hand account from a DOD interrogator

that a sham or staged interview had taken place on multiple occasions, but

that she did not observe this practice herself.

III. Disposition of FBI Agent Reports Regarding Detainee Treatment

at GTMO

In this Section we examine the disposition of reports by FBI agents to

their superiors or to military personnel regarding their concerns about

detainee treatment at GTMO. The most significant such reports were the

series of communications relating to military's use and planned use of

various aggressive interrogation techniques on Al-Qahtani (#63) during

2002 and 2003, which are described in detail in Chapter Five. The agents

who made the greatest efforts to elevate these issues were SSAs Lyle, Foy,

McMahon, and Brett from the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU). As

previously detailed in Chapter Five, these agents' concerns were elevated to

officials in FBI Headquarters through Foy's EC of November 22, 2002, and

McMahon's EC dated May 30, 2003, and were ultimately taken to the

Department of Justice and the inter-agency process. In the end, the DOJ

representatives were told that the military's methods would be pursued over

DOJ's objections. In addition, the agents did not receive the formal

guidance they requested from FBI Headquarters regarding how they should

respond to the use of non-FBI techniques by interrogators from other

agencies. Prior to the Abu Ghraib disclosures in 2004, most FBI agents who

requested guidance regarding aggressive military interrogation techniques

were given oral instructions to "stand clear" of such techniques.

The outcome of the FBI's attempts to elevate the dispute regarding Al-

Qahtani inevitably influenced how the FBI handled subsequent reports

regarding potential detainee mistreatment. FBI agents came to understand

that military interrogators were authorized to use more aggressive

interrogation techniques than were permitted for FBI agents, although the

outer boundaries of military policy were not necessarily made clear. Many

agents saw no point in reporting or complaining about conduct that they

understood had been approved by the Secretary of Defense. The reluctance

of many FBI agents to elevate their concerns about aggressive techniques

was increased by the fact that the FBI was seeking to carve out a significant

role in counterterrorism rather than to be cast in the unwelcome role of

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policing the conduct of other agencies' investigators. The FBI also generally

sought to avoid becoming involved in determining whether particular

techniques employed by the military were permitted under military policy.

There were additional factors that operated to limit the number of

contemporaneous reports regarding detainee mistreatment at GTMO.

Although some agents told us they understood that they were supposed to

make such reports if they witnessed such abuses, other agents said they

were never given any instructions in this regard, or that no mechanism for

official reporting was in place. As noted in Chapter Six, the FBI had no

formal reporting requirement prior to May 19, 2004. In addition, many FBI

agents told us that they were never given clear instruction on what

procedures were prohibited or permissible under military policy.

Despite these factors, some agents did report their concerns about

detainee mistreatment, as detailed below. In general, these reports did not

appear to have had a significant impact on military practices at GTMO.

A. Early Reports of Short-Shackling

Even before the concerns relating to Al-Qahtani reached FBI

Headquarters, some FBI agents attempted to elevate the issue of rough

interrogation tactics by military interrogators. As described in Section II.B

of this chapter, in June 2002 an FBI agent observed a detainee in what

appeared to be a stress position on his knees, being yelled at by a translator

while two soldiers laughed. The agent reported what he observed to the

CITF legal advisor, who relayed the report to the CITF chain of command

and to the Staff Judge Advocate for Joint Task Force 170, to which the

interrogators were assigned.

According to the FBI agent and CITF legal advisor, a meeting about

this issue was held with the JTF 170 Deputy Commander. Both witnesses

told the OIG that the Deputy Commander quickly lost his temper during

this meeting. The FBI agent told us that the Deputy Commander

misinterpreted the agent's concern as constituting a torture investigation,

but that the agent was able to clarify the matter with the Deputy

Commander.

The CITF legal advisor told us that after the meeting with the Deputy

Commander the CITF Special Agent in Charge determined that the conduct

in question was unacceptable and required further training and supervision,

but that an investigation was not necessary. He said that all FBI and CITF

agents were instructed that detainees would have the opportunity to be

seated during FBI and CITF interviews. The legal advisor told us that the

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) supervisor also agreed to instruct the

Defense HUMINT Service interrogators to observe this rule.

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This incident apparently did not resolve the issue of short-shackling,

however. Another FBI agent who was deployed at GTMO a few months

later, in September 2002, stated that he observed non-FBI interviews where

the interviewers instructed the guards to chain the detainee to a bolt in the

floor in a sitting position that the agent believed was stressful and painful.

The agent reported the conduct to his SSA, after which all of the interview

teams were called together and given specific instructions about what

techniques were not allowed. The agent told the OIG that after this, he no

longer heard stories about or observed questionable interviewing

techniques. However, as detailed in Section II.B, other FBI agents deployed

at GTMO continued to see or hear about instances of short-shackling as late

as February of 2004.

B. Agent Reports to Their On-Scene Commanders

Several agents told the OIG that, consistent with instructions that

they received at or before the time they arrived at GTMO, they reported their

concerns about incidents of detainee mistreatment that they had witnessed

to their FBI superiors on the island such as an SSA or the On-Scene

Commander (OSC). The incidents or techniques reported in this way

included the thumb-bending incident observed by SSA Brett, the incident in

which a detainee was draped in an Israeli flag, stress positions, strobe

lights, short-shackling, and FBI impersonation. As described in Chapter

Five, we found that some of these reports worked their way up the chain of

command in the FBI and in DOJ. The MLDU Unit Chief told us that in

response to these reports, he relayed instructions to FBI agents at GTMO

that there was no revision to the FBI's existing policies about interviews and

the FBI was not to participate in any tactics that were questionable. He said

that Andrew Arena (Section Chief of the FBI's International Terrorism

Operations Section 1) gave the same instruction during a visit to GTMO in

2002.

Some reports that FBI agents made to their OSCs never got elevated

to officials in FBI Headquarters or DOJ. For example, once it was

established that military interrogators were permitted to use certain

interrogation techniques that were not available to FBI agents, the OSC

often did not take the matter further up the FBI chain of command. One

OSC told us that during his tenure at GTMO in the summer of 2003, FBI

agents told him that they had concerns about a variety of techniques,

including forcing a detainee to watch gay pornography, flashing red strobe

lights in the detainee's face, loud music, and female interviewers straddling

a detainee and whispering in his ear in an attempt to belittle him. The OSC

told us he discussed these techniques with General Miller's Chief of Staff at

GTMO. However, the OSC told the OIG he did not think that any of these

techniques warranted intervention by the FBI and that these techniques

most likely comported with the techniques approved by the Secretary of

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.249

Defense, such as "pride down." The OSC told us that he may have

mentioned some of these techniques to the MLDU Unit Chief, but that by

that time it was well established that the military was employing these

techniques, so he was not "burning down the phone line" to FBI

Headquarters. An agent who served at GTMO in the summer of 2003 under

this OSC told us that although he told the OSC about the military using

short-shackling, strobe lights, and loud music during detainee

interrogations, by that time it was "common knowledge" that these

techniques were being used on detainees and he considered it an "ordinary"

event.

Other agents described similar experiences. One agent stated that on

most occasions when she raised questions about military techniques to her

superiors at GTMO in early 2004, she was told something to the effect of

"Yes, we agree that this is a bad practice, but it is not illegal." This agent

told us that she was advised that most or all of the techniques she reported

were permitted for the military under a policy memorandum issued by the

Secretary of Defense or his Deputy. Sometimes the OSCs would adopt

strategies to help FBI agents avoid using a particular interrogation trailer on

a day that the military was using it, so that the agents would not be exposed

to military techniques such as loud music.

C. Detainee Allegations of Mistreatment

The FBI agents at GTMO followed somewhat different procedures for

dealing with the situation in which a detainee made an allegation during an

interview with an FBI agent that the detainee or other detainees had

previously been abused. Often these allegations related to alleged abuse

that occurred prior to the detainee's arrival at GTMO. These allegations

presented different considerations from incidents in which FBI agents

personally observed the use of non-FBI tactics by military interrogators. To

begin with, in many instances the agent hearing the allegations did not

deem them credible. They knew that captured al-Qaeda training materials

recommended that detainees should make false allegations of mistreatment.

However, FBI agents did not find all detainee allegations to be incredible,

and several agents sought guidance regarding what to do with such claims.

One SSA who served two rotations as OSC at GTMO told us that he

initially told the agents to write up detainee abuse allegations to a "war

crimes" file so the FBI could retrieve the information if it was needed for

further investigation. Two agents described instances in which they made

such reports.

For example, one agent who served in 2002 told the OIG that during

his administrative orientation with the FBI when he first arrived at GTMO

he was told that he should write up any potential "war crimes" allegations in

206

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.250

an FD-302 for inclusion in the "war crimes" case files in the FBI office at

GTMO. He stated that the agents were not given a definition of "war crime,"

however. This agent wrote up one such allegation from detainee Abbas

Abed Romi Al Na'ely (#758) in an FD-302. The detainee claimed that while

being interrogated by an American in Bagram, Afghanistan, he was required

to stand or kneel with his hands and arms over his head for hours at a time

over a period of three days, until he would admit to his interrogators having

connections to al-Qaeda. The FBI agent told the OIG he did not have the

resources to further investigate the detainee's claims but that it was his

understanding was that it "would be looked at sometime in the future" and

"leads" would be sent out to agents working in the field where the incidents

occurred. The agent did not know if this particular detainee's claims were

ever actually investigated.

Another detainee told an FBI agent in November 2002 that he was

beaten by an FBI or CIA agent in Afghanistan before his transfer to GTMO,

and that stress positions had been used on him. It was not clear how the

detainee knew the FBI was involved. The detainee gave very specific details

about what happened to him, which the agent wrote up in an FD-302

interview summary for inclusion in the "war crimes" file. The agent told the

OIG that he believed that something bad had happened to the detainee but

doubted that the FBI was involved.

At some point in 2003, however, the OSC at GTMO received

instructions not to maintain a separate "war crimes" file. The OSC stated

that the MLDU Unit Chief told him that investigating detainee allegations of

abuse was not the FBI's mission. The OSC stated that he was told that the

agents could continue to memorialize such allegations in their FD-302

interview summaries, but that the FBI wouldn't segregate such allegations

into a separate file.

The documents provided by the FBI to the OIG included several FD-

302 interview summaries that reported detainee claims of mistreatment

together with the substantive information obtained during the interview. As

previously noted, one agent told us that in April 2003 a detainee claimed

that a female interrogator touched the genitals of another, unidentified

detainee, removed her blouse, and wiped what she said was menstrual

blood on the detainee. The agent told his OSC, who instructed him to

record the allegations in an FD-302 report. The agent told the OIG that he

doubted the credibility of the detainee's account or believed the incident had

been embellished.

Another agent who served at GTMO in the summer of 2003 told the

OIG that he made a report to his OSC at GTMO about a detainee who

claimed he had been raped by a female CIA agent in Afghanistan. The agent

also reported the allegation in the FD-302 he prepared at the time, but

207

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.251

indicated that the interviewers doubted the truth of these claims. The OSC

told us he did not recall hearing about this allegation, but that he probably

did and would not have believed it, based on the OSC's own experiences in

Afghanistan. We concluded that this allegation was not elevated further

because the agents at GTMO (including the OSC) did not find it credible.

We believe that the OIG did not receive an FD-302 summary for every

claim of mistreatment that a detainee made to an FBI agent. There were

several reasons that some allegations were not reported contemporaneously

in the interview summaries. Some agents told us they did not recall getting

instructions about what steps to take if a detainee made a claim of

mistreatment. In other cases, the agent believed that the alleged conduct

was consistent with military policy and therefore did not need to be

reported. Further, some agents reported that their OSC specifically

instructed them not to include allegations of abuse in their FD-302 reports.

D. Referral Back to the Military

The FBI and DOJ generally did not consider themselves to have

jurisdiction over detainee claims of abuse by interrogators from other

agencies in the military zones. Although some FBI agents understood that

they should report incidents of detainee mistreatment to their supervisors or

record detainee allegations of abuse in their FD-302 interview summaries,

we found no indication that there was any formal procedure for

communicating the incidents or detainee claims of abuse back to the

military or of otherwise following up on such claims until after the Abu

Ghraib scandal became public.159

On July 14, 2004, the FBI referred three particular incidents to the

military for "appropriate action": the thumb-bending incident witness by

SSA Brett (described in Section II. A of this chapter), the duct tape incident

witnessed by SA Lyle (described in Section II.J of this chapter), and the use

of a dog during the interrogation of Al-Qahtani witnessed by SAs Lyle and

Foy (described in Section II.E of this chapter.16° These incidents were

referred by means of a letter from DAD Harrington to Major General Donald

J. Ryder of the Army Criminal Investigation Command. The incidents

reported in this letter involved matters personally observed by FBI agents in

the fall of 2002, nearly 2 years before the letter was sent. In selecting which

159 Military personnel had access to the FD-302 interview summaries, some of

which were prepared jointly by FBI and military interrogators. However, such access was

primarily for the purpose of developing intelligence or evidence rather than for seeking out

or tracking allegations of detainee mistreatment.

160 The FBI also referred several allegations of detainee mistreatment by FBI agents

at GTMO to the OIG for investigation. These are addressed in Chapter Eleven.

208

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.252

incidents to refer, the FBI excluded incidents involving techniques such as

stress positions that the FBI believed were approved under military policy.

Harrington told the OIG that although there had been prior discussions of

these incidents with the military, the FBI was concerned that the incidents

had not been formally reported to the proper personnel.

As detailed in Chapter Six, during July 2004 the FBI surveyed

approximately 500 employees who served at GTMO to determine the extent

of the FBI's knowledge of aggressive interviews of detainees. In September

of that year the FBI conducted several follow-up interviews. FBI General

Counsel Valerie Caproni forwarded the results of the survey and the

interviews to John H. Smith, Deputy General Counsel for the DOD.

Caproni's letter stated:

Our initial evaluation [of the results of the GTMO inquiry] was

that no employee reported conduct appropriate for referral

(either because the conduct appeared to be within the

techniques authorized for Department of Defense employees or

because the employee had insufficient factual detail on the

reported incident). Nonetheless, all affirmative responses to the

survey are attached for any follow-up investigation the

Department of Defense deems appropriate.

We did not attempt to ascertain what action the DOD took in response to

Caproni's letter.

In August 2004, the FBI Assistant General Counsel assigned to GTMO

reviewed FBI interview summaries (FD-302 Forms) and relayed any

allegations of abuse contained in them to FBI Headquarters and to the legal

and command elements of the military at GTMO. As discussed in Chapter

Six, in February 2005 the FBI established a formal process for reporting any

such allegations to the military and, in the case of allegations against FBI

agents, to the OIG or the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility.

IV. Conclusion

The most commonly reported technique used by non-FBI

interrogators on detainees at GTMO was sleep deprivation or disruption.

Numerous FBI agents told the OIG that they witnessed the military's use of

a regimen known as the "frequent flyer program" to undermine cell block

relationships among detainees and to disrupt detainees' sleep in an effort to

lessen their resistance to questioning. A few FBI agents participated in this

program by requesting military officials to subject particular detainees to

these frequent cell relocations. Other FBI agents described observing

military interrogators use bright lights, loud music, and extreme

209

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.253

temperatures to keep detainees awake or otherwise wear down their

resistance.

Prolonged short-shackling, in which a detainee's hands were shackled

close to his feet to prevent him from standing or sitting comfortably, was

another of the most frequently reported techniques observed by FBI agents

at GTMO. This technique was sometimes used in conjunction with holding

detainees in rooms where the temperature was very cold or very hot in order

to break the detainees' resolve. "Stress positions" were prohibited at GTMO

under DOD policy beginning in January 2003. FBI agents' observations

confirm that prolonged short-shackling continued at GTMO for at least a

year after the DOD policy prohibiting stress positions took effect.

FBI agents also observed the use of isolation at GTMO, both to

prevent detainees from coordinating their responses to interrogators and, in

its most extreme form, to deprive detainees of human contact as a means of

reducing their resistance to interrogation. We found that, in several cases,

FBI agents participated in interrogations of detainees who were subjected to

prolonged isolation by the military.

In addition, FBI agents reported a number of other harsh or unusual

interrogation techniques used by the military at GTMO. These incidents

tended to be small in number but became notorious because of their

extreme nature. They included using a growling military dog to intimidate a

detainee during interrogation; twisting a detainee's thumbs back; using a

female interrogator to touch or provoke a detainee in a sexual manner;

wrapping a detainee's head in duct tape; exposing a detainee to

pornography; and wrapping a detainee in the flag of Israel.

We examined how reports from agents regarding detainee treatment at

GTMO were handled by the FBI. In addition to the reports addressed in

Chapter Five, we found that early FBI concerns about detainee shortshackling

were raised with JTF-GTMO in June 2002. However, FBI agents

continued to observe the use of short-shackling as a military interrogation

technique as late as February 2004. Some reports to FBI Headquarters led

to instructions that FBI agents should stand clear of non-FBI techniques.

As time passed, other reports from FBI agents to their OSCs regarding

military conduct were not elevated within the FBI chain of command

because the OSCs understood that the conduct in question was permitted

under DOD policy.

Detainees sometimes told FBI agents they had previously been abused

or mistreated. FBI practices in dealing with such allegations varied over

time. Some agents were told to record such allegations for inclusion in a

"war crimes" file; others were told to include the allegations in their regular

FD-302 interview summaries; and others told us they were instructed not to

210

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.254

record such allegations at all. No formal FBI procedure for reporting

incidents or allegations of mistreatment to the military was established until

after the Abu Ghraib prison abuses became public in 2004.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.255

[Page Intentionally Left Blank]

212

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.256

0

E.4

0

2

8

3 I 1781

CHAPTER NINE

FBI OBSERVATIONS REGARDING

DETAINEE TREATMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

I. Introduction

Most of the FBI employees we contacted reported that they never

observed or heard about any potentially abusive treatment of detainees in

Afghanistan. Overall, of the 172 FBI agents who responded to our survey

and who served in Afghanistan between late 2001 and the end of 2004, 118

stated that they neither observed nor heard about any of the kinds of

detainee treatment described in the survey. We received similar reports

during our interviews with agents who had served in Afghanistan.

Several of the FBI agents sent to Afghanistan reported that they

observed or heard about various rough or aggressive treatment of detainees

by military interrogators, including harsh or prolonged use of shackles or

restraints, coercive use of stress positions, deprivation of clothing, and sleep

deprivation by means of frequent awakenings, loud music, or lights. Table

9.1 summarizes the survey responses to our questions regarding the use of

particular interrogation techniques in Afghanistan.161

TABLE 9.1

Survey Results Concerning

Interrogation Techniques Observed in Afghanistan

2 Depriving a detainee of clothing

3 Depriving a detainee of sleep, or interrupting

sleep by frequent cell relocations or other

methods

Beating a detainee

Interrogation Technique

1 I Depriving a detainee of food or water

161 For a discussion of the limitations to the interpretation of this data, see Chapter

Eight, Section I.

213

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.257

: .•

1 :

:: 1 1 •-•! '0

1 1 ca 0

I

1 0 t

u0,

Interrogation Technique I (14 0

5 1 Using water to prevent breathing by a detainee 1

1 or to create the sensation of drowning

!Observations Led

IMe to Believe

Detainee Told Me

Others Described

(To Me

,Ilstone of the Above

6 Using hands, rope, or anything else to choke or 185

strangle a detainee

7 Threatening other action to cause physical pain, 2 185

injury, disfigurement, or death

1

8 Other treatment or action causing significant n  1 184 i

physical pain or injury, or causing disfigurement

or death . !

9 Placing a detainee on a hot surface or burning a 1 1 185

detainee

10 Using shackles or other restraints in a prolonged 1 3 183

manner 1 :

11 Requiring a detainee to maintain, or restraining 1 1 5 179 1

a detainee in, a stressful or painful position

12 Forcing a detainee to perform demanding 1182

physical exercise

. : 1

13 1 Using electrical shock on a detainee 184 1

14 1 Threatening to use electrical shock on a detainee 1 183

15 1 Intentionally delaying or denying detainee 186

t medical care ;

16 1 Hooding or blindfolding a detainee other than 5 1 2 177

11- du-ring transportation , -- i

h- H

--i

17 1 Subjecting a detainee to extremely cold or hot 1 T 185

room temperatures for extended periods

18 1 Subjecting a detainee to loud music 13 5 165 1

19 1 Subjecting a detainee to bright flashing lights or 1 2 1 4 177 1

darkness

20 1 Isolating a detainee for an extended period 5 1 2 5 172 1

21 Using duct tape to restrain, gag, or punish a:: 185

detainee

22 1 Using rapid response teams and/or forced cell 3 2 4 175 1

. 1 extractions i !

--1-

-- ,

23 1 Using a military working dog on or near a 1 2 181

1 detainee other than during detainee

: '_transportation

1 :

24 Threatening to use military working dogs on or 1 1 183

near a detainee

25 Using spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other 184

animals on or near a detainee i

26 Threatening to use spiders, scorpions, snakes, or 1 185 1

other animals on a detainee

214

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.258

35 I Other treatment or action causing severe 1 I I 184

emotional or psychological trauma to a detainee 1 ::

.•. : :. I

•I • . :.• 1 184

humiliation of a detainee .• :

: i •

37 I Other treatment of a detainee that in yOur , 185 .. ..••• :.•I

opinion was unprofessional, unduly harsh or .. .:

• :•

.

aggressive, coercive, abusive, or unlawful .•

:• . 1 ::•

• Observation Totals I 58 I 13 1 14 I 56 I 6,701

36 I Other religious or sexual harassment or

1 :. • o

0

I

:•I• '

I DA

1 40 1 1 0 0

.

u, 1 42 i A 1

i . - 0. 1 c.) rn o

. 1 I o.2 1 E

4

:•• l I 0 1 4 1 .

I

:

:.•' 1

1 71

14) :

-4 i o c:4 4.)

i

.•••• ! O I

o

o

rn o

i

..• : 1 o 2 1 0

:• 4J 4:1 : 0

:• Interroga.tion Tec Aie_ 48 VI A

1 o 4 I 4, o i o ! 11401 10f-I! Z I

27 1 Disrespectful statements, handling, or actions ii .I I 1 I 1 185

involving the Koran

28 I Shaving a detainee's facial or other hair to 3 182

embarrass or humiliate a detainee

29 I Placing a woman's clothing on a detainee

30 I Touching a detainee or acting toward a detainee

in a sexual manner

31 I Holding detainee(s) who were not officially

acknowledged or registered as such by the

agency detaining the person.

32 I Sending a detainee to another country for more

aggressive interrogation

33 I Threatening to send a detainee to another

country for detention or more aggressive

interrogation

34 I Threatening to take action against a detainee's

family

In Part II of this chapter, we describe the FBI agents' specific

observations regarding particular interrogation techniques.162 In Part III, we

examine the handling of reports by FBI agents to their superiors or to

military personnel regarding their concerns about detainee treatment in

Afghanistan.

162 Many of the incidents described below have previously been discussed in press

accounts of FBI documents that were released to the American Civil Liberties Union

pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request.

215

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.259

II. Observations Regarding Particular Techniques

A. FBI Knowledge of Detainee Beating Deaths

None of the FBI employees reported that they ever personally

witnessed any beating or other treatment which caused physical injury to a

detainee in Afghanistan.

Four FBI agents stated in their survey responses or interviews that

while they were in Afghanistan they heard about two detainee deaths at the

military facility in Bagram. These agents were referring to two incidents in

December 2002 at Bagram that have been described in the Church Report

and news reports. The two detainees died at the Bagram facility following

interrogations in which the detainees were shackled in standing positions to

prevent them from sleeping and were kicked and beaten by military

interrogators and military police.163 Church Report at 235-236; 2/13/2006

www.NYTimes.com; New York Times, 9/14/05.

None of the FBI agents who referred to these deaths said that they

had personal knowledge of the incidents or were aware of any of the details,

and none indicated that any FBI personnel had contact with either of these

detainees. One of the FBI agents told the OIG that he and his FBI partner

discussed the matter and called back to FBI Headquarters about it. He said

they were told that U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command was

investigating the deaths.

164 However, no FBI agent provided any information to us

relating to these incidents.

163 The Army's Criminal Investigative Division recommended charges against 28

soldiers in connection with these deaths. Church Report at 235-6. At least 15 of these

soldiers have been prosecuted by the Army. At least 6 have pleaded guilty or been

convicted of assault and other crimes, but several have been acquitted. New York Times,

2/13/06 "The Bagram File."

164

The Department of Justice decided that there was inadequate evidence to support criminal

prosecution of any individual in connection with this incident. In June 2003 a military

detainee died at Asadabad Base after being assaulted by a CIA contractor. David Passaro,

a civilian CIA contractor, was found guilty on several counts of assault in that case, and his

conviction is on appeal as of August 2007. 8/17/2006 Washington Post, at A17;

USAToday.com (Aug. 17, 2006); PACER Docket Summary (4th Cir.). According to the

Church Report, Afghan lawyers have also alleged that an Afghan Army recruit was killed

and that seven other Afghans were severely mistreated in March 2003 at a forward

operating base in Gardez. Although the military initially closed the case for lack of

evidence, in September 2004 the military reopened its investigation. Church Report at 237.

216

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.260

B. Beating, Choking, Strangling, or Other Abusive Handling of

Detainees

The OIG survey asked FBI agents to provide information concerning

physical violence against detainees, including beatings, the use of hands,

rope, or anything else to choke or strangle a detainee, or other treatment

causing significant physical pain, injury, disfigurement, or death. Nothing

in the Church Report suggests that techniques involving the infliction of

pain, injury, or death were ever officially approved for use in military

interrogations in Afghanistan. According to the Church Report, "mild, noninjurious

physical contact" that did not cause pain was approved for use in

Afghanistan for at least part of the relevant period, but this would not

encompass beating, choking, or other treatment causing pain,

disfigurement, or death. Church Report at 221. The Church Report

described allegations of detainee beatings by military personnel that were

either confirmed by military investigators or still under investigation by the

Army Criminal Investigation Command. Id. at 234-35, 237.

No FBI agents reported to us that they ever saw a detainee whom they

suspected had been injured other than during battle or capture, or reported

that they observed any injuries which by their nature or appearance

suggested post-capture mistreatment. Two agents stated in their survey

responses that they witnessed incidents involving rough treatment of

detainees by military personnel. One agent who served at Kandahar during

January and February 2002 reported that, on occasion, he observed MPs at

Kandahar "man-handling" or roughly handling detainees. For example, the

agent told us that on one or two occasions MPs brought a detainee to an

interview tent with his arms restrained behind his back, and that the MPs

raised his arms, causing him to wince in apparent pain as they brought him

in. The agent said he became angry when the MPs laughed about it because

this started the interview badly. He told us that when he spoke to the

Sergeant in charge about it, the Sergeant agreed this should not happen,

and the agent said he "did not see this again from the same people." The

agent indicated that in general, "[t]he Army chain of command was

supportive" in response to FBI concerns about detainee treatment and in

correcting the problems. The agent stated he also raised his concerns orally

with his OSC, but that he did not know if any FBI action was taken as a

result of his report.

Another FBI agent told us that in July 2003, during his processing of

detainees at Bagram, he observed two military personnel escorting a

shackled detainee. He said that one of the soldiers started yelling at the

detainee, and then gave him a two-handed push which "bounced him off a

wall." This agent said that he immediately brought this to the attention of a

Master Sergeant who was present, and that she reprimanded the soldier.

217

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.261

When the FBI agent also described the incident to a military Captain, the

soldier was removed from the operation.

FBI documents, including FD-302 detainee, interview summaries

prepared in 2003 and a timeline prepared by the FBI Office of General

Counsel, describe other claims by detainees that they had been physically

abused in Afghanistan. For example, detainee Naqibullah Shawali Zair

Mohammed (#834) told FBI interviewers that after his arrest by U.S. forces

in October 2002, he was taken to Bagram and hung from the rafters by his

handcuffs for five to seven days and had his head smashed against the wall.

Detainee Bashir Nasir Ali Al Marwalah (#837) told FBI agents at GTMO that

after being arrested in Pakistan he was beaten by unidentified captors in

Bagram. In another interview, Marwalah stated the beatings occurred at a

prison run by Pakistanis before he was transferred to Bagram. Detainee

Zahir Shah (#1010) told the FBI that he was beaten by guards while in

detention in Bagram or in transit to GTMO.165

As noted in Chapter Six, the FBI eventually implemented a procedure

for recording and tracking detainee claims of abuse at GTMO and referring

them to the military for possible investigation. We found no indication that

any similar procedure was adopted for Afghanistan.

The FBI OSC in Afghanistan during February to April 2005 told the

OIG that shortly before he left Afghanistan, he was advised by the Provost

Marshal at the Bagram Airbase that a detainee had alleged that he had

suffered physical abuse in Kabul by an unnamed FBI agent many months

earlier. The OSC said he was not aware of any holding facility in Kabul at

which any FBI personnel worked during his tour and so advised the Provost

Marshal. The OSC sought further information from the Army Criminal

Investigation Command on the base in an effort to collect information

regarding the detainee making the allegation, in order to begin an

appropriate investigation. However, the OSC stated that no further

information was provided to him prior to his departure on April 26, 2005.

C. Using Shackles or Other Restraints in a Harsh or Prolonged

Manner

Five FBI agents provided information in their survey responses and

follow-up interviews regarding the use of shackles or other restraints in a

harsh, painful, or prolonged manner in Afghanistan. These agents generally

165 The FBI also learned about allegations that CIA agents physically assaulted

detainees in Afghanistan in August and September 2002. This information was provided by

the CIA OIG in connection with a request that the FBI conduct a criminal investigation.

218

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.262

described the use of restraints as a military security measure for U.S.

personnel and operations.

The Church Report did not specifically describe the use of prolonged

shackling by the military as an interrogation technique in Afghanistan.

Such a technique could be considered a form of a "safety position" or "stress

position," which the Church Report generally described as requiring a

detainee to maintain an awkward or uncomfortable position in order to

control his movement during interrogation, both for purposes of interrogator

safety and as an incentive to cooperate. Church Report at 216-18.

According to the Church Report, military policies governing this technique

were not always clear and changed several times during the relevant

period.166 The Church Report found that military interrogators used stress

positions in Afghanistan as an interrogation tool at least until February

2003 and again between March and June 2004. Id. at 217-18.

Two FBI agents told us that they observed the prolonged use of

shackles or restraints by military personnel at Bagram in March and April

2002 on several detainees whom they understood posed a significant danger

to U.S. personnel. They said that while outside of the holding enclosures,

all detainees were handcuffed and usually shackled at the feet. Depending

on the threat level of a detainee, the handcuffs would be removed in the

interview room and the leg shackles left on, but for the few dangerous

"hard-core" detainees, the handcuffs were left on as well. Neither of these

agents believed that the restraints were used to coerce information or

cooperation from detainees. One agent said that if the FBI agent felt that he

was developing a rapport with the detainee, he would ask to have the

restraints removed, but the military guards usually refused.

Similarly, an FBI agent at Bagram and Kabul in the first few months

of 2003 reported that "detainees were often handcuffed during entire

interrogations for security purposes," and that he was told that "sometimes

violent detainees remained handcuffed in [their] cells" as well.

166 This method was not specifically discussed in Field Manual 34-52, which

governed interrogations in Afghanistan during the early part of that war. Church Report at

196-204. According to the military documents described in the Church Report, the practice

was a "frequent occurrence" in Afghanistan. Id. at 217. In February 2003, CJTF-180

directed that safety positions be limited to safety considerations and not "to increase

discomfort or as a means of interrogation." Id. at 203. In March 2004, however, the use of

uncomfortable "safety positions" as an incentive for cooperation was reinstated as an

approved interrogation technique as part of an interrogation plan approved by an officer-incharge

or an interrogation team leader. Id. at 217. In June 2004, following the Abu Ghraib

disclosures, "stress positions" were specifically prohibited in Afghanistan. Id. at 211, 217-

18.

219

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.263

Another agent reported in his survey response that in January and

February 2002 detainees were often brought to the interview tent in

shackles or cuffs that were too tight. The agent said that once when he

complained a soldier laughed and said the agents were being "too soft."

However, after the agents took their complaint up the military chain of

command, they did not see the soldier in that capacity again. The agent

said incidents like this occurred several times. The agent stated that when

he raised this issue with different soldiers, the reaction depended on the

individual MP -- some said they would use some other kind of restraints to

help the FBI establish more rapport with the detainee, and others said they

were too busy to give the detainee special treatment.

The same FBI agent also noted that on several occasions MPs used an

"almost medieval-looking," rigid, wrought iron shackle system he had never

seen before. The clamps on the wrists were connected by a stiff metal rod,

and the rod was joined by a chain to shackles around the detainees' ankles.

The devices were not adjustable for the size of the detainees' wrists or

ankles or height, and he saw that the detainees were uncomfortable as they

shuffled into the interview tent. The agent said that these shackles did not

look like anything the U.S. government would have provided, and he

believed that they may have been locally obtained.

