Report from the Office of Inspector General on Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities from September 2001-October 2003, specifically focusing on the use of Enhanced Interrogation Techniques (EITs).
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Central Intelligence Agency
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'--------c~ COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND· ..
INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES
(SEPTEMBER 2001-OCTOBER 2003)
(2003-7123-IG)
7May2004
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_, TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................ 1
SUMMARY .................................................................. ~ ................. 2
BACKGROUND ........................................................................... 9
DISCUSSION ........................ ,.;.,,, ............................... ~ ................ 11
GENESIS OF POST 9/11 AGENCY DETENTION AND INTERROGATION
ACTIVITIES ...................................................... : ............................................ 11
THE~ OF ABU ZUBAYDAH AND DEVELOPMENT OF EITS ............ 12
DoJ LEGALANALYSIS ........................... ~ ............................................. ~ .•..... 16
NOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION WITH EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESSIONAL
OFFICIALS .............. ~·,, .................................................................................. 23
(b )(1) GUIDANCE ON CAPTURE, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION ................. 24
(b )(3) NatSecAct ................................... 25
DCI Confinement Guidelines ......................................................... 27
DO Interrogation Guidelines ......................................................... 29 .
Medical Guidelines ........................................................................... 31
Training for Interrogations .......................................... ~··•oo••""'"'"''''31
(b)( 1 ) DETENTION AND INTERROGATION OPERATIONS AT
(b )(3) NatSecAct ,, ..... ~ ............................ ;• •.. ~ ••.••••••.•••.•.••••. -.•.- .• -•.•- •..•- ..- •••- •• -•••- •••- •• -•••- .••~ 33
(b)(1)
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(b)(1)
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.......................................................................................... 34 L_ ____ _j
Staffing and Operations ............................................................... 34
Videotapes of ~I\terrogations ...................................................... 36
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Staff~ng ........................................................................... ~ ................ 39
Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines ........................................... 40
. :-.·
Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques ......... 41
Handgun and Power Drill ................. : .. ~·······························.41
Threats ....................................................................................... 42
Smoke .... ~ ........... ~ ........................................................................ 43
Stress Positions ....................................................... · .... ~ ............ 44
(b)(1)
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Stiff Brush and Shackles ........................................................ 44
Waterboard Technique ........................................................... 44
(b)(1) '
(b )(3) NatSecAcPETENTION AND INTERROGATION ACITV1TIESL_ _____ _j ........ 46
................................................................................... 47
(b)(1)
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Headquarters· Oversigllt .............................................................. 48
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Facility and Procedures ................................................................ SO
Bite Managemen~ f ............................... 54
~----.-----------_j Interrogators and Linguists .. , ..................................................... 57
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Medical Support ............. ~ ...................................................... ~ ..... ,58
(b)(1) ....................... ;. ................................................................ 65
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Death of.Gul Rahman .................................................. ~ .................... 67
Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniq'\l_es ............. 69
Pressure Points ............................................................................... 69
MoCk Executions ........................................................................... 70
Use of Smoke ................................................................................. 72
Use of Cold ..... ~ .............. ~ ................................... :-·········· ........... ~ ...... 73
Water Dousing ...... ~········································································· 76
Hard Takedown ···································································•···~···· 77
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Abuse at Other Locations Outside of the ere
PrOgraLm-•.-..- ..- .. -...- .. -..._ ..j. ............................................................................. 78
(b)(1) .-·
(b )(3) NatSecAct ACCOI.INTING FOR DETAINEES ................................... 80
ANALYI1CAL SUPPORT TO IN'TERROGA110NS ......................................... ~.82
EFFECTIVENESS ................................. ;,,,., ............................................. ~ .•••• 85
POUCY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE DIITENTION
AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM ............................................................. 91
.Policy Considerations ....................................................................... 92
Concerns Over Participation in the CI'C Program ..................... 94
ENDGAME .................................................................................................. 95
CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................... 100
RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................... 106
APPENDICES
A. Procedures and Resources
B. Chronology of Significant Events
C. Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel of the .
Central Intelligence Agency, Re: Interrogation of an Al-Qa'ida
Operative, 1 August 2002
D. DCI Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees,
28 January 2003
E. DCI Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the
Presidential Memorandum of Notification of 17 September
2001, 28 January ?003
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F. Draft Q(fjce of Medical &:!~,"Vices Guidelines on Medical
2003 . . :·
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
(b)(1) SPECIAL REVIEW
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(~~'--------"~ COUNTERTERRORISM DETENTION AND
INTERROGATION ACTIVITIES
(SEPTEMBER 2001· OCTOBER 2003)
(2003-7123-IG)
7May2004
(b)(3) NatSecAct INTRODUCTION
(b)(1) .
1.1 On 17 September 2001, the President
ed a Memorandum of Notification (MON) (b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
eo . e ey weapons m e war on error was . e
authorization for CIA to "undertake operations designed to capture
and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of violence
or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning terroriSt
activities."
(b )(3) NatSecAct 2. ~ In November 2002, the Dep~ty Dl.rector for
Operations (DDO) informed the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
that the Agency had established a program in the CounterterroriSt
Center to detain and interrogate terrorists at sites abroad ("the CTC
Program"). He also informed OIG that he had just learned of and had
dispatched a team to investigate the death of a detainee, Gul
(b)(1) Rahman In Jartuary 2003, the DDO informed OIG
(b)(3) NatSecActthat he had received allegations that Agency personnel had Used
tmauthorized interrogation techniques with a detainee, .
'Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashiri, at another foreign site, and requested that·~·-""---
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01(; mvestigaj:~. Separately, OIG receivedinformation-that some
employees were concerned that certain covert Agency activities at an
overseas detention and interrogation site might involve violations of
human rights. In January 2003, OIG initiated a review of Agency
counterterrorism detention and interrogation activities and
investigations into the death of Gul Rahman and the incident with
Al-Nashiri.l This Review covers the period September 2001 to midOctober
2003.2 Results of the Gul Rahman and Al-Nashiri-related
investigations are the subject of separate reports.
(b)(1)
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3. ~After the President signed the
17 September 2001 MON, the DCI assigned responsibility for
implementing capture and detention authority to the DDO and to the
· Director of the DCI Counterterrorist Center (D/CTC). When U.S.
military forces began detaining individuals in Mghanistan and at
Guantanamo Ba , Cuba
(b)(1)
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4. ffS,L Following the approval of the MONon
17 September 2001, the Agency began to detain and interrogate
directly a number of suspected terrorists. The capture and initial
Agency interrogation of the first high value detainee, Abu Zubaydah,
(b )(3) Na!SecAct
1 (SI ~ Appendix A addresses the Procedures and Resources that OIG employed in
conducting this Review. The Review does not address renditions conducted by the Agency or
interrogations conducted jointly with the U.S. military.
2 (U) Appendix B is a chronology of significan~ events that occurred during the period of this
Review. (b)( 1 )--:-:--::----c----------,
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in March 20Q2,.presented the Agency with a signifi~;ant dilemma.4
The Agency was under pressure to do everything possible to prevent
additional terrorist attacks. Senior Agency officials believed Abu
Zubaydah was withholding information that could not be obtained
through then-authorized interrogation techniques. Agency officials
believed that a more robust approach was necessary to elicit threat
information from Abu Zubaydah and possibly froin other senior
(b)(1) Al-Qa'ida high value detainees.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
5. \fS.I The conduct of detention and interrogation
activities presented new challenges for CIA. These included
determining where detention and interrogation facilities could be
securely located and operated, and identifying and preparing
qualified personnel to manage and carry out detention and
interrogation activities. With the knowledge that Al-Qa'ida
personnel had been trained in the use of resistance techniques,
· another challenge was to identify interrogation techniques that
Agency personnel could lawfully use to overcome the resistance. In
this context, CTC, with the assistance of the Office of Technical
Service (OTS), proposed certain more coercive physical techniques to
use on Abu Zubaydah. All of these considerations took place against
the backdrop of pre-September 11, 2001 CIA avoidance of
interrogations and repeated U.S. policy statements condemning
torture and advocating the humane treatment of political prisoners
(b)(1) and detainees in the international commuriity.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
,6. ~ !The Office of General Counsel (OCC) took
the lead in determining and documenting the legal parameters and
(b)(1) constraints for interrogations. OGC conducted indef'endent research
(b )(3) NatSecAct -------- ·'
4 \fSJ The use of "high value" or "medium value" to describe terrorist targets and
detainees in this Review is based on ho.y they have been generally categorized by ere. ere
distinguishes targets according to the quality of the intelligence that they are believed likely to be
able to provide about current terrorist threats against the United States. Senior Al-Qa1da
planners and operators, such as.Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, fall into the
category of "high value" and are given the highest priority for capture, detention, and
interrogation. ere categorizes those individuals wlto are believed to have lesser direct· ..
knowledge of such threats, but to have information of intelligence value, as "medium value"
targets I detainees.
• 3
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and consult~d-~xtensively with Department of Justice (DoJ) .and
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National Security Council (NSC) legal and policy staff. Worldng with J
DoJ's Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), OGC determined that ih most
instances relevant to the COUnterterrorism detention and fl
interrogation activities under the MON,the criminal prohibition H
against torture, 18 U.S.C. 2340-2340B, is the controlling legal
constraint on interrogations of detainees outside the United States. In. n
August 2002; DoJ provided to the Agency a legal opinion in which it
determined that 10 specific "Enhanced Interrogation Techniques" rJ
(EITs) would not violate the torture prohibition. This work provided·
the foundation for the policy and administrative decisions that guide n
(b)(1) th.,CTCProgram. . . d
(b)(3) NatSecAct ·
7. t1'S,{ By November 2002, the Agency had Abu . · ]
Zubaydah and another high value detainee, 'Abd Al-Rahim
~~lgl NatSecA~(.-Nashiri, in custody at an overseas facility ]
.In December 2002, the Agenc rendered these two detainees to
(b)(1) , another coun~l to a fhacility d Until ]
'(b)(3) NatSecAct2003 w en it was close as the location for
the detention and interrogation of eight hi[h value detainees.s ']
(b)(1) Agency employees and contractors staffed_ ;
(b )(3) NatSecAct\e Directorate of Operations (DO) provided a Chief of Base (COB) :.]· .
and interrogation personnel, the Office of Security (OS) provided _
security personnel, and the Office of Medical Services (OMS)
(b)(1) orovided medical care to the detainees. (b)(1) n_._'
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct ;J
purposes. functions as a detention, debriefing! ;=an:..::d=----...,
interrogation facility for high and medium value targets.
(b)(1) serves as a holding facility at which the Agency assesses th~e-p---o.,--te--:n-;-!tial
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
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value of deta,in~es before making a decision on their disposition. It
served as a transit pointfor detainees going to[ (b)( 1 ) ]
· (b )(3) NatSecAct
9. ('fSI1 With respect to site management and
.1 Headquarters oversight of the Program, the distinctions between the
(b)(1;) detention arid interrogation activities a~ pn .
(b)(3) NatSecActthe one handr arid detention an~ ~terrogation activitiesO
: 1 . on the other, are significant. The Agency devoted far
(b)(1) · · greater human resources and management attention toL...,-___ __j
(b)(~{ NatSecAit I From the begirming, OGC briefed DO officers . .
1 assigned to these two facilities on their legal authorities, and Agency
personnel staffing these faciliti~s documented interrogations and the
(b)(1) condition of detainees in cables.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
i 10. ~ There were few instances of deviations !
· from approved procedures with one
(b)(1) notable exception described in this Review. With respect to two
(b)(3) NatSecAct detainees at those sites, the use and frequency of one EIT, the
waterboard, went beyond the projected use of the technique as
originally described to DoJ. The Agency, on 29 July 2003, secured
oral DoJ concurrence that certain deviations are not significant for
(b)(1) purposes of DoJ's legal opinions. ~~~g~ NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
11. fl'S"/ J I By contrast, the A en s conduct of
(b)(1) . detention and interrogation activities in'-rr-,-,--7'0'7'~~--~--__j
(b)(3) NatSecAct in particular, raises a host of issues. The st 1te anager at
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
I lwas a first-tour officer who had no experience or
training to run a detention facility. He had not received
interrogations training and ran the facility with scant guidance from
Headquarters! f ~~~g~ NatSecAct
12.
(b)( 1)
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13. (.!fSI J I During the period covered by this
(b)(i) Review,l itid not uniformly document orreport the
(b)(3) NatSecActatment of detainees, their conditions, or medical care provided.
Because of the lack of guidance, limited personnel resources, and
! (b)(1) limited oversi~t, there w~re ins~ces of improvisation and other
· (b )(3) NatSecActtdocumented mterrogation techniques I I In November
2002, one individual-Cui Rahman-died as a result of the way he
(b)(1)
was detained there. ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct
14. fl'S"/ There is no indication that the ere
Program has been inadequately funded. Across the board, however,
staffing has been and continues to be the most difficult resource
challenge for the Agency. This is largely attributable to the lack of
personnel with interrogations experience or requisite language skills
and the heavy personnel demandsfor other counterterrorism
(b)(1) assignments.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
15. ~ I Agency efforts to provide systematic,
clear and timely guidance to those involved in the CTC Detention
and Interrogation Program was inadequate at first but have
.improved considerably during the life of the Program as problems
have been identified and addressed. CTC implemented training·
programs forintimogators and debriefers.6 Moreover, building upon
(b)(1) ot>erational and legal guidance previously sent to the field, the DCI
(b)(3) NatSecAct . ·
6 ~I Before 11 September (9 I 11) 2001, Agency personnel sometimes use
since evolved and, today, ere more clearly distinguishes their meanings. A debriefer engages a
detainee solely through question and answer. An interrogator is a person who completes a
two-week interrogations training program, which is designed to train, qualify, and certify a
person to administer Errs. An interrogator can administer Errs during an interrogation of a
detainee.only after the field, in coord,ination with Headquarters, assesses the detainee as
withholding information. An interrogator transitions the detainee fiom a non-cooperative to a
cooperative phase in order that a debriefer can. elicit actionable intelligence through ..
non-aggressive techniques during debriefing sessions:· An interrogator may debrief a (lefamee
during an interrogation; however, a debriefer may not interrogate a detainee.
6
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on 28 JanuarY:~003 signed "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions
for CIA Detainees" and "Guidelines on futerrogations Conducted
Pursuant to the Presidential Memorandum of Notification' of ·
17 September 2001." The DCI Guidelines require individuals
engaged in or supporting interrogations pursuant to programs .
implementing the MON of September 200lbe made aware of the
guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have read them.
The DCI futerrogation Guidelines make formal the existing CTC
practice of requiring the field to obtain specific Headquarters
approvals prior to the application of all BITs. Although the DCI
Guidelines are an improvement over the absence of such DCI
Guidelines in the past, they still leave substantial room for
, misinterpretation and do not cover all Agency detention and
(b)( 1) interrogation activities,
(b)(3) NatSecAct
I 16. ~e Agency's detention and interrogation
(b)(1)
. of terrorists has provided intelligence that has enabled the .
identification and apprehension of other: terrorists and warned of
terrorist plots planned for the United States and around the world.
The CTC Program has resulted in the issuance of thousands of ·
· individual intelligence reports and analytic products supporting the
counterterrorism efforts of U.S. policymakers and military
commanders.
(~)(3) NatSecAct
17. \FStl I The current CTC Detention and
Interrogation Program has been subject to DoJ legal review and
. Administration approval but diverges sharply from previous Agency
policy and rules that govern interrogations by U.S. military and law
enforcement officers. Officers are conce;med that public revelation of
the CTC Program will seriously damage Agency officers' personal
reputations, as well as the reputation and effectiveness of the Agency
(b)
1
(1) itself.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
18. \.F§./ recognized that detainees may
be held in U.S. Govenitnent custody indefinitely if appropriate law
enforcement jurisdiction is not asserted .. Although there has been _
ongoing discussion of the issue inside the Agency and among NSC,
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Defense Department, lJfld Justice Depal:tment officials, no decisions
on any "endgame" for Agency detainees have been made. Senior ·
Agency officials see this as a policy issue for the U.S. Goverriment
rather than a CIA issue. Even with Agency initiatives to address the
endgame with policymakers, some detainees who cannot be
(b)( 1 ) prosecuted will likely remain in CIA custody indefinitely.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
19. ~ The Agency faces potentially serious
long-term political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC
Detention and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of BITs and
the inability of the U.S. Government to decide what it will ultimately
(b)(1) do with terrorists detained by the Agency.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
20. ~ This Review makes a number of .
recommendations that are designed to strengthen the mal).agement
and conduct of Agency detention and interrogation activities.
Although the DCI Guidelines were an important. step forward, they
were only designed to address the CTC Program, rather than all ·
A en debriefin or interro ation activities.!
(b)(5)
the Agency should evaluate the
~e~f--f"'-ec·t-·i ·v-e-ne-ss- o-f.. ~ t·h·-e = ~E=·rr=~~s- a-nd~"~t"h' e necessity for the continued use of
each.[
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IOl"SECRJi:T{ (b)(1) ______ _J
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(3) Na!SecAct
(b)(5)
r i
21. (.!fS/1
'--=---.-.-----,--;--~--.--:---.-.--..---.--.~.-1 the General
Counsel should seek an updated legal opinion from DoJ revalidating
and modifying, consistent with actual practice, the legal authority for
· the continued application of EITs. If such approval is not
forthcoming, the DCI should direct that EITs be implemented only
within the parameters of the existing written DoJ authoriza,tion. The
DCI should brief the President on the use of BITs and the fact that
detainees have died.
(b)(5)
BACKGROUND.
22. "(5). The Agency ha.S had intermittent involvement in the
interrogation of individuals whose interests are opposed to those of
the United States. After the Vietnam War, Agency personnel
experienced in the field of interrogations left the Agency or moved to
other assignments. fu the early 1980s, a resurgence of interest in
teaching interrogation techniques developed as one of several
methods to foster foreign liaison relationships. Because of political
sensitivities the then-Deputy Director of Central futelligence (DDCI)
forbade Agency officers from using the word "interrogation." The
Agency then developed the Human Resource Exploitation (HRE)
training program designed to train foreign liaison services on
interrogation techniques.
1
23. ~ 1984, OIG investigated allegations of misconduct on
. the part of two Agency officers who were involved in interrogations
~~ )m NatSecA'Jd the death· of one inqividuall
--~----------~_JFollowinLg~tlW-.t~irr-v_e_s~ti-ga~ti~·o-n-,~fu~e~A-g-en_c_y-.--~
took steps to ensure Agency personnel understood its policy on ~-·..._._
9
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interrogatiol).S-.debriefings, and human rights issues. Headquarters
sent officers to brief Stations and Bases and provided cable guidance
to the field. · ·
24. ~ In 1986, the Agency ended the HREtrciining program ·
because of alle ations of human ri ts abuses in Latin America.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
DO Handbook 50-2 (b)(3) CIAAct
L_~~--~~~~~--~~~~ which remains in effect, explains the Agency's general interrogation
policy:
, It is CIA policy to ni!ither participate directly in nor encourage
interrogation that involves the use of force, mental or physical
torture, extremely demeanirig indignities or exposure to inhumane
tr nt olany kind as an aid to interro~tation. I
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
.~·.
(b)(1)
r----------'l,O_(b )(3) NatSecAcl-------,
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DISCUSSION
GENESIS OF POST 9/11 AGENCYDHI'ENTION AND INTERROGATION
ACTIVITIES
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 25 .. em~ I The statutory basis for CIA's involvement
in detentions and interrogations is the DCI's covert action
responsibilities under the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.7
Under the Act, a covert action must be based on a Presidential
"finding that the action is necessary to support identifiable foreign
policy objectives and is important to the national security."S Covert
action findings must be in writing and "may not authorize any action
that would violate the Constitution or any statute of the United
States."9 These findings are implemented through Memoranda of
Notification.
(b)(1) . I
(b)(3) NatSecAct 26. {'FS,f(b)(1) The 17 September 2001 MON
. I (b)(3) NatSecAct la=-u::Tithc-:o=nz-=es=----'
the DO, acting through CIA, to undertake operations "designed to·
capture and detain persons who pose a continuing, serious threat of
violence or death to U.S. persons and interests or who are planning
terrorist activities." Although the MON does not specifically mention
interrogations of those detained, this aspect of the CTC Program can
be justified as part of CIA's general authority and responsibility to
collect intelligence.1o
27. '(5//:NB The DCI delegated responsibility for
implementation of the MON to the DDO and D/CTC Over time,
CTC also solicited assistance from other Agency coniponents,
including OGC, OMS, OS, and OTS .
. -
7 (U I /l'ffi:1Q) DoJ takes the position that a5 Commander~in-Chief, the President independently
has the Article II constitutional authority to order the detention and interrogation of enemy
combatants to gain intelligence information.
8 (UI 11'900) 50 U.S.C. 413b(a).
9 (U 1 I~) 50 U.S.C. 413b(a)(1), (5).
10 (UI I:EOOO) 50 U.S.C. 403-1, 403-3(d)(1).
---o=.n;:o:--::..• .---(b)(1 )1,_,1 _______ -,
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1'01' SECREJ'/ (b)(1) _____ __j
c__ __ (b)(3) NatSecAct
. -,
(b)(3) Na!SecAct
(b)(1)
28. ~ To assist Agency officials in
understancling the scope and implications of the MON, between
17 September and 7 Nvember 2001; OGC researched, analyZed, and
wrote "draft" papers on multiple legal issues. These mcluded
discussions of the applicability of the U.S. Constitution overseas,.
applicability of Habeas Corpus overseas, length of detention,
potential civil liability uncl,er the Federal Tort Claims Act and
employee liability actions, liaison with law enforcement,
interrogations, Guantanamo Bay detention facility, short-term
detention facilities, and disposition of detainees. OGC shared these
"draft" papers with Agency officers responsible for implementing the
MON.
29.1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) Na!SecAct
'THE CAPTl1RE OF ABU ZUBAIDAHAND DEVELOPMENr OF ElTs
(b )(3) Na!SecAct 30. ~ I The capture of senior Al-Qa'ida operative
Abu Zubaydah on 27 March 2002 presented the Agency with the
opportunity to obtain actionable intelligence on future threats to the
United States from the most senior Al-Qa'ida member in U.S. custody
at that time. This accelerated CIA's development of an interrogation
Program and establishment of an interrogation site. I
(b)(1)
(b)(3) Na!SecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct
12 • . "'i'IIP ~PRF:I:i (b)(1)
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) ,.,.,.1 .
(b)(3) NatSecAct 31. (.t~ ITo treat the severe wounds that Abu
Zubaydah suffered upon his capture, the Agency provided him
intensive medical care from the outset and deferred his questioning
for several weeks pending his recovery. The Agency then assembled
a team that interrogated Abu Zubaydah using non-aggressive,
(b)( 1) · · non-physical elicitation techniques. Between June and July 2002, the
(b)(3) NatSecAct!aml land Abu Zubaydah
(b)(1)
was placed in isolation. The Agency believed that Abu Zubaydah
was withholding imminent threat information.
(b)(3) NatSecAct ,...,c ~ · · . 32. \J.~L________JSeveral months earlier, m late 2001~,-=C=IA=-=----,
had tasked an independent contractor psychologist, who had L__ ___ __j
(b)(3) CIAAct ·1 ~xperience in the U.S. Air Force's Survival, Evasion, .
(b)(6) Resistance, and Escape (SERE) training program, to research and
(b)(?)(c) write a paper on Al-Qa'ida's resistance to interrogation techniques.l3
' (b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
This psychologist collaborated with a Department of Defense (DoD)
psychologist who ha~ ,SERE experience in the U.S. Air
Force and DoD to p.roduce the paper, "Recognizing and Developing
Countermeasures to Al-Qa'ida Resistance to Interrogation
Techniques: A Resistance Training Perspective." Subsequently, the
two psychologists developed a list of new and more aggressive E!Ts
that they recommended for use in interrogations.
12 "(5) CTC had previously identified locations for "covert" sites but had not established facilities.
. 13 (U //FO'tte) The SERE training program falls under the DoD Joint Personnel Recovery
Agency uPRA). JPRA is responsible for missions to include .the training for SERE and Prisoner of
War and Missing In Action operational affairs including repatriation. SERE Training is offered
by the U.S. Army, Navy, and AJ!' Force to its personnel, particularly air crews and special
operations forces who are of greatest risk of being captured during military operations. SERE
students are taught how to survive in various terra)F, evade and endure captivity. resist- · -~··-"'"-
interrogations, and conduct themselves to prevent harm to themselves and fellow prisoners of
war.
_,.,.,._ _c =n;:--::_1----13" "---(b) ( 1) ------,
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(b)(1 )OI• SBCRJ
(b)(1)
33. ~ I CIA's OTS obtained data on the use of the
proposed EITs and their potential long-term psychological effects on.
detainees. OTS input was based in part on information solicitecj. from
a number of psychologists and knowledgeable academics in the area
of psychopathology.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
34. ~ I OTS also solicited input from DoD /Joint
Personrtel Recovery Agency (JPRA) regarding techniques used in its .
SERE training and any subsequent psychological effects on students.
DoD/JPRA concluded no long-term psychological effects resulted
from use of the EITs, including the most taxing technique, the
waterboard, on SERE students.14 The OTS analysis was used by OGC .
(b)(1) . in evaluating the legality of techniques.
(b )(3) NatSecAct · .
35. \.FSJ Eleven EITs were proposed for adoption
in the CTC Interrogation Program. As proposed, use of EITs would
· be subject to a competent evaluation of the medical and psychological
state of the detainee. The Agency eliminated one proposed
technique-the mock burial-after learning from DoJ that thiS could
delay the legal review. The following textbox identifies the 10 EITs
the Agency described to DoJ.
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waterboard was used for demonstration purposes on a very small number of students in a cJass.
Except for Navy SERE training, use of the waterboard was discontinued because of iis ctramatic
effect on the students who were subjects. -~·----- a
14
• 'TOP !iBCimT/1 ~~lgl NatSecAct 00024
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I~ ------~·~'-----;I~OP;S;!~!O~:E(Tb)(£b))(3()~ N1at)S·~c~A~ct~ ~~--------~
Enhanced Interrogation Techniques
+ The attention grasp consists of grasping the detainee with both hands, with one
hand on each side' of the collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion. In the
same motion as the grasp, the detainee is drawn toward the interrogator.
+ During the walling technique, the detainee is pulled forward and then quickly and
fumly pushed into a flexible false wall so that his shoulder blades hit the wall. His
head and neck are supported with a rolled towel to prevent whiplash.
