Court-Martial Record: Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick, II (Volume 5 of 8)

<p>This Court Martial record (volume 5 of 8) discusses the court martial proceedings of Staff Sergeant Ivan L. Frederick, II, who was charged for offenses he committed while assigned to the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility on or about November 08, 2003. SSG Frederick was arraigned and charged with a number of offenses, including maltreatment of subordinates, conspiracy, dereliction of duty, assault, and wrongful commission of an indecent act with detainees. Included in the record is the Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into the offenses committed by SSG Frederick's Brigade, the 205th Military Brigade, which included in the AR 15-6 investigation is a list of approved techniques the Army used on detainees. Also included are interrogator notes taken during a victim's/detainee's interview and Army Regulation 190-8 policies.</p>

Thursday, May 20, 2004
Tuesday, November 29, 2005

COURT-MARTIAL RECORD NARE..cR6.DERzcK,ZVAA) L. 7T .. , • SSN ACTIONS CODED: ASSIGNED TO: INITIAL PANEL if ACCA EXAM. DIV. FINAL COMPANION(S): RETURNTHISTILE TO:: OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT . US: ARMY.JUDICIARY 901 NORTH • .STUART STREET„ SUITE. -1200 .• ARLINGTON, VA.. 222G3-11137 VOLVOFVVOL(S) 2 0 0 4 1 1 2 9 ARMY _1111111111111111111111: IN3 JALS-CC FORM 24, tOCTOBER 200{):. . CO 0 19 0 0 8 DOD-042166 VOL eV of VtL ORIGINAL COPY VERBATIM1 )4(/), 4// At/ 1(1. RECORD OF TRIAL2 • (and accompanying papers) OF FREDERICK, Ivan L., II Staff Sergeant 41111114111111 (NAME: Last, First Middle Initial) (Social ecu umber) (Rank) HHC, 16th MP Bde (ABN) III Corps.US Army Victory Base, Iraq (unit/Command Name) (Branch of Service) (Station or Ship) BY GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL CONVENED BY COMMANDING GENERAL (Title of Convening Authority) Headquarters, III Corps (Unit/Command of Convening Authority) TRIED AT Baghdad and Victory Base, Iraq ON. 19 May, 21-22 Jun; 24 Aug; 20-21 Oct 04 (Place or Places of Trial) (Date or Dates of Trial) COMPANION CASES: SPC AMBUHL, Megan N. SGT DAVIS, Javal S., SPC GRANER, Charles A., J SPC HARMAN, Sabrina D., SPC SIVITS, Jeremy C., SPC CRUZ, Arman J., PFC ENGLAND, Lynndie R Defense exhibits through Prosecution Exhibit i,:7) FID 2.Insert "verbatim" or summarized" as appropriate. (This form will be used by the Army and Navy for verbatim records of trial only.) ins ide nside back cover for instructions as to preparation and arrangement. DD FORM 490, OCT 84. Previous editions are obsolete. FRONT COVOR1 9 00. 2004112 0 DOD-042167 DEFENSE EXHIBITS ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE 019010 DOD-042168 UNITED STATES V. STIPULATION OF FREDERICK, Ivan L. II EXPECTED TESTIMONY SSG, U.S. Army, Headquarters and Hea uarters Company 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne) 20 OCTOBER 2004 III Corps, Victory Base, Iraq APO AE 09342 Stipulation of Expected Testimony: Captain 1111111111111111111 ) — -2/ It is hereby agreed by and between the trial counsel and defense counsel, with the express consent of the Accused, that if Captain 1111111111111 were present and testifying under oath, he would testify asfollows:. (1)P -a ) y I received an e-mail in regards to collection of information from detainees saying that the gloves were coming off. I am unable to recall who specifically sent that e-mail at the time. I received or saw the e-mail in late July or very early August 2004. From Afghanistan, where I was with the 519 th MI Battalion, I redeployed to Fort Bragg and within six weeks of redeployment, I was back in Iraq attached to the 205 th MI Brigade. I arrived in Iraq in March 2003 and departed 4 December 2003. I arrived at Abu Ghraib on 4 August 2003, shortly after I received this e-mail. —02 LTC.shrived at Abu Ghraib in September 2003. He served as the interface between military intelligence and the MP's at Abu Ghraib and met daily at the morning briefings with MP personnel, primarily staff and Company Commanders. From my level, it appeared that LTC11111.11P c )4,authorized ghost detainees to come into Abu Ghraib without being registered. There was a weak command structure within the MP battalion while I was at Abu Ghraib. Both the MP's and the MI were severely undermanned and under resourced. Supplies were limited and it was difficult to maintain repair of the facility. Force protection was substandard. 0). 's_lktsaL;611 IVAN L. FREDERICK, II M • , A. SSG, U.S. Army. CPT, JA Trial Counsel. Accused. Defense Counsel 019011 DEFENSE EXHIBITV __FAv OFFERED R.441 ADMITTED 44& DOD-042169 UNITED STATES STIPULATION OF FREDERICK, Ivan L., II EXPECTED TESTIMONY SSG, U.S. Army, flegalir Headquarters and Headquarters Company 16th Military Police Brigade (Airborne) 20 OCTOBER 2004 III Corps, Victory Base, Iraq APO AE 09342 Stipulation of Expected Testimony: Major General Geoffrey Miller It is hereby agreed by and between the trial counsel and defense counsel, with the express consent of the Accused, that if Major General Geoffrey Miller were present and testifying under oath, he would testifyas follows: During the period 1 October 2003 through 4 January 2004 the following interrogation techniques among others were employed at Abu Ghraib by Military Intelligence personnel. They were: -Sleep deprivatiog. -Dietary manipulation -Stress positions -Change of scenery -Environmental manipulation -Sensory deprivation Upon my taking command these techniques were terminated and more congenial passive intelligence gathering techniques were employed. I have found these passive techniques are more effective in gathering intelligence. I am of the opinion that keeping detainees nude for long periods and handcuffing detainees to cells while nude are violations of the Geneva Conventions. N)oku6,9.)eir-_ IVAN L. FREDERICK, II MAJ, JA Trial Counsel SSG, U.S. Army. Accused. CPT, J Defense Counsel DEFENSE EXHIBIT V OFFERED R. 4 41 ADMITTED 411-1? DOD-042170 UNITED STATES (((\: . STIPULATION v. OF EXPECTED TESTIMONY FREDERICK, Ivan L. II SSG, U.S. Army, 11.111111111.k 27 May 2004 HHC, 16th MP Bde (Abn), III Corps Victory Base, Iraq, APO AE 09342 Stipulation of Expected Testimony: Sergeant mmisw(i)0-1, It is hereby stipulated by and between the trial counsel and defense counsel, with the express consent of the accused, that if Sergeant 111111.11101 came before the co ,b,q6j ----/ • as a witness during the sentencing portion of the trial, and was placed under oath, he would testify as follows:7 1 ; 7 (6/ //: 1. My name is SGTAmmimemptleadquarters and Headquarters Company, Garrison Fort Lee, Virginia. On 24 September 2001, I was assigned to the 352nd MP Company, 220th MP Brigade, Gaithersburg, Maryland. On 23 February 2003, I was involuntarily transferred to the 372nd MP Company, Cumberland, Maryland. On 24 February 2003, my unit was mobilized and on 27 February 2004, I arrived at Fort Lee, Virginia. On 16 May 2003, members of the 372nd MP Company deployed from Fort Lee, Virginia to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. I remained at Fort Lee in order to undergo surgery. On 21 September 2003, after the surgery, I deployed from Fort Lee and arrived at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait. On 30 September 2003, I left Camp Arifjan and on 1 October 2003, I arrived at the Baghdad Correctional Facility (BCF/Abu Ghraib). I was assigned to 3rd Platoon of the 372nd [P Company. My duty assignment was team leader. My missions included escort of detainees from BCF to various courts in Baghdad, as well as escorts of VIPs and contractors. My quarters were located at the 3rd Platoon Building, approximately 400 meters away from the BCF hard-site. I was not detailed to conduct any missions at the BCF hard-site. Z). (OP 2. During the last week of Octob r at a proximately 2200 hours I went over to the BCF hard-site in order to speak with SPC ., my driver. I found SPC.t Tier 1A speaking with his cellmate, CPL Graner. When I approached Tier 1A, I observed two (2) service members (the first service member wore black PT shorts, brown t-shirt, and shower shoes; the second service member wore DCU pants and 15i:6n-shirt). I perceived both service members to be military intelligence (MI). I saw both MI soldiers handcuff two (2) naked Iraqi detainees to the bars of cells on opposite sides. I then witnessed the same MI soldiers handcuff the detainees together, face to face. The MI soldier dressed in black PT shorts and brown t-shirt approached me and asked me in a sarcastic tone of voice: "Do you think we crossed the line?" or words to that effect. I responded: "I am not sure, you are MI" or words to that effect. The MI soldier then stated that they were interrogating 2 detainees and said: "We know what we are doing," or words to that effect. 019013 DEFENSE EXHIBIT C. OFFERED R. 44/ ADMITTED 44e DOD-042171 3. Subsequently, both MI soldiers walked back to the detainees, separated them, and then re-cuffed them to the bars. The MI soldier wearing PT shorts tapped one of the detainees on his buttocks with a plastic water bottle. Then both MI soldiers re-cuffed the detainees together. Throughout this incident, both MI soldiers, via an interpreter, ordered the detainees to confesWhenthe detainees failed to cooperate, both MI soldiers yelled at them and ordered CPL Graner to yell at the detainees. At this time another MI soldier (wearing DCU pants and brown t-shirt) came in and the others seemed to look to him with respect and sought his approval. I asked him: "Is this how you interrogate detainees?" or words to that effect. The MI soldier responded "there are different ways to get it done," or words to that effect. The MI soldiers escorted the naked detainees around Tier 1A. 4. One of the MI soldiers pointed to the naked detainees and said, "These are the people who raped a little boy," or words to that effect. Then SSG Frederick, I believe, escorted a third detainee to Tier 1A. SSG Frederick saitthat this detainee assisted in the rape by holding down the victim. One of the MI soldiers then told the third detainee to get undressed like the other two. The new detainee refused. The MI soldiers proceeded to yell at the detainee. Then, one of the MI soldiers ordered CPL Graner to tell the detainee to get undressed. The third detainee undressed after CPL Graner yelled at him. Then the MI soldiers ordered all three detainees to low crawl on the floor. When the detainees attempted to arch up, two of the MI soldiers put pressure in the middle of their backs and yelled at them to get down. Two MI soldiers then cuffed the detainees together. 5. After the detainees were again handcuffed, I walked over and asked the detainee to tell the MI soldiers what they needed know and that I would try to make the MI soldiers stop. The detainee stated, through the interpreter, that he would not confess to something that he did not do. I turned to the older MI soldier and asked him with a raised voice: "Did you all ever consider that these guys are innocent?" or words to that effect. The MI soldier responded: "I've been doing this longer than you've been in the military. You know, sergeant, they are guilty," or words to that effect. I then turned to walk out and the MI soldier wearing black PT shorts started to sprinkle water on the detainees from his water bottle. While I was leaving the tier, I also observed one of the MI soldiers on the upper tier tossing a Nerf ball towards the detainees. I also noticed SPC England standing in the distance and taking photos. I went back to my LSA at approximately 2230. By the time I returned to my LSA, everyone was already asleep. -0-` 6. The following morning, at approximately 0530, I along with SPC Land SPC "leftthe BCF on a mission to escort detainees to Rusafa Courthouse. After Je Pat. completing the mission, at approximately 1600, I went to my platoon leader, 2LTialallft and I described to him the incident I witnessed the previous night. I informed 2LT eipthat MI soldiers were interrogating naked detainees. 2LT .stated: "They are MI and they are in charge let them do their job," or words to that effect. I then began to question 2L1111111111about who was in charge of the facility. I further voiced my I .I. concerns about our mission and organization. 2LTillipthen acknowledged my complaint and indicated that he will address it. Approximately one week later CPL 019014 DOD-042172 Graner received a written counseling statement from CPT .for use of excessive force. CPL Graner informed me about the counseling statement and I overheard CPTIndicating that he counseled CPL Graner for use of excessive force. 7. I saw SSG Frederick observing some of these activities and to the best of my knowledge he was the senior NCO there. CPT, JA SSG, USA TRIAL COUNSEL DEFENSE COUNSEL ACCUSED i . 0#3/40 019015 DOD-042173 • Re FW Taskers.txt (4 ) Sen.! Thursday, Augu t 14, 2003 5:17 PM To: cl,...65mihecc Effects) Cc: SPC (E-mail); c5-3252ibcoipwl (E-mail); Maj (CW2 iiim c5-325mibticpt (CPT ; c 325micihoc (SGT ; 4ID 519MI THOPS1; 0101311MIHOCOIC; 0101ACECIAS; D1010MG2X; E. CW4; 40.1.111111.11.11111116 7. MAJ (IAD 501st MI S3)' SG (1AD. 501st MI BN HOC); IMEFDF G2 CICO; .mil ; T3ACR-1SQONTOC; T3ACR-66MI; T3ACR-RS2; 4ID MI ICE; 410 DMAIN G2 OPS; 410 G2X; TF20)2X; Subject: Re: FW: Taskers err I sent several months in Afghanistan interrogating the Taliban and al Qaeda. Restrictions on interrogation techniques had a negative impact on our ability to gather intelligence. Our interrogation doctrine is based on former Cold war amd WWII enemies. Todays enemy, particularly those in SWA, understand force, not psychological mind games or incentives. I would propose a baseline interrogation technique that at a minimum allows for physical contact resembling that used bylining , (This allows open handed facial slaps from a distance of no more than about two feet and back handed blows to the midsection ),I from a distance of about 18 inches. Again, this is open handed. I will not comment on the effectiveness of these techniques as both a control measure and an ability to send a clear message. I also believe that this should be a minimum baseline. Other techniques would include close confinement quarters, sleep deprivation, white noise, and a litnany of harsher fear-up approaches...fear of dogs and snakes appear to work nicely. I firmly agree that the gloves need to come off. V/R .2 3 (i)(6)- CW3 3ACR Original message ----- From: "c5165mihecc (Effects)" Date: ThurSday, August 14, 2003 2:51 pm Subject: FW: Taskers sounds crazy, but we're just passing this on. Ori final Messa From: Cpt. [mailto. CORPS.HQUSAREUR.ARmY.SmIL.MIL] Sent: Thurs ay August 14, 2003 1:51 AM • To: 65112520sthiicKIiija) -u.. E-., HECC (E-mail) (E-mail) Cc: gimmeimmimonmer (E-mail) Subject: Taskers • ALCON Just wanted to make sure we are all clear on the taskers at hand 1- A list identifying individuals who we have in detention that fall under the category of "unlawful combatants" I've included a definition form the S)A folks: Page 1 019016 DEFENSE EXHIBIT _1)____-Ftfr OFFERED R. 441 ADMITTED +53 DOD-042174 • Re FW Taskers.txt • 2- An additional list identifying who we have detained who are "I0 siaaXtremist" 3- Immediately seek input from interrogation elements (Division/Corps) • concerning what their special interrogation knowledge base is and more importantly, what techniques would they feel would be effective 5 techniques that SJA could review (basically provide a list). Provide interrogation techniques "wish list" by 17 AUG 03. Wes are"ctiming off gentleman regarding these detainees, col has p) (b - .2; y a x: ma e it clear that we want these individuals broken. casualties are mounting -430 and we need to start gathering info to help protect our fellow soldiers from any further attacks. I thank you for your hard work and your dedication. MI ALWAYS OUT FRONT! V/r (2 , M , USA Battle Captain, CJTF-7 J2X Page 2 0 1 9 0 1 7 DOD-042175 Re FW Taskers.txt AKOS:, (b) (6) Page 3 019018 DOD-042176 UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 YC)(5 ) q ) INTERROGATOR NOTES ( REPORT NUMBER: IN-AG00477-150542-04 INTERROGATOR/S:41110639, LEAD; 1114663, ASSISTANT. INTERPRETER: AM TIME IN: 2340 TIME OUT: 0240 DATE: 14 NOV 2003 WARNING:(U) THIS IS AN INTERNAL DOCUMENT FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY, NOT FOR THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE REPORTS. TEAR LINE BACKGROUND: (UtiFOU0) DETAINEE IS 26 YEAR.OLD MALE WHO HAS KNOWLEDGE CF FUNCTIONS.AND PERSONALITIES OF ANSAR AL ISLAM, AL QAIDA, ANC THE ZARQAWI NETWORK. THE DETAINEE FLED AND WAS STOPPED BY SWIMMIIIIMMEMO AN IRAQI POLICEMAN. SUMMARY: (U//F000i WENT OVER DETAINEE'S TIMELINE AND PERSONAL 10.:XGROUND. t:C.CUSED AND HIS INVOLVEMENT' IN ANTI- C:CAL:T:0N ACTIVITIZS. -, TEXT: 1..Z2//FOU0) • DETAINEE GRADUATED FROM HIGH SCHOOL WHEN WAS :2 YEARS OLD. HIS HOBBIES WERE HANDBALL AND ECONOMICS. HE. :PENT THE NEXT YEAR AND A HALF STUDYING TO RETAKE HIS TESTS SO HE CfY.:LD GET INTO A BETTER COLLEGE. IN 19 HE OPENED A PRINT :3HOIBOOKSTORE CALLED -gromme-(SIMILAR TO A KINKO'S). AT ,EIS STORE HE HAD VARIOUS ENGINEERING BOOKS FROM HIS FATHER, A CIVIL ENGINEERING TEACHER, AND ECONOMICS BOOKS FROM HIS MAJOR. HE ENTERED COLLEGE IN JERASH IN 11111111111111111.. DETAINEE LEFT 6,:,CAUSE HE GOT MARRIED A IT WAS TOO DIFFICULT AND =XE'ENS=VE TO DO BOTH. DETAINEE AND HIS WIFE TRAVELED ON P.:i.REMACIE TO MECCA IN MARCH.FOR TWO WEEKS. . //FOUO) rHE FIRST TIME THE DETAINEE MET SIMOMM WAS IN IRAQ TN 200$. THE FIRST TIME THAT DETAINEE. HEARD ABOUT ZARQAWI THRC-: HIS. FRIENDS WAS FROM UMW IN 19$. ZARQAWI VISITED THE • IN 1911N. THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE MOSQUE IS EXTREMELY VARIED :NI5fNC: THE "BROTHERS" AND SULIFEANS. UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 019019 DEFENSE EXHIBIT E., Fer OFFERED R. 152-ADMITTED 1,53 DOD-042177 UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 3. II//FOU0) DETAINEE TRAVELED TO BAGHDAD ON FEBRUARY ip 2003 EY 41E OF TAXI CAB. THE DETAINEE AND HIS FAMILY STAYED AT A HOTEL AND THEN STAYED AT THE HOME OF ONE OF HIS WIFE'S FRIENDS. DETAINEE WAS CAPTURED IN JAN 2001 BY•THE 1111111/111111111111111111111101 tAND INTERROGATED FOR 11,DAYS. DETAINEE CLAIMS HE.WAS RELEASED ON FEBRUARY, 20011 DETAINEE WAS INTERVIEWED BYMMIR 1111111.11111.11111111111.111111111.1111 IN THEW DISTRICT OF BAGHDAD. HE WAS QUESTIONED ABOUT.HIS COUSINS. WHEN RELEASED DETAINEE WENT TO RAMACI AFTER 6-7 DAYS. DETAINEE LIVED WITHIN/1M IN RAMADI UNTIL HIS CAPTURE ON.AUGUSTNIN20011. AT THIS TIME THE DETAINEE'S FATHER WAS SENDING HIM MONEY. 0:1//FOU0) DETAINEE DESCRIBESUMMISAS BEING EDUCATED AND .VERY RELIGIOUS. mom PREACHES AT THE MOSQUE ABOUT HOW THE AMERICANS ARE TAKING OVER. THE THEIR.LAND AND OIL AND PUTTING THEIR PEOPLE IN JAIL. HOWEVER DETAINEE SAYS THAT IMIIIIIVONLY COM?LAINS ABOUT THE AMERICANS, HE NEVER SUGGESTED ANY ACTION A:7AINST THEM. DETAINEE CLAIMS THAT SIMMOWNEVER PLANNED OR PATICIPATED IN ANY ANTI-COALITION ACTIVITIES. DETAINEE DENIES THE EXISTENCE OF THE ANTI-COALITI•N PROPAGANDA CD'S THAT WERE FOUND IN HIS RESIDENCE. HE SAYS THAT HE ONLY HAD1MCD'S WITH NEWS ARTICLES ON THEM. WHEN.QUESTIONED ABOUT BEING A CAR SALESMAN DETAINEE SAID THAT THE LAST CAR HE SOLD WAS TO ONE CF r RELATIVES, A CERTAIN jOPEL. DETAINEE SAYS HE WAS SURPR:SED WHEN TOLD THAT MEW WAS CAPTURED IN THAT SAME VEHICLE rfliTTH EXPLOSIVES KT ACT SURPRISED. TEAR LINE COMMENTS: CU) A. rUI/FOU0) MOOD/ATTITUDE OF DETAINEE: DETAINEE WAS CALM. DETAINEE BECAME VERY EMOTIONAL AND SAD AT ANY MENTION OF HIS • E. (Ui/EC,UO: ASSESSMENT: • DETArtN'EE IS FORTHRIGHT AND TRUTHFUL EXEPT WHEN DISCUSSING WM/ C 'C. AVAMMOMM SUGGESTED FUTURE INTERROGATIONS: QUESTION Ommommem OF HOW LONG HE WAS DETAINED BY THE MI, AND ACQUIRE MORE THAN SEMPI.ESTIC DETAILS OFOIMMOMIL IT SHOULD BE DULY NOTED THAT PEAR OF RE-RE WILL BE USED, AS WELL AS GAY UP HARSH, AND iRk');ND HOG-DAY APPROACH. SOURCE IS A FAG, OF HIGH INTEL VALUE, SHOULD STAY IN THE HOLE. HE IS BAD. HE IS MEAN. I DON'T LIKE HIM, HE CAN KILL. HE IS BAD. MUSTAFA=BAD. HE KNOWS AL EDA.. HE IS BAD. HE KNOWS ANSAR AL ISLAM. HE IS BAD. HE KNOWS 7AEQAWT. HE. IS BAD. BECAUSE. HE KNOWS BAD PEOPLE, HE IS BAD. UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 019020 DOD-042178 UNCLASSIFIED//FOU0 ANALYST COMMENTS: HE IS BAD. BECAUSE HE IS BAD, ONE SHOULD NOT THE ?!:,:-LEY.iNC SITUATION AT HAND;-HE IS BAD. VERY BAD. I THINK IN ADDITION TO ALL APPROACHES, FEAR OF BROOMSTICK IN THE ASS SEO'JLD BE USED. HE IS BAD. UNCLASSItIED//FOU0 Bates pages 19022 is nonresponsive based on application of the Judge's specific and applied rulings. DOD-042180 VSPQSYN •C)\ -C\NCL- U¦ CikAi\ac.-64\c\CA.6cyrc 5tAt\:lvf\ 52,0. -a,\A *Thai\_CC4.CcikCS.\c\CLCQ-1a¦R6 \`‘`r\ C\Ok i\A.-c?--k 0C AAINcz- i-f\ c\rvake-S aid c-ces-qc--. up Th.44 VkaCc a_ Ccis-k\-cc_ 3c:_•-k7 ac\cs._JeTvicv._c--0\cz,s --\-0-tknoci\ -sk-k\a\k Yid_ Mil k-C LDC_,\L s,\Nk \tw¦V-Sk9, . o'\-\ C - ic\ING101, .. -\z_D.k\c•cL\4. &.61(\kk (\an6 -3( Secof\d-$_¶2 o-ck k-\(-Nq-kcycc--. 'a,\¦tv\osA 3cD-\ --6-arrcac_--k-Nc\cd-n,_Sx-NkN¦akes_k\c\Q_ of\ V2SSA\r\cc\_cz._cor¦cS_ac\cA‘c\ac_-Vc.) u\_*Sa-Owe.-10c,cAl qq,k A\nct ac\_cac\¦._( \.cc_k Voc-r¦ -\-sc\c,. k 50? a. 6 aN„kArk. „,_\9 \:1/4*e__ 019023 DOD-042181 Bates pages 19024 is nonresponsive based on application of the Judge's specific and applied rulings. DOD-042182 -I-SamV r- J -r I'd. / NO.035 P002/011 21/09/04 09:19 7 1111111M ((e)3 CONSULTATION SHEET: ELECTRONIC VERSION OF SF4I3 RESIVNSE CONSULTATION SHEET MEDICAL RECORD FROM: OM Ph.D. TO: PSYCHOLOGY PSYCHOLOGY CQNSULTATION REP T emill=111110 USA AD E-6 PSYCHOLOGY SERVICE LANDSTUHLREGIONALMEDICALCENTER MCEUL-PS•M APOAE09180 REFERRAL INFORMATION The patient is a 37 y/o white, married male with 20+ years TIS (17 years national guard and reserves, 3 years active). ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE The patient was informed of the purpose and nature of the evaluation and the limits of confidentiality were discussed with the patient. He acknowledged understanding, and he agreed to the evaluation. The patient was interviewed (31 August, 2 September 2004) and the following psychological tests were administered (31 August & 2 September 2004): The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. Second Edition (MMPI-2), Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-Ill, Wechsler Abbreviated Intelligence Scale (WAS!). The patient's medical records were not available for review. Eye contact was good, and he MENTAL STATUS EXAM The patient was neatly and appropriately dressed. was cooperative and fully oriented. Speech was of normal rate and volume. He appeared mildly anxious. cis Affect was full and appropriate to thought and situation. Thinking was linear, logical, coherent, and goal directed, and there were no indications of a disturbance in thought content. There were no indications of hallucinations or other perceptual disturbance. Psychomotor activity was normal. There were no thoughts of harming self or others. BACKGROUND INFORMATION The patient reported that he is facing legal charges that resulted from his service at Abu Ghraib prison. He stated that he is charged with maltreatment of prisoners, assault, and indecent acts. The patient said, "I'm taking responsibility for my actions," and he stated that he has pled guilty to the charges. The patient indicated he was called to active duty on 26 February 2003, and he arrived in Iraq on 13 that he was May 2003. He stated that he was initially stationed at a city south of Baghdad. He stated reassigned to the prison in early October 2003, because of his experience as a correctional officer. The patient Said that when he arrived thesituatierrat theprisom as a "nightmare," and that it was "filthy dirty." The patient said that when he arrived at the prison he saw °several things that I didn't agree with." He stated that he reported some of his concerns to his chain of command, and he was told by his chain of command that that was the way military intelligence "wanted it handled." The patient indicated that he was in charge of the night shift with five other soldiers, and he had to maintain order for over 1000 prisoners. He described his job as "nonstop stress," and his day as basically consisting of sleeping at working. He said he was "very exhausted most of the time,' and that he had never experienced that much stress in his life. He also stated that he was "mentally drained," and that he had a force himself to get out of bed in the morning. He said that he was "In fear all the time," in part because of the threat of insurgents breaking into the prison. The patient reported that he was told that military intelligence had information that insurgents might attempt to break into the prison through the sewer system. He said this made him feel "paranoid." The patient also indicated that his job was made difficult because his suggestions were essentially ignored. He said this made him feel "bad." The patient stated that ileArrim 201215-60-8739 Page 1 of 4 019025 DEFENSE EXHIBIT C-5-FID OFFERED R.442-ADMITTED DOD-042183 VV . L-V • L.- sl r• I „111 r L 11,11,1C. ulf Dir.3 P.O N0_035 P003/011 .21/09/04 09:19 additional stress resulted from °never knowing who was in control or what the rules were, they were always changing." He described the situation as "total chaos." The patient indicated that some of the Iraqi guards at the prison brought guns and knives to prisoners, and they also helped prisoners escape. The patient indicated that on one occasion one of the prisoners fired several rounds at him. He subsequently experienced dreams of being shot at and he described the dream as being "so . two months prior to thisrear' that it would awaken him. He indicated that his last dream occurred approximately shooting. The evaluation. He also stated that he no longer experiences any dreams or intrusive thoughts of the patient indicated that he was "real jittery" for some time after he left prison environment. He stated that sudden noises would scare him. For example, he stated that all one occasion someone dropped a helmet, and he "did everything" he "could to get under the table." ' • is The patient reported that he has experienced depression since January 2004. He rated his depression as an 8 or 9 on a 10 point scale (1 = equals normal mood, 10 = severe depression) at As worse point. He indicated that at times his depression may decrease to a 2 or 4, but this lasts for only a day or so. The patient said that very little gives him pleasure, and he attributes this, in part, to his family not being around. He says he does not like to experience things without his family, and he added that he "thrives off' my family. He stated that he was having difficult getting to sleep and staying asleep. He said that his appetite is down and he has "just no taste for food." He reported that he has lost 20 pounds since January 2004. The patient indicated that he was prescribed Remeron for sleep, about to three weeks prior to this evaluation. He indicated that the Remeron has helped his sleep. However, he said he still has occasional nights when he cannot get to sleep, and he occasionally awakens and cannot get back to sleep. The patient said that sometimes he feels worthless. He indicated that when he feels like that, he tries to think of the good things that he has done and the good times he has had with his family. He indicated that he sometimes has difficult keeping his mind on task. He reported that his energy and interest have been down a little bit. The patient stated that he thought about suicide, but he concluded that it -just put it on someonewould be "a selfish to do." He indicated that it would "take the pain away" from him but else.° The patient reported that he experiences a "weird feeling in my stomach, which he attributes to "nervousness." He said he worries a good deal about the financial future of his family. He indicated that his hands shake on occasion. and he experiences occasional "heart pounding." The patient described himself as "very quiet, affectionate, down-to-earth, and softhearted." He said that he will "do anything I can to help out." In this context, he said he is "an overall good person, but he was placed in a bad situation." The patient also described himself as "very agreeable and kind of quiet and shy." However, he said that he was outgoing, and by this he meant that he will go out of his way to help someone out. He indicated that he will drop whatever he is doing to help someone, and he sometimes sacrifices his own needs to accommodate others. He stated that he does not like people to be "mad at me or hate me." He reported that people can change his ideas, even if his mind is made up. He said that he often gives in because he fears rejection. The patient stated that he does not like to be alone, and gets a "little depressed" when he is alone. He said, "I like to have attention and someone around all the time, especially my family." The patient indicated that he is perfectionist He stated that he likes his clothes to be folded in a certain way, and he like things to be "nice, neat, and clean." He said that his penchant for being neat sometimes "drives" his "wife crazy." He indicated some of his fellow soldiers in Iraq would make fun of him because of his need to have a neat uniform with creases. He reported that he would put his pants between a mattress and a piece of plywood in order to get a crease in them. The patient reported that he grew up in West Virginia. His father, 77 years old, worked in the coalmines and is now retired. His mother, 73 years old, sold insurance, but according to the patient was mostly a homemaker. The patient reported that his mother was "very supportive and caring." The patient indicated his relationship with his father was also very good. He said that his father "taught" him "a lot and was very patient" with him. He pleasantly recalls often being in the garage within his father working on vehicles. The patient indicated that he had many friends In school and maintains contact with some of them. He has one sister, 48 years old, who is a registered nurse. The patient had been married for 5112 years; this is his first marriage. He has two-step daughters, 19 and 14 years old. His wife works as a correctional officer. The patient describes his wife as "a very strong woman," who is supportive of him. el en ms 201215-56-8739 Page 2 of 4 019026 DOD-042184 V r. •. I I I J.V I. III W. 4. I kolV -r. -r • 21/09/04 09:20 NO.035 PO04/011 The patient reported that he graduated from high school, and he has earned 29 semester hours of credit at Allegheny College of Maryland. He indicated that he studied criminal justice. The patient said that he was an average student in high school and had a B average in college. The patient stated that he enjoyed high school and played football, basketball, and baseball. He indicated that he failed no grades, and he was never diagnosed with an attention deficit disorder or other learning disabilities. He indicated that he did not experience any developmental delays and his not aware of any perinatal complications. The patient indicated that he joined the National Guard in 1984, and he initially served as a combat engineer. He changed career fields 1995, when he became an MP. He has been a correctional officer for approximately eight years. Prior to his work as a correctional officer, he worked for 7% at Bausch and Lomb making glasses. The patient reported that he has no serious medical problems. He indicates he takes "antimalarial pill." He has never had any surgeries. His last physical was in October 2001. He has never had a head injury with a loss of consciousness. He is not aware of any exposure to any chemicals or toxins. The patient indicated that he has never experience any seizures. He stated that he experiences "migraines" once every 2-3 months. He said that he also experiences other headaches about once per week that are characterized by pain behind the eyes. He indicated that he takes a Goody's powder or Tylenol, which is helpful. The patient reported that he has not noted any recent sensory or motor changes. The patient indicated he is not noted any cognitive changes, such as memory difficulties or expressive and receptive language difficulties. He stated that he has been experiencing some dizzy spells for approximately 1 month. These dizzy spells occur once every two to three days and last approximately one minute. The patient reported that his use of alcohol has never created problems for him. He indicated that he drinks approximately one to two beers per week. He denied use of illicit drugs. He indicated that he smokes very rarely. He said that for the past two to three years he has not used any tobacco products. The patient denied past psychiatric treatment. The patient reported that at 19 years of age he was charged with disturbing the peace. He indicated that he paid a five-dollar fine, and his record was eventually expunged. The patient indicated he was suspended one time from school for fighting. He said he cannot recall the details of the fight. The patient reported that he has never received any disciplinary actions while in the military, other than a negative counseling statement for being late for formation in 1985. TEST RESULTS On the WASI the patient obtained a Verbal IQ of 92 (30 th percentile), which is in the Low Averse to Average range range (95% Confidence Interval = 87-98); a Performance I0 of 99 (47 th percentile), which is in the Average range (95% Confidence Interval = 93-105 ); and a Full Scale 10 of 96 (39 th percentile), which is in the Average range (95% Confidence Interval -= 92-100 ). The 7 point difference between the Verbal IQ and Performance I0 is is not an unusual occurrence in the general population. The Full Scale I0 should provide a good estimate of the patient's overall level of intellectual functioning. Validity scales on the three self-report measures of personality and emotional functioning used in this evaluation do not suggest of the patient attempted to present himself in an overly positive light with respect to psychological functioning. Validity scales indicate that the patient presented himself as a morally virtuous individual. There are no indications that he attempted to present himself in an overly negative light. This patient reported many symptoms associated with anxiety. He is restless, anxious, apprehensive, edgy and jittery. He will be expected to have a variety of somatic complaints associated with physiological overarousat especially gastrointestinal problems. He worries and great deal and is ruminative. He is reporting a large number of general fears and may tend to overidentify danger in the environment. He appears to be somewhat pessimistic, feels weak and tired, and is lacking in drive and motivation. Test results suggest that a core motivation for this patient is to obtain and maintain nurturance and supportive relationships. He is expected to be obliging, docile, and placating, while seeking relationships in which he can lean on others for emotional support, affection, nurture, and security. His temperament will likely be pacifying and he will try to avoid conflict. In this regard, he will have general difficulty in expressing negative feelings for fear of alienating others. He will exhibit an excessive need for both attachment and to be taken care of, and he 01111111111iMai USA AID g-e 201215-58-8739 Page 3 of 4 019027 DOD-042185 VV C. ¦-•V J.V• 1 111 .L 1r. C- III IJ el I 1.4 D1 VCCO't . NO.035 P005/011 21/09/04 09:21 will likely feel uneasy when alone. This underlies, in part, his tendency to submit to the wishes of others in order seem to be to maintain security. There are indications of some feelings of resentment and persecution. which related to his current legal issues. (1) (6) - 9 Ph.D. DAC Clinical p sychologist LRMC Psychology Service ,PREIERIempwripip USA AD E-6 201215-56-8739V Page 4 of 4 019028 DOD-042186 --rV VVJ. f..¦ • --rV• I Ill J. 1 r L 1 111..1 GM 1 • •.7 J. J kJ I ,J C. Go—r p• 21/09/04 09:21 NO.035 P006/011 ^ 3323Vat:V.3V 1.1 0.17 ¦¦ 1110. Y •Or n..¦ .000¦ + ¦_ 001.JW0 th !ft aaStSaa f aasassamsa a 11111111thwi turIrrullirdwarinlmOilirhruhridtwhild I- at 1..I 11171V1111111111. I 11 aV11171 1VI I IV11111111111141 S 1111 1.1.7 1.1.Ti 1 111 1.'ILI.II ,_ , fo 111. a.ft.X.M 1 1 II 1.1 1.1 1 1_1_1_1_1 1_11_I_I I_1_1_1_1_11_1_1_1 1_1_1_1_11_1_11 aV7.Va X [.II I. I.1 rt.I I.1 1 is.II. 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Illilivirlimlo Iti villitileits/t, Illitrilimo pet y1'8 1 111,1 X A a a ggamg cl S sI?jUj S,JaRIOS p0$01, 418(1 019029 DOD-042187 --r.4-1••4,/LC cALmoarao. . ee• P. 6 . 21/09/04 09:21 NO.035 P007/011 MCMI-111 7mV11,1 Profile Report ID 215568739 (1$)V-Page 3 411111111141w iReFfiLten_L, MILLON CLINICAL MULTIAXIAL INVENTORY -III CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION FOR PROFESSIONAL USE ONLY Valid Profile PERSONALITY CODE: 3 ** - * 8A 2B 7 + 2A 8B 4 5 " 6B 1 6A " // - ** * // SYNDROME CODE: A ** - *11- - *// DEMOGRAPHIC: 215568739/0N/M/37/W/F/12/0/J0100000/10/00000/ VV CATEGORYVSCORE PROFILE OF BR SCORES DIAGNOSTIC SCALES VV RAW BR 0 60V 75V85 115 X 94 60 DISCLOSURE MODIFYING - Y 14 65 DESIRABILITY INDICESV- Z 15 70 I 1 DEBASEMENT SCHIZOID _ — 2A 5 59 AVOIDANT 28 6 70 i DEPRESSIVE 15 85 DEPENDENT 2 24 52 ImmmummTm HISTRIONIC PERSONALTFY 5 12 51 imoNNIONI NARCISSISTIC CLINICALV4 17 _ PATTERNSV SA 3 22 MB ANTISOCIAL 68 3 26 IIS SADISTIC 7 22 83 COMPULSIVE SA 10 72 NEGATIVISTIC 8B 3 57 .11¦11111•111111 MASOCHISTIC 4 SCHIZOTYPAL PERSONALITY C 4 37 BORDERLINE SEVEREV8 61 _ PATHOLOGY -V11 P ea PARANOID A 10 ANXIETY -••• • H a SOMATOFORM N 7 BIPOLAR: MANIC CLINICAL I -. --- DYSTHYMIA 5 SYNDROMES ._ - - ------ .. B 1 ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE .V_ T 2 DRUG DEPENDENCE R 6 POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS 6 63 THOUGHT DISORDERSEVEREVSS CLINICALVCC 11 71 MAJOR DEPRESSION SYNDROMES PP 5 67 DELUSIONAL DISORDER 019030 DOD-042188 7c, PrOMilligtmalltoalplogsp.edul = Sent: w nes , pt mrr 2 , 2004 6:04 PM 1"0:'Vz 6) -.4 SubV1, Test InterpretVdo of Client/ 411 received the material on the 37 year old white male who, as I understand It, is being evaluated at thesuggestion of his defense counsel and in preparation for his trial on charges of maltreatment of prisoners, assault, and Indecent acts, ail with reference to events at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Please understand that ordinarily. i would want to Interview the individual both before and after he completed the psychological assessment devices, in order to ensure the validity of the findings. However, that is not possible in this case and I am relying on a blind interpretation of the material I am using the pr V the MMPI-2 and the MCMI-111, along with a written copy of the psychological report signed by of J. PhD, This is a 37 year old male who, by review of the psychological report, is functioning within the average to low average range of intelligence. His educational level is unreported, but overall, the information available suggests that this man was capable of reading and understanding the materials presented tohim and is able to understand the charges against him. Moreover, his response to the assessment, while somewhat guarded, is generally within the range expected of someone who is in a stressful situation ofrevealing material that may be used in his prosecution. The results of the assessment can be considered to be reasonably reliable and valid indicators of his current functioning. It should be said that I find nothing of substance, in the current psychological report by V wit4° which I disagree. The patient/prisoner presents himself as being a bit overly concerned with morality and adheres to quite conventional and conservative values and beliefs. His excess concern with morality and with issues of right and wrong is probably partly understood as a reaction to the current charges and the subsequent events surrounding his duties at Abu Ghraib Prison. Indeed, his morals have been calledquestion and have served as a basis for criticizing he and his comrades. In this context, it is not into remarkable that he would be concerned with what is right and wrong and to be a bit defensive about his own sense of morality and ethics. It should also be noted that there Is no evidence of gross psychopathology. He appears to be oriented to time and events, evidences no serious distortion of reality, and is able to plan his actions and anticipate their consequences, His foresight and judgment are unimpaired. The only areas of concern are those related to the expression of symptoms of anxiety, Self-doubt, end distrust of authorities, He appears unduly anxious and is likely to have associated symptoms of stress,such as sleep disturbance, tension, difficulty concentrating, physical symptoms of nervousness, remorse,recurrent thoughts about real and imagined misbehaviors, and periods of pronounced subjective anxiety.These symptoms are likely to Impede his ability to respond to new situations and may reduce his flexibilityand ability to adapt to change. He is likely to indecisive, Insecure, and to rely on others to help him make decisions. Indeed, the latter characteristic Is likely to be a long- tending quality of this young man. He presents himself as rather dependent and cautious, lacking in self-confidence, insecure, needy of direction and approval, and easily Intimidated by those In authority. In response to the current situation, he Is In a difficulty quandary, being wary of authorities and generally being distrustful of those who are In charge, on one hand, but very uncertain of his Own abilities to make decisions, and very needy of approval and of structure and guidance from authorities, on the other. He seeks assurance of his worth and acknowledgement of his efforts, and Is quite dependent on others to help him It and keep agenda or make decisions. 1 019031 DOD-042189 BATES PAGE 19032 IS A DUPLICATE PAGE OF 19031 DOD-042190 ragvi ui i Subj:.RE: Frederick Evaluation Date:.9/26/2004 7:14:55 PM Daylight Time (6j/ aster' To:. Ind.ame fL) 0 4f 9 26 04 At 01:22 AM 9/21/2004, you wrote: The test data and a short report of results with some background info have been faxed to 415 673 2294- I did not draw any conclusion because no specific questions were asked of me. .Original Message. Dearielnip, (h) - I have carefully read your evaluation and the test data, and thank you so much for this expert appraisal. My basic question for you is: 1. Did you find anything in this client's evaluation that could be considered a pathological disposition that might have influenced his behavior as a guard in the Abu Ghraib Prison? Another way to frame this is, 2. Can you say with any degree of certainty-- on the basis of your assessment -- that the Client came into that situation (or brought into that setting) a psychiatric pathological condition that affected his daily behavior as a corrections office on that prison tier for the time period he was there? 3. Or, in trying to partition the causes of his (admitted) abuse of prisoners on that !A tier, how much of it would you say could be reasonably attributed to pathological features of his personality-- based on your assessments? 4. If his actions were to be described as "sadistic", in that setting, is there anything in your evaluation that would lead you to conclude that the Client's evaluation revealed sadistic symptomatology? Thanks mop /6 ) (6) At 01:22 AM 9/21/2004, you wrote: The test data and a short report of results with some background info have been faxed to 415 673 2294- I did not draw any conclusion because no specific questions were asked of me. Original Message Tuesday, September 28, 2004 America Online: um" 019033 DOD-042191 r dgC 1 Ill 1 Subj: RE: Witnesses (UNCLASSIFIED) Date: 10/12/ 004 7:37:06 AM Eastern Daylight Time From: h• da . arm .mil (16 To: .com 1 Classification: UNCLASSIFIED Caveats: NONE -*** ArgStill trying to get a finiercial phone number for ...I should have it within the hour. Please fax me the report at (703) 696 I will try again is morning. v/r ) Chris Original Message— From: [mailto @aolcorn] Sent: Monday, October 11, 2004 1:17 To: Cc: ©us_arrnyani1;11111111111111@usarrny.triii Subj : Re: Witnesses 1.4VTC is no problem. Hawaii was a welcome respite. This was particularly true because I won a motion to dismiss the single charge and spent Friday Saturday and part of Sunday on the beach. If we are going to Victory I presume I will not have to go in country until 19 Oct Please confirm. Understood on (6) (69 I really need to speak with 111/1116 as do you. Please give me a good fax number for and I will fax the report immediately. It shows Frederick to have no pathology. He took no pathology into Abu. Bythat I mean no personality disorder, no sadism, etc. Just a country boy Thorn Virginia with significant dependant traits. Not the stuff of good leaders. (Li - !also am having difficulty.rot11110k-„Ticl Maj multiple messages with Leavenworth,. and no Understood tf'Z, 4;4:2 is finl--fdah;e .iR with NYPTI. ; rhiiAt Si..1==1'%-lk With him by V.,:edne.,aday or get 2. court order. Would fatbc.fiT not rfo ; do Dot me_;,-:In E-OU.rd pressuring. Jii-st that time running out. 1111111.( ) 2 Further, ; may st;•; need stip on ;AG 11111 Caveats: NONE 13E-.7.%1.1:1.) . 1-11;:t1 1.•• I. •• 0 903 k DOD-042192 (-6 Cft. 13" wyn, irginia 23936 EDUCATION: Additional Training: 7A -RnvA RESUME OF QUALIFICATIONS Buckingham County High School Bucldngharn, Virginia Diploma — 1974 Southside Community College Administration of Justice — 21 hrs. — 1982 Merts Advanced Officer Training Advanced Firearms Training Haiardous Materials Principles of Supervision, Planning, Organizing, Controlling Techniques of Inmate Supervision Firearms Division Guidelines & Update Report Writing Legal Responsibility of CO's Principles of Supervision: Performance Standards In-Service Training Sgt. & Lts. '!'first Aid In-Service Itase IV Firearms Instnictor School 'BM 88-16 Introduction to All-In-I Hostage Negotiations Daily Duty Roster Training Security Chiefs Conference Drug-Free Workplace Training (CRO) Supervisors Management Skills Performance Standards Emergency Vehicle Training Leadership Skills Training Program Hostage Negotiations recertification 019035 '"461' DEFENSE EXHIBIT 14 OFFERED R. 44-ADMITTED 4 s4 ` 6Z:91 1700Z/ET/OT 0Ong 5559EB6VEV DOD-042193 Additional Correctional Leadership Development (NIC) Training (Continued) Business Writing Strategic Planning/Leadership Development How to Supervise People (Fred Pryor Seminar) Regional Coordinator/Starting Line Program Middle Managers In-Service Upper Management Leadership Executive Training for New Wardens Annual Pathogens Annual Firearms Senior Management Institute Correctional Peace Officers Institute Leak Detection VCA Accreditation VCA Detention Crowding VCA Cultural Diversity Outlook Basic Skills in Mediation Blood Borne Pathogens 019036 60 39Vd °Dna 5555E86PEO 6Z:9T 17003/6T/0T DOD-042194 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: Nov. 2000 to Present Buckingham Correctional Center P. a Box 430 Dillwyn, Virginia 23936-0430 Corrections Warden Senior Responsible for ensuring a safe and healthy environment through compliance with related policies, procedures, regulations, and legal mandates. Plans and implements procedures to reduce the risks for escapes and assaults. Ensures agency is in compliance with DOC policies & procedures, IOP's, Post Orders, audits, and standards. Purchases and maintains adequate equipment to ensure safety and security. Manages, directs, and supervises Buckingham Correctional Center. Defines and ensures compliance with the organizational mission. Is visible within the secure perimeter of the institution to ensure knowledge of staff and inmate issues and concerns, assessment of institutional needs and to communicate and convey information. Directs the draft, review, and implementation of lOPs and reviews and implements DOPs and DOC policies & procedures. Plans for effective recruitment, selection and retention of staff by compliance with DOC policies, procedures, and practices and industry best practices. Ensures staff knowledge, skills, and abilities are adequate to provide required criminal justice/law enforcement functions. Directs the development of the facility budget consistent with the needs of the institution, Ensures the institutional goals and objectives are linked to the budget planning process, Controls facility expenditures and costs. Ensures efficient and effective management of inmate funds. Monitors compliance with fiscal policies and procedures. 