D. Sexually Abusive or Humiliating Contact

One FBI agent provided information concerning a detainee's allegation

that U.S. personnel engaged in sexually abusive conduct toward him in

Afghanistan. The agent stated that in July 2003 a detainee in GTMO

alleged that a white female CIA agent had raped the detainee while he was a

prisoner at Bagram. Because this allegation was reported at GTMO, we

address it in Section III of Chapter Eight.

E. Abusive Body Cavity Searches

According to two April 2004 DOD Inspector General memoranda, two

military attorneys reported to military investigators that they learned of

potential detainee abuses during a dinner with two FBI agents in January

2004 in Florida. We determined that one of the agents was an FBI Special

Agent and the other was a New York City Police Department employee

assigned to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (the "NYPD detective").

These agents were deployed to Afghanistan and later to GTMO.

According to the DOD memoranda, during the dinner the NYPD

detective told the attorneys that he had been in Bagram sometime in

December 2001 or early 2002 "and was involved in photographing detainees

during the in-take process." The NYPD detective also said that he observed

several detainees coming out of an area where they were being processed

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and searched. He said he saw feces running down their legs and that they

were in apparent pain. The NYPD detective said he went into the area and

noticed that the detainees were being given what appeared to be anal cavity

searches, and that an unknown individual involved in the process asked the

agent to photograph him while he performed such a search, but the NYPD

detective refused. In addition, the second military attorney told DOD

investigators that the NYPD detective stated that the individual performing

these searches "was not changing gloves" after each search, because the

NYPD detective "observed feces and blood inside a bottle of Vaseline that he

observed in the area." The attorney stated that while both agents were

intoxicated at the dinner, he "believed the [NYPD detective] was telling the

truth . . . ."

We confirmed that the NYPD detective was serving in Afghanistan at

the time of the alleged events described. The FBI agent told us that he was

deployed to Afghanistan from the end of April 2002 through the beginning of

June 2002. The NYPD detective declined our request for an interview.

We interviewed the FBI agent, who stated that he disagreed with the

way the military attorneys had characterized in their memoranda what the

NYPD detective had described at the dinner. The FBI agent said that he had

not been in Afghanistan when the January 2002 cavity searches described

by the NYPD detective occurred, but had served in Afghanistan with the

NYPD detective later in 2002. The FBI agent believed that the young

military lawyers, who had no combat or law enforcement experience,

misunderstood or misconstrued the veteran NYPD detective's "locker room"

or "battlefield" humor relating to an unpleasant but standard aspect of

detainee in-processing in that military theater. The FBI agent said he was

not made uncomfortable by the NYPD detective's description, nor did he

believe as a result that something inappropriate or abusive had occurred.

He also said he did not believe that anyone at the dinner was intoxicated.

The conduct described in the DOD Inspector General memoranda

does not appear to have been related to interrogations, but rather to military

in-processing of newly captured detainees. Nothing in the materials made

available to us suggests that abusive body cavity searches were approved as

a military interrogation technique. No similar information regarding abusive

cavity searches in Afghanistan was described in the Church Report.

F. Stressful or Painful Positions or Calisthenics

The OIG investigation determined that several FBI agents observed or

heard about the use of stressful or painful positions by the military in

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Afghanistan.167 According to their survey responses, one FBI agent

observed and five other FBI agents heard about the use of stress positions

in Afghanistan. One agent reported that he observed that some detainees

were restrained with their hands together above their head, behind their

back, or to the wall for long periods of time. Several agents told us that

military personnel told them that stress or uncomfortable positions were

authorized military interrogation or disciplinary techniques.

An FBI Intelligence Analyst reported in his survey response that he

was told that in both Afghanistan and Iraq, "[d]etainees who wouldn't talk

were told to do push-ups and other forms of exercise[.] [T]hey weren't forced

to do it but they would do it anyway, probably out of fear. They exercised

until they talked or for no longer than 1 hour every twenty-four hours[;]

water was always on hand and medics readily available."

Other agents told the OIG that detainees alleged during interviews at

GTMO that stress positions had been used on detainees in Afghanistan.

One agent stated that he heard that a detainee had claimed that he was

hung by his heels in Afghanistan, but the agent could not remember which

detainee made the claim. Another agent reported in an FD-302 and told the

OIG that a detainee in GTMO claimed that in Afghanistan a U.S.

interrogator had forced him to admit to being a member of al-Qaeda by

requiring him to stand or kneel with his arms over his head for 3-hour

intervals.

G. Deprivation of Clothing

The OIG investigated allegations about the removal of clothes as an

interrogation technique in Afghanistan. Use of this tactic as an

interrogation technique was never expressly approved or prohibited under

military policies in Afghanistan. The Church investigators did not report

any instances of nudity being employed by the military as an interrogation

technique in Afghanistan. Church Report at 226-7.

Four FBI agents reported to the OIG that detainees were stripped

prior to being issued standard jumpsuits during routine intake procedures

in late 2001 and early 2002 in Kandahar, but the agents did not indicate

that forced nudity was used as an interrogation technique. The agents told

the OIG that after detainees were brought in from the battlefield, military

personnel conducted medical exams, strip searches, and body

cavity searches. The detainees had their clothing removed or cut off so that

they were completely naked and had empty sand bags placed over their

167 The evolution of the military's policies regarding stress positions in Afghanistan

is addressed above in Section II.0 of this chapter, footnote 169.

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heads. They were then led through a processing tent in which FBI agents

were working. The detainees were given jump suits, sandals, blankets, and

water, after which FBI personnel fingerprinted, photographed, collected DNA

swabs, and asked a few questions to obtain basic biographical information

from the detainees. These agents stated that while in the tent, the detainees

were naked for usually less than one-half hour, and were unclothed outside

of the tent for only a few minutes. These agents did not consider these

intervals unduly long or inappropriate.

The agents also told us they understood that the detainee strip and

cavity searches were done for safety and security reasons rather than to

humiliate the detainees. They further understood that the sandbags helped

prevent the detainees from getting a sense of the layout of the camp. None

of these agents were aware of any other situation where detainees were

deprived of clothing or had hoods placed on their heads, or where either was

done in order to coerce information from the detainees. The agents said

they believed these actions were reasonable and necessary detention

procedures used by the military.

H. Hooding or Blindfolding

Several FBI agents told the OIG that they observed or heard about the

use of hoods or blindfolds on detainees in Afghanistan, primarily for

security purposes. According to the Church Report, between February 2003

and March 2004 the use of hoods during interrogations was prohibited in

Afghanistan, although the use of blacked-out goggles was allowed. Church

Report at 220. The military's prohibition was changed in March 2004. The

Church investigation determined that the military in Afghanistan routinely

hooded detainees for security during movement and transportation, and

sometimes also used hoods or blackout goggles as an interrogation

technique. Id. Beginning in June 2004, military policy required prior legal

review and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Commander approval for

hooding or blindfolding, and the Church investigation found no evidence

that this technique was used by the military after that date. Id.

Five FBI agents responded to the OIG survey said that they observed

hooding or blindfolding in Afghanistan, and two said that they heard about

it from detainees or others. Several of the agents indicated, however, that

the hoods were used for military safety and security purposes only. For

example, one of the agents we interviewed said that he saw the military use

green sandbags placed loosely over the heads of detainees to prevent them

from observing their surroundings. Another agent told us that he often

observed hoods on detainees, usually during transportation, but that he did

not see this done during interrogations. One agent described a high-profile

detainee in military custody - Paracha (#593) - whom she interviewed in

July 2003 at Bagram. She observed Paracha "in his cell, . . . sitting on the

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ground, blindfolded with ear coverings on . . . ." It was not clear to the FBI

agent whether these sensory deprivation measures were to make the

detainee more cooperative in interrogations or for safety reasons.

I. Sleep Deprivation or Interruption

We sought information from FBI agents about the use of sleep

deprivation or disruption on detainees in Afghanistan. According to the

Church Report, "sleep adjustment" (defined as limiting a detainee to as little

as 4 hours of sleep, not necessarily consecutive, per 24-hour period) was an

approved military interrogation technique in Afghanistan for much of the

relevant time period until it was prohibited in June 2004. Church Report at

221-22. The Church investigators found that military interrogators

employed this technique throughout this period. However, according to the

Church Report, "sleep deprivation" (anything less than 4 total hours of sleep

per 24-hour period) was prohibited by law or policy at all times in

Afghanistan. Id. at 213. The only instances of "sleep deprivation" described

in the Church Report occurred in connection with the incidents leading to

the deaths of two detainees at Bagram in December 2002, discussed above.

Id. at 228.

Numerous FBI agents told the OIG in their survey responses and

interviews that they observed or heard about the use of sleep deprivation or

interrupted sleep cycles on detainees in Afghanistan. Twenty-seven survey

respondents said that they observed or heard about detainee sleep

management or deprivation practices in Afghanistan throughout the period

covered by our investigation. Many agents also described the use of loud

music or bright or flashing lights to interfere with detainees' sleep or with

communications among prisoners.

For example, one agent told us that in early 2002 the military would

awaken high value detainees at Kandahar at frequent intervals during their

rest period, after which the detainees would be interrogated. The same

agent said that he and the other FBI agents often disagreed with the

military's use of this technique and did not want to interview detainees who

had recently been subjected to a sleep interruption or deprivation regimen

because it would not be productive. This agent also told us that FBI agents

expressed their opinions to the military commanders. He stated that "[o]nce

the military obtained info to their satisfaction, we could generally lay out

our conditions and requests for the interview setting and request that the

detainees could sleep in advance and/or feed them during the interviews."

This agent also stated that agents elected not to participate or attend

interrogations of detainees who had been subjected to such treatment.

Other FBI personnel reported similar military practices at Bagram,

but they did not describe the specific means used to interfere with detainee

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sleep. Some of the reports were from FBI personnel who obtained their

information while serving as members of the military. For example, an FBI

agent who served as an Air Force intelligence officer at Bagram in April

through June 2002 told us that he "had heard . . . that they altered the

sleep times of the detainees to keep them off balance and increase their

susceptibility to our interrogation techniques." Another agent reported that

in July 2002, while he served in the Army, military intelligence personnel at

Bagram described interrogation techniques, including sleep deprivation,

generally as a way "to 'set the conditions' for an interrogation." An agent at

Bagram in March 2003 said in his survey response that he observed

detainee sleep deprivation by military police during an introductory tour of

the Bagram detainee facility, which he was told was a disciplinary procedure

for detainees who were not cooperating with detention procedures, rather

than as an interrogation technique.

An FBI communications support technician at Bagram. told us that he

learned in daily prison briefings that "Sleep deprivation was a common

practice with High Value Targets. The military said that the prisoner did get

8 hours of sleep a day, just not all in one shot." An FBI electronics

technician stated that during various conversations throughout 2003 and

2004 at Bagram and Kandahar, he was told that the "more difficult

detainees would be awakened every 15 minutes during their rest period by

the military police in an effort to wear down their resistance." None of these

agents or support personnel reported the use of sleep deprivation to their

supervisors or to military personnel.

In one case, an FBI agent acknowledged his own participation in a

regimen of sleep deprivation. The agent was deployed primarily to Bagram

in July and August 2003. He told the OIG that he and a military

interrogator "agreed on a course of sleep deprivation" for a detainee who

they believed had information about a recent attack. The lights were left on

in the detainee's cell and the detainee was awakened periodically. The

agent told us he believed that sleep deprivation was appropriate in that

situation. He further stated that he did not know if FBI agents are

permitted to use sleep deprivation in the United States, although he "would

not think so." The agent stated that he had no discussions about this with

anyone at FBI Headquarters.

This incident occurred in 2003, prior to the issuance of the FBI's May

2004 Detainee Policy stating that agents in the military zones should

continue to comply with FBI guidelines for custodial interviews applicable

inside the United States. The FBI has frequently stated that the 2004 Policy

merely reiterated existing policies with respect to FBI conduct during

interrogations. We believe that under existing policy it is unlikely that an

FBI agent would have been permitted to use sleep deprivation as an

interview tool in the United States.

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J. Undocumented "Ghost" Detainees

We also attempted to determine whether any FBI employees observed

or heard about incidents in which U.S. personnel held detainees who had

not been officially acknowledged or registered as detainees by the U.S.

agency responsible for their detention, a practice known as holding "ghost

detainees."

These

detainees were not assigned Internment Serial Numbers (ISN), and DOD

personnel held them without accounting for them, obtaining biometric

information from them, or knowing their identities or the reasons for their

detention. Ta uba Report at 26-27;

K. Actual or Threatened Transfer to a Third Country

Thirteen survey respondents who were de lo ed to Af hanistan

re orted that the had information concernin

Four

respondents said that they had information that had

occurred, four said that detainees alleged that this had occurred to them,

and one said he heard such allegations from someone other than a detainee.

Ei ht a ents said the were aware of threats to detainees that they would be

for interrogation.

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We sought information regarding the prolonged isolation of detainees

in Afghanistan.

When we sou ht further information

. One

agent said that a detainee claimed that he had been sent to Jordan where

the interrogators "yelled at him," and another agent stated that a detainee

making an allegation about appeared mentally unstable

and not credible.

L. Isolation of Detainees

Twelve survey respondents reported that they had information

regarding the isolation of detainees in Afghanistan for extended periods.

Five of these respondents said that they observed the isolation of detainees,

and six of them said that they heard about such isolation from detainees or

others. However, none of the FBI employees were referring to the use of

extended isolation as a coercive interrogation technique, such as a

punishment for failure to provide requested information or as a means to

manipulate the mental state of the detainee. The FBI agents described

several purposes for the isolation of detainees by military personnel within

locations such as Kandahar and Bagram, such as prevention of detainee

coordination of stories for investigative integrity, rewards for cooperative

detainees, and disciplinary measures for disruptive detainees. For example,

one agent said that during January and February 2002, he was aware of the

isolation of detainees at Kandahar for an extended period to prevent them

from telling other detainees what questions were being asked and how to

respond, to keep high value detainees from being exposed to the general

detainee population, and in some cases as a reward for cooperative

detainees. He was not aware of isolation being used as a way of coercing

any detainees.

Another FBI agent deployed to Afghanistan in early 2002 stated that

"the Marines would isolate" detainees who were disciplinary problems, "just

like we put prisoners in the U.S. in isolation if they are causing problems,"

and stated that he "saw no issue with this." Another agent deployed to

Afghanistan later in 2002 also noted the use of isolation as a reward for

cooperative detainees.

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The agent who served as Deputy OSC in Afghanistan during the last

quarter of 2004 said he observed the isolation of detainees by the military at

Bagram. However, he stated that the isolation he observed was warranted

by safety, security, and tactical considerations, and was not abusive. He

likened it to separating suspects in a conspiracy and questioning them

individually to get their separate versions of events as a truth verification

tool.

M. Impersonation of FBI Agents

We sought information regarding the impersonation of FBI agents by

non-FBI personnel in Afghanistan. The Church Report did not specifically

discuss the practice of impersonating an FBI agent in Afghanistan. It

stated, however, that deception was common to many doctrinal techniques

approved for use in Afghanistan, and that deception had been employed in

detainee interrogations throughout the war in Afghanistan. Church Report

at 216.

Some FBI agents reported to the OIG that they either observed or

heard that military or CIA personnel had falsely represented themselves as

FBI agents in Afghanistan. One OIG survey respondent stated that he

observed the impersonation of FBI personnel by others, and five agents

reported that they heard about such conduct from others.

For example, one FBI agent stated in his survey response that in

January or February 2002 an Army specialist told him that he was going to

wear an FBI hat in a detainee interrogation. The agent characterized the

Army specialist as "an aggressive interviewer" who played the "bad cop."

The agent stated he told the specialist "that there was no need for him to

pose as an FBI agent when we had agents there. . . ." The agent also

indicated he saw the soldier on another occasion with the same hat and that

he therefore raised the issue with the soldier's sergeant, who agreed that it

was unacceptable and unprofessional for the soldier to act in this way. The

FBI agent said he had no knowledge of any subsequent problems of this

kind at Kandahar. The agent told the OIG that he may have casually

mentioned the impersonation incident to his OSC, who told him that if it

happened again the OSC would, if needed, take it up with more senior

military personnel.

Several agents told the OIG that they inferred that someone had

impersonated an FBI agent from the statements of detainees who claimed

they had already been interviewed by the FBI. For example, one agent

stated in his survey response that a detainee in either March or April 2002

told him at the outset of an interview that he had already talked to the FBI,

which the agent said was impossible because there were only two FBI

agents there. The agent suspected that CIA personnel had claimed to be

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.272

FBI personnel. Another agent reported that in October or November 2002

two detainees told him they had been interviewed by FBI agents just days

before the agent interviewed them. This agent determined that CIA officers

had "tricked the detainees into believing they were FBI agents," and that

this problem was handled locally in Afghanistan.

Similarly, the agent who served as the OSC in Afghanistan during

February through April 2002 told us that when FBI agents identified

themselves, some detainees at Kandahar told them that they had already

been interviewed by the FBI, and the agents drew the conclusion that

military personnel had said so to the detainees. The OSC believed that this

hampered detainees' cooperation with genuine FBI agents. He said he

raised this two or three times at the daily joint U.S. personnel meetings at

Bagram, and his military contact said that he would bring this up with the

commander at Kandahar.

The most notorious instance of someone impersonating a U.S. official

in Afghanistan was the Idema matter, although this incident apparently did

not involve impersonation of an FBI agent. In mid-2004, Jonathan Idema

and two other private U.S. citizens were detained by Afghan authorities for

allegedly impersonating U.S. government personnel while detaining,

interrogating, and torturing Afghan citizens in an illegal prison in Kabul. An

FBI document stated that Idema had impersonated an Army Major and later

a CIA agent, but had apparently not impersonated an FBI agent. According

to FBI documents, witnesses and videotapes indicated that Idema and a

second U.S. citizen interrogated prisoners by dunking their heads into

buckets of water and striking their bodies and heads with rifles. The

documents also indicate that prior to being arrested, Idema had repeatedly

contacted the FBI and other U.S. government agencies claiming to have

information about planned future terrorist attacks in the United States and

abroad, but that Idema failed one or two polygraph tests and the FBI was

skeptical of his credibility. The documents do not reflect any FBI

involvement with Idema's activities. The documents indicate that Idema

traveled to Afghanistan on his own accord and against FBI direction in April

2004.

N. Other Techniques

The OIG survey sought information regarding other interrogation

techniques in addition to those discussed above. In several cases,

respondents stated that they had seen or heard of additional techniques,

but follow-up investigation revealed that the agents were reporting about

measures undertaken for security or hygiene purposes and not as part of an

interrogation plan.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.273

For example, we sought information regarding the use of military

working dogs to intimidate detainees, a technique that was publicized in

connection with the Abu Ghraib disclosures. Several survey respondents

reported the use of dogs as a security measure in Afghanistan, such as

during the movement of prisoners or to gain compliance with military police

instructions to a detainee. No FBI witness reported the use of dogs during

interviews or interrogations in Afghanistan.

We also sought information regarding the shaving of detainees' facial

or other hair to embarrass or humiliate them. Although several agents

reported that detainees were shaved in Afghanistan, they indicated that this

was a hygiene or identification measure undertaken during initial

processing rather than for punishment or humiliation.

We sought information concerning threats to detainees by U.S.

personnel to take action against members of a detainee's family. Two

survey respondents stated that they told a detainee that the agents

themselves would have to question detainee family members on certain

matters. The agents explained that the sons of one detainee and the wife of

another were themselves implicated by other information in terrorist or

insurgent activities and were in fact interviewed by the FBI as a result.

One agent reported in a survey response that during his deployment

to Kandahar in early 2002 he was told by a detainee that the detainee was

"not receiving regular meals." Another agent said that a detainee at GTMO

had claimed to him that U.S. personnel in Afghanistan had subjected the

detainee to extremely cold or hot room temperatures for extended periods,

but this agent provided no specifics.

None of the FBI employees who responded to the survey or whom we

interviewed stated that they observed or heard about any the following

specific kinds of conduct: (a) placing a detainee on a hot surface or burning

him; (b) using water to prevent breathing by a detainee or to create the

sensation of drowning, including the practice known as "water-boarding"; (c)

using electrical shock on detainees; (d) intentionally delaying or depriving a

detainee of medical care; (e) using spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other

animals on or near a detainee; or (f) forcibly removing detainees from their

cells. In addition, none of the survey respondents or interview witnesses

told us that they had observed, heard about, or had other information

concerning any instances in Afghanistan when U.S. personnel made

disrespectful statements about the Koran, handled the Koran in a

disrespectful manner, or placed women's clothing on male detainees.

The OIG survey also asked respondents to report any information they

had concerning any "sham" or "staged" detainee interviews or interrogations

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.274

conducted for Members of Congress or their staff. None of the respondents

who were deployed to Afghanistan reported any information on this subject.

III. Disposition of FBI Agent Reports Regarding Detainee Treatment

in Afghanistan

We found few contemporaneous reports by FBI agents in Afghanistan

regarding concerns about the potential mistreatment of detainees.168 Of the

roughly 200 FBI agents who served in Afghanistan and responded to our

survey, only 10 agents stated that they made such reports to FBI

supervisors, military personnel, or both. When we interviewed FBI agents

about particular techniques they observed or heard about in Afghanistan,

most indicated that they did not report what they saw or heard about to

anyone.

We believe that several factors contributed to the small number of

reports made by FBI agents to FBI or military supervisors. As indicated

above, the vast majority of FBI agents who served in Afghanistan reported

that they never saw or heard about any incidents of detainee treatment that

caused them discomfort or that fell into any of the specific categories of

potential mistreatment that were listed in the OIG survey. Further, there

was no formal requirement to report suspected abuse prior to May 19, 2004,

when the FBI issued a policy requiring agents to alert their OSCs about any

known or suspected abuse or mistreatment of detainees by non-FBI

personnel.

Some agents believed, sometimes incorrectly, that the conduct they

saw or heard about was authorized for use by military interrogators and

therefore did not need to be reported, even though it was not a technique

that was approved for use by the FBI. As a related matter, many agents told

us they were never trained regarding what techniques military interrogators

were permitted to use. Therefore, some agents assumed that conduct that

they saw was consistent with military policy and did not need to be

reported.

In addition, unlike the situation at GTMO, many FBI agents in

Afghanistan were operating in a war zone in which they were dependent on

the military for their protection and material support. They said they

understood their role in Afghanistan as seeking information about terrorist

168 This Section addresses only the disposition of contemporaneous reports of

potential detainee mistreatment in Afghanistan. After the Abu Ghraib prison abuses were

publicized in April 2004, FBI Headquarters conducted an informal survey of the four OSCs

who had served in Afghanistan to determine if the FBI had additional information about

detainee abuses in Afghanistan. This survey is discussed in Section IV.0 of Chapter Six.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.275

threats to the United States or its personnel or interests overseas, not as

policing or overseeing the conduct of the military. These circumstances

made some agents reluctant to elevate their concerns about the military's

treatment of detainees.

Despite these factors, several agents told us that they did make

reports regarding particular incidents or allegations of detainee

mistreatment to their supervisors. The report that received the greatest

attention was the one made by SSA Horton, which is addressed in detail in

Section II of Chapter Six. As detailed there, Horton did not actually witness

any detainee abuse, and several of his supervisors and CTD personnel in

FBI Headquarters said they concluded that he had overreacted. However,

the FBI supervisors did not specifically address his larger concern that the

FBI could be deemed to have participated in detainee abuse simply by

interviewing detainees at a location where rougher military techniques were

being used on the same detainees.

As noted in Section II.A of this chapter, FBI Headquarters also

received a report from FBI agents regarding detainee deaths at Bagram.

One of the agents told the OIG that he and his partner were told that the

Army Criminal Investigation Command was investigating the deaths, and

that the FBI was not in Afghanistan to investigate such matters.

There were several other cases in which FBI agents reported their

concerns about detainee mistreatment.

One agent said he alerted his OSC in early 2002 to the fact that

military interrogators had treated detainees roughly. But this agent also

discussed his concerns with military supervisors, as discussed in more detail

below, and he told the OIG that they resolved his concerns. Therefore, there

was no need for the OSC to take further action on these reports.

One agent told the OIG that before he arrived in Afghanistan in April

2004, he heard general, second-hand rumors about mistreatment of

detainees from other agents who had been deployed to GTMO. In Afghanistan

he asked his OSC about detainee treatment and the OSC told him that on his

visits to detention facilities in Afghanistan he had witnessed no evidence of

improper treatment of detainees.169 Since the agent had not reported a

particular incident or allegation about detainee mistreatment to the OSC, the

OSC did not report up the chain of command.

169 The agent said he also discussed the rumors with , who

informed the agent that the rules of the Geneva Convention did not apply in this conflict,

but that prisoners were not being mistreated.

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One agent told us that he reported concerns about detainee treatment

in Afghanistan to the MLDU Unit Chief at FBI Headquarters. The a ent

re orted in his survey response that during a tour of

in November 2002, he was told that the CIA used loud music

to de rive detainees of slee •

there unless we

wanted to be part of a congressional hearing at some later date." The agent

wrote in his survey response that: "This info was reported up to [the Unit

Chief]" in writing "without any response or guidance." When we interviewed

this agent, he explained that he and another agent sent the Unit Chief

multiple e-mails and became frustrated that they could not get any

guidance relating to detainees and working with other agencies. The Unit

Chief told us that he may have received a call from this agent but he did not

recall his response or what instructions he mi ht have given. He said that

he generally told agents to

We interviewed all but one of the 14 former OSCs and all of the 6

Deputy OSCs who served in Afghanistan between late December 2001 and

the end of 2004. None of these OSCs or Deputy OSCs said that they

received any report from an agent in Afghanistan concerning potential

mistreatment of any detainees. Given the nature of the reports that were

described to the OIG by the agents who made them, it is not surprising that

the OSCs did not recall these reports. Some of the reports were actually

questions about rumors rather than reports of witnessed incidents. Others

involved matters that were resolved cooperatively with the military and did

not require further elevation.

Several agents told the OIG that they spoke to military supervisors in

Afghanistan about the treatment of detainees by military personnel. One of

the agents deployed to Afghanistan in late 2001 told us he felt the military

was ill-equipped to deal with interrogating detainees. He stated:

Many of the interviewers were young and inexperienced and

yelled and screamed at the detainees, but had no knowledge of

al-Qaeda. Any concerns we as the FBI raised were dismissed

because the military= needed intelligence immediately. We

(FBI) were also told in no uncertain terms we were not in charge

and the military were running the show.

Another agent reported in her survey response that during her service

in Afghanistan in July 2003 she raised concerns about military

interrogators at the Bagram Collection Point who wanted to interrogate a

detainee in "a different way." She stated that she informed the Major that

there would be no disrespectful or potentially harmful things done to the

detainee. Three other agents told us that they elevated concerns about

detainee treatment with military supervisors, and that these concerns were

233

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.277

resolved as a result. For example, one FBI agent who served in Bagram and

Kandahar told us he complained to military supervisors about military

personnel who hurt a detainee whose arms were restrained behind his back,

by lifting his arms in a painful manner. The same agent said he also

complained to military supervisors about MPs who shackled detainees too

tightly and about military interrogators who posed as FBI agents. The agent

told us that the military chain of command was supportive and that after

these complaints he did not see a repeat of this conduct.

Another FBI agent deployed to Bagram reported to military

supervisors his objection to military police shoving a shackled detainee

against a wall. The agent told us that the soldier was removed from

detainee escort duty as a result.

IV. Conclusion

FBI employees in Afghanistan conducted detainee interviews at the

major military collection points in Bagram and Kandahar and at other

smaller facilities. The most frequently reported techniques used by military

interrogators in Afghanistan were sleep deprivation or disruption, prolonged

shackling, stress positions, loud music, and isolation. Several FBI

employees also told us they had heard about two detainee deaths at the

military facility in Bagram, but none of the FBI employees said they had

personal knowledge of these deaths, which were investigated by the DOD.

We found few contemporaneous reports by FBI agents in Afghanistan

regarding concerns about the potential mistreatment of detainees. In many

cases the agents believed, sometimes incorrectly, that the conduct they saw

or heard about was authorized for use by military interrogators and

therefore did not need to be reported. The desire of the FBI agents to

establish their role in Afghanistan and their dependence on the military for

their protection and material support may have contributed to a reluctance

to elevate their concerns about the military's treatment of detainees. In

addition, several agents told the OIG that they were able to resolve concerns

about the mistreatment of individual detainees by speaking directly to

military supervisors in Afghanistan.

234

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.278

CHAPTER TEN

FBI OBSERVATIONS IN IRAQ

I. Introduction

Iraq was the location of the Abu Ghraib prison, the site of many

notorious incidents of detainee abuse that were widely publicized in April

2004. Although FBI agents served at Abu Ghraib and other detention

facilities in Iraq, most of the FBI employees reported to the OIG that they

never observed potentially abusive treatment of detainees in Iraq or heard

about it from detainees or other witnesses. Overall, of the 267 survey

respondents who served in Iraq between March 2003 and the end of 2004,

188 stated that they neither observed nor heard about any of the kinds of

detainee treatment described in the survey.

However, some of the FBI agents sent to Iraq reported that they

observed or heard about the use of various rough or aggressive treatment of

detainees by military personnel. With a few exceptions, the FBI agents did

not report seeing detainee abuse in Iraq that was similar to the most

notorious abuses reported in connection with the Abu Ghraib scandal. The

most frequently reported techniques were deprivation of clothing, sleep

deprivation or interruption, and hooding or blindfolding. A smaller number

of agents reported incidents such as detainees being accidentally burned by

exposure to hot vehicle surfaces during transport, prolonged shackling, and

stress positions. Table 3 summarizes the survey responses to our questions

regarding the use of particular interrogation techniques in Iraq.170

The agents' specific observations regarding particular techniques as

reported to the OIG are discussed in Part II of this chapter. In Part III, we

describe the handling of reports by FBI agents to their superiors or to

military personnel regarding their concerns about detainee treatment in

Iraq.

170 For a discussion regarding the limitations to the appropriate interpretation of

this data, see Chapter Eight, Section I.

235

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.279

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7 1 Threatening other action to cause physical pain,

injury, disfigurement, or death

8 Other treatment or action causing significant

physical pain or injury, or causing disfigurement 1

or death

10 1 Using shackles or other restraints in a prolonged 1 6

manner

1 1 4 1 277

18 1 Subjecting a detainee to loud music 1 11 1 3 1 191 _ 252 .

19 1 Subjecting a detainee to bright flashing lights or 1 6 1 2 1 7 1 268

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20 1 Isolating a detainee for an extended period I 20 1 1 1 1 6 1 257

21 1 Using duct tape to restrain, gag, or punish a 1 ::: ..• 1 1 286

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236

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.280

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24 I Threatening to use military working dogs on or I2

near a detainee

25 I Using spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other

animals on or near a detainee

26 I Threatening to use spiders, scorpions, snakes, or

other animals on a detainee •

27 I Disrespectful statements, handling, or actions

involving the Koran

28 1 Shaving a detainee's facial or other hair to 1 2

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37 I Other treatment of a detainee that in your

opinion was unprofessional, unduly harsh or

aggressive, coercive, abusive, or unlawful

1

Observation Totals I 112 I 30 46 I 117I 10, 333

237

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.281

II. Observations Regarding Particular Techniques

A. FBI Knowledge Regarding Detainee Deaths

Several detainees died while in military or CIA custody in Iraq

under circumstances raising questions about detainee abuse.171 For

example, news reports stated that a former Iraqi Major General, Abed

Hamed Mowhoush, died of asphyxia in November 2003 while being

interrogated by U.S. and/or Iraqi personnel, and that his chest and legs

bore "evidence of blunt force trauma."172 Other news reports described

the November 2003 death of another detainee, Manadei al-Jamadi, at

Abu Ghraib. According to these public reports, al-Jamadi was captured

by Special Forces personnel and died while being interrogated at Abu

Ghraib by the CIA.173

None of the FBI employees contacted by the OIG reported that they

ever personally witnessed, or heard about from those who witnessed, any

beating or other treatment which caused the death of a detainee in Ira•,

includin the two detainee deaths described above.

B. Beating, Choking, Strangling, or Other Abusive Handling

of Detainees

The OIG survey asked respondents to provide information

concerning detainee beatings, the use of hands, rope, or anything else to

171 According to the Church Report, as of September 30, 2004, there were five

substantiated abuse cases in Iraq that resulted in a detainee's death, although none of

them involved interrogation-related abuse. Church Report at 293-94.

172 5/28/04, 12/22/04, 8/3/05, www.talkleft.com; 1/15/05 www.smh.com.au;

4/3/05 www.washingtonpost.com; Washington Post - 4/19/2005; 12/18/06 New York

Times. We found no evidence that FBI personnel were deployed to the facility in Iraq

where this incident allegedly occurred. An Army Chief Warrant Officer was convicted of

negligent homicide in a court martial in January 2006 in connection with this incident.