+ The facial hold is used to. hold the detainee's head immobile. The interrogator
places ari open palm on either side of the detainee's face and the interrogator's
fingertips are kept well away from the detainee's eyes. ·
+ With the facial or insult slap, the fingers are slightly spread apart. The
interrogator's hand makes contact with the area between the tip of the detainee's
chin and the bottom of the corresponding earlobe.
+ In cramped confinement, the detainee is placed in a confined space, typically a
small or large box, which is usually dark. Confinement in the smaller space lasts
no more than two hours and in the larger space it can last up to 18 hours.
+ Insects placed in a confinement box involve placing a harmless insect in the box
with the detainee.
• During wall standing, the detainee may stand about 4 to 5 feet from a wall with
his feet spread approximately to his shoulder width. His arms are stretched out in
· front.of him and his fingers rest on the wall to support all of his pody weight. The
detainee is not allowed to reposition his·hands pr feet.·
• The application of stress positions may include having the detainee sit on the floor
with his legs extended straight out in front of him With his armsiaised above his
head or kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle.
+ Sleep deprivation will not exceed 11 days at a time.
,•'
+ The application of the waterboard technique involves binding the detainee to a
bench with his feet elevated above his head. The detainee's head is immobilized
and an interrogator places a cloth over the detainee's mouth and nose while
pouring water onto the doth in a controlled manner. Airflow is restricted for 20 to
40 seconds and the tec!mique produces the sensation of drowning at)d suffocation.
"101' !!BCR£~(b )( 1) I ·. ~·-........,
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(b)(1) DnJLEGAL~~YSIS
(b )(3) NatSecAct c.··
36. (!s; CIA's OGC sought guidance from DoJ
regarding the legal bounds of BITs vis-a-vis individuals detained
under .the MON authorization. The ens'llii1g legal opinions focus on
· the Conventio~ Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane and
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Tor~ Convention),1s
especially as implemented in the U:.S. criminal code, 18 U.S,C. 2340-
2340A. . .
37. (U I /'PeOO) The Torture Convention specifically prohibits
. "torture," which it defines in Article 1 as:
any act by which se:vere pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes·as
. obtaining from him or a third person infonnation or a confeSsion,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or ci:u~rcing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the .
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in·an official capacity. It does not include
pain or suffering arising· only from, inherent in. or incidental to
lawful sanction. [Emphasis added.]
Article 4 of the Torture Convention provides that states party to the
Convention are to ensure that all acts of "torture" are offenses under
· their criniinallaws. Article 16 additionally provides that each state
party "shall undertake to prevent .in any territory under its · ·
jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment which do not amount to acts of torture as defined in
Article 1."
15 (U /.~ Adopted 10 December 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988) 1465 U.N.T.S .. 85
(entered into force 26 June 1987). The Torture Convention entered into force for the United States·
on20 November 1994.
..,
16
I 1 ll' .'!F.C.REJ:1 ~~~g~ NatSecAct ~
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38. (U I iJOO~ The Torture Convention applies to the United
States only in accordance with the reservations and understandings ·
made by the United States at the time of ratification.I6 As 'explained
to the Senate by the Executive Branch prior to ratification: ·
Article 16 is arguably broader than existing U.S.law. The phrase
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" is a
standard formula in international instruments and is found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights; and the European Cqnvention on
Human Rights. To the extent the phrase has been interpreted in the
context of those agreements, "cruel" and "inhi.lman" treatment or
punishment appears to be roughly equivalent to the treatment or
punislurient barred in the United States by the Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. "Degrading" treatment or punishment,.
however, has been interpreted as potentially including treatment
that would probably not be prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.
[Citing a ruling that German refusal to recognize individual's.
gender change might be considered "degrading" treatment.] To
make clear that the United States construes the phrase to be
coextensive with its constitutional guarantees against cruel,
unusuaL and inhumane treatment, the following understanding is
recommended:
"The United States understands the term 'cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment; as used in Article 16 of
the Convention, to mean the cruel, unusual, and inhumane
treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth
and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the
United States."l7 [Emphasis added.]
16 (U) Vienna Convention on 'the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 U.N.T .S. 331 (entered into
force 27 January 1980). The United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention on tre~ties, but ..
it generally regards its provisions as customary international law. · ~··-~
17 (U f /POtt9) S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, at 15-16.
17 (b)(1)·~~~(
b )(3) NatSecAct
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39. (U I I.~OUO) In accordance with the Convention, the
Uruted States criminaJized acts of torture in 18 U.S.C. 2340A(~),
which provides as follows:
Whoever outside the United States commits or attempts to commit
torture shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
20 years, or both, and if death results to any person from conduct
prohibited by this subsection; shall be punished by death or
imprisoned for any term of years or for life.
The statute adopts the Convention definition of "torture" as "an act
committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other
·than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another
. person within his custody or physical control."18 "Severe physical
pain and suffering" is not further defined, but Congress added a
definition of "severe mental pain or suffering:" ·
[T]he prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from-
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened
administration or application, of mind-altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or
the personality;·
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected
to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration
or application of mind-altering substances or other procedures
calculated to disrupt profol!ndly the senses or personality ... .19
These statutory definitions are consistent with the understandings
and reservations of the United States to the Torture Convention.
18 (U/7FOI:lo3)-18 U.S.C. 2340(1}.-
19 (U/ ll'm!Q) 18 U.S.C. 2340(2).
18
"F'fOQPp-SSJ'ElEC:HR:S:13TF.,I/f~~~====:'====(b )( 1 )--------,
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-'
· 40. (U I J1't}BQ) DoJ has never prosectited a violation of the
torture statute, 18 u.s.c. §2340, and there is no case law construing.
its provisions. OGC presented the results of its research into relevant
issues under U.S. and international law to DoJ's OLC in the summer
of 2002 and received a preliminary summary of the elements of the
torture statute from OLC in July 2002. An unclassified 1 August 2002
OLC legal memorandum set out OLC's conclusions regarding the
proper interpretation of the torture statute and concluded that
"Section 2340A proscribes acts inflicting, and that are specifically
intended to inflict, severe pain or suffering whether mental or
physical."20 Also, OLC stated that the acts must be of an "extreme·
nature" and that "certain acts may be cruel, inhuman, or degrading,
but still not produce pain and suffering of the requisite intensity to
fall within Section 2340A's proscription against torture." Further
describing the requisite level of intended pain, OLC stated:
Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity
to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ
failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death. For purely
mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under Section 2340, it
must result in significant psychological harm of significant
duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years.21
OLC determined that a violation of Section 2340 requires that the
infliction of severe pain be the defendant's "precise objective." OLC
also concluded that necessity or self-defense might justify
interrogation methods that would otherwise violate Section 2340A.22
The August 2002 OLC opinion did not address whether any other
provisions of U.S. law are relevant to the detention, treatment, and
interrogation of detainees outside the United States.23
20 (U I~ Legal Memorandum, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under
18 U.S. C. 2340-2340A (1 August 2002).
21 (U/ /!'ElYO) Ibid., p. 1.
22 (U I /1'000) Ibid., p. 39.
23 (U I IF'Ol:IQ) OLC's analysis of the torture statu\e was guided in part by judicial d
for victims of torture. OLC noted that the courts in this context have looked at the entire course
19
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41. (U I ,/F0091-A second unclassified 1 AuguSt 2002 OLC
opinion addressed the international law aspects of such. -.
interrog(ltions.24 This opinion concluded that interrogation methods ·
that do not violate 18 U.S.C. 2340 would not violate the TortUre .
Convention and would not come within the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
42. ~ rn addition to the two unclassified .
opinions, OLC produced another legal opinion on 1 August 2002 at
the request of CIA.25 (Appendix C.) This opinion, addressed to
CIA's Acting General Counsel, discussed whether the proposed use
of EITs in interrogating Abu Zubaydah would violate the Title 18
prohibition on torture. The opinion concluded that use of EITs on
Abu Zubaydah would not violate the torture statute because, among
other things, Agency personnel: (1) would not specifically intend to
inflict severe pain or suffering, and (2) would not in fact inflict severe
pain or suffering.
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct I I 43. (TSI This OLC opinion was based upon
(b)(1)
specific representations by CIA concerning the manner in which BITs
would be applied in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. For
example, OLC was told that the EIT "phase" would likely last "no
more than several days but could last up to thirty days." The EITs
would be used on "an as-needed basis" and all would not necessarily
be used. Further, the BITs were expected to be used "ill some sort of
escalating fashion, culminating with the waterboard though not
necessarily ending with this technique." Although some of the BITs
of conduct; although a single incident could constitute torture. OLC a~¥> noted that courts rrmy
be willing to find a wide range of physical pain can rise to the level of "severe pain and
suffering." Ultimately, however, OLC concluded that the cases show that only acts "of an
extreme nature have been redressed under the TVP A's civil remedy for torture." White House
Counsel Memorandum at 22 - 27.
24 (U //FOOO) OLC Opinion by John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, OLC
(1 August 2002).
25 ('RVj [Memorandum for John Rizzo, Ac!ing General Counsel of the Centr3l
Intelligence Agency,'lnterrogation of a! Qaida Operative" (1 August 2002) at 15.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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might be used.tnore than once, "that repetition will not be substantial .
because the techniques generally lose their effectiveness after several
repetitions." With respect to the waterboard, it was explaihed that:
... the individual is bound securely to an inclined bench . . . . The
individual's feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed over the
forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a
controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it
covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and
completely covers the mouth and nose, the air flow is slightly
restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This
causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual's blood.
This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effort
to breathe. This effort plus the cloth produces the perception of
"suffocation and incipient panic," i.e., the perception of drowning.
The individual does not breathe water into his lungs. During those
20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of [i2
to 24] inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the
individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full
breaths. The sensation of di:owning is immediately relieved by the
removal of the cloth. The procedure may then be repeated. The
water is usually applied from a canteen cup or small watering can
with a spout. . . . [T]his procedure triggers an automatic
physiological sensation of drowning that the individual cannot
control even thougl). he may be aware that he is in fact not
drowning. [I]t is likely that this procedure would not last more
than 20 minutes in any one application.
Finally, the Agency presertted OLC with a psychological profile of · ·
Abu Zubaydah and with the conclusions of officials and .
psychologists associated with the SERE program that !he use ofEITs
would cause no long term mental harm. OLC relied on these
representations to support its conclusion that no physical harm or
prolonged mental harm would result from the use on him of the
(b)(1) EITs, including the waterboard.26
(b)(3) NatSecAct · · ..
26 ~ !According to the Chief, Medical Services,.OMS was neither consulted nor
involved in the initial analysis qf the risk and benefits of E!Ts, nor provided with the ors report
cited in the OLC opinion. In retrospect, based on the OLC extracts of the ors rei>ort, OMS
contends that the reported sophistication of the pre)jminary EIT review was exagserati:d. at least ~~·-...._
as it related to the waterboard, and that the power of this EIT was appreciably overstated in the
. rei>ort. Furthermore, OMS contends that the expertise of the SERE psychologist/interrogators on
~" r----__ ___,2.,.,_1 _ ,(b )(1 )~-------,
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
44. ~ l OGC continued to consult with DoJ as the
CTC Interrogation Program and the use of BITs expanded beyond the
interrogation of Abu Zubaydah. This resulted in the production of
an undated and unsigned document entitled, "Legal Principles
Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of Captured _
Al-Qa'ida Personnel."27 According to OGC, this analysis was fully
coordinated with and drafted in substantial part by OLC. In addition
to reaffirming the previous conclusions regarding the torturE! statute;
the analysis concludes that the federal War Crimes statute, 18 U.S.C.
2441, does not apply to Al-Qa'ida becaUse members of that group are
not entitled to prisoner of war status. The analysis adds that "the
[Torture] Convention permits the use of [cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment] in exigent cirCumstances, such as a national
emergency or war." It also states that the inteqogation of Al-Qa'ida ·
members does not violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
' because those provisions do not apply extraterritorially, nor does it '
violate the Eighth Amendment because it only applies to persons
upon whom criminal sanctions have been imposed. Finally, the
analysis states that a wide range of BITs and other teChniques would
not constitute conduct of the type that would be prohibited by the
Fifth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments even were they to be
applicable:
The use of the following techniques and of comparable, approved
teclmiques does not violate any Federal.statute or other law, where
the CIA interrogators do not specifically intend to cause the
detainee to undergo severe physical or mentai pain or suffering
(i.e., they· act with. the good faith belief that their conduct will not
cause such pain or suffering): isolation, reduced caloric intake (so
lorig as the amount is calculated to maintain the general health of
the detainees), deprivation of reading material, loud music or white
the waterboard:was probably misrepresented at. the time, as the SERE waterboard experience is
so different from the subsequent Agency usage as to make it almost irrelevant. Consequently, .
according to OMS, there was no a prU;ri reason to believe that applying the waterboard with the
frequency and intensity with whiclfit was used by the psychologist/interrogators was either
efficacious or medically safe. ·
27 ('TSi "Legal Principles Applicable to CIA Detention and Interrogation of
(b )(1) Captured Al-Qa'ida Personnel," attached toL _1(16 June 2003) •.
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) CIAAct ·
22
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noise (at a, flecibellevel calculated to avoid damage to the
detainees' hearing), the attention grasp, walling, the facial hold, the
facial slap (insult slap), the abdominal slap, cramped confinement,
wall standing, stress positions, sleep deprivation, the use of
diapers, the use of harmless insects, and the water board.
According to OGC, this-analysis embodies DoJ agreement that the
. reasoning of the classified 1 Augu5t 2002 OLCopinion extends
beyond the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and the conditions that
were specified in that opinion.
·i NOTICE TO AND CONSULTATION WITl:l EXECUTIVE ANJJ CONGRESSIONAL
:>
(b)(1) OFFICIALS
(b)(3) NatSecAct
45. ~At the same time that OLC was reviewing
the legality of EITs in the summer of 2002, the Agency was consulli!1g
with NSC policy staff and senior Administration officials. The DCI
· briefed appropriate senior national security and legal officials on the
proposed Errs. In the fall of 2002, the Agency briefed the leadership
of the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committees on the use of
(b)(1) both standard techniques and Errs.
(b)(3) NatSecAct I I
46. ('IS./ In early 2003, CIA officials, at the urging
of the General Counsel, continued to inform senior Administration·
officials and the leadership of the Congressional Oversight
Committees of the then-current status of the CTC Program. The
Agency specifically wanted to ensure that these officials and the
J Committees continued to be aware of and approve CIA's actions.
The General Counsel recalls that he spoke and met with Whlte House
Counsel and others at the NSC, as well as DoJ's Criminal Division
and Office of Legal Counsel beginning in December 2002 and briefed
them on the scope and breadth of the CTC's Detention and
(b)(1) Interrogation Program.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
47. ('FSj j Representatives of the DO, in the
presence of the Director of Congressional Mfairs and the General
Counsel, continued to brief the leadership of the Intelligence · · ···-· ,_.........._
Oversight Committees on the use of EITs and detentions in February
23 (b)(1)·----~-,
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and March 200~. The General Counsel says that none of the
participants expressed any concern about the teChniques or the
(b)(1) Program. .:-.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
48. ('1'S./ On 29 July 2003, the DCI and the General
Counsel provided a detailed briefing to selected NSC Principals on
CIA's detentionand interrogation efforts involving "high value
detainees," to include the expanded use of EITs.28 According to a
Memorandum for the Record prepared by the General Counsel
following that meeting, the Attorney General confirmed that DoJ
approved of the expanded use of various EITs, including multiple
applications of the waterboard.29 The General Counsel said he
believes everyone in attendance was aware of exactly what CIA was
doing with respect to detention and interrogation, and approved of
the effort. According to OGC, the senior officials were again briefed
regarding the CTC Program on 16 September 2003, and the ·
· Intelligence Committee leadership was briefed again in September
2003. Again, according to OGC, none of those involved in these
briefings expressed any reservations about the program.
(b)( 1) GUIDANCE ON CAP'I'URE, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION
(b )(3) NatSecAct
· 49. (l'S.LI I Guidance and training are fundamental
to the success and integrity of any endeavor as operationally,
politically, and legally complex as the Agency's Detention and
Interrogation Program. Soon after 9/11, the DDO issued guidance on
the standards for the capture of terr011$t targets.
(b)(1)
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
50. (1S.L The DCI, in January 2003 approved
formal ''Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees"
(b)(1) (Appendix D) and "Guidelines on Interrogations Conducted
(b)(3) NatSecAct -----'----- ....
28 fffii The briefing materials referred to 24 high value detainees interrogated. at
CIA...:ontrolled sites and identified 13 interrogated using Errs.
29 (JJ 1 /l'Ol:f9). Memorandum for the Record[ (b )(3) C IAAc(J
24
It II' .'~F.ER-E.'J: l (b)(1)
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Pursuant to thE: Presidential Memorandum of Notification of
j·
17 September 2001" (Appendix E), which are discussed below .. Prior
to the Dei Guidelines, Headquarters provided guidance via informal·
briefings and electronic communications, to include cables from CIA
Headquarters, to the field. Because. the level of guidance was largely
site-specific, this Reportdiscusses the pre-January 2003 detention and
interrogation guidance in the sections addressing specific detention
(b)(1) facilities.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
51. \FSJ linN ovember 2002, ere initiated training
courses for individuals involved in interrogations. In April2003,
OMS consolidated and added to its previously issued.informal
guidance for the OMS personnel responsible for monitoring the
medical condition of detainees.30
(b)( 1)
L_ ___ (b)(3) NatSecAct. _____ ___j
52.J
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
53.[
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
30 (U I /FSIJ0) OMS reportedly issued four reviSi~ns of these draft guidelines, the latest of
which is dated 4 September 2003. The guidelines remain in draft.
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54.[
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
55.[
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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.i
(b)(1) DCI Confinement Guidelines
(b)(3) NatSecAct
57. (1'S/ Before January 2003, officers assigned to
manage detention facilities developed and implemented confinement
condition procedures. Because these procedures were site-specific
and not uniform, this Review discusses them in connection with the
review of specific sites, rather than in this section. The January 2003
DCI Guidelines govern the conditions of confinement for CIA
detainees held in detention facilities
(b)(1)
b )(3) NatSecAct
31
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
. 58. ff'S~ I The OCI Guidelines specify that D/CTC
shall ensure that a specific Agency staff employee is designated as
responsible for each specific detention facility. Agency staff:
employees responsible for the facilities and participating in the
questioning of individuals detained pursuant to the 17 September
2001 MON must receive a copy of the DCI Guidelines. They must
review the Guidelines and sign an acknowledgment that they have
done so.
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
59. (':rs,( The DCI Guidelines specify legal
"minimums" and require that "due provision must be taken to protect
the health and safety of all CIA detainees." The Guidelines do not
require that conditions of confinement at the detention facilities
conform to U.S. prison or other standards. At a minimum, however,
detention facilities are ~o provide basic levels of medical care:
... (which need not comport with the highest standards of medical
care that is provided in.U.S.-based medical facilities); food and
drink which meets minimum medically appropriate nutritional and
sanitary standards;_ clothing and/ or a physical environment
sUfficient to meet basic health needs; periods of time within which
detainees are free to engage in physical exercise (which maybe
limited, for example, to exercise within the isolation cells
themselves); for sanitary facilities (which may, for example,
comprise buckets for the relief of personal waste) ...
Further, the guidelines provide that:
Medical and, as appropriate, psychological personnel shall be
. physically present at, 6r reasonably available to, each Detention
28
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
Facility .. · M;edical personnel shall check the physical condiiioJ:l of
each detainee at intervals appropriate to the circumstances and
·shall keep approJ?riate records. ~-·
DCI Interrogation Guidelines
60. (StfNli). Prior to January 2003, CTC and OGC
disseminated guidance via cables, e-mail, or orally on a case-by-case
basis to address req:uests to use specific interrogation techniques.
Agency management did not require those involved in interrogations
to sign an acknowledgement that they had read, understood, or .
agreed to comply with the guidance provided. Nor did the Agency
maintain a comprehensive record of individuals who had been
briefed on interrogationprocedures.
61. (_
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
TheDCI
'-T::::-;:t=err=o=ga=-ti"'o' =n=-cGr;cUI..-:-a:r:e:=c::e-::-s =re:-:q=-Uir=e=-=-:::.-::.rp=e::::r=s~onnel directly engaged
in the interrogation of persons detained have reviewed these
Guidelines, received appropriate training in their implementation,
and have completed the applicable acknowledgement.
62. {Sti-WE,) The DCI Interro~ation Guidelines defjne
"Permissible Interrogation Techniques" and specify that "unless
otherwise approved by Headquarters, CIA officers and other
personnel acting on behalf of CIA.may use only Permissible
Interrogation Techniques. Permissible Interrogation Techniques
consist of both (a) Standard Techniques and (b) Enhanced
(b)(3) CIAAct
32 Seer----'--..:·~r relevanr text of 00 Handbook 50-2. c-------~---.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
29
Ti IFCTICRtl'T'/ (b)(1)
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Techniques.':3~.,EITs require advance approval from Headquarters, as
do standard techniques whenever feasible. The field must document
(b)(1) the use of both standard techniques.and BITs. :--
(b)(3) NatSecAct
. 63. '('l'S.L The DCI Interrogation Guidelines define
"standard interrogation techniques" as techniques that do not
incorporate significant physical or psychological pressure. These
techniques include, but are not limited to, all lawful forms of
questioning employed by U.S. law enforcement and military
interrogation personnel. Among standard interrogation techniques
are the Use of isolation, sleep deprivation not to exceed 72 hours,M
reduced. caloric intake (so long as the amount is calculated to
maintain the general health of the detainee), deprivation ofreading
material, use of loud music or white noise (at a decibel level
calculated to avoid damage to the detainee's hearing), the use of
diapers for limited periods (generally not to exceed 72 hours, or
· during transportation where appropriate), and moderate
psychological pressure. The DCI Interr9gation Guidelines do not
specifically prohibit improvised actions. A CTC/Legal officer has.
said, however, that no one may employ any technique outside
specifically identified standard techniques without Headquarters
(b)(1) approval.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
64. ~BITs include physical actions and are
defined as "techniques that do incorporate physical or psychological
pressure beyond Standard Techniques." Headquarters must approve
the use of e!!-ch specific EIT in advance. EITs may be employed only
by trained and certified interrogators for use with a specific detainee
and with appropriate medical and psychological monitoring of the
process.35
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
33 ~The 10 approved Errs are described in the textbox on page 15 of this Review.
34 ~According to th,e General Counsel, in late December 2003, the period for
sleep deprivation was reduced to 48 hours.
35 ('liS~ !Before EITs are administered, a detainee musi receive a detailed _
psychological assessment and physical exam. Daily pnysical and psychological evaluations are
(b )(1) continued throughout the period of EIT use.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
30 Tt lP .~Rf'REI' ,----~'---(b )(1 )---------,
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(b)( 1 )
Medical Gu,idelines(b)(3) NatSecAct
65. · -~ I OMS prepared draft guideline's for
medical and psychological support to detainee interrogations. The
Chief, Medical Services disseminated the undated OMS draft ·
guidelines in April2003 to OMS personnel assigned to detention
facilities. According to OMS, these guidelines were a compilation of
previously issued guidance that had been disseminated in a
piecemeal fashion. The guidelines were marked "draft" based on the
advice of CTC/Legal,36 These guidelines quote excerpts from the
DCI Interrogation Guidelines. They include a list of sanctioned
interrogation techniques, approval procedures, technique goals, and
staff requirements. The OMS draft guidelines also expand upon the
practical medical implications of the DCI Interrogation Guidelines,
addressing: general evaluation, medical treatment, uncomfortably
·cool environments, white noise or loud music, shackling, sleep
deprivation, cramped confinement (confinement boxes), and the
waterboard. According to the Chief, Medical Services, the OMS
Guidelines were intended solely as a reference for the OMS personnel
directly supporting the use of EITs and were not intended to be
Agency authorizations for the techniques discussed. OMS most
recently updated these draft guidelines in September 2003, and;
according to the Chief, Medical Services, they were disseminated to
all OMS field personnel involved in the Detention and Interrogation
Program. (Appendix F.)
(b)(1) Training for Interrogations
(b)(3) NatSecAct ·
r------,
66. ~/ In November 2002, CTC/Renditions and
Detainees Group (RDG) initiated a pilot running of a two-week
Interrogator Training Course designed to train, qualify, and certify
individuals as Agency interrogators.37 Several CTC officers,
36 (U I T.l'tilJQ) A 28 March 2003.Lotus Note from C/CTC/Legal advised Chief, Medical
eServi-ces· th a.t. h e "Seventh Floof'; "would need to approve the promulgation of any further fonnal Fm-,...,=, >oom~""'""""""m"' ... .' . . ...,.. __ ..:..,_..
(b)(1) :
(b )(3) NatSecAct .
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including a £onner SERE instructor, designed the curriculum, which
included a week of classroom instruction followed by a week of
''hands-on" training in Errs. In addition to standard and enhanced
interrogation techniques, course material included apprehension and
handling of subjects, renditions, management of an interrogation site,
interrogation team structure and functions, planning an
interrogation, the conditiqning process, resistance techniques, legal
requirements, Islamic culture and religion, the Arab mind, and
Al-Qa'ida networks. Training u8ing physical pressures was
conducted via classroom academics, guided discussion, ·
~~ lgl NatSect~;nonstration-performance, student practice and feedback.
67. ('l'SI Three of the 16 attendees of the pilo't
course, includ,ing a senior Agency interrogator and two independent
contractor/psychologists, were certified by CTC/RDG as.
interrogators.3S Their certification :was based on their previous
(b)(1) · operational experience. The tw() psychologist/interrogators, who
(b)(3) NatSecAcl!re a~ lduring the pilot course, were deemed certified
based on their experience as SERE instructors and their
interrogations of Abu Zubaydah and Ai-Nashiri. Once certified, an
interrogator is deemed qualified to conduct an interrogation
employing Errs. Seven other individuals were designated as "l:rained
and qualified," meaning they would have to apprentice under a .
certified interrogator in the field for 20 hours in order to become
eligible for their certifications.
68. ~ By September 2003, four Interrogation Training
(b)( 1 ) Courses had been completed, resulling inOtrained inte~;rogators.