019037 PO 39Vd Dona 9999E861EP 6Z:9T POOZ/ET/OT DOD-042195 Provides notice to the regional and central offices regarding potential budget problems. Manages public relations for the facility by establishing cooperative relationships with other state and criminal justice agencies to ensure inmate supervision and services are delivered as required. Provides safety and security for inmate services delivered in local communities. Provides accurate and timely information to the public to ensure good community relationships are established and maintained. Resolves issues, complaints and concerns. Implements volunteer programs to ensure effective delivery of institutional programs. Serves as chief executive officer on all matters relative to public safety, inmates, personnel, volunteers, programs, security and other activities. Responsible to the parent agency for accomplishment of the Department's mission in accordance with constitutional and legislative mandates, within the framework of agency and institutional rules, regulations and established operating budget. 019038 SO 39Vd ppm. 559SE861760 6Z:9T POOZ/ET/OT DOD-042196 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: Oct. 1997 to Powhatan Correctional Center Nov, 2000 State Farm, Virginia 23160 Corrections Assistant Warden of Operations -Responsible for managing the daily operations of Powhatan Correctional Center in an efficient and effective manner so as to ensure the public safety in accordance with the mission of the Institution and the Department of Corrections. Direct daily activities of security, food service, building and grounds, training, safety and sanitation, inmate disciplinary hearings and other key areas. -Establish goals and objectives and assist in direction to accomplish goals, objectives and Department of Corrections Standards, Review work of staff and writes performance evaluations. -Address employee relations and disciplinary issues. -Provide direction for maintaining a safe, sanitary and clean environment, through weekly inspections of institution- -Provide direction in preparing action plans for fire, safety, sanitation and maintenance deficiencies. -Provide assistance to other state facilities, local jails, courts and other State agencies. -Maintain good communications with inmates and employees, relating to institutional problems and concerns. -Tour facility to ensure reasonable policy and procedure compliance. -Coordination of M-Building and General Population classification process of transfers. Feb. 1994 to James River Correctional Center Oct. 1997 State Farm, Virginia 23160 Corrections Assistant Warden of _perations -Responsible for the general direction and management of all operational functions. -Direct daily activities of security, food service, building and grounds, .training, safety and sanitation and other key areas. -Establish goals and objectives and assist in direction to accomplish goals, objectives and Department of Corrections Standards. -Review work of staff and writes performance evaluations. -Address employee relations and disciplinary 019939 90 39Vd Dye 9999E8617E17 EZ:TE VOK/ET/OT DOD-0421 97 issues. Provide direction for maintaining a safe, sanitary and clean environment, through weekly inspections of institution_ -Provide direction in preparing action plans for fire, safety, sanitation and maintenance deficiencies. -Provide assistance to other state facilities, local jails, courts and other state agencies. Maintain good communications with inmates and employees, relating to institutional problems and concerns. -Tour facility to ensure reasonable policy and procedure compliance. -Responsible for developing a 6 year site plan and assist in budget and expenditure preparations. Aug. 1993 to Deep Meadow Correctional Center Feb . 1994 State Farm, Virginia Corrections Assistant Warden of Operations -Responsible for the general direction and management of all operational functions. -Direct daily activities of security, food service, building and grounds, training, safety and sanitation and other key areas. -Establish goals and objectives and assist in direction to accomplish goals, objectives and DOC Standards. -Review work of staff and writes performance evaluations. Address employee relations and disciplinary issues. -Provides direction for maintaining a safe, sanitary and clean environment, through weekly inspections of institution. -Provide direction in preparing action plans for fire, safety, sanitation and maintenance deficiencies. -Provide assistance to other state facilities, local jails, courts and other state agencies. -Maintain good communications with inmate and employees, relating to institutional problems and concerns. -Tour facility to ensure reasonable policy and procedure compliance. Responsible for developing a 6 year site plan and assist in budget and expenditure preparations. Aug. 189 to Deep meadow correctional Center Aug, 1993 State Farm, Va. Corrections Major -Supervise Shift Commanders and Coordinates. 019040 L0 39Vd.opal sssyceEtEt. 6Z:91 VOOZ/ET/OT DOD-042198 the overall security program of the institution. -Reviews work of staff and writes performance evaluations. -Responds to inmate complaints and grievances that are related to security issues or security staff. -Issues security procedures and post orders and oversees the security procedures to ensure proper implementation. -Submits budget requests for Operation to meet security objectives. Approves purchases for all security equipment. -Makes sure that the institution's training program is followed and all personnel are adequately trained to perform the duties of their job. -Participates as a Management Team Member to give input into the overall operation of the institution from a security perspective. -Interviews corrections officer applicants and makes recommendation to hire. -Plan and coordinate all security operations of the institution; develop policies and procedures relating to security functions. -Manage a budget of five (5) million dollars annually. -Responsible for the security of 830 inmate population and 167 security staff. Nov. 1987 to Aug. 1989 James River Correctional Center State Farm, Va. Corrections Lieutenant -Watch Commander of Third Shift, -Responsible for a staff of 25 Correctional Officers and a population of 335 inmates. -Supervise and coordinate the work of all sergeants, correction officers and inmates. -Direct, control and supervise daily activities. -Keep thorough and accurate up-to-date duty roster of all security staff. Ensure that all log books and written reports concerning the shift are up-to-date, and that all incidents on the shift are properly handled and reported to appropriate personnel. -Tour entire institution daily checking performance of staff & conduct of inmates. -Prepare daily duty roster to ensure proper and effective staffing of security. -Ensure count of inmates is correct before assuming shift responsibility. Oct. 1955 to Virginia Power Nuclear Security 80 39Vd 30115 5S55E861E17 8Z:9T VOOZ/ET/OT DOD-042199 Nov. 1987 North Anna Power Station Mineral, Va. Security Control_gystems Operator -Operate Alarm Station Consoles; Electronic Access Control System; and Alarm Station Communications Systems. -Control Personnel, Vehicle and Cargo Access to protected areas using remote access control hardware. -Program the Security computer to perform required functions. Program the electronic access control system. -Produce required reports and records utilizing the Security computer. -Dispatch security personnel to perform necessary functions. Document activities occurring during the shift. -Conduct functional tests of alarm station equipment and systems and assist in con­ducting functional tests of remote security hardware. -Maintain records of maintenance performed on the security systems and hardware, Nov. 1982 to Buckingham Correctional Center Oct. 1985 Dillwyn, Va. Corrections LieutenanI -Responsible for a staff of 65 Correctional Officers and a population of 690 inmates. -Supervised and coordinated the work of all sergeants, corporals, officers and inmates. -Directed control and supervised daily activities, including internal movement. -Transported inmates for scheduled and unscheduled events. Kept thorough and accurate up-to-date duty roster of all security staff. Ensured that all log books and written reports concerning the shift were up-to- date, and that all incidents on the shift were properly handled and reported to appropriate personnel. -Toured entire institution daily checking performance of staff and conduct of inmates. -Prepared daily duty roster to ensure proper and effective staffing of security. Ensured count of inmates was correct before assuming shift responsibility. Assigned as Assistant Watch Commander on two of the three shifts. July 1974 to.James River Correctional Center 019042 60 3SVd pona 599968617EP 6Z:91 1700Z/ET/0T DOD-042200 Nov. 1982 State Farm, Va. Corrections Sergeant -Officer in charge of third shift. -Supervised 5 Corporals, 25 Officers and 300 inmates. -Responsible for security of entire insti­tution, staff, time keeping schedule, and handling all situations that may have occurred during the tour of duty. Corrections Officer -Worked every security post within the institution, from cell blocks to work gangs and gun towers. REFERENCES AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST 019043 OT 39Vd Dona 9999EBEIVEV 6Z:9T VOOZ/ET/OT DOD-042201 USA (b) EDUCATION/TRAINING: B.A. 1971 Psychology, East Carolina University M.A. 1973, Psychology, East Carolina University Ph.D. 1980 Psychology, Texas Christian University Residency in Clinical Psychology (American Psychological Association approved), USAF Medical Center, Wright-Patterson AFB OH Post-Doctoral Fellowship in Clinical Neuropsychology, University Medical Center, University of Arizona LICENSES/CERTIFICATES: Licensed as Practicing Psychologist with Health Service Provider Designation, North Carolina, License # 978, 1983 National Register of Health Care Providers, Registrant #42974, 1994 MEMBERSHIPS: American Psychological Association (APA) Division 40 (Neuropsychology) of APA Society for Personality Assessment Psi Chi (National Honor Society in Psychology), 1970 Sigma Xi (The Scientific Research Society), 1980 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: Clinical Psychologist/Neuropsychologist 01/18/1994 to present. Department of Psychology, Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Washington, DC Provide services to active duty military and their beneficiaries as coordinator of psychological services for an inpatient psychiatric unit and Adult Partial Psychiatric Hospitalization Program. Perform psychological evaluations and provide individual and group psychological treatments for outpatient and inpatient adults, including alcohol and other drug abusing patients, utilizing a biopsychosocial approach. Utilize cognitive-behavioral therapy approaches to provide short-term individual and group pychotherapies, including assertiveness/social skills training and stress management, for adult outpatients. Perform and supervise command directed mental health evaluations, security clearances, and serve on sanity boards. Integrate psychological and/or neuropsychological test data with diagnostic interviews and collateral data to provide recommendations and diagnostic conclusions to command, mental health professionals, and other medical providers concerning hospitalization, military administrative issues, treatment planning, and differential diagnosis. This includes the full range of 019044 DEFENSE EXHIBIT. 14FY OFFERED R. 4 3ADMITTED 4 s9- DOD-042202 adult patients, especially those with more severe and complex psychiatric conditions. Provide feedback to patients concerning results of psychological evaluations. Supervise unlicensed military paraprofessionals, psychology practicum students, and psychology residents (participating in an American Psychological Association approved clinical training program) in psychological treatment and psychological evaluations/testing as appropriate. Train medical students and psychiatric residents in the use of psychological assessment methods. Participate in multidisciplinary treatment planning teams involving social workers, psychiatrists, nurses, and other professionals and paraprofessionals. . Prepare and deliver advanced lectures to psychology and psychiatry residents. Conduct and publish psychological research in peer- reviewed journals. Post-Doctoral Fellow in Neuropsychology University Medical Center, Memory Disorders Clinic, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 03/01/1992 to 05/01/1993. Performed neuropsychological evaluations of adult neurosurgery patients, adult patients who experienced traumatic brain injury, and patients referred to the memory disorders clinic. Provided feedback to patients and family members as appropriate regarding evaluation results and made referrals to appropriate treatment services, such as social work and community agencies. Age groups ranged from adolescents to the elderly. Participated in multidisciplinary diagnostic teams. Supervised clinical psychology interns. Chief, Psychology Service (USAF Captain) 836th Medical Group, Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ 8572 07/23/1987 to 02/29/1992 Provided individual cognitive-behavioral and problem-focused treatments to active duty military and beneficiaries with an emphasis on short-term psychotherapy. Provided structured cognitive-behavioral group therapies, including stress management, anger management, social skills training, and cognitive-behavioral groups for depression. Completed psychological evaluations for differential diagnosis and treatment planning purposes, including referral for medication and hospitalization. Supervised intakes and short-term treatment provided by enlisted mental health technicians. Evaluated active duty personnel for fitness for duty and security clearances, including SCI clearances. Assessed individuals on TDRL status for medical boards determinations. Conducted emergency after hour on-call mental health evaluations to assess risk and need for hospitalization. Served as consultant to Hostage Negotiation Team and responsible for base suicide prevention program. Served as the psychologist on the mental health team for a 60 bed Air Transportable Hospital while deployed during Desert Storm/Shield providing short term focused treatment, psychological evaluations, combat stress management and redeployment briefings for active duty personnel. Senior Psychologist Cumberland County Mental Health Center. Fayetteville , NC 08/01/1985 to 07/01/1987., Provided psychotherapy and psychological evaluations for the complete spectrum of psychiatric disorders including adult and adolescent drug and alcohol abusers with an emphasis on individuals experiencing chronic and severe psychiatric disabilities. Developed and implemented a computerized screening, intake, and referral system. Served as training director for paraprofessionals in the alcohol/drug treatment program, which included providing lectures (e.g., mental status, psychotherapy) and individual supervision. Participated and supervised multidisciplinary treatment planning teams. Chief, Psychology Service (USAF Captain) USAF Hospital Barksdale AFB , LA 71101 08/01/1985 to 07/01/1987. 019045 DOD-042203 Provided cognitive-behavioral treatments with a focus on short-term psychotherapy for military active duty. Completed psychological evaluations for differential diagnosis and treatment planning purposes, including referral for medication and hospitalization. Supervised mental health technician's initial evaluations and short-term treatment as well as psychological testing services they provided. Eyaluated active duty personnel for fitness for duty and security clearances. Provided emergency after hours on-call mental health evaluations. Evaluated alcohol and drug abusing patients for disposition. Assistant Professor of Psychology University of North Carolina at Pembroke. Pembroke , NC 09/01/1981 to 08/15/1982. Prepared and delivered lectures for the following courses: psychological testing, abnormal psychology, clinical psychology, and personal adjustment. Each was a semester long course. PUBLICATIONS/PRESENTATIONS: VC,11— 471.6 441111011111k(200 1 ). An examination of the MMPI-2 Wiener-Harmon Subtle subscales for D and Hy: Implications for parent scale and neurotic triad interpretation, Journal of Personality Assessment,77 105-121. , . (Eds.) (1991) Handbook of self-actualization, [Special Issue.] Journal of Social ehavior and Personality, 6, 5. -.- 44iniiiiimill.(1991). Ike in self-actualization measurement. In A. Jones and R. Crandall (Eds.), Handbook of self-actualization. [Special Issue.] Journal of Social Behavior and Personality, 6, 339-344. ) (CI) 411111111111111111.11.0.1!(1986). alidation of a short index of self-actualization. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12, 63-73. - -2- amilimumikoo 985). Preparing newcomers to enhance assimilation into groups: A group therapy example. Small Group Behavior, 16, 31-57. 4111.1/1110.11118111111111MMIONOMMIIIIMINIM (19811i. Me combined treatment of drug and alcohol abusers: An overview. Journal of Drug Issues, 11, 109-122. (46/.- .981). Inpatient vs. out-pat ient treatment df drug and a cohol abusers. American Journal of rug and Alcohol Abuse, 8, 329-345. (#) --2 1981). Percepti ns.psychological influence: A cognitiveinforms ion proce -ing. a -roac for explaining moderated relationships. Personnel Psychology,34 453-477. .- dimummumhupoinmmmommmmij ..94, Feb.). Errors of omission and commission in distinguishing Alzheimer-type and depressed patients. Paper presented at the International Neuropsychological Society meeting. 411111111111Rela. cffiectivees6ofttpatient and inpatient combined treatment for alcohol and drug abusers. (1980). Paper presented at the annual convention of the Southwestern Psychological Association, Oklahoma City, OK. . (19 9, Sept.). Professional status, past addiction and treaThrient -expe'rience o counselors: The relationship to helping skills and client treatment 019046 DOD-042204 and life satisfaction. Paper presented at the annual convention of the American Psychological Association, New York City. lkjt) 4;2 41/ lrnaIIIIIIIMIMMIIIIIIIINMIMM1979, Sept.). Role of client load on treatment climate. Paper presented at the annual convention of the American Psychological Association, New York City. RESEARCH I N Ply)GRESS: (b 116) 110111.11.An examina tion of the validity of the Levitt and Gotts MMPI-2 personality disorder scales. 0) (6)- An nalysis of the compone , t neurocognitive processes for the Trail-in est. 'nation of age related changes. 019047 DOD-042205 January 2003 VITA Office: Home: Department of Psychology Jordan Hall, Mail Code 2130 Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305-Telephone: Fax: (415) 673-2294 (PP —5 Fax: 650 7 -56 - 11/1" dmin. Associate PERSONAL INFORMATION Born: -mph New York City, NY Married: , Ph.D., Psychologist, U. C. Berkeley Children: ',4)(6!- Licensed: Psyc , e of California Prince 1975) EDUCATION AND HONORARY DEGREES Brooklyn College, A.B. (Summa) Honors in Psychology, Sociology/Anthropology, 1954, Phi Beta Kappa, 1953. Yale University, M.S. 1955; Ph.D., 1959 Honorary Degree, Doctor of Humane Letters in Clinical Psychology, Pacific Graduate School of Psychology, 1996 Honorary Degree, Doctor Honoris Causa, National University of San Martin, Peru, 1996 Honorary Degree, Doctor Honoris Causa, Aristotle University, Thessalonika, Greece, 1998 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE Post Doctoral Trainee - West Haven Veteran's Hospital, Clinical Psychology Dept., 1959-1960 Co-Director (with Dr. S. Sarason), Children's Test Anxiety Research Project, Yale University, 1959-1962 Created, Directed The Harlem Summer Program, "A Head Start-Black Pride" Daily Program Staffed by NYU and CCNY Students in Harlem (1965) Training and research consultant in hypnosis, Morton Prince Clinic, New York, 1963-1967 Co-Director (with Dr. E. Hilgard), Stanford Hypnosis Research Lab, 1969-1980 Director, Stanford University Social Psychology Graduate Research Training Program Founder, Co-Director (with Dr. L. Henderson), Shyness Clinic/ Shyness Institute, 1975-present Senior Scientific Advisor, writer, narrator, Discovering Psychology, PBS-TV/ Annenberg CorpVideo series (1989, updated 2001) TEACHING Instructor/Assistant Professor, Yale University, 1957-1960 Assistant Professor, New York University, 1960-1967 Professor, Stanford University, 1968 to present Visiting Professor. Yale (1962), Stanford (Summer 1963), Barnard College (1966), University of Louvain (Belgium) Part-time (Summer 1966), University of Texas (1967), Columbia University (1967-68; Klingenstein Professor of Race Relations), University of Hawaii (Summer 1973), International Graduate School of Behavioral Sciences, Florida Institute of Technology at Lugano, Switzerland (Summer, 1978), University of Warsaw (Summer 2000) 019048 DEFENSE EXHIBIT J FID OFFERED R.41-3 ADMITTED' 4 E+ DOD-042206 HONORS TEACHING *Distinguished Teaching Award, New r • niversity, 1965 *Distinguished Teaching Award for Outstanding Contributions to Education in Psychology, American Psychological Foundation, 1975 *Phoenix Award for Outstanding Teaching, Stanford Psychology Department Faculty, 1984 *California Magazine, Best Psychology Teacher in California, 1986 *The Walter Gores Distinguished Teaching Award, Senior Faculty, Stanford University, 1990 *Bing Fellow Outstanding Senior Faculty Teaching Award, Stanford University, 1994-1997 *VVPA Recipient of the annual Outstanding Teaching Award, 1995 *Distinguished Teaching Award, Phi Beta Kappa (Northern California Chapter), 1998 *Robert S. Daniel Teaching Excellence Award, APA Division 2, Society for the Teaching of Psychology, 1999 *Dean's Award for Distinguished Teaching, Stanford University 1999-2000 RESEARCH *Peace Medal from Tokyo Police Dept., 1972 (special recognition of a foreign national whose research and ideas significantly contributed to improving criminal justice administration) *Fellow, Center for the Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, 1972 *Gordon Allport Intergroup Relations Prize (honorable mention), 1974, Society for Psychological Study of Social Issues (for the Stanford Prison Experiment) *Distinguished Research Contributor Award, California State Psychological Association, 1977 *Psi Chi Award for contributions to the Science of Psychology, 1986 *Guze Award (Society for Clinical & Experimental Hypnosis), Best Research in Hypnosis, 1989 *Selected as one of ten major contributors to Social Psychology, Yosemite Conference on 100 Years of Experimental Social Psychology, 1997 *Ernest R. and Josephine R. Hilgard Award for the Best Theoretical hypnosis paper for Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, published 1999 *Distinguished Lifetime Contributions to General Psychology (APA, Division 2, 2000) *Distinguished Contributions to Scientific Hypnosis (APA, Division 30, 2001) *Psychology Today Magazine, Mental Health Award for Research and Treatment of Shyness, 2001 *Distinguished Lifetime Contributions to Psychology, California Psychology Association, 2003 WRITING *National Media Award (honorable mention), American Psychological Foundation, 1973 (forpopular writing on vandalism) *William Holmes McGuffey Award for Psychology and Life, for Excellence and Longevity,(Textbook Authors Association) 1995 GENERAL *President, Western Psychological Association, 1983, again in 2001 *Who's Who in America, 1982 to present *Ugliest Man on Campus (Most Popular Stanford Faculty/ Administrator), Alpha Phi Omega, 1983*Chosen by Editors of The Sciences to represent psychology in its 35 th year celebration reflecting on the contributions in each field of science, November, 1996 *Phi Beta Kappa, Distinguished Visiting Lecturer, 1989-1990 *Distinguished Contribution to Psychology as a Profession, California Psychological Association, 1998 *APA Division 1 award, Ernest Hilgard Award for Lifetime Contributions to General Psychology, 2000 * Los Angeles County Psychological Association: Psyche Award for lifetime contributions toPsychology as a science and art (2000) *Fulbright Scholar at U. Rome (2001) President of the American Psychological Association, 2002 MEDIA *Selected to be Senior Academic Advisor, Host, Writer and Narrator of Discovering Psychology,(A 26-part PBS TV series on psychology, Annenberg/CPB project, 1986-1989) 2 ' 9 2 4 9 DOD-042207 -Ti' *London Weekend Television (Granada Media), "Human Zoo" Three Programs, Chief Scientific Advisor and On-Screen Expert *STC (Society for Technical Communication) International Audiovisual Competition Award of Excellence for "The Power of the Situation" (Discovering Psychology video series), 1991 *Columbus International Film & Video Festival Bronze Plaque Award for "The Developing Child" (Discovering Psychology video series), 1992 *International Film & TV Festival of New York Finalist Certificate for "Past, Present and Promise" (Discovering Psychology video series), 1992 *WPA Film Festival Award of Excellence for "The Responsive Brain" and "Social Psychology" (Discovering Psychology video series), 1992 *WPA Spring Festival first place award for Quiet Rage: The Stanford Prison Study video, 1993 *WPA Spring Festival first place award for Candid Camera Classics in Social Psychology Video, 1993 *APA Presidential Citation for outstanding contributions to psychology for the Discovering Psychology video series, 1994 *Psychological Consultant, New Programming for NBC TV, 2002. *Emmy Award, New England Instructional Television, Host, Cognitive-Neuroscience (Discovering Psychology Video Series), 2002 *WPA Spring Festival, First Place Award for Cultural Psychology (Discovering Psychology Video Series), 2002 *Sagan Award for Promoting Public Understanding of Science, Awarded by Council of Scientific Society Presidents, 2002. PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS American Psychological Association (APA), Fellow; Div. 1(F), 2(F), 3(F), 8(F), 9(F), 13(LM), 15(F),26(LM), 35, 45, 46(LM), 48(F), 52(F) Association for Advancement of Psychology (AAP) American Psychological Society (APS), Fellow Charter Fellow Canadian Psychological Association (CPA) Western Psychological Association (WPA), Fellow Eastern Psychological Association (EPA), Fellow California State Psychological Association (CSPA) International Association of Applied Psychology (IAAP) International Congress of Psychology (ICP) Society for Inter-American Psychology Society for Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI) American Association for Advancement of Science (AAAS), Fellow Society for Experimental Social Psychology (SESP) Society for Advancement of Social Psychology (SASP) Society for Personality and Social Psychology (SPSP) Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, Psi Chi American Association of University Professors (AAUP) Psychologists for Social Responsibility CONSULTATIONS AND BOARDS Research Consultant, Morton Prince Clinic for Hypnotherapy (New York City) Asthma Research Unit, Cornell Medical School (New York City) Tokyo Police Department Wake Up! Louisiana (New Orleans Citizens' Group) Public Advocates Law Offices (San Francisco) Charles Garry Law Offices—expert witness, prison litigation, Senate subcommittee on prisonsand juvenile delinquency Japanese internment reparations hearings (San Francisco) San Francisco Newspaper Agency (Senior Project Research Consultant) 3 01.9050 DOD-042208 Adowl. Wily 'F Cristaldi Films, Rome, Italy (Consultant on "Control" film) SRI International Consultant to PSI Phenomena Project (Oversight Committee) San Francisco Exploratorium, Consultant to APA Traveling Museum Exhibit, and Memory Project Executive Board for the Holocaust Study Center, Sonoma State University Advisory Panel for the Center on Postsecondary Learning, Teaching and Assessment Board of Advisors, Psychology Today Magazine Consulting Editor, McGraw Hill Publishers, Social Psychology Series Historian, Western Psychological Association (1984-2000) Editorial Board, Journal of Social Behavior and Personality Editorial Board, Journal of Social Issues Institute for Research on Social Problems Contributing Editor, Healthline Advisory Board, The Foundation for Grand parenting Advisory Board, End Violence Against the Next Generation (California) Advisory Board, North American Journal of Psychology Honorary Member, Italian Inter-university Center for the Study and Research on the Origins and Development of Prosocial and Antisocial Motivations Consultant, Live Entertainment, Hollywood, "Stanford Prison Experiment" film Advisory Council, Resources for Independent Thinking Advisor, London Weekend Television, "Human Zoo" 3 programs on group behavior Discovery Channel Advisor, BBC, Human Rights, Human Wrongs Program: "Five Steps to Tyranny," Founder, Scientific Advisor, Consultant, NBC TV Consultant, Maverick Films, Hollywood, "Stanford Prison Experiment" film Board of Directors, Council of Scientific Society Presidents INTERNATIONAL INVITED ADDRESSES, WORKSHOPS, PRESENTATIONS Conventions and Associations International Congress of Psychology (in Bonn, London, Tokyo, Mexico City, Brussels, Stockholm); International Congress of Applied Psychology, International Social Psychology Conference (in Majorca, Spain, and Budapest); Canadian Psychological Association, Japanese Psychological Association, Japanese Social Psychological Association, German Psychological Society, Greek Psychological Association, Spanish Social Psychological Association, European Association of Experimental Social Psychology, European Association of Personality Psychology, World Congress on Eclectic Hypnotherapy in Psychology (Ixtapa), International Conference on Time (San Marino, Italy); International Convention on Shyness and Self Consciousness (Cardiff, Wales), Mexican Psychological Society Universities University of Salamanca, University of Barcelona; The Sorbonne; University of Paris (Ecole des Hautes Etudes), University of Rome, University of Bologna, Catholic University of Milan, University of Naples, University of Parma; Oxford University, East London University, Central London University, University of Cardiff, Open University-Birmingham, England; University of Thessalonika, University of Athens; University of Louvain; Hamburg University; Tokyo University, Kyoto University, Okinawa University, Osaka University; University of Sao Paolo, University of Rio de Janeiro; Guanajuato University; University of British Columbia, Calgary University, University of Alberta, Toronto University, McGill University, University of New Foundland; Chinese University of Hong Kong, Deree College, (Athens). DOMESTIC LECTURES, WORKSHOPS, PRESENTATIONS Conventions and Associations American Psychological Association, American Psychological Society, Eastern Psychological Association, Western Psychological Association, Midwestern Psychological Association, South Eastern Psychological Association, Rocky Mountain Psychological Association, New England Psychological Association, American Psychiatric Association, American Ortho-psychiatric Association, American Association for the Advancement of Science, New York Academy of Sciences, Society for 4 019051 DOD-042209 44.1111111111110 Experimental Social Psychology, Federation of Behavioral, Cognitive and Social Sciences, Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, National Conference on Law Enforcement, Smithsonian Institute, Annenberg Foundation, American Association of Behavior Therapy, Anxiety Disorders Association of America, California School of Professional Psychology (Fresno and Berkeley), Pacific Graduate School of Psychology, Eriksonian Conference on New Developments in Therapy, National Conference on Teaching, Texas Junior College Convention. Veteran's Administration Hospital Psychology Programs in Palo Alto, Menlo Park, CA., Bronx, NY, Society for Research in Child Development, California Psychological Association, Midwest Institute for Teachers of Psychology. Colleges, High Schools University of Virginia Visiting Scholar (lectured at VMI, Virginia Tech, George Mason, William & Mary Colleges); University of California: at Berkeley, Davis, La Jolla, Los Angeles, Riverside, Santa Barbara, Santa Cruz, San Francisco (Extension Program), San Francisco (Langley Porter Institute); California State University: at Fresno, Long Beach, San Diego, San Marino, Sonoma; Claremont-McKenna College, Claremont College, Cal Tech, University of Southern California, San Francisco State University, College of San Mateo, Foothill College, D'Anza College, NYU, Columbia University, Yeshiva University, New School for Social Research, Queens College, Hunter College, Brooklyn College, Lehman College, City University of New York, Einstein Medical School, West Point Military Academy, University of Vermont, Dartmouth College, Cornell University, Harvard University, Boston University, Wesleyan University, Yale University, Brandies University, MIT, Pennsylvania University, Temple University, St. Joseph's University, Princeton University, Rutgers University, Montclair State College, University of Delaware, Emory University, Pittsburgh University, University of Cincinnati, Duke University, North Carolina University, University of Florida, Broward Community College, Baton Rouge College, LSU, University of Texas (Austin), Sam Houston Community College, University of Houston, Texas Tech University (Lubbock), McNeese State College, Arkansas University, University of Northern Arizona, Arizona State University, Arizona University, Michigan University, Northwestern University, University of Chicago, University of Illinois- Chicago, St. Louis University, Oregon University, Washington University, University of Central Washington, University of Eastern Washington, Chemmetkita College (Washington), University of Hawaii (Manoa Campus), Central Oklahoma University, University of Puget Sound, Reed College, University of South Carolina, Claremont Graduate School, California State University, Long Beach, Ohio State University, Devry University, College of DuPage, Holy Names College, Baldwin Wallace (Harrington Distinguished Lecturer), Temple University (Uriel Foa Distinguished Lecturer), Tufts University, Prince Georges CC. Jordan Junior High School (Palo Alto), Crittenden Middle School (Mountain View), Lick-Wilmerding High School (S.F.), Lincoln High School (S.F.), Gunn High School (Palo Alto), Loudin County High School (Virginia), Walt Whitman High School, (Bethesda, Maryland) Non Academic Lectures, Presentations Commonwealth Club (San Francisco), Comstock Club (Sacramento), IBM, Maritz Corporation, Xerox Corporation, New Orleans Chamber of Congress, Harper Collins Publisher, Scott, Foresman Publisher, National College Textbook Publishers Conference, Lucas Arts (Industrial Light and Magic Company), George Lucas Workshop on Creativity, Local PTA Groups, Prison Reform Groups, Peace Group Associations (New York and California). MEDIA PRESENTATIONS (TV AND RADIO) "Discovering Psychology" Series, 26 episodes shown nationally on PBS and Internationally in 10 Countries (from 1989 to Present), The Today Show, Good Morning America, 20/20, Night Line, and The Phil Donahue Show (each several times), That's Incredible, Not For Women Only, To Tell The Truth, Tom Snyder Show, Charlie Rose Show, NBC Chronolog, People Are Talking, AM and Late Night TV Shows in NYC, LA, Chicago, Seattle, Washington, DC, Atlanta, Detroit, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Boston, Vancouver; Canadian Broadcasting Company, BBC, CNN, National Public Radio, KGO Radio, Live 105 San Francisco Radio, Milt Rosenberg Radio Interview Program (Chicago), Italian TV-RAI (Shyness Program on Quark), Stanford Television Network, The Discovery Channel Program on Torture. 60 Minutes, and, London Weekend TV/ Discovery Channel 5 019052 DOD-042210 program on the "Human Zoo." Only Human", NBC/Discovery Channel. INTERVIEWER/ ON STAGE CONVERSATION SERIES Public interviews/conversations for California Academy of Sciences and S. F. City Arts & Lecture Series) with: Anna Deveare Smith, Oliver Sachs, Jonathan Miller, Robert Coles, Andrew Weil, Frank Sulloway, Sarah Lawrence Lightfoot, Elizabeth Marshall Thomas, Mary Catherine Bateson, Peter Funt (son of Allen Funt), Frank Sulloway, Michael Gazzaniga. CAREER GOALS The joys of psychology have come from blending teaching, research, and applications of psychological knowledge as basic career goals. I love to teach and have done it extensively and intensively for nearly 50 years, trying to communicate what we know and how we know it to the next generation of citizens and psychologists. But my training as a research psychologist has prepared me to take much delight in contributing to the basic knowledge about how the mind and behavior works. Publishing that information is not only essential to career advancement, but to sharing with colleagues and the public these new ideas. Finally, it has always been a central goal for me academically and personally to "give psychology away" to the public, to the media, and to those who could use it in ways that enhance the human condition. I like to think of myself as a social change agent--able to use my experience, training, and insights as a psychologist to make a difference in the lives of many people. TEACHING CAREER The year 2003 marks my 46th year as an educator, the sixth decade of continually teaching Introductory Psychology. I began teaching in 1957 as a part-time instructor at Yale, in charge of a class of 25 freshmen in Introductory Psychology, and continued this wonderful experience for several more years until my first full-time appointment as assistant professor at New York University, Heights Campus in the Bronx. That was teaching in the raw: 12 semester courses a year, including summer school, all lecture courses, including 3 large Introductory Psychology courses per year. Living in New York on semi- starvation wages forced me to add a 13 th course for several years, moonlighting up at Yale, teaching the Psychology of Learning to master's level students in the Education School, and another year teaching Social Psychology at Barnard College. Some years I taught summer school at Stanford, in Louvain, Belgium, and Lugano, Switzerland. I love to teach large lecture classes where I am on the "performing center," doing demonstrations, class experiments, and integrating novel AV materials, but it is more challenging to be intimately connected to students in seminars where I learn from our interaction. In addition to this in-class teaching, I have always mentored students in individual study, undergraduate honors research, and thesis research of masters and doctoral students. Another dimension of teaching for me has been to develop teaching materials, and course supplements that make teaching both more effective and easier. To this end, I have not only written many basic texts and primers in Introductory and Social Psychology, but pioneered the new breed of Instructor's Manual that helps teachers with every aspect of course preparation and curriculum design. I have also developed Student Guides and Workbooks, and a variety of demonstrations and AV resources for teachers. Among the later are: the "Discovering Psychology" PBS - video series of 26 programs covering all of general psychology, "Candid Camera Classics," one for Introductory and another for Social Psychology courses (with teacher's manuals for each), "Quiet Rage," the video documentary of the Stanford Prison Experiment, and a public web site slide show of my experiment ( ). In the past decade, about 70,000 students in Tele-Courses have received full credit for Introductory Psychology by passing a standard test based on the "Discovering Psychology: video series and a basic textbook. For me, that represents an ideal in "outreach teaching." 6 019053 DOD-042211 (h) 16i i14` 411111111111.5r Another dimension of teaching in my career has been training teachers also to discover the joys of teaching by helping them to do their job really well. I regularly give workshops on teaching throughout the country, at professional meetings (APA, APS, WPA, National Conference on Teaching, and others); in many universities and colleges; organize my own workshops at Stanford (for local area teachers at all levels of psychology education), and have given many teaching workshops internationally as well. I also contribute to teaching by training my own teaching associates to become experts through working closely with them in an intensive Practicum in Teaching course, that I innovated in 1960 at NYU, and have developed over the years into a training program that includes undergraduate TAs as well as graduate students. Many of these students have gone on to become distinguished, prize-winning teachers in colleges across the country and in national competitions. STANFORD TEACHING: I believe that I have taught more students, for more credits, in a greater variety of courses, than any other Full Professor in the history of Stanford University. Since 1968, I have regularly taught large lectures in Introductory Psychology, one of the most popular courses in the University, typically to about 325 students, but have taught this course to as many as 1000 students, and as few as 10 students in a special seminar format with computerized daily interaction on written assignments, in addition to lectures. Unit Mastery Instruction: For several years, I taught about 600 students in a Unit Mastery System with Personalized Instruction that included taking individual testing on each of 18 chapters of the text, and oral exams on an additional reading. Proctors, 200 of them, administered all testing in their dorms separately to each of their 3 students, and met weekly with me to discuss issues relevant to this form of teaching. About 50 other undergraduate teaching assistants worked in pairs to lead their weekly discussion section component of the course. Practicum in Teaching is a seminar I designed to train graduate and undergraduate teaching assistants to become effective teachers, first by helping them to develop engaging weekly sections that are coordinated with my lecture course, Introductory Psychology, based on original experiments, demonstrations and exercises that I designed and are available in my Instructor's Manual for this course, In addition, this course is designed to teach students to value the honor of being able to teach and guide them toward successful careers in teaching. Lecture Courses: Introductory Psychology The Psychology of Mind Control Social Psychology (taught solo and also as a co-teacher) Social Psychology In Action Social Alienation The Nature of Madness The Psychology of Hypnosis Sex Roles in the U.S. and Italy (During Florence teaching term) Cross-Cultural Psychology (During Florence teaching term) Psychology and Drama (Co-taught with Patricia Ryan, Drama Department) Seminar Courses: The Psychology of Imprisonment (Co-taught with Carlo Prescott, former inmate) The Dynamics of Shyness (general students and Freshman, Co-taught with Lynne Henderson) The Psychology of Time Perspective (Sophomore Seminars) On Becoming a Professional Psychologist (for advanced graduate students) Effective Teaching (Co-taught with David Rosenhan) Research Methods in Social Psychology (Graduate Course) Research Issues in Social-Cognitive Pathology (Graduate Course) Graduate Pro-seminar in Social Psychology (Weekly Area Meetings, Faculty & Graduate Students) Practicum in Teaching for Graduate and Undergraduate Teaching Associates Individual Study, Reading and Laboratory Projects: I usually have several undergraduate Honors students working under my direction each year, and also supervise 5 to 20 undergraduates and graduate students doing individual study with me, either in special laboratory projects or independent reading. 