CNN.com 1/22/06; New York Times 9/4/07.

173 In 2005 the commanding officer of the Navy SEALs who were allegedly

involved in the interrogation of this detainee was acquitted of responsibility for the

death in a court-martial. We are not aware of any charges or other discipline having

been brought against any CIA agent involved in the interrogation of this detainee.

238

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.282

choke or strangle a detainee, or other actual or threatened kinds of

treatment causing significant physical pain, injury, disfigurement, or

death. These techniques do not appear to have been approved in Iraq

under any military policy. Church Report at 257-273. Other than the

widely publicized incidents at Abu Ghraib, the Church investigators

stated there were only "rare reports" of beatings. The Church Report

described 16 cases in which interrogation-related abuse of detainees was

substantiated, including several closed military investigations concluding

that interrogators struck detainees, as well as other incidents of

detainees being slapped, punched, kicked, or struck with objects.

Additional cases remained open as of the time the Church Report was

issued.

None of the approximately 267 FBI agents who served in Iraq

through the end of 2004 and who responded to the OIG survey reported

that they ever observed any beating or other physical abuse that caused

physical harm or injury to a detainee. However, 14 agents responded

either that their observations led them to believe that such physical

abuse had occurred or that they had heard about it from others. For

example, one agent told us that a detainee alleged he had been

mistreated by the Iraqi police, and another detainee claimed that U.S.

military personnel had mistreated him. The agent said that the first

detainee looked like he had been beaten. Another agent stated in his

survey that a detainee claimed he was beaten at "Camp Babylon" by

Polish soldiers before being transferred to U.S. custody at Abu Ghraib.

The agent said the detainee's face was bruised and swollen and that it

was requested he be given medical treatment. Another FBI agent stated

that he recalled one or two detainees at a particular facility who claimed

to have been beaten when they were first taken into custody by the

military, but that these detainees showed no signs of bruising or

mistreatment.

In addition, most agents told us that they had no information that

any detainee injuries that they observed were sustained as a result of the

conduct of U.S. personnel other than in battle or during capture. Other

agents stated that detainee claims of such abuse were not corroborated.

On March 14, 2004, CENTCOM Major General Taguba completed

the investigation and report concerning the Abu Ghraib abuses. Church

Report at 257. The Taguba Report stated that between October and

December 2003, the "numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and

wanton criminal abuses of detainees intentionally perpetrated" by

military personnel at Abu Ghraib included "punching, slapping and

kicking detainees and jumping on their naked feet." Taguba Report at

16-17. We found no evidence that FBI personnel were aware of the

conduct described in the Taguba Report at the time it occurred.

239

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.283

One FBI agent reported in his survey responses that he had seen a

detainee in early 2004 that appeared to have been beaten by a member of

the U.S. military or by Iraqi personnel. During his interview, however,

the agent clarified his response by stating that the detainee looked

disheveled and as though he had been "slapped around" or "roughed up."

The agent reported that he and three other FBI agents observed the

detainee being treated roughly during a joint FBI-DOD interrogation. We

address this allegation separately in Part VII of Chapter Eleven.

The FBI received at least one report in the United States from a

returning serviceman regarding detainee abuse in Iraq. On June 24,

2004, a former National Guardsman who had served in Iraq came into

the FBI's Sacramento Field Office and told the FBI that he had observed

detainee abuses at an Iraqi police station in Samara, Iraq, including

strangulation, beatings, and burning with lit cigarettes, and that U.S.

military personnel had conspired to cover up these abuses by means of

threats to witnesses. According to an FBI agent from the Sacramento

Division who interviewed the former Guardsman, the Guardsman

claimed that he had to resuscitate some of the detainees after this abuse.

The Guardsman identified several U.S. Army personnel who perpetrated

these alleged abuses. The FBI agent stated that the FBI forwarded the

information to the DOD Inspector General.

Also, as discussed in Chapter Six, in late January 2004 an FBI

agent serving as an interview team leader in Iraq sent an e-mail to her

OSC alerting him that there was substance to allegations of prisoner

mistreatment at Abu Ghraib, including videotape evidence of the

mistreatment which included beatings and rape. The OSC forwarded

this information to senior CTD officials at FBI Headquarters, including

then-Deputy Assistant Director Gary Bald, CTORS Section Chief Frankie

Battle, and DAD T.J. Harrington, together with the OSC's

recommendation that the FBI not conduct an abuse investigation but

rather let the Army CID handle it. Bald concurred with this

recommendation, and we found no evidence that the FBI took any

further action with respect to the agent's report.'74

Another agent stated that in approximately June or Jul 2004 he

had learned that Defense Intelli ence A enc DIA.ersonnel

174 We determined for various reasons that other allegations described in survey

responses to this question did not merit further investigation. For example, one agent

reported that while she was interviewing detainees at GTMO in July and August 2002, a

detainee alleged to her that he had previously been beaten by U.S. military personnel in

Iraq, an obvious fabrication or mistake by the detainee, since U.S. forces did not invade

Iraq until March 2003.

240

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.284

. We address allegations about detainee abuse at this

facility in Part VIII of Chapter Eleven.

C. Causing Burns by Placing Detainees on Hot Surfaces

Several agents told the OIG in interviews or survey responses that

they were aware of incidents involving the placement of detainees on hot

surfaces or otherwise inflicting burns on detainees in Iraq. At least four

of these witnesses were apparently referring to the same detainee.

Burning detainees was never an approved military technique in

any military theater. Burning was not specifically reported as a category

of interrogation technique in the Church Report, and no substantiated

incidents of burning detainees were described in the report.

Two FBI employees (a Special Agent and a linguist) told us that in

an interview of detainee Ibrahim Khalid Samir Al-Ani in the fall of 2003,

Al-Ani told them that U.S. military personnel came to his home late at

night, hooded him, restrained his hands, put him the back of a vehicle,

and drove for a very long time. Al-Ani said he was face down and

squirming on the rear bed of the vehicle. He told the agent and the

linguist that he thought the military personnel believed he was being

uncooperative because they held him down without realizing he was

burning. The agent noted that in a Humvee, the engine heat conducts all

the way back through the bed of the vehicle. The soldiers were sitting on

the sides in the rear, and the agent said he concluded that the soldiers

apparently did not feel the heat in the bed through the soles of their

boots. The agent and linguist also told us that the agent photographed

Al-Ani's burn scars.175

Three other agents, including two former OSCs, told the OIG about

an incident that we concluded also related to detainee Al-Ani. One

former OSC told us that in the summer of 2003 the FBI wanted to

interview a detainee, but the military said that because of injuries the

detainee had sustained during capture, he was hospitalized in a military

medical camp. The OSC stated that an FBI agent could not interview the

detainee because of the detainee's serious burn injuries and sedation.

The OSC recalled hearing from the agent that the military may have said

175 The agent and the linguist told us that they included the photographs with

the interview ECs. The FBI was unable to find copies of these photographs, however,

and neither the agent nor the linguist knew what became of them.

241

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.285

that the detainee was burned in the back of a hot Humvee. He also said

that this was one of the matters he handed off to the incoming OSC who

replaced him. We also learned that during mid-July 2003, another agent

tried to interview Al-Ani in the hospital, but also could not do so because

of the severity of the detainee's injuries.

The second OSC, who served in Ira. from Se tember to November

2003, told us that he understood that had captured

a prisoner during a had transported him for

a long period on the hot hood of a jeep, and as a result, the detainee "got

fried." The FBI interviewed the detainee when his medical condition

improved, but his burns were still apparent. This OSC said that his

recollection was uncertain, but he thought the military told him that they

had no other wa to trans ort the detainee, that they had to leave the

scene of the hastily, or that they did not know

the detainee was being burned because he was unconscious.

Another survey respondent described what appears to have been a

second burning incident in July 2003. This agent stated that he learned

that Walid Nayif Mohammed Al-Jabburi, a fog Hier Lieutenant Colonel in

the Iraqi Intelligence Service, had suffered a 2-inch burn on his upper

left arm after bein taken into custod and transported

back to the . The agent stated that he saw

the injury, and that the detainee told him that "while lying in the back

bed of a HUMVEE, he suffered the burn to his arm from being in contact

with a hot portion of the metal on the HUMVEE." The agent added:

This injury did not appear to have occurred during the

course of an[ ] interrogation from what Al-Jabburi said and

because to our knowledge, we were the first people to

interrogate him. It is not known whether this injury was

accidental or whether Al-Jabburi was negligently or

purposely placed against the hot metal of the vehicle. We

informed the MP guard to have a medic look at the wound.

In a later interview, Al-Jabburi showed us the burn and said

that a medic had looked at it and treated him. I could see

there was some type of salve on the wound.

An FBI agent who interviewed detainees at and Abu

Ghraib in late 2004 stated in his survey responses that a detainee at

, whose name he did not recall, told the agent that "when

he was taken into custody by military personnel . . . he was handcuffed

and placed on [a] truck bed which caused severe burning to his arms,

legs, and chest." According to the agent, the detainee had scars and his

Army chandler' had documented the allegations and injuries in the

detainee's dossier. We did not determine whether this was a fourth

242

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.286

This information was relayed to

the military chain of command and eventuall briefed to all individuals

(FBI and non-FBI) assigned to the ." Other agents stated that

the commandin officer tl be an a milit

invest

detainee or one of the detainees described above whose injuries had

since healed.

D. Use of Electric Shock

We sought information concerning the use by U.S. personnel of

electric shock or the threat of it to coerce information from detainees.

According to the Church Report, use of electric shock was never an

approved technique at any time in any military theater. Church Report at

29-34. The only incident of actual or mock electric shock described in

the Church Report was the infamous Abu Ghraib photograph showing a

hooded detainee balancing on a box while wired with mock electrodes.

Id. at 287. The Taguba Report likewise stated that between October and

December 2003, the abuse of detainees included positioning a naked

detainee on a box with a sandbag on his head, and attaching wires to his

fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture. Taguba Report at 16-

17.

Six FBI agents told the OIG in survey responses or interviews that

they heard about the use of electric shock, although five apparently

described the same incident.

243

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.287

an internal DOD investigation found "improper use

of a Tazer that resulted in burn marks on a detainee."

E. Harsh or Prolonged Shackling

The OIG sought information regarding the use of shackles or other

restraints in an abusive or harsh manner. The Church Report did not

specifically describe the use of prolonged shackling by the military as an

interrogation technique in Iraq. As noted in connection with

Afghanistan, such a technique might be considered a form of a "safety

position" or "stress position," which the Church Report generally

described as requiring a detainee to maintain an awkward or

uncomfortable position in order to control his movement during

interrogation, both for purposes of interrogator safety and as an incentive

to cooperate. Church Report at 216-18. According to the Church Report,

use of stress positions not exceeding four hours was specifically

approved in Iraq under a DOD policy issued in September 2003. Id. at

265-70. It was removed from the list of pre-approved techniques in

October 2003, but permitted to be used with prior approval from the

CJTF-7 Commander. Id. The DOD May 13, 2004, Policy stated that

"under no circumstances" would approval for stress positions be given.

Id. The Church investigators found that stress positions were frequently

used by the military in Iraq, and that some interrogators reported using

them even after this technique was explicitly prohibited. Id. at 276-77,

281-82.

Six FBI agents responded to the OIG survey that they observed

prolonged shackling of detainees, and five said they had heard about

such treatment from others who had observed it. In general, these FBI

agents described two ways in which detainees were restrained:

handcuffing them in various ways and shackling them to floors or other

structures in uncomfortable or stressful positions.

Several agents .rovided information re

ractices at the

ardin otentiall harsh

176 Adair is a pseudonym. The OIG's investigation of additional allegations

regarding Adair's conduct at this facility is described in Part VIII of Chapter Eleven.

244

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.288

We found

that FBI agents working at this facility participated in the use of the

military's detainee restraint category system by informing guards of the

level of the detainee's cooperation and recommending the degree of incell

restraint to be imposed as a result.'77 In mid-2004, at least one FBI

agent at was also involved in deciding whether a detainee would

receive a blanket or mattress in his cell, a ain based on whether he was

coo erative in interviews.

The agent told the OIG she believed she discussed this incident with an

FBI supervisory special agent, who in essence told her that because the

177 We address whether the agents' participation in this system violated FBI

policy in Chapter Eleven. We note also that, as described in Section III.D. of Chapter

Six, in May 2006 the FBI Office of General Counsel issued an Electronic

Communication addressing this practice.

245

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.289

FBI did not intend to interview the detainee at issue, the military's

treatment of the detainee would not be an issue for the FBI.

Another a ent described an incident in which a military detainee at

was handcuffed in his cell in a standing

position for several hours as punishment for making noise and inciting

other prisoners.

F. Using Military Working Dogs

Public images of detainees at Abu Ghraib depicted military working

dogs with frightened detainees. Use of muzzled dogs to exploit the

detainees' fear of dogs was approved in Iraq under the DOD's September

2003 Policy for Iraq. Church Report at 265. This technique was removed

from the list of approved techniques in October 2003, but its use was

still permitted with specific prior approval from the CJTF-7 Commander.

Id. at 268. The use of unmuzzled dogs was never approved under

military policy. Id. at 281. Several different military investigations found

that dogs were used to intimidate and attack detainees at Abu Ghraib,

including after October 2003. E.g. Taguba Report at 15-17; Church

Report at 280-81.

We asked FBI agents in Iraq about the use of military working dogs

on or near detainees other than for security or safety during detainee

transport. In 2003, FBI su ervisors and field agents had considerable

contact with , who provided assistance to FBI personnel

working at Abu Ghraib. However, none of the agents we interviewed said

that they knew of the conduct for which was punished. Most of

the FBI agents told us that in 2003 and 2004 they never saw or heard

about an milit working dogs used at Abu Ghraib or at the

during detainee interrogations, or to menace,

intimidate, or physically harm detainees at any location in Iraq.

The FBI's OSC in Iraq in May 2004 told us that he learned about

the use of military working dogs at a particular facility from a set of

military e-mails that the resident FBI supervisor there had brought back

to the FBI's Baghdad Operations Center (BOC).178 The OSC sent an email

to senior CTD personnel at FBI Head uarters on Ma 22, 2004,

describin an "e-mail stream I have seen"

. The OSC told us that even if the use of dogs was

allowed by military rules, the fear of dogs made such actions troubling in

environments in which FBI agents were also working.

178 We were unable to obtain a copy of these e-mails during our investigation.

246

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.290

G. Sexually Abusive or Humiliating Contact

The widely publicized Abu Ghraib disclosures included sexually

humiliating photographs of detainees and other sexually abusive

conduct. The March 2004 Taguba Report stated that between October

and December 2003, the abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib included: (1)

videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees; (2)

forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for

photographs; (3) forcing male detainees to wear women's underwear; (4)

forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate while being photographed

and videotaped; (5) arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then

jumping on them; (6) placing a dog chain around the neck of a naked

detainee and having a female soldier pose with him in a picture; and (7) a

male guard having sex with a female detainee. Taguba Report at 16-18.

According to the Church Report, sexual acts or mock sexual acts

were never an approved interrogation technique in Iraq. Church Report

at 273. The Church Report described a sexual assault of a female

detainee by military intelligence personnel at Abu Ghraib in October

2003. Id. at 296-97. In addition to the other widely publicized incidents

at Abu Ghraib, the Church investigators found one anecdotal report of

stripping and photographing female detainees. Id. at 289.

None of the 267 FBI employees who were deployed to Iraq and who

responded to the OIG survey reported any information of this nature.

However, during our investi ation we received documents describin • an

alle ation that at

However, we examined this allegation because

FBI agents were stationed at this facility in 2004. We deter mined that

this alleged incident took place before any FBI agents were deployed at

this facility. No FBI agent had personal knowledge of this incident.

H. Using Water To Prevent Breathing by a Detainee or To

Create the Sensation of Drowning

The OIG survey also asked respondents to provide information

regarding the use of water to prevent breathing by detainees or to create

the sensation and fear of drowning. This question was intended to

include and capture information about a practice known as

"waterboarding." We found no evidence that waterboarding or similar

techniques were approved for use under military policies for Iraq or any

other theater.

One FBI agent deployed to Iraq during January through March

2004 told the OIG that he personally observed a non-FBI interrogator

247

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.291

give a shackled detainee a drink of water in a rough manner that caused

the detainee to cough or choke at an unidentified building

1111. He added that three other FBI agents also observed this incident.

This matter is discussed in Part II of Chapter Eleven.

, and that the military considered this a

"harsh-up" technique. Because an FBI agent was allegedly involved in

this practice, we address this matter further in Part VIII of Chapter

Eleven.

I. Stressful or Painful Positions or Calisthenics

We determined that several FBI agents observed or heard about

the use of stressful or painful positions by the military in Iraq. As

previously noted, under military policies stress positions were permitted

in Iraq at least from September to October 2003, and thereafter until

May 2004 with prior approval of the CJTF-7 Commander. Church Report

at 265. The May 13, 2004, DOD policy for Iraq stated that "under no

circumstances" would approval for stress positions be given. Id. at 270.

The Church Report found that stress positions were frequently used by

the military in Iraq. Id. at 281-82. According to the Church Report,

physical exercise was not explicitly addressed in any Iraq policy. Id. at

283-87. The Church investigators discovered several incidents in which

detainees in Iraq were made to engage in physical exercise to overcome

their resistance to questioning, and that some interrogators considered

this to be part of a stress position regimen. Id. at 286-87.

Several FBI agents described the use of stress positions or forced

exercise in Ira.. Most of these resorts ertained to conduct that took

lace

FBI agents reported that they personally observed only a limited

number of instances in which detainees were sub'ected to "harsh-up"

techniques. Agents deployed in mid-

2004 told us that they believed this was not a common occurrence and

that only two or three "harsh-ups" were approved during each of the two

3-month rotations they were deployed there. Other agents stated that

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they observed or heard about one or two such interrogations during their

deployments from July through October 2004. Most of the information

we gathered related to what agents were told by others, because FBI

agents said they sought to avoid participating in or observing such

interrogations. FBI agents typically learned during shift change meetings

at the facility, for example, that the military had decided to engage in

such an interrogation and therefore knew in advance to avoid that

interrogation. One agent said that the military personnel with whom he

dealt at the facility did not want FBI agents to witness interviews in

which the military employed "harsh-up" techniques. He also said that

the Deputy OSC ordered him not to observe or take part in any such

practices.

However, FBI agents told us that they observed or were told by

others about the milit 's use of several stressful positions at the

. These included ordering one or more

detainees to stand on one leg, to stand for long periods of time,

sometimes with bags over their heads, in order to "soften" them up for

interrogations, or to "hold their hands above their heads for long periods

of time." Other FBI agents told us that detainees were told to squat in

order to simulate sitting in an invisible chair.

FBI employees also described the use of stressful or prolonged

exercises for uncooperative detainees by military and intelligence service

personnel. One FBI intelligence analyst said that he was told by those

who had observed such techniques that uncooperative detainees in both

Afghanistan and Iraq were "told to do push-ups and other forms of

exercise." He was also told that "they weren't forced to do it but they

would do it anyway, probably out of fear. They exercised until they

talked or for no longer than 1 hour [out of] every twenty-four hours."

This analyst also noted that "water was always on hand and medics

readily available." An FBI agent resorted that durin Febru or March

2004 he was walking

when he observed Army personnel "direct[ing a detainee] to do

squats while holding two or three cases of MREs." Another agent told us

that sometime in March or April 2004 at an unnamed location, he saw a

detainee walking and doing calisthenics while holding a case of MREs.

Several agents at in 2004

reported that they observed or heard about the use of calisthenics during

military interrogations, such as push-ups, deep knee bends, or sit-ups,

in order to induce detainee fatigue and cooperation. One agent told us

that other agents told him in early 2004 that military "interrogators

would occasionally have a detainee pace back and forth along a wall for

hours in order to induce fatigue" and thereby lessen his resistance to

answering their questions. While this witness heard about some

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detainees refusing to comply with instructions to continue the

calisthenics or walking, he said he had no information about what the

military did in such cases.

J. Deprivation of Food and Water

The OIG survey asked respondents to provide any information they

had about any intentional deprivation of food or water for detainees by

any U.S. personnel. According to the Church Report, denial of basic

human needs such as food was always prohibited in every theater.

Church Report at 155, 213, 273. The Church Report stated that one

interrogator reported that his unit nevertheless tried food deprivation as

an interrogation technique in Iraq. Id. at 35, 273, 288.

One FBI agent told the OIG that a group of detainees one day were

yelling and screaming that they were not being fed. However, the agent

said that he "observed water and food being provided daily" to the

detainees."

We received several re orts that the

had a policy or practice of

denying food or water to detainees for the first 24 hours of their

detention. Because these allegations relate to the conduct of an FBI

agent, we address them in detail in Part VIII of Chapter Eleven.

K. Depriving Detainees of Clothing

In Section II.G. of this chapter we discussed FBI observations of

sexual abuse of detainees involving nudity. A related form of reported

detainee abuse involved the humiliation of detainees by forcibly removing

their clothing with no related sexual assault. Taguba Report at 16-17.

Some of the most infamous photographs of the abuses at the Abu Ghraib

prison depicted the humiliation of naked or almost-naked detainees by

U.S. military personnel. The March 2004 Taguba Report stated that

between October and December 2003, military personnel at Abu Ghraib

forcibly removed detainees' clothing and kept them unclothed for days at

a time. Id.

According to the Church Report, removal of clothing was not

explicitly addressed in the military interrogation policies for Iraq. Church

Report at 283-85. This technique could have been considered to be

encompassed by one of the Field Manual 34-52 techniques, such as

"pride and ego down" or "incentive." The Church Report stated that in

addition to the highly publicized nudity incidents at Abu Ghraib, there

were two reports of military interrogators using this technique in Iraq but

no evidence of the "systematic use" of this technique. Id. at 285.

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Deprivation of clothing was one of the frequently reported

techniques in Iraq described by FBI agents. Five survey respondents

said that they personally observed this conduct and eight stated that

they heard about it from others. Almost all of the observations resorted

to us related to incidents at the Abu Ghraib prison or the

1. Abu Ghraib Prison

One FBI agent told the OIG that sometime in November 2003 he

saw that "[u]nknown detainees in Abu Gh[ra]ib prison were being held

naked in isolated cells, [and] others were being asked to rol[1] naked on

the floor from one end of the cell block to the other." He added that on

another occasion, he and a second agent saw a naked detainee being told

to roll on the corridor floor between two rows of cells at Abu Ghraib. He

said that a military guard told him the detainee was being disciplined for

being disruptive or uncooperative. He also said that military personnel

told him that detainees were also held naked in cells if they were

disruptive or uncooperative by yelling or screaming in their cells, and

that taking away their clothes had the effect of quieting them.

The agent told us that he did not report or discuss this incident

with anyone in Iraq, including the OSC or Deputy OSC, because he did

not know whether or not this was allowed under military rules, and

because this occurred before the Abu Ghraib photos became public.

However, he did not report these incidents during the May 2004 OGCInspection

Division special inquiry, which was conducted within the FBI

after the Abu Ghraib photos became public.'79

A second agent told the OIG that while he was deployed in Iraq in

November 2003 through January 2004, he saw a detainee at Abu Ghraib

lying on the floor either naked or in boxer shorts with a military guard

and possibly an interrogator nearby. The agent thought this was a

disciplinary measure rather than an effort to coerce information from the

detainee. This agent said that the incident appeared to him to be similar

to common disciplinary procedure in a U.S. jail when a prisoner is being

disruptive. This agent did not report this incident to his chain of

command in Iraq at the time, but he did report it during the May 2004

OGC-Inspection Division special inquiry.

179 This agent said he did not report this incident to the FBI Inspection Division

interviewers who interviewed him in 2004 because he did not believe it was within the

scope of the questions asked.

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Another agent who worked at Abu Ghraib told the OIG that on one

occasion in December 2003 while he was walking through part of the

prison, he saw several detainees "in their cells with only underwear on."

He said that the Army sergeant escorting him through the prison said

that this was an approved technique." The agent said he understood

that this was meant to soften the detainees up and make them more

cooperative in interrogations. He told us that he did not discuss his

observations of the detainees in their underwear with the OSC or Deputy

OSC because he assumed it was an approved technique and thought

there was no controversy about it. He said that the sergeant volunteered

that the deprivation of clothing was authorized, and the agent received

the impression that this practice was not uncommon at Abu Ghraib at

the time for detainees who were being difficult.

2.

One FBI a ent described an incident that occurred at the

between November 2003 and January 2004. This agent said he observed

detainees stripped naked or nearly naked and marched around a room in

that facility. He stated that the same room was often in use with the

door closed while he was at the facility. The agent told us he was not

sure he described to his OSC or Deputy OSC what he had observed, and

he did not believe it was necessary to report it to anyone.

In addition, SA Adair,

, reported that he

was told that before he arrived there the military interrogators would

strip a detainee naked in order to humiliate him.180 He said that his

understanding was that the military had stopped using this technique by

the time he arrived there in February 2004.

Another agent who served at the told

us that he observed on one occasion during April or May 2004 a

"detainee shackled to [the] floor, naked and blindfolded." The agent did

not know how long the detainee had been in that position. The agent

said that a second agent was with him at the time, but neither of them

questioned military personnel about this or reported it to the OSC or

Deputy OSC. The agent said he had no information as to whether or not

180 Adair is a pseudonym.

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this had been authorized by military commanders, or why the detainee

was being held in that condition.181

Several agents reported to us that they had heard that the

deprivation of detainee clothing was a standard procedure, but never saw

it themselves. One of these agents stated that at least in some cases,

military personnel may have done so for purposes of discipline rather

than to coerce information from detainees.

L. Hooding or Blindfolding Detainees

The OIG survey also asked respondents to provide information

concerning the use of hoods or blindfolds on detainees other than during

detainee transportation. According to the Church Report, hooding was

not explicitly addressed as an interrogation technique in military

interrogation policies for Iraq. Church Report at 283. The Church Report

stated that there were no reports that hooding had been used as an

interrogation technique, as distinct from a force protection measure

during the transport of detainees. Id. As detailed below, this finding was

not consistent with the accounts given to the OIG by some FBI agents.

Twenty-two FBI employees responded to the survey that they had

observed detainee hooding and blindfolding and three stated that they

had heard about it from others. However, many of the responses

indicated that the blindfolding occurred during detainee transportation

or for purposes of safety, security, or discipline. However, other agents

reported the use of blindfolding or hooding as an interrogation technique.

Several of these other agents told the OIG that the U.S. military in

Iraq routinely used blindfolds to prevent detainees from seeing their

detention surroundings and for the protection and security of U.S. and

Iraqi personnel. Agents reported to us that the common practices they

observed during the movement of detainees within or outside of the

detention facilities were the use of either (1) hoods or sandbags over the

heads of detainees, left loose or secured loosely with tape on the outside

of the bags, or (2) large goggles with the lenses blacked out with duct

tape or spray paint.

Other agents described the use of blindfolds, blackened goggles, or

hoods, together with other efforts to disorient and confuse detainees

during the period shortly after their capture. For example, a former OSC

told us that when a group of captured insurgents was brought in to a

181 The second agent reported in his survey responses that sometime in May

2004 he observed a detainee who was blindfolded and naked, but his recollection was

that he saw this at a different facility.

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detention compound during the fall

of 2003 at around 3:00 a.m., military personnel yelled in Arabic and

English through bull horns while loud rock music was played. The OSC

stated that the detainees were told to stand up and squat down in the

middle of the compound with hoods on their heads.

Several agents told us that in the period of May through October

2004, the military required that detainees be blindfolded for as much as

the first 24 hours after arrival at the . One

agent said that the purpose was to disorient the detainees and to

persuade them to cooperate with interrogators.

Agents also described the use of hoods or blindfolds during

interrogations. Although detainees were often blindfolded during their

initial interrogations at the military's request, the FBI agents said it was

not the general practice to blindfold detainees during subsequent

interrogations or interviews. Removing the handcuffs and blindfold

depended on the interviewer's assessment of how cooperative and candid

the detainee was. In some cases, detainees who were considered

dangerous were blindfolded during interrogations or interviews. Another

agent told us that some detainees were interrogated by the military with

hoods on, possibly as part of "harsh-up" interrogations.

One agent who served at in early

2004 stated that some detainees were left in their cells with hoods on for

extended periods of unknown duration. Detainees who removed their

hoods were directed to put them back on by guards who checked

through the cell door "peep holes." Another agent told us that he

observed that some detainees wore blacked-out goggles while in their

cells, but he did not know why or for how long.

Two FBI personnel also told us about what they viewed as

inappropriate military humor using drawings of "smiley faces" on the

outside of bags over the heads of detainees at Abu Ghraib. An agent in

Iraq in the fall of 2003 told us that an MP brought a detainee for an FBI

interview with a hood marked in this way, and the agent "told the soldier

it was unprofessional." The MP "apologized and came back with a clean

hood at the end of the interview." The agent told us he believed he

reported this incident to an SSA in his FBI Division when he returned to

the United States. An intelligence analyst likewise stated that in the fall

of 2004 she saw a seated prisoner at Abu Ghraib, hands bound behind

his back, wearing a burlap sack on his head with the face drawn on the

sack. She "felt [this] was unprofessional, humiliating and a sick joke,"

but when she said so to a military officer, "he seemed to think it was an

acceptable MP practice."

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We also received reports that FBI agents observed and may have

participated in the use of duct tape to blindfold detainees in Iraq. These

reports are addressed in Part II of Chapter Eleven.

M. Sleep Deprivation or Interruption

Sleep deprivation or interruption was one of the most frequently

reported forms of detainee treatment reported by FBI agents who served

in Iraq. Most agents who described this conduct stated that detainees

had their sleep interrupted by frequent awakenings or through the use of

loud music and lights.

The military's September 2003 Iraq Interrogation Policy explicitly

authorized the use of sleep adjustment, including adjusting sleep cycles

from night to day and limiting total sleep to as little as 4 hours per day.

Church Report at 265, 283. The October 2003 Policy removed sleep

adjustment from the pre-approved list but authorized its use with prior

approval from CJTF-7 Command. Id. at 268. The May 2004 Policy

stated that henceforth this technique would not be approved under any

circumstances. Id. at 270. According to the Church Report, military

interrogators continued to use this technique in Iraq even after it was

explicitly prohibited, and although interrogators apparently adhered to

the 4-hour minimum, they did not always require that the 4 hours be

consecutive. Id. at 282.

Altogether, 15 survey respondents said they observed and 32 said

that detainees or others told them about sleep deprivation being used as

earl as June 2003 at various detention facilities in Iraq, especially at the

. FBI agents resorted that they heard that

this was a standard, approved military procedure.

Similarly, 9 FBI employees stated that they observed the

interference with detainee sleep by loud music or in some cases the

broadcast sound of a baby crying, and 16 stated that they heard about

such actions from others. However, they suggested that the purpose of

such actions could have been sleep deprivation, interference with

communication among detainees, or to create additional stress for

uncooperative detainees as part of a "harsh-up" interrogation.

One FBI agent deployed to Iraq between the fall of 2003 and early

2004 told us that based on what he had heard, "[i]t was commonly

known that the military made detainees stand for long periods with bags

on their heads" in order to interfere with their sleep. Another agent who

worked at also told us that in February

or March 2004 he observed a detainee who was forced to stand in his cell

for an unknown period of time in order to keep the detainee awake. The

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.299

agent said that a military guard told him that the guard had been

instructed to keep the detainee awake.

According to FBI agents, the purpose of sleep disruption or

deprivation was to disorient and confuse the detainees about the time of

day and how much time had passed since their capture.

The OSC said that he told agents in Iraq that the

FBI was aware of this practice and that agents need not report it further.

He did not consider the conduct abusive.

Another agent deployed to told us

that detainees were interviewed several times over the course of 24 hours

in a deliberate effort to disrupt their sleep patterns. Further, the

detainees were prevented from knowing what time of day it was. They

were held in a building with no windows and in completely dark cells,

except when they were taken out to go to the bathroom or to be

interrogated. There were also set times at which they were awakened to

be moved from cell to cell, fed, or taken to the bathroom, and the times

for these events changed periodically.

N. Unregistered "Ghost" Detainees

Ten FBI agents told the OIG that they had personal knowledge of

or had heard about the detention of individuals by the United States in

Iraq without official acknowledgment of the detainee

. The

incidents reported by the FBI agents occurred during September through

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.300

December 2003, and high value detainees were the focus of the practice.

Although the agents usually learned of this practice from military

personnel, in each case they were told that the detainees were being held

in undocumented status at the behest of the CIA.