(b )(3) CJAAct Three of these are certified to use the waterboard. Additionally, a
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct J 38 (Sf{HF) These certifications wete for "Enhanced Pressures," which involved all of the EITs
except the waterboard. Only the tWo psychologist/interrogators were certified to use the ·
waterboard based on their previous JPRA/SERE experience. Subsequently, another indepe.ndent
contractor, who had been certified as an interrogator, oecame certified in the use of the
waterboard.
32
• 101' SEC&&f~~ (b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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number of p$y~ologists, physicianS, Physician's Assistants,39 and ·
COBs completed the training for familiarization purposes. Students·
completing the Interrogation Course are required to sign in
acknowle.dgment that they have read, understand, and will comply
(b)(1) with the DCI's Interrogation Guidelines.
(b )(3) NatSecAct ·
69. ~ I In June 2003, CTC established a debriefing
course for Agency substantive experts who are involved in questioning
detainees after they have undergone interrogation and have been
deemed "compliant." The debriefing course was established to train
non-interrogators to collect actionable intelligence from high value.
detainees in CIA custody. The course is intended to familiarize
non-interrogators with key aspects of the Agency interrogation
Program, to include the Program's goals and legal authorities, the DCI
Interrogation Guidelines, ·and the roles.and responsibilities of all who
interact with a high value detainee. As of September 2003, three of
I · these training sessions had been conducted, with a total of
(b)(1) [)ndividuals completing the training. CTC/RDG was contemplating
((bb))((3
3
)) CN IAA
8
ct A t establishing a similar training regimen for Security Protective Officers
· , at ec c and ling w·s ts w h owi ll .b e ass1· gne d t o m· terrogati· on si·t es.
I · (b)(1)---~
(b)(1) · DETENTIONANDINTERROGA110NOPERA110NSATI(b)(3) NatSecAct [
(b )(3,) NatSecAit I L .
(b)( 1 ) r-------,
(b)(3) NatSecAct 70. fi'S"A I The detention and interrogation activity
examined during this Review occurred primarily at three facilities
! encrypted as I [was the
I facility at which two prominent Al-Qa'ida detainees, Abu Zubaydah
and Al-Nashiri, were held with the foreign host government's
knowledge and approval, until it was closed for operational security
reasons in December 2002. The two detainees at that location were
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
,·,
39 (U) Physician's Assistants are formally trained \9 provide diagnostic, therapeqtic, and
preventative health care services. They work under the supervision of a physician, record
. progress notes, and mayprescribe'medications.
33
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the~ moved .t~ I located in another foreign country. Eight
individuals were detained and interr.ogated at( Jincludmg
Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashiri. . (b)(1) c(
b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)( 1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
I (b)(1)
Staffing and Operatim;u(b)(3) NatSecAct .
71. tffi/ CTC initiall to
detain and interrogate Abu Zubaydah. as operational
between I I December 2002. had no
permanent positions and was staffed wi d1,1ty (TDY)
officers. Initially, Abu Zubaydah's A~cy interrogatorS atj
included ani jofficer, who also serv'="ea~as~-_j
(b)(
1
) CO~, and a s:ruor Ag~ncy security offic_er. _They were assisted .by
(b)(3) NatSecAcfiOUS secunty, medical, and commurucations personnel detailed to
to support the interrogation mission. An independent
Lc=o=nco::tr=-ac"'t:::cor=-'psychologist with extensive experience as an_interrogation
(b)( 1) instructor at the U.S. Air Force SERE School also assisted the team.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
1'-"""--'-~J.__"lc-~-_j Once the Agency approved the use of
EITs in August 2002, a second independent contractor
(b)(3) CIAAct psyc o ogts w1 1 ears of SERE experience joined the team. This
~~~~~~(c) followed a determination by the CIA personnel involved in ·
debriefing that the continuation of the existing methods would not
produce the actionable intelligence that the Intelligence Community
believed Abu Zubaydah possessed. The te~ was supervised by the
COB and supported by the on-site team of security, medical, and
(b)( 1) communications personnel.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
. 73. ('f'Si1 I The responsibility of the COB --=-----o=--_j
was to ensure the facility and staff functioned within the authorities
that govern the mission. In conjunction with those duties, the COB
was responsible for the overall management and security of the site
and the personnel assigned to support activities there. The COB
oversaw interrogations and released operational and intelligence.
j
3(b)(1)------~
TI '" ~PlUl.T 'I (b )(3) NatSecAct
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--(b )(3) NatSecAct---------,-----"
cables and si:tiJ
(b)(1) Renditions Group.40 ''
(b )(3) NatSecAct .
,.-----------,
74. lfS1 The two psychologist/interrogators at
i '---.---=;"'"Jled each interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and Al-Nashlri ·
where EITs were used. The psychologist/interrogators conferred
with the COB and other team members before each interrogation
session. Psychological evaluations were performed by both
Headquarters and on-site psychologists. Early on in the
development of the interrogation Program, Agency OMS
psychologists objected to the use of on-site psychologists as
interrogators and raised conflict of interest and ethical concerns. This
was based on a concern that the on-site psychologists who were
administering the EITs participated in the evaluations, assessing the
~~lm NatSecActffectiveness and impact of the EITs on the detainees. ·
. 75. ~ The interrogation intelligence
(b)(1.) . requirements for Abu Zubaydah were generally developed at
(b)(3) NatSecActHead uarters by CTC/Usama Bin Laden (UBL) Group and refined at
· I CTC/RDG, CTC/LGL, CTC/UBL, and I I
(b)(1) I 1provided input into the rendition and
(b)(3) CIAAct interrogation process. I I
(b )(3) NatSecAct · ·
Il -~. .~ -..~--~~1 lstaff maintained daily dialogue with
Headquarters management by cable and secure telephone, and .
I ]officers initiated a video conference with Headquarters to
discuss the efficacy of proceeding with EITs.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 76. crsJ I Abu Zubaydah was the only detainee at
I ]until 'Abd Al-Rahim Al-Nashlri arrived on 15 November
2002. The interrogation of Al-Nashlri proceeded after'------'
received the necessary Headquarters authoriZation. The two
(b)(1) .
(b)(3) NatSecAct
--;::::====;--------'-
40 (!IS,£-A I In August 2002, the group na'!!.e be<:ame renditions="" and="" detainees="" group.="">
indicative of its new responsibilities for running detention facilities and interrogations. For -
consistency purposes in this Review, OIG subsequently refers to this group as CfC/RDG.
,----~3.5__(b)(1 )·----------,
.,.,TI~IFI>-<:ic:::vu:c::jip _____="" .="" natsecact.="" _="" ____j="">
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psychologist/roterrogators began Al~Nashiri's interrogation uqing
BITs immediately upon his arrival. Al-Nashiri provided lead
information on other terrorists dUring his first day of interrogation.
On the twelfth day of interrogation, the two psychologist/
interrogators administered two applications of the waterboard to .
Al-Nashiri during two separate interrogation sessions. Enhanced
~interroe:atioiLof_.AH•sashiri_continued_throue:h_4December_2002
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1 (b)( ) "'d t fi t t' 3) NatSecActl eo apes o n erroga ~ons
77. ("ffij Headquarters had intense interest in
~~lm Natsei;A'~ing abreast o~ all aspec7> of Ab~ Zubayd:m's interro~ationr----,
1 !including compliancew1th the gmdance provided to the
site relative to the use of BITs. Apart from this, however, and before
(b)(1) · the use of BITs, the interrogation teams a~ . jdecided to
(b )(3) NatSecActieotape the interrogation sessions. One initial purpose was to
ensure a record of Abu Zubaydah's medical condition and treatment
should he succumb to his wounds and questions arise about the
medical care provided to him by CIA. Another purpose was to assist.
in the preparation of the debriefing reports, although the team
advised CTC/Legal that they rarely, if ever,were used for that
purpose. There are 92 videotapes, 12 of which include EIT
. applications. An OGC attorney reviewed the videotapes in
November and December 2002 to asc~ain compliance with the
August 2002 DoJ opinion and compare what actually happened with
what was reported to Headquarters. He reported that there was no
(b)(1) deviation from the DoJ guidance or the written record. ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct
. . 78. ('rS.~ I OIG reviewed the videotapes, logs; and
cables! I in May 2003. OIG identified 83 waterboard
applications, most of which lasted less than 10 seconds. 41 OIG also
(b)(1) identified one instance where a psychologist/interrogator verbally
(b)(3) NatSecAct . ·
41 {'fSL For the purpose of this Review, a ·waterboard application consti~ted e;ch
dlsciete instance in wlrich water was applied for any period of time during a session.
' 'Ti IP EOtiiPDVT.J.--~----'3"6"-(b)( 1 )---------,
'l"rri'"E'Iii=ID~'--:---,.-----(b )(3) NatSecAct. _ ___.J
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threatened Ab.q Zubaydah by stating, "If one child dies in America,
and I find out you knew somethirig about it, I will personally cut
your mother's throat."42 OIG found 11 interrogation videcitapes to be
(b)(1) blank. Two others were blaxlk except for one or two minutes of
(b)(3) NatSecAct recording. Two others were~d could not be reviewed. OIG ·
compared the Videotapes tol_ __ jogs and cables and identified
a 21-hour period of time, which included two waterboard sessions,
(b)(1) that was not captured on the videotapes.
(b )(3) NatSecAct .
79. ~ loiG's review of the videotapes revealed.
that the waterboard technique employec;i atl fvas different
from the technique as described in the Do J opinion and used in the
S.ERE training. The difference was in the manner in which the
detainee's breathing was obstructed. At the SERE School and in the
DoJ opinion, the subject's airflow is disrupted by the firm application
of a damp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator applies a small
(b )(1) · amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrast, the
(b)(3) NatSec. ActA gency m. t errogat or ont in'u ous 1y appl i e d 1a rge vo1 u· mes
of water to a cloth that covered the detainee's mouth and nose. One of
the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the Agency's use
. of the technique differed from that used in SERE training and
explained that the Agency's technique is different because it is "for
real" and is more poignant and convincing.
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecfct L___-==--.
(b)(1) · 80 L__~ __ J_:F~rom December 2002 untilj
(b )(
3
) NatSecALJepte~ber 2003.~---=a:::.-s~ us:::e~d~t~o~d~e~tain~=a·n ::::d=in~-t.::::e-rr;o;;~-·a ~t-e:::_-~--~
(b)(1) ei t individuals.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
I During this time, Headquarters issued
tnelorm DC! Co ement Guidelines, the DCI Interrogation
Guidelines, and the additiofull draft guidelines specifically
,.
42 (U 1 !l'eBe) See discussion in paragraphs 92-93 regarding threats.
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b)(3) NatSecAct
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addl'essing r.eqJ.rirements for OMS personnel. Tltis served to
strengthen the command and control exercised over the CTC
Program. :
Background and Detainees
8l.J
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
'----------(b)(3) NatSecAct-------------__j
82. fl'S/ was originally intended to hold
(b)(1) · ~ :naximum of two high value detainees I = I
(b)(3) NatSectct~ecause the Agencyhad_notestablished another detention
(b)(1) facility for these detainees, five cells had been constructedrto"-----,
(b)(3) NatSecActmunodate five detainees-Abu Zubaydah, Al-NashiriJ (b)(1) I
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Several Agency personnel expressed concern to OIG that I~ . 'I
had become overcrowded.
83.1
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
38
..,II II' ~PCPEJ:: ,.-----=-=---(b)(1)·--------,
'--------(b)(3) NatSecAct __ __j
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I
) . -,~ (b)(1)
(b)( 1) Staffing
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
.··
84. (5//])>IP) Like ad no permanent
positions and was staffed with TDY officers. It had the same general
1 staffing complement as ; L_ ____ ~
~~ lgl NatSecAct 85. lp//~.JF) DO managers told OIG that in selecting a COB at
1 !they considered a combination of factors, to include grade
and managerial experience. A senior DO officer said that, by March
2003, because of a lack of available, experienced DO officers who
could travel to the selection criteria were limited. to
selecting CTC candidates based on their grade. Like most TDY
personnel who traveled to the COB was generally
(b)(1) expected to remain for a 30-day TDY.
(b)(3) NatSecAct .
1
86 . .f['&/ j I The duties of the COB to
(b)(1) " manage the facility, its security and its pcnnel,ere the same as
(b)(3) NatSecAclthose of the COB atj(The COB also oversaw.
interrogations and debriefings, released ca. es an reports, and.
(b)(1) communicated daily with the local Station and Headquarters.
(b)(3) NatSecAct -~· ___,
87. f.l%1 ~ I Although the COBI-Iwas
ultimately responsible for on-site security, the ~nsibilities
(b)(1) for security matters fell to security personnel who, in adclition to
(b)(3) NatSecArmonito~g\the detainees around-the-clock, also monitored
:gerimeter via audio and video cameras. Security
petsonne atllmaintained records of vital detainee
information,~ medical information, prescribed medications,
bathing schedules, menus, and. eating schedules. They prepared
three meals daily for each detainee, which generally consisted of
beans, rice, cheese sandwiches, vitamins, fruit, water, and Ensure
nutritional supplement.
,-------"-39'---(b )( 1 )-:-:-=---;--cc-------,
~"~' _...,nn..,n='" 1 (b)(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
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88. fffl A~ ~sychologists' roles did not
immf!diately change. They continued to psychologically assess and
interrogate detainees and were identified as
"psychologist/interrogators." Headquarters ad
that stated: . · ·-(b)(3) NatSecAct
It has been and continues to be [A-gency] practice that the
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(6)
individual at the interrogation site who administers the techniques .
is not the same person who issues the psychological assessment of
record ..... In this respect, it. should be noted that staff and IC
psychologists who axe approved interrogators may continue to
serve as interrogators and physically participate in the
administration of enhanced techniques, so long as at least one other.
psychologist is present who is not also serving as an mterrogator,
and the appropriate psychological interrogation assessment of
rei::ord has been completed.
(b )(7)( c)
IIMedical Services believes this problem still eXists because
~logists/interrogators continue to perform both functions.
(b)(1) Guidance Prior to DCI Guidelines
(b )(3) NatSecAct
89. ~ I By the time !became
operational, the Agency was providing legal and operational
briefings and cables[ [that contained Headquarters'
(b)(
1
) guidance and discussed the tortuie statute and the DoJ legal opinion.
(b)(S) NatSecActTC had also estaplished a precedent of detailed cables between
d Headquarters regarding the
interrogation and debrieful.g of detainees~ The wd.ti:en gUidance did
not address the four standard interrogation techniques that,.
according to CTC/Legal, the Agency had identified as early as
· November 2002.43 Agency personriel were authorized to employ
standard interrogation techniques on a detainee without
Headquarters' prior approval. The guidance did not specifically
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43 ~ The four standard interrogation techniques were: (1) sleep deprivation not to .
exceed 72 hours, (2) continual lise of light or darkness ·;n a cell, (3) loud music, and (4) white noise· ·~~--..:-- ~ l
(background hum). .J
40
(b)(1)
'I( IPSF.C'RF.'F-IL_ ______ (b)(3) NatSecAct. _ __j
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address the 1,15_~ of props to imply a physical threat to a detainee, nor
did it specifically address the iSsue of whether or not Agency officers
· could improvise with any other techniques. No formal m~Chanisms
were in place to ensure that personnel going to the field were briefed
on the existing legal and policy guidance.
(b)( 1) Specific Unauthorized or Undocumented Techniques
(b )(3) NatSecAct
90. ('l:'SJ I This Review heard allegations of the use
of unauthor~~ techniques The most significant, the
handgun and power drill incident, discussed below, is the subject of a
separate OIG investigation. In addition, individuals interviewed
during the Review identified other techniques that caused concern
because DoJ pad not specifically approved them. These included the
making of threats, blowing cigar smoke, employing certain stress
positions, the use of a stiff brush on a detainee, and stepping on a
· detainee's ankle shackles. For all of the instances, the allegations .
were disputed or too ambiguous to reach any authoritative
determination regarding the facts. Thus, although these allegations
· · are illustrative of the nature of the concerns held by individuals
associated with the CTC Program and the need for clear guidance,
they did not warrant separate investigations or ach:ninistrative action.
(b)(1) . (b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct Handgun and Power Dnll (b)(?)(c)
· 91. (I'S./ and interrogation team members,
whose purpose it was to interrogate Al-Nashiri and debrief Abu
Zubaydah, initially staffe~ [The interrogation team
continued EITs on Al-Nashiri for two weeks in December 2002 until
they assessed him to be "compliant." Subsequently, CTC officers at
Head uarters disa.greed with that assessment and sent a(b)(1)
. ti ffi (th d b . ~ >[(b)(3) NatSecAct
-=--::r=1=~=-='-seruor opera ons o cer e e ne1er 1 .
(b)(1) to e ne an assess Al-Nashiri.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
92. (~ I The debriefer assessed Al-Nashiri as
(b )(6)
(b)(?)(c)
'
withholding information, at which point[ ]reinstated sleep
. deprivation, hooding, and handcuffing. Sometime between
.. ,.,
41
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(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
'lOP SECRiT/r--((bb))((1 )) N I· -· L_ 3 atSecAct ______ ___J_
. 28 Decembe:J; ~902 and 1 January 2003, the debriefer used an
unloaded semi-automatic handgun as a prop to frighten Al-Nashiri
into disclosing information.44 Mter ciiscussing this plan with c=J the debriefer entered the cell where Al-Nashiri sat shackl~e-cd:-_an-"d
racked.the handgun once or twice close to. Al-Nashiri's head.45 on
what was probably the same day, the debriefer used a power drill to
frighten Al-Nashiri. With J ~onsent, the de briefer entered · (b )(6)
the detainee's cell and rev.ved the drill while the detainee stood (b)(7)(c)
naked and hooded. The debriefer did not touch Al-Nashiri with the
power drill.
93. \5/ /N:P)- The Land de briefer did not request
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1) . authorization orreport the use of these unauthorized techniques to
(b )(3) NatSe;ActLdauar_te_rs. However, in January 2003, newly arrived TDY officers
· I )who had learned of these incidents reported them to
Headquarters. OIG investigated and referred its findings to the
· Criminal Division of DoJ. On 11 September 2003, DoJ declined to
prosecute and turned these matters over to CIA for disposition.
These incidents are the subject of a separate OIG Report of
Investigation.46
(b)(1)
(b)(1) Threats (b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
94. (rS./ During another incident the
same Headquarters de briefer, according to ar------'----c:-:~
was present, threatened Al-Nashiri by saying at if e not talk,
"We could get your mother in here," and, 'We can bring your family
in here." Thej jdebriefer reportedly wanted-Al-Nashiri
~~ ~m N tS A Fer, for psychological reasons, that the debriefer might beD
a
9f c Jintelligence officer based on his Arabic dialect, and that Al-
Nashiri was inJ J.custody be<::ause it="" was="" widely="" believed="" in="">
Middle East circles that interrogation technique involves
44 '{5//lffl This individual was qot' a trained interrogator and·was not authorized to use E!Ts.
45 (U I /F009) Racking is a mechanical procedure used with firearms to chamber a bulle! or
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simulate a bullet being chambered. . · ·
46 '(81/Nli) Unauthorized Interrogation Techniq(b )(1) b October 2003.
_____ ....._. j!
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· (b)(3) NatSecAct
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sexually abusing female relatives in front of the detainee. The
debriefer denied threatening Al-Nashiri through his family. The
debriefer also said he did not explain who he was or where he was
from when. talking with Al-Nashiri. The de briefer said he never said
he was intelligence officer but let
(b)(1) Al-Nashiri draw his own conclusions.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
95 .. (TS,J I An experienced Age~cy interrogator
reported that the psychologists/interrogators threatened Khalid
(~)(~) N
18
A
1
Shaykh Muhammad I I According to this interrogator, the
( )( ) a ec c psychologists/interrogators said to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad that
(b)(3) CIAAct if anything.else happens in the United States, "We're going to kill .
(b)(6) your children." According to the interrogator, one of the ·
(b)(7)(c) psychologists/interrogators sai~ I eTC/Legal had advised that
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(S)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
. threats are ermissible so Ion as the aie "conditional."
L--.. -.,---,,.--,.-;;---:.-----:-,------LW_ith, respect to the report
provided tq him of the threats'-------,--------,--_jthat report did not
indicate that the law had been violated.
(b)(1)
(b)(1) s k . (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct mo e
96. (laL An Agency independent contractor
interrogator admitted that, in December 2002, he and another
independent contractor smoked cigars and blew smoke in
Al-Nashiri's face during an interrogation. The interrogator claimed
they did this to "cover the stench" in the room and to help keep the
interrogators alert late at night. This iri.terrogator said he would not
do this again based on "perceived criticism." Another Agency
interrogator admitted that he also smoked cigars during two sessions
with Al-Nashiri to mas!} the stench in the room. He claimed he did
not deliberately force smoke into Al-Nashiri's face.
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct)tress Positions
(b)(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
97. · ('m/1 I OIG received reports that interrogation
team members employed potentially injurious stress positions on
Al-Nashiri. · Al-Nashiri.was required to kneel on .the floor and lean
back. On at least one occasion, an Agency officer reportedly pushed
Al-Nashiri backward while he was in this stress position. On another
.=:=='..----raid he had to intercede after! I
expressed concern that Al-Nashiri's arms might be
L_.rr·::..-oc==a-.:-:te:-:ld from his shoulders. explained that, at the time,
the interrogators were attempting to put Al-Nashiri in a standing
stress position. Al-Nashiri was reportedly lifted off the floor by his
arms while his arms were bound behind his back with a belt.
Stiff Brush and Shackles (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
98. (TS.,( interrogator reported that
he witnessed ofuer techniques used on Al-Nashiri fuat the
interrogator knew were not specifically approved by DoJ. These.
included the use of a stiff brush that was intended to induce pain on
Al-Nashiri and standing on Al-Nashiri's shackles, which resulted in ·
(b)(1) .... db . Wh ti' d . t t h. t (b)(3) NatSecActan rwses. en ques one , an m erroga or w o was a
1 ~cknowledged that they used a stiff brush to bathe
Al-Nashiri. He described fue brush as the kind of brush one uses in. a
bath to remove stubborn dirt. A CTC manager who had heard of the
incident attributed the abrasions on Al-Nashiri's ankles to an Agency
officer accidentally stepping on Al-Nashiri's shackles while
repositioning him into a stress position.
(b)(1) Waterboard Technique
(b )(3) NatSecAct · . .
99. ~ I The Review determined that the
interrogators used the waterboard. on Khalid Shaykh Muhammad in
a manner inconsistent wifu the SERE application of the waterboard ·
and the description of thewaterboard in the DoJ OLC opinion, in that
the technique was used on Khalid Shay_kh Muhammad a large ·.
number of times. According to the General Counsel, fue Attorney
' 44
.,, ,,. rrcnp"r/ ,--------"'-''---(b)(1)-------,
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L__--(b)(3) NatSecAct:-------~__j
General acknQwledged he is fully aware of the repetitive use of the
waterboard and that CIA is well withiri the scope of the DoJ opinion
and the authority given to CIA by that opinion. The Attorli.ey
General was informed the waterboard had been used 119 times on a
(b) ( 1 ) single individual.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
· 100. ~ I Cables indicate that Agency
interrogatorsl ~pplied the waterboard technique to
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad 183 times during 15 sessions over a
period of 14 days. The application of this technique to Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad evolved because of this detainee's ability to counter the
technique by moving his lips to the side to breathe while water was
being poured. To compensate, the interrogator adininistering the
waterboard technique reportedly held Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's
lips with one hand while pouring water with the other. Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad also countered the technique by holding hiS
· breath and drinking as much of the water being administered as he
could. An on-site physician monitoring the waterboard sessions
estimated that Khalid Shaykh Muhammad was capable of ingesting
up to two liters of water. Cables indicate that an average of 19liters
(5 gallons) of water were used per waterboard session, with some of
·the water being splashed onto Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's chest
and abdomen to evoke a visceral response from him. On the advice
of the presiding physician, water was replaced with normal saline to
prevent water intoxication and dilution of electrolytes. ln. addition,
one of the interrogators reportedly formed his hands over
Khalid Shci:ykh Muhammad's mouth to collect approximately one
inch of standing water.47 Cables reflect that, during sixwaterboard
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CJAAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
47 ff5i j ~ccording't6 thel lehile Khalid Shaykh Muhiunmad
proved to be remar ly resilient to waterboard appliCations, e "Wlprecedented intensity of its
use" led OMS to advise CfC/SMD that OMS consi\tered the ongoing process 'both excessive 3!'d ~-.:....pointless."
This concern was the impetus for OMS to juxtapose explicitly the SERE waterboard
experience with that of the Agency's in the OMS Guidelines ·then being assembled.
r--------"'4"--5 -l(b )(1 )--------,
·.~ ...
............. ...,c""ncnCPl,.,~·"'C..I (b) (3) N atSecAct
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TOPSECR£T/r---(b)(1) I ....
· L_(b)(3) NatSecAct.-------_j·
sessions.with Khalid ~haykh Muhammad, the interrogation team
excet;!ded the·contemplated duration of20 minutes per session with
the most notabl~ session lasting 40 minutes,48 , ..
(b) ( 1 ) . . . . . (b)( 1 )-,-:-c::----:---c-----.
(b)(3) NatSe~ctEN'ITON AND INTERROGATION ACTIVlTIES
1
(b)(3) NatSecAct
101 . f.E'S/ 'I IT he Ag ency prov1'd e dle ss management
attention to detention and interro~ration activities I
it gave to I Iandi !took the lead on
these activities! iusin~ las the primary · .
detention and interrogation facili!Y,L
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
102. j
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
48 ~e OLC opinion dated 1 August 2002 states, "You have also orally
informed us that it is likelv that this procedure [waterboard] would not last more than 20 minutes
in any one aoolication." I (b)( 1 )
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
.-------'!'46~-(b)(1 )------,
..,.,,.., '"'"-ee"""'""li'"""J::~'P~' (b )(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C05856717 _ _j
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(b)(3)
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. 00056
C05856717
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TOf SECRETL(b)(i)
. (b)(3) NatSecAct-------__J
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct------,
I
103.1
(b)( 1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
104.1
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
105.]
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
. 106.1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
. '~
47
r'I: ,.-------=----(b}(1 }---------,~·
(b)(3) NatSecAct ..
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C05856717 .
00057
C05856717
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct·-__j
~--~10=7~.1,----------------------------------,
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
' 108. (fS !received its first detainee on
0September 2002. After the first month of operation~.t.----c~--__]1
detainee population had grown to 20. Since then, the detainee
population ranged from 8 to 20.