7 019054 DOD-042212 RESEARCH INTERESTS My research has always focused on trying to understand basic psychological phenomena, from early research on exploratory and sexual behavior (in rats) to test anxiety (in school children), prejudice, affiliation, dissonance, persuasion, motivation, deindividuation, aggression, memory, shyness, pro- social and anti-social behavior, time perspective, madness and more. The research issues in which I am currently interested center on several fundamental human concerns: time, madness, shyness, and evil. TIME PERSPECTIVE The psychological study of temporal perspective investigates the ways in which our learned sense of partitioning experience into the three frames of past, present and future exerts profound influences upon how we think, feel and act. Because of learned biases in over emphasizing one of these three temporal modes, or de-emphasizing one or more or the other time zones, we may distort reality, reduce our personal effectiveness or happiness, create problems in our social relationships, and lead others to misattribute our performance to ability or motivational factors rather than to the subtle, pervasive, and non-obvious operation of our temporal perspective. This issue is studied with a multi-method approach that includes a new assessment instrument (Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory), large-scale surveys, field studies, interviews, and laboratory experiments. The emerging results have important implications for educational practice, family dynamics, group conflict, creativity, and social problems such as addiction and unwanted teenage pregnancies. Both a sociological and economic level of social class level of analysis supplements the psychological level of analysis of individual behavior. This area of research (begun in 1971 with an original experiment that manipulated time perspectives by transforming future-oriented students into present-oriented hedonists using hypnotic manipulations) advances Time Perspective as a "foundational" process in psychology. My theorizing(elaborated in a Dec., 1999 JPSP article) proposes that Time Perspective exerts profound influences across a wide range of human experiences and actions, yet is unrecognized in its power. I argue that TP is the foundation upon which many psychological and social constructs are erected, such as achievement motivation, commitment, responsibility, guilt, goal seeking, planning, and many more. Going beyond experimental and correlational research, I (with John Boyd) have developed a new reliable, valid index of time perspective profiles that give promise of organizing much of the research in this area, while stimulating new research on risk taking, health decisions, and addictive behavior. THE DISCONTINUITY THEORY OF THE ORIGINS OF MADNESS A similar concern for integrating individual psychology with social analysis is seen in my long-term interest in discovering the process by which "ordinary, normal" people are "recruited into madness." The conceptual model here seeks to clarify our understanding of the first stages in the process of "going mad," that is, of beginning to think, feel, or act in ways that the person (as actor) or observers judge to be pathological. This research utilizes a social-cognitive approach to understanding how a person's attempt to explain a perceived significant discontinuity initiates a search process, which if misdirected because of the operation of specific cognitive biases, can result in "symptomatic" explanations. These attributions are diagnostic of non-rational thinking. This work, though conducted over the past 25 years, has been published only recently (in Science, JAP) and featured in an invited chapter for the 1999 (Vol. 31) issue of Advances in ExperimentalSocial Psychology. The research first began by clarifying Schachter's findings on unexplained arousal, then went on to explore the dynamics of emotional arousal without awareness of its source or origins (using hypnosis to induce the physiological arousal and source amnesia). Now its scope is broadened with a new theory about the perception of a significant personal discontinuity in one's functioning that triggers either a cognitive search for causal meaning (seeking rationality) or a social search (seeking normality). The research offers a new paradigm for studying the origins of psychopathological symptoms and makes provocative and proven predictions about how individual explanatory biases in utilizing certain search frames for meaning of the discontinuity can lead to specific forms of pathology, such as environmental search frames leading to phobias, while people-based search frames are more likely to result in paranoid thinking, and body-related search frames to 8 019055 DOD-042213 hypochrodiasis. This research is a creative synthesis of many lines of thinking, combines cognitive, social, personality and clinical psychology in novel ways, and integrates aspects of them into a new integrated whole that promises to stimulate a renewal of research in experimental psychopathology. It also draws parallels between processes that contribute to individual psychopathology and social forms of pathology in ways never articulated previously THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN CREATING A SHYNESS EPIDEMIC My early research on the dynamics of shyness in adults, adolescents, and children opened this area of research to many new investigators in social and personality psychology, as well as in clinical psychology. My current interest now is in the psychological processes that sustain and exacerbate shyness in clinical populations that we treat in our Shyness Clinic. But my most recent revival of interest in shyness comes from new data that the prevalence of reported shyness is steadily increasing over the past decade to reach epidemic proportions of 50% or more. One hypotheses being explored is that technology is creating an A-Social environment for heavy users of electronic technology, a self-imposed social isolation that contributes to social awkwardness in "face situations," thus promoting avoidance, and thereby feelings of shyness. POWER OF THE SITUATION AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIL The research demonstration of the power of social situations over individual dispositions is highlighted in the now classic Stanford Prison Experiment, along with Milgram's Obedience research ( This research advances a conceptual view of how ordinary citizens can be transformed into aggressors, into people who act in evil ways. By focusing on social situational variables the can influence or seduce good people to do evil deeds, we move the analysis away from traditional dispositional trait approaches to studying evil. The underlying conception of the transformation of human nature by social forces has led me to new investigations of the nature of the training of young men to become torturers for the State in Brazil, during the reign of the military junta (see Violence Workers, U.C. Berkeley Press, 2002, with co-investigators, Martha Huggins and Mika Haritos-Fatouros). In addition, this analysis has been used to understand how German men, ordinary men, could be made into perpetrators of evil for the Nazi state and help to create the ultimate evil of the holocaust. I also maintain an on-going interest in cults and mind control, under this general rubric of the psychology of evil. APPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY My attempts to enhance the human condition by "giving psychology away to the public" have taken many forms over the years, a few examples of which give a flavor of the old and the new instances. I organized "The Harlem Summer Project" in 1965 that provided "Head Start" type educational opportunities for pre-school and elementary school children in New York's Harlem area, along with an introduction to college life for high school students from this area, and a Black Pride program for all 100 children in our center. My work on police interrogation tactics, vandalism, and prisons led to changes in public and government policy. Consulting with a community organization in New Orleans led to many neighborhood programs to reduce crime and vandalism and increase jobs for qualified black citizens. The Shyness Clinic and The Shyness Institute (with Dr. Lynne Henderson) hasdirectly applied our research findings and theories on shyness to help treat shy clients, and to train therapists to work with shy clients, as well as to disseminate information and research on shyness tothe general public (via our web site, ). The Internet now provides the ideal way togive psychology away to millions of people for free, so my colleagues, Lee Ross and Sabrina Lin, and I have developed a content-intensive web site that provides in depth information from experts about a range of psychological topics related to improving one's self in personal, social and career domainsFebruary 03 STANFORD UNIVERSITY EXTRAMURAL LECTURES, PRESENTATIONS Sloane Foundation Fellows in Business, Frequent Guest Lecturer Knight Foundation Fellows in Journalism, Frequent Guest Lecturer Alumni College Lecturer, Frequently Alumni Club Invited Lecturer: New York, Los Angeles, Hawaii, Denver, Washington, Portland, Napa,San Francisco, Cincinnati, Chicago, Rome Stanford Community Lecture Series 9 019056 DOD-042214 Stanford Distinguished Teachers Lecture Series Sierra Camp Invited Guest Lecturer, several times Cowell Student Health Staff Program Psychiatry Department Rounds Frosh Orientations Prospective Donor Lecturer, New Student Admit Expo President's Reception for Parents of New Students Roundtable Discussant on Technology, Reunion Homecoming Lecturer, Stanford Graduate School of Business Continuing Education Program Lecturer STANFORD UNIVERSITY 'CITIZENSHIP' ACTIVITIES Departmental Service Director of Summer School Program (1984-2001) Founder, Co-Advisor to Stanford Undergraduate Psychology Association (SUPA) Reactivated, Advisor to Psychology Honor Society (PSI CHI) Head, Social Psychology Graduate Training Program Director, Committee Member, Undergraduate Education Committee Chair, Colloquium Committee Chair, Member, Various Faculty Search Committees Major Area Advisor to about 20 students annually Sophomore Mentor to 12 students University Service Faculty Dormitory Resident and Fellow, Cedro Dormitory Organized, Directed about 2000 students engaged in constructive anti-war activities as part of our Political Action Coordinating Committee centered in the Psychology Dept., spring 1969 Member, Faculty Senate Steering Committee Residential Education Guest Presenter, frequently Human Subjects Research Committee Member Dean Thomas' Committee on Improving Undergraduate Education Member, Committee on University and Departmental Honors (subcommittee on Academic Appraisal and Achievement) Co-Directed Summer Teaching Program to Improve Quality of High School Psychology Teaching held at Stanford University (Funded by National Science Foundation) Organized Several Teaching Workshops in Psychology for California teachers at 4-year colleges, Community Colleges, Junior Colleges and High Schools, held at Stanford University. Presenter to Prospective Donors to Stanford University Faculty Representative to Committee to Renovate Audio-Visual Facilities in Lecture Halls Professor, Residential Supervisor, Stanford-in-Florence Program, 1983 Liaison, Scholar Exchange and Research Program between University of Rome and Stanford University 10 019057 DOD-042215 SECRETIINO-FpRN/IX1- AR 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE ABU GHRAIB DETENTION FACILITY AND 205th MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BRIGADE (U) MG GEORGE R. FAY INVESTIGATING OFFICER SE-CRETBNOFORNIA-1- CLASSIFIED BY: AR 380 6 DECLASSIFY ON: OADR DEFENSE EXHIBIT -Ft i2 K OFFERED R.143 ADMITTED 151- 019053 DOD-042216 SEGRET-010E-0RNIIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. (U) Appointing Official's Instructions and Investigation Methodology . 4 2. (U) Executive Summary . 7 3. (U) Background and Environment . 10 a. (U) Operational Environment . 10 b. (U) Law, Policy, Doctrine and Training . -11 (1) (U) Applicable Law. 11 (2) (U) Army Regulation 190-8. 14 (3) (U) Military Intelligence Doctrine and Training . 15 (4) (U) Military Police Doctrine and Training . 20 (5) (U) Intelligence and Interrogation Policy Development . 21 (6) (U) Other Regulatory Procedural Guidance . 29 4. (U) Summary of Events at Abu Ghraib . 30 a. (U) Military Intelligence Task Organization and Resources . 31 (1) (U) Task Organization (2) (U) Resources b. .(U) Establishment of the Prison at Abu Ghraib . 33 c. (U) Detention Operations and Release Procedures . 34 d. (U) Establishment of Military Police Presence at Abu Ghraib . 39 e. (U) Establishment of Military Intelligence Presence at Abu Ghraib .40 f. (U) Establishment, Organization, and Operation of the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) . 41 g. (U) Contract Interrogators and Linguists . 47 h. (U) Other Government Agencies and Abu Ghraib . 52 i. (U) The Move of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade Commander to Abu Ghraib. 55 j. (U) Advisory and Training Team Deployments. 57 (1) (U) MG G. Miller Visit (2) (U) JTF-GTMO Training Team (3) (U) Fort Huachuca Mobile Training Team k. (U) International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) . 64 5. (U) Summary of Abuses at Abu Ghraib . 68 SE—C-RETAN0-FORNIA4 2 019059 DOD-042217 SECRE-TANOFORNIIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade TABLE OF CONTENTS (cont) 6. (U) Findings and Recommendations 109 a. (U) Major Findings 109 b. (U) Other Findings and Recommendations 109 c. (U) Individual Responsibility for Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib 120 7. (U) Personnel Listing 137 8. (U) Task Force Members 138 9. (U) Acronyms 139 SECRET4440FORNIIX4 3 r: 0 DOD-042218 SECRET//NOFORN/JXI SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6investigation of the Abu Ghraib -Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade 1. (U) Appointing Officials' Instructions and Investigative Methodology a. (U) Appointing Officials' Instruction. (1) (U) On 31 March 2004, LTG Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint Task Force 7 (CJTF-7), appointed MG George R. Fay as an Army Regulation (AR) 381-10 Procedure 15 Investigating Officer. LTG Sanchez determined, based upon MG Antonio Taguba's out brief of the results of an Article 15-6 investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility in Iraq, that another investigation was warranted. MG Fay was to investigate allegations that members of the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility. (a) (U) MG Fay was instructed as follows: Pursuant to AR 381-10, Procedure 15, you are hereby appointed as an investigating officer to conduct an investigation in accordance with (IAW) Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 into all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding the alleged misconduct on the part of personnel assigned and/or attached to the 205 th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade, to include civilian interrogators and/or interpreters, from 15 August 2003 to 1 February 2004 at the Abu Ghraib (AG) Detention Facility. (b) (U) Specifically, you will investigate the following areas: [1] (U) Whether 205th MI Brigade personnel requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited. Military Police (MP) personnel to abuse detainees at AC as preparation for interrogation operations. [2] (U) Whether 205th MI Brigade personnel comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations when questioning Iraqi security internees at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center. (2) (U) The Commander, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) requested a new appointing authority and investigating officer be assigned to the investigation. On 14 June 2004, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald Rumsfeld requested the Acting Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) R.L.Brownlee assign an "officer senior to LTG Sanchez" to assume his duties as appointing authority, and a new or additional investigating officer should one be required. SECDEF provided the following additional guidance to the Acting SECARMY: (U) The new appointing authority shall refer recommendations concerning issues at the Depai.tznent of the Army level to the Department of the Army and recommendations concerning issues at the Department of Defense (DoD) level to the Department of Defense for appropriate action. The appointing authority shall refer the completed report to the Commander, 4 019061 DOD-042219 SE—CRE—T41NAFORNI/X4 SUBJECT:. (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade United States Central Command for further action as appropriate, including forwarding to the ATSD(IO) [Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight] in accordance with DoD Directive 5240.1-R and CJCS-I 5901.01. Matters concerning accountability, if any, should be referred by the appointing authority, without recommendation, to the appropriate level of the chain of command for disposition. (3) (U) On 16 June 2004, Acting SECARMY Brownlee designated GEN Paul J. Kern, Commander of the US Army Materiel Command, as the new Procedure 15 appointing authority. Acting SECARMY Brownlee's instructions included the following: (a) (U) I am designating you as the appointing authority. Major General Fay remains available to perform duties as the investigating officer. If you determine, however, after reviewing the status of the investigation, that a new or additional investigating officer is necessary, please present that request to me. (b) (U) Upon receipt of the investigation, you will refer all recommendations concerning issues at the Department of the Army level to me and all recommendations concerning issues at the Department of Defense level to the Secretary of Defense for appropriate action. You will refer the completed report to the Commander, United States Central Command, for further action as appropriate, including forwarding to ATSD(IO) IAW DoD Directive 5240.1-R and CJCS-I 5901.01. Finally, you should refer matters concerning accountability, if any,', without recommendation, to the appropriate level of the chain of command for disposition. If you determine that you need further legal resources to accomplish this mission, you should contact the Judge Advocate General. (4) (U) On 25 June 2004, GEN Kern appointed LTG Anthony R. Jones, Deputy Commanding General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), as an additional Procedure 15 investigating officer. GEN Kern's instructions to LTG Jones included the following: (a) (U) Pursuant to AR 381-10, Procedure 15, and AR 15-6, you are hereby appointed as an investigating officer to conduct an investigation of alleged misconduct involving personnel assigned or attached to the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility. Your appointment is as an additional investigating officer. MG Fay and his investigative team are available to assist you. (b) (U) Specifically, the purpose of the investigation is to determine the facts and to determine whether the questionable activity at Abu Ghraib is legal and is consistent with applicable policy. In LTG Sanchez's 31 March 2004 appbintment letter to MG Fay, which I have adopted, he specified three areas into which the investigation was to look: whether the 205 th gEGRE—TANOFORNIA4 5 019062 DOD-042220 SECRE—TgNOFORWIX1- SUBJECT: (U) AR:15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade Military Intelligence Brigade had been involved in Military Police detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib; whether 205 th Military Intelligence Brigade personnel complied with established procedures, regulations, and laws when questioning internees at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center; and the facts behind several identified sworn statements. In addition, your investigation should determine whether organizations or personnel higher in the chain of command of the 205 th Military Intelligence Brigade were involved directly or indirectly in any questionable activities regarding alleged detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib. b. (U) Investigative Methodology. (1) (U) The investigative team conducted a comprehensive and exhaustive review of available background documents and statements pertaining to the operations of the 205th Military Intelligence (MI) Brigade (205 MI BDE) at Abu Ghraib from a wide variety of sources, to include all previous investigations. Where possible, coordination was established with other ongoing investigations of the same nature. (2) (U) Over 170 personnel were interviewed (some multiple times) during the course of the investigation (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1). These interviews included personnel assigned or attached to the 205 MI BDE, the 800th Military Police (MP) Brigade (800 MP BDE), CJTF-7, Joint Task Force Guantanamo (JTF-GTMO), 28th Combat Support Hospital (CSH), the United States Army Intelligenc.e. Center (USAIC), the United States Navy, Titan Corporation, CA Cf International; Inc. ; and three detainees at .A.liu .Written'sworri statements were prepared as a result of these interviews. .Several personnel invoked their rights :tinder Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and the 5 th Amendment of the US Constitution. In these cases and in cases where no sworn statements were collected, Memoranda for Record (MFR) were prepared to describe the nature of and information addressed in the interview. (3) (U) Over 9,000 documents were collected, catalogued and archived into a database. Advanced analytic tools were used to organize, collate, and analyze this data as well as all collected interview data. Other analytical tools were used to prepare graphic representations of the data. (4) (U) The investigative team consisted of 26 personnel to include investigators, analysts, subject matter experts and legal advisors. SECRET//NOFORN//X1 6 019063 DOD-042221 SE—CRETIINOFORNI4X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade 2. (U) Executive Summary a. (U) Background. (1) (U) This investigation was ordered initially by LTG Ricardo S. Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7. LTG Sanchez appointed MG George R. Fay as investigating officer under the provisions of AR 381-10. MG Fay was appointed to investigate allegations that members of the 205 MI BDE were involved in detainee abuse at the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility. Specifically, he was to determine whether 205 MI BDE personnel requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited MP personnel to abuse detainees and whether MI personnel comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations. The investigative team conducted a comprehensive review of all available background documents and statements pertaining to Abu Ghraib from a wide variety of sources. Over 170 persons were interviewed concerning their knowledge of interrogation and detention operations at Abu Ghraib and/or their knowledge of and involvement in detainee abuse. On 16 June 2004, GEN Paul J. Kern, Commander, US Army Materiel Command (AMC), was appointed as the new Procedure 15 appointing authority. On 25 June 2004, GEN Kern appointed LTG Jones, Deputy Commanding General, TRADOC, as an additional Procedure 15 investigating officer. MG Fay was retained as an investigating officer. (2) (U) This investigation identified forty-four (44) alleged instances Or events of detainee abusejAnarnitted .by MP. and. MI Soldiers, as well as civilian contractors.•On sixteen (1 -6) of these occasions, abuse by the MP Soldiers was, or was alleged to. have been, requested, encouraged, condoned, or solicited by MI personnel. The.abuse, however, was directed on an individual basis and never officially sanctioned or approved. MI solicitation of MP abuse included the use of isolation with sensory deprivation, removal of clothing and humiliation, the use of dogs as an interrogation tool to induce fear, and physical abuse. In eleven (11) instances, MI personnel were found to be directly involved in the abuse. MI personnel were also found not to have fully comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and regulations. Theater Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policies (ICRP) were found to be poorly defined, and changed several times. As a result, interrogation activities sometimes crossed into abusive activity. (3) (U) This investigation found that certain individuals committed offenses in violation of international and US law to include the Geneva Conventions and the UCMJ and violated Army Values. Leaders in key positions failed properly to supervise the interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib and failed to understand the dynamics created at Abu Ghraib. Leaders also failed to react appropriately to those instances where detainee abuse was reported, either by other service members, contractors, or by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Fifty-four (54) MI, MP, and Medical Soldiers, and civilian contractors were found to have some degree of SECR-E-T-14NOFORNIA-1- 7 019064 DOD-042222 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade responsibility or complicity in the abuses that occurred at Abu Ghraib. Twenty-seven (27) were cited in this report for some degree of culpability and seventeen (17) were cited for misunderstanding of policy, regulation or law. Three (3) MI Soldiers, who had previously received punishment under UCMJ, were recommended for additional investigation. Seven (7) MP Soldier identified in the MG Taguba Report and currently under criminal investigation and/or charges are also central figures in this investigation and are included in the above numbers. One (1) person cited in the MG Taguba Report was exonerated. (4) (U) Looking beyond personal responsibility, leader responsibility and command responsibility, systemic problems and issues also contributed to the volatile environment in which the abuse occurred. These systemic problems included: inadequate interrogation doctrine and training, an acute shortage of MP and MI Soldiers, the lack of clear lines of responsibility between the MP and MI chains of command, the lack of a clear interrogation policy for the Iraq Campaign, and intense pressure felt by the personnel on the ground to produce actionable intelligence from detainees. Twenty-four (24) additional findings and two (2) observations regarding systemic failures are included in the final investigative report. These findings ranged from doctrine and policy concerns, to leadership and command and control issues, to resource and training issues. b. (U) Problems: Doctrine, Policy, Training, Organization, and Other Government Agencies. (1) (U)-Inadequacy of doctrine for. detetition:operations and interrogation operations was a contributing factor to the situations that occurred. at Abu Ghraib. The Army's capstone doctrine for the conduct of interrogation operations is Field Manual (FM) 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, dated September 1992. Non-doctrinal approaches, techniques, and practices were developed and approved for use in Afghanistan and GTMO as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). These techniques, approaches, and practices became confused at Abu Ghraib and were implemented without proper authorities or safeguards. Soldiers were not trained on non-doctrinal interrogation techniques such as sleep adjustment, isolation, and the use of dogs. Many interrogators and personnel overseeing interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib had prior exposure to or experience in GTMO or Afghanistan. Concepts for the non-doctrinal, non field-manual approaches and practices came from documents and personnel in GTMO and Afghanistan. By October 2003, interrogation policy in Iraq had changed three times in less than thirty days and it became very confusing as to what techniques could be employed and at what level non-doctrinal approaches had to be approved. (2) (U) MP personnel and MI personnel operated under different and often incompatible rules for treatment of detainees. The military police referenced DoD-wide regulatory and procedural guidance that clashed with the theater interrogation and counter-resistance policies that the military intelligence interrogators followed. Further, it appeared that neither group knew SE—CRETIINOFORNIIX4 8 019065 DOD-042223 SE—C-RE—T11140FORNIIXA SUBJECT: (II) AR 15-6 Investigation of the.Abd Glaaib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade or understood the limits imposed by the other's regulatory or procedural guidance concerning the treatment of detainees, resulting in predictable tension and confusion. This confusion contributed to abusive interrogation practices at Abu Ghraib. Safeguards to ensure compliance and to protect against abuse also failed due to confusion about the policies and the leadership's failure to monitor operations adequately. (3) (U) By December 2003, the JIDC at Abu Ghraib had a total of approximately 160 personnel with 45 interrogators and 18 linguists/translators assigned to conduct interrogation operations. These personnel were from six different MI battalions and groups — the 519 MI BN, 323 MI BN, 325 MI BN, 470 MI GP, the 66th MI. GP, the 500 MI GP. To complicate matters, interrogators from a US Army Intelligence Center and School, Mobile Training Team (MTT) consisting of analysts and interrogators, and three interrogation teams consisting of six personnel from GTMO, came to Abu Ghraib to assist in improving interrogation operations. Additionally, contract interrogators from CACI and contract linguists from Titan were hired in an attempt to address shortfalls. The JIDC was created in a very short time period with parts and pieces of various units. It lacked unit integrity, and this lack was a fatal flaw. (4) (U) The term Other Government Agencies (OGA) most commonly referred to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The CIA condUcted unilateral and joint interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. The CIA's detention and interrogation practices contributed to a loss of 'accountability and abuse at,Abu Ghi-aib. No memorandunkof understanding existed on the , subject interrogation operations betWeeli the CIA,and CHF-7, and -local CIA officersonvinced • Military leaders that: theyshould be allowed to operate outside the established local rules and 'procedures. CIA detainees in Abu Ghraib ; known locally as "Ghost Detainees," were not accounted for in the detention system. With these detainees unidentified or unaccounted for, detention operations at large were impacted because. personnel at the operations level were uncertain how to report or classify detainees. c. (U) Detainee Abuse at Abu Ghraib. (1) (U) Physical and sexual abuses of detainees at. Abu Ghraib were by far the most serious. The abuses spanned from direct physical assault, such as delivering head blows rendering detainees unconscious, to sexual posing and forced participation in group masturbation. At the extremes were the death of a detainee in OGA custody, an alleged rape committed by a US translator and observed by a female Soldier, and the alleged sexual assault of a female detainee. These abuses are, without question, criminal. They were perpetrated or witnessed by individuals or small groups. Such abuse can not be directly tied to a systemic US approach to torture or approved treatment of detainees. The MPs being prosecuted claim their actions came at the direction of MI. Although self-serving, these claims do have some basis in fact. The environment created at Abu Ghraib contributed to the occurrence of such abuse and the fact that SEC 9 019066 DOD-042224 SE—C-RET44NO-FORNIIX4 • SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib,Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade • it remained undiscovered by higher authority for a long period of time. What started as nakedness and humiliation, stress and physical training (exercise), carried over into sexual and physical assaults by a small group of morally corrupt and unsupervised Soldiers and civilians. (2) (U) Abusing detainees with dogs started almost immediately after the dogs arrived at Abu Ghraib on 20 November 2003. By that date, abuses of detainees was already occurring and the addition of dogs was just one more device. Dog Teams were brought to Abu Ghraib as a result of recommendations from MG G. Miller's assessment team from GTMO. MG G. Miller recommended dogs as beneficial for detainee custody and control issues. Interrogations at Abu Ghraib, however, were influenced by several documents that spoke of exploiting the Arab fear of dogs. The use of dogs in interrogations to "fear up" detainees was utilized without proper authorization. (3) (U) The use of nudity as an interrogation technique or incentive to maintain the cooperation of detainees was not a technique developed at Abu Ghraib, but rather a technique which was imported and can be traced through Afghanistan and GTMO. As interrogation operations in Iraq began to take form, it was often the same personnel who had operated and deployed in other theaters and in support of GWOT, who were called upon to establish and conduct interrogation operations in Abu Ghraib. The lines of authority and the prior legal opinions blurred. They simply carried forward the use of nudity into the Iraqi theater of operations. The use of clothing as an incentive (nudity) is significant in that it likely contributed to WI escalating "de7thuinanization"'of the detainees and , sfq.the stage for,additional ,and more severe abuses to occur. .- (4) (U) There was significant confusion by both MI and MPs between the definitions of "isolation" and "segregation." LTG Sanchez approved the extended use of isolation on several occasions, intending for the detainee to be kept apart, without communication with their fellow detainees. His intent appeared to be the segregation of specific detainees. The technique employed in several instances was not, however, segregation but rather isolation - the complete removal from outside contact other than required care and feeding by MP guards and interrogation by MI. Use of isolation rooms in the Abu Ghraib Hard Site was not closely controlled or monitored. Lacking proper training, clear guidance, or experience in this technique, both MP and MI stretched the bounds into further abuse; sensory deprivation and un­safe or unhealthy living conditions. Detainees were sometimes placed in excessively cold or hot cells with limited or poor ventilation and no light. 3. (U) Background and Environment. a. (U) Operational Environment. SE-CRET-1140FORNIIM 10 019067 DOD-042225 SE-CRETIMOF-ORNI4X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of tho.Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and • 205th MI Brigade (1) (U) The Global War on Terrorism began in earnest on 11 September 2001 (9/11). Soon after the 9/11 attacks, American forces entered Afghanistan to destroy the primary operating and training base of Al Qaida. Prisoners collected in these and other global counter-terrorist operations were transferred to Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba. Two Task Forces were formed at JTF-GTMO to manage intelligence collection operations with the newly captured prisoners. Military and civilian interrogators, counterintelligence agents, analysts, and other intelligence personnel from a variety of services and agencies manned the task forces and exploited the captured personnel for information. (2) (U) US and coalition partners attacked Iraq on 20 March 2003 and soon after toppled Saddam Hussein's regime. The Iraq conflict transitioned quickly and unexpectedly to an insurgency environment. Coalition forces began capturing and interrogating alleged insurgents. Abu Ghraib prison, opened after the fall of Saddam to house criminals, was soon used for collecting and interrogating insurgents and other persons of intelligence interest. The unit responsible for managing Abu Ghraib interrogations was the 205 MI BDE. b. (U) Law, Policy, Doctrine and Training. (1) (U) Applicable Law. (a) (U) Military Order of November 13 th 2001 - Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in thc ,War Against Terrorism (Reference:Annex-J; Appendix (b) (U) Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 August 1949 (Reference Annex J, Appendix 5). (c) (U) AR 190-8 / OPNAVINST 3461.6 / AFJI 31-302/MCO 3461.1, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and other Detainees, 1 October 1997 (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2). (d) (U) FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, 28.September 1992 (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3). (e) (U) Classification of Detainees. The overwhelming evidence in this investigation shows that most "detainees" at Abu Ghraib were "civilian internees." Therefore, this discussion will focus on "civilian internees." [1] (U) Detainee. AR 190-8 defines a detainee as any person captured or otherwise detained by an armed force. By this definition, a detainee could be an Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW), a Retained Person, such as a doctor or chaplain, or a Civilian Internee. The term SE-CRET-MOFORNIA4 019068 DOD-042226 SEGRE-TIINOFORNIIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the!A_bn Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade "detainee" is a generic one with no specific implied rights or protections being afforded to the individual; however, it is almost exclusively used by the Soldiers and other individuals interviewed in this investigation to refer to the individuals interned at Abu Ghraib. In order to understand the rights and protections that need to be provided to a "detainee," further classification is necessary. [2] (U) Civilian Internee. Using Geneva Convention IV (GC IV), Article 78, as further defined by AR 190-8, a "Civilian Internee" is someone who is interned during armed conflict or occupation for security reasons or for protection or because he has committed an offense against the detaining power. (Reference Annex H, Appendix 1, FRAGO 749 to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036). The overwhelming evidence in this investigation shows that all "detainees" at Abu Ghraib were civilian internees. Within the confinement facility, however, there were further sub-classifications that were used, to include criminal detainee, security internee, and MI Hold. [a] (U) Criminal Detainee. A person detained because he/she is reasonably suspected of having committed a crime against Iraqi Nationals or Iraqi property or a crime not related to the coalition force mission (Reference Annex H, Appendix 1, FRAGO 749 to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036). [b] (U) Security Internee. Civilians interned during conflict or occupation for their own-protection or because they,pose a threat to the security of -coalition forces,• or its mission, or are, of intelligence, value. This includes persons detained for committing Ofenses (including­attempts) against coalition forces (or previous coalition forces), members of the Provisional Government, Non-Government Organizations, state infraSUmcture, or any person accused of committing war crimes or crimes against humanity. Security internees are a subset of civilian internees (Reference Annex H, Appendix 1, FRAGO 749 to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036). [c] (U) MI Hold. A directive to hold and not release a detainee/internee in the custody of the Coalition Forces, issued by a member or agent of a US Military Intelligence Organization (Reference Annex H, Appendix 1, FRAGO 749 to CJTF-7. OPORD 03-036). [d] (U) Most detainees located within Abu Ghraib, to include those in Tier lA and 1B (Reference Annex F, Appendix 1, Abu Ghraib Overhead with Organizational Layout), were Civilian Internees and therefore, entitled to protections under GC IV. In addition to applicable international laws, ARs, and the FMs on Intelligence Interrogations further clarify US Policy regarding the protections afforded Civilian Internees. (f) (U) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War. GC IV provides protections for civilians in time of war. The US is bound by the Geneva Conventions; therefore, any individual acting on behalf of the US during an armed conflict is 12 019069 DOD-042227 SE-C-RET-1440-F.ORN-X4II SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade also bound by Geneva Conventions. This includes not only members of the armed forces, but also civilians who accompany or work with the US Armed Forces. The following are some relevant articles to the discussion on detainee abuse: [1] (U) Article 5. Where in the territory of a Party to the conflict, the latter is satisfied that an individual protected person is definitely suspected of or engaged in activities hostile to the security of the State, such individual person shall not be entitled to claim such rights and privileges under the present Conventions as would, if exercised in the favor of such individual person, be prejudicial to the security of such State. Where in occupied territory an individual protected person is detained as a spy or saboteur, or as a person under definite suspicion of activity hostile to the security of the Occupying Power, such person shall, in those cases where absolute military security so requires, be regarded as having forfeited rights of communication under the present Conventions. In each case, such persons shall nevertheless be treated with humanity and, in case of trial, shall not be deprived of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed by the present [convention]. [2] (U) Article 27. Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honor, their family rights; their religious convictions and practices, and their manner and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity. .. . [3] (U.) Article 31.:Islo , ph1 sical or Morallcoercion-shall be .citercised against protected persons, in particular to obtain information from thentor from third parties. [4] (U) Article 32. The [Parties to the Convention] agree that each of them is prohibited from taking any measure of such a character as to cause the physical suffering or extermination of protected persons in their hands. This prohibition applies not only to murder, torture, corporal punishments, mutilation and medical and scientific experiments not necessitated by the medical treatment of a protected person, but also to any other measures of brutality whether applied by civilian or military agents. [5] (U) Article 37. Protected persons who are confined pending proceedings or serving a sentence involving loss of liberty, shall during their confinement be humanely treated. [6] (U) Article 100. The disciplinary regime in places of internment shall be consistent with humanitarian principles, and shall in no circumstances include regulation imposing on internees any physical exertion dangerous to their health or involving physical or moral victimization. Identification by tattooing or imprinting signs on the body is prohibited. In particular, prolonged standing and roll-calls, punishment drills, military drill and maneuver, or the reduction of food rations, are prohibited. SECRE-TANOF0RNI4X4 13 019070 DOD-042228 SECAET-11-140FORNIA1- SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu:.Glitaib Detention Facility and... 205th MI Brigade [7] (U) Article 143. Representatives or delegates of the Protecting Powers shall have permission to go to all places where protected persons are, particularly to places of internment, detention, and work. They shall have access to all premises occupied by protected persons and shall be able to interview the latter without witnesses, personally or through an interpreter. Such visits may not be prohibited except for reasons of military imperative, and then only as an exceptional and temporary measure. Their duration and frequency shall not be restricted. Such representatives and delegates shall have full liberty to select the places they wish to visit. The Detaining or Occupying Power, the Protecting Power, and when occasion arises the Power of origin of the persons to be visited, may agree that compatriots of the internees shall be permitted to participate in the visits. The delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross shall also enjoy the above prerogatives. The appointment of such delegates shall be submitted for the approval of the Power governing the territories where they will carry out theirduties. (2) (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees and other Detainees is a joint publication between all services of the Armed Forces (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2). (a) (U) US Policy Overview. • The regulation (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, Paragraph 1-5) sets out US Policy stating that "US policy, relative to the treatment of ._EPW, Civilian Internees and RP' in the custody, of,thc US. Aimed Forces, is as follows: :..persons captured, detained, interned, or othr7wise held inUS ArmedFOrces•custody.4.ring the: course of conflict Will be, given humanitariancare.and treatment from.the raiment they fall the hands of the US forces until final release and repatriation." The regulation further defines this policy. (b) (U) Inhumane Treatment. Specifically, inhumane treatment of detainees is - • prohibited and is considered a serious and punishable offense under international law and the UCMJ. The following acts are prohibited: murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, the taking of hostages, sensory deprivation, collective punishment, execution without trial, and all cruel and degrading treatment. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, Paragraph 1-5(b)). (c) (U) Protection from Certain Acts. All detainees will be protected against all acts of violence to include rape, forced prostitution, assault and theft, insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, and reprisals of any kind. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, Paragraph 1-5(c)). This is further reinforced in FM 34-52 (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3), which states that the Geneva Conventions and US policy expressly prohibit acts of violence or intimidation, including physical or mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to inhumane treatment as a means of or aid to interrogation. SE—GRET-14N0FCANIA-4 14 019071 DOD-042229 SECRET1440FORNIIYI SUBJECT:. (U) AR•15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention FaCility and .., •.205th MI Brigade . (d) (U) Photographs. Photographs of detainees are strictly prohibited except for internal administrative purposes of the confinement facility. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, Paragraph 1-5(d)). (e) (U) Physical torture or moral coercion. No form of physical or moral coercion will be exercised against the Civilian Internee. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, Paragraph 1 -5(a)(1)). (f) (U) At all times, the Civilian Internee will be humanely treated and protected against all acts of violence or threats and insults and public curiosity. The Civilian Internee will be especially protected against all acts of violence, insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, reprisals of any kind, sexual attacks such as rape, forced prostitution, or any form of indecent assault. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, Paragraph 1-5(a)(2) & (3)). (3) (U) Military Intelligence Doctrine and Training. (a) (U) Doctrine. [1] (U) The Army's capstone doctrine for the conduct of interrogation operations is FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogation, dated September, 1992. This doctrine provides an adequate-basis for the training of interrogators at the Soldier level (e.g. -, in the art of tactical interrogation arci the GenevaCo-ventions);)however, .out.of date with respW to the . management and conduct of detainee -operations. Joint Doctrine on the conduct of detainee operations is sparse even though the Army has operated JIDCs since 1989 in Operation JUST CAUSE, and because the Army is normally tasked by the Joint Force Commander to establish and manage EPW/Detainee operations for the deployed force (Reference Annex M, Appendix 1, APPENDIX G-3, Joint Publication 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations). National level doctrine, in the form of a Defense Intelligence Agency Manual (DIAM), also contains very little doctrinal basis for the conduct and management of joint interrogation operations. A critical doctrinal gap at the joint and service level is the role of national level agencies (e.g., other governmental agencies [OGA]) in detainee operations to include appropriate protocols for sharing valuable intelligende assets. The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) reported the following in a recent assessment of Operation Iraqi Freedom detainee and interrogation operations (Reference Annex C, Appendix 5): MP and MI doctrine at division and below must be modified for stability operations and support operations to reflect the need for long-term detention facilities and interrogation of captives at the tactical level. SECRET//AIr1C / RN//VA 15 019072 DOD-042230 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6, Investigation of the AbuGhraib Detention Facility and • 205th MI Brigade [2] (U) It is possible that some of the unauthorized interrogation techniques employed in Iraq may have been introduced through the use of an outdated training manual (FM 34-52 dated 1987 vice FM 34-52 dated 1992). The superseded version (FM 34-52, dated 1987) has been used at various locations in OIF. In a prior AR 15-6 investigation of Camp Cropper (Reference Annex C, Appendix 2), the 1987 version was again used as the reference (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3). On 9 June 2004, CJTF-7 published an email (Reference Annex L, Appendix 4, email) that indicated the May 1987 version was used as CJTF-7's primary reference. The section encapsulated below from the 1987 version has been removed from the 1992 version of FM 34-52. To the untrained, the reference in the outdated version could appear as a license for the interrogator to go beyond the current doctrine as established in the current FM 34-52. The 1987 version suggests the interrogator controls lighting, heating, and configuration of the interrogation room, as well as the food, shelter, and clothing given to the source. The section from the 1987 version that could be misunderstood is from Chapter 3 and reads as follows: FM 34-52 (.1987) Chapter 3, Establish and Maintain Control. The interrogator should appear to be the one who controls all aspects of the interrogation to include the lighting, heating, and configuration of the interrogation room,. as well as the food, shelter, and clothing given to the source. The interrogator must always bc .. in-control, he must act quickly and fitmly. .Howeyer, everrhing that he; says and .does must be --witlithe •lits of the Geneva and Hague Conventions, as well as the standards of conduct outlined in the UCMJ. [3] (U) Doctrine provides the foundation for Army operations. A lack of doctrine in the conduct of non-conventional interrogation and detainee operations was a contributing factor to the abuses at Abu Ghraib. (b) (U) Training [1] (U) Formal US Army interrogation training is conducted at the Soldier level, primarily as part of a Soldier's Initial Entry Training (IET). There is no formal advanced interrogation training in the US Army. Little, if any, formal training is provided to MI leaders and supervisors (Commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers, and Non-Commissioned Officers) in the management of interrogation and detainee operations. These skills can only be developed in the unit environment through assignments to an interrogation unit, involvement in interrogation training exercises, or on deployments. Unfortunately, unit training and exercises have become increasingly difficult to conduct due to the high pace of deployments of interrogation personnel SE-CRE-T1440FORMIX4 16 019073 DOD-042231 SECRET//NOFORN//X1 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade and units. With very few exceptions, combined MI and MP training on the conduct of detainee operations is non-existent. [2] (U) The IET course at the USAIC, Fort Huachuca, AZ, provides a 16.5 week course of instruction. The course consists of 758.2 hours of academic training time that includes collection prioritization, screening, planning and preparation, approaches, questioning, termination of interrogations, and report writing in the classroom and practical exercise environments. The course focuses on the conduct of tactical interrogations in conventional war. Each student receives eight hours of classroom training on AR 381-10, Army Intelligence Activities (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2) and FM 27-10, Law of Land Warfare (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3) and 184 hours of practical exercise. The student's understanding of the Geneva Conventions and Law of Land Warfare is continually evaluated as a critical component. If at any time during an exercise, the student violates the Geneva Conventions, they will fail the exercise. A failure does not eliminate the student from the course. Students are generally given the chance to recycle to the next class; however, egregious violations could result in dismissal from the course. [3] (U) The reserve components use the same interrogator program of instruction as does the active component. They are exposed to the same classes and levels of instruction. Like the active component, the reserve components' training opportunities prior to deployment in recen.t yeors have been minimal, if any. Those slated for deployment to thejTF-GTMO attend the Intelligence Support to Counter Tetrorism (IS.CT) Course._ [4] (U) Ariny Regulations require interrogators to undergo refresher training on the Geneva Conventions annually. Units are also expected to conduct follow-up training for Soldiers to maintain and improve their interrogation skills. This becomes difficult given that Soldiers fresh from the basic interrogation course are deployed almost as soon as they arrive to their unit of assignment. This leaves little, if any, time to conduct that follow-on training with their unit to hone the skills they have learned in school. In addition to the unit deployments, the individual interrogators find themselves deployed to a wide variety of global engagements in a temporary duty status—not with their units of assignments. It is not uncommon for an individual to be deployed two or three times in the course of a year (e.g., the Balkans, Cuba [JTF-GTMO], Afghanistan, Iraq, or in support of Special Operations Forces [SOF]). [5] (U) There is no formal advanced interrogation training in the US Army. The DoD manages a Strategic Debriefing Course for all services. While some of the skills are similar, the Strategic Debriefing Course is not an advanced interrogation course. Further, only interrogators being assigned to strategic debriefing assignments are authorized to attend this course. This prevents the tactical interrogator, the operator at Abu Ghraib, from further developing skills. Junior NCOs receive only limited interrogation-related training during his or SE—C-RETANIOFORNIIM 17 019074 DOD-042232 SE-C-RETAN-0-FORNIIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade her advanced NCO courses--the Basic Non-Commissioned Officers Course (BNCOC) and the Advanced Non-commissioned Officer's Course (ANCOC). This limited training is restricted to the management of interrogation operations. The amount of time spent on the Geneva Conventions training during either of these courses is minimal. Officers receive limited training in interrogation or interrogation management in their entry level and advanced level courses. Like BNCOC and ANCOC, this training is focused on management and not the intricacies of interrogation operations or the legal restrictions applicable to interrogation operations. [6] (U) Very little training is available or conducted to train command and staff elements on the conduct, direction, and oversight of interrogation operations. To address a portion of this shortfall, USAIC is standing up a course to teach the management of Human Intelligence-to MI officers. A pilot course is scheduled and is designed to prepare the intelligence staffs (G2, S2) of a deploying Army Division with the capability to synchronize, coordinate, manage and de-conflict Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) operations within the division's area of responsibility. [7] (U) Most interrogator training that occurred at Abu Ghraib was on-the-job­training. The JIDC at Abu Ghraib conducted Interrogation Rules of Engagement (IROE) and interrogation operations training. The fast paced and austere environment limited the effectiveness of any training. After mid-September 2003, all Soldiers assigned to Abu Ghraib had to read a memorandum titled IROE,.ackncwledging they understood the ICRP, and-sign a confirmaAon sheet ;indicating they had read and understood the .1c2RP. Most Soldiers hay.) confirmed .received training on the MOF. See attached CJIT-7 IROE standard signature sheet (Reference Annex J, Appendix 4) to view an example.. [8] (U) MG G. Miller led an assessment team to Abu Ghraib in early September 2003. This was followed by a training team from 2 October - 2 December 2003. There is no indication that the training provided by the JTF-GTMO Team led to any new violations of the Geneva Conventions and the law of land warfare. Training focused on screening, the use of pocket litter during interrogations, prioritization of detainees, planning and preparation, approaches, questioning, interpreter control, deception detection, reporting, automation, and interrogation booths. The training provided at Abu Ghraib did not identify the abuses that were ongoing as violations of regulations or law, nor did it clarify issues involving detainee abuse reporting. [9] (U) Interrogators learn as part of their training that the MPs provide the security for and run detention operations at the Collection Points (CPs), Corps Holding Areas (CHAs), and Internment/Resettlement (IR) facilities. The interrogator's mission is only to collect intelligence from prisoners or detainees. Interaction with the MPs is encouraged to take advantage of any observations the MPs/guards might have concerning a particular prisoner or SE-CRETANOFOIMIX4 18 019075 DOD-042233 — SZGRET441140-FA-RNIIX4 — SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade detainee. While the USAIC includes this in the interrogator's training, very little time is spent training MI/MP detention operations. In the past, the Army conducted large EPW/Detainee exercises (the Gold Sword and Silver Sword series) that provided much of the training critical to MPs' and Interrogators' understanding of their respective roles and responsibilities. These exercises were discontinued in the mid 1990s due to frequent deployments and force structure reductions, eliminating an excellent source of interoperability training. The increase in op-tempo since 9/11 has further exacerbated the unit training and exercise problem. [10] (U) Contract Training. [a] (U) The US Army employs contract linguists/translators and contract interrogators in military operations. Some IET is provided to familiarize military interrogators in the conduct of interrogations using translators. No training is conducted at any level (enlisted, NCO, Warrant Officer, or Officer) on the employment of contract interrogators in military operations. The use of contract interrogators and linguists at Abu Ghraib was problematic (See paragraph 4.g.) from a variety of perspectives. JIDC interrogators, analysts, and leaders were unprepared for the arrival of contract interrogators and had no training to fall back on in the management, control, and discipline of these personnel. [b] (U) No doctrine exists to guide interrogators and their intelligence leaders (NCO, Warrant Officer,..and.Officer) in the contract management or command and control.of contractors in a wartime environment. These interrogators andl:mders faced.pumerous i isstles involving coptract management: roles and responsibilities of JIDC personnel with respect to contractors; roles, relationships, and responsibilities of contract linguists and contract interrogators with military personnel; and the methods of disciplining contractor personnel. All of these need to be addressed in future interrogation and interrogation management training. [11] (U) Soldier interrogation training is adequate with respect to interrogation techniques and procedures for conventional warfare. It is far less suited to the realities of the GWOT and Stability and Support Operations (SASO) and contract management. Despite the emphasis on the Geneva Conventions, it is clear from the results at Abu Ghraib (and elsewhere in operations in support of the GWOT) that Soldiers on the ground are confused about how they apply the Geneva Conventions and whether they have a duty to report violations of the conventions. Most Abu Ghraib interrogators performed their duties in a satisfactory manner without incident or violation of training standards. Some interrogators (See paragraph 5.e.- 5.h., below), however, violated training standards in the performance of selected interrogations. Army training at USAIC never included training on interrogation techniques using sleep adjustment, isolation, segregation, environmental adjustment, dietary manipulation, the use of military working dogs, or the removal of clothing. These techniques were introduced to selected interrogators who worked at Abu Ghraib from sources other than official Army training. SEC ET/ NOFORNr/v1 19 019076 DOD-042234 SE—C-RET4INGF0RNI4X4 - SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (4) (U) Military Police Doctrine and Training (a) (U) DoD Directives 2310.1, DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War and Other Detainees, and 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program, require that the US military services comply with the principles, spirit, and intent of international laws of war, that the DoD observes and enforces the US obligations under the laws of war, that personnel know the laws of war obligations, and that personnel promptly report incidents violating the laws of war and that the incidents be thoroughly investigated. (b) (U) AR 190-8, "Enemy Prisoner of War, Retained Personnel Civilian Internees and other Detainees," is a multi-service policy that incorporates the directives from the DoD publications above. The regulation addresses the military police treatment of civilian internees, and directs that: -No physical or moral coercion be used -Internees be treated with respect for their person, honor, manner, and customs -Internees be protected against violence, insults, public curiosity, bodily injury, or any form of indecent assault It specifically prohibits: ••• •••••., -Measures causing physical suffering, co include corporal punishment, and . other measures of brutality,. It specifies that disciplinary measures NOT: -Be inhumane, brutal, or dangerous to health -Include imprisonment in a place without daylight The authorized disciplinary punishments include: -Discontinuance of privileges granted over and above the treatment provided for by regulation -Confinement, not to exceed 30 consecutive days (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8) (c) (U) AR 190-12, Military Working Dog Program, notes that military police may potentially use dogs for EPW control, but limits their use against people to instances when the SE-CRET-11NOFORNII-X4 20 01907 DOD-042235 SE—C-RET-4140-FORN/IX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th. MI Brigade responsible commander determines it absolutely necessary and there have been reasonable efforts to use all lesser means of force. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-12) (d) (U) Procedural guidance, found in FM 3-19.40 and the MP Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for Abu Ghraib (400th MP BN SOP for Camp Vigilant Detention Center), consistently follow directly from the DoD directives and the applicable ARs. The procedural guidance provides military police clear-cut guidance for permissible and impermissible practices during Internment Operations. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3, FM 3-19.40; Annex J, Appendix 4, 400 MP BN SOP Camp Vigilant Detention Center) (5) (U) Intelligence and Interrogation Policy Development. (a) (U) National Policy. (1) (U) US forces and intelligence officials deployed to Afghanistan and elsewhere to conduct military operations pursuant to GWOT. Specific regulatory or procedural guidance concerning either "humane" treatment or "abuse" was not available in the context of GWOT and the recently promulgated national policies. Military and civilian intelligence agencies, to include the 519th MI Battalion (519 MI BN) in late 2002, conducted interrogations in Afghanistan in support of GWOT. As a result, deployed military interrogation units and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan developed.certain practices. Later, some of these same techniques surfaced as interrogation techniques in _Iraa., these 4eployments, US Army_ interrogatcrs,used the doctrine found in FM 34-52. The 1992 FM was what military interrogators at Abu:Ghraib wei'e • trained on, and it contained the techniques and the restrictions they had been taught. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3; FM 34-52, Interrogation Operations, [1987 and 1992 versions]) (2) (S//NF) SE—CRE—TINGEORNI/X4- 21 019078 DOD-042236 SECRET/ PJ-0FORPIIIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (3) (S//NF) S€CRMN-GFORNilX4 22 019079 DOD-042237 SECIRET-ANOFORN11-X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (4) (S//NF) (5) (U) On 16 April 2003, SECDEF approved approaches for use on the Guantanamo "unlawful" combatants, as defined by the President's Military Order of 13 November-20.01 and reiterated in the 7 February 2002 memorandum to. Doll Once this document was signed,, -it became policy:at JTF...GTMO, and latr,r bec.ame.the sbedrock on which the,CJTF,7 policies were based. The first 18 approaches listed inthe l,6 April 2003 memo from the SECDEF all appear in the. current, 1992, FM 34-52, except the Mutt-and-Jeff approach, which was derived from the superseded 1987 FM 34-52. The remaining approaches, similar to the ones identified in the OGC working group's memorandum derived from the CJTF-180 memorandum and the JTF-GTMO request, included: Change of Scenery Down Dietary Manipulation Environmental Manipulation Sleep Adjustment False Flag Isolation Although approving all approaches for use, the SECDEF required that he be notified prior to implementing the following approaches: Incentive/Removal of Incentive .Mutt and Jeff Pride and Ego Down.Isolation SE—CRETANGRORNIA4 23 019030 DOD-042238 SE-CRET440FORNIA4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6: Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Mi Brigade (Reference Annex J, Appendix 2, Counter-Resistance Techniques) (6) (U) No regulatory guidance exists for interrogators aside from DoD Directives 2310.1, DoD Program for Enemy Prisoners of War and Other Detainees and 5100.77, DoD Law of War Program. The most current interrogation procedural guidance is in the 1992 FM 34-52. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 1, DoD Directive 2310.1; Annex M, Appendix 1, DoD Directive 5100.77). (b) (U) Development of Intelligence and Interrogation Policy in Iraq and Abu Ghraib. (1) (U) In July 2003, the 519 MI BN, veterans of Afghanistan already at the BIAP facility, simultaneously conducted interrogations of the detainees with possible information of intelligence value and began to develop IROE for interrogators to meet the newly-focused mission. No known documentation exists concerning specific approaches and techniques used before September 2003. (2) (S//NF) (3) (U) Meanwhile, at Headquarters, CJTF-7, as the need for actionable intelligence rose, the realization dawned that pre-war planning had not included planning for detainee operations. Believing that FM 34-52 was not sufficiently or doctrinally clear for the situation in Iraq, CJTF-7 staff sought to synchronize detainee operations, which ultimately resulted in a methodology and structure derived from the JTF-GTMO system as presented by MG G. Miller. At the same time, LTG Sanchez directed that an interrogation policy be established that would address "permissible techniques and safeguards for interrogators" for use in Iraq. The CJTF-7 SE—GRE-TANOFORNIA4 24 019081 DOD-042239 SECRE-T-440FORNI/X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade staff relied heavily on the series of SOPs which MG G. Miller provided to develop not only the structure, but also the interrogation policies for detainee operations (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). ; z?4 (4) (U) On 10 September 2003, CPT .ssigned to the 205 MI BDE as the Command Judge Advocate, was tasked by COL . t e Staff Judge Advocate (SJAfor CJTF-7, to work with MAJAINIMIIIIIMand MAJ . om the CJTF-7 Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA) to produce a set of interrogation rules. The OSJA lidentified interrogation policies fro theSECDEF 16 April 2003 memo for JTF-GTMO 1 .,-- operations. OSJA provided CPT . he 16 April 2003 SECDEF memorandum, which he copied almost verbatim onto a document entitled CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy (ICRP). This document w s developed without reference to the 519 MI BN's July 2003 i y and August 2003 memos. CPT al sent the policy memo to the 519 MI BN for coordination, and the 519 MI BN added the use of dogs, stress positions, sleep management, sensory deprivation, and yelling, loud music and light control from its 27 August 2003 memo. The use of all .techniques was to apply to interrogations of detainees, security internees, and EPWs. CPT. alized the combined memo and sent it back to the CJTF-7 SJA. It also went to the 1 CJ-2, -3, and the Commander, 205 MI BDE, who until that point had apparently not been 7 , , involved in drafting or approving the policy. (Reference Annex B, Appendix lidamik —7 .46/(4,/ — 40.111111111111b Annex J, Appendix 3, CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, [1st Draft], Annex J, Appendix 3, CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, [2nd Draft]) (5) (U) Between 10 and 14 Se tinber 2003, the -OSJA,.at CJTF-7 changed the 10 September 2003 memo to reflec , Upon the guidance and recornme SJA staff it was decided that LTG Sanchez woul (6) (S//NF) SECRET//NOFORN//X1 25 019082 DOD-042240 SECRE—TAN-0FORNII-X4 SUBJECT: (U) Ak. 15-6 Investigation of the.Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (7) (S/(NF) (8) (S//NF) ‘.0 (9) (S//NF) rrs (1) (U) The 12 October 2003 policy significantly changed the tone and substanceof the .revious policy. (11) (SI/NF) SECRET4440FORNI/X4 26 019083 DOD-042241 SE-GRETANOFORN14X-1- SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (12) (SI/NF) • (13) (S//NF) SE-CRETANOFORMX4 27 019084 DOD-042242 SEGRETUNGRORNIIX-1- SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of "Abu Gliraib Detention. Facility and 205th MI Brigade (14) (S//NF) (15) (U) On 16 October 2003, the JIDC Interrogation Operations Officer, CPT produced an "Interrogation Rules of Engagement" chart as an aid for in erro a ors, aphically portraying. the 12 October 2003 policy. It listed the approved approaches, and identified the approaches which had..been removed as mrthorized'interrogation._. approaches, which rionetheless could be used with LTG Sanchez's approval. The chart was confusing, however. It was not completely accurate and could be subject to various interpretations. For example, the approved approaches list left off two techniques which previously had been included in the list (the Pride and Ego Down approach and the Mutt and Jeff approach). The right side of the chart listed approaches that required LTG Sanchez's prior approval. What was particularly confusing was that nowhere on the chart did it mention a number of techniques that were in use at the time: removal of clothing, forced grooming, hooding, and yelling, loud music and light control. Given the detail otherwise noted on the aid, the failure to list some techniques left a question of whether they were authorized for use without approval. (Reference Annex J, Appendix 4, CJTF-7 IROE training card) (16) (U) By mid-October, interrogation policy in Iraq had changed three times in less than 30 days. Various versions, of each draft and policy were circulated among Abu Ghraib, 205 MI BDE, CJTF-7 C2, and CJTF-7 SJA. Anecdotal evidence suggests that personnel were confused about the approved policy from as early as 14 September 2003. The SJA believed that the 14 September 2003 policy was not to be implemented until CENTCOM approved it. Meanwhile, interrogators in Abu Ghraib began operating under it immediately. It was not always clear to JIDC officers what approaches required LTG Sanchez's approval, nor was the level of SE—CRETIINOFORNIIX4 28 019085 DOD-042243 SEC SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib.Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade approval consistent with require ents in othe commands. The JIDC October 2003 SOP, likewise created by CPT"was remarkab similar to the Bagram (Afghanistan) Collection Point SOP. Prior to deployment to Iraq, CPT"unit (A/519 MI BN) allegedly conducted the abusive interrogation practices in Bagram resulting in a Criminal Investigation Command (CID) homicide investigation. The October 2003 JIDC SOP addressed requirements for monitoring interrogations, developing detailed interrogation plans, delegating interrogation plan approval authority to the Interrogation Officer in Charge (OIC), and report writing. It failed to mention details concerning ICRP, approval requirements or procedures. Interrogators, with their section leaders' knowledge, routinely utilized approaches/techniques without obtaining the required authority, indicating confusion at a minimum of two levels of supervision. (Reference Annex J, Appendix 4, JIDC Interrogation SOP; Annex J, Appendix 4, CJTF-180 Bagram Collection Point SOP) (17) (U) Concepts for the non-doctrinal, non-field manual approaches and practices clearly came from documents and personnel in Afghanistan and Guantanamo. The techniques employed in JTF-GTMO included the use of stress positions, isolation for up to thirty days, removal of clothing, and the use of detainees' phobias (such as the use of dogs) as the 2 December 2002 Counter-Resistance memo, and subsequent statements demonstrate. As the CID investigation mentioned above shows, from December 2002, interrogators in Afghanistan were removing clothing, isolating people for long periods of time, using stress positions, exploiting fear of dogs and implementing sleep and light deprivation. Interrogators in Iraq, alseady familiar .1with the prac.ticef some .of these new ideas,.implemgted them,even .prior to any policy guidance from CTIT-7. These-practices were . accepled as SOP by newly-arrived interrogators. Some of the CJTF-7 ICRPs neither effectively addressed these prattices; nor curtailed their use: (Annex J, Appendix 2, Tab A, Counter-Resistance Techniques; Annex J, Appendix 2, Interrogation Techniques; Annex E, Appendix 4, CID Report) (18) (S//REL TO USA and MCFI) (6) (U) Other Regulatory Procedural Guidance (a) (U) On 13 November 2001, the President issued a military order entitled the Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism. The SE—CRETA10FORN#X4 29 019086 DOD-042244 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and • .205th MI Brigade order authorized US military forces to detain non-US citizens suspected of terrorism, and try them for violations of thVlaw of war and other applicable laws. The order also authorized the SECDEF to detain •individuals under such conditions he may prescribe and to issue related orders and regulations as necessary. (Reference Annex J, Appendix 1, Presidential Military Order) (b) (S//NF) (c) (U) The MP personnel and the MI personnel operated under different and often incompatible rules for treatment of detainees. The MPs referenced DoD-wide regulatory and procedural guidance that clashed with the theater interrogation and counter-resistance policies that the MI interrogators followerl-Further, it appears that neither group knew or understood the limits imposed by,the other's regulatory or procedural guidanetconcer*ng the treatinent 0f detainees,, resulting iri predictable tension and confuion.: (d) (U) For instance, a MI order to strip a detainee as an interrogation process conflicted with the AR 190-8 directive to treat detainees with respect for their person and honor (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, paragraph 5-1a(2)); onto protect detainees against violence, insults, public curiosity, or any form of indecent assault (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, paragraph 5-1a(3)); and FM 3-19.40 (Reference Annex M, Appendix 3) (which specifically directs that internees will retain their clothing). A MI order to place a detainee in isolation violated the AR 190-8 directive to not imprison a detainee in a place without daylight (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, paragraph 6-11a(5)); to not confine for more than 30 consecutive days, (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8, paragraph 6­12d(1)); and FM 3-19.40 which specifically directs that the facility commander must authorize any form of punishment. Finally, when interrogators ordered the use of dogs as an interrogation technique, the order violated the policy and intent of AR 190-12. (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2) 4. (U) Summary of Events at Abu Ghraib. SEGRE--T-11N0FORNIA4 30 019087 DOD-042245 SE-CRE-TANOF-0RNI-IX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and . 205th MI Brigade" a. (U) Military Intelligence Organization and Resources. (1) (U) Task Organization. (a) (U) The 205 MI BDE was organizationally, and geographically, the size of two MI Brigades. It was composed of four Active and three Reserve Battalions. The 205 MI BDE possessed no organic interrogation elements or personnel. All HUMINT assets (units and personnel) assigned to the 205 MI BDE were from other organizations. Major subordinate elements of the 205 MI BDE included three Tactical Exploitation Battalions (HUMINT and Counterintelligence), one Aerial Exploitation Battalion (Signal Intelligence [SIGINT]) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT), an Operations Battalion (ANALYSIS), a Linguist Battalion (HUMINT Support) and a Corps Support Battalion (HUMINT). Elements of the Brigade were located throughout Iraq supporting a wide variety of combat operations. (Reference Annex H, Appendix 6, Tab C, 205 MI BDE Command Brief). x . 205 V I I 223 323 325 'a • 141 HMS Fit I HH S 223 323 MEK Screening A 223 205th MI Brigade Task Organization (August 2003) i/:) , /.2 -) ,(b) (U) The 205 MI BDE Commander, COL"111.1101 had reputation for being ng an excellent MI officer with a great background and experience e ore being selected for command. He took command of the 205 MI BDE on 1 July 2003 while the unit was already deployed in Iraq. His performance as Brigade Commander prior to the Abu Ghraib incidents was "outstanding" according to his rater, MG Wojdakowski, DCG, V Corps/CJ - Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, WOJDAKOWSKI). LTG Sanchez also believed COL "was an SECRE-TIMOFORN11X4 - 31 019088 DOD-042246 SE-CRET-14140FORNIIX4- SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade excellent and dedicated officer (Reference Annex Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). Othe k members of COL"taff included MAJ"eputy Commander; MAJ Brigade Operations Officer (S-3); and CPT "ommand Judge Advocate. (2) (U) Resources. (a) (U) As hostilities began to shift from a tactical fight to an insurgency, so did intelligence priorities. Iraq quickly became a HUMINT-focused environment in support of SASO with interrogation operations representing the intelligence 'Center of Gravity' (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). Beginning in July 2003, demands placed upon interrogation operations were growing rapidly from both the tactical commanders as well as from the CJTF-7. The 205 MI BDE had the missions of providing Tactical HUMINT Teams (THT - small elements consisting of an interrogator, a linguist, and several combat arms Soldiers attached to maneuver elements to conduct tactical interrogations at "the point of the spear") to forward-deployed combat forces as well as operating a Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC). (b) (U) As previously mentioned, the 205 MI BDE had no organic interrogation capability. Those assets were eliminated from the active force structuring the down-sizing wol_ 02 • of the Army in the 1990's. The interrogation assets available to COL 1M1111wwhen he first took Command were A1519 MI BN and interrogation sections from the 325th MI Battalion (325 MI BN), US Army Reserve-(ZJSAR), and 323rd MI Battalion (323 MI BN), USAR: Because•both of the USAR units were significantlyunder strength baore beint Adeployed.tojraqitheyrecOved many Soldiers from other USAR units country-wide -to fill up their-ranks. This process is known as "cross-leveling:". Although . it has .the benefit of filling the ranks, it has the disadvantage of inserting Soldiers into units shortly before deployment who had never trained with those units. The Soldiers did not know the unit. The unit and the unit leadershi 'd not know the Soldiers. The Army has always stressed "you train as you fight." As COL"began to focus his (h)() - • efforts on interrogation operations, all he had were disparate elements of units and individuals, including civilians, that had never trained together, but now were going to have to fight together. (c) (U) Interestingly, and as a matter of comparison, Iraqi Survey Group (ISG) interrogation operations of high-level detainees at BIAP suffered no such shortages of interrogators. Roughly the same level of personnel supported the ISG interrogation operations at BIAP, even though the ISG facility had an order of magnitude less of detainees of intelligence interest to exploit than did the 205 MI BDE (100 at PO vs. over a 1000 at Abu Ghraib). Unfortunately, these much needed resources were unavailable for support to critical CJTF-7 mission needs (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). (d) (U) The number of interrogators initially assigned to the 205 MI BDE was sufficient for a small detainee population of only several hundred. In late July 2003, onakinterrogation SE--CRET-INGFORNII-X4 32 019089 DOD-042247 SE—CRETIINOFORNIA4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade personnel were present in the 205 MI BDE to support interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. All of these person10001.e from one unit — A/5 len BN. By December 2003, Abillpielthe JIDC) had approximately 160 205 MI BDE piennel with 45 interrogators and 18 linguists/translators assigned to conduct interrogation operations. These personnel were from six different MI battalions and groups — the 519 MI BN, the 323 MI BN (USAR), the 325 MI BN (USAR), the 470th MI Group (470 MI GP), the 66th MI Group (66 MI GP), the 500th MI Group (500 MI GP). Additional resources in the form of interrogators from one MTT consisting of analysts and interrogators, and at just about the same time, three "Tiger Teams" consisting of six personnel from JTF-GTMO, came to Abu Ghraib to assist in improving interrogation operations (See paragraph 4.j.(2)). Still short of resources, the Army hired contract interrogators from CACI International, and contract linguists from Titan Corporation in an attempt to address shortfalls (See paragraph 4.g.). Some units, such as the A/519 MI BN, had personnel who had been deployed to combat operations in theater in excess of 400 days so they also faced a rotation of selected personnel home with the resulting personnel turmoil. b. (U) Establishment of the Prison at Abu Ghraib. (1) (U) The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) made the initial decision to use Abu Ghraib Prison as a criminal detention facility in May 2003 (Reference 11111tx ,B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). Abu Ghraib began receiving criminal prisoners in June 2003. There were no MI Holds or security detainees in the beginning. All such categories of detainees were sent to.Gamp Cropper (located at "PW) or to:7the other existing facilities throughout the country such as Camp, • Bucca (Reference -Aniiex F; Appendix 1 ., AG'Overhea:d Photo):"• (2) (S//NF) SECRETANOFORNIIX4 33 019090 DOD-042248 SEGRE--T44N-O-FORN4/X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th. MI Brigade (3) (U) The Hard Site permanent building facilities at Abu Ghraib were not ope'fi , for occupancy until 25 August 2003. The opening-,of the Hai"ii' ie was important because it marked the beginning of the serious abuses that occurred. CPT "A/519 MI BN, believed that, (3)0 - -Z . 2 based on her experience, the availability of an isolation area to house detainees determined to be of MI value would enhance results. She initiated the request through the 205 MI BDE to CPA for use of part of the Hard Site building for that purpose. Her request sysiLastrong support from the 205 MI BDE, specifically from its Operations Officer, MAJ MOW The 519 MI BN i Ci---,,2 . was then granted use of Tier lA (Reference Annex F, Appendix 1, AG Overview Briefing for "'"/ diagram) to house detainees. c. (U) Detention Operations and Release Procedures (1) (S//NF) (2) (S//NF) SEGRET-11140FORNI/X4 34 019091 DOD-042249 SE--GRE-T4INOF0-R44/4X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the AbuGhraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (3) (S//NF) (4) (S//NF) (5) (S//NF) SE-C-RET4/NOFORNI4X4 - 35 019092 DOD-042250 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade SE—CRE-TINOFORNIA4 36 019093 DOD-042251 AI 1 miy-4 (Ai -7 (1'44 S-E-CRE-TgNOFORNI/X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility an 205th MI Brigade (6) (U) The problems cited above contributed significantly to the overcrowding at Abu Ghraib. Overcrowding was even further exacerbated with the transfer of detainees from Camp Bucca to Abu Ghraib. The physical plant was totally inadequate in size and the construction and renovations that were underway were incomplete. Scarcity of resources — both personnel and equipment — to conduct effective confinement or interrogation operations made the situation worse. (7) (U) There , was general consensus (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, FAST, CIVILIAN-12, 1.111110111111.1111POLDIER14, SANCHEZ) that as the pace of operations picked up in late November — early December 2003, it became a common practice for maneuver elements to round up large quantities of Iraqi personnel in the general vicinity of a specified target as a cordon and capture technique. Some operations were conducted at night resulting in some detainees being delivered to collection points only wearing night clothes or under clothes. SGT "assigned to the Abu Ghraib Detainee Assessment Board, estimated that 85% -90% of the detainees were of no intelligence value based upon board interviews and debriefings of detainees. The Deputy C2X, CJTF-7, CIVILIAN-12, confirmed these numbers. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, 41111111111111CIVILIAN-12). Large quantities of detainees with little or no intelligence value swelled Abu Ghraib's population and led to a variety of overcrowding difficulties. Already scarce interrogator and analyst resources were pulled from interrogation operations to identify and screen increasing numbers of personnel whose capture documentation was incomplete or missing. Complicated and unresponsive release procedures ensured that these detainees stayed at. Abu Ghralb even thoughmost had no value. — • _" (8) (U) To make matters worse, Abu .Ghraib increasingly became the target-of mortar attacks (Reference Annex F, Appendix 3 shows an image of mortar round strikes at Abu Ghraib prior to February 2004 and the times of mortar strikes from January-April 2004) which placed detainees — innocent and guilty alike — in harms way. Force protection was a major issue at Abu Ghraib. The prison is located in a hostile portion of Iraq, adjacent to several roads and highways, and near population centers. BG Karpinski recognized Abu Ghraib's vulnerabilities and raised these concerns frequently to both MG Wojdakowski and LTG Sanchez (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, KARPINSKI). LTG Sanchez was equally concerned with both the inherent vulnerability of Abu Ghraib and frustrated with the lack of progress in establishing even rudimentary force protection measures and plans (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). LTG Sanchez directed that measures be taken to improve the force protection situation even to the point of having the 82nd Airborne Division Commander meet with Abu Ghraib officers concerning the issue. But, little progress was made and the mortar attacks continued. In an effort to improve force protection at Abu Ghraib, LTG Sanchez directed COLdippirassume Tactical Control (TACON) of the Abu Ghraib Forward Operating Base (FOB) (Reference Annex H, Appendix 1, FRAGO 1108) on 19 November 2003. COLISIOrdevoted considerable energy to improving security, even to the point of bringing a subordinate battalion commander to Abu SE-CRE-TIINOFORNIIX4 37 019094 DOD-042252 SEC • SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the AbliGhraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade Ghraib to coordinate force protection plans and operations. In spite of these efforts, the mortar attacks continued and culminated in an attack in April 2004 killing 22 detainees and wounding approximately 80 others, some seriously. This highlights the critical need for adequate force protection for a detainee center. (9) (U) The Security Internee Review and Appeal Board was established on 15 August 2003. It served as the release authority for security internees and/or those on MI Hold who were deemed to be of no security threat or (further) intelligence value. It consisted of three voting members - the C2, CJTF-7 (MG Fast), the Commander 800 MP BDE (BG Karpinski), and the CJTF-7 SJA (COL IMO, and two non-voting members (a SJA recorder and a MI assistant recorder). When first instituted, it was to meet on an "as required" basis; however, it appeared to be difficult to balance the schedules of three senior officers and the necessary support staff on a recurring, regular basis. Due to poor record keeping, accurate detainee release statistics are not available. We do know that by 2 October 2003, only 220 files had been reviewed by the board (Reference Annex H, Appendix 9, 031002 Oct CJTF7 JA Memo for CG). A preliminary screening board (Appellate Review Panel) at a level of authority below the General Officers on the Security Internee Review and Appeal Board was established to speed up the review of files by the General Officers. In the October - November 2003 timeframe, only approximately 100 detainee files a week were considered for release (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SUMMERS). As the detainee population increased, it became necessary to have the meetings on a much more frequent basis - initially twice a week. In the January 2004 timeframe, the board -was meeting six times a week (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1., FAST). B.y..February -2 4, a standing bo'.rd was established to deal with the ever increasing backlog. Even with more frequent meetings,-the release of-detainees from Abu Ghraib did not keep pace with the inflow. BG Karpinski believed that MG Fast was unreasonably denying detainees' release. By 11 January 2004, 57 review boards had been held and 1152 detained personnel had been released out of a total of 2113 considered. From February 2004 on, the release flow increased. (Reference Annex C, Appendix 1, Tab B, Annex 104) (10) (U) As of late May 2004, over 8500 detainees had been reviewed for release, with 5300 plus being released and 3200 plus being recommended for continued internment. (Reference Annex H, Appendix 9, CJTF-7 C2X email). Even those that were initially deemed of no intelligence value and those that had been drained of intelligence information were not released on a timely basis - not as the result of any specific policy, but simply because the system that supported the release board (screening, interviews, availability of accurate records, and coordination) and the release board itself could not keep up with the flow of detainees into Abu Ghraib. Even with these long release delays (often 6 months and longer), there were concerns between the intelligence and tactical sides of the house. Combat Commanders desired that no security detainee be released for fear that any and all detainees could be threats to coalition forces. On occasion, Division Commanders overturned the recommendations of SEC-RE-TltNOFORN/IX4 38 01909 DOD-042253 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (() Division Staffs to release some detainees at the point of capture (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, 1111111111111.111101 The G2, 4 ID informed MG Fast that the Division Commander did not concur with the release of any detainees for fear that a bad one may be released along with the good ones. MG Fast described the 4ID's response to efforts to coordinate the release of selected detainees, "...we wouldn't have detained them if we wanted them released." (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, FAST, CIVILIAN-12). MG Fast responded that the board would ultimately release detainees if there was no evidence provided by capturing units to justify keeping them in custody. (11) (U) The chart below depicts the rise in detainee 'MI Hold' population (those identified by the "system" to be deemed of intelligence interest) (Reference Annex H, Appendix 5). SOLDIER-14, the officer at Abu Ghraib primarily responsible for managing collection requirements and intelligence reporting, estimated that only 10-15% of the detainees on MI Hold were of actual intelligence interest. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-14) 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 —7: 20-0 O' Jul- Aug. Sep- Oct Nov- Dec-, Jan-03 03 03 03 03 03 04 (12) (U) Interrogation operations in Abu Ghraib suffered from the effects of .a broken detention operations system. In spite of clear guidance and directives, capturing units failed to perform the proper procedures at the point-of-capture and beyond with respect to handling captured enemy prisoners of war and detainees (screening, tactical interrogation, capture cards, sworn statements, transportation, etc.). Failure of capturing units to follow these procedures contributed to facility overcrowding, an increased drain on scarce interrogator and linguist resources to sort out the valuable detainees from innocents who should have been released soon after capture, and ultimately, to less actionable intelligence. d. (U) Establishment of MP Presence at Abu Ghraib. The first Army unit to arrive was the 72nd MP Company (72 MP CO), Nevada Army National Guard. When first assigned to Abu Ghraib, the 72 MP CO was a subordinate unit of the 400th MP Battalion (400 MP BN) SE—CRET-1410FORNIIX-4 39 019096 DOD-042254 SECRET//NOFORN//X1 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention. Facility and 205th MI Brigade headquartered at BIAP. The 320th MP Battalion (320 MP BN) advance party was the next to arrive at Abu Ghraib on 24 July 2003. The rest of the 320 MP BN Headquarters, commanded by LTC41111111.1., arrived on 28 July 2003. With the 320 MP BN came one of its subordinate units, the 447th MP Company (447 MP CO). The 72 MP CO was then reassigned from the 400 MP BN to the 320 MP BN. The next unit to arrive was the 229th MP Company (229 MP CO) on or about 3 August 2003. On 1 October 2003, SSG Frederick, CPL Graner and other MPs who have allegedly abused detainees, arrived as part of the 372 MP CO. The rest of the 320 MP CO arrived in late October 2003, followed by the 870th MP Company (870 MP CO) and 670 MP Company (670 MP CO) on approximately 14 November 2003. e. (U) Establishment of MI Presence at Abu Ghraib. (1) (U) The first MI unit to arrive at Abu Ghraib was a detachment from A/519 MI BN on 25 July 2003. The person in charge of that contingent was 1SGTIONOIr. Soldiers from the 519 MI BN had been sent there to prepare for OVB. CPT 10.1Parrived at Abu Ghraib on 4 August 2003 to assume the duties of Interrogation Operations OIC. MAJ 11111.146.1g arrived on or about 10 September 2003 along with elements of the 325 MI BN. MAJ 11.11.1r was sent by COLto set up the JIDC at Abu Ghraib. LTC/Ratarrived at Abu GhrAb on 17 September 2003 to become the Director of the JIDC. MAJ.. and elements of the 323 MI BN arrived at the end of September 2003. MAJ apt had been the OIC of the interrogation operation at-Camp Bucca. He became the Operations Officer of the JIDC, working closely with MAJ."