According to the Church Report, Lt. Gen. Sanchez (the CJTF-7

Commander) stated in July 2004 that CJTF-7 staff officers and the CIA

reached an unwritten agreement to provide a number of cells at Abu

Ghraib for the CIA's exclusive use in holding "ghost" detainees. Church

Report at 317. Under this agreement, there was no requirement for the

CIA to register the prisoner with the military when the CIA used those

cells. Id. The Army investigation led by Lt. Gen. Anthony Jones in 2004

also concluded that "ghost detainees" occurred at Abu Ghraib because

detainees were accepted from other agencies and services without proper

in-processing, accountability, and documentation. The Jones

investigation concluded that "[t]he number of ghost detainees temporarily

held at Abu Ghraib, and the audit trail of personnel responsible for

capturing, medically screening, safeguarding and properly interrogating

the 'ghost detainees,' cannot be determined." 2004 US Army, LTG

Anthony R. Jones, Investigation of Intelligence Activities at Abu Ghraib,

AR 15-6 ("Jones Report") at 23.

A former FBI OSC in Iraq stated in his survey responses that

military intelligence personnel described to him in general terms the

existence of ghost detainees at Abu Ghraib. Two other agents told us

that during the period of September through December 2003, the CIA

refused to allow the FBI to interview certain high value detainees held at

Abu Ghraib. One of these agents told us that he learned about the

"ghost" detainee practice when some detainees scheduled for FBI

interviews at Abu Ghraib could not be located, and military personnel

told him that the detainees were likely on a CIA "ghost" list because the

facility had no records or identifying information for the detainees. The

agent said that he thought there were at most three or four such "ghost

detainees" while he served in Iraq.

Another agent reported to us that during the fall of 2003 he was

told that a particular high value detainee had been interrogated by the

CIA at Abu Ghraib for some time before this agent was given access to

him. The detainee remained unregistered during part of the period in

which this agent interviewed him. During that period, the agent told us

the International Committee of the Red Cross was making a very public

effort to get access to all detainees. The agent said he and a military

officer obtained a prisoner number for the detainee, who subsequently

was reported to the Red Cross. The agent also told us that he did not

know whether the detainee's "ghost" status was legal. In addition,

according to another FBI agent, an officer at Abu Ghraib told him in

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December 2003 that the CIA had an arrangement whereby they could

house "ghost detainees" without documenting them.

0. Actual or Threatened Transfer to a Third Country

An FBI SSA who served as su ervisor for the FBI agents at n 

in 2004 told the OIG on one

occasion he was informed that a detainee the FBI wanted to interview

was going to be removed He stated that

the FBI moved up its interview timetable because it was going to lose its

access to the individual. The SSA also stated that he did not recall the

name of the detainee or the reasons he was being , and

therefore he could not say it was

Two FBI agents told us that they told uncooperative and untruthful

detainees that they could be transferred to GTMO. One of these agents

stated that while detailed to in 2004, he

and his partner occasionally used a ruse with detainees, telling them

that if they did not cooperate, they could be sent to GTMO or a U.S.

prison far away from their families, and implying that the detainees

would not be well-liked and would be vulnerable to the kinds of violence

that existed in U.S. prisons. Three other agents told us that they used

the ruse of advising untruthful or uncooperative foreign fighter detainees

that they would be sent back to their home countries for further

interrogation.

One of the agents we interviewed described another ruse that

involved telling the detainee that the agents were sent to Iraq specifically

to interview him, and that if the detainee did not cooperate he would be

taken back to the United States to face criminal charges of terrorism and

murder and would be imprisoned in a federal maximum security facility.

P. Threats Against Detainee Family Members

We sought information regarding the making of threats against

detainees' families. According to the Church Report, threatening harm to

others was prohibited by law or doctrine throughout interrogation

operations in Iraq. Church Report at 273. The Church investigators

found no evidence that detainees were subjected to threats against family

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.302

or friends beyond general statements that detainees' failure to cooperate

could result in the arrest of those friends or family members. Id. at 289.

Two FBI agents told the OIG about a ruse they used in mid-2004

on certain uncooperative or deceptive detainees by telling them that the

milit was oin to detain members of their families and bring them to

for questioning. One of the agents told

us that detainees' family members were often also involved in insurgent

activities, especially fathers, cousins, and brothers. According to the

agent, uncooperative detainees would be asked if they wanted their

family members to be picked up and questioned knowing that they could

incriminate the detainee in insurgent activities. He stated that there

were numerous times that fathers, sons, and brothers were detained

together because they were all involved, and that detainees were also told

that if they cooperated their father or brothers could be released.182

Another agent said that he advised a detainee in Mosul during the

first quarter of 2004 that the detainee's failure to cooperate could result

in his family being questioned or detained by Kurdish Security Forces,

which the agent understood was true under the circumstances.

Q. Impersonation of FBI Agents by Other U.S. Government

Personnel

Some agents reported in their survey responses that they had

heard that military or CIA personnel had falsely represented themselves

as FBI agents.183 Five FBI agents reported that they heard about the

impersonation of FBI personnel in Iraq, but none stated that they ever

observed such conduct. Three agents told us that they usually

suspected CIA or military DIA personnel because of mistaken claims by

detainees that other FBI agents had interviewed the detainees shortly

before these agents arrived. However, a former Depu OSC told us that

he knew that at locations such as Abu Ghraib and

detainees were interviewed by personnel from many different agencies,

and the detainees often did not know which agency's employee was

asking them questions. As a result, when an FBI agent showed up, the

detainee would say he had already been interviewed by the FBI. The

182 We discuss whether this conduct constituted misconduct in Section VIII of

Chapter Eleven.

183 The Church Report did not specifically discuss the practice of impersonating

an FBI agent. It stated that "deception" was explicitly approved in the September 2003

Policy but was removed from the pre-approved list in October 2003, after which

requests to use this technique had to be submitted to the CJTF-7 Commander. Church

Report at 265-268. The Church Report stated that deception has been employed in

detainee interrogations throughout the war in Iraq. Id. at 273.

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Deputy OSC said he and his colleagues concluded that this was

confusion on the part of the detainee, rather than deliberate

misrepresentation by the prior interviewer.

R. Other Findings Concerning Agent Observations

Extremely Cold or Hot Room Temperatures. One survey

respondent said he observed detainees subjected to extremely cold room

temperatures in Iraq, and another said he heard about such an

incident.'" The first agent told us that at

during the first quarter of 2004 he once observed a detainee

through the open door of an interrogation room who appeared to be

shaking due to the cold. He said he heard the wall air conditioning unit

operating in the room and knew that the room could get cold because he

had conducted interviews there, but did not know how lon the detainee

was ke t there. Another agent who worked at

reported to us that military personnel told him in mid-2004 that

cold temperatures were used to place stress on the detainees, but that he

never personally saw this done.

Isolation. Over 30 agents told the OIG that they observed or

heard about various forms of isolation of Iraqi detainees, including the

isolation of some detainees as long as 2 or 3 weeks.185 Some witnesses

told us that detainees were regularly kept in one-person cells in which

the detainees could hear but not see one another. Other witnesses told

184 According to the Church Report, military interrogators used temperature

manipulation (both hot and cold) in Iraq prior to May 2004. The technique was used as

a prelude to the incentive technique under Field Manual 34-52 (i.e. moving the detainee

to a more comfortable environment as an incentive for cooperation). In September

2003, environmental manipulation was explicitly approved under DOD policy as an

interrogation technique in Iraq. The October 2003 DOD policy removed this technique

from the pre-approved list but authorized its use with prior approval from CJTF-7

Command. Church Report at 268. The May 2004 DOD policy for Iraq stated that

henceforth this technique would not be approved under any circumstances. Id. at 270.

185 The September 2003 Iraq military interrogation policy listed isolation as an

approved technique, although its use on enemy prisoners of war (as distinct from

security or criminal detainees) required advance approval by the CJTF-7 Commander.

Church Report at 265. The October 2003 Policy removed "isolation" as a listed

technique but authorized the use of "segregation" for several purposes, including "to

ensure the success of interrogations." CJTF-7 approval was required for any

segregation in excess of 30 days. Id. at 269. (The difference between "segregation" and

"isolation" is not made clear, although it appears that the former relates to the

separation of the detainee from other detainees, while the latter relates to limiting the

contact of the detainee with any other persons.) The May 2004 Policy expressly

prohibited "sensory deprivation" as an interrogation technique, which could encompass

more extreme versions of isolation. Id. at 270. The Church investigators found that

isolation was used in Iraq. Id. at 273.

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us that detainees were isolated as rewards for their cooperation, and

therefore had better living conditions than did other detainees. Several

survey respondents stated that detainees at one facility, particularly high

value detainees, were kept in individual cells to reduce their influence on

other detainees, and to "maximize [their] cooperation" with interrogators.

Handling of the Koran and Forcible Shaving of Detainees. One

survey respondent reported in his survey response that a detainee had

objected to him about the fanning of the pages of his Koran by military

guards. Another agent reported that detainees believed that shaving of

their heads and beards was a form of punishment by military personnel,

but the agent also stated that military personnel told her that it was

done for hygiene purposes. A second agent reported that he had

observed the forcible shaving of detainees, but provided no details.

Techniques that No Agents Reported to the MG. There were

two techniques that none of survey respondents stated they ever

observed or heard about, including: (a) intentionally delaying or

depriving a detainee of medical care; and (b) using or threatening to use

spiders, scorpions, snakes, or other animals on or near a detainee.

We also asked witnesses who were involved in detainee interviews

about any complaints that detainees made to them that the detainees

had been mistreated. As in Afghanistan, FBI agents in Iraq often asked

detainees about their treatment and custodial conditions. FBI employees

told us that detainees seldom complained to them about the way they

were being treated by U.S. personnel, and seldom told the agents they

had been mistreated. Rather, detainees often complained that they could

not contact their families, complained that they should not have been

detained at all, or complained about prison conditions generally.

III. Disposition of FBI Agent Reports Regarding Detainee

Treatment in Iraq

As was the case with Afghanistan, we found that very few of the

FBI agents who served in Iraq made contemporaneous reports to anyone

in the FBI or the military regarding the potential mistreatment of

detainees in Iraq. Of the 267 agents who served in Iraq and responded to

the OIG survey, only 13 agents said they made such a report to FBI

superiors or to military personnel. Likewise, most of the agents we

interviewed stated that they did not report any incidents of detainee

abuse to their supervisors or to the military.

We believe that the factors that contributed to the small number of

reports in Afghanistan, discussed in Section III of Chapter Nine, had a

similar impact in Iraq. Most agents said they saw no abuses to report.

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Moreover, there was no formal reporting requirement prior to May 19,

2004, and many agents assumed that any conduct that they observed

was permitted under military interrogation policies in Iraq. As in the

other military zones, the FBI agents in Iraq generally did not consider

their role to include policing the conduct of the military personnel with

whom they were working.

Several FBI agents stated that they raised concerns with their

Supervisory Special Agents (SSA) or with military personnel regarding the

military's detentions of minors in Iraq. Some told the OIG that their

concerns related to the young age and lack of intelligence value of the

detainees rather than any indication that the detainees had been

mistreated. One of the agents stated that shortly after his concerns were

elevated to the SSA and the military commanders, the minor detainees

were released. Two other agents in Iraq during May through July 2004

told the OIG that they spoke to their SSA about their concern that the

military did not have an adequate basis for holding some detainees. One

agent stated that this concern was also communicated to military

intelligence personnel, but he did not know the outcome. Again, these

concerns did not relate to mistreatment of detainees but rather to the

detention itself.

Another agent told us that he heard about but did not see

detainees being forced to pace back and forth along a wall for hours in

order to induce fatigue and lessen resistance to interrogation. This agent

reported the practice to a supervisory agent. The agent said he received

a reiteration of the standard general guidance that agents should not

participate in any practices beyond FBI procedures, that they should

keep the on-scene supervisors informed if they saw anything "abusive

[or] illegal," and that they should use their good judgment as agents.

An agent who served at during

2004 observed sleep deprivation, shackling, stress positions, and other

techniques by the military. He told the OIG that he made a report to an

SSA that some of the agents had concerns that the environment was

coercive. He did not indicate to the OIG whether any action was taken as

a result of his report.

Another agent stated in his surve res.onse that after he saw

being yelled at by

military guards, he asked that a particular detainee he had interviewed

several times be transferred back to the general detainee population.

One agent told us that his complaint to an Army Captain about guards

putting a "smiley face" on a hooded detainee was met with apparent

indifference.

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Most of the agents' reports did not reach as high as the FBI OSCs

or Deputy OSCs in Iraq. We interviewed all of the former FBI OSCs and

most of the Deputy OSCs who served in Iraq during 2003 and 2004, and

with a single exception detailed below, none of these witnesses said that

they ever received any reports from subordinates regarding detainee

mistreatment. In particular, OSCs and Deputy OSCs who served in Iraq

at the time that the abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison were taking place

told us that they did not recall receiving any reports from FBI agents of

such conduct, despite having instructed the agents to make such reports

if they witnessed detainee abuse.

The one significant exception that we learned about was an e-mail

report made in January 2004 from an FBI interview team leader to the

FBI OSC alerting him that there was evidence that prisoners had been

mistreated at Abu Ghraib. This report relayed information provided by

the Army Criminal Investigation Command (CID). As previously

explained, this report was elevated to Executive Assistant FBI Director

Gary Bald, who concurred with the OSC's assessment that the matter

was outside the scope of the FBI's mission in Iraq and that the Army CID

should handle the matter. According to the Deputy OSC at the time, "we

advised all agents working at the prison to watch for any activity they

considered abusive."

Our survey uncovered another incident in which FBI agents in Iraq

reported detainee mistreatment by a foreign interrogator in a non-U.S.

controlled detention facility. An agent who served as the FBI's Legal

Attaché (Legat) to the U.S. Embassy in Iraq in late 2004 told us in his

survey response that an FBI agent and an agent from the U.S.

intelligence community observed a detainee being slapped by a foreign

interrogator. The Legat stated both U.S. agents terminated the

interrogation and left the facility. The Legat stated that he or the agent

e-mailed FBI Headquarters about the incident and were told that

Headquarters was aware of it. We did not receive any additional

information regarding the disposition of this report.

As detailed in Chapter Six, on May 17 and 18, 2004, the FBI

Inspection Division interviewed 14 FBI employees who had conducted

interviews or otherwise been present at Abu Ghraib from October

through December 2003. The results of the inquiry were summarized in

an Inspection Division report to the Counterterrorism Division, the

Director's Office, and the FBI Office of General Counsel, dated May 19,

2004. On January 6, 2005, FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni

forwarded the results of the Inspection Division interviews to John H.

Smith, Deputy General Counsel for the DOD. Caproni's letter stated:

"None of the employees reported observing the sort of mistreatment of

detainees that gained widespread media attention, although a few

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observed handling of detainees in ways that would not be appropriate for

within the United States."

IV. Conclusion

We received varied reports about detainee interrogation practices

from FBI agents who were detailed to Iraq. As detailed in this chapter,

several FBI agents said they observed detainees deprived of clothing.

Other frequently reported techniques identified by FBI agents as used by

military personnel in Iraq included sleep deprivation or interruption, loud

music and bright lights, isolation of detainees, and hooding or

blindfolding during interrogations. FBI employees also reported the use

of stress positions, prolonged shackling, and forced exercise in Iraq. In

addition, several FBI agents told the OIG that they became aware of

unregistered "ghost detainees" at Abu Ghraib whose presence was not

reflected in official records. We also heard reports from FBI agents that

detainees had been sent or were threatened with being sent from Iraq to

a third country for interrogation.

Although several FBI agents were deployed to the Abu Ghraib

prison in Iraq, these agents told us that they did not witness the extreme

conduct that occurred at that facility in late 2003 and that was publicly

reported in April 2004. The FBI agents explained that they typically

worked outside of the main prison building where the abuses occurred,

and that they did not have access to the facility at night when much of

the abuse took place.

We found that few of the FBI agents who served in Iraq made

contemporaneous reports to anyone in the FBI or the military regarding

the potential mistreatment of detainees in Iraq. The FBI OSCs who

served in Iraq during 2003-2004 were virtually unanimous in telling the

OIG that they never received any reports from FBI agents regarding

detainee mistreatment. There was no formal FBI reporting requirement

prior to May 19, 2004, and many agents assumed that the conduct that

they observed was permitted under military interrogation policies in Iraq.

As in the other military zones, the FBI agents in Iraq generally did not

consider their role to include policing the conduct of the military

personnel with whom they were working. Some agents told us that they

were able to get their concerns resolved by taking them directly to the

military. We believe these factors contributed to the relatively small

number of reports made by FBI agents regarding detainee mistreatment.

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CHAPTER ELEVEN

OIG REVIEW OF ALLEGATIONS OF MISCONDUCT BY FBI

EMPLOYEES IN MILITARY ZONES

In this chapter, the OIG describes our investigation and findings

with respect to allegations that particular FBI employees in the military

zones were involved in detainee abuse or mistreatment or other

misconduct. Some of the allegations were made by detainees, but some

of the allegations came from other FBI employees, in most instances in

response to the OIG's survey.

In general, we evaluated FBI conduct by reference to the FBI

policies discussed in detail in prior chapters. The FBI has stated that its

agents were at all relevant times subject to the same policies regarding

detainee interrogations that applied to FBI interrogations inside the

United States, with the exception of the requirement to provide Miranda

warnings. These policies prohibited brutality, physical violence, duress

or intimidation of detainees, and obtaining statements from detainees by

force or threats. In addition, many FBI agents were instructed not to

participate in joint interrogations in which military interrogators were

using techniques not approved for use by the FBI. On May 19, 2004, the

FBI issued a written policy that reiterated the general injunction against

participating in such interrogations and that added for the first time a

requirement that agents report any abuse or mistreatment of prisoners

by non-FBI personnel up the FBI chain of command.

In evaluating the conduct of FBI agents who were alleged to have

abused or mistreated detainees, we recognized that FBI agents sent to

GTMO, Afghanistan, and Iraq were working'in environments that were

not analogous to those the agents faced in the United States. We also

found that the FBI's existing policies did not always provide clear

guidance to agents working in unfamiliar circumstances in the military

zones. In addition, in the absence of more detailed definitions of

concepts such as "participation" and "abuse," it was sometimes difficult

for agents in the military zones to know the degree to which the agents

were required to separate themselves from interrogations that included

non-FBI techniques or when to report the use of such techniques to their

supervisors.

This chapter addresses the individual allegations of misconduct by

FBI employees and is divided into eight Sections describing differing

allegations.

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I. Alleged Mistreatment of Moazzam Begg

In this Section we address allegations made against the FBI by

Moazzam Bet!, who was arrested in Pakistan in late January 2002 and

detained in and at GTMO until his release in January 2005.

Begg alleged that he was subjected to mistreatment and coercion at both

locations and that FBI agents participated in or knew about this

conduct.

A. Background

Begg, a British and Pakistani national, was arrested in Islamabad,

Pakistan by Pakistani authorities on January 28, 2002. He was held

and was questioned by U.S. and coalition intelligence personnel,

including several FBI agents.

In late February 2002, Be was transferred to the United States

military detention facility at , where

he was questioned by U.S. and British intelligence personnel. Begg was

also questioned by FBI Special Agent Bell and by

Detective Harrelson, a New York City Police Department detective serving

on the FBI-sponsored Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York City.186

In February 2003, Begg was transferred to GTMO,, where he was

a am interviewed b Bell and Harrelson,

Begg subsequently disavowed the signed statement, claiming it was

obtained under duress, and stated that he was innocent of the

accusations against him.

In 2004, Begg was scheduled to be the first detainee tried by the

Military Commission at GTMO. Begg was accused by the military of

being a member of al-Qaeda and other affiliated terrorist organizations,

recruiting individuals to attend al-Qaeda terrorist training camps,

receiving training at such camps, and providing support to terrorists by

providing shelter for their families. He was also accused of being

prepared to fight on the front lines against United States and allied forces

along with Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters.

186 Bell and Harrelson are pseudonyms.

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In January 2005, Begg and three other British nationals held at

GTMO were released to British custody. Upon arrival in the United

Kingdom, Begg was released by British authorities and he returned to his

residence in Birmingham, England.

B. Begg's Allegations

Begg made his allegations regarding mistreatment in a letter dated

July 5, 2004, to the United States Forces Administration, Joint Task

Force/Joint Detention Operations Group, and in a written statement to

the Combatant Status Review Tribunal dated July 12, 2004. He provided

further details in interviews with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service

(NCIS) on December 15 and 16, 2004, and with the OIG on May 31,

2006. Begg made additional allegations of mistreatment in a report

prepared by his attorney entitled, "One Thousand Days and Nights of

Torture - The Systematic Torture and Abuse of Moazzam Begg, a British

Citizen, by the United States of America." In addition, Begg wrote a book

describing his arrest and detention, entitled: Enemy Combatant: My

Imprisonment at Guantanamo, Bagram, and Kandahar (The New Press,

2006).

Begg made the following specific allegations of mistreatment and

coercion potentially involving FBI employees:

1. Begg alleged that FBI a ent Bell and NYPD officer Harrelson

participated in interro ations durin which

Be was

2. Begg alleged that on one occasion at Bagram he was hooded

and "hog-tied" by military personnel as punishment for failing to tell the

interrogators what they wanted to hear, struck or kicked in the back and

head, and left in this position overnight. He stated that his interrogators,

including Bell and Harrelson, directed or were aware of this treatment.188

187 Begg identified the individuals who participated in these interviews by their

correct first names, and the FBI later determined that he was referring to Bell and

Harrelson.

188 Begg also alleged that he was aware of two detainee deaths at Bagram and

that the FBI might have been aware of them at the time they occurred. However, he did

not identify any FBI agent who had this knowledge. Bell and Harrelson had already left

Bagram by the time the deaths occurred. We address the FBI's knowledge regarding

deaths at Bagram in Chapter Nine.

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3. Begg alleged that Bell and Harrelson coerced Begg into signing

the written statement at GTMO by threats of imprisonment and

execution without legal recourse.

According to an undated letter from the United States Principal

Undersecretary of Defense to the British Embassy, the Department of

Defense (DOD) conducted three investigations of Begg's allegations of

abuse and found no evidence to substantiate his claims. The DOD

provided the OIG with a Report of Investigation prepared by the U.S.

Army Criminal Investigation Command dated July 23, 2005. According

to this report, the Army reviewed correspondence and statements by

Begg and interviewed over 30 witnesses who were stationed at the

facilities at which Begg claimed the abuses occurred. The report

concluded that "the offenses of Communicating a Threat, Maltreatment

of a Person in U.S. Custody, and Assault did not occur as alleged." Many

of the witnesses interviewed by the Army investigators said that Begg

cooperated with military interrogators by assisting with translations, that

Begg received comforts such as reading and writing materials, and that

Begg never complained about mistreatment while he was at Bagram.

C. OIG Investigation

The primary subject of the OIG's investigation was FBI agent Bell,

who was the only FBI agent against whom Begg made any allegations by

name. Harrelson was a detective with the New York City Police

Department. Although Harrelson was a member of the FBI-sponsored

Joint Terrorism Task Force in New York City, he was not an FBI

employee and therefore not subject to the OIG's jurisdiction.

The OIG interviewed Begg, Bell, and two other FBI agents who

witnessed Begg's interrogations in Bagram and GTMO. Harrelson

declined to be interviewed by the OIG. The OIG also reviewed the FD-

302s and Electronic Communications summarizing Begg's FBI

interviews, his letters and statements complaining about abuse in

Afghanistan and GTMO, his book, and an interview conducted by NCIS

in December 2004.

The OIG interviewed Begg by telephone on May 31, 2006. Begg is

fluent in English, and no interpreter was required. His attorney was on

the phone during the interview. Begg's statements to the OIG were

largely consistent with the allegations that he had made in letters to the

DOD and in his book.

D. OIG Analysis of Begg's Allegations

In this subsection, we summarize and analyze the evidence

relating to Begg's allegations. We also assess the conduct of the FBI

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employees allegedly involved in this matter pursuant to the FBI policies

relating to interrogations as detailed in prior chapters of this report.

1. Alleged Threats and Psychological Ploys in

Afghanistan

Begg Interview. In his OIG interview, Begg alleged that while he

was incarcerated at Bagram Air Force Base, he was questioned by a

variety of interrogators, including Bell, Harrelson, a CIA employee named

"Martin," and a military interrogator named "Alex." He said that during

the interrogations, both his hands and feet were usually in restraints

unless he needed to write something. He said that his hands were

restrained in front of his body.

He said that while Bell and Harrelson asked him many questions,

the CIA employee and the military interrogators were "clearly in control."

Begg stated that over a period of about a month, he was interviewed 10

to 15 times. He said in addition to Bell and Harrelson, he was

interviewed by four other unidentified FBI agents. He said that

sometimes these were cordial conversations and were not always

interrogations.

Begg told the OIG that during interrogations attended by Bell and

Harrelson in May 2002, he was threatened with rendition to Egypt. He

stated that he was told that a captured al-Qaeda member had "played

the same games" with the interrogators and was sent to Egypt, where he

"broke down" within two days, and that Begg would also be sent to Egypt

if he did not cooperate. He said that initially this threat was made by the

CIA employee, and that Harrelson "possibly" discussed it. Begg said that

he did not recall Bell making any reference to Egypt. Begg stated that he

understood that the threat to send him to Egypt meant that he would be

tortured there, as it was commonly known in the Muslim world that

Egypt uses such methods as rape and electric shocks to interrogate

prisoners.

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Bell Interview. Bell told the OIG that when he and Harrelson

began interviewing Begg in May 2002, Begg was generally cooperative.

He stated that when they interviewed Begg, he was given "Miranda

warnings." In an FD-302 relating to an interview with Begg on May 11,

2002, Bell wrote that at the outset of the interview Begg was asked if he

had previously been read his rights, and that Begg stated he had and

that he fully understood those rights. Bell said that during the interview

there was some "back and forth" with Begg when Begg would deny any

knowledge of something that they believed he knew about. Bell said that

the most aggressive tactic that the interviewers used with Begg was to

raise their voices to challenge him. Bell said that the interviews were

never more aggressive than that and that they never had any physical

contact with Begg or harmed him physically.

Bell stated that for a majority of the interviews of Begg, he and

Harrelson were joined by other members of the intelligence community.

He said that the interviews of Begg were all documented with either an

FD-302 or an EC if a member of the intelligence community was present.

Bell told the OIG that Begg was escorted into the room for

interviews in hand restraints and was hooded during transport. Bell

stated that the hood was removed when Begg entered the room and that

Bell asked the military escort to remove the restraints, which was done.

Bell denied threatening Begg with being sent to Egypt or

referencing another detainee being sent to Egypt. He told us that such

an approach would be inconsistent with what he and Harrelson were

trying to accomplish with Begg, which was to elicit information that

could be used in a United States court.

We asked Bell whether he heard anyone question Begg with words

to the effect of "do you ever want to see your children again?" Bell stated

that he did not recall that question being asked. He stated, however,

that one of the strategies that he and Harrelson employed was to try to

encourage Begg to cooperate so that they could move him into FBI

custody, have him plead guilty, and then try to help his family to move

closer to him. Bell said that they were nevertheless frank with Begg that

they did not know what the future would hold for him or any of the

detainees. Bell stated that they never threatened him that he would not

be able to see his family, but they did warn him that if he lied to them

they would not be able to help him.

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Bell stated that he had no recollection of a woman screaming in a

room next to Begg, nor was he aware of the use of that tactic or even that

there were female detainees held at the facility. He stated that neither he

nor Harrelson ever made any threats or indicated that Begg's family

would be abused or harassed in any way.

OIG Conclusions. Begg stated that a CIA agent and "possibly"

Harrelson threatened him with being sent to Egypt if he did not

cooperate, but that he did not recall Bell threatening to send him to

Egypt. Given Begg's uncertainty about what Harrelson said to him and

lack of recollection of Bell making such a threat, we found insufficient

evidence to conclude that an FBI employee threatened Begg with

rendition to Egypt.

When Begg was interviewed in Bagram in May 2002, the FBI

Director had not yet made the decision that the FBI would not participate

in interrogations when other agencies were using tactics not normally

available to the FBI. (As noted in Chapter Four, we believe this decision

occurred in July 2002 in connection with the Zubaydah interrogation.)

In other words, the FBI's "do not participate" policy had not yet been

communicated to all agents serving in military venues. Therefore, even if

a CIA agent did threaten Begg with rendition in the presence of Harrelson

or Bell, FBI policy did not yet clearly require them to leave the

interrogation.

A similar analysis applies with respect to Begg's allegation that he

was led to believe that his wife was screaming in an adjacent room. Bell

said he did not recall this incident, and we found no other evidence that

it occurred or that Bell or Harrelson directed it. Moreover, Begg

acknowledged that the CIA and the DOD were in charge of his

interrogations.

We also found insufficient evidence to conclude that the

interrogators explicitly or implicitly threatened Begg's children when they

showed Begg pictures of his family. Even assuming that the

interrogators asked Begg if he cared for his family, as he alleged, this

form of questioning as a means to induce cooperation would not

constitute an improper threat in violation of FBI interrogation policies.

2. Alleged Physical Abuse in Afghanistan

Begg Interview. Begg also told the OIG that he suspected that

interrogators in Afghanistan, including Bell and Harrelson, were involved

in an incident in May 2002 in which Begg was physically abused by

military personnel. Begg said that during his second or third

interrogation, he was in an interrogation room with Bell, Harrelson, and

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.315

a CIA employee. He said that at the end of the interrogation session the

interrogators said they did not believe that he was telling the truth.

According to Begg, the CIA employee stated as he was leaving the room

that he was going to arrange Begg's punishment. Begg said that shortly

thereafter military personnel escorted him to an adjoining room where

his hands were restrained behind his back and closely connected to his

ankle restraints by a chain. Begg described this as being "hog-tied." He

said that he was also hooded. Begg told the OIG that Bell and Harrelson

were present in the interrogation room when he was being moved to the

other room by soldiers.

Begg told the OIG that several hours later a soldier named Nathan

came in and told Begg that the cases of detainees being sent to Syria and

Egypt were "very real."

Later in the OIG interview, Begg said that not long after he was

restrained on the ground in the room next to the interrogation room, he

was struck in the back and head and that he thought it was by the

soldiers. He said that he was left alone in that position until the

restraints were removed the next day. He said that this was the only

time that this kind of treatment occurred.

Begg said that he did not hear any of his interrogators tell the

military personnel to tie him up or restrain him, but that he believed that

in almost every case, the interrogators would determine how detainees

were treated.

According to Army records, one of the accounts that Begg gave to

Army investigators was somewhat different from the version he provided

to the OIG. According to an investigative report prepared during the

Army investigation, Begg told an investigator on June 22, 2004, that he

was never beaten or struck by anyone at Bagram, but that he was "hogtied"

and laid on his side for a period of time. In a subsequent interview

in December 2004, Begg made essentially the same allegations that he

made to the OIG.

Bell Interview. Bell told the OIG that he did not hear a CIA

employee stating he was going to arrange Begg's punishment. Bell said

that if he had heard such a statement, he would have withdrawn from

the interview and reported the statement to his FBI chain of command.

Bell also pointed out that such a tactic would have been inconsistent

with his approach of attempting to build rapport with Begg.

Bell denied that Begg was "hog-tied" and struck in a room next to

the interrogation room at Bagram. Bell said that if such an incident had

happened, Begg would have told Bell about it. Bell said that he

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OIG Conclusions. Numerous witnesses interviewed by the Army

Criminal Investigation Command stated that they never witnessed Be

or an other detainee bein ho t -tied at the Ba• ram facili

"certainly" would not have allowed something like that to occur. Bell also

said that he was not aware of a room that Begg would have been taken to

other than the interrogation room or his cell.

Interview of Another FBI Agent. We interviewed another FBI

agent who served in the military in Afghanistan in the summer of 2002

before joining the FBI. The agent stated that he attended an FBI

interrogation of Begg at Bagram and that the FBI agent's questioning was

calm and personable. He also told us, however, that he witnessed Begg

being slapped on the back of the head during the interrogation as a way

of getting his attention. The agent said he did not recall who slapped

Begg, but he was certain it was not the FBI agent. He said that Begg

appeared agitated about being slapped, but that shortly after the incident

Begg was "laughing and smiling."

Even crediting Begg's version of his treatment at Bagram, Begg did

not allege that he was struck or hog-tied by an FBI agent or even that an

FBI agent was present during this incident. Begg's allegation of his

interrogators' complicity in the incident was based not on personal

observation or direct knowledge, but rather on his belief that

interrogators dictated how detainees were treated and on the statement

of the CIA interrogator that he was going to arrange Begg's punishment.

In the face of Bell's specific denials and his explanation that abusing

Begg would undermine the effort to build rapport with him, we found

insufficient basis to conclude that Bell or Harrelson were aware of or

complicit in the alleged incident of physical abuse.