,HeadQuarters Oversight
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
109. EB'/[ VNF) The disconnect between the field and
Headquarters regarding arose early. After (b)(1)
o ened, the Station acknowled ed that, in racti~al terms (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)( 1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
110,[
(b)( 1 )
(b)(3) NatSecAct
I TOP SECREJ:I
t!Q
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'lOP SECRET1 1--
L---------------------------~
i I (b)(1) ~------------,
'
(b)(3) NatSecAct
1
!
111. (S//1'~ OIG also found confusion among DO
l components regarding which Headquarters element was responsible
(b)(1) , _ _1 I • ~ • · (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct~ rpnor to Serptember 2003.50 The proposal for openmg (b)(B)
·1 1 !originated wit±L land many of the decisions (b)(?)(c)
regarding! le.g., selection of the I rrere made in
(b)( 1)
1
the field. The confusion stemmed in part from the fact thatl I
(b )(3) NatSe~Ac'--------------------------------=----,---o-----___j
Despite the
(b)(1) c...rr_an_s i ::cti=-o-n_,,h =-o-w--ev_e_r-,-=-th-e-,f'o-c'us--o-f'a-c-:cti:-v-;-:iti,...e-s-=·-.---->--,in general, and
(b )(3) NatSecAct 1· ti' ul t t · · d th ti' 'ti'
1
m par c ar, was coun er erronsm, an ose ac v1 es
were supported by counterterrorism funds. As a result, at
Headquarters,! !monitored the activities but did r(b )( 1)
(b)(1) ::.ttempt to provide management oversight. (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b):(3) NatSecAct
~=so-;::===========---(b)(1 )--------'-~-=------.1·~·"-"- L (b)(3) NatSecAct .
·= nnrm '.--------"4"'-9 -(b )(1 )------,
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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~(b)(1)
(b)(1) TOI'5ECRE:f/L_(b)(3) NatSecAct:-------,-J
(b)(3) NatSecAct
. 113. (~/{NP') In December 2002, made a
(b)(1) · nrogrammatic assessment of th~ !staffing requirements. The
(b )(3) NatSe1cAct--"--tstated its view that the staffing should include!
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
114. tfSi A I Also in laecember 2002, after CTC/RDG
assumed responsibility fo~a CTC/RDG asseSsment team
traveled to the site. The assessment teammade recommendations
ranging from administrative improvements, such a5 installation of
.thermometers in the facility and the. wie of a logbook, to
(b)(1) programmatic changes, such as the need for additional personnel and
(b)(3) NatS~cActermining the endgame for each detainee. Subsequently, there
were some improvements in interrogation support. A September
· 2003 assessment froml I indicated that
staffing remained insufficient to support the detention prog!:am. In
D e, CTC/RDG proposed to add three positions to th~ =:J . . . . . (b)(1)
to address reg10nal mterrogation reqwrements. (b)(3) NatSecAct
Facility and Procedures
115. ~'rl- (b)( 1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
, The detention facility
'---o-ins~id.--e---,th,.----e-w-ar-e.--h-ous-e-c-o-ns~is~ts-o---,f~2=o~in~~-vt~.~u-'al concrete structures
·. used as cells,· three :itlterrogation rooms, a staff room, and a
~~lm NatSecA'~?rdroom.l lis not
insulated and there is no central air conditioning or heating.·
Individual cells were designed with a recess for electrical space
heaters; however, electrical heaters were not placed in the cells. The
(b)(3) CIAf-ct !estimated there were between 6 and 12 gas heaters in
D
B
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(b )(6) the cell block in November 2002 at the time a detainee, Gul Rahman,
(b)(7)(c) ·- · ··~-~"--- il
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T01' SEcmlr ;[]~lgl NatSecAct ______ __jldied
from hypQthermia.51 This was increased to 40 to 60 heaters after
· thedeath.j (b)(1)
~~lgl Nat~ecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
116. ~ ~ad no written standard
operating procedures until January 2003 when the DCI Confinement
Guidelines were issued. A psychologist/interrogator visiting the
facility beforeGul Rahman's death in November 2002 noted this
deficiency, stating that the procedures should be so detailed as tci
specify who is responsible for turning the lights on and off, or what the
temperature should be in the facility. Although the (b)(1)
psyc h0 1o gt· s t/m' t errogat o r· re 1ay e d this opr· m· on t 0 th-9' (b)r(:3:ll mN:a tSecAct
Manager al).d ulanned'to author procedures, before he could do so, he
(b)(1) vvas sent tol lfor the interrogation of a high value detainee.
(b )(3) NatSecAct . · ·
117. ff&;1 The customary practice at'l ----,~as
' to shave each.detainee's head and beard and conduct a medical
examination upon arrival. Detainees were then given uniforms and ·
moved to a cell. All detainees were subjected to total darkness and.
loud music. Photographs were taken of each detainee for
identification purposes. While in the cells, detainees were shackled
to the wall. The guards fed the detainees on an alternating schedule
of one meal on orie day and two meals the next day. As the
· temperature decreased in November and December 2002, the Site
Manager made efforts to acquire additional supplies, such as wariner
uniforms, blankets, and heaters.sz. If a detainee was cooperative~ he
was afforded improvements in his environment to include a mat,
blankets, a Koran, a lamp, and additional food choices: Detainees
who were not cooperative were subjected to au5tere conditions and
aggressive interrogations until they became "compliant."
51 (5/0ffl The facts and circumstances of Gul Rahman's death are discussed later in this
ReView.
52 (U) In November 2002, the temperature ranged.from a high of 70 to a low of 31 degrees
Fahrenheit. ·
II
51 (b)(1)
nncnn~ 'I (b)(3),_N_a-tS-ec_A_ct---,~
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) Na!SecAct
"1ui'SECFFTjL __ --,-________ (b)(1) I -(
b )(3) Na!SecAct
118. tffl"£~ I Ptior to December 2002,lihad
no written interrogation procedur~s. According to ~tion
officer, Headquarters' approval in July 2002 of the handling of.a
detainee with techniques of sleep deprivation, solitary confinement,
~~~m CIAAct and noise served as the basis for the standard operating procedures ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct !According to I I
(b )(6) 1 ']had no de~dance regarding interrortions
(b )(7)( c) until a CTC officer came toL_jin late July 2002.1 cable to
CTC/Legal proposing techniques, such as the use of darkness, sleep
deprivation, solitCi!)' .confinement, and noise, that ultimately became
a which were reported to Headquarters included standing for[ Other interrogation techniques adopted at .
(b)( 1 ) s p privation, nakedness, and cold showers. . · · ·
(b )(3) Na!SecAct
119. Interrogators atl lwere l~ft to
their own devices in working with the detainees. One new CTC
· operations officer explained that he received no trainin ·dance.
(b)(1) related to interro ations before he arrived in
(b)(3) Na!SecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(7)( d)
Other officers provided similar accounts.
~-~~~-~~ Several officers who observed or participated in the activities at
'--------=-_Jin the early months expressed concern about the lack of
procedures.
120. fFS/ received little general
· guidance regarding detention and interrogation tintil after the death
(b)(
1
) of Rahman onONovember 2002. In the perceived absence of
(b)(3) Na!SecActecific guidance from Headquarters,)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(7)(d)
I It was not until December 2002, three months
L_af=-ter_o_p_e_run~.- g-, .,.,th-a--,tl_j==-'-'-"""ll.received official written guidance from
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b)(1) H
. (b)(3) Na!SecAct
D
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Headquarters. Some of that guidance, for example the instruction
that only those who had taken the interrogator training J(b)(1)
.. · (b)(3) Na!SecAct
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n
53 ~ IThe first session of the interrogation course began in November.2002 .. See - -~--=-··-...:- Tj
paragra'='phs=64-'65•" ...J ~
• TO'P S'RCR-EI'I
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"'TOP SECREIIL(b)(1)
. (b)(3) NatSecAct:-------_j
commenced inNovember 2002 should conduct interrogations, was
(b)(1) met with surprise by officers who had been operating pri~r to
(b)(3) NatSecActNovember 2002 under other de facto procedures. · · (b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
121. ffS~ I The interrogation proces~ I
(b)(1) evolved after the death of Gul Rahman. On[]December 2002,
(b)(3) NatSecActcTC/RDG announced it would assume the res onsibility for the
. management and maintenance of all CIA [interrogation
(b)(1.) facilities. An assessment team traveled toL~_Jin..Th~nh!~
(b )(3) NatSecAct 2002 and prepared a list of recommendations.
(b )(6) stated he was comfortable with the level of guihd'an-ce-th:co-e"S.,.ta-cti'"·o _n_j
(b)(?)(c) received after the a:(b)(1 )ment team's visit.
i
·i
!
(b)(3) NatSecAct __ .,
122. fFSi the employment of EITs is(b)(B)
now reportedly well codified. According tp thel jwhen(b)(?)(c)
interrogators arrive, he provides them with a folder containing
· written security issues and theprocedures for using EITs. ·
Interrogators are required to sign a statement certifying they have
read and understand the contents of the folder. Written interrogation
plans are prepared and sent to Headquarters for each detainee. ·
Directorate of Intelligence analysts are not used as interrogators; they
(b)(1) · are the sul;>stantive experts. Psychologists are alsoJllonitoring the
(b)(3) NatSecAct detainees and a Physician's Assistant is now at[ ~whenever
(b)(1) I
Errs are being employed. The! I staff is watching the
temperature and detainee diets more carefully. Headquarters
monitors medical, hygiene and other health, safety and related issues
by, among other things, daily cable traffic and quarterly written
reports.[
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
· (b)(3) NatSecAct ______ -c-_~ ____________ __j
I
123. (Wjl High value detainees Al-Nashiri and
Khalid Shaykh Muhanu;nad i:ransited1 bnroute to other
facilities. Several medium value detainees have been detained and
interrogated at For exainple, Ridda Najjar, a purported _ ~--.--..-
(b )(1) UBL bodyguard; Mustafa Ahmad Adam al-Hawsawi, an Al-Qa'ida
(b)(3) NatSecAct ·
53
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L_(b)(3) NatSecAct-------_j·
financier who.:ceportecjly handled the transfer of funds to the 9/1i
hijackers and was captured with Khalicl. Shaykh Muhammad; and
Khalid Shalkh Muhammad's 11ephew, Ammar al-Baluchi, were .
detained a{ I Although these individuals were not planners,
they had access to information of particular interest, and the Agency
(b)(1) used interrogation techniques a~(b)( 1 r--ltn ""''i!k to obtain this ..
. . . . (b)(3) NatSecAct · · ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct•rmation.
(b)(1) (b)(1)
. Site Management[(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3)NatSecAct 124. fffu!~ jwhowcisatl lrrom
k:iescribed I ~ a "high riSk,
((bb)) ((1 ) 71--:---.~ 1-.-::.---:-.- t- ::lli::-.- --;;-f~ -~ilic.:-:--ty-::":-:H;;-.;; . d "b . d hi 1 din 3) NatSecAcl.)
(b )(6) 1 I He stated that he traveled there
(b)(?)(c) I jto obtain a general sense of the facility
or learn fiisthand of a specific inteqogation. he released
· all cables regarding thefacility and the interrog\ltions conducted
(b)(1) there. (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct · (b)(?)(c)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 125. ho had several overseas
(b)(?)(c) 6aid his responsibilities inc u ed overseeing the activities
(b)(6) ~signments ~as
a He said he went to the facility about three times,
· explaining that Station management tried to limit the number of trips
(b)( 1 ) to the facility because going th("'b")"'( 1")ras considered an o erational act;
(b)(3) NatSecAucctc ause o 512·-0-~'. ..( "'ilbl"'")'· (3) NatSecA•c t..~, on re· ue d
~o andthe
(b)(1) I (bJ{1 yversee the day-to-day nmni.ng-of the
(b)(3) NatSecAc!ifity. (b)(3) CIAAct
~~\~~\(c) (b)(3) NatSecAct
126. ffSf 1 kYho was interviewed
during this Review, I I
l____jl He was unable to estimate the percentage of time that he spent
(b)(1) on detention-related matters but said it varied. I I
(b )(3) NatSecAc::lted that he went toL(b )(1 )]on a number of occasions and·
(b)(3) NatSecAct
TAP~FCRFT/,..-------"S""4 -(b)(1 ) _______ .,
L..... _____ (b )(3) NatSecAc'------'
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(b)(6) ]
(b)(?)(c)
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
l
. .,...~ . ~ 'J .,.
~
. -·~]
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iOl" SECRB'l;JI (b)(i)
,L___(b)(3) NatSecAct ______ ___j
believed he knew what was ocCUrring there. I
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) ,.....,..,1 I
(b)(3) NatSecAct----=1=2::...;7. ~ Rtation assigned responsibility for
!. I prior to its occupancy to al I officer
hired ilf I This officer lacked any education or
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
experience that was relevant to mailaging the construction of a
detention facility. He only learned of his assi ent after re orting
to the Station. He was res onsible for the site (b)(6)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(6),
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1) (b )(7)( c)
(b)(3) CIAAct '------------------------1
~~~~~~ NatSecA.-c_t __,t~.2 8 ~ The first
1
(b)(1) !site Managc=::er:...w,..:.cas=...:.a"---l _clfir=·= st,_,-t=-our=·:. -,
(b)(7)(c) l~fficerl (b)(3) NatSecAct-
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
129.
(b)(i) [ !the Site Manager had no idea what duties he would
(b)(3) NatSecAcle assi ed. He believes the. primary factors in his assignment as
(b )(6) Site Mana er were the vacan in the detention rogram
(b)(7)(c) and. that The Site
Manager received a copy of the PCI's Interrogation Guidelines in
January 2003 and certified that he had read them. The first formal
training the Site Manager receivea on the use of EITs, however, was
an interrogation class he attended! lnine months into his
tour. . · . · (b )(6) ·
(b )(7)( c)
(b)(1)
/ (b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6) - ~-....__
-(b)(7)(c)======:..__--------------,
54
-nonr~• 55 (b)(1)~-------,
I (b )(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1) .
~10P SEERiiT/r-=============-(b-)(_3_) Na_t_s_ec_A_c_t __,I·
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAcl-----,
130 .. (T&lL I gave the Site Mana er
respohsibili for an · g that had to do with detention
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) (b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) CIAAct (b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAc (b)(7)(c)
~~l~~l(c) 131. ~I ~xplained that he sele
based on several factors, includin~
fJ
d
H
l'1
jJ
. dded that he watched. n
the Site Manager discll.ai'ge his a-:ccuti""e=sc-:an...,...,..-w_jas very satisfied with the
(b)(1) . jol;lheperformed.l ~aidthathe,l ~dtheSite . ~~l~~lCIAAct J
(b)(3) NatSecA~tanager talked a lot about issues. The Site Manager had free access (b)(?)(c)
to) ~tation Front Office, and recalled consulting
with the Site Manager at least once a day. ·
~~lm CIAAct 132. (S//~ The Site Manager advised he had discussions
(b)(3) NatSecActth Station management, including) ~d the
'------co---' every other day or as issues arose. He stated that
someone from Station management came out to) ~bout once
(b)(3) CIAAct •.. ]
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
a month (b)(3) CIAAct came once or twice,\
(b )(6) When seni.'--or-,H=-ea-d.-u-ar-:t-er_s __,
'--c-,----,--,( b) (7) (c)
rJ
D
L --,----,.- ----=--::--:---,--r'.t r=a=-v,_,e=le=d"-'itoL( (bb ))(( 31)) NatSecActI n
management accompamed them to'----~-'
133. (S//HF) A number of individuals who served at the
Station with the Site Manager said that it was abundantly clear to
~~ lgl NatSecActem that he was overwhelmed. Additionally, they believed
1 lwas understaffe
required.
(b)(1)
.-----~5nc.__ _ (b)(3) NatSecAct
I l If'
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(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
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,---(b)(3) NatSecAct. ______ ____,
TbPSI!CREY L_ ____________ ~
134. (S/iNF) as unaware until
(b)(1) t.. • • t ·. dd . thisR . th th firs s· M .
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) NatSecAet'emgm emewe u:n'? . eVlew at e t Ite . ~age,rat
1 I had been a JunlONfficer.l lstated that a firstwtour
officer should not be running anything. One of the reasons he cited
for his revocation of the assi ent of the replacement Site Manager
a . was that .U:e nominee was onl a(b )(6)
'-----c.__JVle':', at a nummum a . (b)(7)(c)
more appropnate for the assignment.~
(b)(1)' _ _j
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) Interrogators and Linguists
(b )(3) NatSecAct I I 135. (!FS,t · The Site Manager explained that the
interrogations conducted a~ !during the firstmonths that it
was operational were essentially custodial interviews coupled with
environmental deprivations. When Agency officers came to conduct
interrogations, the Site Manager initially took them to The
· only guidance he provided i:hem at that time was how to get in and
out of the facility securely. Substantive experts were in short supply,
so the interrogators had to read the background on the detainees.
The Site Manager explained i:hat the interrogators essentially had the
freedom to do what they wanted; he did not have a list of "do's and
don'ts" for interrogations.
136. ("FSS ~ I During first four months of
operation, iridividuals with no previous relevant experience, no
trairiing, arid no guidance often condlj.cte e interrogations. In fact,
(b)(1) . most of theseindividualswere sent to in other capacities and
(b )(3) NatSecActw~ssed into service a _ For example, one analyst sent
. · t
the process. Another officer who-debriefed/interrogated atl I
((~))((~)) N
8
A '?aid he agreed to do so because it needed to be done and because the
at ec cluternative was to leave the detainees languishing indefinitely. Several
officers expressed concern about the extended and sometimes .. ~ (b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct :--:"~~~===~--------~-----,
(b)(3) NatSecAct ~-.,.._
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
• .....
57 (b)(1)--------,
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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00067
Appr(b~~ )or Release: 2016/06/10 C05856717 (b)(1)
r---'(b)(3) NatSecAct--------(b)(3) NatSecAct
TOP SECRET 'I__ (b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
unjustified detention of individuals atl I
stated that individuals might have beElnreleased or moved sooner nad
they been debriefed/ iitterrogated earlier and if a determination had
then been made fu"t there was little j'ustification for their continued . . . r---(b)(1) . . .
detention,atL___(b)(3) NatSecAct · .
· 137. (TSj I In addition to a shortage of . .
interrogators,! lfUiSsuffered from a shortage of lingui$ts.
Because most of the debriefers/interrogators a~ Jhave had
(b)(1) . ~~ relev~t forei language capabili ,lin · ts must assist in the
(b)(3) NatSecActeiTO ations.
,_----.-.-~--~---~
Instances have occurred,
however, when detainees were not questioned because of a lack of
linguistic support. i ·Station requested both interrogation and
linguistic support when it has been specifically needed, but its
requests have not always been accommodated.
(b)(1)
Medical Support (b )(3) NatSecAct (b)( 1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
138. %1 Providing inedic.U attention to'-----,----_j
(b)(1
) ~etainee.s has also been a staffin? problem. In ~ddition, compared to
(b )(3) NatSecActrelativel small number of high value detamees at
· the larger number and less well-known
detainees a posed unique challenges.
139.1
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C05856717
C05856717 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C05856717
"'"Ol?'"SE9m r--(b)( 1 )
!Of SECRJITL_(b)(3) NatSecAct: _______ __j
. I (b)(1) I
L----:--~--(-b-)(3_)_N_a_ts_e_c_Ac_t _____________ · .
140./
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
I
I I
I
141. ('l'Si A (b)( 1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
lOne cable
per month report.e d the results of examinations of thel I
(b)( 1) detamee population over the foll6wmg five-month penod. Desptte
(b)(3) NatSecActthe monthly reports of the exari:tination and treatment of detainees at
c____ __ _Jwhich commenced four months after the facility received
its first detainee, it is difficult to determine the extent of medical care
56 f*'S/ ~ lJ;l fact, one prior cable, on 1~ j;nuary 2003, provided an assessmen; of 13-
detainees-atL_(b)(~) I . ~.
(b)(3) NatSecAct . . ·
• man crc,.·n-"·""1
59
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C05856717
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__________ (b)(3) NatSecAct
Te>FSE8Rli'I,t=(b)(1) (b)(6). _
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c)
rovided to ·the detainees.
(b)(1) for example, reported that he did not
(b)(3) NatSe~Actpare recor so any treatment r~nderedl !ail.d his
OMS supervisor reported that OMS does not have a written protocol
requiring practitioners to produce documentation of patient contact,
"relying rather on the accep,ed professional 'requirement' to
document patient contacts." (b)(6) I (b)(1) I .. (b)(7)(c) .
(b )(3) NatSecAct
142. tffi tation reported that it is standard
procedure for one medical officer to participate in all renditions to
(b)(1) ensure the detainee does not have ahicj.den weapon, to determine the
(b)(3) NatSectStial condition of the detainee, and to stabilize the detainee during
rendition. That officer, therefore, ai'rived with any detainees who
(b)(1)
]
were rendered tol !As further describe~ in pjagraph 161,
shortly after the ·death of Rahman, the DOO sent Agency
(b)(3) NatSecAct
J
(b)(1) · office~ !
(b )(6) DO Investigative Team that detainees are examined an
(b)(?)(c) photographed upon their arrival to protect the Agency in the event
they were beaten or otherwise mistreated by liaison prior to
rendition. However, when asked for the identity of the medical
officer, the information on Rahman's medical examination, and
copies of the photographs could not produce them.
He reported that no medical documents were retained from the ·
renditions and the Station did not.retain medical documentation of
detainees. Further, the digital photos of Rahman had been
overwritten.
143.1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
·.
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
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(b )(3) NatSecAcl---~,----__j·
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(b )(3) NatSecAct
144.
(b)(1)
(b )(3) Na!SecAct
(b)(1) ___________________ _j
(b)(3) NatSecAct]
145. (b)(1)
(b)(3) Na!SecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
arranged for the U.S. Bureau of Prisons (BOP)
~.,o=-=csen~"aor-----J..----iteam to from
0November.59 This team worked with the guard"f.,..o~rc-e,---'
concentrating on tedmiques, such as entry and escort procedures,
application of restraints, security checks, pat-down and cell searches,
and documenting checks of detainees.r--(b)(1) _j
. · l__(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) Na!SecAct
61 -:. ---~' (b)(1)-------,
- (b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06110 C05856717
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TDI> 15BCRET/r---(b)( 1 ) I· -·
- L__(b)(3) NatSecAct.-------_j·
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
146.1
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
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148.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
149.
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
150. After CTC/RDG assumed responsibility
for the management of all CIA(b)(1) !interrogation facilities on
. 3 December 2002, CTC/RDG (b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
·I_ -------(b-)((b- )(13)) _ Nat_Sec_Act __________ _.j r~·-.......
63 (b)(1 )-----~
~-._.,=;::;--=-::.:lj (b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C05856717' __ _
00073
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L_(b)(3) NatSecAct-------_j ·
151.
152.1
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
,---~ 64-(b)(i)--------,
'---------,--,----,--,----(b) ( 3) N atS ecAct _ __J
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(b)(1)1
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
154.J
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
155.1
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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65 (b)(1)-------,
(b)(3) NatSecAct
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C05856717-----'
=--· 00075
C05856717 Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C05856717
TOP Sf!C~TA,-----(b)(1 )-~-----------,~
L___,(b )(3) NatSecAct----------,-___j·
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
156.1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
157.[
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
158.
(b)( 1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
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Approved for Release: 2016/06/10.S:.Q.5~5_6~7~17c___ _________ _
C05856717
Approved for Release: 2016/06/10 C05856717
"TaP SECPsTLC~~~m NatsecAct ____ ~ __ _j
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) '
(b)(3) NatSecActDeath of Gul Rahman
'
159. fFSII jGul Rahman, a suspected Afghan
(b)(1) extremist assoch'lted with the Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin organization,
(b)(3) NatSecActwas captured inj onl bd rendered to .
. . I ===rn[]November 2002. Betweenj ~ovember 2002,
i ~arunan underwent at least six interrogation sessions conducted b
I (b)( 1) various members of a team that included the
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c) was experienced from decades of work in
L,.,-:e'S""E""RiTE"p='r:c::oc=gr=ac-:m::::-", ra::c:rce·lped develop the BITs, and had conducted
· interrogations a' lhad
(b )(1) no experience or relevant training in interrogations before their
(b )(3) NatSecActassignment to but had acquired approximately six
(b)(6) months of experience through on-the-job training.· (b)(1)
(b)(7)(c) · (b)(3) NatSecAct
160. ~ I Rahman was subjected to sleep
deprivation sessions of up to 48 hours, at least one cold 'Shower, and a·
(b)(1) "hard takedown"-euphemistically termed "rough treatment."66 In
(b )(3) NatSecActiddition, Rahman was apparently without clothing for much of his
time a~ las pait of the sleep deprivation and to caiu1e cultural
humiliation. Despite these measures, Rahman remained
·.uncooperative and provided no irltelligence. His only concession
was to admit his identity onONovember 2002; otherwise, he
retained·his resistance posture and demeanor. The [}Jovember
~~ ~m NatSecAc~cable reporting that Rahman admitted his identity to · ·
~ers irlcludes the following, "Rahman spent the days since
his last session in cold conditions with minimal food and sleep." A
r=======,(b)(1)-----------(
b)(3) NatSecAct
66 (S)' Both the cold shower and hard takedown are described in greater detail later in this
Review.
;:;:;, ·," • rcnn~_l
iL__~~~~~~~~~~-·
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· ....
00077
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(b)(1) """"l"eFSECREJ:/1 (b)(1) I
(b) (3) Na tSecAct L.- -------'("'"blu .:(3 e../_)_,_N,a""tS'-"e""cA'-"c"'t- ---,-__j· .
psychologic~.
(b)(1 l in nart, "continued environmental deprivations." · >
(b)(3) NatSecAct · . · · ·
r=:=.:____>='--'------r;-;;_j On the afternoon of []November 2002;
elivered food to Rahman, he reportedly
threw'-=-::-e'o.,..,o,-,-,T:T::-::w-c-::ac:-iter bottle, and defecation bucket afthe guards.
In addition, he reportedly threatened the guards and told them he
had seen their faces and would kill them upon his release. When the
Site Manager learned of this incident, he authorized short-chaining,·
i.e., Rahman's hands and feet were shackled and connected with a
short-chain. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct .
162. fFS/L l£ound Rahman dead
(b)(1 l ;"JUs cell on the morning ofLJNovember 2002. The ambient
(b)(3) NatSe~~fi.\perature was recorded at a low of0degrees. Rahman was still
· in the short-chain position that required him to sit, naked from the
waist down, on the concrete floor of his cell. He wore only a
sweatshirt. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct ·(b)(3) NatSecAct _ ,
163. ff&/L !reported Rahman's death
that day in
the DO Investigative Team, (b)(1)
· (b)(3) NatSecAct
CIA also promptly reported the incident to SSCI
_Lan-d"HP.-="'s"'c"'I.----..Th,.--,-e""DO Investigative Team conducted interviews and
the pathologist performed an autopsy of Rahman. The autopsy
indicated, by a diagnosis of exclusion, that death was caused by
hypothermia.67 After the DO investigation was completed, CIA
reported the death to DoJ and further briefed the SSCI and HPSCI
leadership. OIG opened an investigation into the circumstances
surrounding this incident. DoJ declined p_rosecution of the Agency
employee responsible for OIG's investigation will be the
subject of a separate Report of Investigation. (b )(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct~,_
67 tsT-The pathologist estimated Rahman to be in his mid-30s.
• I
'-------(b)(3) NatSecAct------"
68
00078
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C05856717
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101' SEE:Riil'/ (b)(1)
L___ ____ (b)(3) NatSecAct ____ ___,
(b)(1) . Specific U~~uthoriz~d or Undocumented Techniques
(b )(3) NatSecAct · . · ,.
(b)(i) ·164. ('FW The treatment of Gul Rahman was but
(b)(3) NatSecActone event in the early months o~ !Agency activity in
;
1that involved the use of interrogation techniques that
DoJ and Headquarters had not approved. Agency personnel
reported a range of ini.provised actions that interrogators and
debriefers reportedly used at that time to assist in obtaining
information from detainees. The extent of these actions is illustrative
) of the consequences of the lack of clear guidance at that time and the
(b)( 1) Agency's insufficient attention to interrogations in[((bb))((
3
1 )) N
8
A =:J
(b)(3) NatSecAct _ at ec ct
165. (1Sj OIG opened separate investigations into
two incidents: the November 2002 death of Gul Rahman a~ I
and the death of a detainee at a military base in Northeast
· Afghanistan (discussed further in paragraph 192) .. These two cases
presented facts that warranted criminal investigations. Some of the
techniques discussed below were used with Gul Rahman and will be
further addressed in connection with a Report relating to his death:
In other cases of undocumented or unauthorized techniques, .the facts
are ambiguous or less serious, not warranting further investigation.
Some actions discussed below were taken by employees· or
contractors no longer associated with the Agency. Agency·
management has also addressed administratively some of the actions.
Pressure Points. (b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
· 166.
!operations officer, '=p=-=ar--c:ti"c' "'ip~at-=e-:'ld""w""i.,.thc-::-an-=-=-othi"f:"'Ce""r- -'
erations o cer m a custodial i.:ttterro ation of a detainee I I
reportedly
Lu_s.,..e,.,-a-.."p:-r-=-es-:-cscc-ur:-ce~p-=-om=-ct,-t.-:e-=-ccc:-.-==-::-cc-=~c-o::-;-c-,ocrr~c-an~·j on the
detainee's neck,! !manipulated his fingers
~--,.-~~~------'
(b)(i) to restrict the detainee''s carotid artery. (b)(6)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(7)(c)
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
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(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
"lOP SECRJ;;T~ (b)(1) I·-
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct-----'
(b)(3) NatSecAct ~~l~~l(c)'-----'--,
167. ~ I ~ho was
facing the shackled detainee, reportedly watched his eyes to the point
that the detainee:would nod and start to pass out; then, the :-
h®k the detainee to wake him. ·This
Lp-r0_C_e5_S_W_as_r_e_p_e-atc-e-.d"fo,-Jr a total 0fthree appliCatiOnS On the detainee.
Thel ~cknowledged to OIG that he laid hands
OJ;l the detainee and may have made him think he was going to lose ·
consciouSness. Thel !also noted that he hrue=(~)(~)
years of experience debriefing and interViewing people and until ( )( )(c)
recently had never been instructed how to conduct interrogations.
168. 15/ /~Wj.. CTC management is now aware of this reported
incident, the severity of which was disputed. The use of pressure
points is not, and had not been, authorized, and CTC has advised the
I ~at such actions are not authorized.
(b)(1) (b)(1)
Mock Executions (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(3) NatSecAct
. 169. ~ I The debriefer who employed the
(b)(i) handgun and power drill on Al-Nashiri[ }dvised that
(b)(3) NatSecAct'se_aclions were predicated on a technique he had artici ated in
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
I I The de briefer stated that when he was
,===~~=L-rH-~~ between september and October 2002
1 1
offered to
fire a handgun outside the interrogation room while the debriefer
was interviewing a detainee who was thought to be withholding
information.68 staged the incident, which inclru""d'-=-ed=-----,
screaming and yelling outside the cell by other CIA officers andj'--oo---_j
guards. When the guards moved the detainee from the interrogation
room, they passed a guard who was dressed as a hooded detainee, .
lying motionless on the ground, and made to appear as if he had
beenshottodeath. · · (b)(1)
(b)(1) (b)(3) NatSecAct.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c) ..
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70
11
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.----------<.>
L_--:-:--=:--:------::c::c(b )(3) NatSecAct __ -"
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(b)(1) IOFSBeRE'f I (b) ( 1 ) ---~-
. j (b)(3) NatSecAct
'------(b)(3) NatSecAct ____ _j_
170. ~.L The de briefer claimed he did not think
· · he needed to report this inf' dent becal the! ~ad
(b)(1) openly discussed this plan several days prior to and
(b)(~) NatSecAcJJter the incident. When the debriefer was later I ~d ..
· · believed he needed a non-traditional technique to iriduce the .· · ·
i detainee to cooperate, he told I ~e wanted to wave a handgim
in front of the detainee to scare him. The debriefer said he did not·
believe he was required to notify Headquarters of this technique,
·1
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
citing the earlier, unreported mock execution (b)(1)
'-----(b)(3) NatSecAct
171.. ~ ~A senior op~tions officer~--=-=--:--=--'
recounted that around September 2002l_Jleard that the de briefer
had staged a mock execution.c:Jwas not present but understood it
went bjdly; ~was transparently a ruse and no benefit was derived (b )(6)
from it. bserved that there is a need to be creative as long as it is~~~~~~~~~
not considered torture. c=Jtated that if such a proposal were made
· now, it would involve a great deal of consultation. It would begi,n
wi~ l.nana,ement and would include CTC/Legal,'
~~~m NatsecA~DG, and the crc)L_ __ _j (b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
172. (5//N~ The! ladniitted staging a "mock
execution" in the first days thatl !was open. According to the
'.-----..-------'
the technique was his idea but was not effective
because it came across as being staged. It was based on the concept,
from SERE school, of showing something that looks real, but is not.
The! recalled that a particular CTC interrogator later
told him about employing a mock exeC'!J.tiOn technique. The I I
did not know when this incident occurred ot 1f it was
-=s:-c-uc-ccc-:e=-=s-::osful,.-J . ·He viewed this technique as ineffective because it was not
believable. (b) ( 1 )
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
,''·
(b)(3) NatSecAct
69 (S//lqf) This same debriefer submitted a cable.fro~ linearly Janu•ry'2nm in whjch~. ~-·· .._.,_
he proposed a number of other -tedmiques, including disconnecting the heating system
overnight. Headquarters did not respond.
71 (b)(1) ______ _____,
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
. ·-.~
(b )(3) NatSecAct 00081
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· (b)(1) . 'I vi' SI'!ERJ
173.
contractors who were futerviewed admitted to either particiJ>at±n in
~~ lgl NatSecA~Ce of the above-described incidents or hearing about them;1
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
described stagfug a mock execution of a detainee~
~--.! Reportedly, a detainee wlw witnessed the ''body"·in the aftermath of
the ruse "sang lil(b)(1.)•rrd."
(b)(3) NatSecAct
· 174. ('rs/f ~evealed that a ~oximately
four days before his interview with OIG the ~tated he
(b)(
1
) had conducted a mock execution in October or
(b)(3) NatSecA;1ovember 2002. Reportedly, the firearm was.discharged outside of
the building, and it was done because the detainee reportedly .
possessed critical threat information.[ ~tated that he told
(b)(1) · th~ lnot to do it again. He stated that he has not heard
(b)(3) NatSec~c;t a si.llliliii" act occUrringl(b)(1) since then. ·
(b )(6) . · . (b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(7)(c) U seof S mok_ e ·
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAcl _ _cl:c..7_ 5__ .- '-'"L._ ___J -A_C_IA_o_ffi_·c c__e_ri__ _- r::-~~--:JO-.::-::-;,-l
(b)(6) revealed that
(b) (7) (c) Lcr"· gc:-ar::-::-::-ett-;-;-:-e -=-sm::::-::-::oTk-=-e-=-w--=-asc:-::-co=-=n::-:c=e--=-u=-=s-=-e-:r::as-=--=-an=-
I lan interrogator, the of ·cer, who does not (b)(7)(c)
(b )(6) .
(b )(7)( c)
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
smoke, blew the smoke from a thin cigarette/ cigar in the detainee's
face for about five minutes. The detainee started talking so. the
smoke ceased. · eard that a -different
officer had used smoke as an interrogation techni9ue. OIG
questioned numerous personnel who had worked[ !about .
the use of smoke as a technique. Nene reported any knowledge of
the use of smoke as an interrogation technique. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
admitted that he has personally used smoke
"inh..--.-al.-a_,.ti~o-n.-t-e --.-~. q_u_jes on detainees to l!_lake them ill to the point ·. ·
where they would start to "purge." After this, in a weakened state,
72
lOP ~~C.RRT/ J (b)(1)
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(b)(1)
,--------'--(b )(3) NatSecAcl-------,
TOP SECRI!~ I•
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c) ____ ----.
these detaineE:.oa. would then provide L !with
information.70I !denied ever p~ysically
abusing detainees or knowing anyone who has. (b )(6) ·
(b)(1) (b)(7)(c)
Use of Cold (b)( s 3) Nat ecAct (b)(1) .,
177 =; A- · • 1
d(b)(3) NatSecAct
• , ~ ._,. .=, preVIous y reporte J
received its first detainees in mid-September 2002. s·'=-=yc::m=-can=y:-:ac-:-cc-=-=o~nn-ts
the temperatur~ fwas hot at that time and remained · .
!
(b)( 1 ) .,.enerally hot or warm until November 2002.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
. 178. ~In late ul to earl . u t 2002. a
detaineewasbeinginterrogated (b)(1)~ ·
l
Pn.o r to proceed m' g w· 1' th any o fthe proposed met ho d s,L__( b)(3_) N_atS ecAct _j
officer responsible for the detainee sent a cable requesting
Headquarters authority to employ a prescribed interrogation plan
· over a two-week period. The plan included the following:
'
Physical Comfort Level Deprivation: With use of a window air
conditioner and a judicious provision/ deprivation of warm
clothing/blankets, believe we can increase [the detainee's] physical
discomfort level to the point where we may lower his
mental/trained resistance abilities.
CTC/Legal responded and advised, "[C]aution mu5t be used when
employing the air conditioning/blanket deprivation so that [the
detainee's] discomfort does riot lead to a serious illness or worse."
~~ lm NatsecAct._--=-17'--'9--'--. ---"
b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(7)( d)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c) ·
asked Rahman his identity, and when he did not respond
'-=Wlc:-=.=-=::-itrue name, Rahman. was placed back nnder the cold water
by the guards I I Rahman was so cold
that he could barely s~y his alias. According to the officer, the entire
70 (e)'" This was substantiated in part by the CIA ~fficer who participated in this act with the -
~b)(6) . .
(b)(7)(c) ·
73 (b)( 1 )---:-:----=---:-------,
(b )(3) NatSecAct J
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process laste.cli.lo more than 20 minutes and was intended to lower
Rahman's resistance and was not for hygienic reasons, At the
conclusion of the shower, Rahman was moved to one of the !our
sleep deprivation cells where he was left shivering for hours or
overnight with his hand chained over his head.
(b)(1) 180. (1'$/]
(b )(3) NatSe~Act
(b )(6) 1
(b)(?)( c) LThis==--:.-pe-r-s-on---=d-et_e_ct_e--=d--=Rahm:--::--an-w_as_s--=-h-o-wm--c,-g----:th-e_e_ar-=lc-y-s-ta-g-e-s -o--=-f ___j
(b)(1) I
hypothermia, and he ordered the ards to 've the detainee a
blanket.
order a cold s ower for
'--,Rahman~-::-:-:-:-. "R"ahm--,-,--,-,--,an:-:-::w:-:c:-::-as::-r-e=-inc:cg:::-:-:un-c:-c-::-o::-co:-::p-c:"er·ative at the time and the
independent contractor stated that it was evident that the shower
was not ordered for hygienic reasons.
181. crs-;J
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1) - I
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
182. (-*8-/l
(b)(5)
74
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(b)(1) lOP SECRE'];f '------(b)(3) Na t S. ecA c t-~---'
(b)(3) NatSecAct
183. ~ I Many of the officers interviewed about
the use of cold showers as a technique cited that the water heater was
inoperable and there was no other recourse except for cold-·showers.
However explained that if a detainee was
cooperative, he \'(Ould be given a warm shower. He stated that when
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
a detainee was uncooperative; the interrogators accomplished two .
goals by combiiting the hygienic reason for a shower with the
(b)(1) unpleasantness of a cold shower. ((bb))((3
1 )) N tS A (b )(3) NatSecAct a ec c1
184. ('rS./ In December 2002, less than one month ·
after Rahman's hypothermia-induced death, a[ [cable
reported that a detainee was left in a cold room, shackled and naked,
(b)(1) until he demonstrated cooperation.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
, 185. ('f&./ I When asked in February 2003, if cold
(b)(1
1
) was used as an interrogation technique, the[ [responded,
(b)(3) NatSecAct"not per se." He explained that physical and environmental
(b )(6) discomfort-was used to encourage the detainees to improve their
(b)(7)(c) environment.' observed that cold is hard to define. He
asked rhetorically, "How cold is cold? How cold is life threatening?"
He stated that cold water was still employed however,
(b)(1) showers were administered in a heated room. He stated there was no
(b )(3) NatSecAc~pecific guidance on it from Healquarters, j~as left to its
own discretion in the use of cold. added there is a cable
(b )(6) . from[ ~ocumenting the use of "manipulation of the
(b)(7)(c) environment." (b)(6)
(b )(7)( c)
186. ('Hi/ Although the DCI Guidelines do not
~~~g~ NatSecAcftention cold as a technique, the September 2003 draft OMS
(;uidelines on Medical and Psychological Support to Detainee
Interrogations specifically identify an "uncomfortably cool
envirorunent" as a standard interrogation measure. (Appendix F.).
The OMS Guidelines provide detailed instructions on safe
temperature ranges, inc!uding the safe temperature range when a
detainee is wet or undothed.
,-----7£5L_ --------, nnonr:~ 'I (b)(1) (b )(3) NatSecAct
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- (b)(3) NatSecAct----__j
(b)(1)
Water DQW!,ing . (b)(3) NatSecAct (b)(6) ..
(b)(7)(c)
(b)(1) , 187. ( Accordin, toC -.-,- Jand ..
(b )(3) NatSecA~t1ers who have worked water dousmg' nas een used
I I since early 2003 when a CTC!RDG officer introduced
this technique to the facility. Dousing involves layi:ttg a detainee
down on a plastic sheet and pouring water over him for 10 to
15 minutes. Another officer explained that the room was maintained
at 70 degrees or more; the guards used water that was at room
(b)(1) temperature while the interrogator questioned the detainee.
(b)(3) NatSecAct . .
188, ("FSJ[ I A review of cable traffic from April and
May 2003 revealedtha~ !Station sought pe:r:mission from
CTC/RDG to employ specific techniques for a number of detainees.
Included in the list of requested techniques was water dousing.72
Subsequent cables reported the use and duration of the techniques by
· detainee per interrogation s~ssion.73 One certified interrogator,
noting that water dousing appeared to be a most effective technique,
requested CTC to confirm guidelines on water dousing. A return
cable directed that the detainee must be placed on a towel or sheet,
may not be placed naked on the bare cement floor, and the air
temperature must exceed 65 degrees if the detainee will not be dried·
(b)( 1) immediately. ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct
189. {'fS./ The DCI Guidelines do not mention
water dousing as a technique. The 4 September 2003 draft OMS
Guidelines, however, identify "water dousing" as one of 12 standard
measures that OMS listed, in ascending degree of intensity, as the ·
11th standard measure. OMS did not further address "water
dousing" in its guidelines.
72 (S) The presence of a psychologist and medic was included in each report of the use of these
techniques. .
(b )(1
) 73 ('lW eported wale~ dousing as a technique used, but ·
(b) ( 3) Nat S e~Actater paragraph used the term "cold water bath."
76
101" SBCRET/ I (b)(1)
' (b)(3) NatSecAct--__J
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(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct Hard Ta~e.~own
190. ('fS~,------,1 During the course of the initiiil
investigation of Rahman's November 2002 death, the pathologist ~~ l~~l( )
noted several abrasions on the body.741 J c
~~ lm NatSecAct who was present during the first 10 days of Rahman's confinement,
reported that he witnessed four or fiv~ !officers
execute a "hard takedown" on Rahman,75 His clothes were removed
·and he was run up and down the corridor; when he fell, he was
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
i
dragged. The process took between three to five minutes and (b)(6)
Rahman was returned to his cell. I I (b)(7)(c)
observed contusions on his face, iegs and hands that '1ooked bad." L . ~saw a value in the exercise in order to
make Rahman uncomfortable and experience a lack of control. He
recognized, however, that the technique was not within the
parameters of what was approved by DoJ and recommended to the L _ __ jthat he obtain written approval for employing'---c _.J
teci:Uiique. Three other officers who were present at the same time
provided similar accounts of the incident. No approval from
(b)(1) Headquarters was sought or obtained. (b)(6)
(b )(3) NatSecAct r--(b )(7)( c)
191. (1'S/I Accorcling toL I the hard
(b)(1) takedown was used often in interrogations atl las "part of the
(b)(3) NatSecActitmospherics." For a time, it was the standard procedure for moving
' a detainee to the sleep deprivation cell. It was done for shock and
psychological impact and signaled the transition to another phase of
the interrogation. The act of putting a detainee into a diaper can ·
cause abrasions if the detainee strug,les because the floor of the
facility is concrete. Thel _stated he did not discuss the · ~~l~~l(c)
hard takedown with Station managers, but he thou ht they: ___ -.
(b)(1) •mderstood what techniques were being used at
(b)(3) NatSecAct '.--~.. ,-L----,,--,--,-J
1 ~tated that the. hard takedown had not been used recentl I J After taking the mterrogation class, he understood that if
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
74 (Bt'/M'l The Final Autopsy Findings noted "superficial excoriations of the right anc~ left
upper shoulders, left lower abdomen, and left knee~ mechanism undetermined." ··,..----··-~
75 (i//~1~ This incident is also being addressed in the Gul Ralunan investigation.
,--------'7'-7'--(b )(1 )--------,
..,.,.,..,,, ,..,...,.e.,.,.o""'.,.. ,.... .,m ' (b) (3 ) Na tSecAct
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he was going .tQ do a hard takedown, he must report it to
Headquarters. Although the DCI and OMS Guidelines address
physical techniques and treat .them as requiring advance ·
(b)(1) HPadquarters approval, they do not otherwise specifically address
((bb ))((3) Na!SecAct ''h d tak d , · 6) uu: ar e own.
(b)(7)(c)
192. ('ffl stated that he was generally
familiar with the technique of hard takedowns. He asserted that they
~~~g~ N
18 ".A:"\authorized and believed they had been used one or. more times at
8
lee c lin order to intimidate a detainee.! ~tated that he.
would not necessarily know if they have been used and did not
(b )(6)
(b )(7)( c)
consider it a serious enough handling technique to require
Headquarters approval. Asked about the possibility that a detainee
may have been draJged on the ground during the course of a hard
takedown,l responded that he was unaware of that and did
(b)(1) not understand the point of dragging someone along the corridor in
(b)(3) NatSefAct 1
Abuse[(b)( 1 l~:of nther Locations Outside of the CTC
P
(b)(3) Na!SecAct
rogram . ·
193. ~ I Although not within the scope of the
am, two other inciden were re orted in
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
note a ove, one
(b)(1) rP~ulted in the death of a detainee at Asadabad Base76
(b)(3) NatSecAct '-----___j
194. '{5//N~ In June 2003, the U.S. military sought an Afghan
citizen who had been implicated in rocket attacks on a joint U.S.
Army and CIA position in Asadabad located in Northeast
Afghanistan. On 18 June 2003tthis individual appeared at Asadabad
Base at the urging of the local Governor. The individual was held in
a detention facility guarded by U.S. soldiers from the Base. During
76~Formore than a year, CIA referred to Asadabad Base a{(b)(1) J
(b )(3) Na!SecAct
TOF SECRE'IIi (b)(1)
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the four da~ tb,e individual was detained, an Agency independent
contractor, who was a p~amilitary officer, is alleged to have·severely
beaten the detainee with a large metal flashlight and kicked him
during iriterrogation sessions. The detainee died in custody on
21 June; his body was tUrned over to a local cleric and returned to his
family on the following date without an autopsy being performed.
Neither the contractor nor his Agency staff supervisor had been
trained or authorized to conduct interrogations. The Agency did not
renew the independent contractor's contract, which was up fot
renewal soon after the incident. OIG is investigating this incident in
concert with DoJ.77 ·
The objective was to determine if anyone at
':.th'e-s-ch'o-o"l"h-a"d-cinf-,-o_rm__,ation about the detonation of a remote-
. controlled improvised explosive device that had killed eight border
guards several days earlier. (b)(6)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
,---~(b)(7)(c)
r---=19-'-6-'-. l:,5/ /NF1-A teacher being interviewed! ~
reportedly smiled and lau~ed inappropriately,
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
'-w-h'e-r-eu_p_o_Jnl ~Jused the butt stock of his rifle
to strike or "buttstroke" the teacher at least twice ill his torso,
followed by several knee kicks to his torso. This incident was
witnessed by 200 students.· The teacher was reportedly not seriously
injured. In response to his actions, Agency management returned the
[ :=Jo Headquarters. He was counseled and
given a aomestic assignment. · · · · .
(b )(6)
(b)(7)(c)
""'Y "' e:rcpoT-'
79 (b)(1)---------,
L__ _____ ,(b )(3) NatSecAct:-----'
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L_ ____ (b)(3) NatSecAct ____ -'
(b)(1) ArcoUNTINGFORDETA1NEESI(b)(1) _j.
(b)(3) NatSecAct · ·· L(b)(3) NatSecAct .
197:. fl'S/ Although the documentation of-the
capture, rendition, detention, and interrogation of high value
detainees at/ /an~ /was comprehensive, .
documentation pertaining to.detainees of lesser notoriety has been
less consistent.78 Because.the Agency had no requirement to
document the capture and detention of all individuals until June
2003,79 OIG has been unable to determine with any certainty the
number or current status of individuals who have been captured and
(b)(1) A ~ · ed F ifi" l f ll (b)(3) NatSecA~tam our spec c examp es o. ow.
198. fi=SI Abu Bakr. Hassan Muhammad Abu
(b)(1) !akr is~ Lib~an who was caotured during a raid onnMav 2002 in
(b)(3) NatSecAcill"achi Pakistan. I
I lrende:tjnghimo~ June·
. 2002j
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
78 ~[ ~d two detainees andl ~ad eight detainees, which
included llie two at I I .
79 l€) Per DDO Guidance, as described in paragraph 54. _
80 -EEr By January 2004, CfC/RDG developed a datab-ase to include all detainees in CIA custody-
(b)(1) I I
(b)(3) NatSecAct
80
' 1~ Jl' .'lF.C'"RFT 1,-------='---(b )( 1 )-------,
L_ ______ (b )(3) NatSecAct ____ _J
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·c_ ____ (b)(3) NatSecAct------
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
199_1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
200. ('P5"/I I Ridha Ahmad Al-Najjar. Al-Najjar, a
Tunisian who reportedly was a UBL bodyguard and Al-Qa'ida travel
facilitator, was captured during the same raid in Karachi that netted
Abu Bakr onnMax 2002. Cable traffic reflects Al-Najjar and Abu
Bakr were re~ei:edl !June 2002. Al-Naiiar became the
first detainee (b)(1) lonl peptember 2002.1
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)( 1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
201. ~ Lutfi Al-Gharisi. Al-Gharisi (a.k.a.
Salim Khan) is a Tunisian Al-Qa'ida detainee captured in Peshawar,
Pakist?Il. in Seotember 2002. The 'Agency subsequently rendered
him t~ I october 2002.d (b)(1) !_ . .,.........;:,.,_......._
I (b )(3) NatSecAct
........
81 (b)(1)--------,
"'¥'lP c:rcnnj (b)(3) NatSecAct 00091
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101' SfiC~/ (b)(1)
L__ ____ (b)(3) NatSecAct ____ j
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct (b )(3) NatSecAct
202. ersi Gul Rahman. Rahman was the Afghan
who was captured in)~tan, rendered to INovE;!mber
and died in custody o November 2002.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
203.l
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1) ANALYnCAL SUPPORT TO INTERROGATIONS
(b )(3) NatSecAct
204. ('"rs.i Directorate of Intelligence analysts
assigned to CTC provide analytical support to interrogation teams in
the field. Analysts are responsible for developing requirements for
the questioning of detainees as well as conducting debriefings in
some cases. (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
----,---,--------=---:-:---,----:-:--___J ..A nalysts, however, do not
participate in the application of interrogation techniques.
82
"Tlt'lvrt>-1' SlSfi~C::FRB!il::j:.'I:,f'\ -------==--,(b)( 1 )-------,
1'-. ______ (b)(3) NatSecAct _ ___j
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lOP SI!CRET( J (b)(1 )-----------.
(b)(
1
) ~'-. ___ (b)(3) NatSecAct __ ___j
(b )(3) NatSecAct
..•. r-·---~
205. · ('ffi/ According to a number of those
interviewed for this Review, the Agency's intelligence on Al-Qa'ida
was limited prior to the initiation of the CTC Tnterrogation Program.
The Agency lacked adequate linguists or subject matter experts and
had very little hard knowledge of what particular Al-Qa'ida ·
leaders-who later became detainees-knew. This lack of knowledge
led analysts to speculate about what a detainee "should know," vice
information the analyst could objectively demonstrate the detainee.
did know. For these reasons; several interrogators considered the
analytical support provided by CTC/UBL to have been inadequate
and sometimes flawed.
