Darkening Clouds; Major Case 199; IT-Iraq

(RevA1-31-2003)
OGO/ORCON/NOFORN
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Precedence: PRIORITY Date: 10/28/2004
To: COunterterrorism
From: Counterterrorism •
Operational Response Section
Contact: SC Frankie Battle, 571-280-6841
Approved By: Bald Gary
Harrington T.J.
fluion Willie T
Briese Chris M
Battle Frankie
Drafted By: rm
(Pending)
DECLASSIFIED BY 65179 DM:El/STU
CE 10-07-2C109
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Titlez DARKENING CLOUDS;
MAJOR CASE 199;
IT-IRAQ
SynOpsis: To summarize the results of the 10/26/2004 de-:,
briefing of a previous Iraq ,Deployment On-Scene-Commander(OSC)
and two Deputy On-Scene Commanders and recommendations,for
future Iraq deployments.
Ri) • Derive
Decla
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Details: On 10/26/2004, Counterterrorism Division (CTD)
held a Post-Deployment debriefing with one previous Iraq On-
Scene Commander ASACI I(Jan 2004 - Jun 2004)
and Deputy On-Scene Commanders (DOSC) SSA I 1 (Jan
2004 - July 2004) and SSA1 I July 2004 - October
2004). They provided feedback to representatives of numerous
units and programs within the FBI with responsibility for
various portions of the Iraq mission. In'addition to the
feedback, modifications to the rotation were'recommended.
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(U) The CT Operational Response Section (CTORS),
CTD, in conjunction with the CIRG Rapid Deployment Logistics
Unit (RDLU), are responsible for the administrative, staffing
and logistical matters concerning the Iraq Theater of
Operations (ITO)... The CTORS works jointly with and in support
of International Terrorism Operations Sections (ITOS) II which
has oversight responsibility for all FBI counterterrorism
operations in Iraq.
(U) The currentil:FBI mission priorities. within the
' ITO remain fairly consistent and are as follows: 1)interviews
of High Value Detainees (HVDs)-;: 2) document exploitation
(DocEx); 3) assisting the Coalition Provibional Authority
(CPA) and Iraqi authorities with terrorist investigations,.to
include crime scene processing; and 4) support of specialized
Ito include, Sensitive Site
Exploitation(SSEs). The nature of the operation, however, has
evolved during each, rotation, to include the addition of the
Terrorist Financing mission and the Regime Crimes Liaison
'Office (RCLO). FBI CTD intends to remain on the forefrOnt of
these changes in its .l anning for futureFBI CTD deployments.
The following-is--a-list of_.tt4NU;i12,dgovered -
during the de riefing. Contained within is a summary of the
information provided by the OSC/DOSCs related to the missions
and operations in Iraq.
U) X 1. Iraq Mission
Discussion: . Mission guidance was not specific enough,and did
not evolve with the changing dynamics within the Iraq Theater
of Operations (ITO). The OSC/DOSC6 felt-that the Iraq mission,
needed to be revisited every 60-:90 days to ensure that the
command component within the.ITO and FBIHQ were operating
within the same framework. A Clearly defined mission would
give the OSC clear guidance in his/her day to day operationb.
This'would dictate to the OSC how best to prioritize missions
in country and allocate resources to those priorities.. The
FBI mission then needs to be shared, understood and deconflicted
with Senior level officials within the Department
of Defense- (DOD) and OGA. This revised mission statement
would provide these entities with clear guidance on how and
what missions the FBI will conduct in-country and what types
of investigative/Operational assistance the FBI would provide.
This would ensure that DOD support is not just implied but
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clearly spelled out. This would in turn facilitate needed
support in logiStical and operational areas.
Recommendations: ITOS II agreed to do a periodic review of
the Iraq mission statement and mission specific goals and
objectives every 60-90 days.
(U) ) 2. Staffing Issues
Discussion: Investigativevle.nd Support personnel deploying to
Iraq should be selected on the basis of experience, maturiy
and investigative, background rather just volunteering.
Recommendations: FBIHQ should make clear to SACs that such
deployments are extremely important to CTD'operations and that
it is important that the best and most experienced Agents and
-Support personnel are allow to participate. It was suggested
that the role of the Critical Incidence Response Group (CIRG)
be re-engineered and expanded to include an analytical and
investigative component. Units frog the Laboratory Division
and the Technical Response Uhit would be added to CIRG as well
housegulstic.suppOrt to-facilitate
consistent ready deployment posture to any region 'ofthe World
I. Inherent within this new organization b7E
.would be unit cohesion and an in place command and control'
structure. ' Additionally, this would minimize the need to
utilize field office resources on a recurring basis and affix.
accountabilitY for operations overseas which fall outside the
purview of Legat operations. This plan would also allow for
the centralized control of CTD resources deployed worldwide.
3. Logistics
Discussion:
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(U) >0) 4. Hostage Resue Team / Security Issues
4DisCussion: Security issues surfaced beginning with Rotation.