3. Alleged Threats and Coercion at GTMO

Begg Interview. Begg told the OIG that several days after he

arrived in GTMO, Bell, Harrelson, and two military interrogators

interviewed him and took a statement from him. He said that Bell and

Harrelson presented him with a draft statement and told him that if he

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refused to sign it he could face "untold amounts of years' imprisonment

in Guantanamo without ever seeing [his] family or having any access to

any legal recourse, which also could include execution by lethal injection

or whatever." Begg said that Bell and Harrelson mentioned that they

wanted him to enter into a plea bargain followed by witness protection.

He said they gave him the example of "Sammy the Bull" who killed 19

people and only got 2 years in prison. Begg also stated that Bell and

Harrelson gave him confusing messages, telling him at times that he

would be sent to Britain and at other times to Pakistan.

Begg said that the agents gave him the draft statement and allowed

him to make changes. He said the statement had poor grammar and

clearly was not drafted by him. Begg said the agents came back minutes

later after having made some of his requested changes and asked him to

sign it, but Begg then asked to see a lawyer. Begg said the agents told

him that he would only see a lawyer after he signed the statement. He

said that he went to pray first and then signed the document out of

"desperation, isolation, fear, apprehension, and all those things that had

happened like beatings and threats."

Bell Interview. Bell told us that representatives from the DOD

Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF) in GTMO who were preparing for

the military commission trials requested his assistance in preparing a

case against Begg, who was to be the first detainee tried by the military

commission. The representative from CITF wanted Bell and Harrelson to

clarify some of Begg's statements and have Begg sign a written

statement. Bell said Begg's statement was prepared by an attorney for

the Office of Military Commissions. Bell said he thought that the

statement was "amateurish" as a way of doing business, but he said it

was accurate because it was prepared from the reports of prior interviews

with B egg.

Bell stated that he and Harrelson went through the statement with

Begg "line by line" and told him that he could cross out the items that he

did not agree with. Bell said that Begg initialed each paragraph that he

agreed with and crossed out the ones that he disagreed with, and the

statement went back to the military. Bell said that he and Harrelson

subsequently presented Begg with a final copy of the statement that had

been revised by the military. He said that Begg asked to pray first, and

after praying signed the statement. Bell recalled that during the

meetings with Begg two military personnel were present.

Bell denied that Begg was threatened with imprisonment and the

possibility of execution if he did not sign the statement. Bell said that he

and Harrelson would have stressed the importance of cooperation as the

better route. Bell further said that he never suggested to Begg that if did

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not to cooperate there would be repercussions to his family. Bell stated

that the agents wanted Begg to be transferred to DOJ custody and have

him plead guilty. They discussed with Begg that the FBI could help his

family by having them moved close to Begg.

Interview of Another FBI Agent. We interviewed another agent

who visited GTMO in February 2003 and worked closely with CITF,

which was developing a case against Begg for the military tribunal. The

agent said that while he was at GTMO he met with Begg several times,

and that Begg was cooperating with the FBI. The agent told us that the

guards treated Begg well and that Begg joked around with them.

The agent said that Bell and Harrelson had already left GTMO

when the agent visited the first time and that Begg had already given the

signed statement to the FBI. According to the agent, Begg told him that

he was being threatened at the time that he gave the written statement to

the FBI. The agent told the OIG that he did not probe this any further

with Begg because he viewed Begg's complaint as an attempt to distance

himself from the written statement that he had given and to minimize it.

He said that Begg complained about "some other guys" who told him that

he would be sent back to Afghanistan, but Begg did not specify whether

the people who supposedly said this were from the FBI or the military.

Begg also joked with the agent about Bell and Harrelson, referring to

them as "big" and "funny."

Begg's Signed Statement. The OIG reviewed a copy of Begg's

signed statement dated February 13, 2003. The statement is eight

single-spaced pages, signed by Begg, Bell, Harrelson, and two DOD

Criminal Investigative Division agents. Begg's signed statement

indicates, among other things, that Begg sympathized with the cause of

al-Qaeda, attended terrorist training camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan,

and England so that he could assist in waging global jihad against

enemies of Islam, including Russia and India; associated with and

assisted several prominent terrorists and supporters of terrorists and

discussed potential terrorist acts with them; recruited young operatives

for the global jihad; and provided financial support for terrorist training

camps.

Notations that appear to be Begg's hand-written initials appear at

the beginning and end of each paragraph of the statement. The

statement also has additions and deletions that are also initialed. These

include both minor and substantive changes. For example, on the first

page Begg apparently corrected the spelling of one of his aliases, changed

"handguns" to "handgun," and deleted "hand" in front of "grenades." On

page 3, Begg apparently changed the statement "I am unsure of the exact

amount of money sent to terrorist training camps of the many years I

275

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.319

helped fund the camps," by replacing the word "many" with the words

"couple of." On page 4, he added the following sentence apparently for

purposes of explanation for his conduct: "This was to help the Kurds in

Iraq."

The facts in Begg's detailed statement are generally consistent with

the facts set forth in the numerous FD-302 summaries of Begg's

interviews. For example, his statement described the training camps in

Afghanistan that he attended and what he learned. This information was

similarly developed in the FBI's FD-302s.

Some of the conclusions that appear in his statement are not

found in the FD-302s. S ecificall , in his statement he admitted that he

The OIG was not

able to find a reference in the FD-302s that correlated with this part of

Begg's statement.

OIG Conclusions. If true, Begg's allegations concerning how his

statement was obtained would potentially violate the FBI's prohibition

against using threats to coerce a confession. However, the OIG did not

find sufficient evidence to support Begg's allegations. The statement

itself with the additions and deletions initialed by Begg support its

voluntariness. In addition, even after making the statement Begg

continued to cooperate with the FBI, according to the FBI agent who met

with him later.

Furthermore, we found that Bell's denial that he threatened Begg

in order to get him to sign the statement was credible because such

conduct could have undermined Bell's long-term strategy of building

rapport with Begg to obtain his cooperation for other prosecutions. Begg

even acknowledged that Bell and Harrelson had mentioned the

possibility of a plea bargain, witness protection, and cooperation with the

government. Therefore, we concluded that the evidence did not support

the allegation that they coerced Begg into signing the statement.

II. Allegations of Mistreatment of Saleh Muklif Saleh

In this Section we address allegations that detainee Saleh Muklif

Saleh was abused by interrogators

) in Iraq during

late February and early March 2004. According to the allegations, FBI

agents participated in these interrogations.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.320

Saleh also was allegedly

in Ira.. He was arrested by

A. Background and Allegations

On February 29, 2004, Saleh was interrogated at the U.S.

detention facility in MEM by FBI special agents Rohr, Cisco, and

Howard, along with an FBI interpreter and two Iraqi-police officials.'89

Prior to the interrogation session, the FBI fingerprinted and

photographed Saleh. During the interrogation session Howard took

photographs to document whether Saleh had any pre-existing injuries,

the condition that he was in, and the conditions under which the

interrogation was conducted. Rohrrovided the OIG with 13

photographs of the interrogation in

Rohr, Cisco, and Howard prepared an EC dated March 1, 2004,

summarizing a 5-hour ni httime interrogation session includin• a 1-

hour break

Shortly after Saleh's interrogation, the FBI agents and interpreter

returned to Around the same time, Saleh's cousin was arrested

and brought to the U.S. detention facility . Over the next

several days, both Saleh and his cousin were further interrogated by

military personnel, who Howard stated were from the U.S. Air Force

Office of Special Investigations (OSI).

, and the OSI agent contacted the FBI about assistance in further

interrogating Saleh and his cousin. Arrangements were made to bring

Saleh and his cousin to IN for additionalastioning. Howard said

that the reason Saleh was interrogated at was to bring him closer to

the location where his information could be put to use.

189 These names are pseudonyms.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.321

ortion of

Late on March 3, 2004, two FBI employees assisted in transporting

Saleh and his cousin to , where they were placed in the U.S.

detention facility prior to the interrogation. A "Receipt for Inmate or

Detained Person" indicates that Rohr delivered Saleh to the military at

at 1:11 a.m. on March 4, 2004. The receipt states "receved [sic] in

good heath," with the additional words "with minor bruising & scratches"

added in different handwriting. The military police sergeant who signed

the receipt told military investigators that he did not write the additional

words on the form and that he did not know who added them.

When asked about the reference in the receipt to "bruising and

scratches," one of the FBI agents said that Saleh had no shoes and that

his feet were bruised and scratched from walking around barefoot. An

FBI medic told military investigators that prior to the interrogation

session , he examined the two detainees and treated both of them

for abrasions on the wrists that were likely associated with plastic

handcuffs.

Another Receipt for Inmate or Detained Person states that Rohr

picked up Saleh for questioning at 7:16 a.m. on March 5, 2004.

Accordin: to Rohr, Saleh and his cousin were brought to a

where they were further interrogated by the same

three FBI agents (Rohr, Cisco, and Howard) and an OSI agent who had

previously interviewed Saleh in . Also present during the

interrogation were two Iraqi police officers who were working closely with

the three FBI agents in Iraq.

The interrogation session lasted for less than 8 hours. According

to Howard, the interrogation was conducted with a sense of ur enc

because the interro ators had information that

. For a

portion of the interrogation, a third detainee was brought into the room

and was questioned. A fourth FBI agent, Bennett, was brought to the

interrogation session for security, although he did not stay for the entire

interrogation session.190 Howard told us the FBI took the lead in the

interrogation, although the OSI agent also participated actively. Howard

stated that he did not recall the name of the OSI agent who participated.

Saleh's cousin was blindfolded with duct ta e for some

the interro ation so that

. Howard took photographs at this interrogation

session, which were included in the photographs provided to the OIG.

190 Bennett is a pseudonym.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.322

Rohr stated that they treated Saleh professionally. Rohr and Cisco

said that they bought him sandals and food and allowed him bathroom

breaks. They said that they sat in a semi-circle around Saleh, who was

also seated, and threw questions at him quickly to confuse him. They

also said that they yelled at him to confuse him.

Accordin • to the a• ents, Saleh and his cousin

, although the FBI

did not provide the OIG with any Form FD-302 or other

contemporaneous record of what happened at this interrogation session.

On March 8, 2004, another FBI agent who was not present at the

interview signed a sworn statement for the milit 's investi ative file

summarizin information rovided by Saleh,

On March 11, 2004,

Saleh was transferred to Abu Ghraib prison.

From records provided by the military, it appears that the first time

Saleh made any allegations of abuse was on June 16, 2004, when he was

at Abu Ghraib prison. According to a military document, Saleh told

military personnel that he was abused during 4 days in February while

detained at , and on the first day that he was

detained at . He stated that he had sustained injuries, including a

dislocated shoulder. However, the translations of two sworn statements

that Saleh gave to the military dated June 19 and July 14, 2004,

describe onl abuse that allegedly took place before Saleh was

transferred

In the June 19 statement, Saleh alleged that "Miley tortured me

and cuffed me in an act called the scorpion, and pouring cold water on

me. They tortured me from the morning until the morning of the next

day, and when I fell down from the severing torture I fell on the barbed

wires, and then they dragged me from my feet and I was wounded and,

and they punched me on my stomach." CID provided Saleh's statement

to the FBI's Baghdad Operations Center on June 29, 2004.

In the July 14 statement, Saleh made more detailed alle ations.

He stated that while he was detained

soldiers cut his clothes off, tied his arms and legs together behind his

back in a "scorpion operation," tied boxes of canned food to his

shoulders, and poured cold water on him if he fell on the ground from

exhaustion. He also stated: "They gave me one or two bottles of water

and they asked me to drink it while I was hungry and they forced me to

drink it, so I did, and I felt vomiting, then they ordered me to drink

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.323

again, and they were looking at me and laughing." He also described

forced exercise and being subjected to "loud music like the devil's voices."

Saleh stated that when he refused to confess, he was punched in the

stomach and face. He stated that one person used a tool around his

neck, pulling him backward, and said that "when I fell down on barbed

wires they dragged me from my feet until I get cuts in my body." Neither

the June 19 statement nor the July 14 statement contained an allegation

that Saleh's shoulder was dislocated.

The Army conducted an investigation into these allegations and

took sworn statements from Rohr, Howard, Cisco, the FBI agent who

transported Saleh and his cousin to , and the FBI medic who had

bandaged Saleh and his cousin. On October 20, 2004, the Army

Criminal Investigation Command issued a Memorandum concluding that

its investigation "established there was insufficient evidence to prove or

disprove the offenses occurred as alleged by Mr. Saleh." The

memorandum noted that FBI witnesses denied that Saleh was harmed

during their interviews, that they did not observe evidence of recent

injuries, and that medical screenings of Saleh on March 11 and July 13

did not document treatment for injuries that might have been caused by

punching, kicking, or being dragged across barbed wire. The Army

memorandum did not provide further explanation for the conclusion of

"insufficient evidence to prove or disprove."

According to DOD documents, on February 1, 2005, the Army

Criminal Investigation Command reopened the investigation in order to

"conduct a thorough review of this investigation and determine if the

investigative summary supported the listed offense and justified the

listing of those offenses as 'insufficient evidence."' On February 2 (the

next day), the Army's Special Agent in Charge (SAC) issued a report

based on his review of the existing record that concluded that:

[T]he investigation clearly demonstrates the detainee was not

injured during his apprehension or subsequent

interrogations by the FBI. This fact was documented within

hours of the event by both the FBI Interrogator and a

medical screening conducted two days after his

apprehension. The review indicates the investigation does

not support listing the offenses as "Insufficient Evidence"

rather, clearly indicates the offense did not occur as alleged

and should therefore list the offenses as "Unfounded".

In support of this conclusion, the Army SAC cited the testimony of

Rohr, Cisco, Howard, as well as the statements of an FBI agent who

accompanied Saleh and an FBI medic who treated wounds on

Saleh's wrists. The SAC also cited a report of a medical examination on

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.324

July 13, 2004, which found no injuries consistent with the detainee's

allegations. On February 2, 2004, the Detachment Commander

approved a memorandum adopting the SAC's conclusion that the

offenses did not occur.

B. OIG Investigation

The OIG further investigated Saleh's allegations by interviewing the

four FBI agents who were present during the interrogation of Saleh and

his cousin MIN (Rohr, Cisco, Howard, and Bennett), the FBI

interpreter who was present during the interrogation at and the

FBI a ent who was involved in transporting the two detainees

n .191 We also reviewed relevant documentation, including

statements to CID, survey responses, and digital photographs provided

by one of the FBI agents. Because one of the FBI agents we interviewed

provided a recollection of events that in part was materially different from

the versions provided by the other agents, we summarize each agent's

version of the incident separately.

1. FBI Special Agent Bennett

In his response to the OIG survey, Bennett indicated the he

personally observed the following conduct: "using water to prevent

breathing by a detainee or to create the sensation of drowning." In the

descriptive part of his response, Bennett referred to the interrogation at

involving three FBI agents and two police officers. Although the

response did not mention Saleh, it identified Rohr, Cisco, and Howard as

witnesses to an interrogation session that allegedly involved aggressive

treatment of the detainees by Iraqi police officers.

When we interviewed Bennett, he told us that on an evening in

earl March 2004, he was sittin at his desk in the common area of the

when Rohr walked by and asked

him to assist in an interrogation session involving three

detainees. Bennett said that he understood he was needed as an extra

body.

Bennett told us that he and Rohr drove to

where he observed three detainees being interrogated b

Howard, a military officer (identified b others as the

a ent , and two Iraqi police officers

Rohr, Cisco,

191 The OIG was interested in interviewing Saleh, but the DOD has not

responded to requests from the OIG regarding Saleh's current whereabouts.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.325

Bennett stated that when he entered the house he was

immediately struck by the scene before him because he had never seen

Iraqi detainees or witnessed an interrogation session in Iraq. He said

that the questioning was already underway when he arrived. He also

observed that the Iraqi police officers were yelling at the detainees while

the FBI agents were standing back and writing down questions. He said

that the military officer also was yelling at the detainees.

Bennett said that he was not sure about the sequence of events,

but he observed a detainee in a "stress position" and two other detainees

having water poured down their throats by a military interrogator. He

said that at the house he saw a detainee in a "stress position," which

consisted of kneeling and facing a wall. He described the position of the

detainee as kneeling such that he was not able to touch the wall or lean

back on his legs.

Bennett said that he also observed that the other two detainees

were seated in chairs and that one of the detainees was blindfolded with

duct tape. He believed that the detainees had their hands in restraints.

Bennett recalled that at some point during the interrogation the

military officer "put water down" a seated detainee's throat. He said he

guessed that the purpose of the water was to give the detainee the

sensation that he was drowning so that he would provide the information

that the interrogator wanted. Bennett stated that the detainee was

gagging and spitting out water. He said that the detainee appeared to be

uncomfortable and assumed that he had trouble breathing. Bennett said

that one water bottle was used, but he did not know how long that the

incident lasted.

Bennett stated that the military officer walked behind the sitting

detainee, pushed the detainee's head back, and put the water in his

mouth. Bennett said that he did not know how the military officer held

the detainee's mouth open or held the detainee's head back, but that he

acted on his own without assistance from others. Bennett stated that

the military officer "held the guy's head back and poured water down his

throat."

Bennett said that during the water incident he went outside the

house on the doorstep or front porch with the door open. He said that he

could still observe the interrogation from the front porch through the

door. He believed that other FBI agents joined him on the front porch at

some point in time. He said that one of the agents on the front porch

with him said, "When stuff like this happens, you leave the room."

Bennett said he did not recall which agents said that, but he believed the

reference was to the water incident.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.326

Bennett said he was uncomfortable with what he saw because

"that's not the way you do things in the U.S." He said that he walked in

and out of the house more than once because he was uncomfortable and

also wanted to chew tobacco.

Bennett stated that less than 30 minutes after the water incident

involving one detainee, the military officer repeated the water procedure

on the other seated detainee. He said that he did not recall whether he

was inside or on the front porch when the second water incident

occurred or where the other FBI agents were.

Bennett said that after the first water incident, he went back into

the house and that some of the other FBI agents were with him. Bennett

said he did not recall whether the agents participated in asking questions

between the two water incidents.

When asked what the detainees' reactions were to the water

incidents and whether they appeared to be frightened or intimidated,

Bennett said that they appeared to be used to it or to have been through

it before.

Bennett said that the detainees appeared disheveled and dirty. He

stated that they looked like they had been "slapped around" or "roughed

up," but they did not appear to have any contusions and were not

bleeding. He said that other than the water incidents, he did not see any

touching of the detainees by the interrogators.

Bennett said that not long after the second water incident he

received a ride back to the Baghdad Operations Center from another FBI

agent who had brought paperwork to the three agents. He said that the

other three agents stayed at the interrogation, but that he did not know

how long it lasted. He said that he only stayed for approximately an

hour.

Bennett stated that he did not provide any information to the FBI's

OSC or Deputy OSC regarding the interrogation. He said that he

assumed the other three agents kept the OSC and Deputy OSC informed.

Bennett also described Rohr, Cisco, and Howard as the "hardest working

people there."

The OIG showed Bennett the photographs taken of the

interrogation session , and he identified two of the detainees in

the photographs as the detainees involved in the water incidents.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.327

2. FBI Special Agent Howard

Howard said that he took photographs of both Saleh and the

interrogation session so that there would be a record of what was going

on and to show that the injuries to Saleh werere-existing. He identified

all but one of the photographs as being taken , where the FBI

agents spent 2 da s, and he identified one from the interrogation of Saleh

and his cousin

Howard said that he was in and out of the interrogation at the

"a lot" and that the interrogation had started before he arrived. He

said that the military officer was taking an active role in the

interrogation, but that the FBI had the lead. Howard stated that ill

source was also involved in the questioning.

When asked by the OIG investigators about an agent observing a

detainee kneeling against the wall, Howard stated that he did not recall

any of the three detainees being questioned while kneeling. He stated

that the only time that he recalled any detainee kneeling was when a

detainee asked for a drink of water and was given a drink by the OSI

agent. When asked to describe the circumstances of the drink, he said

he could not remember why the detainee was kneeling, but he said that

the detainee's hands were bound and that the OSI agent poured water

down the detainee's throat after he had asked for a drink of water.

When we asked Howard whether the incident involved forcing

water down a detainee's throat, he responded that if too much water was

being poured, all the detainee had to do was close his mouth because

there was never a situation where the mouth was forced open. He said

that the interrogators had only one-liter bottles of water.

Howard further stated that he would not have wanted to drink that

way, but if his hands were bound, that was the only alternative. He said

that he thought it was an odd way to give water to a detainee and that he

had not seen it before. He stated that it appeared to be the routine

method for giving the detainee water and the detainee was used to it.

Howard said he did not observe that the detainee was squirming.

He also said that when the detainee had enough water, he closed his

mouth, and that he did not recall the detainee gagging or choking. He

stated that the detainee was holding his own head back. Howard said

that had he been the one providing water he would have placed the bottle

to the detainee's lips rather than pouring it down his throat like the OSI

agent did. Although he said he viewed this method of giving the detainee

water as odd and unusual, he did not see it as abusive. However,

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.328

Howard said that the OSI agent would not have had to go much further

for the method to "be a problem."

Regarding the kneeling, Howard said that he had seen detainees

placed in a kneeling position as a security measure during a detainee

movement. He said that this incident involving the detainee kneeling

was probably for the purpose of interrogation rather than security.

When asked how long the detainee was kneeling, Howard said not longer

than a minute or two - long enough for him to get a drink of water.

Howard said that he never intentionally left the room to avoid

observing an incident at an interrogation. He said that if he saw

something that he was uncomfortable with, he would step in to stop it.

Regarding the duct tape around the head of Saleh's cousin,

Howard said that he had no part in placing the tape on the detainee's

head and that he did not see it happen. He stated that at the time the

military's standard protocol for a detainee movement was to have cloth

over the detainee's eyes taped on his head and then hooded. He said

that the military usually removed the tape after the transport, and that

he guessed that the photograph was taken shortly after the detainee

arrived. When the OIG investigators mentioned the scenario of

blindfolding the detainee so that he could not see another detainee who

was in the room, Howard said that "we did that at one point."

3. FBI Special Agent Rohr

Rohr also told the OIG that he was in and out of the interrogation.

He said that he and Howard had to pick up and return one of the

detainees to the detention facility, and that each movement took

approximately 90 minutes while the interrogation of the other detainees

would have continued.

Rohr said that placing detainees on their knees was routine when

moving detainees. He stated, however, that having a detainee kneel as a

stress position for purposes of an interrogation was not permitted.

Rohr stated that he never saw anyone pushing water down a

detainee's throat and that he would not sanction that type of conduct.

He said that when detainees drank water during interrogations, the

bottle was held for them because their hands were restrained. He said

that he recalled that Saleh and his cousin were given water and food

during the interrogation, and that he never heard complaints from the

detainees that they were abused with water.

We asked Rohr whether he stated or heard another agent state

that the FBI should leave the room when things like the water incident

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.329

occur. Rohr responded that neither he nor any of the other agents made

such a statement.

When the OIG asked Rohr about the duct tape around the head of

Saleh's cousin, Rohr responded that one of the FBI agents (he thought it

might have been Cisco) placed cloth over the detainee's eyes and then

lightly taped the head with duct tape. He explained that the purpose of

the cloth was to avoid pulling off the detainee's eyelashes and eyebrows.

He said that the tape was not ripped off the detainee's head.

Rohr said that the purpose of the blindfold was to have Saleh's

cousin repeat his admission for Saleh to hear without letting Saleh's

cousin know that Saleh was in the room. Rohr said that they could not

use a bag because then Saleh would not be certain that his cousin was

making the admission.

Rohr said that when he retrieved the detainees from the detention

facility at prior to the interrogation, they were smiling when

they saw that he was picking them up because in his view they

recognized that the FBI was not going to use harsh tactics.

Rohr pointed out that in the photographs of Saleh at the

interrogation sessions, Saleh does not appear to be scared of his

interrogators, but instead looks comfortable with them. In addition,

Rohr suggested that if they were trying to torture the detainees, they

would not have called in the FBI medic to examine and treat the minor

abrasions on Saleh's and his cousin's wrists.

4. FBI Special Agent Cisco

We interviewed Cisco prior to receiving the allegations from

Bennett. Cisco subsequently resigned from the FBI. When contacted for

a second interview, Cisco informed the OIG that he was being sent to

Iraq several days later by his new private employer, but he agreed to be

interviewed. However, he did not return our subsequent phone calls to

schedule the interview. Therefore, we were not able to ask Cisco

questions about Bennett' observations.

gil

In his earlier OIG interview, however, Cisco provided an account

that was similar to his statement to CID. He said that the FBI agents

d at Saleh and that they were playing "good cop/bad cop" during El

interrogation.

Cisco told the OIG that Saleh initially denied everything during the

interrogation . The agents subsequently brou ht Saleh and his

cousin where his cousin started confessing to

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.330

When Cisco was asked if he observed any treatment of detainees

that would cause him concern, he stated "no," except for an incident at

where he saw a detainee carrying a case of MREs while doing

calisthenics. Cisco said he did not know whether this incident involved

regular exercise or whether the detainee was being forced to carry the

case. He said that the detainee did not appear to be in any stress.

He said that when the FBI brought Saleh and his cousin to

the agents noticed that the detainees' wrists had minor abrasions from

the flex-cuffs, and the FBI medic was called to treat them.

5. Other Witnesses

We interviewed the FBI agent who was involved in transporting

Saleh and his cousin . He stated that he was not involved in the

interrogation sessions, and the photographs of the interrogations

sessions do not include this a ent. He said that when he picked up

Saleh and his cousin , they appeared healthy, had no

visible marks, and did not ex ress any complaints. He said that he

witnessed the interrogation for only about 10 or 15 minutes

when he brought the FBI agents paperwork to sign relating to the

custody of the detainees. He said that he did not see anything unusual

during that time. He also said that he never witnessed any treatment of

detainees that was inconsistent with what he was taught at Quantico.

We also interviewed a contract translator for the FBI, who was

present at the FBI interview but who said that he was not

resent during the interrogation session of Saleh and his cousin at the

the where the alleged water incident took place. The photogra hs of

interrogation do not show the translator. He said that

the OSI agent may have played the "bad cop" and exhibited some sort of

aggression, but he could not remember what it was.

The translator said that the technique of requiring Saleh to kneel

possibly was used 1.1111.11, but he was unable to make the distinction

whether the kneeling was directed by the FBI agents or the OSI agent.

He further stated that Saleh was not struck with any object or with a

"fist to the head," but that he was "flipped about" by the interrogators

during the process of having him face the wall.

In addition, the translator said that Saleh's cousin was the only

detainee he saw blindfolded with tape - others wore blackened goggles or

hoods. When asked what the purpose of blindfolding was, he said that it

may have been to punish or disorient the detainee. He also said that he

observed the blindfold being taken off the detainee and that it was not

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.331

painful at all. He believed that Howard took off the blindfold in the least

painful way possible.

We were unable to interview the OSI agent because none of the

four FBI agents who were present during the interview said they could

recall his name. In addition, the materials provided to the OIG by the

DOD do not indicate that military investigators attempted to identify or

locate this witness or the Iraqi policemen who were present at the

interrogations.

C. OIG Conclusions

We anal zed separately Saleh's allegations regarding events at II.

in late February 2004 and events at BIAP on

approximately March 5, 2004.

1. Saleh's Allegations Regarding

Saleh alleged that he was mistreated over a period of several days

beginning on February 26, 2004, until he was trans orted to late

on March 3, 2004. Saleh was detained at during

that time. As noted above, Saleh claimed he was restrained in a

"scorpion position," subjected to forced exercise and loud music, and

dragged over barbed wire during this period. The evidence did not show

that an FBI agents witnessed or participated in abusing Saleh at

Saleh stated that one of his alleged abusers was a

"black soldier" and that one was a soldier with blue eyes, blonde hair,

and tattoos who was accompanied by a female. These descriptions did

not match any of the FBI agents who interviewed Saleh. Moreover, Saleh

did not specifically identify any of his abusers at as FBI agents.

Saleh was detained at that location for nearly a week. The

available evidence indicates that Rohr, Cisco and Howard interviewed

Saleh together for 5 hours on February 29. The rest of the

time Saleh was in confinement he was in the custody and

control of the military. Rohr told us that Saleh was interrogated by the

military after the FBI agents left the air base, possibly by OSI personnel,

and that he provided information which resulted in him being transferred

to for further questioning. Moreover, if Saleh was in fact

subjected to harsh treatment during this interrogation, the FBI agents

would not necessarily have known about it.

The Army concluded that Saleh was not injured during his

apprehension or subsequent interrogations by the FBI, stating that

"[t]his fact was documented within hours of the event by both the FBI

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.332

Interrogator and a medical screening conducted two days after his

apprehension." However, we did not find this assessment of the evidence

complete. The materials supplied to the OIG by the Army did not include

any indication that the Army conducted any interviews of non-FBI

interrogators or military police who had contact with Saleh

during February 26-March 3, 2004. The Army's materials neither

identified nor discussed the existence of the OSI ersonnel who were

involved in the interrogation of Saleh

Moreover, the FBI "documentation" referred to by the SAC was the EC

dated March 1, 2004, which did not contain any assessment of whether

Saleh had been injured.

In the photographs during the interrogation on

February 29 and the interrogation on approximately March 5, no

clear evidence of wounds or other recent injuries is visible. In addition,

as noted above, the receipt for Saleh's arrival at 1:11 a.m. on

March 4 indicates he was received "in good health," although an

unknown person added the words "with minor bruising 86 scratches."

However, we found some evidence that could be interpreted to be

consistent with some of Saleh's allegations. Bennett told the OIG that

when he saw Saleh and the other detainee 1111111.11, they looked like

they had been "slapped around" or "roughed up," although they did not

appear to have any contusions and were not bleeding. Some of Saleh's

complaints related to treatment that would not necessarily have resulted

in obvious injuries that would appear in photographs. Saleh described

having boxes of canned food being tied to or put on his shoulders and

being ordered to step up and down on other boxes. Cisco told the OIG

that he observed a detainee "doing calisthenics with a case of MREs,"

although he did not identify Saleh as the detainee.192 Moreover, Saleh's

description of being forced to drink bottles of water until he felt sick was

consistent with at least one agent's description of a technique used on

Saleh (discussed in the next section). Saleh also described being

choked with a tool that extended and "was solid like a stick with a white

thing that extended like a knife." The military investigator found that

this description was consistent with a device know as an ASP baton,

which is sometimes used to control prisoners. In addition, a Detainee

Preinterrogation Evaluation dated March 11 indicated that Saleh had an

"abdominal strain," which conceivably could have been associated with

being struck in the stomach, as Saleh alleged occurred

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We concluded, however, that even if Saleh's allegations about

mistreatment are true, there is insufficient evidence to

conclude that the FBI agents who interviewed Saleh at that location on

February 29, 2004, participated in this conduct, heard about it, or saw

clear evidence that abuse of this nature had taken place outside of the

FBI's presence.

2. Alleged Mistreatment of Detainees at

We also analyzed the conduct of the FBI agents during the

interrogation of Saleh on March 5, 2004. The allegations

regarding this interrogation came primarily from information provided by

Bennett, not Saleh.193

Alleged Use of Water on Detainees. We concluded that a non-

FBI interrogator used water on one or more shackled detainees (one of

which may have been Saleh) in a manner that would be considered

coercive and would not be permitted to FBI agents conducting interviews

in the United States.

We credited Bennett's account of the water incident. Bennett had

no reason to fabricate this account; indeed, he appeared to be reluctant

to provide it to OIG investigators. Howard described the same conduct,

albeit in somewhat gentler terms. He told the OIG that the OSI

interrogator gave a drink to the detainee by pouring water down the

throat of the detainee's open mouth while he was kneeling with his

hands cuffed behind his back. We did not agree with Howard, however,

that this conduct was solely for the purpose of giving the detainee a

drink. Other means of supplying water to the detainee were available,

such as raisin: the bottle to the detainee's lips. Indeed, the photographs

of Saleh show him with his hands cuffed in front. He could

have given himself a drink of water from a plastic bottle in that condition.

The FBI agents also told us they offered the detainees food during the

interview. Unless the agents were planning to feed them by hand, they

apparently expected to allow the detainees to feed themselves with their

hands cuffed in front. Likewise, the detainees could have been permitted

to drink from a plastic bottle with cuffed hands. Instead, the detainees

were re-cuffed with their hands behind their backs before the water was

poured down their throat. Therefore, we concluded that Howard's

193 In the two sworn statements that Saleh provided to Army investigators,

Saleh did not allege that any mistreatment occurred during the interview that took

place on approximately March 5, 2004. Memoranda prepared by Army

investigators suggest that Saleh did make such allegations during interviews on other

occasions. However, we were unable to determine from the military documents

provided to us what Saleh specifically alleged about his treatment at

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description of this incident as merely an unconventional way of giving a

detainee his requested drink of water was not persuasive.