206. (1'S/j (b)(1)
I,-~=_L.~L_------(b)(3) NatSecAct------------1
I \When
· a detainee did not respond to a question posed to him, the
assumption at Headquarters was that the detainee was holding back
and knew more; consequently, Headquarters recommended
(b)(1) resumption of BITs.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
207 . .f.ffif The standard that CTC /UBL employed
to assess one detainee's level of compliance was articulated in a
December 2002 cable requesting interrogators to further press
Al-Nashiri for actionable threat information:
... it is inconceivable to us that Nashiri cannot provide us concrete
leads to locate and detain the active terrorists in his network who
are still at large ....
From our optic, the single best measure of this cooperation will be
in his reporting. Specifically, wfien we are able to capture other
terrorists based on his leads and to thwart future plots based on his
reporting, we will have much more confidence that he is, indeed,
genuinely cooperative on some level.
,-----'83 ___ (b)(1)-----~
"'i"'i''l"i IlPl\' ""C:~"Pli:PLJ:.I
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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(b)(1)
IOPSBCR£~'1 ----'------(b)(3) NatSecAct--------,
1
.
(b)(1)
f(b)(3) NatSecAct ·
208. effl.~ I diSagreed in its 23 December ·
. 2002 response:'-----------'
7.··
Base recommends against resUming enhanced measures with
Subj[ect] unless .there are specific pieces of information he has
provided that we are· certain/ certain are lies or omissions; or there
is equally reliable additional information from other sources which
implicates subj[ect] in a· heretofore unknown plot to attack u.s. or
allied interests. If such is the case, Base would eagerly support
returning to all enhanced measures; indeed, we would be the first
to request them. Without tangible proof of lying or intentional
withholding, however, we believe employing enhanced measures
will accomplish nothing except show subj[ect] that he will be
punished whether he cooperates or not, thus eroding any
remaining desire to continue cooperating ....
Bottom line is we think subj[ect] is being cooperative, and if
subjected to indiScriminate and prolonged enhanced measures,
there is a good chance he will either fold up and cease cooperating,
or suffer the sort of permanent mental harm prohibited by the
statute.· Therefore, a decision to resume enhanced measures must
be grounded in fact and not general feelings that subj[ect] is not
being forthcoming ....
It was after this interchange that Headquarters sent a new debriefer,
(b)(1) whose unauthorized actions are discussed in paragraphs 90 through
(b)(3) NatSecA9tto Subsequ.ently, after further deliberation and
renewed medical and psychological assessment, EITs, not including
(b)(1)
the waterboard, were authorized for a brief period.
(b)(3) NatSecAct ~ I
. 209. (PSThe shortage of accurate and verifiable
information available to the field to assess a detainee's compliance is
evidenced in the final waterboard session of Abu Z~aydah.
(b)(1 (b)( ) A din . CTC ffi th . t ti t t 3) NatSecAdcor g to a ~eruor o cer, em erroga o.n earn a .
1 !considered Abu Zubaydah to be compliant and wanted to
terminate BITs. CTC/UBL believed Abu Zubaydah continued to
withhold information,!
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
L__ ______________ lat the tim.e it ~
84
lOP SECRBT/1 (b)(1)
. (b)(3) NatSecAct
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c__ ____ (b)(3) NatSecAct. ____ _
generated sub;;Jaritial pressure from Headquarters to continue use of
· . the EITs. Accordlng to this senior officer, the decision to resume use
of the waterboard on Abu Zubaydah was made by senior 'Officers of
~~lgl NatSecActthe DO. A team of senior CTC officers traveled from Headquarters to
'--::-----:--__Jto assess Abu Zubaydah's compliance and witnessed the
final waterboard session, after which, they reported back to
Headquarters that the EITs were no longer needed on Abu
(b)(1)
Zubaydah.
210. \fS/ told OIG that
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b )(6) -
(b)(7)(c) "risk" for CTC/UBL is very different from the "risk" perceived by
CTC/RDG and the interrogators. Specifically, for CTC/UBL, risk is
associated with not obtaining the actionable information needed to
prevent "the next big attack," hence analysts are reluCtant to agree
that a detainee is not employing resistance techniques. On the other
hand, risk for CTC/RDG is associated with the continued u.Se of EITs,
(b )(7)( d)
· which could possibly lead, directly or indirectly, to a detainee's death
or cause him permanent harm.
EFFECITVENESS
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
211. ('fSI The detention of terrorists has prevented
them from engaging in further terrorist activity, and their
interrogation has provided intelligence that has enabled the
· identification and apprehension of other terrorists, warned of.
terrorists plots planned for the United States and around the world,
and supported articles frequently used in the .f:irushed intelligence
publications for senior policymakers and war fighters; ·In this regard,
there is no doubt that the Program has been effective. Measuring the
effectiveness of EITs, however, is a more subjective process and not
(b)(1) without some concern. ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct ·
212. (TsA. When the Agency began capturing
terrorists, management judged the success of the effort to be getting
them off the streets) (b) ( 1 )
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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With the capture of terrorists who had access to much more :.-.
significant, actionable info!Jllation, the measure of success of the
Program increasingly became the intelligence obtained from the
(b)( 1 ) · tainees.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
213. ~ I Quantitatively, the DO has significantly
increased the number of counterterrorism intelligence reports with ·
the inclusion of information from detainees in its custody. Between
9/11 and the end of April2003, the Agency produced over 3,000
intelligence reports from detainees. Most of the reports came from
intelligence provided by the high value detainees at[(b)(1) J
I I - . (b )(3) NatSecAct
. . (b)(1) .
=~ ,l-(b)(3) NatSecAct~
214. ~~ CTC frequently uses the
· information from one detainee, as .we as other sources, to vet the
information of another detainee. Although lower~level detainees
provide less information than the high value detainees, information
from these detainees has, on many occasions, supplied the
information needed to probe the high value detainees further.
According to two senior CTC analysts, the triangulation of
intelligence provides a fuller knowledge of Al-Qa'ida activities than
would be ossible from a sin le detainee.
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct _______________________ __J
215. ('rsl Detainees have provided
information on Al-Qa'ida and other terrorist groups. Information of·
note includes: the modus operandi of Al-Qa'ida, members who are
worth targeting, terrorists who are capa._ble of mo1.)Il.ting attacks in the_
United States/ (b)(1) --
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and sources of funding for
"-.~ ... .-~-.~~--~--~~~~ Al-Qa'ida. Perhaps the most significant information about Al-Qa'ida
obtained from detainees is on the subject of the group's planned use
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the United States.
Analysts had long suspected Al-Qa'ida was attempting to develop a
WMD capability, and information from Abu Zubaydah and
Ibn al-Ahaykh al-Libi (a.k.a. Zubayr) hinted at such efforts. It was
the information from Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, however, that ·
confirmed the analysts' suspicions. In addition to·information on
anthrax; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear programs; ·
and training in the use of poisons and explosives, Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad provided information that has led to the capture of
individuals who headed the programs to develop WMD capabilities,
including Sayed Al-Barq who was the head of Al-Qa'ida's anthrax
(b)(1) nrngram
(b )(3) NatSecAct ·
216. (Ts;j I Detainee information has assisted in the
identification of terrorists. For example, information from Abu .
Zubaydah helped lead to the identification of Jose Padilla and
Binyam Muhammed-operatives who had plans to detonate a
uraitium-topped dirty bomb in either Washington, D.C., or New
York City. Riduan "Hambali" Isomuddin provided information that
led to the arrest of previously unknown inembers of an Al-Qa'ida cell ·
in Karachi. They were designated as pilots for an aircraft attack
! · inside the United States. Many other detainees, including lower-level
detainees such as Zubayr and Majid Khan, have provided leads to
other terrorists, but probably the most prolific has been Khalid
Shaykh Muhammad. He provided information that helped lead to
the arrests of terrorists including Sayfullah Paracha and his son Uzair
Paracha, businessmen whom Khalid Shaykh Muhammad planned to
use to smuggle explosives into the United States; Saleh Almari, a
sleeper operative in New York; and Majid Khan, an operative who
could enter the United States easiliand was tasked to research
attacks against U.S. wat~r reservoirs. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's
information also led to the investigation and prosecution of lyman
Faris, the truck driver arrested in early 2003 in Ohio. Although not_ ·-·-·--"'--
-.; ..
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yet captured, Wformation from Khalid Shaykh Muhammed and Abu
(b)(
1
) Zuba~dah led to the identific~tion of an operative termed one of the ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct>t likely to travel t the Uruted States and carry out opera:tions.
217. ()'s..f Detainees, both planners
and operatives, have also made the Agency aware of several plots
planned for the United States and around the world. The p]Q~· '
(b)(1) '..:I ~1 t-'
( b) ( 3) N atSecAcln P ans ~L--::-:o-,--=---;--:----=----=,---------=-:-=---:-:~----::-=-----=----,--l
'------:;;-~ ttack the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan; hijack aircraft
to fly into Heathrow Airport and the Canary Wharf Tower; loosen
(b)(1) track s~ikes in an attem~t to derail a train in the United States
(b)(3) NatSe;:-c:.:...A.:..::.c.:_t ----------------~-------,----l
C,..,.---------:---;-;---,----:--~c-----.,.-----.--;-;--.__j lqw up several
U.S. gas stations to create panic and havoc; hijack and fly an airplane.
into the tallest building in California in a west coast version of the
World Trade Center attack; cut the lines of suspension bridges in
New York in an effort to make them collapse; and poison the U.S.
water supply by dumping poison into water reservoirs. With the
capture of some of the operatives for the above-mentioned plots, it is
not clear whether these plots have been thwarted or if they remain
viable. This Review did not uncover any evidence that these plots
were imminent. Agency senior managers believe that lives have been
saved as a result of the capture and interrogation of terrorists who .
were planning attacks, in particular Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, Abu
(b)(1) Zubaydah, Hambali, and Al-Nashiri.
(b)(3) NatSecAct ·
218. ('I'S4 CTC analysts judge the reporting from
(b)(3) CJAAct detainees as one of the most important sources for finished · .
(b)(6) intelligence.! !viewed
analysts' knowledge of the terrorist target as having much more
depth as a result of information from detainees and estimated that
detainee reporting is used in all counterterrorism articles produced
for the most.senior policymakers. Detainee re ortin is also used
re arl in dail ublications
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
In an interview, the DCI
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said he beliey~:;; the use of BITs has proven to be extremely valuable
in obtaining enormous amounts of critical threat information from
detainees who had otherwise believed they were safe from any harm
(b)( 1) in the hands of Americans.
(b )(3) NatSecAct ·
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219. (TS senior officers familiar with the
dissemination of reporting from detainee interrogations voiced
concem,s about compartmentation. In particular, those concerns
regarded the impact on the timeliness of disseminating intelligence to
analysts in CIA and to the FBI while the initial operational recipients
(b)(1) of the information are separating out the intelligence from more
(b )(3) NatSecA~!msitive operational information. I I senior officers
who voiced these concerns indicated that the issue was being.
reviewed by analysts to more precisely assess the impact of the ·
(b)(1) problem.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
220. ("FSj I Inasmuch as BITs have been used only
sinc.e August 2002, and they have not all been used with every high
value detainee, there is limited data on which to assess their
individual effectiveness. This Review identified concerns about the
use of the waterboard, specifically whether the risks of its use were
justified by the results, whether it has been unnecessarily used in
some instances, and whether the fact that it is being applied in a
manner different from its use in SERE training brings into question
the continued applicability of the DoJ opinion to its use. Although
the waterboard is the most intrusive of the EITs, the fact that
precautions have been taken to provide on-site medical oversight in
(b)(1) the use of all BITs is evidence that their use poses risks:
(b)(3) NatSecAct . .
221: ~Determining the effectiveness of each
EIT is important in facilitating Agency management's decision as to
which techniques should be used and for how long. Measuring the
overall effectiveness of EITs is challenging for a number of reasons
including: (1) the Agen~y cannot detennine with any certainty the
totality of the intelligence the detainee actually possesses; (2) each
detainee has different fears of and tolerance for EITs; (3) the · ·
application of the same BITs by different interrogators may have
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different res\ll.l$; and (4) the lack of sufficient historical data related to
· certain Errs because of the rapid escalation to· the use of the
(b)( 1) wi:lt.>rboard :iri. the cases where it was used. ·
(b )(3) NatSecAct · ·
222. "('FS/ The waterboard hils been used on three
detainees: Abu Zubaydah, Al-Nashiri, and Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad. The waferboard's use was accelerated after the limited
application of other Errs in all three cases because the waterboard
was considered by some in Agency management to be the "silver
bullet," combined with the belief that each of the three detainees
possessed perishable information about imminent threats against the
(b)( 1) TTnited States.
(b)(3) NatSecAct ·
223. ~ Prior to the use of Errs, Abu Zubaydah
provided information for over 100 intelligence reports. Interrogators· , ·
applied the waterboard to Abu Zubaydah at least 83 times during
· August 2002. During the period between the end of the use of the
waterboard and 30 April2003, he provided information for
approximately 210 additional reports. It is not possible to say
definitively that the waterboard is the reason for Abu Zubaydah's
increased production, or if another factor, such as the length of
detention, was the catalyst. Since the use of the waterboard,
however, Abu Zubaydah has appeared to be cooperative, helping
(b)(1) with raids by identifying photogra hs of the detainees ca tured,
(b )(3) NatS,_ec_A_c_t --.-,---------,---o---,--=--=---=----,-J
~,--..-_jand giving interrogators information on how to induce
other detainees to talk, based on his own experiences. (b)(6)
(b)(
1
) . . . . (b)(7)(c)
(b)(3) NatSecAct 224. ~With respect to Al-Nashlri, __ --,-l
j !reported two waterboard sessions in November 2002, after
· whiCh the psychologist/interrogators determined that Al-Nashlri .
(b)(
1
) was compliant. However, after being moved to I [where a
(b)(3) NatSecACiferent interrogation team assumed responsibility for hiS
interrogations; Al-Nashlri was thought to be withholding
information. Al-Nashlri subsequently received additional Errs,
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including stress positions, but not the w.:aterboard. The Agency then -·~-""- n
determined Al-Nashiri to be "compliant." Because of the litany of J
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techniques u,s~p by different interrogators over a relatively short
period of time, it is difficult to identify exactly why Al-Nashiri
became more willing to provide information. However, following
the use of EITs, he provided information about his most current
operational planning"and the Saudi Al-Qa'ida network, as opposed to
(b)(1 l the historical information he provided before the use ofEITs.
(b)(3) NatSecAct .
225. ('rs.; On the other hand, Khalid Shaykh
Muhammad, an accomplished resistor, provided only a few
intelligence reports prior to the use of the waterboard, and analysis of
that information revealed that much of it was outdated, inaccurate, or
incomplete. A£, a means of less active resistance, at the beginning of
their interrogation, detainees routinely provide information that they
· know is already known. Khalid Shaykh Muhammad received 183
applications of the waterboard in March 2003 and remained resilient,
providing limited useful ifttelligence, until the application of sleep
deprivation for a period of 180 hours. Although debriefers still must
ask the right questions to get answers from Khalid Shaykh ·
Muhammad, since the employment of sleep deprivation, intelligence
production from his debriefings totaled over 140 reports as of
30 Apri12003. In Khalid Shaykh Muhammad's case, the waterboard
was determined to be of limited effectiveness. One could conclude
that sleep deprivation was effective 1nthis case, but a defiirltive
conclusion is hard to reach considering that the lengthy sleep
deprivation followed extensive use of the waterboard. ·
. POUCY CONSIDERATIONS AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE DETENTION
(b)(1) AND INTERROGATION PROGRAM
(b)(3) NatSecAct
226. ('H:l The BITs used by the Agency under the
CTC Program are inconsistent with the public policy positions that the
United States has taken regarding human rights. This divergence has .
been a cause of concern to some Agency personnel involved With the
Program.
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Policy Con_s}.derations
227. (U I /:FeOO) Throughout its history, the United St~tes has
been an international proponent of human rights and has voiced
opposition to torture and mistreatment of prisoners by foreign
countries. This position is based upon fundamental principles that are
deeply embedded in the American legal structure and jurisprudence.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amenclinents to the U.S. Constitution, for
example, require due process of law, while the Eighth Amendment
bars '.'cruel and unusual punishinents."
228. (U/ ~ The President advised the .Senate when
submitting the Torture Convention for ratification that the United
States would construe the requirement of Article 16 of the Convention
to "undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other
acts of cruel; inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment which
· do not amount to torture" as "roughly equivalent to" and "coextensive
with the Constitutional guarantees against cruel, unusual, and
inhumane treatment."81 To this end, the United States submitted a
reservation to the. Torture Convention stating that the United States
considers itself bound by Article 16 "only insofar as the term 'cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel,
unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the
5th, 8th and/ or 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United
States." Although the Torture Convention expressly provides that no
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, mcluding war or any other
public.emergency, and no order from a superior officer, justifies
torture, no similar provision was mcluded regarding acts·of "cruel;
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."
81 (U I /FOUO) See Message from.the President of the United States Transmitting the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
Sen. Treaty Doc. 1()0..20, tOOth Cong., 2d Sess., at 15, May 23, 1988; Senate Committee on Foreip;n
Relations, Executive Report 101-30, August 30, 1990, ai25, 29, quoting summary and analysis
submitted by President Ronald Reagan, as revised by President George H.W. Bush.
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. (b )(3) NatSecAct
229. (U /./FOOO) ·Annual U.S. State Department Col.mtry
. Reports on Human Rights Practices have repeatedly cond~mned
harsh interrogation teclmiques utilized by foreign governillents. For
j example, the 2002 Report, issued in March 2003, stated:
:1 [The United States] have been given greater opportunity to make
i good on our commitment to uphold standards of human dignity
and liberty .... [N]o country is exempt from scrutiny, and all
countries benefit from constant striving to identify their .
weaknesses and improve their performance . . . . [T]he Reports
serve as a gauge for our international human rights efforts,
pointing to areas of progress and drawing our attention to new and
continuing challenges.
In a world marching toward democracy and respect for human
rights, the United States is a leader, a partner and a contributor.
We have taken this responsibility with a deep and abiding belief
that human rights are universal. They are not grounded
exclus~vely in American or western values. But their protection
worldwide serves a core U.S. national interest.
The State Department Report identified objectionable practices in a
variety of countries including, for example, patterns of abuse of
prisoners in Saudi Arabia by such means as "suspension from bars by
handcuffs~ and threats against family members, ... [being] forced
constantly to lie on hard floors [and] c)eprived of sleep .... " Other
reports have criticized hooding and stripping prisoners naked.
230. (U I /l'6YQ) In June 2003, President Bush issued a
statement in observance of "United Nations International Day in
Support of Victims of Torture." The statement said in part:
The United States declares its strong solidarity with torture victims
across the world. Torture anywhere is an affront to human dignity
everywhere. We are committed to building a world where human
rights are respected and protected by the rule of law.
~"""',_;.""'"'r __ _____e_9.,_3 (b)( 1 )------,
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Freedom .!i;om torture is an inalienable human right ... , Yet
torture continues to be practiced around the world by rogue
regimes whose cruel methods match their determination to crush
the human spirit . . . . . . .
Notorious human rights abusers ... have sought to shield their
abuses from the eyes of the world by staging elaborate deceptions .
and denying access to international human rights monitors ....
The United States is' committed to the worldwide elimination of
torture and we are leading this fight by example. I call on all
governments to join with the United States and the community of
'law-abiding nations in prohibiting, investigating, and prosecuting ·
all acts of torture and in undertaking to prevent other cruel and
unusual punishment ....
Concerns Over Participation in the CI'C Program
231. '"{5//NB During the course of this Review, a number of
Agency officers expressed unsolicited concern about the possibility of
recrimination or legal action resulting from their participation in the
(b)(1) CTC }lrogram. A number of officers expressed concern that a human
(b)(3) NatSecActl\s_lrr_OJ!P_:r:nightJLUipUe them for activitiesL_--=-c,--~----o____)
I ]Additionally, they fea:i:ed that the Agency
would not stand behind them if this occurred.
232. (~/nl'lij One officer expressed concern that one day,
Agency officers will wind up on some "wanted list" to appear before
(b)(1) . •J..n lN ld C urt f • t' . • fr • • • ~I I (b)(3) NatSecAct or o or w:ar crunes s emnung om actiVlti~'1
1 [Another sru.d, "Ten years from now we're goli).g to be sorry
we're doing .this ... [but] it has to be done." He expressed concern
that the CTC Program will be exposed in the news media and cited
particular concern about the possibj.lity of being named in a leak.
233. (51/NF) I
I lthatmany
countries consider the interrogation techniques employed by the CTC
Program, i.e., hooding, stress positions, etc., to be illegal. Although
he felt the 1 August 2002 OLC legal opfui.on provided to the Agency
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would precl1,1d~ prosecution of Agency employees in the United
States, he believed it to be conceivable that an emiJloyee could be,
. arrested and tried in the European Union. I j
I (b)(1)
(b)( 1)
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(b )(6) .
(b)(7)(c).--'-----,
234. fi'5 According toL I u.s.
· law does not proscribe the conduct of Agency employees and
contractors who have employed BITs or authorized their use. The
said that DoJ's view is that CIA personnel are acting
L_---.-,---c-----.-c....---1 ·consistent with customary international law, but that viewmay not
be shared by others. He added, "My position is that we are covered."
When asked if the Agency treatment of detainees has been humane,
he replied that he does not know how others would define the term,
but the CTC Program and its activities have been consistent with the
· Torture Convention, as interpreted by the United States.
235. (5//N'F) cknowledged he
has some concern regarding the Torture Convention. However, he
said his primary focus is what has been codified in U.S. law. He
recognizes that interrogators may have a problem traveling to some
locationS overseas.
(b)(1)
ENDGAME (b)(3) NatSecAct
1 236. ff&~ I Post 9/11, the U.S. Government is
having to address a number of extraordinary matters, not the least of·
which is an "endgame" for the disposition of detainees captured
during the war on terrorism. I
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
237~ ('FS/ The number of detainees in CIA custody
is relatively small by comparison with those in U.S. military custody.
Nevertheless, the Agency,like the military, has an interest in the
disposition of detainees and particular interest in those who, if not
kept in isolation, would likely divulge information about the
(b)(1) rirc:timstances of their detention.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
238. (+$/ Although the former D/CTC in early
2002proposed the establishment of a covert long-term detention
facility, OIG found scant documentation of the issue bef~re Agency
~~lm Nats;;'A~pnnel atl ~ent a cable to Headquarters on 19 August·
. LUlU .. In that cable, IDY Agency personnel proposed that Agency
· management consider several options for the future disposition of
detainees. Such options included constructing a permanent facility
outside the United States for indefinite mcarceration of detainees or
arrangirlg with DoD for incarceration of detainees at the U.S. Naval
Base, Guantanamo Bay. TDY Agency personnel also called attention
to security and counterintelligence risks associated with exposure of .
CIA methodology if detainees are released or rendered to another
(b)(1) country. OIG found no cable response from Headquarters.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
239~ ('f&!/ I with respect to Agency equities, a
particular concern for senior Agency managers is the long-term
disposition Of detamees who have undergone BITs or hav:e been
exposed to Agency sensitive sources and methods. Moreover,
Agency employees have expressed concern that a lack of an endgame
for Agency detainees results m overcrowding at Agency detention
sites. · ·
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
"
240. "'(:fSj According to the DCI, Agency officers ·
· have had theoretical discussions about the disposition of detainees.
The DDO explained that a key issue is what should happefi to
detainees who have undergone EITs. According to the DDO, no one
knows the answer to that question and it is a policy decision that ·
(b)(1) must be ma
i
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241. (IfS/ This Review identified four options for
the disposition of detainees. These options, discussed in more detail
below, include [
(b)(S)
242.1
(b)( 1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
243.[
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(S)
244.[
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
·-
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(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
245. {'Ri./ Policymakers have given consideration
to prosecution as a viable possibility, at least for certain detainees. To
date, however, ·no decision has been made to proceed with this
option.
246. ('I'Sij
247.[ (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
il u
1]
1
83 (U f tf'OU~ Memorandum for the Record, dated 2-August 2002, on dosed heariilgs w1th ihe · ~-~......__ d
SSCI.
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'fOPSECRRTA (b)(1)
~__(b)(3) NatSecAct __ --,--------"
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(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct-----------------,--------__j
248. (!f&l Senior U.S. Government and Agency
officials have yet to determine if third parties, such as the ICRC, will
eventually have access to individuals whose detention has been
disclosed. Such is the case of Ibn Sheikh al•Libi, whom the U.S.
military declared to the ICRC before the milit
CIA control. According to the General Counsel, Al-Libi was not
subjected to any of the interrogation techniques discussed in this
Review. According to senior Agency officers, the Agency is loath to
send CIA detamees who have been exposed to EITs or to other
sensitive information, as in the case of al-Libi, to detention facilities
(b)(1) where they would be available to the ICRC.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
•, 249. f.FS/1 f'\,ccording to the DCI, the·crc
. Interrogation Program will continue to exist as long as the Agency
continues to elicit information from detainees. He added that, in the
near future, he sees no change from the current system.
. ..
(b)(1)
~_ ___ (b)(3) NatSecAct ______ __j
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(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct CONCLUSIONS
250. ~e Agency's detention and ·
interrogation of terrorists has provided intelligen<:e that="" has="" enabled="">
the identification and apprehension of other terrorists and warned of
terrorist plots planned for the United States and around the world.
The CTC Detention and Interrogation Program has resulted in the
issuance of thousands of individual intelligence reports and analytic
products supporting the counterterrorism efforts of U.S.
policymakers and military commanders. The effectiveness of
particular interrogation techniques. in eliciting information that might
not otherwise have been obtained cannot be so easily measured,
(b)(1) · "hnw~ver.
(b)(3) NatSecAct ·
251. ~After 11 September 2001, m,1.merous
Agency c()mponents and individuals invested immense time and
effort to implement the CTC Program quickly, effectively, and within
the law. The work of the Directorate of Operations, Counterterrorist
Center (CTC),Office of General Counsel (OGC), Office of Medical.
Services (OMS), Office of Technical Service (OTS}, and the Office of
Security has been especially notable. In effect, they began with
almost no foundation, as the Agency had discontinued virtually all
involvement in interrogations after encountering difficult issues with
earlier interrogation programs in Central America and the Near East.