... and CPT"Most.of the_person_n0 from the 321MI BN elerilent that- . arrived with MAJ lwere used'as the Headquarters element and did not directly participate"in interrogations. (2) (U) Civilian CACI contract interrogators began to arrive in late September 2003. There are a number of shortfalls connected to this issue (See paragraph 4.g., below). It was another complicating factor with respect to command and control. CPT " relied on the CACI site manager, CIVILIAN-18, to interview contractors as they arrived and to assign them based on his interviews. She knew little of their individual backgrounds or experience and relied on "higher headquarters" to screen them before arrival. Such screening was not occurring. (3) (U) During October 2003, in addition to the elements of the already mentioned MI units and the Titan and CACI civilians, elements of the 470 MI GP, 500 MI GP, and 66 MI GP appeared. These units were from Texas, Japan, and Germany, and were part of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), which tasked those subordinate units to sendr.whatever interrogator and analyst support they had available. MAJ d.rotated back to the US on 15 November 2003. CPT"left on emergency leave on "ecember 2003 and never returned. MAJ 411 then, was the only commissioned officer remaining in the Operations Section. SE-CRE-T4/NQFORNll-X4 40 019097 DOD-042255 4 frio ir( 6(41 7^-J, /Ai; SEC 6149— 92) SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility an 205th MI Brigade (4) (U) It is important to understand that the MI units at Abu Ghraib were far from complete units. They were small elements from those units. Most of the elements that came to Abu Ghraib came without their normal command structure. The unit Commanders and Senior NCOs did not go to Abu Ghraib but stayed with the bulk of their respective units. The bringing together of so many parts of so many units, as well as civilians with very wide backgrounds and experience levels in a two month time period, was a huge challenge from a command and controlperspective. f. (U) Establishment, Organization, and Operation of the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC) (1) (U) The idea for the creation of the JIDC came about after a number of briefings and meetings were held among LTG Sanchez, MG Fast, COL, and COL41.11111111, Assistant C2, CJTF-7. These meetings and briefings occurred about mid-August 2003 through early September 2003. They partially coincided with MG G. Miller's arrival from GTMO. He and his team provided an assessment of detainee operations in Iraq from 31 August to 9 September 2003 (See Paragraph 4.j.(1)). MG G. Miller's discussions with the CJTF personnel and the 205 MI BDE personnel influenced the decision to create a JIDC and how it would be organized, but those discussions were already underway before his arrival. The objective for the establishment of the JIDC was to enhance the interrogation process with a view toward producing better, timelier, actionable intelligence (actionable intelligenoe -provides comtnendersand Soldiers a high Ievel of situational understanding ; delivetbd with speed, accuracy, andtimeliness, in order to conduct successful operations). (2) (U) On 6 September 2003, COL del briefed LTG Sanchez on a plan to improveinterrogation operations resulting from a 31 August 2003 meeting (Reference Annex H, Appendix 10). LTG Sanchez approved the concept and directed COL411100to accelerate all aspects of the plan. This decision established the JIDC and modified previous interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib. COL afikdecided when standing up the JIDC not to make it a battalion operation (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,111111111.), therefore deciding not to place one of his battalion commanders in charge of the JIDC but instead rely upon staff personnel to manage the entire operation. The current operation would be transitioned to a JIDC by personnel already assigned at Abu Ghraib with additional manning provided by the consolidation of security detainee interrogation operations from other locations (e.g., Camp Cropper). •Jordan would becolieltiihe Director of the JIDC on 17 September 2003. Otherkey JIDC personnel included CPT"(OIC ICE), MAJ"(JIDC Operations Officer),MAJMOVIDC Operations Officer), SOLDIER-14 and SOLDIER-23 (Interrogation Technicians). CJTF-7 decided to use the JTF.:GtMO Tiger Team concept which uses an interrogator, an intelligence analyst, and an interpreter on each team. A re-organization of the SEGRET4INGFORNIA4 41 019098 DOD-042256 ri-k40-1f SECRET//NOFORN/IXI SUBJECT:. (U) AR 15-6 InvestigatiOn of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade JIDC took place in the late September to October 2003 timeframe which divided Tiger Teams into functional categories. (3) (U) The reorganization introduced another layer of complexity into an already stressed Abu Ghraib interrogation operations environment. The Tiger Team worked well at GTMO. JTF-GTMO's target population and mission, however, were different from what was faced in Iraq. The Tiger Team method was designed to develop strategic level information from the GTMO detainees who were primarily captured in Afghanistan. By the time they reached GTMO any tactical value they may have had was gone. The same is true for Abu Ghraib relative to Iraq. The best place to collect tactical intelligence from interrogations is at the tactical level. Tactical intelligence is the most perishable, and the faster you harvest it the more useful it will be to help that tactical unit. JIDC personnel at Abu Ghraib believed the thirst for intelligence reporting to feed the national level systems was driving the train. There was then a focus to fill that perceived void and feed that system. LTG Sanchez did not believe significant pressure was coming from outside of CJTF-7, but does confirm that there was great pressure placed upon the intelligence system to produce actionable intelligence (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). The Tiger Team concept should have only been used at Abu Ghraib for any high value targets identified. Those targets should receive careful planning and preparation, and be interrogated by the most experienced interrogators, analysts, and interpreters. Using a Tiger Team at Corps (the JIDC) for developing tactical intelligence did not work. (4)-(U) The J11),(7. is a non-doctrnialorganiiation. Initially, there was tko joint manning document for the JIDC (though one -was.developed by the 205 MI FIDE over time and -was submitted to CJTF-7). There was no approved structure for the JIDC. The manning doCument was being created as the JIDC was already operating (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, .Because there is no JIDC doctrine (or training), procedures were ad hoc in nature — adapted from FM 34-52 where possible, though most processes and procedures were developed on the fly based upon the needs of the situation. The organization of the JIDC changed often (Reference Annex H, Appendix 6, Tab B) and contributed to the general state of turmoil at Abu Ghraib. Interrogators were not familiar with the new working arrangements (e.g., working with analysts) and were only slightly trained on the conduct of interrogations using translators. Note that most interrogators are only trained in conducting tactical interrogations in a conventional war environment (See paragraph 3.b.(3)). In spite of this turmoil, lack of training and doctrine, and shortages, the JIDC did mature over tirKandqmproved intelligence production derived from interrogations at Abu Ghraib. (5) (U) Early in the formation of the JIDC, COL asrequested COL 4.6provide him with a Lieutenant Colonel to run the new organization because the responsibilities would require someone of that rank and commensurate experience. LTC ape had just arrived in Iraq four days earlier. He was originally sent to be COL OaDeputy C2 but then a decision was made SEC 42 019099 DOD-042257 Ail ,44-al SE—C-RMN-0-FORNIIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and Cbl P) 205th MI Brigade to upgrade the C2 position from a COL to a MG. MG Fast was sent to CJTF-7 to be the C2, COL"became the Deputy C2 and LTC11.1in became excess. Since LTC.111r was available, COL am asst ned him to Abu Ghraib to run the JIDC. COL., expected LTCarat to report to COL"because COLA"! had command responsibility for the JIDC. LTC "was assigned to the JIDC verbally. He states that he never received orders (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,4011 (6) (U) There is a significant difference between what LTC "claims he was told when he was sent to Abu Ghraib and what COLM10. and COL OPsay he was told. LTC 411010 says he was sent to be a "liaison" officer between CJTF-7 and the JIDC. COL alp and COL allsay he was sent there to be in charge of it. Reference to titles is useless as a way to sort through this because there was no actual manning document for reference; people made up their own titles as things went along. Some people thought COLO. was the Director; some thought LTC1111. was the Director. A major shortcoming on the part of COLO. and LTCwas the failure to do a formal Officer Evaluation Report (OER) support form, Department of Army (DA) Form 67-8-1, to clearly delineate LTC ~roles and responsibilities. It is clear that both had their own ideas as to roles and responsibilities, and an initial goal-setting session formalized via the support form would have forced both parties to deal in specifics. Such sessions are frequently done after the fact; especially in stress-filled combat situations. The less organized the situation, however, the more such a process is needed in order to sort out the boundaries and lanes in the road. Abu Gbraib was certainly a place and a-situation that required both cleat,boundaries and clear lanes in the road. LTC. did provide a support form that he said he did some weeks after his assignment to Abu Ghraib and which he sent to COL4f. COL"claims he never received it LTC "never received a signed copy back from COL"and never followed up to get one. Even if LTC apt had sent the support form a few weeks later as he states, it was by then too late. The confusion/damage had been done. The early stages of the Abu Ghraib operation were the most critical to the disastrous end results (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1 (7) (U) The preponderance of evidence supports the COLS "osition that LTC ApPwas sent to run the JIDC. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, MAJOIMM, Operations Officer of the 205 MI BDE, and MAJ ", Deputy Commander of the 205 MI BDE, were adamant that LTC4111111, was sent for that reason. LTC 111111111. believed LTC"was in charge once he arrived at Abu Ghraib and started dealing directly with him. In a 1 but one important aspect, interrogation operations, LTC.. began to act as if he were in charge. (8) (U) As is now evident, LTCM. was a poor choice to run the JIDC. He was a Civil Affairs officer. He was an MI officer early in his career, but transferred to Civil Affairs in 1993. The MI experience he did have had not been in interrogation operations. LTC.. left the SEC 43 ,1:91 r4 0 DOD-042258 A lt MY---(tw SE-CRET-lifs10FOR-N4IX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 .Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade actual management, organization, and leadership of thej core of his responsibilities to MAJ 41111lMIIIIIand CPT VI/M. The reality of the situation was that MAJ 111.101111Pnd CPTalir' were overwhelmed by the huge demands of trying to organize, staff, equip, and train the JIDC while at the same time answering incessant requests for information from both the 205 MI BDE as well as from CJTF-7. What the JIDC needed in the beginning, more than ever, was a trained, experienced MI LTC. COLON. was correct in his assessment of what was required. In the critical early stages of the JIDC, as it was being formed, Abu Ghraib needed a LTC to take total control. The need was for a leader to get the JIDC organized, to set standards, enforce discipline, create checks and balances, establish quality controls, communicate a zero tolerance for abuse of detainees, and enforce that policy by quickly and efficiently punishing offenders so that the rest of the organization clearly understood the message. Well-disciplined units that have active, involved leaders both at the NCO and Officer level are less likely to commit abuses or other such infractions. If such instances do occur, they are seldom repeated because those leaders act aggressively to deal with the violators and reemphasize the standards (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,1111/411111111111111 1111111111MI1JI.P (9) (U) LTC"gravitated to what he knew, and what he was comfortable with, rather than filling the void noted above. He was actually a very hard working officer who dedicated himself to improving life for all of the Soldiers at Abu Ghraib. He is physically brave, volunteered for Iraq, and was wounded in action at Abu Ghraib during the mortar attack on 20 September 2003. He addressed shortcomings in the mess situation, lack of exercise equipment, , protective gear_;. living eonditions":and communications—He also on:forced stricter adherence to - the uniform -policies and the wearing-of protective gear by Soldiers and contractors. Many:of the • Soldiers that we spoke to, both MPs and MI, considered urciapethe-go to guy" to ge•the types of things just enumerated done. BG Karpinski even remarked once to LTC Jordan during one of her visits "Do you ever sleep?" (Reference Annex B, Appendix 2, KARPINSKI). Unfortunately, all of the issues he was addressing should have been left to the staffs of the 205 MI BDE and the 320 MP BN. He was not the FOB Commander. LTC"as the FOB Commander until the 19 November 2003 FRAGO. (Annex B, Appendix 1, (10) (U) LTA.. became fascinated with the "Other GovemmotAlgencies," a term used mostly to mean Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), who were operating at Abu Ghraib. The OGA "Ghost Detainee" issue (housing of detainees not formally accounted for) was well known within both the MI and MP"unities and created a mystique about what "thby" were doing (See paragraph 4.h.). LTCAlallowed OGA to do interrogations without the presence of Army personnel (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1," Prior to that time, JIDC policy was that an Army interrogator had to acccimpan GA if the were interrogating one of the detainees MI was also interrogating. As noted above, LTC "was little involved in the interrogation operations, but in this aspect he did become involved and it did not help the situation. The lack of OGA adherence to the practices and procedures SE–CREUN0FORNI4X4 44 019101 DOD-042259 re-(A SEC ) ?) Q 1 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade established for accounting for detainees eroded the necessity in the minds of Soldiers and civilians for them to follow Army rules. (11) (U) LTC allthand ten other Soldiers were wounded in the mortar attack that occurred on 20 September 2003. Two Soldiers died in that attack. LTC 4111110was extremely traumatized by that attack, especially by the two deaths and the agony suffered by one of those Soldiers before his death. He was still very emotional about that attack when interviewed for this investigation on 27 May 2004. He said he thinks about the attack and the deaths daily. That attack also had an impact on a number of other Soldiers at Abu Ghraib as did the very frequent mortar attacks that occurred at Abu Ghraib during this entire period The Soldiers' and civilians' morale at Abu Ghraib suffered as the attacks continued. Additionally, there was a general feeling by both MI and MP personnel that Abu Ghraib was the forgotten outpost receiving little support from the Army. (Reference Annex F, Appendix 3, Mortar Attacks). The frequency of these attacks and the perceived lack of aggressive action to prevent them were contributing factors to the overall poor morale that existed at Abu Ghraib. (12) (U) COL ONperceived intense pressure for intelligence from interrogations. This began soon after he took Command in July 2003. In fact, as the time progressed from July 2003 through January 2004, interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib became the central focus of his efforts despite the fact that he was in command of the entire MI Brigade. That pressure for better results was passed from COL " to the restof the JIDC leadership (including MAJ .0M MN. ap,,CPT.SOLDIER-23, and SQLDIER-14) and from them t the interrogators. and analysts -operating, at Abu Ghraib. Pressure consisted in deviation from doctrinal reporting. standards, (pressure to report rapidly any-and all information in non-standard formats such as Interrogator Notes in lieu of standard intelligence reports), directed guidance and prioritization from "higher," outside of doctrinal or standard operating procedures, to pursue specific lines of questioning with specific detainees, and high priority `VFR Direct' Aaskings to the lowest levels in the JIDC. This pressure should have been expected in such a critical situation, but was not managed by the leadership and was a contributing factor to the environment that resulted in abuses. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1 , nd Annex B, Appendix 2,"GEOFFREY MILLER (13) (U) The most critical period of time for Abu Ghraib was when COL allicommitteda critical error in judgment by failing to remove LTC"as soon as his shortcoolgs werenoted, on approximately 10 October 2003. Very shortly after LTC "s arrival-.iri Ghraib, on or about 17 September 2003, the 205 MI BDE Staff began to note LTCinvolvement in staff issues and his lack of involvement in interrogation operations. The situation as described above ould have been a " ting challenge for the most experienced, well trained, MI Officer. COL"knew LTC" was not who was needed to fulfill the JIDC SECRET14NOFORAl//VA 45 DOD-042260 SE—CRETIIN0-FORNAX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR .15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade" 4 , functions early on, but nevertheless chose to see if LTC 011bcould work out over time. COL111111Pmade more frequent visits during this time period both because he as receiving increasing pressure for results but also because he could not rely on LTC "to run the entire operation. (14) (U) As pointed out clearly in the MG Taguba report, MP units and individuals at Abu Ghraib lacked sufficient training on operating a detainment/interrogation facility. MI units and individuals also lacked sufficient, appropriate, training to cope with the situation encountered at Abu Ghraib (See Paragraph 3.b.(4)). An insurgency is HUMINT intensive. The majority of that HUMINT comes from interrogations and debriefmgs. Yet at the JIDC, which as set up to be the focal point for interrogation operations, there was only one officer, CPT IMP, with significant interrogation operations experience. There were four MI Warrant Officers but all were used for staff functions rather than directly supervising and observing interrogations. There was a shortage of trained NCOs at the E-7/E-6 level. Each Section Leader had four or five Tiger Teams, too many to closely observe, critique, counsel, consult, and supervise. One Section Leader was an E-5. Several of the interrogators were civilians and about half of those civilians lacked sufficient background and training. Those civilians were allowed to interrogate cause there were no more military assets to fill the slots. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, Such a mixture together with constant demands for reports and documentation overwhelmed the Section Leaders. The analysts assigned to Tiger Teams were not all trained 96Bs, but were a mixture of all available intelligence Military Occupational Specialties (MOS). Many of those- --assigned as analysts harc.never betm trained -nor_hatl they-ever served-as. analysts. ,". - (15) (U) Guard and interrogation personnel at Abu Ghraib wereno not adequately trained or experienced and were certainly not well versed in the cultural understanding of the detainees. MI personnel were totally ignorant of MP lanes in the road or rules of engagement. A common observation was that MI knew what MI could do and what MI couldn't do; but MI did not know what the MPs could or could not do in their activities. The same was true of MP ignorance of MI operational procedures. Having two distinct command channels (MI and MP - see Command and Control) in the same facility with little understanding of each other's doctrinal and regulatory responsibilities caused uncertainty and confusion. There was a perception among both MI and MP personnel that the other group was not doing its fair share in mutually supportive tasks of running the physical plant. CIVILIAN-12 (Assistant CJTF-7 C2X) observed that confusion seemed to be the order of the day at Abu Ghraib. There was hostility between MI and MP personnel over roles and responsibilities (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, CIVILIAN­12). There was a distinct lack of experience in both camps. Except for some of the Reserve Component MPs who had civilian law enforcement experience, most of the MPs were never trained in prison operations. Because of the shortage of MPs, some MI personnel had to assume detainee escort duties, for which they received only the most rudimentary training. - SE-C-RET1140FORNI4X4 46 019103 DOD-042261 SE-GRE-P4440E-ORNI4X4- SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abri Ghraib,Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (16) (U) Abu Ghraib rapidly evolved from a tactical interrogation operation in July 2003 to a JIDC beginning in September 2003. Doctrine, SOPs, and other tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) for a JIDC were initially non-existent. The personnel manning the JIDC came from numerous units, backgrounds, and experiences. Equipment such as computers, software, IT infrastructure (networks, data storage), and connectivity to relevant intelligence data bases was very limited. Even file cabinets were in short supply which resulted in lost documents. One JIDC Soldier stated, "I can believe them (files for requests for exceptions to policy) getting lost because we often lost complete files. Our filing system was not the best. We did not have serviceable file cabinets and teams were given approval to place files in cardboard boxes." VLI)C 16 (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, 111119111.16) Initially there was only one computer available for every four interrogators. Ad hoc data bases were built, employed, and modified as requirements dictated. Data connectivity between interrogators and analysts was established using "thumb drives." Forms, intelligence products, and database formats came and went based upon their immediate utility — many times dictated by the changing structure of the JIDC itself as directed by leadership. Critical records regarding each detainee were located in several electronic and hardcopy locations — the operations officers maintained some files, others were maintained by section leaders, others by collection management personnel, and others by Detainee Release Board (DRB) personnel. Some interrogation related information was recorded on a whiteboard which was periodically erased. No centralized management system existed to manage interrogation operations. One result was that detainee records critical to the evaluation of prisoners for a-variety of reasons (for intelligence, value assessment, release, medical evaluation, -etc.) were difficult to find or construct. MP Abu Ghraib vale equally_ primitive.. —. fhese documentation shortfalls not only hindered effective interrogation operations and information sharing, but also hindered the ability of the Security Internee Review and Appeal Board (which relied upon records reviews to make decisionS to release or retain detainees). As addressed earlier, many detainees arrived at Abu Ghraib with little or no documentation from capturing units. Follow-on records maintained by the MP and MI personnel at Abu Ghraib would be sparse if the detainee had not been thoroughly interrogated. DRBs were reluctant to release a detainee if they knew little about him. MG Fast noted that one detainee file that was reviewed by the release board was completely empty. Even detainee medical records that should have been created and stored (Reference Annex H, Appendix 8) were not maintained appropriately. Medical doctors on site at Abu Ghraib claim that excellent medical records were maintained on detainees (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, " . Only a few detainee medical records could be found, indicating that they are not being main fined JAW AR 40-66 (Medical Records Administration and Healthcare Documentation). (19) g. (U) Contract Interrogators and Linguists (1) (U) Contracting-related issues contributed to the problems at Abu Ghraib prison. Several of the alleged perpetrators of the abuse of detainees were employees of government SE—GRE—T11140FORNM 47 019104 DOD-042262 SE-CRE-TANOFORNI/X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade contractors. Two contractual arrangements were involved: one with CACI, for interrogators and several other intelligence - related occupational categories; and one with BTG, for linguists. Since 28 November 2001, BTG has been part of Titan Corporation. The contract is still in the name of BTG. Most people have referred to it as the Titan Contract. A brief description of these two contractual arrangements follows: (a) (U) Linguist contract- Titan, Inc. - Contract DASC01-99-D-0001. [1] (U) The need to supplement the Army's capacity for linguists was first raised to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army in a 1997 "Foreign Language Lay . down." It was proposed to establish a contract with the private sector to provide linguists, as needed, for contingencies and current intelligence operations. [2] (U) As a result of this perceived need, INSCOM awarded Contract DASC01-99-D-0001 to Titan, in March 1 999. The contract called for Titan initially to develop a plan to , provide and manage linguists throughout the world, and later, implement the plan as required. The contract called for three levels of linguists- some were required to obtain security clearances and some were not. The linguist candidates were subject to some level of background investigations, based on individual requirements for security clearances. Since the award of the contract, hundreds of linguists have been provided, with generally positive results. It is noted that the contract calls for translation services only, and makes no mention of contractar 7-_ employees. actuidly conducting interrogationg:-Si± , xe,the statement_of work is limited,to translation services, -the linguists apparently were not required -1.-o review and Aga the IROE at .Abu Ghraib. A recent review of the contract indicated that the current contract ceiling is approximately $650 Million. Other agencies can order linguist services under this contract. For the most part, the ordering activity also provides the funds for these delivery orders. The contract contains a clause that allows the Contracting Officer to direct the contractor to remove linguists from the theater in which they are performing This clause has been invoked on occasion for misconduct. (b) Interrogator contract-CACI, Inc. , [1] (U) The second contractual arrangement is a series of Delivery Orders awarded to CACI, in August 2003, which call for the provision of numerous intelligence-related services such as "Interrogator Support," "Screening Cell Support," "Open Source Intelligence," "Special Security Office," "HUMINT Augmentee Contractors" (which includes "Interrogation Support," "Junior Interrogators," "Senior and Junior Counter-Intelligence Agents," and "Tactical/Strategic Interrogators")._ SE—CREPIN0F0RN4IX4 48 019105 DOD-042263 SECRE-TIINO-F-0-RNIIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade [2] (U) These Delivery Orders were awarded under a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA) (NBCHA01-0005) with the National Business Center (NBC), a fee for service activity of the Interior Department. The BPA between CACI and NBC set out the ground rules for ordering from the General Services Administration (GSA) pursuant to GSA Schedule Contract GS-35F­5872H, which is for various Information Technology (IT) Professional Services. Approximately eleven Delivery Orders were related to services in Iraq. While CJTF-7 is the requiring and funding activity for the Delivery Orders in question, it is not clear who, if anyone, in Army contracting or legal channels approved the use of the BPA, or why it was used. [3] (U) There is another problem with t" 11111111111.11pparticipated with the COR, LTC "writing the State nt of Work a (SOW) prior to the award of the contract (Referenceex B, Appendix 1, "his t°4 situation may violate the provisions of Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 9. 505-2 (b) (1). (ih i(e6) CAC2I contract. A CACI employee, [4] (U) On 13 May 2004, the Deputy General Counsel (Acquisition) of the Army issued an opinion that all Delivery . Orders for Interrogator Services should be cancelled immediately as they were beyond the scope of the GSA Schedule contract. (2) (U) Although intelligence activities and related services, which encompass interrogation services, should be performed by military or govemment.civilian personnel wherever feasible, it is recognized that contracts.for may be required in.urgent or emergency situations. / • The general pelicrof.npt -contracting for intelligenee functiog..S .. and .services: was designed'in part many of the-problems that eventually developed at Abu Ghraib, i.e. ;- lack ofoversight to.. insure.that intelligence operations continued to fall within the law and the authorized chain of command, as well as the government's ability to oversee contract operations. (3) (U) Performing the interrogation function in-house with government employees has several tangible benefits for the Army. It enables the Army more readily to manage the function if all personnel are directly and clearly subject to the chain of command, and other administrative and/or criminal sanctions, and it allows the function to be directly accessible by the commander/supervisor without going through a Contracting Officer Representative (COR). In addition, performing the function in-house enables Army Commanders to maintain a consistent approach to training (See Paragraph 3.b.(3)) and a reliable measure of the qualifications of the people performing the function. (4) (U) If it is necessary to contract for interrogator services, Army requiring activities must carefully develop the applicable SOW to include the technical requirements and requisite personnel qualifications, experience, and training. Any such contracts should, to the greatest extent possible, be awarded and administered by an Army contracting activity in order to provide for the necessary oversight, management, and chain of command. Use of contracting vehicles SE—GRE—TiiNDF0RNIA4 49 019106 DOD-042264 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade such as GSA Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contracts should be carefully scrutinized given the complexity and sensitivities connected to interrogation operations. (5) (U) Some of the employees at Abu Ghraib were not DoD contractor employees. Contractor employees under non-DoD contracts may not be subject to the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (18 US Code 3261- 3267). The Act allows DoD contractor employees who are "accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United States" to be subject to criminal prosecution if they engage in conduct that would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year if the conduct had occurred within the jurisdiction of the United States. (6) (U) In the performance of such sensitive functions as interrogation, the Army needs to maintain close control over the entire operation. If a decision is made to contract for these services, the most effective way to do that and maintain a direct chain of command is to award, administer, and manage the contract with Army personnel. As learned in the current situation, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to effectively administer a contract when the COR is not on site." • (7) (U) The Army needs to improve on-site contract monitoring by government employees (using CORs) to insure that the Army's basic interests are protected. The inadequacy of the on-si e contract management at Abu, Ghraib is best understood by reviewing the statement of CPT. R-..ference. Annex B, Appendix 1, V;z00D), thea.terroga :tion 01C, who indicated_she never received any parameters or -guidance as to how the-CACI persomel were to be utilized. She also indicates that her primary point of contact (POC) on matters involving the -CACI Delivery Orders was the CACI on-site manager. There is no mention of a COR. Another indication of the inadequacy of the contract management is reflected in the statement of SOLDIER14 (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-14), who indicated he was never informed that the Government could reject unsatisfactory CACI employees. It would appear that no effort to familiarize the ultimate user of the contracted services of the contract's terms and procedures was ever made. In order to improve this situation, training is required to ensure that the COR is thoroughly familiar with the contract and gains some level of familiarity with the Geneva Conventions standards. It needs to be made clear that contractor employees are bound by the requirements of the Geneva Conventions. (8) (U) If it is necessary to contract for interrogator services, more specific training requirements and personnel standards must be incorporated into the solicitation/contract to insure that the contractor hires properly trained and qualified personnel. (9) (U) Emerging results from a DA Inspector General (DAIG) Investigation indicate that approximately 35% of the contract interrogators lacked formal military training as interrogators. SE—GRETIIN0FORNIIX4 50 019107 DOD-042265 SEC-RETINGFORNI4X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 1576 Investigation of the'Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade While there are specific technical requirements in the linguist contract, the technical requirements for the interrogator contract were not adequate. It appears that the only mention of qualifications in the contract stated merely that the contractor employee needs to have met the requirements of one of two MOS, 97E or 351E, or "equivalent". Any solicitation/contract for these services needs to list specific training, if possible, not just point to an MOS. If the training from the MOS is what is required, those requirements should be listed in the solicitation/contract in full, not just referenced. Perhaps the best way of insuring that contractor interrogators receive adequate training would be to utilize existing government training. For example, prospective contractor employees could be sent, at contractor expense, to the Tactical Human Intelligence Course for the 97E MOS, "Human Intelligence Collector." Such a step would likely require some adjustments to the current program of instruction. Prospective contract interrogators could be given the course tests on Interrogation and the Geneva Conventions. If they can pass the examinations, no further training would be required. After a reasonable training period, prospective contractor interrogators who are unable to pass the exam would be rejected. There are, of course other training possibilities. The key point would be agreement on some standardization of the training of contractor interrogators. The necessity for some sort of standard training and/or experience is made evident by the statements of both contractor employees and military personnel. CIVILIAN-21 (CACI) seemingly had little or no interrogator (. ,1 experience prior to coming to Abu Ghraib (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,CIVILIAN-21, °¦,0./-1"—WIJMNPI), even though he was a Navy Reserve Intelligence Specialist. Likewise, numerous statements indicated_that-little, if any, training on Geneva Conventions was presented to / contractor employees (Reference Annex B, Appendigl SOLDER-25, CIVILIAN-10 1,.' C1VILIAN-21 and CIVILIAN-1.1). Prior to deployment, all contractor linguists or interrogators should receive training in the .Geneva.Conventions standards for the treatment of detainees/prisoners. This training should include a discussion of the chain of command and the establishment of some sort of "hotline" where suspected abuses can be reported in addition to reporting through the chain of command. If the solicitation/contract allows "equivalent" training and experience, the Contracting Officer, with the assistance of technical personnel, must evaluate and assess the offerors'/contractor's proposal/written rationale as to why it believes that the employee has "equivalent" training. It appears that under the CACI contract, no one was monitoring the contractor's decisions as to what was considered "equivalent." (10) (U) In addition, if functions such as these are being contracted, MI personnel need to have at least a basic level of contract training so they can protect the Army's interests. Another indication of the apparent inadequacy of on-site contract management and lack of contract training is the apparent lack of understanding of the appropriate relationship between contractor personnel, government civilian employees, and military personnel. Several people indicated in their statements at contractor personnel were "supervising" government personnel or vice versa. SGT.indicated that CACI employees were in positions of authority, and appeared to be supervising government personnel. She indicated a CACI employee named "First Name" SE-CRE-T-010FORNIA4 51 019108 DOD-042266 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade was listed as being in charge of screening. CIVILIAN-08 (CACI) was in charge of "B Section" with military personnel listed as subordinates on the organizatioeit. SOLDIER-14 also indicated that CIVILIAN-08 was a supervisor for a time. CPT .tated that CACI ()k -"supervised" military personnel in her statement, but offered no specifics. Finally, a government organization chart (Reference Annex H, Appendix 6, Tab B) showed a CIVILIAN-02 (CACI) as the Head of the DAB. CIVILIAN-02 is a CACI employee. On the other side of the coin, CIVILIAN-21 indicated in his statement that the Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC) was his supervisor. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-14, CIVILIAN-21, 4111111111011.) (b) f, 71 (11) (U) Given the sensitive nature of these sorts of functions, it should be required that the contractor perform some sort of background investigation on the prospective employees. A clause that would allow the government to direct the contractor to remove employees from the theater for misconduct would seem advisable. The need for a more extensive pre-performance background investigation is borne out by the allegations of abuse by contractor personnel. (12) (U) An important step in precluding the recurrence of situations where contractor personnel may engage in abuse of prisoners is to insure that a properly trained COR is on-site. Meaningful contract administration and monitoring will not be possible if a small number of CORs are asked to monitor the performance of one or more contractors who may have 100 or more employees in the theater,•and in some cases, perhaps in several leoations (Which seems to have been'the situation-at Abu -Ghrarb)..In these cases, ,the CORs do Well to keeptp. with the paper work, and simply have no tithe to aetiVelymOnitOr contractor performance: It is dpparent that there was no credible exercise of appropriate oversight of contract performance .at -Abu Ghraib. (13) (U) Proper oversight did not occur at Abu Ghraib due to a lack of training and inadequate contract management and monitoring. Failure to assign an adequate number of CORs to the area of contract performance puts the Army at risk of being unable to control poor performance or become aware of possible misconduct by contractor personnel. This lack of monitoring was a contributing factor to the problems that were experienced with the performance of the contractors at Abu Glaraib. The Army needs to take a much more aggressive approach to contract administration and management if interrogator services are to be contracted. Some amount of advance planning should be utilized to learn from the mistakes made at Abu Ghraib. h. (U) Other Government Agencies and Abu Ghraib. (1) (U) Although the FBI, JTF-121, Criminal Investigative Task Force, ISG and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were all present at Abu Ghraib, the acronym "Other Government Agency" (OGA) referred almost exclusively to the CIA. CIA detention and interrogation SE-CRET1440F0RNHX4 52 019100. DOD-042267 SE-C-RETIINO-FORNIIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade practices led to a loss of accountability, abuse, reduced interagency cooperation, and an unhealthy mystique that further poisoned the atmosphere at Abu Ghraib. (2) (U) CIA detainees in Abu Ghraib, known locally as "Ghost Detainees," were not accounted for in the detention system. When the detainees were unidentified or unaccounted for, detention operations at large were impacted because personnel at the operations level were uncertain how to report them or how to classify them, or how to database them, if at all. Therefore, Abu Ghraib personnel were unable to respond to requests for information about CIA detainees from higher headquarters. This confusion arose because the CIA did not, follow the established procedures for detainee in-processing, such as fully identifying detainees by name, biometric data, and Internee Serial Number (ISN) number. (3) (U) DETAINEE-28, suspected of having been involved in an attack against the ICRC, was captured by Navy SEAL Team 7 during a joint TF-121/CIA mission. He reportedly resisted arrest, so a SEAL Team member butt-stroked DETAINEE-28 on the side of the head to subdue him. CIA representatives brought DETAINEE-28 into Abu Ghraib early in the morning of 4 November 2003, sometime around 0430 to 0530 hours. Under a supposed verbal agreement between the JIDC and the CIA, the CIA did not announce its arrival to JIDC Operations. SPCoar the MP on duty at the Hard Site at the time, observed the two CIA representatives come in with DET.EE-28 and place him in a shower room in Tier 1B. About 30 to 45 minutes later,-SP.G..was summoned to the shower stall and when-he..arrived, .PET.EE-28.appeared tom: dead.. RemovMg the San bag covering,DETAMEE 728's head, SPC.checked DETAINEE-28's pul,se. 'Finding none; he calledfor iriedibal assistance, and notified his chain ofcommand. LTC irrived on site at approximately 0715- hours, and found several MPs and US medical staff with DETAINEE-28 in the Tier 1B shower stall, face down, handcuffed with his hands behind his back. CIVILIAN-03, an Iraqi prison medical doctor, informed him DETAINEE-28 was dead. "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE01," a CIA representative, un-cuffed DETAINEEnd turned his body over. Where DETAINEE-28's head hAllain against the floor, LTC WOnoted a small spot of blood. LTC eibnotified COL WM(205 MI BDE Commander), and "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE01" said he would notify "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE02," his CIA superVisor. Once "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE02" arrived, he requested that the Hard Site hold DETAINEE28's body until the following day. DETAINEE-28's body was placed in a body bag, packed in ice, and stored in the shower area. CID was notified. The next day, DETAINEE-28's body was removed from Abu Ghraib on a litter, to make it appear as if he were only ill, so as not to draw the attention of the Iraqi guards and detainees. The body was transported to the morgue at BIAP for an autopsy, which concluded that DETAINEE-28 died of a blood clot in the head, 1' of innries he sustained • n: a rehension. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, , Annex I, Appendix 1, pho ographs C5-21, D5-11, M65-69) SE-GRET44NOFORN4/X4 53 019110 DOD-042268 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (4) (U) The systemic lack of accountability for interrogator actions and detainees plagued detainee operations in Abu Ghraib. It is unclear how and under what authority the CIA could place prisoners like DETAINEE-28 in Abu Ghraib because no memorandums of understanaagpe existed on e subject between the CIA and CJTF-7. Local CIA officers convinced COL and LTC.that they s ould be allowed to operate outside the established local rule and proced es. When COL raised the issue of CIA use of Abu Ghraib with COL COLincouraged CO to cooperate with the CIA because everyone was all one team. COL.directed cooperate. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, (5) (U) In many instances, failure to adhere to in-processing procedures caused confusion and acrimony between the Army and OGA, and in at least one instance, acrimony between the US and Saudi Arabian entities. (Reference Annex K, Appendix 3, emails) For example, the CIA interned three Saudi national medical personnel working for the coalition in Iraq. CIA officers placed them in Abu Ghraib under false names. The Saudi General in charge of the men asked US authorities to check the records for them. A search of all databases using their true names came back negative. Ambassador Bremer then requested a search, which produced the same results. The US Embassy in Riyadh also requested a search, which likewise produced no information. Ultimately, the Secretary of State, Colin Powell, requested a search, and as with the other requestors, had to be told that the three men werenot bein US custody. Shortly after the search.,for the Secretary of State, a ;UDC official•recalled that CIA officers .once: bought three men together into thea facility: A-quick dikussion with the detainees discic - Sed their. true -names, which matched the name search requests, and the-men ,were-eventually .releastd. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, CIVILIAN-12) (6) (U) Another instance showing lack of accountability to the procedures or rules involved a CIA officer who entered the interrogation room after a break in the interrogation, drew his weapon, chambered a round, and placed the weapon in his holster. This action violated the rule that no weapons be brought into an interrogation room, especially weapons with live rounds. Detainees who have been interrogated by CIA officers have alleged abuse. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,CIVILIAN-12) (7) (U) The death of DETAINEE-28 and incidents such as the loaded weapon in the interrogation room, were widely known within the US community (MI and MP alike) at Abu Ghraib. Speculation and resentment grew over the lack of personal responsibility, of some people being above the laws and regulations. The resentment contributed to the unhealthy environment that existed at Abu Ghraib. The DETAINEE-28 death remains unresolved. CIA officers operating at Abu Ghraib used alias' and never revealed their true names. "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE01" (alias) was the CIA officer with DETAINEE-28 on the morning of SE—GRETANOFORNIIX4 54 019111 DOD-042269 Chl'()nj SE—GRE---T-010FORNIIX4 /12! /Li ; SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6:Investigation of the Abu.Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade his death. "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE02" (alias) was not directly involved in DETAINEE-28's death, but participated in the discussions after his death. Had the CIA followed established Army procedures and in-processed DETAINEE-28 in accordance with those procedures, DETAINEE-28 would have been medically screened. (8) (U) OGA never provided results of their abuse investigations to Commander, CJTF-7. This resulted in a total lack of visibility over OGA interaction with detainees held in CJTF-7 spaces. Additionally, the CJTF-7 charter provided no oversight or control over the ISG. LTG Sanchez could neither leverage ISG interrogation assets to assist the detainee operations in Abu Ghraib, nor could he compel.ISG to share substantive intelligence reports with CJTF-7. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ) i. (U) The Move of the 205 MI BDE Commander to Abu Ghraib. (1) (U) In September 2003, coLap began visiting Abu Ghraib two or three times per week as opposed to once every week or two, his previous routine. He was also beginning to stay overnight occasionally. His visit schedule coincided with the increased emphasis being placed on interrogation operations and the newly formed JIDC. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, PAPPAS) (2). (Il) On 16 November 2003, COL .took up full time residence at Abu Ghraib after once again, spe,aking ,with LTQSandhez &nd MG FasLand deciding chat he needed to be ,there. He was appointed FOB Conntander. on 19•November 2003 in FRAGO108-.- The issuance of-FRA:00,,1108 has .pointed to and looked upon by many as-being a significant change and one that was a major factor in allowing the abuses to occur. It was not. The abuses and the environment for them began long before FRAGO 1108 was ever issued: That FRAGO appointed the Commander, 205 M DE,,the Commander FOB Abu Ghraib for Force Protection and Security of Detainees. COL .en hacileiCON of the 320 MP BN. TACON has been misinterpreted by some to mean that COLWillIthlat iook over the running of the prison, or what ha een referred to as Warden functions. COL Weyer took over those functions, and LTC.agrees that the running of the prison was always his responsibility. LTG Sanchez has stated that he never intended to do anything except improve the Force Protection posture of the FOB. That improved ce rotection posture would have thus improved the ty of detainees as well. COI.,.rater, MG Wojdakowski, also stated that COL was never given responsibility for running the prison, but that the MPs retained that responsibility. It would appear from MG Taguba's investigation and the interview for this investigation that BG Karpinski was the only person among the Army leadership involved at the time who interpreted that FRAGO differently. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, KARPINSKI and Annex B, Appendix 2, KARPINSKI) SEC-RETIINOF0RNI4X4 55 019112 DOD-042270 - SE-CRE-T-1440E-0-RNIIX4 6r SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (3) (U) Upon being appointed FOB Commander, COL .brought in one of his subordinate units, the 165th MI Battalion (165 MI BN) to enhance base security and to augment forces providing perimeter security as well as to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance outside the perimeter. That unit had reconnaissance and sure illance elements similar to line combat units that the MP Battalions did not possess. COL. on 8 December 2003, requested additional forces to support his force protection mission (Reference Annex H, Appendix 6, TAB — Request for Forces (RFF)). Requested forces included personnel for additional guards and a rapid reaction force. (4) (U) The fact that COL 41111116did not have control of the MP force after the 19 November 2003 FRAGO regarding prison operations is further supported by the fact that at some point near the end of November 2003, the MPs stopped escorting detainees from the camps to the interrogation sites due to personnel shortages. This required MI to take ove is function despite their protests that they were neither trained nor manned to do it. COL . would have ordered the MPs to continue the escorts if he had had such authority (See paragraph 4.c.) (5) (U) A milestone event at Abu Ghraib wasiailirting incident that occurred in Tier lA on 24 November 2003 (See paragraph 5.e.). COL vies by then in residence at Abu Ghraib. LTC illelisplayed personal bravery by his direct involvement in the shoot-out, but also extremely poor judgment. Instead of ordering the MPs esent to halt their actions and isolate the tier until the 320 MP BN Commander and COL .could be notified, he became directlrTivolved.s,,,As the senii.__ o officer present, LTC-.ecame responsible for what happened. Eventually,-COL was notified, andhe did visit the,scene. By then-the shooting was over, and the MPs were searching the cells. COL . id not remain long but admits to being to41 bitiOLDIERikit the Iraqi Police were being interrogated by MI personnel. COL left LTC. in charge of the situation after the shooting which came to be known as the IP Roundup. The IP Roundup was, by all accounts chaotic. The Iraqi Police, hence the name "IP," became detainees and were subjected to strip searching by the MPs in the hallway, with female Soldiers and at least one female interpreter present. The IP were kept in various stages of dress, including nakedness, for prolonged periods as they were interrogated. This constitutes humiliation, which is detainee abuse. Military working dogs were being used not only to search the cells, but also to intimidate the IPs during interrogation without authorization. There was a general understanding among the MI personnel present that LTG Sanchez had authorized suspending existing ICRP (known by the Abu Ghraib personnel locally as the IROE) because of the shooting (Reference Annex C, Appendix 1, Tab B, Annex 8, AR 15­6 Investigation, 24 November 2003). Nobody is sure where that information came from, but LTG Sanchez never gave such authorization (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ). LTC wand the Soldiers should have known the Interrogation Rules would not and could not have been suspended. LTC Jordan should have controlled the situation and should have taken steps to reinforce proper standards at a time when emotions were likely high given the SE—C-RETANOFORNI4X4 56 SECRETIINOF-0RNIIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade • circumstances. LTC el is responsible for allowing the chaotic situation, the unauthorized nakedness an re ultant humiliation, and the military working dog abuses that occurred that night. LTC.should have obtained any authorizations to suspend ICRP in writing, via email, if by no othanians. The tone and the environment that occurred that night, with the tacit approval of LTC., can be pointed to as the causative factor that set the stage for the abuses that followed for days afterward related to the shooting and the IP Roundup. COL 4s also responsible and slait lpoor judgment by leaving the scene before normalcy returned, as well as for leaving LTC.n charge. (6) (U) The small quantity of MI personnel had a difficult time managing the large number of MI holds which moved from the hundreds to ver a thousand by December 2003 (See paragraph 4.c.(12)). In December 2003, COL .in his role as FOB Commander, requested additional forces be allocated to support the difficult and growing force protection mission. Prior to his designation as FOB Commander, COL Wei had requested additional forces to support the JIDC mission. One of the reasons he cited in the December request was that the mixing of MI and MP functions was worsening the already difficult personnel resource situation. j. (U) Advisory and Training Team Deployments (1) (U) MG Geoffrey Miller Visit (U) MG G. Miller's visit was in response to.:a. J3, JCS ,, request to.SOUTHCOM for a teary-to assist CENTCOM and ISG in theater (Reference Annex L, Appendix 1, Electrical Message, DTG: 181854Z Aug 03, FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC // J3). The team -was directed to assist with advice on facilities and operations specific to screening, interrogations, HUMINT collection, and interagency integration in the short and long term. MG G. Miller was tasked as the result of a May 2003 meeting he had with MG Ronald Burgess, J2, JCS. MG Burgess indicated there were some challenges in CJTF-7 with the transition from major combat operations to SASO in the areas of inte • ence, interrogation, and detention (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, MILLER). COL .lieved LTG Sanchez had requested the support (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, MM..(6 (2_)( (b) (U) From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG G. Miller led a team to Iraq to conduct an "Assessment of DoD Counterterrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq." Specifically, MG G. Miller's team was to conduct assistance visits to CJTF-7, TF-20, and the ISG to discuss current theater ability to exploit internees rapidly for actionable intelligence. MG G. Miller and his team of 17 experts assessed three major areas of concern: intelligence integration, synchronization, and fusion; interrogation operations; and detention operations. The team's assessment (Reference Annex L, Appendix 1, MG Miller's Report, Assessment of DoD Counterterrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in Iraq, undated, and MG Miller's SE—CRE-TI/N0FORNIIX4 57 019114 DOD-042272 Ai( SE—CRE—TIMOFORNIA-1- . SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade Briefmg of his findings, dated 6 September 2003) identified several areas in need of attention: the interrogators didn't have the authorities and procedures in place to effect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees in Iraq; the information needs required an in-theater analysis capability integrated in the interrogation operations to allow for access/leverage of the worldwide intelligence databases; and the detention operations function must support the interrogation process. (c) (U) MG G. Miller's visit also introduced written GTMO documentation into the CJTF-7 environment. LTG Sanchez recalled MG G. Miller left behind a whole series of SOPs that could be used as a start point for CJTF-7 interrogation operations. It was clear that these SOPs had to be adapted to the conditions in Iraq and that they could not be implemented blindly. LTG Sanchez was confident the entire CJTF-7 staff understood that the conditions in GTMO were different than in Iraq, because the Geneva Conventions applied in the Iraqi theater. (d) (U) The assessment team essentially conducted a systems analysis of the intelligence mission in Iraq and did not concentrate on specific interrogation techniques. While no "harsh techniques" were briefed, COL .ecalled a conversation with MG G. Miller regarding the use oflu.' Hilary working dogs to support interrogations (See paragraph 51.). According to COL.MG G. Miller said they, GTMO, used military working dogs, and that they were effective in setting the atmosphere for interro ations (Reference Annex B, Appendix 2, PAPPAS). MG-G. Miller contradicted COL ..his statement (Reference Amex B,. Appendix.sayiq he only,discus.sed using military worIcin&dogs to help the MPs with detainee custody and control issues.- According to MG G. 'ller, the dogs help provide a controlled atmosphere (not interrogations as recalled by-COL. .that helps --reduce risk of detainee demonstrations or acts of violence. According to MG G. Miller, his team recommended a strategy to work the operational schedule of the dog teams so the dogs were present when the detainees were awake, not when they are sleeping. (e) (U) Several things occurred subsequent to MG G. Miller's visit to Abu Ghraib. The JIDC was established. The use of Tiger Teams was implemented based on the JTF-GTMO model, which teamed an interrogator and an analyst together, giving each team an organic analytical capability. There was also a moderate increase in the number of interrogators reassigned to the Abu Ghraib operation. This increase was probably not connected to MG G. Miller's visit as much as to the arrival of elements , of the 325 MI BN which began to arrive 10 September 2003--the same day MG G. Miller departed Iraq. Prior to their arrival, the interrogation assets consisted of one OIC (captain), one technician (chief warrant officer), 12 HUMINT collectors (MOS 97E/97B), an analyst, and a communications team. While the number of interrogators increased, the JIDC requirements for a staff and leadership also increased. Those positions were filled from within the assigned units. It is indeterminate what impact the MG G. Miller Team's concepts had on operations at Abu Ghraib. There was an SE—GRE-TANOFORN11X1- 58 019115 DOD-042273 SE—CRET4/140FORNI4X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade increase in intelligence reports after the visit but that appears more likely due to the assignment of trained interrogators and an increased number of MI Hold detainees to interrogate. (2) JTF-GTMO Training Team. (a) (U) Subsequent to MG G. Miller's visit, a team of subject matter experts was dispatched from JTF-GTMO to Abu Ghraib (approximately 4 October to 2 December 2003) to assist in the implementation of the recommendations identified by MG G. Miller. The JTF­GTMO Team included three interrogators and three analysts, organized into three teams, with one interrogator and one analyst on each, which is the GTMO "Tiger Team" concept. The JTF GTMO Team included SOLDIER28 (351E Team Chief), SOLDIER27, CIVILIAN-14 (97E), SOLDIER-03 (97E), SSG4111111(96B), and SOLDIER-11 (96B). The Team Chief understood his task was to assist CJTF-7 for a period not to exceed 90 days with the mission of building a robust and effective JIDC, and identifying solutions and providing recommendations for the JIDC (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-28). Upon arrival at Abu Ghraib, SOLDIER-28 and SOLDIER-27, both of whom had been on the original MG G. Miller assessment visit, concentrated on establishing the various JIDC elements. Particular emphasis was given to formalizing the JIDC staff and the collection, management and dissemination (CM&D) function at Abu Ghraib, to alleviate many of the information distribution issues surfaced during MG G. Miller's visit. Some interrogation policies were already in place. Consistent with its .charter to assist in establishment of a GTMO-like operation, the team ­provided copies of the current :ITF-GTMO polWde_s, SOP“Reference,- c Annx L, -Appendix . SOP for JTF-GTMO, Joint Intelligence Group [JIG .ControLhlemeni [ICE], ,Guantanamo Bay, CU, dated-21 January 2003, revised 12 Tune 2003), and the SECDEF Letter (Reference, Annex J, Appendix 2, MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, US SOUTHERN COMMAND, Subject: Counter-Resistance Techniques in the War on Terrorism (S), dated 16 April 2003) outlining the techniques authorized for use with the GTMO detainees. The four other JTF-GTMO team members were split up and integrated into interrogation operations as members/leaders of the newly formed Tiger Teams under the ICE. SOLDIER-28 and SOLDIER-27 did not directly participate in any interrogation operations and reported that they never observed, or heard about, any detainee abuse or mistreatment. SOLDIER-28's assertion as regards knowledge of abuses is contradicted by one of his Soldiers (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-03) (See paragraphs 4.j.(2)(c) and 4.j.(2)(d), below). (b) (U) While the JTF-GTMO team's mission was to support operations and assist in establishment of the JIDC, there was a great deal of animosity on the part of the Abu Ghraib personnel, especially some A/519 MI BN Personnel. This included an intentional disregard for the concepts and techniques the GTMO Team attempted to instill, as well as contempt for some of the team's work ethic, professional judgment, and ideas. Because of this, the GTMO Team's ability to effect change at Abu Ghraib may have been severely limited. This information was SECRET//N DF0RNIIX-1- 59 019116; DOD-042274 SE—CRE—T4N0FORNI4X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade obtained during.vie of email exchanged betwe SOLDIER-14, CW2 111111.CW3 SFC , with info copies to CPT nd SOLDIER-23. It should be note that senior managers at Abu Ghraib thought highly of the JTF-GTMO team and believed they positively impacted the operations. (c) (U) SOLDIER-11, a JTF-GTMO analyst assigned to the "Former Regime Loyalists" Tiger Team, stated that he witnessed and reported two incidents of abuse (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-11). In his first report, SOLDIER-11 reported that he was observing an interrogation being conducted by SOLDIER19 AJ,519 MI BN. As SOLDIER-11 observed from behind a glass, SOLDIER-19 directed a detainee to roll his jumpsuit down to his waist and insinuated that the detainee would be stripped further if he did not cooperate. The interrogation ended abruptly when the translator objected to the tactic and refused to continue. SOLDIER-11 reported the incident to both SOLDIER-16, his Tiger Team Leader, and to SOLDIER-28, his JTF GTMO Team. Chief. SOLDIER-16 invoked her rights under UCMJ and chose not to make any statement regarding this or any other matters (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1SOLDIER16). When asked, SOLDIER-28 stated that he could not recall what SOLDIER11 reported to him regarding the rolling down of the detainee's jumpsuit, but does recall a conversation about a translator walking out of an interrogation due to a "cultural difference" (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-28). SOLDIER-11 is adamant that he reported the incident in detail (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-11) and that he never used the phrase "cultural difference.".• (d) (U) In another report to SOLDIER-28; SOLDIER-11 reported a -second incident. SOLDIER-11 and SOLDIER--19 were conducting an interrogation around mid 7October2003. The detainee was uncooperatiVe and was not answering questions. SOLDIER19 became frustrated and suggested to SOLDIER11 that the detainee be placed in solitary. SOLDIER-11 did. not agree with the recommendation and suggested it would be counterproductive. About 15 minutes later (two hours into the interrogation), SOLDIER-19 exercised his authority as the lead interrogator and had the detainee placed in solitary confinement. About a half an hour later, SOLDIER-11 and SOLDIER-19 went to the Hard Site to see the detainee, and found him lying on the floor, completely naked except for a hood that covered his head from his upper lip, whimpering. SOLDIER-11 andSOLDIER-19 had the MPs redress the detainee before escorting him back to the general population. SOLDIER-11 was disturbed by what he had seen and considered reporting it to several different people. Ultimately, SOLDIER-11 reported this incident to SOLDIER-28 (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-11). SOLDIER-11 added that SOLDIER-28 accepted the report and indicated he would surface the issue to COL Makifik.(not due to return to Abu Ghraib for 2 - 3 days). Also according to SOLDIER-11, SOLDIER-28 was very ill and placed on 30 days quarters shortly after SOLDIER-11 made his report. When asked, SOLDIER-28 could not recall such a report being made to him (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-28). — SEGRETIINGFORNIIX4 60 DOD-042275 SE--GRET-IINOF-ORNIIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (e) (U) SSG .does not recall the JTF-GTMO team ever discussing specific interrogation techniques employed, abuse, or unauthorized interrogation methods. He observed only approved interrogation techniques in line with FM 34-52, and nev saw any detainee abuse, mistreatment, or nakedness (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, (f) (U) CIVILIAN-14 never observed any activity or training event that was not in compliance with basic human rights and the Geneva Conventions. CIVILIAN-14 did, however, notice "a lot of detainee nakedness at Abu Ghraib," possibly, he speculated, attributable to the lack of available clothing. There was nothing he observed or heard that he considered detainee abuse. Relating to his JTF-GTMO experience/training, CIVILIAN-14 believed the removal of clothing for interrogation purposes was an option available with the appropriate approvals; however, it was rarely used at JTF-GTMO. This misunderstanding of the rules and regulations was evident in his reaction to the detainee nakedness at Abu Ghraib. Clearly CIVILIAN-14 was not aware of the fact the SECDEF had withdrawn that authority. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, CIVILIAN-14) (g) (U) In reviewing his activities while at Abu Ghraib, SOLDIER-03 recalled his team submitted two requests to use techniques requiring approvals beyond the team ley In cases requiriasouch approvals, the request went to the Operations Officer (either MAJ .or MAJ.) (Operations Officer) and they would approve;Kdisapprove the technique. Those requests requiring a CJTF-7 approval level went to CPT W. who would forward them for approval. SOLDIER-03 recalled submitting the requests several days it -advance of the - . - . interrogation to ensure it was approved or disapproved before the interrogation ...began. Hi-S-first request (detainee sitting against a wail) was initiated by SOLDIER-21 (analyst) andSOLDIER­30 (interrogator). SOLDIER-03 reviewed the request and forwarded it for approval (SOLDIER­03 could not recall to whom he submitted the request or who had approved it). The request was approved and was implemented. After "observing for a couple of minutes," SOLDIER-03 ended the interrogation. In preparation for another interrogation, the same two females (SOLDIER-21 and SOLDIER-30) submitted a request to interrogat a detainee .ed. The request was d reviewed by SOLDIER-03 and forwarded to MAJ lMAJ .denies ever approving a naked interrogation. SOLDIER-03 recalled that the technique had been approved, but could not recall by whom. As with the above interrogation, SOLDIER-03 observed the interrogation. After about 15 minutes, he determined the nudity was not a productive technique and terminated the session. SOLDIER-03 never discussed this incident with SOLDIER-28. In his opinion, he had obtained the appropriate authorities and approvals for an "acceptable technique." When asked, SOLDIER-03 recalled hearing about nakedness at GTMi .never employed the technique. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-03, (h) (U) The JTF-GTMO Team viewed itself as having the mission of setting up and organizing an effective and efficient JIDC staff, and assisting in establishing the Tiger Team SE-CRE-TAN0FORNI4X4 61 019118 DOD-042276 SE—CRET14140FORNI/X4 rr SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade concept based on the GTMO model and experience. They did not view their mission as being for training specific interrogation techniques. This is contrary to MG G. Miller's understanding of the mission. There is no evidence that the JTF-GTMO team intentionally introduced any new/prohibited interrogation techniques. Clearly, however, they were .operating without a full understanding of the current JTF-GTMO ICRP. (i) (U) According to SOLDIER-28, no After Action Report (AAR) was prepared for this mobile training team's effort. He provided a post-mission briefing to MG G. Miller upon his return to GTMO. The team's mission was not clearly define .til they arrived at Abu Ghraib. According to MAJeb/(Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, ., the JTF-GTMO Team arrived without a defined charter; however, in his opinion, .am's suggestions were very good and exactly what the bu Ghraib operation needed. MAJ .It that the real changes began to show after COL.rrived on or about 16 November 2003. (3) (U) Fort Huachuca Mobile Training Team (a) (U) From 7 to 21 October 2003, a five person ISCT MTT from the USAIC, Fort Huachuca, AZ, was dispatched to conduct an overall assessment of interrogation operations, present training, and provide advice and assistance at the Abu Ghraib JIDC. This course was developed in response to requirements surfaced during interrogation operations at JTF-GTMO, specifically to prepare reserve interrogators and•order of battle.,analysts for deployment to JTF-CiTMO. The.course.0011SitS of a refreshen an interrogation proceduresLandan-nitroductiqn to strategic debriefing. procedures (Reference o.pex L,.Appendix 4, ISCT POI;1S-CT MTT AAR). T. MTT consisted a team .chieflikiyL.(351B), three T1E-interrogators, MSG.. SFC.a.nd SFC.and one analyst (96B) SOLDIER-56. The MTT spent the first few days at Abu Ghraib observing ongoing JIDC interrogation operations and establishing a training schedule based on their observations. The training phase lasted .. _. approximately five days and focused on interrogation skills and elicitation techniques, cultural awareness, collection management, and use of interpreters. The team discussed the use of Tiger Teams, but did not conduct any training in their use. The Tiger Team concept of teaming an Interrogator and an Analyst together had been previously recommended by the GTMO Assessment Team and was already being employed at Abu Ghraib when the ISCT MTT arrived. Following the training, at least two ISCT MTT Interrogators participated in approximately 19 interrogations and observed several others. The MTT prepared an After Action Report (Reference Annex L, Appendix 4, ISCT MTT AAT, Joint Detainee Interrogation Center, CJTF­7, Abu Ghurayb (sic), Iraq, dated 3 November 2003), which noted eleven issues and provided recommendations for each. The issues mainly concerned screening procedures, interrogation planning and preparation, approaches, quest' onin , interpreter control, deception detection, and administrative and reporting issues. SFC .did recall they had access to the 16 April 2003 SECDEF Memorandum and devoted some time to discussing approach strategies outside SECRE—T4NOFORN4/X4 62 019119 DOD-042277 SE—CRE-T-4140FORNIA• SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade the ones mentioned in FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations, 28 September 1992, like the issue of military working dogs, sleep deprivation, etc., (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, FILHANESSIAN). According to SOLDIER-25 (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,SOLDIER25), "A team from Fort Huachuca ... gave us 3 days of classes, including rules of engagement and the use of sleep deprivation and sleep management." The ISCT MTT AAR did not note any incidents of detainee abuse or mistreatment. Three interviewed ISCT MTT members stated that they did not witness, or hear of any incidents of detainee abuse or mistreatment. Neither did they observe or know of any incidents where MI instructed or insinuated that the MP should abuse detainees. Further, MTT members stated that the 519 MI BN interrogators at Abu Ghraib demonstrated experience, "did things by the book," and used techniques that were within the limitations established by FM 34-52 (Interrogation Operations). Some team members, however, expressed some concerns about what appeared to them to be a lack of experience with some of the civilian contracted CACI Interrogators, and the fact that the MTT did not have the opportunity to train d work with some newly iving contractors (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,.CIVILIAN-07; and.. (b) (U) On 21 June 2004, SFC ea contacted the investigative team via email and in is ted he wanted to make additions .'s statement (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, 20040621, email). SFC.was concerned that as a member of the ISCT MTT, he may have contributed to the abuse at Abu Ghraib. When questa" CACI employee CIVILIAN-21 for ideas to use to get these prisoners to talk, SFC .elated several stories-about the use of isp inducemnt, suggesting he -(CIVILIAN,21,) talk to the MPs about the -possibilities. SFCC further explained thattletainees are most susceptible dufing the first few hours after capture. "The -prisoners are captured by Soldiers, taken from.their familiar . surroundings, blindfolded and put into a truck and brought to this place (Abu Ghraib); and then they are pushed down a hall with guards barking orders and thrown into a cell, naked; and that not lciiii ' what was going to happen or_what the guards might do caused them extreme fear." SFC.also suggested CIVILIAN-21 could take some pictures of what seemed to be guards being rough with he could use them to scare the prisoners. Lastly, SFC also shared what he described as a formal, professional prisoner in-processing as he observed it in Bagram (a reference to the detainee operations that had taken place Afghanistan). c U) On 26 June 2004, during a follow-on interview (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,.); SFC amp confirmed the information he provided in his email. He clarified that his conversation with CIVILIAN-21 occurred before the training was conducted and that he w s certain CIVILIAN-21 clearly understood the rules with regard to interrogations. SFC was adamant he had stressed ts - i iifiseja to obtain the appropriate authorities before using any of the techniques discussed. SFC MS knewa , liagather "off line" conversations between the MTT members and assigned interrogators. SFC .§aid he had related stories he had heard, but did not personally observe. In addressing the ISCT MTT training objectives, SFC SECRET/ ­ 0FORN/IX4 63 019120 DOD-042278 SE-CRETANOF0RNIA4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Gliraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade / Ilirnoted they (ISCT MTT) did not agree with the JTF-GTMO modus operandi. The (ISCT MTT) felt the use of Tiger Teams wasted limited analytical support. Analysts should support interrogation teams and not be part of the interroatii. This mirrors the opinions of the Abu Ghraib team (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, (d) (U) Throughout OIF I, USAIC assisted in sending MTTs to all divisional locations within Iraq in order to provide instruction on THT operations, G2X staff functions, and tactical questioning for non-military intelligence Soldiers. Prior to this training, a separate team traveled to Afghanistan and Iraq to provide similar training at Bagram Airfield and Abu Ghraib Detention Facility. This training was the same training provided to OIF units in Iraq that also incorporated lessons learned during that MTT. k. (U) International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (1) (U) The ICRC visits to Abu Ghraib have been the source of great concern since the abuses at Abu Ghraib became public knowledge. The ICRC are independent observers who identified abuses to the leadership of Abu Ghraib as well as to CJTF-7. Their allegations were not believed, nor were they adequately investigated. (2) (U) During the 9-12 and 21-23 October 2003 visits to Abu Ghraib, the ICRC noted that the ill treatment, of detainees during interrogation was.n-ot systemic, except with regard to personi. arrested in connection with suspected security Offenses sandeemed to have-_'an "intelligence value." These individuals were probably the MI holds. "In .these Cases; persons deprived of their liberty [and] under supervision.of the Military Intelligence Were at high risk of being subjected to a variety of harsh treatments. These ranged from insults, threat and humiliations, to both physical and psychological coercion (which in some cases was tantamount to torture) in order to force cooperation with their interrogators (Reference Annex G, Appendix 1, Executive Summary)." The ICRC noted that some detainees in Tier lA were held naked in their cells, with meals ready to eat (MRE) packing being used to cover their nudity. The ICRC immediately informed the authorities, and the detainees received clothes for the remainder of the ICRC visit. Additionally, the ICRC complained about MI-imposed restrictions on visiting certain security detainees in Camp Vigilant and in Tier 1A. Red Cross delegates were informed they could visit those areas the following day and then only on the basis of a list of detainees and tasks agreed on with Abu Ghraib officials. (Reference Annex G, Appendix 1, TAB B) (3) (U) The ICRC found a high level of depression, feelings of helplessness, stress, and frustration, especially by those detainees in isolation. Detainees made the following allegations during interviews with the ICRC: threats during interrogation; insults and verbal insults during transfer in Tier 1A; sleep deprivation; walking in the corridors handcuffed and naked, except for female underwear over the head; handcuffing either to the upper bed bars or doors of the cell for SE—GRE-T-11-N-OF0RNIIX4 64 019121 DOD-042279 SE-CR-E-T-11140E-O-RNIA4 SUBJECT: (U) AR-I5-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade 3-4 hours. Some detainees presented physical Marks and psychological symptoms which were compatible with these allegations. Also noted were brutality upon capture, physical or psychological coercion during interrogation, prolonged isolation, and excessive and disproportionate use of force. (Reference Annex G, Appendix 1, TAB B) (4) (U) The ICRC made a number of recommendations after the October 2003 visits, including: grant ICRC full and unimpeded access to all detainees; improve the security related to the accommodation structure; clarify and improve conditions of detention and treatment; distribute hygiene items, spare clothes, blankets, etc.; inform detainees of the reason for their detention; implement regular family visits for detainees; and increase recreational and educational activities. (Reference Annex G, Appendix 1, Tab B, ICRC Working Paper, dated 6 November 2003). (5) (U) LTC.egarding the 9 — 12 October 200 visit, stated he was told of naked detainees by the ICR and immediately contacted LTC The two went to see the situation first hand. LTC.laimed that LTC acknowledged that it was common practice for some of the detainees to be kept nak in their cells. In November 2003, zi.LI after having rec • e.written ICRC report, CJTF-7 sent an Aigalian Judge Advocate(40.0 officer, MAJ., to Abu Ghraib to meet with LTC owand and other ficers to craft response to the ICRC memo. (Reference Annex B, Appendices 1 and 2, (6) (U) Sternming Irom *se October 2003'visita, thelCRC, also mad•the following request of the CoalitiOn Forces respect at all times the human tlignity,.physioa-1 integrity cultural sensitivity of detainees; set up a system of notification of arrest to the families' of detainees; prevent all forms of ill-treatment; respect and protect the dignity of detainees; allow sufficient time for outside activity and exercise; define and apply, regulations compatible with international Humanitarian Law; thoroughly investigate violation of international Humanitarian Law; ensure that capturing forces and interment facility personnel are trained to function in a proper manner without resorting to ill-treatment of detainees. (Reference ANNEX G, Appendix 1, Tab A, ICRC Report February 2004 ,(4/ (7) (U) COL ea tcle CJTF-7 SJA, stated that neither he nor anyone else from CJTF-7 Headquarters was present at Abu Ghraib during the ICRC visit in October 2003. Throughout 2003, all ICRC reports were addressed to the commander or subordinate commanders of the 800 MP BDE. The OSJA receive.o of the reports. Letters on specific topics addressed to LTG were given to COL.and he would prepare the response for LTG Sanchez. MAJ repared an analysis oft e report on 25 November 2003 and the draft was sent to CJTF­7 C2 and the 800 MP BDE for re iew. On 4 December 2003, a meeting was held at Abu Ghraib, attended by MP, MI, and legal pe sonnel, in order to discuss the report. In mid-December, the draft response was sent by OSJA to the 800 MP BDE for review and coordination. BG 1 sicRETriNoFoRt4mo 65 019122 DOD-042280 ....• SEC-RETIMOFORNIIM SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade Karpinski signed the response, dated 24 December 2003. (Reference Annex G, Appendix 3, KARPINSKI Letter) (8) (U) Durin. January 2 04 visit, the ICRC expressed special concern over being informed by COL and COL. that they were invoking Article 143 of Geneva Convention IV, thereby denying the ICRC access to eight of the detainees in the interrogation section. Of particular interest was the status of detainee DETAINEE-14, a Syrian national and self-proclaimed Jihadist, who was in Iraq to kill coalition troops. DETAINEE-14 was detained in a totally darkened cell measuring about 2 meters long and less than a meter across, devoid of any window, latrine or water tap, or bedding. On the door the ICRC delegates noticed the inscription "the Gollum," and a picture of the said character from the film trilogy "Lord of the Rings." During the 14-18 March 2004 visit, the ICRC was once again denied access to nine detainees, including DETAINEE-14. They noted that DETAINEE-14 was no longer in the same cell as he was previously, but was still in one of the more "difficult" cells. (Reference Annex G, Appendix 1, ICRC Working Paper, dated 6 November 2003; Appendix 2, ICRC Letter dated February 2004; Appendix 2, Tab B, ICRC Letter dated 25 March 2004) (9) (U) Article 143, Fourth Geneva Convention, reads in part "Such visits may be prohibited except for reasons of • erative militaiiisity, and then only for an exceptional and temporary measure." COL .nd COL. both acknowledge denying access to specified detainees by the ICRC on each of two occasions (in January and March 2004), aboVe cited provisioali ICRC,.in their memorandum of 25 Karch 200-4, -acknowletiged.the right cif .COL.and ffivoke the "imperative military.. necessity clause." It questicined the "exceptional and -temporary" nature of the denial ofaccess to DETAINEE-14 on both occasions, however, given that DETAINEE-14 (by the time of the second visit) had been under interrogation for some four months. This was the same DETAINEE-14 that was viewed a "special project" and who was abused b the useof dogs. (See paragraph 51) (Reference Annex B, Appendix link (10) (U) COI41111.acknowledges in his statement that the ICRC visited Abu Ghraib twice (January and March 2004). He received a copy of the results and noted there were allegations of maltreatment and detainees.wearing women's underwear on their heads. He did not believe it. He recalled he might have related to the staff that "this stuff couldn't have been happening." He added that when the ICRC came by the second time (March 2004), he invoked Article 143, preventing the • t detainees in Tier A from tallcing to the ICRC while undergoing active interrogation. COL .tates: "COL. formed me that I had the authority to do this." (Reference Annex B, Appendices 1 and 2, (11) (U) COL ilk also stated that when he saw the ICRC report on naked detainees and detainees wearing women's underwear, he couldn't believe it. He saw the report when he SEGREP-MOPORN/1M 66 019123 DOD-042281 SE-CRET4/140F0RNI/X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade returned to CJTF-7 from leave on 30 November 2003. His office probably had received the report on 16 November 2003. He regrets not having taken the report earlier to LTG Sanchez or MG Wojdakowski. While this would not have prevented the abuse they subsequently discovered (because it had taken place in November 2003), it may have resulted in CID beginning an investigation a month earlier than Ali During the ICRC's next visit to Abu Ghraib, during the period 4-8 January 2004, COL states they invoked Article 143 of the Fourth Geneva Conventions and did not allow the ICRC to have private interviews with eight detainees who were undergoing active interrogations. He did allow the ICRC delegate to see the detainees, observe the conditions of their detention and obtain their names and Internee Serial Numbers." (Reference Annex B A pendix 1,1111111111) (12) (U) LTC.Commander of the 115th MP Battalion (115 MP BN), has stated that although he attended the ICRC out-brief, after the 21-23 October 2003 visits, he never saw or heard of any detainees being stripped or held naked, nor did he ever see a written report from the ICRC. He stated that a doctor with the ICRC team provided information concerning a few detainees having psychological problems and stating that they should be evaluated. ICRC also related charges of handcuffing, nakedness, wearing of female underwear, and sleep deprivation. The ICRC also complained about lack of access to certain detainees, and he discusee matter with LTC alb Hedligussed the allegations made by the ICRC with MAJ, BG Karpinski, and MAJ BG Karpinski does not recall hearing about .e ort until early December 2003 when it s 'scussed at CJTF-7 Headquarters with COL .(Reference Annex B,.Appendix 1,.KARPINSKI). - (13) (U) LTC." has stated that after-the .1CRC'visited Abukihraib, COL. Karpinski received the final report, but that he did not see th e ort: When asked-by COL ad ever seen or heard any rumors of .TC.told COL.hat he had not. He was not aware of COL.a doing anything concerning the egations (Referenc.e.Annex B, Appendix 1, .and Annex .13, Appendix 2, (14) (U) The only response to t .RC was a letter si ed b BG Karpinski, dated 24 . December 2003. Accord' nd quoted above) an Australian Judge Advocate o er MAJ .was the principal drafter of the letter. Attempts to erview MA .were unsuccessful. The Australian Government agreed to have.respond to written questions, but as of the time of this report, no response has been receive . The section of the BG Karpinski letter pertaining to Abu Ghraib primarily addresses the denial of access to certain detainees by the ICRC. It tends to gloss over, close to the point of denying the inhumane treatment, humiliation, and abuse identified by the ICRC. The letter merely says: Improvement can be made for the provision of clothing, water, and personal hygiene items. (Reference Annex G, Appendix 3, KARPINSKI Letter) SE-CRETANOF0RN/A4 67 019124 DOD-042282 SE—GRETANGFORNIA4 — SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the. Abu Ghraib.Detention Facility and 205th Mi Brigade 5. Summary of Abuses at Abu Ghraib a. (U) Several types of detainee abuse were identified in this investigation: physical and sexual abuse; improper use of military working dogs; humiliating and degrading treatments; and improper use of isolation. , (1) (U) Physical Abuse. Several Soldiers reported that they witnessed physical abuse of detainees. Some examples include slapping, kicking, twisting the hands of a detainee who was hand-cuffed to cause pain, throwing balls at restrained internees, placing gloved hand over the nose and mouth of an internee to restrict breathine4"polcing" at an internee's injured leg, and forcing an internee to stand while handcuffed in such a way as to dislocate his shoulder. These actions are clearly in violation of applicable laws and regulations. (2) (U) Use of Dogs. The use of military working dogs in a confinement facility can be effective and permissible under AR 190-12 as a means of controlling the internee population. When dogs are used to threaten and terrify detainees, there is a clear violation of applicable laws and regulations. One such impermissible practice was an alleged contest between the two Army dog handlers to see who could make the internees urinate or defecate in the presence of the dogs. An incident of clearly abusive use of the dogs occurred when a dog was allowed in the cell of two male juveniles and allowed to go "nuts." Both juveniles were screaming and crying with the youngest and. smallest trying to hide behind the other juvenile. (Reference . Annex B, Appendix' 1,SOLDIER-17).