We also note the consistency between Bennett's description of the

water incident and Saleh's allegation that "[t]hey gave me one or two

bottles of water and they asked me to drink it while I was hungry and

they forced me to drink it, so I felt vomiting, then they ordered me to

drink again, . . . ."194

At the same time, we do not consider what Bennett and Howard

saw to be equivalent to "waterboarding," in which drowning is simulated

by pouring water on a prisoner's face and mouth while he is restrained

on an inclined board. As described by both Bennett and Howard, the

water was administered by a single interrogator. A single interrogator

would have had difficulty preventing a detainee from closing his mouth

or turning his head to avoid choking. Rather, we believe that this rough

technique was part of an effort to intimidate the detainees and increase

their feelings of helplessness.

Bennett left the room when he observed this activity; he also stated

that that another FBI agent said that "when stuff like this happens, you

leave the room." Such an instruction would have been consistent with

the training that some (but not all) agents told us they received before

deploying to the military zones: that FBI agents should remove

themselves from any interrogation in which another agency's interrogator

used techniques that would not be permitted for an FBI agent.195

None of the FBI agents personally participated in the conduct that

Bennett described. The question therefore is whether any agent's

presence in the room or continued involvement in the interrogation after

the incident occurred violated any FBI policy.

As detailed in Chapter Six, on May 19, 2004, FBI Headquarters

issued a policy stating, among other things, that "[i]l' a co-interrogator is

complying with the rules of his or her agency, but is not in compliance

with FBI rules, FBI personnel may not participate in the interrogation

and must remove themselves from the situation." This policy not yet

been issued in March 2004 when the Saleh interrogation took

194 We recognize that Saleh's statement to the milit. , taken several months

after the incident, indicates that the incident occurred We believe

that at the time he made this allegation he may have confused locations and events, so

that he may have been describing the water incident

195 These instructions are described in Chapter Seven.

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place. The policy states that it merely "reiterates and memorializes

existing FBI policy with regard to the interrogation of [detainees]."

We found that FBI policy clearly prohibited an agent from

"participating" in an interrogation in which other agencies used non-FBI

techniques, but that before May 19, 2004, FBI policy was unclear

regarding whether "non-participation" could be satisfied merely by not

joining actively in the proscribed conduct. The May 2004 FBI Detainee

Policy required agents to physically withdraw from any interview in

which non-FBI techniques were being used by others. Based on

responses to the OIG survey, some agents deployed to the military zones

prior to May 19, 2004, received training to this effect, but many agents

did not.

Howard told us he did not leave the room during the interrogation

. However, the requirement that an FBI employee "remove

himself from the situation" when another agency uses non-FBI

techniques had not yet been clearly articulated in FBI policy at that time.

Similarly, FBI policy did not clearly preclude Howard and the other

agents from resuming participation in the interrogation after the OSI

agent was finished administering the water to the detainees. Indeed, as

discussed in Chapter Twelve, the FBI still has not provided clear

guidance to its agents regarding the circumstances under which an

agent may resume interrogation after non-FBI techniques have been

used. Therefore, we do not find that Howard's conduct clearly violated

FBI policy in effect at the time.

However, we believe that Howard should have recognized that this

activity was inappropriate to an interrogation being led by the FBI, even

if the acts were those of a non-FBI agent. In our opinion, an FBI

employee who observed conduct of this kind should have at least

reported the activity to his OSC.

The other FBI agents who were present during the

interrogation did not tell the OIG that they saw the water incident. One

possible explanation is that they were outside of the room at the time it

took place. Rohr stated that he and Howard may have left the

interrogation for at least one 60- to 90-minute period to transport a

detainee. We therefore found insufficient evidence to conclude that Rohr

was aware of the water incident.

Cisco, who is no longer an FBI employee, did not volunteer any

information about this incident in his interview, which occurred before

we learned about the incident. Cisco did not respond to our requests for

a follow-up interview. We therefore could not make any finding regarding

Cisco's involvement in this incident.

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We also did not conclude that the failure of Howard and Bennett to

report the water incident to their supervisors was misconduct. The FBI

policy requiring that any abuse be reported was not issued until May 19,

2004, more than 2 months after the interrogation. Moreover, the FBI

agents may have inferred that this conduct was permissible for military

interrogators in Iraq. As explained in Chapter Six, even after the

issuance of the FBI's May 19, 2004, policy, it was not clear how FBI

agents were expected to know the boundaries of permissible military

interrogation techniques.

Alleged Use of Stress Positions. Bennett told us that the

detainees were placed in an uncomfortable kneeling position or "stress

position" at some point during the Saleh interrogation . Rohr also

stated that the detainees were made to kneel against the wall, but that

this was not as a stress position for purposes of the interrogation. He

stated that detainees were often put in this position during

transportation.

Howard told the OIG that one of the detainees was already in the

kneeling position when he was being "given a drink," but that he could

not remember why. However, in the written statement Howard provided

to the Army he stated that Saleh "was seated in a chair the whole time

and was never put in any odd positions."

FBI agents would not be permitted to put a prisoner in a kneeling

"stress" position as an interrogation technique during a custodial

interview in the United States (as distinguished from a security measure

during an arrest). However, there is no evidence that any FBI agents

participated in placinnees in stress positions. Moreover, the

interrogation facility =II was not equivalent to a typical facility used

for custodial law enforcement interrogations in the United States, and

security may have been a concern underlying the use of a kneeling

position for a limited period of time to ensure control over the detainees.

For these reasons, we did not find sufficient evidence to conclude that a

kneeling "stress position" was used as an interrogation technique as

contrasted to a security measure, or that the FBI agentsn p•roperly

"participated" in the use of stress positions during the interview. In

addition, given the widespread use of this technique by the military in

Iraq, the agents could have reasonably inferred that the use of stress

positions was permitted at the time of the interrogation, and there was

no FBI policy at that time requiring the agents to report this conduct to

their superiors.

Alleged Use of Duct Tape To Blindfold a Detainee. Several

witnesses told us that a detainee (identified as Saleh's cousin) was

blindfolded with duct tape. One of the photographs made available to

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the OIG shows a detainee with duct tape wrapped on his head, which

would have likely been painful to remove.

Rohr said he thought Cisco might have put duct tape on the

detainee. As mentioned previously, Cisco was originally interviewed

before this issue came to light and has since left the FBI. He did not

respond to our requests for a follow-up interview, and as an ex-FBI

employee he could not be compelled to cooperate. Howard stated that

the military typically used duct tape this way when transporting

detainees, and that the detainee may have arrived in this condition.

However, this suggestion was inconsistent with Rohr's statement that

detainees were usually hooded during transportation but that duct tape

was used in this instance so that the other detainee would be able to tell

the identity of the person making the confession, which hooding would

not permit.

We believe that FBI policies regarding coercion would have

prohibited an FBI agent from using duct tape in this manner in the

United States. We also believe that the FBI participated in this technique

during interview. However, we were unable to determine which

FBI agent was directly involved in duct taping a detainee's head to

blindfold him, in part because Cisco declined to provide a follow-up

interview. None of the agents objected to the use of duct tape at the

time, or reported the incident to their superiors. We acknowledge that in

the United States alternatives would be available that may not have been

available in the Iraq war zone, such as videotaping the confessing

detainee or using a one-way mirror. This does not excuse the potentially

painful use of duct tape, however, because other alternatives could have

been used, such as a conventional blindfold or blacked-out goggles.

Conclusion. The available evidence was insufficient for us to

conclude that any FBI employee actively participated in using coercive or

otherwise prohibited interrogation techniques in March

2004. Techniques were used by non-FBI personnel during this interview

that clearly would not have been permitted for use by FBI agents in the

United States. With the exception of Bennett's leaving the room during

the water incident, we found that the FBI agents generally did not

withdraw from the interview, object to these techniques, or report the

matter to their OSC. Because of the lack of clarity in FBI policies at the

time and the vagueness of some witnesses' recollections, we did not find

a sufficient basis to conclude that these agents violated FBI policy.

However, the FBI was the lead agency during the interviews of

Saleh and his cousin , and we believe that agents could have

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influenced the techniques used by other interrogators during these

interviews, or at least reported this incident to their OSC. 196 We also

believe that this incident illustrates shortcomings in the guidance that

the FBI provided its agents regarding interrogation techniques in the

military zones. We address this issue further in Chapter Twelve.

III. Allegations of FBI Mistreatment of Mohamedou Ould Slahi

In this Section we address allegations made by detainee

Mohamedou Ould Slahi (#760) relating to the conduct of FBI agents at

GTMO. In Section XV of Chapter Five we discussed the treatment of

Slahi, primarily by the military, and the FBI's reporting on the allegations

that it received relating to his treatment. This section analyzes the

conduct of FBI agents involved in the handling of Slahi.

A. Slahi's Allegations

Slahi made his allegations relating to FBI conduct during two

interviews conducted on April 25 and 27, 2005, by a military interrogator

on behalf of the 01G.197 Prior to these interviews, the military

interrogator provided the OIG with a Memorandum for Record (MFR)

dated December, 24, 2004, summarizing an earlier interrogation in

which Slahi had made allegations of mistreatment by the military.

In the interviews for the OIG, Slahi told the military interrogator

that most of his contact with the FBI was with FBI agents Poulson and

Santiago, and he identified Santiago as a "nice guy."198 He stated that no

one from the FBI ever threatened his family. However, he made the

following allegations relating to the FBI, which the OIG investigated:

196 Our criticism is not directed at Bennett, who was not an FBI interrogator

responsible for interrogations and who was clearly surprised and upset at

what he observed. We believe that Bennett provided the most complete and candid

information about this incident to the OIG.

197 During the OIG's visit to GTMO in April 2005, the OIG requested access to

Slahi to interview him regarding FBI e-mails that referenced his treatment by the

military. General Hood, the JTF Commander at the time, expressed concern about

disrupting the detainee's interrogation by a military interrogator who he said had

developed an excellent rapport with Slahi. As a result, the military interrogator

presented our questions to Slahi and provided us with his responses. The military

interrogator posed the OIG's questions in two separate sessions with Slahi. During the

OIG's second trip to GTMO in February 2007, the OIG investigators obtained direct

access to Slahi, and he confirmed much of what he had told the military interrogator

asking questions on our behalf. He also provided additional details on several issues.

198 Poulson and Santiago are pseudonyms.

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• An FBI agent named "Samantha" was involved in putting

him on the boat for the "boat ride" as a ruse for making him

believe he was being transferred to a different location. (This

incident is described in detail in Chapter Five.)

• When Poulson was leaving GTMO, he said that Slahi would

"not have a good time in the near future," which Slahi later

interpreted as a prediction that the military would torture

him.199

• Santiago said Slahi would be sent to Iraq or Afghanistan if

the charges against him were proved.

• On the behalf of the FBI, an interrogator told Slahi that he

would be sent to a "very bad place" if Slahi did not provide

certain information.

In addition to interviewing Slahi, the OIG interviewed Poulson and

Santiago and examined relevant records.

B. OIG Analysis

1. Alleged FBI Participation in the "Boat Ride"

Incident

As discussed in Chapter Five, at GTMO Slahi was taken on a boat

ride as part of a ruse to make him believe he was being transferred to a

different location. Slahi alleged that the only FBI agent who was involved

in the boat ride was an agent named "Samantha." He said that

Samantha conducted the interrogation just prior to when he was

removed to the boat and that she may have observed this movement.

Santiago told the OIG that a person who referred to herself as

"Samantha" to Slahi was not an FBI agent. As detailed in Chapter Five,

the OIG determined from FBI and military records that the person who

identified herself as "Samantha" was actually an Army Sergeant.

2. Alleged FBI Predictions of Harsh Treatment by

Military

Slahi stated during his interview that when Poulson told him

Poulson was leaving GTMO, Poulson said that Slahi would "not have a

199 According to the December 24, 2004, MFR, Slahi alleged that Poulson had

told Slahi that he "would not be invited to tea and snacks" when he was transferred to

military interrogators. Slahi did not allege that Poulson said anything else about the

transfer.

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good time in the near future." Slahi said he interpreted this to mean that

he was going to be tortured by the military. Slahi told the OIG that he

did not take this statement by Poulson as a threat, but rather that

Poulson was objectively telling him what would happen. Slahi also told

the OIG that when he was treated harshly by the military, referring to the

boat ruse discussed in Chapter Five, he did not believe that Poulson or

the FBI had any control over what happened.

Poulson told the OIG that his approach to interviewing Slahi was

to build rapport with him. He said that he never suggested to Slahi that

if he did not cooperate he would be turned over to the military and the

military would use harsher techniques. He said that Slahi often asked

Poulson what was going to happen to him, and Poulson told him he did

not know but that things were changing, as a way of planting doubt in

Slahi's mind.

Poulson told the OIG that in his last interview with Slahi, he told

Slahi that he would not be working with him anymore, but said he did

not state this in a threatening way. Poulson said that he wanted Slahi to

know that he was no longer going to be handled by the FBI. Poulson told

us that he had no idea what the military planned to do with Slahi, but he

suspected the treatment would be similar to how the military handled Al-

Qahtani (#63), which would likely involve some harsh techniques.

Poulson's partner, Santiago, told us that before he left GTMO he saw a

draft of a special interrogation plan that the military was preparing for

Slahi, and that it was similar to Al-Qahtani's interrogation plan.

As described in Chapter Five, the interrogation plan that was

approved for Slahi did in fact include harsh techniques, including the

helicopter ruse (later changed to a boat), 15-hour interrogations (during

which Slahi would be prevented from sleeping), and continuous sound to

hinder Slahi's concentration and establish fear. In addition, after

assuming control of the Slahi interrogation, the military subjected Slahi

to "variable lighting patterns and rock music" in order to keep Slahi

"awake and in a state of agitation," as well as a "Fear Up" approach in

which Slahi was deprived of some clothes and yelled at. The military also

used a masked interrogator, "Mr. X," to question Slahi and used a forged

memorandum as part of a ruse to make him believe that his mother

would be arrested and brought to GTMO. Slahi subsequently made

further allegations of abuse by military interrogators, including a claim

that he was severely beaten during the boat ride. (See Chapter Five,

Section XV.)

However, we concluded that even if Poulson did discuss Slahi's

future military interrogation with Slahi, Poulson did not intend to

threaten Slahi. It would have been inconsistent with Poulson's and

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Santiago's weeks-long rapport-building approach for Poulson to threaten

Slahi.200 We found that, if anything, the military investigators were

critical of Poulson's and Santiago's reluctance to push Slahi. Military

intelligence personnel observed many of Slahi's interviews by Poulson

and Santiago from an observation booth. In an MFR dated March 21,

2003, a military intelligence officer observed that the agents had

established "an excellent rapport" with Slahi, but that the FBI agents

stated that they did not "want to push [Slahi] because doing so will

damage their rapport with him." In an MFR dated May 23, 2003, the

same military intelligence officer offered the following criticism of the

approach taken by Poulson and Santiago:

FBI Special Agents have built strong rapport with [Slahi], but

have generally not used that rapport to gain intelligence.

While rapport is normally used as a means by which to gain

intelligence, it seems as though FBI agents have not been

willing to offend detainee or push him on matters on which

he is uncomfortable because of the desire to maintain

rapport.

We concluded that Poulson's alleged statement to Slahi regarding

what he could expect in the future did not constitute a threat made to

induce Slahi to make a statement or to cooperate with the FBI. Poulson

was leaving GTMO and the FBI was no longer going to handle Slahi. The

military's plan to use much harsher techniques on Slahi was not agreed

to or condoned by the FBI, and we found no evidence that the FBI agreed

to the military's decision to assume control of Slahi's interrogation.

3. Alleged FBI Threat to Transfer Slahi to Afghanistan

or Iraq

Slahi said that Santiago once told him that he would be sent to

Iraq or Afghanistan if the government agents could prove what they

thought Slahi was involved in. Slahi said he interpreted this to be a

reference to the "Millennium bomb plot," which he understood as the

reason for the FBI's interest in him. Slahi said that Santiago repeated

200 The non-threatening approach used by Poulson and Santiago was also

confirmed in contemporaneous records. Two agents from the FBI's Behavioral Analysis

Unit (BAU) observed Poulson and Santiago conduct more than 20 hours of interviews

with Slahi. The two BAU agents, along with Poulson and Santiago, prepared an

"Interview/Interrogation Plan" for Slahi dated February 3, 2003. The plan stated that

Poulson and Santiago had "successfully established a high level of rapport with the

detainee." In the strategy section of the plan, it stated that the "investment in a longterm

strategy of building rapport with the detainee will continue to pay off with higher

quality dialogue."

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this statement about being sent to Iraq or Afghanistan, but that Slahi did

not consider this to be a valid threat at the time. Slahi told the OIG

interviewers that he viewed Santiago's statement as an objective, factual

prediction.

Santiago told the OIG that he did not recall ever telling Slahi that

he would be sent to Afghanistan or Iraq. Poulson also told the OIG that

he never heard Slahi being told that he would be sent to Afghanistan or

Iraq.

We did not find a sufficient basis to conclude that Santiago made a

threat against Slahi. Slahi did not characterize Santiago's alleged

statement about being transferred to Iraq or Afghanistan as a threat to

induce him to cooperate. Furthermore, Slahi did not claim that Santiago

suggested he could avoid this outcome by providing information to the

FBI. Moreover, Santiago said he did not recall making a statement about

sending Slahi to Afghanistan or Iraq, and we did not find that he had any

incentive to do so.

4. Alleged Threat by a Task Force Officer

During his interview with the military interrogator, Slahi described

another person he believed was questioning him on behalf of the FBI in

January 2003. Slahi stated that this person identified himself as a police

officer named "Tom" and told Slahi that if he did not explain certain

phone calls he would be sent to a "very bad place." Slahi told the OIG

interviewers that he believed the statement by "Tom" was just an

interrogation technique, but he also said that he believed it was possible

that he could be transferred to the control of another agency.

We concluded that Slahi was referring to a Detective from the New

York Police Department who was a member of the Joint Terrorism Task

Force (JTTF) and who interviewed Slahi with Poulson in January 2003.

Although the Detective was not an FBI employee, he did participate in

interviews on behalf of the FBI, and we therefore analyzed his alleged

statement.

The Detective's alleged statement about sending Slahi to a "very

bad place" if he did not provide certain information (and the related

implication that he would not be sent there if he cooperated), could be

interpreted as an impermissible threat or promise if used by an FBI

agent in the United States. However, we found that even if the statement

was made, it was too vague to constitute a clear violation of the FBI's

policy against threats or promises.

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IV. Misconduct Involving Zuhail Abdo Al-Sharabi

In this Section we address two separate allegations of FBI

mistreatment of Zuhail Abdo Al-Sharabi (#569) at GTMO. Al-Sharabi

was a Yemeni detainee suspected of having a connection with early

planning for the September 11 attacks. The first allegation of

mistreatment arose when two FBI agents described an incident involving

Al-Sharabi in their responses to the OIG survey. The agents stated that

in late February 2003 FBI Special Agent Demeter told them that he had

sprayed perfume on Al-Sharabi, doused him with water, and placed a

pornographic magazine his cell in order to undermine his status among

his cellmates.201 The second allegation was raised by Al-Sharabi himself,

who stated during an FBI interview in April 2003 that he was being

subjected to "psychological torture" as a result of being isolated from

other detainees. 202

A. OIG Investigation

1. Contemporaneous FBI Documents

We reviewed numerous interview summaries prepared from

interviews of Al-Sharabi conducted by FBI agents from

. These summaries indicate that

beginning on Al-Sharabi was placed in an

isolation cell for at least Although the FBI agents working

with him during this period were not involved in the decision to isolate

him, they repeatedly told him that he would remain in isolation until he

decided to cooperate in providin: information to the agents. According to

an FBI interview summary for , Al-Sharabi "stated he

would admit to anything at this point because he is being subjected to

psychological torture" and that he "felt like he was going to catch a

disease from the living conditions and die." Al-Sharabi continued to

demand to be removed from isolation before he would talk to the

interviewing agents. The summary stated that at the end of the

interview, the FBI agents told Al-Sharabi that "he had better take a good

201 Demeter is a pseudonym.

202 The allegation of "psychological torture" was discovered in November 2004

by the military's Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) staff during a review of the

FD-302 interview summaries for Al-Sharabi. A CITF staff memorandum dated

November 16, 2004, stated that the claim of "psychological torture" constituted an

allegation of "questionable techniques that may be considered criminal conduct,"

inconsistent with the Presidential Order dealing with humane treatment of detainees

and contradictory to the Convention against Torture. The military informed us that

there was no further military investigation of this allegation, however.

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look at their faces because these were the only human faces he would

see until he decided to be fully cooperative."

The agents met with Al-Sharabi frequently over the subsequent

weeks and repeatedly told him that he would only be removed from

isolation if he began to cooperate in providing information. According to

the interview summaries, the agents also repeatedly suggested that Al-

Sharabi could not only be moved from isolation but could also win his

freedom and return to Yemen if he spoke openly and provided full details

regarding the subjects of the agents' inquiries. Al-Sharabi repeatedly

complained that he could not talk because the "mental pressure and

stress" from his isolation was not allowing him to think straight. On

May 12, Al-Sharabi began providing detailed information which the FBI

found to be credible. According to a summary for

however, Al-Sharabi remained in isolation and the FBI agents told him

that if he did not provide the information requested, his case would be

turned over to military investigators.

The FBI interview summaries do not contain any information

relevant to the claims relating to the use of water, pornography, or

perfume on Al-Sharabi.

2. Interview of Al-Sharabi

The OIG interviewed Al-Sharabi on February 25, 2007. Al-Sharabi

stated that he recalled finding a picture of an immodestly dressed or

naked woman in his cell at GTMO, which he tore up and threw into the

toilet. He believed that the picture was planted by interrogators as a ploy

to undermine him with other detainees. He stated that an interpreter

approached him when he found the picture but that he told the

interpreter "oh, you are playing a game, go away."

Al-Sharabi also said he recalled an instance in which interrogators

made him put on a woman's coat that had perfume on it, and that when

he took it off he smelled like the perfume. He thought this was an effort

to humiliate him.

Al-Sharabi stated that he did not remember ever telling anyone

that he was suffering from "psychological torture," although it is possible

he said this. He stated that he spent by himself in an isolation

cell because he would not cooperate during

interrogations.

3. Interview of FBI Special Agent Demeter

In his OIG interview, Demeter said that he was assigned to GTMO

full-time, with several brief breaks, from February 2002 until April 2003.

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He was designated as one of the two case agents for the entire GTMO

case. Demeter said that, as a result, he had extensive contact with Al-

Sharabi over a long period of time. He said that at some point, Al-

Sharabi had taken a role in the cell block as a leading advocate against

cooperating with the interviewers. Demeter stated that he and the other

agents assisting him tried to devise ways to undermine Al-Sharabi's

status among the other detainees on his cell block as a way to isolate

him from others.

According to Demeter, one method that he and his team used was

to interview Al-Sharabi in the evening hours during the time that the

detainees on the cell block engaged in "chatter" and were likely to notice

that Al-Sharabi was often being interviewed while at the same time he

was telling the other detainees to resist.

Another method that Demeter said he used with Al-Sharabi was to

secretly place a sexually suggestive men's magazine in his cell late at

night so that other detainees would see it in the morning and would have

a strong reaction to Al-Sharabi possessing the magazine. Demeter stated

that the magazine was not pornographic - it was a magazine like

"Maxim" or "FHM." As part of this method, Demeter said that he

coordinated with an Arab linguist to chastise Al-Sharabi in front of his

cell neighbors for bringing back the magazine from his interview, which

was not permitted.

Demeter told the OIG that on one occasion, Al-Sharabi was not

cooperating during the interview and started singing. Demeter stated

that he and his team surreptitiously sprayed Al-Sharabi with perfume on

his back, by pretending to cough or sneeze when spraying it on Al-

Sharabi. Demeter said that the intent with the perfume was to create

doubt about Al-Sharabi in the minds of his cell neighbors and to drive a

wedge between him and his cell neighbors so that he would focus more

on his relationship with his interviewers.

Demeter stated that the perfume and magazine techniques were

completed in such a way as to prevent Al-Sharabi from knowing that

Demeter or the other interviewers were behind either incident.

Demeter said that another method he and the team considered to

drive a wedge between Al-Sharabi and his cell neighbors was to wet Al-

Sharabi's hair to make it appear that he was receiving extra shower time

during interviews. Demeter stated that he did not recall whether he and

the team actually implemented this ploy because he did not recall

dousing Al-Sharabi with water, but he did have a recollection of Al-

Sharabi's hair being wet at some point. Demeter stated that in his view

these techniques would be available for him to use as an FBI agent in the

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U.S. and that he would not be prohibited from using them. Demeter said

that Al-Sharabi was the only detainee with whom he used these

methods.

4. Interviews of Other Agents

The description that Demeter provided to the OIG regarding the

techniques he used on Al-Sharabi was generally consistent with what

other FBI agents told us Demeter had told them earlier. Two agents from

the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit told the OIG that in late February

2003 Demeter told them that he had used the following techniques with

Al-Sharabi, who was not cooperating with the FBI: sprayed perfume on

the detainee to make it seem like he had been with a woman, poured

water on the detainee's hair to make it look like he had broken the

shower strike, and placed pornography in his cell. 203

One of the BAU agents said that Demeter seemed to be proud of

his use of these techniques and appeared to be surprised when the two

agents expressed astonishment and criticism of this approach. The BAU

agent said that she told Demeter that he and the other agent who used

these techniques should have no further contact with Al-Sharabi because

they had "lost all credibility" with him.

One BAU agent characterized Demeter's conduct with Al-Sharabi

as non-criminal harassment and "nonsense," but she said she did not

consider it serious enough to report to the FBI chain of command on

GTMO. The other BAU agent said that she later told her supervisor in

the United States about the incident. She said her supervisor was

shocked, but that she did not know whether anything was done about it.

Demeter's supervisor at GTMO told the OIG he did not recall

hearing about Demeter's use of these techniques. However, he said

sometimes the interrogator "reaches the limit" and wants to place the

detainee in an uncomfortable situation. He also stated that an

appropriate strategy is to make it look to others that the detainee is

cooperating, thereby potentially isolating him from his peers and making

him more dependent on the interrogators. He said that in the United

States, the FBI sometimes uses techniques of this kind.

203 Demeter told the OIG that he did not recall discussing the use of these

techniques on Al-Sharabi with the BAU agents.

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B. OIG Analysis of the Allegations

1. Analysis of Allegations of "Psychological Torture"

Al-Sharabi's claim that he was subjected to "psychological torture"

was a reference to his isolation from other detainees. As detailed in

Chapter Eight, Section II.F, numerous FBI agents reported observing the

use of extended isolation as an interrogation technique at GTMO. Some

FBI agents told us that they participated in using this technique, while

others said they understood that the FBI should avoid being involved in

this interrogation tactic. The FBI interview summaries for Al-Sharbi

establish that FBI agents participated in a program to isolate Al-Sharbi

from human contact in order to induce him to cooperate.

We believe that under FBI policies prohibiting coercive interview

techniques, an FBI agent in the United States would not be permitted to

order a prisoner into isolation or prevent him from being returned to the

general prison population for a period as long as 2 months solely

because the prisoner would not provide information to the agent. The

Legal Handbook for Special Agents specifically identifies psychological

pressure, isolation, and incommunicado interrogation as circumstances

that will tend to undermine the legitimacy and voluntariness of a

statement. LHBSA at 7-2.2.

However, it is clear that this practice was fairly widespread at

GTMO. Moreover, at least with respect to this technique, many FBI

agents at GTMO believed that they could participate in at least some

coercive interview practices that might be prohibited in the United

States. The FBI policy reiterating that "existing FBI policy with regard to

the interrogation of prisoners" continued to apply in the military zones

was not issued until May 19, 2004. Under these circumstances, and

given that isolation did not involve the use of force or threats, we do not

believe that the FBI agents who exploited the isolation of Al-Sharabi

committed misconduct. However, we believe that this matter illustrates

the inadequacy and lack of clarity in the guidance provided to FBI agents

regarding permissible interrogation techniques in the military zones.204

204 Several agents understood that they could not participate in using isolation

as an interrogation technique, including Demeter, who told us that as "sworn law

enforcement officers" at GTMO, FBI agents were prohibited from recommending a

detainee for isolation purely for intelligence gathering or information gathering

purposes. Although Demeter had extensive involvement with Al-Sharabi, he was not

one of the agents interrogating Al-Sharabi during the time the detainee was in isolation.

Demeter said that Al-Sharabi was placed in isolation as a disciplinary matter because of

a spitting incident, but he acknowledged that Al-Sharabi provided useful information

during his isolation. In fact, the contemporaneous documents do not indicate that the

(Cont'd.)

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It is not clear whether the lengthy isolation of Al-Sharabi was

consistent with military rules. As previously noted, on April 16, 2003,

Secretary Rumsfeld explicitly approved the use of isolation as an

interrogation technique at GTMO upon a determination of "military

necessity" and with prior notice to the Secretary of Defense. Church

Report at 139-40. The April 16 DOD Policy cautions that "[t]his

technique is not known to have been generally used for interrogation

purposes for longer than 30 days," and that some nations may view this

technique as inconsistent with the Geneva Convention. Al-Sharabi was

isolated for much longer than 30 days. We do not know whether the

requisite finding of military necessity was made or whether prior notice

was provided to the Secretary of Defense.

We also believe that by telling Al-Sharabi that he could earn his

release and be returned to Yemen if he cooperated, the FBI agents made

promises to Al-Sharabi that they would not have been permitted to make

in the United States. FBI Policy prohibits agents from attempting "to

obtain a statement by force, threats, or promises." LHBSA 7-2.1. FBI

training materials indicate that an explicit promise of leniency usually

renders a confession involuntary. Again, we believe that this tactic was

the product of an understanding that the rules for interrogating

suspected terrorists at GTMO (especially a detainee suspected of

involvement in the September 11 conspiracy) were different. The FBI's

rule against such promises stems from considerations of legal

voluntariness applicable to criminal prosecution in U.S. courts. The

agents understood they were collecting intelligence and not necessarily or

exclusively preparing for conventional criminal prosecutions. However,

this illustrates again the tension between FBI rules designed to serve its

traditional law enforcement function and the changing role of the FBI in

collecting intelligence for the prevention of terrorist attacks.

2. Analysis of Demeter's Conduct

The FBI policies on interviews do not prohibit specifically the

techniques that Demeter used on Al-Sharabi, such as using a men's

magazine or perfume in an effort to undermine Al-Sharbi's standing

among the detainees. These techniques also did not involve the use of

force, threats, or coercion. We recognize that in the United States, FBI

agents might use ruses to drive a wedge between co-conspirators, or

arrange that these prisoners be separated. However, in this case we

spitting incident was the reason for Al-Sharabi's lengthy isolation. Rather, the

documents make clear that the FBI agents who interviewed him told him he would

never escape isolation unless he began to provide the information they wanted.

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believe that Demeter's techniques such as using a men's magazine and

perfume, were ineffective and possibly counterproductive.

V. Allegations Regarding FBI Participation in Interrogation of

Detainee Yousef Abkir Salih Al Qarani

In this Section we address the conduct of FBI agents, together with

the military, in the interrogation of detainee Yousef Abkir Saleh Al Qarani

(#269) at GTMO. We determined that in September 2003, FBI agents

participated in a joint interview with the military that resulted in Al

Qarani being short-chained and left alone for several hours, during

which time he urinated on himself. In addition, at least one FBI agent

participated in subjecting Al Qarani to a technique of disorientation and

sleep disruption through frequent cell movement known at GTMO as the

"frequent flyer program." We also examined additional allegations made

by Al-Qarani during an OIG interview in March 2007 regarding FBI

mistreatment.

A. Background

FBI records indicate that Al Qarani's telephone number was found

in the possession of other detainees known to be associated with al-

Qaeda. At least 10 different FBI agents participated in interviewing Al-

Qarani at GTMO between July 2002 and September 2003. The agents

sometimes worked in pairs and sometimes conducted joint interviews

with military investigators.

205 Hajj is an annual pilgrimage of Muslims to Mecca, Saudi Arabia.

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B. FBI Special Agents Brandon and Stephenson

FBI agents Brandon and Stephenson were deployed to GTMO in

August 2003 and they worked together on numerous detainee

interviews.206 Stephenson said she learned what techniques she could

and could not employ in detainee interviews from other FBI agents who

were already at GTMO. She said that she understood that "we are FBI

agents no matter where we go, so we have policies in place, and there are

things that we do, and things we don't do. And the rules were no

different on GTMO, in terms of what we could do and what we couldn't

do." Stephenson said that no one specifically used those words; rather it

was something she picked up from the operational environment at

GTMO. Stephenson told us that the FBI's general approach with the

detainees was rapport building. She also said that she and Brandon

discussed the use of other techniques that were not available to FBI

agents in the United States because on GTMO they were working with

the military. She said that the FBI's OSC had advised FBI agents that

they had opportunities to "collaborate" with the military on detainee

interviews.

Brandon stated that he did not receive specific guidance on

interview techniques at GTMO, but he knew what was permissible based

on his good judgment and 15 years of law enforcement experience.