I Inevitably, there also have been some problems with current
activities.
252. (StiNE) OGC worked closely with DoJ to deten:Iune the
legality of the measures that came to be known as enhanced ·
interrogation teclmiques (BITs). OGC also consulted with White
House and National Security Council officials regarding the
proposed techniques. Those efforts and the resulting DoJ legal
opinion of 1 August 2002 are well documented. That legal opinion
was based, in substantial part, on OTS analysis and the experience
and expertise of non-Agency personnel and academics concerning
whether long~term psychological effects would result from use of-the ..
proposed techniques.
100 (b)(1)--------,
..,, IP >5!P=RP'I:\ (b)(3) NatSecAct
~Ac::cpp "'"ro=vc::ced:;-cfc:cor :-;R"""'e-ce::l" "'as=e'""2: 20':;';16; :;!/0'""6/.;,;:1" '"a ~c0 :::-;5:.;;.85 ;::;6"'"71'"""7;-_--
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253. "{5/ /N~+ The DoJ legal opinion upon which the Agency
relies is based upon technical definitions of "severe" treatment and
the "intent" of the interrogators, and consists of finely detailed
analysis to buttress the conclusion that Agency officers properly
carrying out EITs would not violate the Torture Convention's
prohibition of torture, nor would they be subject to criminal
prosecution under the U.S. torture statute. The opinion does not
address the separate question of whether the application of standard
or enhanced techniques by Agency officers is consistent with the .
undertaking, accepted conditionally by the Unite4 States regarding
Article 16 of the Torture Convention, to prevent "cruel, inhuman or
l(b)(1) deg:rading treatment or punishment."
~(b )(3) NatSecAct ·
254. ~Periodic efforts by the Agency to elicit
reaffirmation of Administration policy and DoJ legal backing for the
Agency's use of EITs-as they have actually been employed-have
been well advised and successful. However, in this process, Agency·
officials have neither sought nor been provided a written statement
of policy or a formal signed update of the"DoJ legal opinion,
. including such important determinations as the meaning and
applicability of Article 16 of the Torture Convention. In July 2003, the
DC;I and the General Counsel briefed senior Administration officials
on the Agency's expanded use of EITs. At that time, the Attorney
General affirmed that the Agency's conduct remained well within the
~~ lm NatSecActcope of the 1 August 2002 DoJ legal opinion.
255. ~A number of Agency officers of various
grade levels who are involved with detention and interrogation
activities are concerned that they may at some future date be
vulnerable to legal action in the United States or abroad and that the
U.S. Government will not stand behind them. ·Although the current
detention and interrogation Program has been subject to DoJ legal
review and Administration political approval, it diverges sharply
from previous Agencrpolicy and practice, rules that govern
interrogations by U.S. military and l~w enforcement officers. ·.
statements of U.S. policy by the Department of State, and public
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statements by_yery senior U.S. officials, including the President, as
well as the policies expressed, by Members of Congress, other
Western governme~ts, intern,ational orga.nizations, and hunian rights
groups. In addition, some Agency officers are aware of interrogation
activities that were outside or beyond the scope of the written Do J
opinion. Officers are concerned that future public revelation of the
CTC Program is inevitabl~ and will seriously damage Agency
officers' personal reputations, as well as the reputation. and
(b)(1) effectiveness of the Agency itself. ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct .
256. ('rS.,( The Agency has generally provided
good guidance and s:upport to its officers who have been detaining
and interrogating high value terrorists us4J_g Er,rs pursuant to the
Presidential Memorandum of Notification (MON) of 17 September
(b)(i) · ~091. ·In p~ticular: CTC did a co~endable job in directing the.
1
.
(b )(3) NatSecActrrogations of high value detamees at I .
· At these foreign locations, Agency personn'----e'l=--Wl--.-c.th.-o_n_e_n_o7ta'b'l_e _J
exception described in this Review-followed guidance and
(b)(1) procedures and documented their activities well.
(b )(3) NatSecAct
· 257. ('ffili By distinction, the Agency-especially
in the early months of the Program-failed to provide adequate
staffing, guidance, and support to those involved with the detention
and interrogation of detainees · Si · ·cant. roblems
(b)(1) d first t th f ill" kn .
(b)(3) NatSecAcfUrre a e ac own as
258. ('Fs,4 Unauthorized, improvised, inhumane,
and undocumented detention andinterrogation techniques were
(b)(1) ""e ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct
to the Department of Justice (DoJ) for p5Jtential prosecution.~,----,-;--____j ~-
(b)(1) 1 Each incident will be the
'---(b)(3) NatSecAct . ·
102
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(b )(1) subject of a seoarate Report of Investigation bv the Office of Insoedor
(b)(3) NatSecAcPeneral.l I
I I
unauthorized techriiques were used m the interrogation of an
individual who died at Asadabad Base while under interrogation by ·
(b)(1) an Agency contractor in June 2003. Agency officers did not normally
(b)(3) NatSecActconduct interrogations at that location. jthe Agency
. officers involv:ed lacked timely and adequate guidance, training,
, experience, supervision, or authorization, and did not exercise sound
(b)(1) . d t
(b)(3) NatSecAct]U gmen ·
'
(b)( 1)
259. ~ The Agency failed to issue in a timely
manner comprehensive written guidelines for detention and
interrogation activities. Although ad hoc guidance was provided to
many officers through cables and briefings in the early monthS of
detention and interrogation activities, the DO Confinement and
· Interrogation Guidelines were not issued until January 2003, several
months after initiation of interrogation activity and after many of the
unauthorized activities had taken lace. The DCI Guidelines do not
address certain im ortant issues (b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
············-··--
~----~==~--------------~
(b)( 1) 260. ('!'Sf j ~ Such written guidance as does exist to
(b)(3) NatSecActaddress detentions and interrogations undertaken by Agency officers
I lis inadequate. The
Directorate of Operations Handbook contains a single paragraph that
(b)(1l · · t d d't ·d £fi I I (b)(3)N8t S A·~mene o:eo cers ec
1
c \Neither this dated guidance nor general
Agency guide es on routine intelligence collection is adequate to
instruct and protect Agen officers involved in contem ora
(b)(1) interro ation activities
(b )(3) NatSecAct
. 261. ff8;Lj I During the interrogations of two
. (b )(1) de~ainees, l;he water~~ard was used in a manner incoru:istent with f:De~----'--
(b)(3) NatSecActl'ltten DoJ legal oprmon of 1 August 2002. DoJ had stipulated that
·--
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its advice w~_\lased upon certain facts that the Agency had
subnutted to DoJ, observing, for example, tlu:it " ... you (the Agency)
have also orally informed us that although some of these techniques
may be used with more than once [sic], that repetition will not be. ·
substantial because th~ techniques generally lose their effectiveness
after several repetitions." One key Al-Qa'ida terrorist was subjected ·
to the waterboard at least 183 times at 15 waterboard sessions during
a two-week period and was denied sleep for a period of 180 hours.
In this and another instance, the technique of application and volume
of water used differed from the DoJ opinion ..
262 r ,r---(b)(1)1 -- -- 'd d . h . . dial
· • llLl-><.l__ natsecactrovl="" e="" compre="" ens1ve="" me="" c="">
attention to detainees I ~here Errs were
employed with high value detainees, but did not provide adequate
(b)(1) attention to detainee~ lEven after the death of a
(b)(3) NatSec~c.!tainee OMS did not give sufficient attention and care
· to these detainees, and did not adequately document the medical care
that was provided. OMS did not issue formal medical guidelines
until April2003~ Per the advice of CTC/Legal, the OMS Guidelines
were· then issued as "draft" and remain so even after being re-issued
(b)(1) in September 2003.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
263. (:ffi"/ did not maintain an ·
accounting of all detainees Specifically, CTC did not
ensure that, for every detainee, respons1 e personnel documented
the circumstances of capture; basis for detention, specific
interrogation techriiques applied, intelligence provided, medical
condition and treatment, and the location and status of the detainee
throughout his detention. Accounting for detainees is improving
(b)(1) because of the recent efforts of CTC.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
264~ ('fS/ Agency officers report that reliance on
analytical assessments that were unsupported by credible intelligence
may have resulted in the application of Errs without justification.
Some participants in the Program, particularly field interrogators,
judge that CTC assessments to the effe<:_t that="" detainees="" are="">
withholding information are not always supported by an objective
104
I tiP !'\~.("~'P.'f/ (b)(1)
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L_(b)(3) NatSecAcl-------~
'i
evaluation of available information and the evaluation of the
I i interrogators but are too heavily based, instead, on preswp.ptions of
. .··
(b)(1) what the individual might or should know.
(b)(3} NatSecAct
265. fFS/ ·A few senior officers are concerned that
compartmentation practices may be delaying the dissemination of·
information obtained from the interrogation of detainees to analysts
and the FBI in a timely manner. They believe it possible to report .
i useful intelligence while still protecting the existence and nature of
(b)(1) the Program.
(b}(3) NatSecAct
";
i
I
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266. {'F§}1 I The Agency faces potentially serious
long-term political and legal challenges as a result of the CTC
Detention and Interrogation Program, particularly its use of BITs and
the inability of the U.S. Governl:nent to decide what it will ultimately
do with terrorists detained by the Agency.
. -
105 (b)( 1 )-;-;--c-;:-----;--:,-----------,
(b )(3) NatSecAct I .
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1.1
RECOMMENDATIONS
(b)( 1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)( 5)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
.··
1
'II \PC::~i .tll'l'f'/l lQ6 (b)(1)
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(b)(5)
3. (-5//:t>W) For the General Counsel. Within 10 days of
receipt of this Review, submit in writing to the Department of Justice
(DoJ) a request that DoJ provide the Agency, within 60 _days, a
formal, Written legal opinion revalidating and modifying, as
appropriate, the guidance provided on 1 August 2002,regarding the
use of EITs. The updated opinion should reflect actual Agency
experience and practices in the use of the techniques to date and
expectations concerning the conpnued use of these techniques. For
the protection of Agency officers, request of DoJ that .the updated
opinion specifically a~dress the Agency's practice of using large
numbers of repetitions of the waterboard on single individuals _and a ..
description of the techniques as applied in practice. The opinion . - ~~·--
• 107 (b)(1)------~
• ....
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should also ~4\.iress whether the application of standard or enhanced
techniques by Agency officers is consistent with the undertaking
accepted conditionally by the United States in Article 16 of the
Torture Convention to prevent "cruel, inhuman or degrading ·
treatment or punishmei:l.t," and· the potential consequences for
Agency officers of any inconsistency. This Recolrimendation is
significant. ·
4. f.!i/ /NF) For the DCI. In the event the Agency does not
receive a written legal opinion satisfactorily addressing the matters
raised in Recommendation 3 by the date requested, direct that EITs
be implemented only within the parameters that were mutually
understood by the Agency and DoJ on 1 August 2002, the date of the
(b)(1) ""'sting written opinion. This Recommendation is significant. ·
(b)(3) NatSecAct . .
5. tfSi I I For the DCI. Brief the Presiden~ regarding
· the implementation onKe Agency's detention and interrogation
activities pursuant to the MON of 17 September 2001 or any other
authorities, including the use of EITs and the fact that detainees have
died. This Recommendation is significant.
6. r
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
7J
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(5)
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TOl" Sl!OtBTIL__(b)(3) NatSecAct _______ ___J
(b)(S)
8.1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(S)
9.1
(b)(1)
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(S)
io.1
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
(b)(S)
. .,.~..._.,-, __ ..........._..
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109
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lOP SECR:ETr(b)(1)
L(b)(3) NatSecAct ______ _
~~lgl NatSecAcl~ROCEDURES AND RESOURCES
1. ('FS -.-J A team, led by the Deputy Inspector
. General, and compnsmg !he Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations, the Counsel to the Inspector General, a senior
Irivestigatioru; Staff Manager, three Investigators, two Inspectors, an
Auditor, a Research Assistant, and a Secretary participated in this
Review.
(b)(3) NatSecAct
2. ~ I OIG tasked relevant' components for all
I
I
information regarding the treatment and interrogation of all
individuals detained by or on behalf of CIA after 9/11. Agency
components provided OIG with over 38,000 pages of documents.
OIG conducted over 100 interviews with. individuals who possessed
potentially relevant information. We interviewed senior Agency
management officials, including the DCI, the Deputy Director of
· Central Intelligence, the Executive Director, the General Counsel, and
. the Deputy Director for Operations. As new information developed,
OIG re-interviewed several individuals.
J (b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct3. ffSII I OIG personnel made site visits to the
i linterrogation facilities. OIG personnel also
.c!
I
...
I
visited an overseas statfon to review 92 videotapes of interrogations
of Abu Zubaydah L_ ___ __j
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(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct (b)( 1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
(b)(3) CIAAct ,: (b)(3Dot
; b )(1)
b)(3) NatSecAct
~ (b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct r
(b)(1)
(b )(3) NatSecAct
I·
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00123
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ruP ~tljMtt
U.S. Department of Justice
Office oflcgal Counsel :--.
August I, 2002
Memonndum for John Rizzo
Acting Genenl Counsel of ihe Cenir:tl lnielligenee Agency
lnte"ogation of a/ Qaeda Operative
You have asked for this Office's views oxi whether certain proposed conduct wopld
violate the prolu "bition against torture fo\Uld at Section 2340A of title 18 of the United S)ates
Code. You have asked for this advice in the course of conducting interrogations of Abu
Zubaydah. As we undeiS!aod it, Zubaydah is one of the highest r.mking members of the a! Qaeda
~crrorist organization, with which the United States is currently engaged in an international anned
-conflict following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11,
2001. This letter memorializes our previous oral advice, given on July 24, 2002 and July 26,
·2002, that· the proposed conduct would not violate this prohibition.
I.
Our advice is based upon the following facts, whi~h you have provided to us; We also
understand that you do not have any facts in your possession contrary to the facts outlined here,
and thi~ opinion is limited to these facts: If these facts were to change, this advice would not
necessarily apply. Zubaydah is currently tieing held by the United States. The interrogation team
is certain that he has additional infonnation thai he refuses to divulge. Speci:fieally, he i~
withholding information regaiding terrorist networks in the United States or in Saudi Arabia and
information regarding planS to conduct attacks within the United,States or against our in!lirests
overseas. Zubaydah has become accustomed to a certain level.oftreatment and displays no signs
of willingness to disclose further information. Moreover, your intelligence indicates that there is
cinrent!y a level ofuchatter" equal to that which preceded· the Septem~ II attacks. In light of
the information you believe Zubaydah has and the high level of threat you believe now "exists, ·
you wish to move the interrogations into what you have described as an "increased pressure ·
phase."
As part of this ixicreascd pressure phase, Zubaydah will have contact only with a new
interrogation specialist, whom he has not met previously, and the Suriival, Evasion, Resistance,
Escape ("SERE'') training psychologist who has been involved with the interrogatioDS since they
began. This phase will likely last no more tban several days but could last up to thiJ:ty days. In
this phase, you would like to employ ten techniques that you believe will dislocate !iis ~~-......._
TOl' !3BCR£T 1
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expectations reganting the trcalment he believes he WJllteeeive and encourage hlm to disclose
the =ial information mentioned above. These teo techniques are: (I) attention grasp, (2)
walling, {3) facial bold, (4) facial slap (msult slap),.(S) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing,
(7) S!fess positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insectS placed in a confinement box, and (10) the
waterboard. You have infonned us that the use of these techniques would be' on an as-neede4
basis and that not all of these· techniques will necessarily be used. The intenogation team would
use these techniques in some combination to convince Zubaydah that the only way he can
' influence his swrounding environment is through cooperation. You have, however, informed us
that you expeci these 1ecbniques to be used in some sort of escalating fashion, culminating wi1)1
the watcrboard, thoughnotnccessarily en4ing with lhis technique. Mo.reover, you have alsb
orally informed us that although some of these. techniques may be used wilh mQre than once, that
repetition will not be substantial because the tel=lmiques generally lose theiz effectiveness 'after
several repetitionS. you have also informed us that Zabaydah sustained a wowld during his
caprilrc,.whic.li is being treated.
Based on the facts you have given us, we understand each of these techniques to be as
. follows. The attention gtasp consists of grasping the individUl!l with both hands; one hand on
each side of the collar opening, in a controlled and quick motion. In the same motion as the
·pp, the individUal is drawn toward the interrogator. ,
For walling, a flexible false wall will be constructed. The. individual is placed with his
heels touching the wall. The interrogator pulls $e individual forward and then quickly and
firmly pushes the individual il).\o the wall, It is the individual's shoulder blades that hit the wall.
During this motion, the head- and neck arc Supported with a rolled hood or tcyvel that provides a
c-collar effect to help prevent whiplash. To further reduce the probability of injury, the
individual is allowed to rebound from the flexible wall. You have orally informed. us that the·
false wall is in part constructed to create a loud sound when the individuafhits it, which. will
further shock or SUiprise in the individual. In part, the idea is to create a sound that will make the .
impact seem far worse than it is and that will be far worse tban.any injury that might result f.rorn
the action. · .
The facial hold is used to h()ld the head immobile. One open palm is placed on either
side of the individual's face. 1be fingertips are kept well away from the individual's eyes.
With the fa9ial slap or insult slap, th~ interrogator slaps the individual's face with :fingers
slightly spread. The hand makes contact with the area directly between the lip of the individual's
chin and the bottom of the con:esponding earlobe. Th~ interrogator invades the individUlll's
personal space. The goal of the facial slap is not to inflict physical pain tliat is severe or lasting.
Instead, the pwpose of the faciar'slap is to induce shoclc, SUiprise, ancl/or humiliation.
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Cramped confinement involves the placement of the individual in a confitteirspace, the---·-"'d~
ensions of which restrict the indi~dual's movement. The confined space is usually dark .
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The duration of confinement varies based upoa the size of the container. For the larger ~Xlnfilll:d
space, the individual can stand up or sit down; the smaller space is large enough for the subject to
sit down. Confinement in the larger space can Uist up to eighteen hours; for the smaller space,
confinement lasts for no more 1ltan two ho111:3,
Wall stmding is used to induce muscle fatigue. The individual stands about four to five
feet from a ~. with his feet spread approximately to shoulder width. His arms are stretched
out in front of him, with 'his fingers resting on the wall. His fingers support all of his body
weight. The individual is 'not permitted to move or reposition bis hands or feet.
A varlet}' of stress positions maY be used. You have informed us that these positions are
not designed to produce the pain associated with contortiops or twisting of the body. Rather,·
somewhat like walling, they are aesigncd to produce the physical discomfort associated With
muscle fatigue. Two particular stress positions are likely to be used on Zubay
the fioor with legs extended straight out in :front ofbim with his arms raised above his head; and
{2) kneeling on the floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle. Y o'u have also orally informed
ils that through observing Zubaydah in captivity, you have noted that he appears to be quite
flexible despite his wound.
Sleep deprivation may be used. You have indicated that your purpose in using this
technique is to reduce the individual's ability to think on his feet and, through the discomfoJ1:
associated with lack of sleep, to motivate :bini to cooperate. The effect of such sleep deprivation
will generally remit after one or two nights ofunintcmupted sleep. You have iiuonned us that
yow: research has revealed that, in rare inslanccs, some individuals who are already predisposed
to JlSY,Chological problems may experience abnonn.al reactions to sleep deprivation. Even in
those cases, however, reactions abate after the individual is pennitted to sleep. Moreover,
pmoimel with medical training are avaiiable to and will intervene in the unlikely event of an ·
abnOllllal reaction. You have orally informed us that you would not deprive Zubaydah of sleep
for more than eleven days at a time and that you have previously kept him awake for n hours;
:from. which no men·. tal or physical hann resulted.
Y au would lilce to place Zubaydah in a cramped coxifinemaJt box with an insect. You
have fufonned us that he appears to have a fear 'of insects. In particula,r, you would like to .tell
Zubaydah that you intend to place a stinging i;sect into the box with him. You would, however,
place a hannless insect in the box. You have· oia.lly infonned us that you would in fact place a
hannless insect such as a caterpillar in tlie box With him. Your goal in so doing is to use his fears
to increase his sense of dread .and motivate hlm to avoid the box in the future by cooperating With
interrogators.
Finally, you would like to use a technique called the "water board.'' In this procedure, the
individual is bound securely to an inclined bench, .which is approximately four .f~et l)y seven feet.,.-.-,_...._..
The individual's feet are generally elevated. A cloth is placed ovenhe forehead and eyes. Water.
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is then applied to the clofu in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered lll!til it
covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated an\1 completely covers 1he mouth
and nose, air flo':" is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This
causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual's blood. This increase in the carbon
dioxide level stimulates increased effort to breathe. This effort plus the cloth produces the
perception ofQsuffocation and incipient panic," i.e., the perception o"f drowning. The individual
does not breathe any water into 'Ius lungs. During those 20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously
applied from a height of twelve to twenty-four inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and
the individual is allowed to breathe Wlimpeded for Uiree or four full breaths. The sensation of
drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of t)le cloth. The procedure may then be
~tcci The water is usually applied from a canteen cup or smalt' watering can with a spout.
You have orally informed us that thi$ procedure triggers an automatic physiological sensation of
drowning that the individual c3nnot control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not
drowning. You have also orally inf'onned us that it is likely that this pro<:edure would="" not="" last="">
more than 20 minutes in any one application: ·
' We also understand that a medical eXpert with SERE experience will be present
throughout this phas
'prevent severe mental or phy';rlcal harm to Zubaydah. As mentioned above, Zubaydah suffered
an·injwy during bis capture. You have infonned us that steps will be taken to ensure that this
injury is not in any \wy exacerbated by the usc of these methods and that adequate medical
attention will be given to ensure that it will heal properly._
II.
In this part, we review the context within which 1hese procedures will be applied. You·
have informed us that you bavc taken 'lariQUS steps to ascertain what effect, if any, these ·
techniques would have Oil Zubaydah's mental health. These same techniques, with the exception
ofthe insect in the cramped confined $paCe, have been used and continue to be used on some
members of our military personnel during their SERE training .. Because.ofthe use of these
procedures in traitring our own military personnel to resist interrogations, you have consulted
with various individuals who have extensive experience in the use of these techniques. You have
done so in order .to ensure that no prolonged mental harm would result from the use of these
proposed procedures.
Tprougb your coJlSilltation with various individuals responsible for such training. icu . . _
have learn¢ that these techniques have been used as clements of a course of conduct without any (b) ( 6)
reported incident ofnml.!m.gcd mental hannj lof the SERE school,
I ~~~~~~theyear
period that he spent in those positions, there were two requests from Congress.for
information concerning alleged injuries resulting"from the training. One ofthe.Se mq1iiries war"'"--~
prompted by the .temporary physical injury a trainee sust~ined as result of being placed in a
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confinement box. The other inquiJy involved claDD$ that !he SERE training caused two
individuals to engage in criminal behavior, namely, felony shopli:fting I!Dd downloading· child
pornography onto a military computer. According to this official, these claims were found to be
baseless. Moreover, he has indicated that during the three and a half yean he spent as I I I of !he SERE program, he trained 10,000 Sl\ldents. Of those students, on])' two
diopped out of the training following the use of these teclmiques. Although on rare occaSions
some students temporarily postponed the remainder of !heir training and received psychological
' counseling, those studen~ were able to·finish the program without any indication oi: subsequent
mental health effects.
You have wormed us· that youh!r{e consulted wi!!:l,_ _____ -'lwhltba.s_ten
ears of erience with SERE trainin
He stated that, during 1hose
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the training. That person experienced an adverse mental health reaction tliat lasted only two
hours: After those two holliS, the individual's symptoms spontaneously dissipated without
· requiring treatment or counseling and no other symptoms were ever reported by this individual.
According to the information you have ptovided to us, thls assessment of the use of these
procedures includes the use of the waterboard.
1
A~ditionallv von receiYeciiun=~:ch you supplied tollS.
h3S expenence with the use ofiiiOf tllese procedures 10 a course of conduct, wi•"""'c"'ex"""c.'"ep""'O~n
of the insect in the confinement box and the waterboard. This memorandum confirms that the
use of these procedures has not resulted in any reported instances of prolonged mental harm, and
vm few instances of immediate and temporary adverse psychological responses to lhe training. L jreported that a small mino;rity of studeJ;Jts have ha,d temporary adverse
psychological reactJoos during training. Of the 26,829 students trained ftom 1992 through 200 I
in the Air Force SERE !raiDing, 4.3 percept of those students had c.ontacfwith psychology
services. Of. those 4.3 percent, only 3.2 percent were pulled from tlie program for psychological
reasons. Thus, out of the students trained overall, only 0.14 oer=~ulled from the
program for psychological reasons. Furtbemtore, a! thou~ I indicated lhat surveys .
of students having completed this training are not done, he exprcontidence that the training
did not cause any long-term psychological impact. He based his conclusion on the debriefing of
students that is done after the training: More im)l9rtantly, he based this assessment on the fact
that although training.is required to be extremely stressful in order to be effective, very few
complaints·have been made regllrding the training. DUring his tenure, in which I 0,000 students
were trained, no congressional complaints have been made. While there was one Inspector
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General complaint, it -.yas not due to psychological concerns. Moreover, be wa£.aWate o( on~¥~·-......_
one le.tt er inquiring about the long-term impact of these .techniques from an individlJ!ll trained.
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t-="-"-'=o,_. "'"H"'c_,fo.und that it was impossible to attribute this individual's symptoms to
oncluded t1w if there are any long-tenn psychological effects of the
~Ml''iffi;ef!ruhi'n g using th'? procedures outlined above they "are certainly . ·
With respect to the waterbOard,.you have also orally infonned us that the Navy cqntinues
to use it in training. You have uuonncd us that your on-site psychologists, who have extensive
•· experience with the use of the watcrboard in Navy training. have not encountered any significant
long-term mental health consc~cnces from i~ use. Your on-.sitc psychologists have also
indicated that JPRA bas likeWise not reported any significant long-term mental health
·tonsequences from the use of the waterboard. You have informed us that other services ceased ·
usc of the waterlx1ard because it.was so successful ils an intetrogation technique, but not because
of. any concerns over any harm, physical or mental, caused by it. It was also reported to be
3lmost 100 percent effective in producing cooperation among the trainees. I f!so
indicated that he had observed the use of the waterboard in Navy training some ten to twelve
times. Each time it resulted 'in cooperation but it did not result in any physical harm to the
student.