2 and continued until January/February of 2004e with a
substantial amount of progreSs after those dates. Critical
shortfalls in the area of armored vehicles and military
compatible communications and loosely defined mission
parameters were identified as contributing factors in putting
FBI personnel at greater risk in an already dangerous
environment.
Recommendation:1
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Recommendations:
Discussion:
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Recommendation: I
6. Operational/Investigative Issues
Topic: Document Exploitation (DOCEX)
Discussion: The importance of the Document Exploitation
(DOCEX) mission was reiterated and it was viewed_as one of the
most productive initiatives. There was a consensus that the
DOCEX mission should involve more'FBI resources to include
linguists and CART personnel.
' Recommendation: I
Topic: Regime Crimes Liaison Office (RCLO)
RCLG haS-taken_immense
two rotations and there are efforts currently underway in the
U.S. to identify victims of abuse by Saddam Hussein's regime
and memorialize their experiences-by FBI agents. In Iraq,
RCLO members are working closely-with Iraqi prosecutors and
making substantial progress in interviewing of subjects,
victims and witnesses of Iraqi atrocities committed by the
former regime. The BOC has offered work space to the RCLO
until the Embassy is fully functional and continues to house.
and provide logistical and material support to the effort.
,Reccomendations: It is obvious to all parties that DOJ and
the State Department are not abidbing by the original
agreements that created the RCLO. The FBI has not only taken
the lead. investigative role but has rolled this criminal
matter into its CTD mission. Eventhough the material support
,and logistical assistance promised by.DOJ and the State
Department have been limited at best, its has been the
individual initiative of the Agents on the ground in Iraq that '
has made this operation a succees.
Topic: Terrorist Financing Operation Section (TFOS)
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Discussion: TFOS is a critical element in any CTD operation
and is especially true in the ITO where.outside resources are
directly funding terrorist operations. Currently the TFOS
mission has been on standby in Iraq as all parties-reevaluate
where best TFOS personnnel can fit in and be most productive. •
The militray views the terrorist finnancing issue as a
priority and is currently being worked on within the Joint
Interagency Task Force (JIATF).
Reccommendations: ITOS IlZ will coordinate, with TFOS and
develop a comprehensive investigative and staffing plan for
the ITO.
Topic: Sensitive Site Exploitations SSE)
Discussion: The consensus was that CTD should develop a
formalized SSE Protocal. . There were no issues with the
existing SSE approval process_nor were there any instances of
the process delaying or hindering any SSE" operations. There .
have been incidences were communication problems between
outlying areas may have slowed the process but those issues
have since been 'addressed.
Reccomendations: The Military Liaison'and Detainee Unit
(MLDU) has developed several initiatives to standardize the
SSE approval process in both Iraq and Afghanistan. '
-Additionally, MLDU has developed Standard Operating procedures
for conductiong SSEs and is training Tier 1 and 2 Special
Operations Forces on SSE and evidence collection protocals.'
Topic: FBIHQ Substantive Unit Support
Discussion:' The communication flow between the BOC and FBIHQ
has been described as excellent: There has never been a
problem and constant dialogue happens on a daily basis. FBIHQ
was very supportive of the day to day needs and issues of the
BOC.
Recommendation: There should be a clear delineation in the .
roles and responsibilities of FBIHQ CTD units. Units should
either have programmatic responsibilities or operational
responsibilties not both. When units are placed in this
situation of program management and running day to day
operations there is no one addressing "bigger picture" issues
to include policy issues that are never addressed.
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7. Final Recommendations
Discussion:
a. The'FBI needs to take full advantage of ,
relationships established with DOD Special Mission Units,
particularly the Joint Spepial Operation Command (JSOC). This
unit is at the forefront On the Global War on Terror (GWOT)
and is not bogged down.in the attrition of indigenous
insurgents and former regime elements. Embedding in this type
of organization maximizes our likelihood of FBI contact,with
detainees.-who may have information relevant to FBI domestic
responsibilities regarding the GWOT. There should also be
consideration of assigning a fUll time FBI LNO to the JSOC.
b. The creation of a more comprehensive version of
.CIRG, which contains not only a tactical component '(HRT) but
an analytic, linguistic and.investigative component as well
,should be considered. Transferring TRU deployment
:..._------..cgargbLlications to this new- entity„ would cLentraliz.e,command iuk ,,.;
and control, minimize the need to tap. field office. resources
on a .recurring basis, allow for more specialized training for
all who-are engaged in worldwide deployments, and affix •
accountability for operations overseas which fall outside the
purview of the Legat program.. - -
c. CTD senior management who are tasked with
oversight for FBI operations in the ITO should visit the ITO
on a periodic'basis to develop firsthand knowledge to assist
in decision making'and policy development.
d. The FBI should send the best 'and most experienced
Agent and support'personnel to Iraq. SAC's should be mandated
to support the CTD mission regardless of 'some degradation, in
the Field off ice.investigative capability.
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