Brandon said that at GTMO he attended mandatory meetings every

Friday with military and FBI personnel to discuss what had transpired

during the week in the detainee interrogations. He said that during

those meetings the military personnel described what they were doing in

detainee interrogations, including frequent movements of detainees and

isolation. Brandon also stated that during these meetings, military

personnel described "different areas that the military could enhance

what the FBI was doing." He said that he received a list of DOD

approved interrogation tactics that could be utilized and that programs

were built around them, including "the frequent flyer program and

isolation techniques . . . dietary disruption and sleep disruption."

During the period from August 28, 2003, until September 23,

2003, Brandon and Stephenson together interviewed Al Qarani on at

least six separate occasions.

206 Brandon and Stephenson are pseudonyms.

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C. The Alleged Short-Chaining Incident

Brandon and Stephenson told the OIG about an incident in which

Al Qarani was short-chained for several hours following an FBI interview.

Initially, the agents had used a friendly approach with Al Qarani,

bringing him coffee and food and engaging in light conversation.

Brandon said he confronted Al Qarani about the inconsistencies in his

story, but that he was "getting nowhere" with Al Qarani, and that when

Al Qarani realized Brandon would not accept his story, he began to "shut

down." Brandon said that he and Stephenson told the detainee that if he

did not cooperate, they would turn him over to the military and that the

military would not bring him "cheeseburgers and coffee in the morning,"

as the FBI agents had done. Stephenson also stated that the agents

threatened to cut their ties with Al Qarani and let the military handle

him. Brandon said the purpose of this statement was to play on Al

Qarani's paranoia and dislike of the military. However, this technique

did not work and Al Qarani continued to be uncooperative.

Contemporaneous FBI records indicate that Brandon and Stephenson

interviewed Al Qarani on August 28, September 3, September 6, and

September 15, 2003, and that he became increasingly uncooperative

during that period.

Brandon stated that the approach that they decided to use with Al

Qarani in collaboration with the military was the "Mutt and Jeff" or "good

cop/bad cop" routine. Brandon and Stephenson stated that they

obtained approval for this approach from their OSC. The OSC told us he

had no recollection of this discussion, but that he would have agreed

with Stephenson's request to have the military engage in a good cop/bad

cop scenario with the detainee.

In preparation for an interview of Al Qarani on September 15,

2003, Brandon and Stephenson enlisted the assistance of a military

interrogator, U.S. Marine Captain Wyatt.207 Brandon said the plan called

for Wyatt to come into the interrogation room and "do his boot camp

thing" in an effort to intimidate Al Qarani, and the FBI would

subsequently return and "save" the detainee.

Stephenson and Brandon began with a normal interview of Al

Qarani around 8:00-9:00 a.m. on September 15, 2004. After a period of

unsuccessful questioning, Brandon told Qarani that Brandon was done

with him. Stephenson left the interview to watch from the observation

room. Captain Wyatt entered the interview room and began yelling and

screaming at Al Qarani. Brandon told the OIG that it became clear right

207 Wyatt is a pseudonym.

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away that this was not going to work because Al Qarani was laughing

and said "Captain, I'm really concerned for your voice and if you continue

to talk like that you will not be able to talk tomorrow."

Brandon said he and Wyatt left the interview room and Wyatt said

that the way to get the detainee's attention was to "short chain" him.

Brandon told Wyatt he did not understand that term, and Wyatt

demonstrated by ordering the guards to place a chain around the

detainee's waist and then bolt the chain to the floor. The detainee could

still stand up, but he would be bent over. Brandon said that when he

expressed concern to Wyatt about short chaining the detainee, Wyatt

responded that the procedure was common and that the detainee would

receive bathroom breaks and food. Brandon said he believed that the

detainee would be kept in the chained position through most of the

afternoon. Brandon also said that at the time Wyatt ordered the short

chaining, it did not strike Brandon as abuse.

Stephenson likewise stated that at the end of Wyatt's interrogation,

Wyatt ordered the guards to place the detainee in a "stress position."

She described the stress position as being shackled on the hands and

feet and then chained to the floor to force him to sit on the floor or

crouch without a chair. Stephenson told the OIG that she understood

that the military's list of approved techniques included stress positions.

Brandon stated that after he returned to the office with

Stephenson at about 10:00 a.m., he called the interrogation trailer to

make certain that the detainee was "ok" and he was told that the

detainee was asleep. He said that he returned at about noon to check on

the detainee. He stated that the guards told him the detainee had

urinated on himself. Brandon told us that he instructed the guards to

return the detainee to his cell. Brandon estimated that the detainee was

chained to the floor for approximately 3 hours. In Stephenson's

interview, she confirmed Brandon's account of what happened after she

and Brandon left the detainee.

Brandon and Stephenson both told the OIG that they reported the

chaining incident to the FBI's OSC. Brandon said the OSC told him that

he did not need to write an EC about the incident because Brandon told

him that he did not participate in the short chaining, that there was no

"force" used, and that the detainee was not injured.

We interviewed the OSC, who said that he did not recall

Stephenson or Brandon telling him about the incident.

Brandon told the OIG that he later complained to Wyatt about

what had happened to Al Qarani. Several days later, Wyatt explained to

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Brandon that a new rotation of guards had come on duty while Al Qarani

was chained and were not informed that the detainee was to receive

bathroom breaks. Brandon said that when he complained to Wyatt

about the treatment, Wyatt ridiculed Brandon for being "weak."

We interviewed Al Qarani at GTMO in February 2007. He stated

that he recalled an interrogation session with an FBI agent during which

a military official entered the interrogation room and started to yell at

him. He also described being chained to the floor in an uncomfortable

hunched over position for 3 or 4 hours and urinated on himself,

although he did not connect this incident with the yelling military official.

Al Qarani said this was not the only time he was chained to the floor and

that on another occasion the military chained him overnight for 12-16

hours.

The FD-302 that was prepared by Brandon and Stephenson for the

interview of Al Qarani on September 15, 2004, makes at most an obscure

reference to the incident that Brandon and Stephenson described to the

OIG. It states that Al Qarani was interviewed by Brandon, Stephenson,

and Wyatt, and that:

AL QARANI was questioned in regard to the truthfulness of

his travels to Pakistan. When confronted with the illogical

nature of the information he was rovidin , AL QARANI

The short chaining of Al Qarani clearly would have violated FBI

policies against coercive interview techniques if the FBI agents had

employed it in the United States. In this case, the decision to short

chain Al Qarani was made by Marine Captain Wyatt, not by Stephenson

and Brandon. However, Stephenson and Brandon acquiesced in the use

of this technique. Although there was no reporting requirement in place

at that time, both Brandon and Stephenson said that they later reported

the incident to the OSC.208

208 We found that the FBI agents' participation in a coordinated interrogation

strategy with the military that incorporated the "Mutt and Jeff' or "good cop/ bad cop"

strategy was not explicitly prohibited by FBI policy. (We note, however, that under the

DOD's April 16, 2003, memorandum, the military was not permitted to use the "Mutt

and Jeff" strategy without advance notice to the Secretary of Defense and a

determination of military necessity.)

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According to Brandon, Wyatt stated that stress positions were a

commonly used technique at GTMO. Stephenson and the OSC both told

the OIG that they understand that this was an approved technique for

the military. However, military documents indicate that stress positions

were not approved at that time. Although "stress positions (like standing)

for a maximum of four hours" was on the list of approved counter

resistance interrogation techniques permitted at GTMO under the

memorandum approved by Secretary Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002,

that list was rescinded on January 15, 2003.209 On April 16, 2003,

Secretary Rumsfeld approved a new list of permissible techniques for use

at GTMO that did not include "stress positions."

This incident again illustrates the inadequacy of the guidance

provided to FBI agents regarding what techniques were approved for use

by the military and how the agents were to conduct themselves in joint

interrogations. The FBI agents thought that this was an approved

military technique; they apparently were not aware that the Secretary of

Defense had rescinded his approval of stress positions 9 months before

the Al Qarani incident took place. According to the Church Report, short

chaining was a form of stress position, a technique that was removed

from the pre-approved list in January 2003. Yet, the military at GTMO

apparently did not consider short-shackling to be a prohibited "stress

position" at least until May 2004, when the military commander at

GTMO prohibited this practice. Church Report at 168.

Although the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy had not yet been

issued, the FBI agents involved in this matter told us they knew they

should not engage in techniques that would be prohibited in the United

States. However, it was not clear what an agent should do if another

agency's interrogator utilized such a technique without the prior

agreement of the FBI agent. Moreover, there was no evidence that

Brandon knew in advance that Wyatt would put Al Qarani in a stress

position. Under the circumstances, we did not find that Brandon

violated any FBI policy in connection with Wyatt's conduct. However, we

are troubled by the fact that Brandon and Stephenson did not recognize

more quickly that Wyatt's conduct was inappropriate for an interview in

which the FBI was participating. Brandon and Stephenson should have

acted more quickly to object to the conduct and attempt to stop it.

209 Moreover, we believe there is very significant doubt that short chaining a

detainee to the floor would have been considered to be "like standing" within the

meaning of the December 2 memorandum.

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D. Alleged Use of the "Frequent Flyer Program" on Al

Qarani

Brandon told the OIG that he arranged for the use of the "frequent

flyer program" on Al Qarani, and Stephenson likewise recalled that this

technique was used on the detainee.210 Stephenson said that a military

official at GTMO assisted in coordinating the frequent moving of a

detainee from cell to cell in order to break up the detainees' "position of

comfort" with guards. She stated that she heard that detainees in the

"frequent flyer program" were moved every 4 hours. The OSC at GTMO

at that time confirmed that the FBI sometimes interrogated detainees

who were in the "frequent flyer" program. He stated that the program

was not designed to deprive the detainee of sleep, but to prevent certain

detainees from becoming comfortable with their surroundings and to

keep them off balance so that the detainees would not have an advantage

when being interrogated. He acknowledged, however, that sleep

deprivation could be a byproduct of implementing this program.

A Summa Investigative Report prepared by the military dated

, states that Al Qarani complained to military

personnel that the FBI was moving him to different cells constantly and

he wanted the military interrogator to see if he could get it to stop.

Brandon and Stephenson said they participated in the "frequent

flyer" program by asking the military to move Al Qarani. Stephenson

acknowledged that this technique would not be permissible for FBI

agents in the United States.211 We did not find any explicit prohibition of

this technique in FBI policy. The Legal Handbook for Special Agents

identifies deprivation of sleep as a potential factor that a court might

consider in evaluating the voluntariness of a defendant's statement,

although it does not indicate that disorienting a prisoner or disrupting

his sleep patterns is per se improper.212 We also note that the OSC was

aware that FBI agents were involved in using this technique.

Nevertheless, we are troubled by the fact that Brandon and Stephenson -

and other agents, as discussed in Chapter Eight - participated in the

210 As noted in Chapter Eight, Section II.C, witnesses and documents indicated

that the "frequent flyer" program was also used on other detainees at GTMO to disrupt

their sleep patterns and lower their ability to resist interrogation.

211 In commenting on a draft of this report, the FBI stated that Brandon "stayed

within the guidelines laid out, used programs promoted to him and when things went

beyond by people not within our control, reported promptly via chain of command."

212 Unlike stress positions, "sleep adjustment" was on the list of approved

techniques for military interrogations at GTMO signed by the Secretary of Defense on

April 16, 2003.

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"frequent flyer" program despite the fact that at least some of them told

us they believed it would not be available in the United States.

E. Allegations by Al Qarani Regarding "Clint"

During an interview with the OIG on February 28, 2007, Al Qarani

made several additional allegations regarding mistreatment by an FBI

agent who Al Qarani said called himself "Clint" or "Clean" and who had

interviewed Al Qarani at GTMO many times over the course of

approximately 1 month in 2003. Al Qarani said that Clint always worked

with a particular interpreter Al Qarani identified by name. Al Qarani

described Clint as a white, tall, blonde, American male without facial

hair, 36 - 37 years of age, who wore civilian clothes with military boots.

Al Qarani said that Clint asked him about Afghanistan, that Clint

became angry and showed his "worse face" when Al Qarani was unable to

answer his questions, and that Clint ordered the guards to move Al

Qarani from cell to cell every 2 hours or less, 24 hours per day.

Al Qarani stated that Clint sometimes made him stand during

interviews, and told guards to hit him, throw him down, and throw cold

water on him. Al Qarani said that on one occasion Clint ordered Al

Qarani to be locked on the floor with chains over his back for 3-4 hours,

which caused Al Qarani to urinate on himself. He said Clint sometimes

used the "N-word" with Al Qarani. Al Qarani stated that once during the

period he was being interrogated by Clint, the military short-chained him

for 12-16 hours overnight and subjected him to loud music and colored

lights. He stated that Clint left GTMO a few days after that incident.

Al Qarani also stated that at one time he had an ingrown toe nail

that was removed without anesthesia. The corpsman told Al Qarani that

he could not give Al Qarani a painkiller unless Clint approved it. Clint

told Al Qarani to talk about his "brothers" (other detainees) if he wanted

the painkiller.

Al Qarani stated that he described his experiences with Clint to a

female FBI agent some time in 2003. He also said that he told this

female agent that he had been beaten in Kandahar but she showed him a

photograph from Kandahar and said he "looked fine" in it.

Some aspects of Al Qarani's story suggest that Clint might have

been FBI agent Brandon, who interviewed Al Qarani approximately seven

times during August and September 2003 and who, as discussed above,

reported the incident in which Al Qarani was short chained for several

hours and wet himself. Al Qarani's physical description of Clint was

generally consistent with Brandon's appearance. In addition, Al Qarani

told us that Clint also interrogated Fand Al-Sharif (#215), and we found

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that Brandon had interviewed Al-Sharif in August 2003. Brandon also

admitted arranging for Al Qarani to be put in the "frequent flyer"

program.

Brandon denied using the name "Clint" or "Clean" at GTMO and

said he never heard of anyone using such a name. He also denied

engaging in the conduct that Al Qarani attributed to Clint, other than

using the "frequent flyer" program. Several other facts also indicate that

Brandon was not "Clint." For example, Al Qarani stated that Clint

withheld painkillers from him when he was treated for an ingrown toe

nail. Available records indicate that the nail on one of Al Qarani's big

toes was removed in March 2003 due to an infection. However, Brandon

was not deployed to GTMO until August 2003, so he could not have been

involved in withholding painkillers from Qarani at the time of this

procedure.

In addition, Al Qarani stated that Clint always used the same

Egyptian interpreter, "Abbas." FBI records indicate that Brandon used at

least five different interpreters during interviews of Al Qarani, none of

whom were identified by the name Al Qarani provided. Brandon told the

OIG he did not recall any interpreter named Abbas.

Al Qarani also reported that a female FBI agent showed him a

photograph of himself to contradict his claim that he was beaten in

Kandahar. FBI records indicate that in April 2003, a female agent from

the Naval Criminal Investigative Service confronted Al Qarani with a

photograph of him in Afghanistan and that Al Qarani subsequently

admitted that he had lied about the beatings. Al Qarani told us that at

the time of this incident, he told the female agent about his experiences

with Clint. However, this incident occurred several months before

Brandon arrived at GTMO, further indicating that Brandon was not

Clint. FBI records produced to the OIG indicate that prior to April 2003,

there were only three FBI agents who had interviewed Al Qarani, and

each of them had only met with him once.

Al Qarani also described a different FBI agent who he said was

smaller than Clint who we believe was likely Brandon. Al Qarani told us

about two FBI agents, one male and one female, who interviewed him. Al

Qarani described the female as being an Asian with black hair, medium

complexion, thin, and approximately 30 years old. Al Qarani said that he

does not recall the male talking, but that he was white with short hair,

medium build, about 30 years of age. He said that the agents showed

him pictures and they did not promise him anything. Al Qarani said

they did not yell and they did not instruct the military to do anything to

him. FBI documents indicate that SAs Brandon and Stephenson showed

five photographs to Al Qarani on August 28, 2003. In addition, Al

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Qarani's description of the female agent was consistent with

Stephenson's appearance. If Brandon and Stephenson were the team of

agents that Al Qarani was describing, then Brandon was not Clint,

because Al Qarani told us the male agent was smaller than Clint.

Although other teams of male and female agents interviewed Al Qarani at

various times, there is no record that any such team brought

photographs for him to identify.

Thus, the evidence does not support that Al Qarani's allegations, if

true, relate to an FBI employee. It is possible that Clint was employed by

a different agency or that Al Qarani's account was false, exaggerated, or

an erroneous conflation of events that related to different interrogators

who were not from the FBI. Based on the available evidence we could

not conclude that any FBI agent was responsible for the conduct that Al

Qarani described.

F. Allegations by Al Qarani Regarding "Daoud"

During his OIG interview, Al Qarani also made allegations about

an African American FBI agent named "Daoud" or "David." Al Qarani

said that Daoud was large, wore glasses, and had a small beard but no

mustache. Al Qarani said that after 2 to 3 weeks, Daoud started doing

the same things Clint did, such as ordering Al Qarani to be shortchained

and to be moved frequently from cell to cell. Al Qarani said that

he was interviewed multiple times by Daoud over a several-month period,

and that Daoud was always by himself. Al Qarani said that Daoud put

him in isolation at one point. Al Qarani said that on August 8, 2005,

Daoud hit Detainee #174 with a chair or refrigerator. 213

Al Qarani said that Daoud took him to a room that was completely

dark and placed him in a chair. When the lights were turned on, he

could see that the walls were covered with pornography. Al Qarani said

he was introduced to a woman that spoke Arabic and wore a bikini. He

was told that if he cooperated, she would sleep with him. Al Qarani said

that he did nothing and after an hour he was taken back to his cell. Al

Qarani said that he was interviewed b Daoud shortl before he was

maintained by the military revealed no record that any FBI personnel

213 Al Qarani used the detainee's number rather than a name during the

interview. Detainee #174 is identified in DOD records as Hisham Bin Ali Bin Amor Sliti.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.359

interrogated Al Qarani durin 2005, includin the months immediately

prior to his being We found no

evidence that any FBI interrogator deployed to GTMO fit the description

that Al Qarani gave for Daoud. In addition, FBI personnel at GTMO

stated that they reviewed military records relating to Detainee #174 and

found that he was only interviewed once by the FBI in

with no record of abuse allegations. Neither of the FBI interviewers were

African-Americans. We concluded that if Daoud existed he was likely

employed by a different agency or that Al Qarani's account was false,

exaggerated, or an erroneous description of events that related to an

interrogator who was not from the FBI. Based on the available evidence

we could not conclude that any FBI agent was responsible for the

conduct that Al Qarani attributed to Daoud.

VI. Alleged Mistreatment of Mohammad A. A. Al Harbi

An FBI agent who served at GTMO in late 2002 wrote an FD-302

report dated November 6, 2002, which described an allegation by

detainee Muhammad A. A. Al Harbi (#333) that he was beaten by FBI

agents in Afghanistan. According to the report, Al Harbi alleged:

After [Al Harbi's] arrest, he was taken by airplane to Bagram,

Afghanistan. While on the airplane, he was struck in the

mouth by a member of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI). When he arrived in Bagram, he was beaten by two

members of the FBI (one of them being the same as the

person who struck him on the airplane). He suffered

multiple injuries to his mouth, eye and back as a result of

these beatings. He characterized the treatment in Bagram

as bad and everyone who participated in these actions were

Americans.

The two FBI employees who allegedly beat him were further

described as white males; both 40 to 50 years of age.

Al Harbi's allegations were also recounted in a memorandum from the

FBI to the Department of Justice entitled "Re: Repatriation Issues,"

dated January 20, 2004.

In October 2004, in connection with releasing the FBI

memorandum along with many other documents in response to a FOIA

request from the ACLU, FBI General Counsel Valerie Caproni sought

information about whether any investigation of Al Harbi's allegations was

ever conducted. According to Caproni, the MLDU Unit Chief told her

that no investigation was done.

316

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.360

We interviewed the agent who originally reported Al Harbi's

allegations. He stated that the detainee did not make clear the basis for

his statement that the agents who beat him were FBI. The agent told us

that he believed something bad did happen to the detainee, but the agent

did not believe that the FBI was involved.

The OIG interviewed Al Harbi in GTMO on April 26, 2005, with the

assistance of a translator. He told the OIG that he had no complaints

about his treatment by the FBI, either at GTMO or in Bagram. When the

OIG pressed him regarding his complaint about being struck on the

mouth and beaten by members of the FBI, he said that he did not think

that the individuals who arrested him were FBI agents, but rather he

thought that they were either military or possibly CIA.

Al Harbi did not have an explanation for why his earlier account

identified the perpetrators as FBI agents. He said that all of his contacts

with the FBI have been positive. We also did not find any basis for

concluding that Al Harbi was ever mistreated by the FBI.

VII. Abuse Allegations Involving Abu Zubaydah

In this Section we address allegations that FBI Special Agent

Gibson participated in the use of abusive interrogation techniques on

detainee Abu Zubaydah and other detainees, and that Gibson disclosed

classified information to persons unauthorized to receive it.214 Gibson

served as a Supervisor in the FBI's Counterterrorism Division and later

as an FBI Legal Attaché. In these capacities he made numerous overseas

trips on counterterrorism missions.

The allegations against Gibson were originally raised in an

anonymous letter to the FBI which stated, among other things, that

Gibson "spoke in detail of the mission leading up to the arrest and

interrogation of Abu Zubaydah" and "spoke openly and with much

enthusiasm about the torturing of captured al-Qaeda terrorists,

undisclosed locations and the brutal interrogation techniques by both

CIA and FBI which Agent [Gibson] was involved."

A. The FBI Investigation of the Allegations against FBI

Special Agent Gibson

The FBI forwarded the anonymous letter to the OIG, and we

initially referred the matter back to the FBI for investigation on

214 Gibson is a pseudonym.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.361

November 25, 2003. The FBI Inspection Division conducted an

investigation of the allegations in the anonymous letter. The FBI

determined that the anonymous letter was written by Landis, a civilian

acquaintance of Gibson, on the basis of statements Gibson made in

Landis's presence, as well as information provided to Landis by

Morehead, Gibson's ex-fiance.215

The FBI's investigative file indicates that the scope of the FBI's

investigation was limited to FBI interviews of Gibson, Morehead, and

Landis, and a polygraph examination of Gibson. Gibson's interview was

memorialized in a signed sworn statement. The interviews of Landis and

Morehead were summarized by the investigating agents in FD-302

reports. The polygraph examination was memorialized in a written

examiner's report. There is no indication in the file that the Inspection

Division made any effort to determine whether the information that

Morehead attributed to Gibson was accurate or, if so, was classified or

sensitive.

B. FBI Interviews of Landis and Morehead

psychological /verbal

techniques." According to an FBI Inspection Division report, Landis told

investigators that:

SSA [Gibson] spoke of interrogation and torture techniques

that are identical to the ones that are now bein: seen on the

news from the Ira .i .risoner abuses,

SSA [Gibson]

accused the CIA of utilizing the worst techniques, and stated

that the FBI would utilize techniques of talking to them for

48 hours straight.

Gibson's ex-fiancé, Morehead, told FBI investigators that in late

2002 or early 2003 Gibson told her about the arrest and interrogation of

a terrorist. According to the FBI investigator who interviewed Morehead

in April 2004, Morehead stated:

SSA [Gibson] . . . told [Morehead] that he had been present

in Pakistan when the raid occurred resulting in the arrest of

the second-in-command of the Bin Laden organization. This

man had a very noticeable feature in that one of his eyes was

215 Landis and Morehead are pseudonyms.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.362

* * *

Morehead] advised [Gibson] described the torture of the one

eyed man described above.

gone and the eye socket sewn shut. SSA [Gibson] said that

this man was injured in the raid and had to be flown to [one

of two particular countries] for medical treatment and to be

interviewed.

SSA [Gibson] said that he won the trust of

this individual when he leaned over and said something in

Arabic to the man. The man was later willing to talk to SSA

[Gibson].

Morehead provided more details regarding this matter in an FBI interview

in August 2004:

Following the capture/arrest, this individual was taken to an

undisclosed location for medical treatment and interrogation.

[Gibson] and FBI SA Thomas traveled to this undisclosed

location .216 [Gibson]

eventually informed her the location was [location deleted] or

somewhere in [location deleted]. When [Gibson] arrived,

doctors were operating on this individual. During

the operation, [Gibson] said a prayer to this individual in

Arabic. This was how he initially developed a relationship

with this individual.

Morehead did not identify the one-eyed man as Abu Zubaydah.

Morehead told FBI investigators that Landis had been mistaken when he

identified Zubaydah in the anonymous letter as the individual that

Gibson had discussed.

216 The agent that Morehead referred to here is a particular agent who has been

identified elsewhere in this report in Chapters Four and Five and later in this chapter.

We therefore substituted the same pseudonym for this agent that we have used

elsewhere in this report.

319

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.363

Morehead also provided FBI investigators with several detailed

stories that she said Gibson told her about his other activities overseas,

includin his involvement in an o eration involvin a

She

also asserted Gibson kept unauthorized classified information on his

personal laptop and pocket PC and leaked confidential information to a

television reporter.

In addition, Morehead asserted that Gibson had inappropriately

provided information to a member of the press, had used his FBI position

to assist family members with law enforcement problems, and had

utilized a former informant to provide free limousine service to Morehead

and her friends.

C. Gibson's Statement to the FBI

Gibson submitted a 13-page signed sworn statement to FBI

investigators in which he denied many of Morehead's allegations.

However, he admitted using his personal laptop computer for processing

classified information at times when FBI equipment was not available.

Gibson's statement also responded to the allegations regarding his

contacts with the media, but he did not address the interrogation

techniques that he or other agents of the FBI and CIA utilized on

suspected terrorists overseas. He stated that he was not aware of having

conversations with Morehead during which he disclosed sensitive or

classified information. He stated that he never discussed sensitive

locations with Morehead but that she may have inferred where he had

been from gifts he brought her from overseas. However, he did not

address the issue of how Morehead came to know that Gibson and

Thomas traveled to interrogate a captured terrorist, which

in fact was true.

D. Gibson's Polygraph Examinations

Gibson was polygraphed on September 30, 2004, as part of the

FBI's investigation. The focus of the polygraph was to determine whether

Gibson had been truthful about two issues: whether he disclosed FBI

information to a specific reporter, and whether he paid for services

rendered by a limousine driver who had previously been his source.

One of the questions posed to Gibson during the examination was

"have you ever purposely discussed classified information with family or

friends?" Gibson answered "no." The examiner's report did not address

this response. It stated that his responses to questions about media

contacts were "not indicative of deception." The report stated that

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.364

Gibson's responses regarding compensating the limousine driver were

"inconclusive."

Gibson had also been polygraphed a year earlier in connection with

an FBI promotion. The polygraph report for that earlier test indicated

that Gibson's negative response to the question "have you provided

classified information to anyone from a non-U.S. Intelligence Service"

was not indicative of deception.

E. Findings by the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility

The FBI communicated information regarding the Gibson matter to

the Public Integrity Section of the DOJ Criminal Division, which reviewed

the file and declined to pursue the matter criminally on September 12,

2005.

The FBI Inspection Division also submitted its investigative report

to the FBI Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) for adjudication.

FBI OPR issued a final adjudication of the allegations against Gibson on

October 18, 2005. OPR emphasized the "tumultuous five-year

relationship" between Morehead and Gibson, which had ended when

Morehead believed Gibson was romantically involved with other women,

and OPR opined that there was insufficient information to substantiate

several allegations against Gibson. OPR found only that Gibson

committed a security violation by placing classified or sensitive

information on a personal computer, and recommended that Gibson

receive a letter of censure.

With respect to the issue of disclosure of classified information,

OPR stated: "The investigation was unable to determine whether the

information alleged to have been improperly disclosed was in fact

classified or sensitive information because [of] the vague descriptions

provided by [Morehead and Landis] as to what privileged information was

alleged to have disclosed."

The OPR report also did not address the issue of whether Gibson

or other FBI agents participated in using "brutal interrogation

techniques" overseas as alleged in the anonymous letter.

F. FBI Special Agent Gibson's OIG Interview

Gibson told the OIG that he was involved in the investigation that

led to locating Zubaydah in Pakistan. Gibson said he traveled with

Thomas and CIA personnel to an undisclosed location in April 2002 to

assist in the interrogation of Zubaydah. Gibson said he was instructed

by his supervisor, Charles Frahm (then Acting Deputy Assistant Director

for the section that became the Counterterrorism Division), not to follow

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.365

standard FBI procedures in that he should not give Zubaydah any

Miranda warnings and that he should not prepare any interview

summaries, which would instead be prepared by the CIA. According to

Gibson, Frahm instructed him that the CIA would be in charge of the

interrogation and that Gibson was to assist the CIA in any way he could.

Gibson said that he and Thomas initially took the lead in

interviewing Zubaydah at the CIA facility because the CIA interrogators

were not at the scene. Gibson said Zubaydah was seriously wounded

when he arrived. Gibson said he used conventional FBI relationshipbuilding

techniques with Zubaydah and succeeded in getting Zubaydah

to admit his identity and to identify a photograph of Khalid Sheik

Muhammad as the mastermind of the September 11 attacks.

After a few days, CIA personnel assumed control over the

interviews, but they asked Gibson and Thomas to observe and assist.

Gibson told us that he continued to work with the CIA for several weeks

into June 2002. Gibson continued to conduct interviews of Zubaydah

after the CIA assumed control. When asked about the interrogation

techniques used on Zubaydah during this period, Gibson minimized the

harshness of what the CIA was doing. When pressed, however, Gibson

admitted that durin the eriod he was workin with the CIA, the CIA

. Gibson stated that the CIA personnel assured him that the

procedures being used on Zubaydah had been approved "at the highest

levels" and that Gibson would not get in any trouble. Gibson stated that

he kept Frahm, his FBI supervisor, informed of his activities with the CIA

by means of telephone calls.

When told about Morehead's statements, Gibson asserted that he

never disclosed any classified information to Morehead. He described

Morehead as being motivated by revenge after a bad breakup. Gibson

said that Morehead may have overheard conversations between Gibson

and Thomas regarding press coverage of Zubaydah's capture. He also

said he sometimes told Morehead general things about difficult

experiences he had had overseas, so she could understand his emotional

condition. He speculated that Morehead could have inferred that Gibson

was involved with Zubaydah from press reports and the timing of

Gibson's travel.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.366

G. OIG Interviews of FBI Special Agent Thomas and Acting

Deputy Assistant Director Frahm

As detailed in Chapter Four, Thomas told the OIG that he traveled

to an undisclosed CIA location in April 2002 to interview a high value

detainee who other witnesses confirmed was Zubaydah. He said that

after the CIA agents assumed control of the detainee, the

. Thomas said he considered the

to be "borderline torture." All of these activities

occurred during the period that Gibson was assisting with the CIA.217

Thomas stated that he and Gibson were ultimately instructed by FBI

Headquarters to withdraw from the undisclosed location, and that he left

some time before Gibson did.

Frahm, Gibson's supervisor, told the OIG that Gibson and Thomas

were sent flight to [location deleted] to participate in the joint

effort to interrogate Zubaydah. He said he spoke to Gibson several times

by telephone, and that Gibson told him that he and Thomas had sat with

Zubaydah for hours, prayed with him, and cleaned him u . Frahm said

that Gibson told him that Zubaydah was

and that he (Frahm) told Gibson that Gibson and Thomas should

not be involved in interrogations using such techniques.

H. OIG Analysis

We first reviewed the issue of whether Gibson participated in using

unauthorized interrogation techniques on Zubaydah, which was not

addressed in the OPR Report. In 2007, we sou ht to interview Zuba dah

after he was transferred to GTMO,

218

We concluded that during the spring of 2002 Gibson participated

in interviews in which interrogation techniques that would not be

available to an FBI agent in the United States were used on Zubaydah.

Specifically, Gibson admitted that during the time he was assisting the

CIA in interro atin Zuba dah at the undisclosed CIA facili , the CIA

utilized

217 Thomas had left the FBI by the time we interviewed him in August 2005. At

the time of Thomas' interview, the OIG had not yet interviewed Gibson and we did not

ask Thomas about conversations he might have had with Gibson which Morehead could

have overheard.

218 See footnote 4 above.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.367

. As noted

above, Thomas' and Frahm's descriptions of the techniques used on

Zubaydah were consistent with Gibson's account.

This interrogation of an extremely high profile detainee took place

very soon after the September 11 attacks, and before the FBI had

determined whether its traditional policies regarding interviews would

apply to overseas interrogations of terrorism suspects. Indeed, as

detailed in Chapter Four, it was the Zubaydah incident that sparked the

deliberations within the FBI that led to the decision that FBI agents

should not participate in interrogations using non-FBI techniques. At

the time of Gibson's participation in the Zubaydah interrogation, he had

received no guidance regarding his participation in interrogations in

which the CIA was using non-FBI approved techniques on detainees in

CIA custody. Rather, he was told that the CIA was in charge of the

interrogations and that normal FBI procedures such as giving Miranda

warnings and writing FD-302 interview summaries should not be

followed.