- (3) (U) Humiliating andDeg,rading Treatments. Actions that are intended to degrade or humiliate a detainee are prohibited by GC IV, Army policy and the UCMJ. The following are examples of such behavior that occurred at Abu Ghraib, which violate applicable laws and regulations. (4) (U) Nakedness. Numerous statements, as well as the ICRC report, discuss the seemingly common practice of keeping detainees in a state of undress. A number of statements indicate that clothing was taken away as a punishment for either not cooperating with interrogators or with MPs. In addition, male internees were naked in the presence of female Soldiers. Many of the Soldiers who witnessed the nakedness were told that this was an accepted practice. Under the circumstances, however, the nakedness was clearly degrading and humiliating. (5) (U) Photographs. A multitude of photographs show detainees in various states of undress, often in degrading positions. SEGRE-41/NOF0MIX4 - 68 019125 DOD-042283 S-E-C-RET#140-FORN/IX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (6) (U) Simulated Sexual Positions. A number of Soldiers describe incidents where detainees were placed in simulated sexual positions with other internees. Many of these incidents were also photographed. (7) (U) Improper Use of Isolation. There are some legitimate purposes for the segregation (or isolation) of detainees, specifically to prevent them from sharing interrogation tactics with other detainees or other sensitive information. Article 5 of Geneva Convention IV supports this position by stating that certain individuals can lose their rights of communication, but only when absolute military security requires. The use of isolation at Abu Ghraib was often done as punishment, either for a disciplinary infraction or for failure to cooperate with an interrogation. These are improper uses of isolation and depending on the circumstances amounted to violation of applicable laws and regulations. Isolation could properly be a sanction for a disciplinary infraction if applied through the proper process set out in AR 190-8 and the Geneva Conventions. (8) (U) Failure to Safeguard Detainees. The Geneva Conventions and Army Regulations require that detainees be "protected against all acts of violence and threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity." Geneva Convention IV, Article 27 and AR 190-8, paragraph 5­1(a)(2). The duty to protect imposes an obligation on an individual who witnesses an abusive act to intervene and stop the abuse. Failure to do so may be a violation of applicable laws and regulations.. . (9) (U) Failure to Repok-t Detainee Abuse. The duty to resort detainee abuse is.closely tied • to the duty to protect. The failure to report an abusive incident could result in additional -abuse.. Soldiers who witness these offenses have an obligation to report the violations under the provision of Article 92, UCMJ. Soldiers who are informed of such abuses also have a duty to report violations. Depending on their position and their assigned duties, the failure to report detainee abuse could support a charge of dereliction of duty, a violation of the UCMJ. Civilian contractors employed as interrogators and translators would also have a duty to report such offenses as they are also bound by the Geneva Conventions and are charged with protecting the internees. (10) (U) Other traditional prison guard issues were far less clear. MPs are responsible for the clothing of detainees; however, MI interrogators started directing nakedness at Abu Ghraib as early as 16 September 2003 to humiliate and break down detainees. MPs would also sometimes discipline detainees by taking away clothing and putting detainees in cells naked. A severe shortage of clothing during the September, October, November 2003, time frame was frequently mentioned as the reason why people were naked. Removal of clothing and nakedness were being used to humiliate detainees at the same time there was a general level of confusion as to what was allowable in terms of MP disciplinary measures and MI interrogation rules, and what SECRET4440EORNIIX4 — - 69 019126 DOD-042284 SEC SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abti. Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade clothing was available. This contributed to an environment that would appear to condone depravity and degradation rather than the humane treatment of detainees. (U) The original intent MI Holds only. In fact, CPT.states in an email dated 7 September 2003, during a visit from MG Miller and BG Karpinski, that BG Karpinski confirmed "we (MI) have all the iso (Isolation) cells in the wing we have been working. We only had 10 cells to begin with but that . has grown to the entire wing." LTC .also thought that MI had exclusive authority to /. house MI holds in Tier 1A. The fact is, however, that a number of those cells were often used by the MPs to house disciplinary problems. That fact is supported by the testimony of a large number of people who were there and further supported by the pictures and the detainee records. In fact, 11 of a total of 25 detainees identified by the CID as victims of abuse were not MI hold and were not being interrogated by MI. The MPs put the problem detainees (detainees who required separation from the general population for disciplinary reasons) in Tier lA because b. (U) .leadership (205 MI BDE) was for Tier lA to be reserved for 7 ) 2)(6)( e) (6 --2 there was no other place available to isolate them. Neither CPT. or MA appreciated the mixing because it did not allow for a pure MI environment, bute issue never) made its way up to either LTC or to BG Karpinski. c. (U) The "sleep adjustment" technique was used by MI as soon as the Tier lA block opened. This was another source of confusion and misunderstanding between MPs , and MI which contributed to an environment that allowed detainee abuse, as well as its perpetuation for ., as long-as it continued...Sleep adjustment_was brought with:the 519 MI BN from Afghanistan: , It., is also-a method used M,GTMO. (See paragraph 3".b.(5)): At Abu Ghraib, however; the MN were not trained; nor informed'as tot ov they actually should do .the sleep adjustment. The MPs were just told to keep a detainee awake for a time specified by the interrogator. The MPs used a) their own judgment as to how to keep them awake. Those techniques included takinthe .-' detainees out of their cells, stripping them and giving them cold showers. CPT .Nosed she did not know this was going on and thought the detainees were being kept awake by the MPs banging on the cell doors, yelling, and playing loud music. When one MI Soldier inquired about water being thrown on a naked detainee he was told that it was an MP discipline technique. Again, who was allowed to do what and how exactly they were to do it was totally unclear. Neither of the communities (MI and MP knew what the other could and could not do. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,.IMO.6) ...2)V-7)( -Z d. (U) This investigation found no evidence of confusion regarding actual physical abuse, such as hitting, kicking, slapping, punching, and foot stomping. Everyone we spoke to knew it was prohibited conduct except for one Soldier. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER­29). Physical discomfort from exposure to cold and heat or denial of food and water is not as clear-cut and can become physical or moral coercion at the extreme. Such abuse did occur at Abu Ghraib, such as detainees being left naked in their cells during severe cold weather without SE—CRET-010FORNI/X4 70 019127 DOD-042285 SE-CRE-TIMOFORMIX1- SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade blankets. In Tier lA some of the excesses regarding physical discomfort were being done as directed by MI and some were being done by MPs for reasons not related to interrogation. (See paragraph 5.e.-h.) e. (U) The physical and sexual abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib are by far the most serious. The abuses spanned from direct physical assault, such as delivering head blows rendering detainees unconscious, to sexual posing and forced participation in group masturbation. At the extremes were the death of a detainee in OGA custody, an alleged rape committed by a US translator and observed by a female Soldier, and the alleged sexual assault of an unknown female. They were perpetrated or witnessed by individuals or small groups. Such abuse can not be directly tied to a systemic US approach to torture or approved treatment of detainees. The MPs being investigated claim their actions came at the direction of MI. Although self- serving, these claims do have some basis in fact. The climate created at Abu Ghraib provided the opportunity for such abuse to occur and to continue undiscovered by higher authority for a long period of time. What started as undressing and humiliation, stress and physical training (PT), carried over into sexual and physical assaults by a small group of morally corrupt and unsupervised Soldiers and civilians. Twenty-four (24) serious incidents of physical and sexual abuse occurred from 20 September through 13 December 2003. The incidents identified in this investigation include some of the same abuses identified in the MG Taguba investigation; however, this investigation adds several previously unreported events. A direct comparison cannot be made of the abuses cited in the MG Taguba report and .„. (1)-(U) Incident #1. -On 20 September 2003; two.Soidierskbeat and kicked a passive; cuffed detainee, suspected of involvement in the 20 September 2003 martar attack cin Abu Ghraib that killed two Soldiers. Two Iraqis (male and female) were detained and brought to Abu Ghraib immediately following the attack. MI and the MP Internal Reaction Force (IRF) were notified of the apprehension and dispatched teams to the entry control point to receive the detainees. Upon arrival, the IRF observed two MI Soldiers striking and yelling at the male detainee whom they subsequently "threw" into the back of a High- Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV). 1LT.320th MP BN IRF intervened to stop the abuse and was told by the MI Soldiers "we are the professionals; we know what we are doing." They refused 1L.'s lawful order to identify themselves. 1LT111111and his IRF team (SGT SFC.immediately reported this incident, providing sworn statements to MAJ 320 MP N S3 and LT., 32 MP B Commander. 1SG.A/205 interviewed and took statements om GT., identified as striking the detainee, and each MI person present: SSG.SSG.Sal. SG.1. While the MP statements all describe abuse at the hands o an unidentified MI person ( ., the MI statements all deny any abuse occurred. LTC .subsequently reported the incident to the CID who determined the allegation lacked su icient asis for prosecution. The detainee was interrogated and released that day (involvement in the mortar attack was unlikely); therefore, no SECRET//NOFORN//X1 71 019128 DOD-042286 SE-CRET-4140FORNI4X1- SUBJECT: (U) AR. 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade detainee is available to confirm either the MP or MI recollection of events. This incident was not further pursued based on limited data and the absence of additional investi ative leads. (Reference B. dix 1,. (6) • Annex B pendix 2, Annex B, Appendix 3. (WO YS) (2) (U) Incident #2. On 7 October 2003, three MI personnel allegedly sexually assaulted female DETAINEE-29. CIVILIAN-06 (iN) was the assigned interpreter, but there is no indication he was present or involved. DETAINEE-29 alleges as follows: First, the group took her out of her cell and escorted her down the cellblock to an empty cell. One unidentified Soldier stayed outside the cell (SOLDIER33, A/519 MI BN); while another held her hands behind her back, and the other forcibly kissed her (SOLDIER32, A/519 MI BN). She was escorted downstairs to another cell where she was shown a naked male detainee and told the same would happen to her if she did not cooperate. She was then taken back to her cell, forced to kneel and raise her arms while one of the Soldiers (SOLDIER31, A 5 19 MI BN) removed her shirt. She began to cry, and her shirt was given back as the Soldier cursed at her and said they would be back each night. CID conducted an investigation and SOLDIER33, SOLDIER32, and SOLDIER31 invoked their rights and refused to provide any statements. DETAINEE-29 identified the three Soldiers as SOLDIER33, SOLDIER32, and SOLDIER31 as the Soldiers who kissed her and removed her shirt. Checks with the 519 MI BN confirmed no interrogations were scheduled for that evening. No record exists of MI ever conducting an authorized interrogation ..of her. The CID investigation. was- closed. SOLDF_ER33, SOLDIER32, and SOLDIER31 each received non-judicial punishment, Field Grade Article -15'.s, from the Commander, 20.5 MI BDEr­for failing to get antherization to interrogate DETAINEE-29. Additionally, COL (6)k removed them from interrogation operations. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, Annex B, Appendix 2,.; Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-29). . (6J(17-1CC/— (3) Incident #3. On 25 October 2003 detainees DETAINEE-31, DETAINEE-30, and DETAINEE-27 were stripped of their clothing, handcuffed together nude, placed on the ground, and forced to lie on each other and simulatesex while photographs were taken. Six photographs depict this abuse. Results of the CID investigation indicate on several occasions over several days, detainees. were assaulted, abused and forced to strip off their clothing and perform indecent cts oneach other. DETAINEE-27 provided a sworn statement outlining these abuses. •Those preserraand/or participating in the abuse were CPL Graner, 372 MP CO, SSG Frettlerick, 472 MP CO, SPC England, 372 MP CO, SPC Harman, 372 IIP COQ SOLDIER34, 372 MP CO, CIVILIAN-17, Titan Corp., SOLDIER-24, -13/325.BN, SOLDIER19, 3,25 MI BN, and SOLDIERIO, 325 MI BN. SOLDIER-24 claimed he accompanied SOLDIER10 to the Hard Site the evening of 25 October 2003 to see what was being de to the three detainees suspected of raping a young male detainee. SOLDIER-10 appeared to have foreknowledge of the abuse, possibly from his friendship with SPC-INIONh, a 372 MP CO MP. SOLDIER-24 did not believe .b (6 )(1) '.(2) SE-CRET-11140FORNIIX4 72 019129 DOD-042287 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade the abuse was directed by MI and these individuals were not interrogation subjects. PFC England, however, claimed "MI Soldiers instructed them (MPs) to rough them up." When SOLDIER-24 arrived the detainees were naked, being yelled at by an MP through a megaphone. The detainees vtere forced to crawl on their stomachs-and were handcuffed together: SOLDIER­ ,24 observed SOLDIER-10 join in the abuse with CPt, Graner and SSG Frederick. All three made the detainees act as though they were having sex. He observed SOLDIER-19 dump water on the detainees from a cup and throw a foam football at them. SOLDIER-24 described what he/,har)4 saw tiiiiIER-25, B/321 MI BN, who reported the incident to SGT111111, 372 MP CO. .c-SGT.dvised SOLDIER-25 he would notify his NCOIC and later told SOLDIER-25 "he had taken care of it." SOLDIER-25 stated that a few days later both she and SOLDIER24 told SOLDIER-22 of the incident. SOLDIER-22 subsequently failed to report what he was told. SOLDIER-25 did not report the abuse through MI channels because she felt it was an MP matter and would be handled by them. (U) This is a clear incident of direct MI personnel involvement in detainee abuse; • however, it does not appear to be based on MI orders. The three detainees were incarcerated for criminal acts and were not of intelligence interest. This incident was most likely orchestrated by MP personnel (CPL Graner, SSG Frederick, SOLDIER34, SPC Harman, PFC England), with the MI personnel (SOLDIER-19, SOLDIER-10, and SOLDIER-24, CIVILIAN-17, and another unidentified interpreter) joining in and/or observing the abuse. (Reference Annex B, Appendix . 1.SOLDIER-19, CIVILIAN-17, SOLDIER-25; Annex B, Appendix 3, SOLDIER34, ENGLAND, HARMAN, DETAINEE-31, DETAINEE-30, DETAJNEE-27; Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M3.6,-41). (4) (U) Incident #4. DETAINEE-08, arrived at Abu G-htaib,,on 27 .October 2003 and was subsequently sent to the Hard Site, DETAINEE-08 claims when he was sent to the Hard Site, he was stripped of his clothing for!six days. He was then given a blanket and remained with only the blanket for three more days. DETAINEE-08 stated the next evening he was transported by CPL Graner, 372 MP CO MP, to the shower room, which was commonly used for interrogations. When the interrogation ended, his female, interrogator left, and DETAINEE-08 claims CPL Graner and another MP, who meets the description of SSG Fredrick, then threw pepper in DETAINEE-08's face and beat him for half an hour. DETAINEE-08 recalled being beaten with , a chair until it broke, hit in the chest, kicked, and choked until he lost consciousness. On other occasions DETAINEE-08 recalled that CPL Graner would throw his food into the toilet and say "go take it and eat it." DETAINEE-08's claims of abuse do not involve his interrogator(s) and appear to have been committed by CPL Graner and SSG Frederick, both MPs. Reviewing the interrogation reports; however, suggests a correlation between this abuse and his interrogations. DETAINEE-08's interrogator for his first four interrogations was SOLDIER-29, a female, and almost certainly the interrogator he spoke of. Her Analyst was SOLDIER-10. In the first interrogation report they concluded he was lying and recommended a "fear up" approach if he continued to lie. Following his second interrogation it was recommended DETAINEE-08 be 73 019130 DOD-042288 SUBJECT: (U) AR I-5-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention. Facility and 205th MI Brigade moved to isolation (the Hard Site) as he continued "to be untruthful." Ten days later, a period roughly correlating with DETAINEE-08's claim of being without clothes and/or a blanket for nine days before his beating, was interrogated for a third time. The interrogation report references his placement in "the hole," a small lightless isolation closet, and the "Mutt and Jeff" interrogation technique being employed. Both techniques as they were used here were abusive and unauthorized. According to the report, the interrogators "let the MPs yell at him" and upon their return, "used a fear down," but "he was still holding back." The following day he was interrogated again and the report annotates "use a direct approach with a reminder of the unpleasantness that occurred the last time he lied." Comparing the interrogation reports with rZ/DETAINEE-08's recollections, it is likely the abuse he describes occurred between his third and forth interrogations and that his interrogators were aware of the abuse, the "unpleasantness." SG.stated that SOLDIER-29 and SSG Frederick had a close personal relationship and it is plausi she had CPL Graner and SSG Frederick "soften up this detainee" as they have claime." told them to do on several, unspecified, occasions (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,.SOLDIER-29; Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-08; Annex I, Appendix 4, DETAINS -08). (5) (U) Incident #5. In October 2003, DETAINEE-07, reported alleged multiple incidents of physical abuse while in Abu Ghraib. DETAINEE-07 was an MI Hold and considered of potentially high value. He was interrogated on 8, 21, and 29 October; 4 and 23 November and 5 December 2003.. DETAINEE-07's claims of physical abuse (hitting) started on his first day of arrival. He was left naked in his cell for extended periods, cuffed in-his cal irkstressful positions ("High cuffed"), left with a bag over his head for extended periods, and denied beddingor blankets. DETAINEE-07 described being made to "bark like a dog, being fordedio crawl on his stomach while MPs spit and urinated on him, and being struck causing unconsciousness." On another occasion DETAINEE-07 was tied to a window in his cell and forced to wear women's underwear on his head. On yet another occasion, DETAINEE-07 was forced to lie down while MPs jumped onto his back and legs. He was beaten with a broom and a chemical light was broken and poured over his body. DETAINEE-04 witnessed the abuse with the chem-light. During this abuse a police stick was used to sodomize DETAINEE-07 and two female MPs were hitting him, throwing a ball at his penis, and taking photographs. This investigation surfaced no photographic evidence of the chemical light abuse or sodomy. DETAINEE-07 also alleged that CIVILIAN-17, MP Interpreter, Titan Corp., hit DETAINEE-07 once, cutting his ear to an extent that required stitches. He told SOLDIER-25, analyst, B/321 MI BN, about this hitting incident during an interrogation. SOLDIER-25 asked the MPs what had happened to the detainee's ear and was told he had fallen in his cell. SOLDIER-25 did not report the detainee's abuse. SOLDIER-25 claimed the detainee's allegation was made in the presence of CIVILIAN-21, Analyst/Interrogator, CACI, which CIVILIAN-21 denied hearing this report. Two photos taken at 2200 hours, 1 November 2003 depict a detainee with stitches in his ear; however, we could not confirm the photo was DETAINEE-07. Based on the details provided by the detainee and the SEC 74 019131 DOD-042289 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade close correlation to other known MP abuses, it is highly probable DETAINEE-07's allegations are true. SOLDIER-25 failed to report the detainee's allegation of abuse. His statements and available photographs do not point to direct MI involvement. However, MI interest in this detainee, his placement in Tier lA of the Hard Site, and initiation of the abuse once he arrived there, combine to create a circumstantial connection to MI (knowledge of or implicit tasking of. the MPs to "set conditions") which are difficult to ignore. MI should have been aware of what was being done to this detainee based on the frequency of interrogations and high interest in his intelligence value. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-25, CIVILIAN-21; Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-04, DETAINEE-07; Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M54-55). (6) (U) Incident #6. DETAINEE-10 and DETAINEE-12 claimed that they and "four Iraqi Generals, were abused upon their arrival at the Hard Site. DETAINEE-10 was documented in MP records as receiving a 1.5 inch laceration on his chin, the result of his resisting an MP transfer. Hisinjuries are likely those captured in several photographs of an unidentified detainee with a lacerated chin and bloody clothing which were taken on 14 November, a date coinciding with his transfer. DETAINEE-12 claimed he was slammed to the ground, punched, and forced to crawl naked to his cell with a sandbag over his head. These two detainees as well as the other four (DETAINEE-20, DETAINEE-19, DETAINEE-22, DETAINEE-21) were all high value Iraqi General Officers or senior members of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. MP logs from the Hard Site indicate they attempted to incite a riot in Camp Vigilant while being transferred to the Hard Site. There is no documentation of what.occuried atCamp Vigilant or of detainees. • .„. receiving injuries.. When DETAINEE-10 was in-processed into thQHard Site, he was/esisting 4. and was pushed against the. wall. At that point the MPs noticed blood coming from under his hood and they discovered the laceration on his chin: -.A medical corpsman was-frnmediately called to suture the detainee's chin. These events are all documented, indicating the injury occurred before the detainee's arrival at the Hard Site and that he received prompt medical attention. When, where, and by whom this detainee suffered his injuries could not be determined nor could an evaluation be made of whether it constituted "reasonable force" in conjunction with a riot. Our interest in this incident stems from MP logs concerning DETAINEE-10 indicating MI provided direction about his treatment. CPL Graner wrote an entry indicating he was told by SFC op, who was in turn told by LTC.. to "Strip them out and PT them." Whether \\ 1., "strip out" meant to remove clothing or to isolate we couldn't determine. Whether "PT them" meant physical stress or abuse can't be determined. The vagueness of this order could, however, have led to any subsequent abuse. The alleged abuse, injury, and harsh treatment correlating A. with the detainees' transfer to MI hold also suggest MI could have provided direction or MP could have been given the perception they should abuse or "soften u detainees," however, there is no clear proof. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,. Annex C). ?.2- - (7) (U) Incident #7. On 4 November 2003, a CIA detainee, DETAINEE-28 died in custody in Tier 1•. Allegedly, a Navy SEAL Team had captured him during a joint TF-121/CIA SE—CRETIINOF0RNIA4 • 75 019132 DOD-042290 SE-CRET-010F0RNIIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade mission. DETAINEE-28 was suspected of having been involved in an attack against the ICRC and had numerous weapons with him at the time of his apprehension. He was reportedly resisting arrest, and a SEAL Team member butt-stroked him on the side of the head to suppress the threat he posed. CIA representatives brought DETAINEE-28 into Abu Ghraib sometime around 0430 to 0530 without notifying JIDC Operations, in accordance with a supposed verbal agreement with the CIA. While all the details of DETAINEE-28's death are still not known CIA, DOJ, and CID have yet to complete and release the results of their investigations), SPC , an MP on duty at the Hard Site at the time DETAINEE-28 was brought in, stated that two CIA representatives came in with DETAINEE-28 and he was placed in a shower room (in Tier 1B). About 30 to 45 minutes later, SPC was summoned to the shower stall, and IN when he arrived, DETAINEE-28 appeared to be - ea . SPC_- removed the sandbag which was over DETAINEE-28's head and checked for the detainee s pulse. He found none. He un-cuffed DETAINEE-28 called for medical assistance, and notified his chain of command. LT.stated that he was informed of the death shortly thereafter, at approximately 0715 hours. LTC.arrived at the Hard Site and talked to C VILIANO3, an Iraqi prison medical doctor, who informed him DETAINEE-28 was dead. LTC stated that DETAINEE-28 was in the Tier 1B shower stall, face down, handcuffed with his hands behind his back. LTC Illiversion of the handcuffs conflicts with SPC 1.1111' account that he un-cuffed EE-28. This incident remains under CID and CIA investigation. (U) A CIA representative identified only as "OTHER,AGENCY EMPLOYEE-01"-wash present, along_with several .MPs and US intldical staff ..LTAIIIIIrezcalled that it was "OTHER C4/0 -2- AGENCY EMPLOYEE-01" Who tincuffed DETAINEE-:28. an the body was turned over: LTC -7( .,) -- 111111111stated that. . did-rajt see any blood anywhere, except for a small-spot whereETAINEE-. where.DETAINEE------ • 28's head was touching the floor. LTC illanotified COLAIII(205 MI BDE Commander), and "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE-01" said he would notify "0 HER AGENCY EMPLOYEE-02," his CIA supervisor-Once "OTHER AGENCY EMPLOYEE-02" arrived, he stated he would call Washington, and also requested that DETAINEE-28's body be held in the Hard Site until the following day. The body was placed in a body bag, packed in ice, and stored in the shower area. CID was notified and the body was removed from Abu Ghraib the next day , on a litter to make it appear as if DETAINEE-28 was only ill, thereby not drawing the attention of the Iraqi guards and detainees. The body was transported to the morgue at BIAP for an autopsy, which concluded that DETAINEE-28 died of a blood clot in the head, a likely result of injuries he sustained while resisting apprehension. There is no indication or accusations that MI personnel were involved in this incident exce t fo • he removal of the body. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,. (6,(6) -zj Annex I, Appendix.otography C5-21, D5-11, 6 - .." (8) (U) Incident #8. On 20 October 2003, DETAINEE-03, was allegedly stripped and physically abused for sharpening a toothbrush to make a shank (knife-like weapon). SE-CRETANOF0RNI/X-4- 76 019133 DOD-042291 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade DETAINEE-03 claimed the toothbrush was not his. An MP log book entry by SSG Frederick, 372 MPs, directed DETAINEE-03 to be stripped in his cell for six days. DETAINEE-03 claimed he was told his clothing and mattress would be taken away as punishment. The next day he claims he was cuffed to his cell door for several hours. He claims he was taken to a closed room where he had cold water poured on him and his face was forced into someone's urine. DETAINEE-03 claimed he was then beaten with a broom and spat upon, and a female Soldier stood on his legs and pressed a broom against his anus. He described getting his clothes during the day from SGT.and having them taken away each night by CPL Graner for the next three days. DETAINEE-03 was an MI Hold but was not interrogated between 16 September and 2 November 2003. It is plausible his interrogators would be unaware of the alleged abuse and DETAINEE-03 made no claim he informed them (Reference Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-03). (9) (U) Incident #9. Three photographs taken on 25 October 2003 depicted PFC England, 372 MP CO, holding a leash which was wrapped around an unidentified detainee's neck. Present in the photograph is SPC Ambuhl who was standing to the side watching. PFC England claimed in her initial statement to CID that CPL Graner had placed the tie-down strap around the detainee's neck and then asked her to pose for the photograph. There is no indication of MI involvement, or knowledge of this incident (Reference Annex E, CID Report and Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M33-35). (10) (U),InOdent #10., Six•Photographs of DETAINEE-15; depict.him standing on`a box with simulated electrical wires attached to•his fingers and a lewd over his head. These .- • photographs were taken between 2145 and 231.5 on 4 November 2003. DETAINEE-15 described a female making him stand on the box, telling him if he fell off he would be electrocuted, and a "tall black man" as putting the wires on his fingers and penis. From the CID investigation into abuse at Abu Ghraib it was determined SGT J. Davis, SPC Harman, CPL Graner, and SSG Frederick, 372 MP CO, were present during this abuse. DETAINEE-15 was not an MI Hold and it is unlikely MI had knowledge of this abuse (Reference Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-15; Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs C1-2, D19-21 M64). (11) (U) Incident #11. Twenty-nine photos taken between 2315 and 0024, on 7 and 8 November 2003 depict seven detainees (DETAINEE-1,7, DETAINEE-16, DETAINEE-24, DETAINEE-23, DETAINEE-26, DETAINEE-01, DETAINEE-18) who were physically abused, placed in a pile and forced to masturbatei: Present in some of these photographs are CPL Graner and APC Harman. The CID investigation into these abuses identified SSG Frederick, CPL Graner, SGT J. Davis, SPC Ambuhl, SPC Harman, SPC Sivits, and PFC England; all MPs, as involved in thb, abuses which occurred. There is no, evidence to support MI personnel .,.involvement in this incident. CID statements from PFC England, SGT J. Davis, SPC Sivits, SPCum, SPC Harman, DETAINEE-17, DETAINEE-01, and DETAINEE-16 detail that the Lha-. SECRE—TANOFORN/IX4 77 019134 DOD-042292 SE—GRETI/140-FORNI4X4- SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade detainees were stripped, pushed into a pile, and jumped on by SGT J. Davis, CPL Graner, and SSG Frederick. They were photographed at different times by SPC Harman, SPC Sivits, and SSG Frederick. The detainees were subsequently posed sexually, forced to masturbate, and "ridden like animals." CPL Graner knocked at least one detainee unconscious and SSG Frederick punched one so hard in the chest that he couldn't breath and a medic was summoned. SSG Frederick initiated the masturbation and forced the detainees to hit each other. PFC England stated she observed SSG Frederick strike a detainee in the chest during these abuses. The detainee had difficulty breathing and a medic, SOLDIER-01, was summoned. SOLDIER-01 treated the detainee and while in the Hard Site observed the "human pyramid" of naked detainees with bags over their heads. SOLDIER-01 failed to report this abuse. These detainees were not MI Holds and MI involvement in this abuse has not been alleged nor is it likely. SOLDIER-29 reported seeing a screen saver for a computer in the Hard Site that depicted several naked detainees stacked in a "pyramid." She also once observed, unrelated to this incident, CPL Graner slap a detainee. She stated that she didn't report the picture of naked detainees to MI because she did not see it again and also did not report the slap because she didn't consider it abuse (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-29; Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-01, DETAINEE-17, DETAINEE-16, ENGLAND, DAVIS, HARMAN,SIVITS, WISDOM; Annex B, Appendix 3, TAB A, SOLDIER-01, and Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs C24-42, D22-25, M73-77, M87). (1.2) (U),Incident #12. A photograph taken circa 27 December 2003, depicts -a naked­DETAINEE-14,, apparently shot with.a shotgun:iiihis-buttoc;ks:.:This photograph ,could.not be tied to a L;pecifie incident, detainee, or allegation and Mi involvement isirideterminate (Reference Annex I; Appendix 1, Photographs D37-38, .H2, M111).. (13) (U) Incident #13. Three photographs taken on 29 November 2003, depict an unidentified detainee dressed only in his underwear, standing with each foot on a separate box, and bent over at the waist. This photograph could not be tied to a specific incident, detainee, or allegation and MI involvement is indeterminate. (Reference Annex I, Appendixl, Photographs D37-38, M111) (14) (U) Incident #14. An 18 November 2003 photograph depicts a detainee dressed in a shirt or blanket lying on the floor with a banana inserted into his anus. This as well as several others show the same detainee covered in feces, with his hands encased in sandbags, or tied in foam and between two stretchers. These are all identified as DETAINEE-25 and were determined by CID investigation to be self-inflicted incidents. Even so, these incidents constitute abuse; a detainee with a known mental condition should not have been provided the banana or photographed. The detainee has a severe mental problem and the restraints depicted in these photographs were allegedly used to prevent the detainee from sodomizing himself and assaulting himself and others with his bodily fluids. He was known for inserting various objects SE-CRE-TINOF0RNIIX4 78 019135 DOD-042293 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade into his rectum and for consuming and throwing his urine and feces. MI had no association with this detainee (Reference Annex C; Annex E; Annex. I, Appendix 1, Photographs, C22-23, D28­36, D39, M97-99, M105-110, M131-133). (15) (U) Incident #15. On 26 or 27 November 2003, SOLDIER-15, 66*MI GP, observed CIVILIAN-11, a CACI contractor, interrogating an Iraqi policeman. During the interrogation, SSG Frederick, 372 MP CO, alternated between coming into the cell and standing next to the detainee and standing outside the cell, CIVILIAN-11 would ask the policeman a question stating that if he did not answer, he would bring SSG Frederick back into the cell. At one point, SSG Frederick put his hand over the policeman's nose, not allowing him to breathe for a few seconds. At another point SSG Frederick used a collapsible nightstick to push and possibly twist the policeman's arm, causing pain. When SSG Frederick walked out of the cell, he told SOLDIER­15 he knew ways to do this without leaving marks. SOLDIER-15 did not report the incident. The interpreter utilized for this interrogation was CIVILIAN-16. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-15) "Z- (16) (U) Incident #16. On an unknown date, analyst, observed CIVILIAN-05, a CACI contractor, grab a detainee from e back o a High-Mobility, Multipurpose, Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) and drop him on the ground. CIVILIAN-05 then dragged the detainee into an interrogation booth. The detainee was handcuffed the entire time. When the detainee tried to get up to his. knees, CIVILIAN-05 would force him to fall. SGT 111111111 reported the incid n o CID but did not report it in MI.chanaels. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,. (6)02 -0)(6 2 (17) (U) Incident #17. A 30 November 2003, MP Log entry described an unidentified detainee found in a cell covered in blood. This detainee had assaulted CPL Graner, 3.72 MP CO, while they moved him to an isolation cell in Tier 1A. CPL Graner and CPL .subdued (4,0) -2 Tc) "" the detainee, placed restraints on him and put him in an isolation cell. At approximately 0320 hours, 30 November 2003, after hearing banging on the isolation cell door, the cell was checked and the detainee was found in the cell standing by the door covered in blood. This detainee was not an MI Hold and there is no record of MI association with this incident or detainee. (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M115-129, M134). (18) (U) Incident #18. On approximately 12 or 13 December 2003, DETAINEE-06 claimed numerous abuse incidents against US Soldiers. DETAINEE-06 was a Syrian foreign fighter and self-proclaimed Jihadist who came to Iraq to kill Coalition troops. DETAINEE-06 stated the Soldiers supposedly retaliated against him when he returned to the Hard Site after being released from the hospital following a shooting incident in which he attempted to kill US Soldiers. DETAINEE-06 had a pistol smuggled into him by an Iraqi Policeman and used that pistol to try to kill US personnel working in the Hard Site on 24 November 2003. An MP SECRET44NOFORNIIX4 79 010136 DOD-042294 SECRET//NOFORN/IXI SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade returned fire and wounded DETAINEE-06. Once DETAINEE-06 ran out of ammunition, he -r" surrendered and was transported to the hospital. DETAINEE-06 claimed CIVILIAN-21 visited him in the hospital and threatened him with terrible torture upon his return. DETAINEE-06 claimed that upon his return to the Hard Site, he was subjected to various threats and abuses which included Soldiers threatening to torture and kill him, being forced to eat pork and having liquor put in his mouth, having a "very hot" substance put in his nose and on his forehead, having the guards hit his "broken" leg several times with a solid plastic stick, being forced to "curse" his religion, being urinated on, being hung by handcuffs from the cell door for hours, being "smacked" on the back of the head, and "allowing dogs to try to bite" him. This claim was substantiated by a medic, SOLDIER-20, who was called to treat a detainee (DETAINEE-06) who had been complaining of pain. When SOLDIER-20 arrived DETAINEE-06 was cuffed to the upper bunk so that he could not sit down and CPL Graner was poking at his wounded legs with an asp with DETAINEE-06 crying out in pain. SOLDIER-20 provided pain medication and departed. He returned the following day to find DETAINEE-06 again cuffed to the upper bunk and a few days later returned to find him cuffed to the cell door with a dislocated shoulder. SOLDIER-20 failed to either stop or report this abuse. DETAINEE-06 also claimed that prior to the shooting incident, which he described as when "I got shot with several bullets" without mentioning that he ever fired a shot, he was threatened "every one or two hours... with torture and punishment", was subjected to sleep deprivation by standing up "for hours and hours", and had a "black man" tell him he would rape DETAINEE-06 on two occasions. Although DETAINEE-06 stated that CPL Graner led "a number of Soldiers" into his cell, he also staled that he had nevereen CPL ,Graner beat_apriaoner,.. These claims are-from a detainee who attempted to kill US service members. While it is likely some Soldiers treated -DETAINEE-06 • harshly upon his return to the Hard Site, DETAINEE-06's accusations are potentially the - - -exaggerations of a man who hated Americans. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE­06, SOLDIER-20). NO 2 :)(6 ) C7) '2 (19) (U) Incident #19. SGT IMF 470 MI GP, stated that sometime between 4 and 13 December 2003, several weeks after the shooting of "a detainee who had a pistol" (DETAINEE­06), she heard he was back from the hospital, and she went to check on him because he was one of the MI Holds she interrogated. She found DETAINEE-06 without clothes or blanket, his wounds were bleeding and he had a catheter on without a bag. The MPs told her they had no clothes for the detainee. SGT 1111111rdered the MPs to get the detainee some clothes and went Qj6-) to the medical site to get the doctor on duty. The doctor (Colonel) asked what SGT .(,)(424-,) .. 2 wanted and was asked if he was aware the detainee still had a catheter on. The Colonel said he L- was, the Combat Army Surgical Hospital (CASH) had made a mistake, and he couldn't remove it because the CASH was responsible for it. SGT 11111111d him this was unacceptable, he again refusatirove it and stated the detainee was due to go back to the CASH the following day. SGT.sked if he had ever heard of the Geneva Conventions, and the Colonel responded "fine Sergeant, you do what you have to do, I am going back to bed." SECRE-TANOFAR-NAX-1- 80 019137 DOD-042295 SE—CRE-T-11140FOMIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (U) It is apparent from this incident that DETAINEE06 did not receive proper medical treatment, clothing orebedcalie. n The "Colonel" has not been identified in this investigation, but efforts continue. LTC was chief of the medical team for "security holds" at Abu Ghraib from early October to late December 2003. He treated DETAINEE06 following his shooting and upon his return from the hospital. He did not recall such an incident or DETAINEE06 . (76 SOTIMIlwas taken to .a different doctor that evening. She having a catheter. It is possible asked and was told the doctor was a Colonel, not a Lieutenant Colonel and is confident she can identify the Colonel from a photograph. LTC.. characterized the medical records as being exceptional at Abu Ghraib, however, the records found bythisinyestigation were poor and in most cases non-existent. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, .ingipt Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-06). (20) (U) Incident #20. During the fall of 2003, a detainee stated that another detainee, named DETAINEE-09, was stripped, forced to stand on two boxes, had water poured on him and had his genitals hit with a glove. Additionally, the detainee was handcuffed to his cell door for a 7 i half day without food or Ovate . The detainee making the statement did not recall the exact date (.-.)() - / or participants. Later, '. ' was identified as DETAINEE-09, who stated that on 5 NovemberWite) -1-2003 he was stripped n ed, beaten, and forced to crawl on the floor. He was forced to stand on a box and was hit in his genitals. The participants in this abuse could not be determined. MI involvement is indeterminate.- (Reference Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-09; Annex I, Appendix. L, Photographs D37-38, M111) .... ,.• (21) (U) , Incident #21. Circa October 2003, CIVILIAN-17, an interpreter of the Titan Corporation, observed the following incident: CPL Graner, 372 MP CO, pushed a detainee, identified as one of the "three stooges" or "three wise men", into a wall, lacerating the detainee's chin. CIVILIAN-17 specifically stated the detainee was pushed into.a wall and "busted his chin." A medic, SG.s inch laceration on thiellittated he was summoned to stitch the detainee and treated a 2.5 s chin requiring 13 stitches. SGTIIIIrid not know how the (6Pie)-2-detainee was injured. Later that evening, CPL Graner took photos of the detainee. CPL Graner was identified in another incident where he stitched an injured detainee in the presence of medics. There is no indication of MI involvement, knowledge, or direction of this abuse. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,CIVILI,AV-17; Annex B, Appendix 3,CIVILIAN-17, IMMODETAINEE-02; Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M88-96). (22) (U) Incident #22. On an unknown date, an interpreter named "CIVILIAN-01" allegedly raped a 15-18 year old male detainee according to DETAINEE-05. DETAINEE-05 heard screaming and climbed to the top of his cell door to see over a sheet covering the door of the cell where the abuse was occurring. DETAINEE-05 observed CIVILIAN-01, who was wearing a military uniform, `raping the detainee. A female Soldier was taking pictures. SE—C-RET-11N-OFORNIIX4 81 019138 DOD-042296 SE-CRET-liNOFGRNI1X-4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade DETAINEE-05 described CIVILIAN-01 as possibly Egyptian, "not skinny or short," and effeminate. The date and participants of this alleged rape could not be confirmed. No other reporting supports DETAINEE-05's allegation, nor have photographs of the rape surfaced. A review of all available records could not identify a translator by the name of CIVILIAN-01. DETAINEE05's destription of the interpreter partially matches CIVILIAN-17, Interpreter, Titan Corp. CIVILIAN-17 is a large man, believed by several witnesses to be homosexual, and of Egyptian extraction. CIVILIAN-17 functioned as an interpreter for a Tactical HUMINT Team at Abu Ghraib, but routinely provided translation for both MI and MP. CID has an open investigation into this allegation. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-05) ) 10),* (0 czio)-z (23)(U) Incident #23. On 24 November 2003, a US Army officer, CPT 11111, MP, (allegedly beat and kicked a detainee. This is one of three ideptified,abuses associated with the 24 November shooting. A detainee obtained a pistol from Irigi polibe wards, ihdt an MP and was subsequently shot and wounded. During a subsequent search of the Hard Site and interrogation of detainees, SGT.. 229 MP CO, a member of the Abu Ghraib Internal Reaction Force (IRF), observed an Army Captain dragging an unidentified detainee in a choke hold, throwing him against a wall, and kicking him in the mid-section. SP .229 MP CO, IRF was also present in the Hard Site and observed the same abuse involving two oldiers and a detainee. The detainee was lying on his stomach with his hands cuffed behind his back and a bag over his head. One Soldier stood next to him with the barrel of a rifle pressed against the detainee's head. The other Soldier was kneeling next to the detainee punching Inindri the back with a clos:-..d fist. •The Soldier then stood up and kickedthe detainee several tunes: The Soldier. inflicting the-beating was described as a white:male with close cropped blond hair: SPC saw this Soldier a few days later in full uniform, identifying him as a Captain,.but could not-see his name. Both SPC11111,d SOTIIIIIreported this abuse to their supervisors, SFC. ).- and 1L111111372 MP CO. Photos of company grade officers at Abu Ghraib during this time were obtained andshown to SPC111111and SGT .who positively identified the "Captain" as CPTIIIIIIThis,h1cident was investigated billiand.:the assault was determined to be unfouncinTagrged event to protect the fact the detainee was a cooperative MP Source. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, . nnex B, Appendix 3,alimmut Annex E, Appendix.of Inves igation 05-04-CID149-83131) (24)(U) Incident #24. A photograph created circa early December 2003 depicts an unicientified detainee being interrogated by CIVILIAN-11, CACI, Interrogator, and CIVILIAN- 16, Titan, linguist. The detainee is squatting on a chair which is an unauthorized stress position. Having the detainee on a chair which is a potentially unsafe situation, and photographing the detainee are violations of the ICRP. (Reference Annex I, Appendix 2, Photograph "Stress Position"). SE-CRET11140FORNIIX4 82 0 1 9 1 3 9 DOD-042297 4E—CRET-1440F0RNI4X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghtaib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade f. (U) Incidents of Detainee Abuse Using Dogs. (U) Abusing detainees with dogs started almost immediately after the dogs arrived at Abu Ghraib on 20 November 2003. By that date, abuses of detainees was already occurring and the addition of dogs was just one more abuse device. Dog Teams were brought to Abu Ghraib as a result of recommendations from MG G. Miller's assessment team from JTF-GTMO. MG G. Miller recommended dogs as beneficial for detainee custody and control issues, especially in instances where there were large numbers of detainees and few guards to help reduce the risk of detainee demonstrations or acts of violence, h Lit.,) ..