The FBI's formal policy addressing participation in joint

interrogations with other agencies in overseas locations was not issued

until 2 years later, in May 2004. Gibson's supervisor, Frahm, told

Gibson to assist the CIA in any way he could. We concluded that under

these circumstances, there was insufficient basis to conclude that

Gibson's cooperation with the CIA while the CIA was using non-FBI

techniques on Zubaydah violated clear FBI policy.

We also reviewed the question of whether the FBI adequately

investigated Morehead's allegation that Gibson disclosed classified or

sensitive information to her. The FBI OPR report stated it was "unable to

determine whether the information alleged to have been improperly

disclosed was in fact classified or sensitive information because [of] the

vague descriptions provided by [Morehead and Landis]." However, we

found that the infoi 'nation Morehead attributed to Gibson was

remarkably detailed, specific, and accurate. It corresponded very closely

with the descriptions that we received from other sources regarding

accurate facts of the capture and initial interrogation of Zubaydah,

described in Chapter Four.219

219 We recognize that Morehead told OPR that she didn't think the detainee at

issue was Zubaydah. However, as detailed below, her description of Gibson's

participation in the interview closely matches what other witnesses told us about

Zubaydah's detention and interrogation in several respects. We concluded that even if

Gibson did not tell Morehead the correct name of the detainee, this does not resolve the

(Cont'd.)

324

ACLU-RDI 5015 p.368

For example, Morehead knew that Gibson traveled with Thomas

and CIA personnel to a location in [a particular country or a particular

city in another country] to interview a notorious terrorist. In fact, Gibson

traveled to the country containing the city that Morehead identified to

interview Zubaydah. Morehead stated that the terrorist was missing an

eye. Gibson told us that Zubaydah had an infected eye, sometimes wore

a atch, and eventually got a glass eye. Morehead knew that

was utilized with the prisoner, a fact that was confirmed by

Thomas. Several witnesses, including Thomas, told us that Gibson and

Thomas traveled to an undisclosed CIA location, tended to Zubaydah's

wounds, and began to obtain useful information from Zubaydah. They

also stated that the CIA intervened and began using interview techniques

on Zubaydah that Thomas described as "borderline torture." The

interro ation methods that Morehead said were used on the detainee -

- were among the techniques Thomas

said were used on Zubaydah. Morehead also identified Thomas as the

agent who accompanied Gibson, which also was true.

We recognize that the fact that Zubaydah had been captured by

the United States was not a secret. On April 2, 2002, the White House

and the Pentagon confirmed that Zubaydah had been captured and was

receiving medical treatment for gunshot wounds. However, the CIA has

treated the details of Zubaydah's detention, including the location of the

CIA facilities at which he was detained and the interrogation methods

used on him, as Top Secret/SCI information. It is also likely that the FBI

would consider the identity of the agents who interviewed Zubaydah as

sensitive if not classified information. Indeed, as discussed below, the

FBI disciplined another agent for revealing only that she was a "foreign

counterintelligence agent." The information that Morehead was able to

provide about Gibson's activities was much more significant and

detailed, but the FBI made no apparent attempt to determine if this

information was accurate.

OPR suggested that Morehead was motivated by her animus

toward Gibson stemming from the termination of their "tumultuous

relationship," which may have been true. However, Morehead's hostility

does not explain how she came to possess such strikingly accurate

information regarding the interrogation of Zubaydah.

Gibson suggested that Morehead may have reconstructed details

about the Zubaydah matter from media accounts and telephone

conversations about such reports between Gibson and Thomas. He

issue of whether the other information Morehead received was accurate and sensitive or

classified.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.369

stated Morehead may have inferred that Gibson was involved in the

Zubaydah matter from the timing of his overseas travel.

We found that many details of the interrogation of Zubaydah have

in fact been reported in the media. However, based on an internet

search for media reports, we believe that most of the details

corresponding to the information Morehead provided was not reported

until after Morehead was interviewed b the FBI in 2004. For exam le,

more than 2 years after Morehead made her statement to the FBI

describin events very similar to this,

Morehead could not have based her statement on this report.

Gibson's suggestion that Morehead constructed these accurate

details from conversations between Gibson and Thomas that she

overheard does not resolve the matter. Even if true, this would suggest

that Gibson improperly conducted telephone conversations about

classified matters in the presence of Morehead.

Moreover, there is no indication in the investigative file for this

matter that the Inspection Division or OPR made any attempt to

determine whether the account of Gibson's trip with Thomas that

Morehead provided was accurate and if so, whether the information was

classified or sensitive.

We also found it inexplicable that the FBI did not make the issue of

Gibson's alleged disclosures to Morehead a major focus of its polygraph

examination of Gibson in 2004.

We also note that the FBI's indifference to allegations of Gibson's

disclosure of his participation in the Zubaydah matter stands in stark

contrast to the FBI's treatment of another agent accused of mishandling

sensitive information. This agent had concerns about the efficacy of FBI

operations in GTMO, where the agent had previously been deployed. In

April 2003 the agent addressed these concerns in a letter to FBI Director

Mueller. The agent attempted to arrange for the delivery of a letter to the

Director by a private citizen who was a mutual acquaintance. In the

letter the agent identified herself as an "FCI" (Foreign Counter

Intelligence) agent and described (but did not name) detainees she had

interviewed at GTMO. OPR ruled in that case that the letter contained

sensitive or classified information and that the agent had improperly

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.370

disclosed the information to an unauthorized person by giving the letter

to a private citizen for delivery to the Director. The agent received a 5-

day suspension without pay for this disclosure and for the offense of

circumventing the normal channels of communicating with the Director.

The information disclosed by this agent was considerably less

specific or sensitive than the information Morehead allegedly received

from Gibson about his involvement with a CIA detainee. For example,

the agent was criticized for revealing that the agent was assigned to an

FCI squad. Morehead somehow obtained far more sensitive information:

that Gibson had been assigned to work with Thomas and the CIA on the

interrogation of a high value detainee at a secret location, using specific

interrogation techniques that the government clearly considers to be

secret. Yet, OPR found that this information was too "vague" to be

considered sensitive or classified. Again, we found no indication of any

effort by the Inspection Division to determine whether the information

was accurate or classified.

The issue of whether Gibson disclosed classified information to

Morehead was adjudicated by OPR in 2005. We believe that too much

time has passed for investigators to determine whether Morehead could

have derived her information from non-classified conversations or

publicly available sources. Also, much of the information that Morehead

described to FBI investigators was subsequently reported in the media,

which attributed the information to several unidentified law enforcement

and intelligence officials. It would be unfair for the FBI to reopen the

investigation of Gibson without initiating an investigation of the sources

of the information in the reports.220 However, the FBI should take note

of the inadequate and incomplete investigation it conducted with respect

to this matter and take steps to ensure that future investigations of

allegations that agents disclosed confidential or classified information are

conducted more thoroughly and evenhandedly.221

220 The New York Times identified the sources of the information in the article

as officials who were not present at the interrogation but rather were briefed on the

events as they occurred or later. This description, if accurate, would exclude Gibson as

the source because he personally witnessed these events.

221 In commenting on a draft of this report, the FBI stated that the adequacy of

the FBI's investigation of the allegation was further supported by the fact that Gibson

passed a polygraph examination in connection with a promotion in September 2003,

and by the DOJ Public Integrity Section's declination to prosecute Gibson. We disagree.

The 2003 polygraph was not a factor in the OPR's adjudication of this issue and does

not shed light on the adequacy of the FBI's investigation in 2004-2005. It took place

before Morehead made her allegations to the FBI and did not include specific questions

about conversations between Gibson and Morehead. Similarly, the decision by the DOJ

Criminal Division not to prosecute Gibson does not establish the adequacy of the FBI's

(Cont'd.)

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.371

In this Section we address allegations relatin: to FBI conduct

durin the s rin • and summer of 2004 at

VIII. Alle • ations of Abuse at the

Most of the allegations that we investigated were made b an FBI

agent, Ryan, who served in Iraq

and who was assigned to the facility for several weeks in

. From

FBI a ent, Adair, was the officer in charge of the

222 However, Adair was actin in his ca acit as an active duty

officer . From , approximately

seven FBI agents were sent by the FBI to the facility to assist the military

in conductin interrogations of detainees held at the

As described in detail later in this Section, Ryan reported to

military superiors and to the FBI Inspection Division that after he left the

facility a military interrogator told him that detainees at the facility were

confined in "inhumane conditions" and were subjected to abusive

interrogation techniques, including food, water, and sleep deprivation

and "water interrogation." Ryan brought the issue to the attention of the

FBI Inspection Division because Adair was an FBI agent, although, as

discussed below, Adair was acting in his capacity as an officer in the

Army at the time of the incidents. The OIG investigated Ryan's

allegations and also examined reports from other agents regarding

practices by other FBI employees at the facility that might violate FBI

policy, including the use of in-cell restraints, blindfolding, and threats in

connection with detainee interrogations.

internal investigation, but rather reflects DOJ's determination on the basis of the FBI

information that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute. Neither the 2003

polygraph nor the Criminal Division declination decision address the central

deficiencies in the FBI's investigation: the failure to recognize that the information

Morehead provided was highly detailed, specific, and accurate; the failure to determine

whether the information was sensitive or classified; and the failure to address how

Morehead got the information except from Gibson.

222 Ryan and Adair are pseudonyms.

another

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.372

A. Background

1. The Facility

2. FBI Special Agent Adair

Prior to joining the FBI, Adair served in the military for over 9

ears. Adair remained on Inactive Read Reserve status and in

he was recalled to active dut

in

February 2004 where he served as a liaison officer and assisted with

developing detainee interrogation strategies. In

Adair was assigned to be the "J2X" (human intelligence) officer for the

Unit when the prior J2X retired.

Adair told the OIG that as the J2X, he was the officer in charge of

collecting human intelligence, which included supervising the entire

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.373

. A Sergeant Major

was also assigned to the facility. Either Adair or the Sergeant Major was

usually physically present at the facility. Ryan told the OIG that the

Sergeant Major "appeared to be in actual control of the facility."

However, Adair stated that he, and not the Sergeant Major, was in charge

of the

Adair told the OIG that when the news accounts appeared about

the conduct of military personnel at Abu Ghraib in the spring of 2004,

his milit su ervisor told him that he should "not let anything happen"

at because of the importance of the

actionable intelligence gained from the facility. Adair said he responded

to his supervisor that he would let the U.S. Constitution be his guide.

Adair told the OIG that all interro ation techni ues used at the facility

had been approved by

Adair said that there was a shortage of experienced interrogators at

the facility, and there had been an "informal" decision to have FBI agents

assist in the interrogations. As a result of his su estion, a team of FBI

agents was sent to the in May 2004 to

assist with the interrogations.

Adair left the military and returned to the United States in the

middle of July 2004.

3. The Team of FBI Agents

Prior to May 2004, primarily military intelligence officers and

Defense Intelligence A enc DIA interro ators conducted detainee

interrogations at the . Beginning in early

May 2004, a team of approximately five FBI agents, including a Team

Leader, was deployed to the facility to assist the military in conducting

interrogations of the detainees for the purpose of obtaining intelligence

concerning threats to coalition forces and to obtain information that had

a U.S. nexus to terrorism. About a week later, two additional FBI agents

joined the five at the facility. The entire team of FBI agents returned to

the United States in July 2004 after a 60-day deployment.

The Team Leader said that his team was the first group of FBI

agents to be . Several of these

agents told us that they received some instruction for their assignment,

either prior to their deployment to the facility or after they arrived.

According to the FBI Team Leader, the Deputy OSC for Iraq gave

instructions that the FBI agents should conduct the same type of

interviews as in the United States and should not to take part in or even

stay and observe interrogations where the military was employing any

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.374

"harsh-u " techniques, such as

. The Team Leader stated that he relayed these instructions

to the agents, and several agents told us that they received instructions

to conduct themselves as they would in the United States.

Three of the agents told us that they understood that if they saw

conduct by the military that was inconsistent with FBI policies, they

should not participate and should report the incident through the FBI

chain of command. Several agents also told us that after they arrived in

Iraq, they received written guidance from FBI Headquarters, which we

concluded was likely the FBI's May 2004 Detainee Policy described in

Chapter Six.

However, three other agents told us that the team did not receive

training on military interrogation. They said that they did not know what

techniques were and were not authorized by the military and other

agencies.

At the , the FBI agents were split into

two 12-hour shifts for conducting interviews of detainees. The agents

said that twice a day the agents, the military interrogators, and the

Sergeant Major met between shift changes to discuss the interrogations.

At these meetings, they would discuss general issues involving

interrogations and also specific detainees. Adair was also in attendance

at the briefings whenever he was present at

Initially, the agents were teamed up with military interrogators, but

after a short period of time they generally worked with other FBI agents.

According to the FBI, this change was implemented to be consistent with

an FBI rule requiring that all interviews be conducted by two agents.

One of the agents stated that the reason for this change was that FBI

interviewers had a different purpose than military interviewers. The

focus of the military interviews was for force protection, while the FBI

agents were looking for information with a U.S. nexus. The agents did

not write FD-302 summaries for each interview, but rather summarized

their interviews in the form of ECs that were submitted weekly.

4. FBI Special Agent Ryan

Ryan has worked for the FBI since 1999. He has also been a U.S.

Marine Corps reserve officer since 1996. Ryan told the OIG that when

the Iraq war began he sought to be deployed with the Marine Corps. He

received orders from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in April 2004

to deploy to Iraq, and arrived in Baghdad on May 1, 2004. He was

assigned to lead a team of human intelligence personnel to support •

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.375

, including

interrogation of detainees.

Ryan was in Iraq from May 1 to the be inning of June, 2004. Of

that time he s ent approximately 2 weeks at = and approximately 2

weeks at . Ryan said that during his time at

he experienced friction with the Sergeant Major over

who was in control of the DIA interrogators. Ryan complained to his

military superior in the United States, and in mid-May he was directed to

leave the facility and move to to monitor DIA officers. He stayed

in that area for 2 weeks and returned to

briefly. Shortly thereafter, he took a flight back to the United

States.

When Ryan returned to the United States, he complained to his

superiors at DIA about problems at the facility, including that the

military command at the facility had treated him poorly and that the

environment at the facility was abusive towards detainees. He also

eventually complained to FBI OPR about his view of Adair's operation of

the facility.

Adair told us that at one point he was informed that Ryan was

missing from the facility and that no one knew where he was. Adair later

learned that Ryan had returned and was staying at a nearby airport

hanger waiting to catch the next flight to the United States because he

knew he was in trouble and that people were looking for him. Adair said

that Ryan had "split from the program."

B. Allegations by Ryan

When Ryan returned to the United States, he re orted his

concerns about the treatment of detainees at

to his military superiors and to the FBI Inspection Division. He

also signed an affidavit for FBI OPR describing these concerns. Ryan

also provided information about these concerns in an interview with the

OIG.

Ryan reported that shortly before he left the

in mid-May 2004, he overhead a facility military guard who was

observing approximately six handcuffed and blindfolded detainees

awaiting release from the facility. Ryan said the guard made a comment

to the effect of, "If we give these guys a sporting chance, how far do you

think we should let them go before we shoot them in the back?" Ryan

said he reported the statement to the guard's supervisor, and that within

48 hours the Sergeant Major banned Ryan from the facility.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.376

Ran stated in his OPR affidavit that after he left the NEM

in mid-May 2004 to go elsewhere in Iraq, he had a

conversation with an unnamed military interrogator. According to Ryan,

the military interrogator told him that some of the detainees at the

facility were confined in "inhumane conditions" without proper medical

treatment and without adequate hygiene opportunities. Ryan also stated

that the military interrogator told him that techniques such as food,

water, and sleep deprivation were used by military interrogators to

extract information from the detainees. In addition, the military

interrogator reported that detainees would be stripped naked and

subjected to "water interrogation."

Ryan told the OIG he did not personally observe these conditions

or the abuse described to him by the milit interro ator. He alleged

that as the Officer in Charge at , Adair

should have known about the conditions and the abuse and should have

taken steps to correct them.

Ryan also stated that he learned when he returned to Ba hdad in

late May or early June 2004 that someone at the

had posted his photograph in the main building of the facility.

We obtained a copy of the poster, which had printed in large letters

"Wanted for Questioning" above Ryan's picture and stated that "if seen

detain and escourt [sic] to the [task force] commander or the [task force]

J-2" (i.e., Adair).

Ryan stated that he did not know who had made the poster, but

that he viewed it as threatening and as retaliation for his reporting the

comments by the guard about shooting detainees in the back. He said

that after returning to the United States, he called the FBI Team Leader

who had been at the facility with the FBI agents, and the Team Leader

denied that the FBI agents made the poster. In our interview with the

Team Leader, he said that someone in the military hung up the poster in

the briefing room after a briefing where Ryan's absence was noted.

C. Prior Investigations

After Ryan returned to the United States, his allegations of abuse

were referred to the DIA OIG, which conducted an interview of Ryan. The

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.377

DIA OIG concluded that no investigation by the DIA OIG was warranted

because Adair was not a DIA employee, and referred the allegations to

the DOD OIG. We did not find any indication that the DOD OIG ever

addressed the allegations against Adair.

Documents provided by the milit indicate that a DIA civilian

debriefer who was assigned to in April

2004 also made allegations to the DOD regarding detainee abuse at the

facilit

had been approved by the J2 of the Task

Force (who was Adair).

Other DIA employees assigned to the facili re orted to DIA or

DOD investigators that detainees arriving

11111111 had bruises and burn marks indicating they had been abused,

and that some detainees were held at the facility for weeks at a time at

the whim of interrogators despite a general rule that detainees should be

transferred or released within 4 days. One DIA employee reported that

when the Task Force was notified that an IG investigation had been

initiated, the Sergeant Major and the Officer in Charge (Adair) became

very upset and the Sergeant Major made threatening statements against

the DIA em lo ee believed to have initiated the com laints.

Due to these events and other concerns regarding the relationship

between the Task Force and the DIA ersonnel, the DIA directed its

personnel serving at to leave the facility

and to return to Cam Sla er in late June 2004. A memorandum from

to the Director of the DIA

dated July 6, 2004, stated that an investigation of detainee abuse was

underwa and that it had revealed

However, we are not aware of any report or findings by the DOD

OIG, the Task Force, or any other milit com onent re ardin the

alleged incidents of detainee abuse at

during Adair's tenure at that facility. As noted above, Ryan also reported

his concerns to the FBI Inspection Division in August 2004. The

Inspection Division initiated an investigation of the allegations against

Adair, who by that time also had returned to the FBI as a Special Agent.

On September 1, 2004, the Inspection Division conducted an interview of

Ryan and obtained a 7-page affidavit from him setting forth his

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.378

allegations. The Inspection Division did not interview Adair or conduct

any further investigation before closing the matter as "unsubstantiated"

in September 2004. An FBI Inspection Division official later

characterized Ryan's allegations as "rumor and innuendo." However, the

Inspection Division referred the matter to the OIG on October 20, 2004,

by providing Ryan's affidavit to the OIG.

D. OIG Investigation

The OIG interviewed Ryan, Adair, and the team of seven FBI agents

who were deployed to the facility to conduct interrogations of detainees.

We also reviewed the survey responses of the FBI interrogation team and

the electronic communications summarizing detainee interviews that

were prepared during the period. We obtained documentation from the

DOD OIG regarding complaints made by Defense HUMINT Service

interrogators re ardin conditions at the

In evaluating Adair's conduct, we recognized that Adair was acting

in his capacity as a military commander while he was stationed at the

detention facility. In this capacity, he was expected to comply with

military regulations relating to the treatment of detainees, not FBI

policies. As noted in prior chapters, military policies regarding

interrogation techniques were significantly different and less restrictive

than policies applicable to FBI agents. As a result, Adair's conduct

should be evaluated as a military commander by reference to military

standards, not FBI standards.223

Nevertheless, the FBI retains an interest in the "off-duty" conduct

of its agents. The FBI's MAOP, Section 1-21.2, provides that "a

disciplinary inquiry is not restricted to activities within the critical

elements and performance standards of the employee's position and may

also include on- or off-duty conduct when such conduct affects an

employee's ability to perform his or her job or adversely affects the

Bureau's ability to secure needed cooperation from members of the

public."

In evaluating Adair's conduct as a military officer, however, we

recognized that compliance with military policies is primarily within the

jurisdiction of the military and not normally a subject within the purview

of the DOJ OIG. The Church Report described in detail the extremely

223 Moreover, we are not aware that the FBI has established any policy or

guidance regarding the applicability of its policies to FBI employees serving in the

military forces.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.379

complex evolution of the military policies and found that in many cases

there were serious deficiencies in the communication of the contents of

military policies to units in the field. Church Report at 276. Moreover,

most of the otential witnesses to conditions and events at the

during Adair's tenure are not DOJ

employees and therefore are not subject to the OIG's investigative

authorities. Consequently, the scope of our review was primarily limited

to the accounts provided by FBI employees.

We identified instances where Adair's conduct might potentially

have implicated particular military policies, based on the descriptions of

such policies in the Church Report and summarized in Chapter Three.

However, we believe that the military should make the ultimate

determination of whether one of its officers complied with military policy.

If the military determines that Adair's conduct violated military policy, we

recommend that such findings be communicated to the FBI for its

assessment whether any discipline is warranted under MAOP 1-21.2.

Although Adair was actin as a milit officer, the FBI agents who

were deployed as a team to during May

through July of 2004 were at all times acting as FBI employees. These

agents were subject to the more restrictive FBI policies regarding

interrogation, as described in prior chapters. As discussed in the

following sections, we assessed their conduct in light of FBI rather than

military standards.

E. OIG Analysis of the Allegations

In this subpart we present the results of the OIG's investi ation

into the allegations relating to misconduct at the

1. Alleged Inhumane Physical Conditions

Ryan stated that a military interrogator had told him that there

were "inhumane conditions at the Baghdad detention facility." The

military interrogator told him that detainees who were not coo erating

with the interro ators were ke t in

The FBI agents who conducted interrogations at the

acknowledged that the conditions for the detainees

were "primitive" and uncomfortable, but the agents did not view them as

inhumane and instead viewed them as appropriate to the circumstances.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.380

One a ent estimated the cells to be

. One

According to most of the FBI agents, the plywood detainee

cells were open at the top and were in buildings that were enclosed and

air-conditioned, including the

agent said that the cells were clean and were swept regularly and

mopped on occasion. Several agents said that the cells had slee m

mats in them. One agent said that the cells were large enough

We believe that conditions in the were likely extremely

uncomfortable, particularly in the summer. However, we have no

evidence that, as J2X of the Unit, Adair was involved in designing or

constructing the facility, which was already in operation when Adair

arrived in Iraq. We also received no evidence that Adair could control the

size or temperature of the , or that he or others intentionally

manipulated temperatures in the to increase detainee

discomfort. Accordingly, we did not analyze whether the conditions in

the .11111111111violated military policies or applicable treat obli ations.

We believe that this issue is not s ecific to Adair.

2. Allegations Regarding Medical and Hygiene

Conditions

Ryan stated he believed that the detainees at the facility were

"denied showers for periods up to one month and medical attention." He

said that although "each detainee was screened by an individual known

as Doc,' there were problems with detainees receiving prescribed

medication." He did not provide any specific examples of detainees not

receiving prescribed medication.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.381

The FBI agents interviewed by the OIG said that a doctor gave all

detainees a medical examination upon their arrival at the facility. One

agent also recalled several incidents when the doctor interrupted an

interview to check on the detainee. Another agent stated that some of

the detainees had diabetes or heart conditions, and the outside of each

detainee's cell would indicate whether he needed specific medication and

when he was to receive it.

Agents stated that detainees were given showers regularly and

were escorted to the toilets periodically and also u•on re uest. The FBI

Team Leader stated that detainees sta ed at

Adair described the medical screening process for new detainees in

a similar fashion as the FBI agents. He stated that the surgeon and an

interpreter interviewed each detainee individually to determine if there

were health problems or injuries. Once the doctor cleared a detainee, the

detainee was given a prison uniform consisting of medical scrubs and

was assigned to an individual cell.

Durin a DOD investigation of conditions in the 11111111111

, one of the DIA civilian interrogators stated in his

affidavit that he noticed some detainees arriving at the facility in May

and June 2004 with fresh injuries such as bruises that were not

recorded in the medical screening sheets. The DIA interrogator stated

that all detainees were screened by the facility's medical doctor within

the first hour of their arrival, but only "major medical problems" were

being recorded. He said that some detainees complained to him of back

pain in the area of the kidneys, but that the medical screening did not

note these complaints. Another DIA debriefer stated that about 50

percent of the detainees arriving at

"appear to have been mistreated" before they got there.

A memorandum from

to the Director of the DIA dated July 6, 2004, stated that the on oin

internal investi ation of detainee abuse by the

found that "it is not uncommon for

detainees to arrive with bruises from actions during capture," and that

there was an "on-going case of kidney stones in the facility, and medical

opinion of recurrent kidney problems due to the water, but no abuse

specific to detainees' kidneys."

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.382

We found insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that

Adair was res onsible for an inadequacies in medical treatment at the

3. Alleged Deprivation of Food or Water

Ryan said that when he was in another city in Iraq, he "observed

the utilization of food/water deprivation on one detainee." He said that

he "only personally observed this abuse occurring" in another city, but

that the unnamed milit interro ator told him that the "same thing

was going on at the

We are not aware of any military policies that permitted depriving

detainees of minimally sufficient food or water, either as an interrogation

technique or as a general detainee management practice.

The accounts of the FBI agents varied concerning food and water

restrictions at the facility. Some agents said the were unaware of an

food or water derivation.

However, neither of the two a•ents

stated that they personally

participated in depriving detainees of food or water. One of these two

agents said that when a detainee asked for food, the agents asked the

military personnel to give the detainee an MRE. Other agents told us

224 Item "T" in the April 2003 GTMO Policy approved by the Secretary of Defense

explicitly provided that the permitted tactic of "dietary manipulation" did not include

the "intended deprivation of food or water."

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.383

the detainees were never deprived of food or water. He stated

that if a detainee arrived at night, the detainee might have to wait until

mornin for the next ration c cle, but he would never be de rived of

water.

was conflictin

that after they gave water to detainees or that whenever a detainee asked

for a drink, they would give him one. Three agents said that there was

water in the interrogation rooms for the detainees or that they often

offered water to the detainees. One of the agents said that food and

water was always available, but that he received a few complaints about

the quality of the food.

Two agents also stated that none of the detainees appeared to be

malnourished or dehydrated. They added that the detainees appeared

well fed or gained weight at the facility. However, this observation seems

inconsistent with the agents' statement that most detainees were

•released or transferred out of the

The limited evidence available to the OIG retarding the deprivation

of food or water at

Moreover, we did not find any

evidence that the team of FBI agents deployed to the facility participated

in depriving detainees of food or water.

We recommend that the military make its own findings regarding

whether military policy was violated and whether Adair was responsible

for any violation. If the military concludes that Adair was culpable, we

recommend that the military communicate this finding to the FBI.

4. Alleged Sleep Deprivation

an stated that in another Ira "slee derivation techni ues

. He said that he did not observe this

technique employed at but said that

the military interrogator in Falluja told him that it was used there.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.384

Several FBI agents deployed to

ave information consistent with what R

However, both

agents insisted that they were not deliberately using sleep deprivation as

an interview technique.

Adair told the OIG that sleep deprivation was used at the facility as

an interrogation technique while he was there. He stated that it was

considered a "harsh-u techni ue."

He said that he

knew that sleep deprivation could not be used by the FBI in the United

States.

Initially, the

military relied on Field Manual 34-52, which did not list sleep

management, sleep deprivation, or extended interrogations among the 17

interrogation "approaches" that could be used in order to elicit

information from detainees. Church Report at 33-37, 257. On

September 14, 2003, the first Interrogation and Counter-Resistance

Policy for the Iraq theater was issued. Id. at 257, 263. Among other

things, this Policy described "Sleep Management" as an approved

technique, and defined it as: "Detainee provided minimum 4 hours sleep

er 24 hour eriod, not to exceed 72 continuous hours." Id. at 265.

On October 12, 2003, however, a revised Policy was issued that

removed several of the previously approved techniques, including "Sleep

Management." Church Report at 268. The revised Polic , which was in

effect when Adair assumed control of the

indicated that any "requests for use of approaches not listed" (which

would include requests for sleep management) were to be submitted to

the Combined Joint Task Force Commander.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.385

We note, however, that the Church

Report found that "dissemination of approved interrogation policies [in

Iraq] was ineffective, resulting in widespread lack of awareness of which

techniques were currently authorized at the unit level." Church Report at

276.

We recommend that the military make its own findings regarding

whether military policy was violated and whether Adair was responsible

for any violation. If the military concludes that he was responsible, we

recommend that the military communicate this finding to the FBI.

5. Allegations Regarding Harsh Interrogation

Techniques

Adair confirmed that one technique used by the military at the

facility was to drip cold water down the detainee's back during an

interrogation to make him cold. He said that this was a "harsh-up"

technique

. He acknowledged that it was used while he was at the

facility. Adair described this practice of dripping water down a detainee's

back if he was being uncooperative as "annoying" to the detainee.

In addition, Adair said that before he arrived at the facility

interrogators would "strip down" detainees, which he said was culturally

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.386

humiliating. He said that he heard that interrogators also would tell the

detainee after usin the "strt down" techni ue that

Adair also described other "harsh-up" techniques used by the

military, including requiring detainees to do push-ups or calisthenics or

to sit in the "invisible chair" condition, blindfolding, and sleep

deprivation, which we addressed above. He said that the number of

times "harsh-u " techni ues were used during the time he was at the

facility

Adair stated that although these techniques were approved by the

military hierarchy, he would not have used them as an FBI agent in the

United States. He also said that he did not think these techniques were

as effective as the FBI's rapport-building approach. He stated that he

believed that none of the detainees were in grave danger or were

physically harmed and that he had personally been through worse

treatment during Army Ranger training and pledging for his college

fraternity.

The FBI agents who were deployed to the facility provided little

information to the OIG regarding the use of harsh or aggressive

techniques at the facility. One agent said that the military interrogators

wanted to use methods like forced physical training and hooding, but

that these techniques had been abandoned after the Abu Ghraib prison

scandal. This agent said that at the end-of-shift briefings, the topic of •

applying more stringent interrogation techniques with a detainee was

raised only two to three times. However, he said that he did not consider

the stricter techniques to be abusive and believed that they were closely

monitored by the military.

Another agent reported that he heard loud music from certain

interrogation rooms and that military interrogators told him they were

forcing detainees to perform physical training exercises.

The FBI Team Leader told us he recalled that while he was at the

facility, to

use "harsh-up" techniques two times, but the FBI agents did not

participate. He said he did not look at the request and did not know

specificall what techniques were to be used. The Team Leader added

that

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.387

Adair told the OIG that a lot of the harsher milit techniques

that had been used before he came to the

Several FBI agents told the OIG that

Therefore, the evidence indicated that during Adair's command of

the facility, interrogators used interrogation techniques that were not

approved by the military. However, as noted above, the Church Report

found that dissemination of approved interrogation policies in Iraq was

ineffective. Church Report at 276. The report also indicated that

compliance with the policies was "often incomplete, even when units

were in .ossession of the latest idance." Id. The Church investi ators

We recommend that the milit review whether milit olicies

were violated at the

, and whether Adair was responsible for any such

violations. We recommend that that the military communicate any

findings to the FBI.

6. Allegations Regarding Use of Restraints

Detainees were also handcuffed while outside of the cells for security

reasons. One of the agents said that it was the interviewer's discretion

whether the detainee was restrained during the interview, and that

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.388

handcuffs were generally removed as a reward for cooperating and as a

sign of respect that often had a positive impact on the interview.

Occasionally a detainee would complain about the handcuffs being too

tight during the interviews, and the agent would ask the military

personnel to loosen the cuffs.

We also received information that FBI agents participated in

deciding whether detainees would be handcuffed inside their cells

following an interview, as part of a s stem of rewards for coo eration and

unishment for non-coo eration.

One of the two FBI a ents who described

. The other said this happened "most of the time." The first agent

said that on more than "a cou le" of occasions he and his FBI partner

until the

detainee's next interrogation. However, the other agent said that the

was a military tool and not an FBI creation. The

first agent also told us that it would have created problems for the

agents' relationshi with the milit to desi nate a detainee as

cooperative, , if the detainee had in

fact lied or been uncooperative.

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ACLU-RDI 5015 p.389

As previously explained, at all relevant times FBI policy prohibited

agents from obtaining statements from detainees by the use of force,

threats, physical abuse, threats of such abuse or severe physical

conditions. Part 1, Section 1-4 of the MAOP specifically provides that

these prohibitions are applicable to "all p