-2-. as at Abu Ghraib. MG G. Miller never recommended, nor were dogs used for interrogations at 91'---)1 6 ;) GTMO. The dog teams were requested by COLIENcornmander, 205 MI BDE. COL. 1,,v.7 to -2-111111never understood the intent as described by MG G. Miller. Interrogations at Abu Ghrai . 1 L' were also influenced by several documents that spoke of exploiting the Arab fear of dogs: a 24 January 2003 "CJTF 180 Interrogation Techniques," an 11 October 2002 JTF 170 "Counter-Resistance Strategies," and a 14 September 2003 CJTF-7 ICRP. Once the dogs arrived, there was controversy over who "owned" the dogs. It was ultimately decided that the dogs would be attached to the Internal Reaction Force (IRF). The use of dogs in interrogations to "fear up" detainees was generally unquestioned and stems in part from the interrogation techniques and counter-resistance policy distributed from CJTF 180, JTF 170 and CJTF-7. It is likely the confusion about using dogs partially stems from the initial request for dog teams by MI, not MPs, and their presence being associated with MG G. Miller's visit. Most military intelligence personnel believed that the uee of dogs in interrogations was a "non-standard" technique w ich required approval, and most also believed that approval rested with COLN.. COL -also believed; incorrectly, that he had such authority delegated to him from LTG- Sanchiez. c01..,._. belief likely stemmed in part from the changing ICRP. -The initial-policy Wavpublisheri. on 14 September 2003 and-allowed -the use of dogs subject to approval by LTG Sanchez. On 12 October 2003, these were amended to eliminate several techniques due to CENTCOM objections. After the 12 October 2003 amendment, the ICRP safeguards allowed that dogs present, at interrogations were to be muzzled and under the control-of a handler. COLaillidid not recall how he got the authorityto em loy dogs; just that he had it. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, G. MILLER and.ndAnnex J, Appendik 3) ..t.' (U) SFC Illstated the two Army dog teams never joined the Navy teams as part of he IRF anG1 remained separate and under the direct control of MAJarift S3, 320 MP BN. hese team's were involved in all documented detainee abuse involving dogs; both MP and MI c-.0 2)). irected. The Navy dog teams were properly employed because of good training, excellent TO eadership, personal moral character, and professionalism exhibited by the Navy Dog Handlers, MAII MAllinand MA2.and IRF personnel. The Army teams apparently agreed to be used in abusive situationii!IIMPs and MI in contravention to their doctrine, training, and values. In an atmosphere of permissiveness and absence of oversight or leadership the Army dog teams became involved in several incidents of abuse over the following weeks SE—CRET-1140FORNIIX4 83 DOD-042298 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, KIMBRO, PLUDE; Annex B, Appendix 2, PLUDE; Annex B, Appendix 3, PLUDE). (1) (U) Incident #25. The first documented incident of abuse with dogs occurred on 24 November 2003, just four days after the dogs teams arrived. An Iraqi detainee was smuggled a pistol by an Iraqi Police Guard. While attempting to confiscate the weapon, an MP was shot and the detainee was subsequently shot and wounded. Following the shooting, LTC MN orderedWeiZ -26) -2 several interrogators to the Hard Site to screen eleven Iraqi Police who were detained following the shooting. The situation at the Hard Site was described by many as "chaos," and no one really appeared to be in charge. The perception was that LTG Sanchez had removed all restrictions that night because of the situation; however, that was not true. No one is able to pin down how that perception was created. A Navy Dog Team entered the Hard Site and was instructed to search for additional weapons and explosives. The dogs searched the cells, no explosives were detected and the Navy Dog Team eventually completed their mission and left. Shortly thereafter, MA1.USN, was recalled when someone "needed" a dog. MA1 Illawent to the top.(4*) 2 7 ')-2 floor o ier B, rather than the MI Hold area of Tier 1A. As he and his dog approached a cell door, he heard yelling and screaming and his dog became agitated. Inside the cell were CIVILIAN-11 (CACI contract interrogator), a second unidentified male in civilian clothes who appeared to be an interrogator and CIVILIAN16 (female contract irate . were efreter), all of whom . yelling at a detainee squatting in the back right corner. MA1 " (6) 2rZci -2 dog was barking a lot () with all the yelling.and commotion. The dog lunged and -MA struggled to regain -controt-of it. At that point, one_ of the men said wordsto the: e ect . ou see that dog there, if • you don't tell me whin -I want to know;fiti.gonna getfhat dog On you . " The three began to step out of the cell leaving the detainee inside and MA111111 backed-up io..allow &rem to exit, but there was not much room on the tier. After they exited, the dog lunged and pulled MA1 lust inside the cell. He quickly regained control of his dog, and exited the cell. , As CIVIL 11, CIVILIAN-16, and the other interrogator re-entered the cell, MA111111110 dog grabbed CIVILIAN-16's forearm in its mouth. It apparently did not bite through her clothes or skin and CIVILIAN-16 st.the dog did not bite her. Realizing he had not been called for an explosives search, MA1.departed the area with his dog and as he got to the bottom of the tier stairs, he heard, someone calling for the dog again, but he did not return. No record of this interrogation exists, as was the case for the interrogations of Iraqi Police in the hours and days following the shooting incident. The use of dogs in the manner directed by CIVIL N-11 was cle .busive and unauthorized (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-11, CIVILIAN-11; Annex 131 Appendix 2, PAPPAS). (U) Even with all the apparent confusion over roles, responsibilities and authorities, there were early indications that MP and MI personnel knew the use of dog teams in interrogations was abusive. Following this 24 November 2003, incident the three Navy dog teams concluded that some interrogators might attempt to misuse Navy Dogs to support their SE-CRE--T-1140FORNIIX4 - 84 019141 DOD-042299 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade interrogations. For all subsequent requests they inquired what the specific purpose of the dog was and when told "for interrogation" they explained that Navy dogs were not intended for interrogations and the request would not be fulfilled. Over the next few weeks, the Navy dog ./: . , -v. teams received about ei ht similar calls, none of which were fulfilled. In the later part of .--.-Z A , 1- " December 2003, COL.ummoned MAliallaind wanted to know what the Navy dogs' capabilities were. MA1.explained Navy dog capabilities and provided the Navy Dog Use SOP. COL MS never asked if they could be used in interrogations and following that meeting the Navy Dog teams received no additional requests to support interrogations., I (2) (U) Incident #26. On or about 8 January 2004, SOLDIER-17 was conducting an interrogation of a Baath Party General Officer in the shower area of Tier 1B of the Hard Site. Tier 1B was the area of the Hard Site dedicated to female and juvenile detainees. Although Tier 1B was not the normal location for interrogations, due to a space shortage in Tier 1A, SOLDIER­17 was using this area. SOLDIER-17 witnessed an MP guard and an MP Dog Handler, whom SOLDIEI-17 leer identified from photographs as SOLDIER27, enter Tier 1B with SOLDIER­27's black dog. '113.e dog was on a leash, but was not muzzled. The MP guard and MP Dog Handler opened a cell in which two juveniles, one known as "Casper," were housetl. SOLDIER­27 allowed the dog to enter the cell and "go nuts on the kids," barking at and scaring them. The juveniles were screaming and the smaller one tried to hide behind "Casper." SOLDIER-27 allowed the dog to get within about one foot of the juveniles. Afterward, SOLDIER-17 overheard SOLDIER-27 zay that he had a competition with another handler (likely SOLD,IER­ -08, the only other Army dog handler) to see if they could scaredetainees-to-the point that.they would defecate.. He mentioned that -they had already Made some detainees urinate, se they . appeared to be raising the competition. This iddident has no direct MI involvement; however, SOLDIER-17 failed to properly report what he observed. He stated that he went to bed and forgot the incident until asked about misuse of dogs during this investigation (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-17). (3) (U) Incident #27. On 12 December 2003, an MI Hold detainee named DETAINEE-11, was recommended by ;VII (SOLDIER-17) for an extended stay in the Hard Site because he appeared to be mentally unstable. He was bitten by a dog in the Hard Site, but at the time he was not undergoing an interrogation and no MI personnel were present. DETAINEE-11 told SOLDIER-17 that a dog had bitten him and SOLDIER-17 saw dog bite marks on DETAINEEll's thigh. SOLDIER-08, who was the dog handler of the dog that bit DETAINEE­11, stated that in December 2003 his dog bit a detainee and he believed that I4 were thepnly personnel around when the incident occurred, but he declined to make further statements regarding this incident to either the MG Taguba inquiry or to this inquiry. SOLDIER-27, another Army dog handler, also stated that SOLDIER-08's dog had bitten someone, but did not provide further information. This incident was captured on digital photograph 0178/CG LAPS and appears to be the result of MP harassment and amusement, no MI involvement is suspected SECRET//NOFORN/IXI 85 019142 DOD-042300 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,SOLDIER-17; Annex B, Appendix 2, SOLDIER-08, all Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs, D45-54, M146-171). (4) (U) Incident #28. In an apparent MI directed use of dogs in detainee abuse, circa 18 December 2003, a photograph depicts a Syrian detainee (DETAINEE-14) kneeling on the floor with his hands bound behind his ba k. DETAINEE -2 14 was a "high value" detainee who had arrived at Abu Ghraib in •peCember i2003, from a Navy ship. DETAINEE-14 was suspected to be involved with Al-Qaeda. Military Working Dog Handler SOLDIER-27 is standing in front of DETAINEE-14 with his black dog a few feet from DETAINEE-14's face. The dog is leashed K(4) -2)(1v)alt)- but not muzzled. SGTININwas DETAINEE-14's interrogator from 18 to 21 December 2003, and CIVILIAN-21, CACI contract interrogator, assumed the lead after SGT departed Abu Ghraib on 22 December 2003. SGT .identified DETAINEE14 as is detainee when shown a photo of the incident. CIVIL .-21 claimed to know nothing about thi incident; however, in December 2003 he' related to SSG .e was told by MPs that DETAINEE-14's bedding had been ripped apart by dogs.CIVILIAN-21 was characterized b SOLDIER25 as having a close relationship with the MPs, and she was told by SGT about dogs being used when CIVILIAN-21 was there. It is highly plausible that CIVILIAN-21 used dogs without authorization and directed the a.buSe in this incident as well as others related this detainee (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, .SOLDIER25, CIVILIAN-21; Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs Z1-6). (5) (U) Incident #29. On orabout 14 15 December 2003, dogs were used_ in an interrogation. SPC.who was the Section Chief of the Special. Projects team, stated that on 14 December, one o.interrogation teams requested the use oFdogs for a -detainee captured -in (h)6) -Z). conjunction with the capture of Saddam Hussein on 13 December 2003. SPC .rerbally requested the use of dogs from COL .and COL IIIIIIIstated that he would call higher tor (b)NC--2 request permission. This is contrary to .statement that he was given authority to use dogs as long as they were muzzled. About one hour later, SPC .received approval. SP(.stated that he was standing to the side of the dog handler theentire time the dog was used m the interrogation. The dog never hurt anyone and was always muzzled, about five feet away from the detainee (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, (6) (U) Incident #30. On another occasion, SOLDIER-26, an MI Soldier assigned to the S2, 320 MP BN, was present during an interrogation of a detainee and was told the detainee was suspected to have Al Qaeda affiliations. Dogs were requested and approved about three days later. SOLDIER-26 didn't know if the dog had to be muzzled or not, likely telling the dog handler to un-muzzle the dog, in contravention to CJTF-7 policy. The interrogators were CIVILIAN-20, CACI, and CIVILIAN-21 (CACI), SOLDIER-14, Operations Officer, ICE stated that CIVILIAN-21, used a dog during one of his interrogations and this is likely that occasion. According to SOLDIER-14, CIVILIAN-21 had the dog handler maintain control of the dog and SE-C-REPINOFORMIX4 86 DOD-042301 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade did not make any threatening reference to the dog, but apparently "felt just the presence of the dog would be unsettling to the detainee." SOLDIER-14 did not know who approved the .WO _9 procedure, but was verbally notified by SOLDIER-23, who supposedly received the approvalt ,Qcv from COL .CIVILIAN-21 claimed he once requested to use dogs, but it was never approved. Based on the evidence, CIVILIAN-21 was deceitful in his statement (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-14, SOLDIER-26, CIVILIAN-21). (7) (U) Incident #31. In a 14/15 December 2003 interrogation, military working dogs were used but were deemed ineffective because the detainee had little to no response to them. ..J6) —2 CIVILIAN-11, SOLDIER-05 and SOLDIER-12, all who participated in the interrogation, .,(6)00)— z believed they had authority to use the dogs from COL 1111111 or from LTG Sanchez; hiwever, no documentation was found showing CJTF7 approval!to use dogs in interrogations. It is probable that approval was granted by COL .without such authority. LTG Sanchez stated ) he never approved use of dogs. (Reference .ex lAppenclix 1, CIVILIAN-11, SOLDIER-12, SOLDIER-14, 111 .SOLDIER-23, CIVILIAN-2'1, SANCHEZ). (8) (U) Incident #32. In yet another instance, SOLDIER-25, an interrogator, stated that when she and SOLDIER15 were interrogating a female detainee in the Hard Site, they heard a dog barking. The female detainee was frightened by dogs, and SOLDIER-25 and SOLDIER-15 returned her to her cell. SOLDIER-25 went to sedowhat r was happening with the dog barking and saw a detainee in hiz..underwear on a mattress on the floor of. Tier lA with a dog standing over him CIVILIAN-21 was upstairs giving .directions to SS(.Fredrick 312 MP Co)4elling him to ., "take him. back home." SOLDIER-25 opined it was "common:IcnowlecleaCIVILIAN .:) -21---.1used dogs while he:was -on special projects', working.direCtly for COL .fter the-captUre of. Saddam on 13 December 2003." SOLDIER25 could not identify anyone else specifically who Eb,l(314) knew of this "common knowledge." It appeared CIVILIAN-21 was encouraging and even directing the MP abuse with dogs; likelya "softening up" technique for future interrogations. The detainee was one of CIVILIAN-21's. SOLDIER-25 did not see an interpreter in the area, so it is uillikely that CIVILIAN-21 was actually doing an interrogation. (9) (U) SOLDIER-25 stated that SSG Frederick would some into her office every other day or so and tell her about dogs being used while CIVILIAN-21 vas present; SSG Fredrick and other MPs used to refer to "doggy dance" sessions. SOLDIER-25 did not specify what "doggy dance" was (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-25), but the obvious implication is that it referred to an unauthorized use of dogs to intimidate detainees. g. (U) Incidents of Detainee Abuse Using Humiliation. Removal of clothing was not a technique developed at Abu Ghraib, but rather a technique which was imported and can be traced through Afghanistan and GTMO. The 1987 version of FM 34-52, Interrogation, talked about "controlling all aspects of the interrogation to include... clothing given to the source," while the SE-GRETAN0FORNIIX4 •. 87 019144 DOD-042302 SE-C-RE—T4440E-ORNIIX4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade current 1992 version does not. The 1987 version was, however, cited as the primary reference for CJTF-7 in Iraq, even as late as 9 June 2004. The removal of clothing for both MI and MP objectives wasauthorized, approved, and employed in Afghanistan and GTMO. At GTMO, the JTF 170 "Counter-Resistance Strategy," documented on 11 October 2002, permitted the removal of clothing, approved by the interrogation officer-in-charge, as an incentive in detention operations and interrogations. The SECDEF granted this authority on 2 December 2002, but it was rescinded six weeks later in January 2003. This technique also surfaced in Afghanistan. The CJTF-180 "Interrogation Techniques," documented on 24 January 2003, highlighted that deprivation of clothing had not historically been included in battlefield interrogations. However, it went on to recommend clothing removal as an effective technique that could potentially raise objections as being degrading or inhumane, but for which'no specific written legal prohibition existed. As interrogation operations in Irdq began to take form, it was often the same personnel who had operated and deployed in other theateri and in support. of GWOT, who were called upon to establish and conduct interrogation operations in Abu Ghraib. The lines of authority and the prior legal opinions blurred. Soldiers simply carried forward the use of nudity into the Iraqi theater of operations. (U) Removal of clothing is not a doctrinal or authorized interrogation technique but appears to have been directed and employed at various levels within MI as an "ego down" technique. It was also employed by MPs as a "control" mechanism. Individual observation and/or understanding of the use and approval of clothing removal.varied in.each interview (46)-2.-} H 70 -z conduoted by this.investigation. ITC .was knowledgeable of naked .deteinees. and. removal of their clothing He denied or enng it and blamed it on the .MPs..and SOLDIER14 claimed not to have observed nudity or approved clothittg -renaoval. Multi-pie Mks, interrogators, analysts, and interpreters observed nudity and/or employed clothing removal as an incentive, while an equal number didn't. It is apparent from this investigation that removal of clothing was employed routinely and with the belief it was not abuse. SOLDIER-03, GTMO Tiger Team believed that clothing as an "ego down" technique could be employed. He thought, mistakenly, that GTMO still had that authority. Nudity of detainees throughout the Hard Site was common enough that even during an ICRC visit they noted several detainees without clothing, and CP.372 MP CO, stated upon his initial arrival at Abu Ghraib, "There's a .(6)P -ZJ lot of nude people ere." Some of the nudity was attributed to a lack of clothing and uniforms .(5)0.)0 for the detainees; however, even in these cases we could not determine what happened to the detainee's original clothing. It was routine practice to strip search detainees before their movement to the Hard Site. The use of clothing as an incentive (nudity) is significant in that it likely contributed to an escalating "de-humanization" of the detainees and set the stage for additional and more severe abuses to occur (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs D42­43, M5-7, M17-18, M21, M137-141). - SE—GRET11N0FORNIIX4 88 019145 DOD-042303 SE-CRE-T-INOFORNIA4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15.6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention FaCility and 205th MI Brigade (1) (U) Incident #33. There is also ample evidence of detainees being forced to wear women's underwear, sometimes on their heads. These cases appear to be a form of humiliation, either for MP control or MI "ego down." DETAINEE-07 and DETAINEE-05 both claimed they were stripped of their clothing and forced to wear women's underwear on their heads. CIVILIAN-15 (CACI) and CIVILIAN-19 (CACI), a CJTF-7 analyst, alleged CIVILIAN-21 bragged and laughed about shaving a detainee and forcing him to wear red women's underwear. Several photographs include unidentified detainees with underwear on their heads. Such photos show abuse and constitute sexual humiliation of detainees (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, .z_ SOLDIER-03, SOLDIER-14, CIVILIAN-21,m Annex B, Appendix 3, DETAINEE-05,CIVILIAN- ,.. 2- IAN-1 , DETAINEE-07; Annex C; Annex G; Annex 1,(.6.0g) ­Appendix 1, photographs D12, D14, M11-16). (2) (U) Incident #34. On 16 September 2003, MI directed the removal of a detainee's clothing. This is the earliest incident we identified at Abu Ghraib. An MP log indicated a detainee "was stripped down per MI and he is neked (sic) and standing tall in his cell." The following day his interrogators, SPCIIIIIMand SSG1111111Warrived at the detainee's cell (40 -2 and he was unclothed. They were both surprised. An MP asked SSC-s, a female, to 017.,e)_z stand to the side while the detainee dressed and the detainee appeared to have his clothing in his cell. SS.was told by the MP the detainee had voluntarily removed his clothing as a protest and, in the su sequent interrogation, the detainee did not claim any abuse or the forcible removal of his clothing. It does not appear the detainee was .ped at the. interrogator's • . direction, but someone in MI most likely diticted it. ',SPC and SOLDIER-25 -provided e. stkernents where they opined SPC11111 in charge of in -processing MI.may haVe-.(4) -2 directed removal of detainee clothing on this and other" occasions. SPC .denies ever giving `' such orders (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, . SOLDIER-25, .1111.). (3) (U) Incident #35. On 19 September 2003, an interrogation "Tiger Team" consisting of SOLDIER-16, SOLDIER-07, and a civilian contract interpreter identified only as ' .(410.1 (female), conducttd a'Itte night/early morning interrogation of a 17 year old Syrian foreign . (6/0tEj-j fighter. SOLDIER-16 was the lead interrogator. SOLDIER-07 was told by SOLDIER-16 that the detainee they were about to interrogate was naked. SOLDIER-07 was unsure if SOLDIER­16 was simply passing along that fact or had directed the MPs to strip the detainee. The detainee had fashioned an empty "Meals-Ready-to-Eat" (MRE) bag to cover his genital area. SOLDIER­07 couldn't recall who ordered the detainee to raise his hands to his sides, but when he did, the bag fell to the floor exposing him to SOLDIER-07 and the two female interrogation team members. SOLDIER-16 used a direct interrogation approach with the incentive of getting back clothing, and the use of stress positions. SE-GRETINGFORN IIX4 89 019146 DOD-042304 SECRETAN-OFORNI4X4 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Gliraib Detention.Facility and 205th MI Brigade (U) There is no record of an Interrogation Plan or any approval documents which would authorize these techniques. The fact these techniques were documented in the Interrogation Report suggests, however, that the interrogators believed they had the authority to use clothing as an incentive, as well as stress positions, and were not attempting to hide their use. Stress positions were permissible with Commander, CJTF-7, approval at that time. It is probable that use of nudity was sanctioned at some level within the chain-of-command. If not, lack of leadership and oversight permitted the nudity to occur. Having a detainee raise his hands to expose himself in front of two females is humiliation and therefore violates the Geneva Conventions (RiiiAnnex B, A4ndix 1, SOLDIER-07, SOI,DIER-).4, SOLDIER-16, SOLDIER-24,. (0).OP -Z (4) (U) Incident #36. In early October 2003, SOLDIER-19 was conducting an interrogation and ordered a detainee to roll his orange jumpsuit down to his waist, insinuating to the detainee that he would be further stripped if he did not cooperate. SOLDIER-19's interpreter put up his hand, looked away, said that he was not comfortable with the situation, and exited the interrogation booth. SOLDIER19 was then forced to stop the interrogation due to lack of - language support. SOLDIER-11, an analyst from a visiting JTF GTMO Tiger Team, witnessed this incident through the booth's observation window and brought it to the attention of SOLDIER-16, who was SOLDIER-19's Team Chief and first line supervisor. SOLDIER-16 responded that SOLDIER-19 knew what he was doing and did not take any action regarding the matter. SOLDIER;11,reported the same information to.SOLDIER 28, his JTF GTMO Tiger Tom Chief, who,.aeeorcling..:to SOLDIER-11,:said he would "take car&of it.r SOLDIER8 recalld a conversation Vila SOLDIER.11 concerning an interpreter Walking ottt of an interrogation due to a "cultural -difference; but could not remember the.incident. -This incident has four; abuse components: the actual unauthorized stripping of a detainee by SOLDIER-19, the failure of SOLDIER-10 to report the incident he witnessed, the failure of SOLDIER-16 to take corrective action, reporting the incident up the chain of command, and the failure of SOLDIER-. 28 to report. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-11, SOLDIER-16, SOLDIER-19, SOLDIER-28) (5) (U) Incident #37. A photograph taken on 17 October 2003 depicts a naked detainee chained to his cell door with a hood on his head. Several other photographs taken on 18 October 2003 depict a hooded detainee cuffed to his cell door. Additional photographs on 19 October 2003 depict a detainee cuffed to his bed with underwear on his head. A review of available documents could not tie these photos to a specific incident, detainee or allegation, but these photos reinforce the reality that humiliation and nudity were being employed routinely enough that photo opportunities occurred on three successive days. MI involvement in these apparent abuses cannot be confirmed. (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs D12, D14, D42 44, M5-7, M17-18, M21, M11-16, M137-141) ­ SEC 90 019147 DOD-042305 SEC SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 InVestigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and . 205th MI Brigade (6) (U) Incident #38. Eleven photographs of two female detainees arrested for suspected prostitution were obtained. Identified in these photographs are SPC Hannan and CPL Graner, both MPs. In some of these photos, a criminal detainee housed in the Hard Site was shown lifting her shirt with both her breasts exposed. There is no evidence to confirm if these acts were consensual or coerced; however in either case sexual exploitation of a person in US custody constitutes abuse. There does not appear to be any direct MI involvement in either of the two incidents above. , (Reference Annex I, Appendix 1, Photographs M42-52) (7) (U) Incident #39.. On 16 November 2003, SOLDIER-29 decided to strip a detainee in response to what she befkved was uncooperative and physically recalcitrant behavior. She had submitted an Interrogation Plan in which she planned to use the "Pride and Ego Down," technique but did not specify that she would strip the detainee as part of that approach. SOLDIER-29 felt the detainee was "arrogant," and when she and her analyst, SOLDIER-10, "placed him against the wall" the detainee -pushed SOLDIER-10. SOLDIER-29 warned if he touched SOLDIER-10 again, she would have him remove his shoes. A bizarre tit-for-tat scenario then ensued where SOLDIER-29 would warn the detainee about touching SOLDIER­10, the detainee would "touch" SOLDIER-10, and then had his shirt, blanket, and finally his pants removed. At this point, SOLDIER-29 concluded that the detainee was "completely uncooperative" and terminated the interrogation. While nudity seemed to be acceptable, SOLDIER-29 went further than most when she walked the semi-naked detainee across the camp. SGT_. la SOLDIER-29's supervisor, commented that walking a semi-naked detainee across ­the camp could havr, caused a riot. CIVILIAN-2 ,1, a, CACI cantrart•intezrogator, witnessed • SOLDIER-29 and SOLDIER-10 escorting the scantily clad detainee froin the HardSite back to Camp Vigilant; wearing only hisUnderwear and carrying his blanket. CIVILIAN-21 notified' SG.who was SOLDIER-29's section chief, who in turn notified CPT .the ICE OIC..immediately called SOLDIER-29 and SOLDIER-10 into her office, counseled them, and removed them from interrogation duties. (U) The incident was relatively well known among JIDC personnel and appeared in several statements as second hand information when interviewees were asked if they knew of detainee abuse. LT i tem orarily removed SOLDIE -29 and SOLDIER-10 from interrogation duties. OL.left the issue for LTC .o handle. COIllieshould have taken sterner action suc as an Article 15, UCMJ. His failure to do so did not send a strong enough message to the rest of the JIDC that abuse would not be tolerated. CPT .ad recommended to LTCIIIIIIthat SOLDIER-29 receive an Article 15 and SFC .the interrogation NCOIC, recommended she be turned over to her parent unit for the non­compliance. (Reference Anneiiiiifdix 1,11111111 CIVILIAN-04, momSOLDIER-29, CIVILIAN-21.nnex B, Appendix 2,1111.11). SE-C-RE—TI/NOFORN#X4 91 019148 DOD-042306 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade (8) (U) Incident #40. On 24 November 2003, there was a shooting of a detainee at Abu Ghraib in Tier 1A. DETAINEE-06, had obtained a pistol. While the MPs attempted to confiscate the weapon, an MP and DETAINEE-06 were shot. It was alleged that an Iraqi Police Guard had smuggled the pistol to DETAINEE-06 and in the aftermath of the shooting forty-three Iraqi Police were screened and eleven subsequently detained and interrogated. All but three were released following intense questioning. A fourth did not report for work the next day and is still at large. The Iraqi guard detainees admitted smuggling the weapons into the facility hiding them in an inner tube of a tire and several of the Iraqi guards were identified as Fedayeen trainers and members. During the interrogations of the Iraqi Police, harsh and unauthorized techniques were employed to include the use of dogs, discussed earlier in this report, and removal of clothing (See paragraph 5.e(18), above). Once detained, the police were strip-searched, which was a reasonable precaution considering the threat of contraband or weapons. Following such search, however, the police were not returned their clothes before being interrogated. This is an act of humiliation and was unauthorized. It was the general understanding that evening that LTG Sanchez and COLIIIIIhad authorized all measures to identify those involved, however, that should not have been construed to include abuse. LT( .was the senior officer present at the interrogations and is responsible for the harsh and humiliatingAnn A ix 2, g treatmentnt of thepolice. ((:)(67) ..)---642 (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,MN Annex B, Appendix 1, DET EE-06). (9) (U) Incident #41. On 4 December 2003, documentation-in the MP Logs indicated that MI leadership-was ,0:‘,,vaTeof clothing removal. An entry indicatedpoke with LTAIIIIIN5 MI BDE) about MI holds in-Tier-1-A/B. He stated he would clear up with MI and-let MPs run , Tiers 1A/B as far as what inmate gets (clothes)." Additionally; inhis statement; LT claims he asked LTC migivhat the situation was with naked detainees, and LTC responded With, "It wa=errogation technique." Whether this supports allegations of MI involvement in the clothing and stripping of detainees is uncertain, but it does show that MI at least knew of the practice and was willing to defer decisions to the MPs. Such vague guidance, if later combined with an implied tasking from MI, or perceived tasking by MP, otentially contributed to the subsequent abuse (Reference Annex B, Appendix 2, h. (U) Incidents of Detainee Abose Using Isolation. IsOlation is a valid interrotationd technique which required approval by the CJTF-7 Commander. We identified documentation of four instances where isolation was approved by LTG Sanchez. LTG Sanchez statedhelad approved 25 instances of isolation. This investigation, however, found numerousdincid&ts of chronic confusion by both MI and MPs at all levels of command, up through CJTF-7, between the definitions of "isolation" and "segregation." Since thee terms were commonly infdrchangel, we conclude Segregation was used far mire often than IsolationiSegregation is a valid procedure to limit collaboration between detainees. This is what was employed most often in Tier lA (putting a detainee in a cell by himself vice in a communal cell as was common outside SEC-RET-1410F0RNIA4 92 019149 DOD-042307 SECRET//NOFORN//X1 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade . the Hard Site) and was sometimes incorrectly referred to as "isolation." Tier lA did have isolation cells with solid doors which could be closed as well as a small room (closet) which was referred to as the isolation "Hole." Use of these rooms should have been closely controlled and monitored by MI and MP leaders. They were not, however, which subjected the detainees to excessive cold in the winter and heat in the summer. There was obviously poor air quality, no monitoring of time limits, no frequent checks on the physical condition of the detainee, and no medical screening, all of which added up to detainee abuse. A review of interrogation reports identified ten references to "putting people in the Hole," "taking them out of the Hole," or consideration of isolation. These occurred between 15 September 2003 and 3 January 2004. (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SANCHEZ) (1) (U) Incident #42. On 15 September 2003, at 2150 hours, unidentified MI personnel, using the initials CKD, directed the use of isolation on a unidentified detainee. The detainee in cell #9 was directed to leave his outer cell door open for ventilation and was directed to be taken off the light schedule. The identification of CKD, the MI personnel, or the detainee could not be determined. This information originated from the prison log entry and confirms the use of isolation and sensory deprivation as interrogation techniques. (Reference MP Hard Site log book entry, 15 September 2003). (2) (U) Incident #43. In early October 2003, SOLDIER-11ivas interrogating an unidentified detainee with SOLDIER-19, an interrogator, and an unidentified contract .interpreter. About an hour and 45 minutes' into the interrogation, SOLDIER-19 tamed to .- • SOLDIER-11 and asked if he thoUght they should place the.detaiiiee in solitary-confinement for a few hours, apparently bcoause the detainee was not cooperating of answering questions. SOLDIER-11 expressed his misgivings about the tactic„but deferred to SOLDIER-19 as the interrogator. About 15 minutes later, SOLDIER-19 stopped the interrogation, departed the booth, and returned about five minutes later with an MP, SSG Frederick. SSG Frederick jammed a bag over the detainee's head, grabbed the handcuffs restraining him and said something like "come with me piggy", as he led the detainee to solitary confinement in the Hard Site, Tier lA of Abu Ghraib. (U) About half an hour later, SOLDIER-19 and SOLDIER-11 went to the Hard Site without their interpreter, although he was available if needed. When they arrived at the detainee's cell, they found him lying on the floor, completely naked except for a hood that covered his head from his upper lip, whimpering, but there were no bruises or marks on him. SSG Frederick then met SOLDIER-19 and SOLDIER-11 at the cell door. He started yelling at the detainee, "You've been moving little piggy, you know you shouldn't move", or words to that effect, and yanked the hood back down over the detainee's head. SOLDIER-19 and SOLDIER­11 instructed other MPs to clothe the detainee, which they did. SOLDIER-11 then asked SOLDIER-19 if he knew the MPs were going to strip the detainee, and SOLDIER-19 said that he SE—CRETI/NOFORN/IX4 93 019150 DOD-042308 SUBJECT: (U) AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th MI Brigade . did not. After the detainee was clothed, both SOLDIER-19 and SOLDIER-11 escorted him to the general population and released him without interrogating hiin again. SSG Frederick made the statement "I want to thank you guys, because up until a week or two ago, I was a good Christian." SOLDIER-11 is uncertain under what context SSG Frederick made this statement. SOLDIER-11 noted that neither the isolation technique, nor the "striping incident" in the cell, was in any "interrogator notes" or "interrogation plan." (U) More than likely, SOLDIER-19 knew what SSG Frederick was going to do. Given that the order for isolation appeared to be a spontaneous reaction to the detainee's recalcitrance and not part of an orchestrated Interrogation Plan; that the "isolation" lasted only approximately half an hour; that SOLDIER-19 chose to re-contact the detainee without an interpreter present; and that SOLDIER-19 was present with SSG Frederick at another incident of detainee abuse; it is possible that SOLDIER-19 had a prearranged agreement with SSG Frederick to "soften up" uncooperative detainees and directed SSG Frederick to strip the detainee in isolation as punishment for being uncooperative, thus providing the detainee an incentive to cooperate during the next interrogation. We believe at a minimum, SOLDIER-19 knew or at least suspected this type of treatment would take place even without specific instructions (Reference Annex B, Appendix 1,SOLDIER-11, SOLDIER-19,M. SOLDIER-28). A,t)-Z}())-z (3) (U) Incident(s) #44. On 13 November 2003, SOLDIER-29 and SOLDIER-10, MI interrogators, noted that a detainee was unhappy with his stay in isolation and visits to the hole. -.(U) On 11,13, and .14 November 2003, MI interrogators; SOLDIER-04; SOLDIER-09, SOLDIER-02; and SOLDIER-23 noted thaa detainee was "walked and put in the -Hole," "pulled out of extreme segregation," "did not seem to be bothered to return to the Hole," "Kept in the Hole for a long time unless he started to talk," and "was in good spirits even after three days in the Hole." (Reference Annex I, Appendix 3, Photo of "the Hole"). (U) A 5 November 2003 interrogation report indicates in the recommendations/future approaches paragraph: "Detainee has been recommended for the hole in ISO. Detainee should be treated harshly because friendly treatment has not been productive and because CO wants fast resolution, or he will turn the detainee over to someone other than the 205th [M 70-2 (U) On 12 November 2003, MI interrogators SOLDIER-18 and SOLDIER13 noted that a detainee "feared the isolation Hole, and it made him upset, but not enough to break." (U) On 29 November 2003, MI interrogators SOLDIER-18 and SOLDIER-06 told a detainee that "he would go into the Hole if he didn't start cooperating." SE-CRETIINORDRNIA4 94 019151 DOD-042309 SE—C-RET4440FORNIA4 SUBJECT: (U) AR•15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghiaib Detention Facility and -205th MI Brigade (U) On 8 December 2003, unidentified' interrogators told a detainee that he was "recommended for movement to ISO and the Hole - he was told his sun [sunlight] would be taken away, so he better enjoy it now." (U) These incidents all indicate the routine and repetitive use of total isolation and light deprivation. Documentation of this technique in the interrogation reports implies those employing it thought it was authorized. The manner it was applied is a violation of the Geneva Conventions, CJTF-7 policy, and Army policy (Reference Annex M, Appendix 2, AR 190-8). Isolation was being employed without proper approval and with little oversight, resulting in abuse (Reference Annex I, Appendix 4, DETAINEE-08). i. (U) Several alleged abuses were investigated and found to be unsubstantiated. Others turned out to be no more than general rumor or fabrication. This investigation established a threshold below which information on alleged or potential abuse was not included in this report. Fragmentary or difficult to understand allegations or information at times defied our ability to investigate further. One such example is contained in a statement from an alleged abuse victim, DETAINEE-13, who claimed he was always treated well at Abu Ghraib but was abused earlier by his captors. He potentially contradicts that claim by stating his head was hit into a wall. The detainee appears confused concerning the times and locations at which he was abused. Several incidents involved numerous victims and/or occurred during a single "event," such as the Iraqi -.Police Interrogations on 24 November 2003. One example receiving some visibili was a report --by SOLDIER-22 who overhbard a c nversation in the "(,liall!,' between-SPG .and his unidentified "friends." SP.was'afleged to have said! "MPs were -using detaineos as practice dummies. They woe it e detainees as practice shots.' They would apply strikes to their necks and knock them out. One detainee was so scared; the MPs held his head and told him everything would be alright, and then they would strike him. The detainees would plead for mercy and the MPs thought it was all funny." SPC as interviewed and denied having knowledge of any abuse. He admitted that he and his . s would joke about noises they heard in the Hard Site and say things such as "the MPs are doing their thin: " SP • .ever thought an one would take him seriously. Several associates of SPC .were interviewed (SPC.SOLDIER-12, PVT ). All claimed their discussions with SPC were just rumor, and the ink anyone would take him seriously or construe he ad personal knowledge of abuse. SPC 's duties also make it unlikely he would have witnessed any abuse. He arrived at Abu Ghraib as an analyst, working the day shift, in late November 2003. Shortly after his arrival, the 24 November "shooting incident" occurred and the following day, he was moved to Camp Victory for three weeks. Upon his return, he was transferred to guard duty at Camp Wood and Camp Steel and never returned to the Hard Site. This alleged abuse is likely an individual's boastful exaggeration of a rumor which was rampant throu hout Abu Ghr.othin more Reference Annex B, Appendix 1, SOLDIER-12, SOLDIER-22). SE—CRETWN0E0MIX4 95 019152 DOD-042310 0 ts.) c4) ¦—, 1—¦ — CD 1-¦ LA) 0 trj ,•0 4.( Cy\ ,,_, 1 .p...,.....¦.'-..... Cip 6' t'') LA VI C4 til C) 0 I LTI 03/ 21 50 C) -3 tO") tc1 CD oc/ (,) fa..• CD CD BeatandKickeda #34. During MI/MPInterrogation. Incident #35. Clothing. Incident Removalof Incident#42 . MI/MP 1.1 R." •E•'• Cr ..,- - • . .... , .. . , ... , . - 2- • . - ,..... . - ' 0 tapCD 4 a Siteat MIdirection. apparentlystripped uponarrivaltoHard I MI/MP isolationandsensorydeprivationasan interrogationtechnique. a. backtothecommand. MP logentryconfirms MI useof Allegationsof Abuse Incidents,the Natureof ReportedAbuse,and Associated Personnel Note: Thechart listsallallegationsconsidered. Thespecificabuseclaimed and entities involved arenotconfirmed inall cases . The categoryof abuseareunderlined.(Seeparagraph 5e-h,above) . Date/ Incident . NatureorAilei Comments Time Nudity/ Assault Sexual Useof The Other Humiliation Assault Dogs "Hole'-' 15 SEP Useof Isolation. CuffedDetainee. Incident#1. 019153 DOD-042311 019154 DOD-042312 C AllegationsofAbuseIncidents,the Natureof Reported Abuse,and Associated Personnel Note: Thechart listsallallegationsconsidered.Thespecificabuseclaimed andentities involved arenotconfirmed inallcases. The categoryof abuseareunderlined.(Seeparagraph 5e-h,above) Date/ Incident Natureof A11e1 Comments Time 0 tli 0 til cz.--.) ,..Z 0-3.' 1-3.'‘..Z •0 © c) 1.-i La t_a Attegea Assaultof Nudity/ Assault Sexual Useof The Other Humiliation Assault Dogs "Hole" Ml 15s. a Female Detainee. Incident #2. Interrogator Directs Partial Removal of Clothing/Failureto MI Report.Incident #36. Confinement/Milita ry PoliceStripping of Detainee/Failure to Report. Incident #43. 4 4 -ci 1 • • ' a.V.L.I.L.1. •.ALAS,.t.7 carried outtherequest,strippedand Allegationsof Abuse Incidents,theNatureof ReportedAbuse,andAssociated Personnel Note: Thechart listsallallegationsconsidered.Thespecificabuseclaimedandentities involvedarenotconfirmed inall cases.The categoryof abuseareunderlined.(Seeparagraph 5e-h,above) Abused for Making aShank froma Toothbrush. Incident#8. 25 OCT Photosof a Naked Humiliationand degradation. No 03/ 201 5 Detaineeona Dog MP indicationof associationwithML (est)Leash. Incident#9. 0 tv .0 O 0 — ,-.J.-.1 ,o. . Date/ Time , cz ,..,.., ,_, 0 .-3 1-3 4tZZCIZeIZ II:i (Al co.— co.— CD.AD ' a N-R. p. 0 to — 0 . (-) — o n.0.rcs al. cn CD. ,-:.CD.17-1.1-1 CD.p--4.¦...d ,..q0 8 .8 ca, _,-•. CD.,-•.P-t).,--*).0., + 04 0.R —,- DetaineeWas No indicationofassociationwithMI. Stripped and Incident Natureof Allel Nudity/ Assault Sexual Useof The Other L Humiliation As'saUlt Dogs "Hole" Comments 019155 DOD-042313 Allegations ofAbuse Incidents, the Nature ofReportedAbuse, and AssociatedPersonnel Note: The chart lists all allegations considered. The specific'abuse claimed and entities involved are not confirmedin all cases. The category of abuse are underlined. (See paragraph 5e-h, above) Date/ juappui Nature ofAlle Comments Time Nudity/ Assault Sexual Use of Humiliation Assault Dogs ,,a1011,5 aqj, Other N 0.I ¦—¦ Photographs of ...a.. 'CI Ei aa.0.;4..+S 744..aa -d 1) g ie0,,L82,.; (..=) ---.c-,1.0 trl m.vs Incident not associated with interrogation operations. MI personnel observed and participated as individuals. MPs took many photos of two female detainees. One detainee photographed ..• 79 .. .... .... ....'. '..:.. a. 28 OCT 03 Female Detainees. dIN dIA1 Incident #38. exposing her breasts. 0 C.) .Abuse and Sodomy of a Detainee (Chem Light Incident). Incident #5. Detainee on MI Hold. No other indication of association with MI. Cn H N - 0 LA 4a, toy . cr,O cn 1:20 CD 11) 0 0 1-*) CD CT' /4. t=1 CD '6+ z 0 rj p 52. 019157 DOD-042315 OCT 03 Detainee's Chin No indicationof associationwith MI. Lacerated.Incident MP Assailantunknown. Detainee Forcedto No indicationofassociationwith MI. Standona Box Attachedwiretopenis.Threatened WithSimulated detaineewith electrocution Water is Poured on Him, His Genitals are Hit. Incident Allegationsof AbuseIncidents,the NatureofReported Abuse,andAssociated Personnel Note: Thechart listsall allegationsconsidered. Thespecificabuseclaimed and entities involved arenotconfirmedinall cases. The categoryofabuseareunderlined.(Seeparagraph5e-h,above) Date/ Incident Natureof Allel Comments. Time Nudity/ Assault Sexual Useof The Other Humiliation AsOtilt Dogs "Hole" 0 LA 03 Electrical Wires Attachedto his Fingersand Penis . Incident#10. 4NOV CIA DetaineeDies SEAL Team involved inapprehending 1.CD -F• (4J.---- 0 . . inCustody. CIA detainee. MPsphotographed body. Incident#7. Tamperedwithevidence [ DetaineeForcedto Detaineeon MIHold.Noother Stand on Boxes, #21. #20. indicationof associationwith MI.