You have also reviewed. the relevant literature and found no empirical data on the effect·
of these techniques, with the exception of sleep deprivation. With respect to sleep deprivation,
you have informed us that is not uncommon for someone to be deprived of sleep for 72 hours and
still perfonn excellently on visual-spatial motor tasks and short-term memory tests. Although
some il!dividuals may experience hallucinations, accordmg to the literature you surveyed, those
who experience Silch psichotic symptoms hav~ almost always had sucb episodes prior to the
sleep deprivation. You have indicated the studies oflengthy sleep deprivation showed no
psychosis, loosening oftho~ghts, :flattening of emotions, delusions, or paranoid ideas. In one
case, even after eleven days of deprivation, no psychosis or pcnnanent brain damaged occurred.'
In fact the individual reported feeling ahnost back to normal after one night's sleep. Further,
based on the experiences with its usc in military training (where it is induced for up to 48 hours),
you found that rarely;if ~ver, will the individual suffer hann after the sleep deprivation is
· discontmued. Instead, the effects rel)l.it after a feW good nights of sleep.
' You have taken the additional step of cqnsulti.Dg with U.S. interrogations experts, Md
other individuals with oversight over the SERE training process. None of these individuals was .
aware of any prolongeq psyChological effect caused by the use of any of the above techniques
either separately or as a comse of conduct. Moreover, you consulted with outside psychologists
who reported that they were unaware of any cases where long-term problems have o~um:d as a
result ?fthese techniques. ·
Moreover, in consulting with a numb~r of mentnl health expGrtS, you have learned that
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the effect of any of these procedures will be dependant on the individual's penen*history, ~~ ·-"'cultur;
ll history and psychological tendencies. To that end, you have infonned us that you ~ve
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completed a psychological assessment ofZubadyah. This assessment is based on interviews with
Zubaydah, obSCIVati~ns ofbim, and infonnation collected from other sour= such as intelligence
and press reports: Our ID!derstanding of Zubaydah's psychological profile, which we set forth
below, is based on that assessment. ·
· Acc
· lieutenant. 'In that capacity, be has managed a network of training camps. He lias been .
instrumental in the training of operative~~~ for a! Qaeda, the'Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and other
!emlrist elements inside Pakistan and Afghanistan. He acted as the Deputy Camp Commander
for al Qaeda training camp in Afghanistan, personally approving entry and graduation of all
trainees during 1999-2000. FroJll. 1996 untill999, he approved all individuals going in and out
of Afghanistan to the training camps. Further, no one went in and out of Peshawar, Pakistan
without his knowledge and approval. He also acted as a1 Qaeda's coordinatOr of external
contacts and foreign communications. Additionally, he has acted as a1 Qa.eda's counter-
. intelligence officer and has been trusted to find spies wi1hin the organization.
Zubaydah bas been involved in every major terrorist operation Carried out by al Qacda.
·He was aplannerfortheMillenniuuiplot to attack U.S. and Israeli targets dur:hlgthe Millennium
celebrations in Jordan. Two of the central figures in this plot who were arrested have identifiea
Zubaydah as the supporter of their cell ;md the plot. He also served as a planner for the Paris .
Embassy plot in 2001. Moreover, he was one of the planners of the September I 1 attacks. Prior
to his capture, he was engaged in planning future terrorist attacks against U.S. interest!; .
.. Your psychological assessment indicates that it is believed Zubaydah wrote al Qaeda' s
manual on' resistance techniques. You also believe that his experiences in al Qaeda make him
well-acquainted with and well-versed in such techniques. As part of his role in a! Qaeda,
Zubaydah visited individuals in prison and helped them upon their release. Through this contact
and activiti~ with other a! Qaeda mujahedin, you believe that he knows many stories of capture,
interrogation, and resistance to such interrogation. Additionally, he has _spoken with Ayman aJ.
Zawahiri, and you. believe it is likely that the two discussed Zawahiri' s experiences as a 'prisoner
of the Russians and the Egyptians.
. Zubaydah stated during interviews that he )hinks of any activity'outside of jihad as
"silly." He has indicated that his heart and mind are devoted to serving Allah and ~lam through
jihad and he has stated that he has no doubts or regrets about committing himselfto jihad.
Zubaydah believes that the global victory oflslam is inevitable. You have informed us that he
continues to express his unabat~ desire to kill Americans and Jews.
. Your psychological ~sment describes his perso~ty as foliows •. He is "a highly self..
directed individual who prizes his independence:'' He has "narcissistic features," io;hich are·~--·-"'evidenc~
d in the iJ.tlention he pays to his personal appearance and his "obVious 'efforts' to
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demonstrate that he is'ieally a rather 'humble and regular guy.'" He is "somewhat compulsive"
in how he organizes his environment and~ He is confident, self-assured, and possesses
an air of au1hority. While he admits to at times wreStling with how to dc:tennine who is an ·
"innocent," he has acknowledged celebrating the destruction of the World Trade Center. He is
intelligent and intellectually curious. He displays "excellent self-discipline." The assessment
describes him BS a perfectionist, persistent, private, and highly capable in his ~oci.iJ interactionS.
' ,, He is yery guarded about opening up to others and your assessment repeatedly emllhasizes that
he tends not to trust4)thers easily. He is also uquick to recognize and assess the moods and
· motivations of others." Furthermore, he is proud of his ability to lie and deceive others
successfully. Through his deception he has, among other things, prevented the location of al
Qaeda safehouses.and even acquired a Un:ited Nations refugee identification card.
According to your reports, Zubaydah does not have lillY pre-existing mental conditions ·or
. problems that w~uld make him likely to suffer prolonged mental hann fi:om your pr
history of"mood disturbance or other psych;iatric pathology[,}" "thought disorder[.] • : . enduring
·mood or ll)ental health problems." He is in fact ~remarkably resiliel\t and confident that he can
overcome adversity." When he encounters stress or low mood, this appears to last only for a
'short time. He deals with stress by assessing its soilrce, evaluating the coping resources aviillable
to bioi, and then taking action. Your as~ssment notes that he is "generally self-sufficient and
relies on his UJiderstanding and application of religious and psychological principles, intelligence
and discipline to avoid and overcome problems." Moreover, you have found that he has a
"reliable and durable support system" in his :fuith, "the blessings of religious leaders, and
camaraderie oflike·minded mujahcdin brothers." During detention, Zubaydah has. managed his
mood, remaining at most points "cirtumspect, calm, controlled, and deliberate." He. has
maintained ibis demeanor dming aggressive interrogations and reductions in sleep. You describe
that in an initial confrontational incident, Zubaydah showed signs of sympathetic nervous system
arousal, which you think was possibly fear. Although this incident led him to disclose ·
intelligence information, he was able to quickly regain his composure, his air of confidence, and
his "strong resolve" not to reveal any information.
Overall, you sillnmarize his primary strengths as the following: ability to focus, goaldirected
discipline, intelligence, emotional resilien~e. street savvy, ability to organize and
·manage peoPJe, keen observation skills, fluid'adaptability (can anticipate and adapt under duress
and with 'tDi.nimal resources), capacity to assess and exploit the needs of others, an,d ability to
adjust goals to emerging opportuni~es.
You llllticipate that he wi)l draw upon his vast knowl~ge of interrogation techniques to
cope with the interrogation: Y
belief that Islam will ultimately dominate the wor1d and !hat this victory is inevitable may- ·~-·....._._
provide the chance that Zubaydah will give information and rationali':e ii solely as a temporary
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setback. Additionally, you believe he may be Willing to disclose some infonwi:tion, partimllarly
information he deems to not be critical, bill which may ultimately be useful to us when :pieced
together with other intelligence infoonation you have gained.
III.
Section 2340A makes it a crilninal offense for any person "oUtside ~the United States
[toJ eommitO or attempt[] to commit torture. n Section 2340(1) defines torture a$:
an act committed by a person acting under the color oflaw specifiCally intended to
inllict severe physical or mental pain or sufferiilg (other than pain or suffering
incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person w!thin his custody of physical
. -control. ·
1& U.S.C. § 2340(1). As we outlined in our opinion on standards of conduct under Section·
2340A, a violation of2340A requires a showing that: (I) the torture occurred outside the United
States; (2) the defendant acted under the color of law; (3) the victim was wi1hin the defendant's
·.custody or control; (4) the defendant specifically intended to iilflict'severc pain or suffering;.and
· (5) that the acted inflicted severe Pain or suffering. See Memorandum for John.Rizzo, Acting
General Co=el for the Central Intelligence Agency, from JayS. Bybee, Assistant Attorney -
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Standards of cOnduct for Interrogation uniler 18 U.s. c.
§§ 234Q-2340A at 3 (AUgus-t 1, 2002) ("Sec.tion 2340A Memorandum"). You have asked us to
ilssurne that Zubayadah is being held outside the United States, Zubayadah is within U.S.·
custody, and the interrogators are l!cting under the color oflaw. At issue i~ whether the last two
elements would be met by the use of the proposed procedures, namely, whether those using these
procedul-es would have the requisite mental state and whether ihese procedures would inflict .
·severe pain or suffering within the mc:anirig of the statute. ·
Severe Pajn or Suff.;wg, In order for pain or suffering to rise to the level oftorture, the
statote requires that it be severe. As we have previously expl:rl!led,- this ~aches only extreme
acts. See id. at 13. Nonetheiess, drawing upon cases under the Torture Vic;tirn Protection Act
(TVPA), which has a d~finition of torture that is similar to Section 2340's defmition, we found
that a single event of sufficiently intense pain may fall within this prohibition. See !d. at 26. As
a result, we have analyzed each of these tccJu,jques separately. In further drawing upon those
cases, \VC also have found that courts tend to take a totality~f-1he-circum.stances approac)l and
consider an entire course of conduct to determine whether torture has occurrec\. See id. at 27.
Therefore, in addition to considering each tecbnique separately, we consider them together as a
course of conduct. ·
Section 2340 defines torture as the infliction of severe physiCal or mental pain or
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suffering. We will consider physical pain and mental pain separately. See 18 U.S. C.§ 2340(-lt.---·-"'With
respect to physical pain. we previously concluded that Msevere pain" withi!l the meaning of . . ' .
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Section 2340 is pain that is difficult for the individual t
pain accomp81).ying serious physical injucy. See Section· 2340A Memorandum at 6. Drawing
·upon the TVP A precedcot. we have noted that examples of acts inflicting severe pain that typifY
tortun: are, among other things, severe beatings with weapons such as clubs, and the burning of
prisQner.;. See id at 24. We conclude below that none of the proposed techniques iuflicts such
pain.
The facial.bold and th!l attention grasp involve no physical pain. In,the absence of such
pain it is obvious that they cannot ?e said to inflict severe physical pain or suffering. The stress
positions and wall standing both rnay result in muscle fatigue. Each involVes the snstained
holding of a position. In wall standing, jt'will be holding a position in which all of the ·
individual's. body weight is plaeed on his finger tips. The stress po~tions will likely include
sittiqg on the floor with legs exte:Dded straight out in front and arrns raised above the head, and
kneeling on the tloor and leaning back at a 45 degree angle. Any pain aSsociated with muscle
fatigue is not of the intensity sufficient to amount to "severe physical pain or suffering" under !be
.stature, nor, despite its discomfort, can it be said to be difficult to end!lre; Moreover, you have
. orally informed us that no Sl1'ess position will be U5
. Zubaydah's wound. Therefore, we conclude that these techniques involve discomfort that falls
·far below the threshold of severe physical pain.
Similarly, although the confiilement boxes (both small and large) are physically
uncomfortabl~ because their size restricts movement, they are not so small as to require the
individual to contort· his body to sit (Slllall box) or. stand (large, box). You have also orally
iilforrned us .that despite his wound, Zubaydah remains quite flexible, which would substantially
reduce any pain associated with being placed in the box. We have no information from the
medical experts you have con5ulted that the limited duration for which the individual is kePt in
. the boxes causes any substantial physical pain. As a result, we do not think the usc of these
· boxes can be .said to cause pain. that is ofthe intensity associated with. serious physical injuiy.
The use of one ofthese boxes with the introduction of an insect does not alter this ·
assessment. As we understand it, no actually hannful inse.ct will be piaeed in the box. Thus,
though the introduction of an Insect may produce trepidation Ui Zubaydah (which we discuss
below), it ceriainly does not cause physical pain.
As for sleep deprivation, it is clear that depriving someone of sleep does not involve
severe physical pain within the meaning of the statute. While sleep deprivation may involve
some physical discomfort, such as the fatigue or the discomfort experienced in the difficulty of
keeping one's eyes open, these effects remit after the individual is permitted to sleep. Based on
the facts you have provided us, We are not aware of !UIY evidence that sleep deprivation results in
severe physical pain or suffering. As a result, its use does riot violate Section 2340A. ..,..-_.,_....,__.
I;lven those techniques that involve physical contact between the interrogator and the
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individual do not result in sever~ paiD. The facial slap and walling contain precautions ~ ensure
that no pain even apJ!I:Oaching this level results. The slap is delivered with fingers sli~y
spread, which you have explained. to us is designed to be less painful than a closed-band slap.
The slap is also delivere~ to the fleshy part of the face, further reducing any risk of physical
damage or serious pain. The facial slap docs not produce pain that is difficult to endure.
Likewise, walling involves quickly pulling the person forward and then thrusting him against a
flexible false wall. You have informed us that the sound of hitting the wall will actually be far
worse than. any possible fujmy to the individual. The usc of the rolled towel. around the neck also
zeduees any risk Of injury. While it may hurt to be pushed against the wall, any pain experienced
is not of the intensity associated with serious physical injury.
As we understand it, when the water board is used, the subject's body responds as iftl)e
subject were drowning-even though the subject may be well aware that he is in fact not
drowning. You have informed us that this procedure does not inflict actual physical hann. Thus,
altbough tbe Subject may cxperi~ce the fear or panic associated with the feeling of drowning;
the waterboard does not inflict physical pain. As we explained in the Section 2340A
Memorandum, "pain and suffering" as used in Section 2340 is best understood as a single
concept, not distinct concepts of"pain" as distinguished from "suffering." See Section 2340A
Memorandum at 6 n.3. The water board, which inflicts no pain or actual hann whatsoever, does
not, in our view inflict "severe pain or suffering." Even if one were to parse the statute l)lOre
:fmely to attempt to treat "suffering" as a distinct concept, the waterboard could not be said to
inflict severe suffcriog. The waterboard is simply a controlled acute episode, Jacking the
cOI,l.DOtation of a protracted period of time generally given to suffering.
Finally, as we discussed above, you have informed us that in determining which
procedures to uSe and how you will use them, you have selected techniques that will not l1arm
Zubaydah~s wound. You have also indicated !hat numerous steps will be taken to· ensure that
none of these procedures irian}' way interferes with the proper healing of Zubaydah's wolind.
Youilave also .indicated that, should it appear at any time tbat Zubaydah is experiencing severe
pain or suffering, the medical personnel on hand will stop the use of any te~bnique.
Even when all of these metbods are considered combined in an overall course of conduct,
they still would cot inflict severe physical pain or suffering. As discussed above, a number of
.these acts result iri no physical pain, others pr_Qduce only physical
that severe physical pain. could arise from such repetition. Accordingly, we conclude that these
acts neither sepaiately nor as part of a course of conduct would inflict severe physical pain or
suffering within the meaning of the statute.
We next consider whether the use of 1bese techniques would inflict severe mental pain or
suffering within the meaning of Section 2340. Section 2340 define's severe mental pain or . "---.. ,_......._
Sllfferiog as "the prolonged mental harm cau. sed by o. r resulting from" one of sever.a l predicate
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acts. 1 g u.s.c. § 2340(2). Those predicate acts are: (l) the mtentional infliction or 1hreatcned
infliction of severe pliysical pain or suffering; (2) the admiDislration or application, or threatened
admjnjsiJ:alion or application of mind-alterillg substances or other procedures calculated to
disrupt pl-ofoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of itnminent death; or ( 4) the threat
that any of the preceding acts will be done to another person. Sed 8 U.S.C. § 2340(2XA}.-(D),
As we have explained, this list of predicate acts is exclusive. See Section 2340A MemorandUm
at 8. No other acts can Stipporta charge Wlder Section 2340A based on the infliction of.severe
, mental pain or suffering. See id. Thus, if the methods that you have described do not either in
and of themselves constitUte one of these acts or as a course of. conduct ful:till the predicate act
requirement, the prohibition has not been violated. See id. B
we note that it is plain that none of these Jirocedi!Tes involves a threat to any third party,1he use
of any kind of drugs, or for the reasons described above, the infliction of severe ph ysi.;J pairi.
Thus, the question is whether any of these acts,. separately or as a: course of conduct, constitutes a
threat of severe ph}rsical pain or suffering, a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the senses,
or a threat of.inuninent death •. As we previously explained, -w:hether an action c~mstitutes a threat
must be assessed from the standpoint of a reasonable person in the subject's position: See id. at
9
. . .
No argument can be made that the attention grasp or the facial hold·constitute threats· of
·imminent death or arc procedures designed to disrupt profoundly ibe senses or personality. In
general the grasp and the facial hold will startle the subject, produce fear, or even iOSlilt him. As
you. have informed us, the use of these techniques is not acCompanied by a specific verbal threat
of severe physical pain or suffering. To the extent that these techniques could be considered a
threat of severe physical pain or suffering, such a threat would have to be inferred from the acts
themselves. Because these actions themselves involve no pain, neither could be interpreted by a
reasonable person in Zubaydah's position to ~onstitute a threat of severe pain or Suffering.
Accordingly, these two techniques are not predicate acts within the meaning of Section 2340.
The facia! slilp likewise falls outside the set of predi
imminent death, under Section 2340(2)(C), or a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the
senses or personallty;under Section 2340(2)(B). Though it may hurt, as discuSsed above, the
eff'eet" is one of smarting or stinging and surprise or hiiiDiliation, but J?OI severe pain. Nor do_es it
alone constitute a threat of severe pain or suffering, under Section 23411(2XA). Like the facial
hold and the attention grasp, the use of this slap is not accompanied by a specific verbal threat of
·further escalating violence. ·Additionally, you· have infonned us that in one use this technique
vyill typically involve. at most two slaps. Certainly, the use of this slap may dislodge any
. !!xpectation that Zubaydah had that he would not be touched in a physically aggressive manner.
Nonetheless, this alteration iri his expectations could hardly be construed by a reasonable person
·in his situation to be tantamount to a threat of severe physical pain or suffering. At most, this
technique suggests that the clrcuiDstances ofhis confinement and interrogation have changed.
Therefore, the f~cial slap is not within the statute's exclusive list of predicate acts.
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wailing plainly is nbt a procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the SCilSes or
pcrionality. While walling involves what might be characterized as rough handl,ing, it does not
involve the threat of imminent d~ath or, as discussed above, the infliction of severe ph}'llical pain.
· · Moreover, onc_e again we Wlderstand that use of this technique wil1119t be accompanied by any
specific verbal_threat that violenee will ensue absent cooperati9n. Thus; like the facial slap,
Walling can only constitute a tbreat of severe physical pain if a reasonable pmon would infer
· sui:h a threat' from the use of the technique itself. Walling does not in and ofitselfinflict severe
·- pain or suffering. Like the facial slap, walling may alter the subject's expectation as to tlie
treatment he believes he will receive. Nonetheless, the c:baracter of the action falls so far Short of
iilflicting severe pain or suffering withip the meanllig of the statute that even if he infened that ·
greater aggressiveness was to follow, the type of actions that could be reaso~bly be anticipated
. would still fall below anything sufficient to inflict-severe physical pain or s¢ferlng under-the
statute. Thus, we conclude that this technique falls outside the proscribed predicate acts •.
. Like walling, stress positio~ ,;oo wall-standiog are not procedure;~ calculated to ~isrupt
profoundly the senses, nor arc they threats_ of imminent death. These procedures, as discussed ·
· above, involve the lise of muscle fatigue to encourage cooperation and do not themselves ·
. constitute the io.flictloa of sev11re physical pain or suffering. Moreover, 'there is no aspect of
·violence to either technique that.mnotely suggests future severe pain or suffering-from which
such a threat of future harm could be inferred. Tbey simply involve foi-cing.the subject to remain
in tmcomfortable positions. 'While these acts'may·indicate to _the subject that he may be placed in
these positions again ifhe does not disclose information, the use of these teclmiques wo~d not
suggest to a reasonable person in the subject's position tllat he is being threatened with severe
pain or suffering. Accordiog)y, we conclUde that these tYio pro·cedures do riot constitute any of
the predicate acts set forth in Section 2340(2) .. · ·
As with the other techniques discossed so far,.~ confinement is nat a threat of ·
imminent death. It may be argtied that, focusing in part on the fact that the boxes will be .without
light, placement in these boxes would' constitute a procedure designed to disrupt profoundly the
sc:Dses. A:; we explained in our recent opinion, howev'er, to "di;;rupt profoundly th~ senses" a
technique must pFoduce ail extreme effect in the subject. See Section 2340A Memorandum at
liJ.-12. We have previously concluded that this requires that the procedure cause substantial
.interference with the individual's cognitive abilities or fundamentally alter his personality. See
id:. at II. Moreover, the statute requires that such procedures must be calculated to produce this
effect Seeid. at 10; ISU.S.C. §2340(2)(B)~
With respect to the small confinement box, yon have informed us that he would spend at.
most two hours in this box. You have informed us that your purpose in using these boxes is not
to interfere with his senses or his personality, but to cause him physical discomfort that will
encourage him to disclose critical information. Moreover, your imposition oftime limitations on
..
the use of eitlier of the boxes also indicates ·that tl!e use of these boxes is not designed o.r -~~~
calculated to disropt profoundly the senses or personality. For the larger box, in which he -can
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both stacil and sit, be may be placed in this box for up to _eighteen hOurs at a time, while you .have
informed us that be will never spend more than ·an hour at time in the smaller box. Thc:~e time ·
limitll further ensure that no profound disruption of the-senses orpersonalii}i, were it e~en
possible, would result As such, the usc of the confmement boxes does not constitute a
proced~ calculatedto diSrupt prof~uiJdly·the senses or personality.
Nor dees the use of the boxes threaten .Zubaydah with severe physical pain or sufrerlng .
- While additional time spent in the boxes may be threatened, their use is not actompruiied by any
express threats of severe physical'pain or suffering, Like the stress position$ and walling, ·
placement in the boxes is ph:(Sically =mfor:table but any such disepmfort does not rise to the
level of severe physical pain oi: sutfet;ing. Accordingly, a reasonable,person in' the subject's.
position would not infer :from the uSe of~ technique that severe physical pain is the next step
in his interrogator's treatment of him. Therefore, we conclude that the use of the confipement
boxes does not fall within the statute's required predicate acts.
In addition to using the cqnfinement boxes alone, you also would like to introduce ar.i
·insect into one of the boxes with Zubaydah. ·As we undemand it, you· plan to inform Zubaydah .
. that you are-going to place a stinging insect into the box, but you will actually place a hannless
insect in the box, such as a caterpillar. If you do so, to ensure that you are outside the predicate
act requ~ent, you must inform him that the insects will not have a sting that would produce
death or severe pain. If, however, you were to place the insect in the box without informing him
that you are doing so, then, in order to not commit a predicate act, you should not affmnatively
lead him to believe that OUIY insect is present which bas a sting that could produce severe; pain or
suffering or even cause his death .. While placing the insect in the box may certaiilly play upon
fears that you believe that Zubay,dah may harbor regarding insects, so long as you take either of
the approaches we have described, the insect's placement in the box would ncit constitute a threat
of seven; physical pain or suffering to a reasonable person in his position. An individual placed
in a box. even an individual with a fe3l' ofinsects, would not-reasonably feel threatened with
severe physical pain or suffering if a eaterpillai- was placed in the box. F~er, you have
iilfor.mcd us that you arc not aware that Zubaydah has any allergies to insects, and you have not
informed us of any other factors that would cause a reasonable person in that same situation to
believe that an unknown insect would cause him severe physical pain or death. Thus, we
conclude that the placement of the ilisect in the confinement box with Zubaydah would not
constitute a predicate act · ·
Sleep deprivation also clearly does not involve. a threat of imminent death.' Although it
produces physical discomfort, it cimnot be said to constitute a threat of severe physical pain or
suffering from the perspective of a reasonable person in Zubayd.ih's position. Nor could sleep
deprivation constitute a procedure calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses, so long as sleep
deprivation (as you have inforined us is your intent) is used for Iiniited periOds,,b'efore
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hallucinations or other profound disruptions of the senses would occur. To.be sliri; sleep .
· deprivation may reduce the subject's ability to think on his feet Indeed, you indtcate thar thi'SiS"''_....._ . . '
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the intended result His inere reduced ability to evade your questions and resist answering does
not, however, rise ta 1be level of disruption requited by the statute. As we explained above, a
disruption within. the meaning of the statute is an extreme one, substantially interfering-with an .
individ)ial's cognitive abilities, for example, inducing hal!uci.oations, or driving him to engage in
uncharacteristic self-desiiuctive·~bavior. See infra 13; Bection 2340A Memorandum at 11.
J'herefore, the limited use of sleep deprivation does not constitute one ofthe required predi~atc
acts.
We find that the ~ of :fue waterboatd constitutes a threat of imminent death. As you
· have explained lho watcrboard procedure to us, it creates in the subject the uncontrollable
. physiol!Jgi~ sensation that the subject is drowning. Although the procedure wiiJ be monitored
by personne'i with medical training and extensive SERE school. experience with this proce
precautions. From the vantage point of any reasonable person undergoing this procedure in such
circumstances, be would feel as if he is drowning at very moment of the procedUre due to the
uncontrollable physiological s.ensation he is exPeriencing. Thus, this procedure caono~ bC
. viewed as too uncertain to satisfY the-imminence requirement. Accordingly. it constitutes a
· . threat of imminent death and fulfills the predicate act requirenieilt under the ~tute.
Although the'waterboard constitutes ·a threat of imminent death, prolonged mental harm
must nonetheless result to violate the statutory prohibition on inflic~on of severe mental pain or
suffering. See Section 2340A Memorandum at 7. We have previouSly concluded that prolonged
mental harm is mental harm of some lasting duration, e.g., mental harm lasting months or years.
See id. Prolonged mental harm is not simply the stress experienced in, for example, an
interrogation by state police. See id_. Based on your research into the use of these methods at the
SERE school. and consultation with others_ with e]lpertise in the field of psychology and
interrogation, you do not anticipate that any prolonged mental hann would result from the usc of
the waterboard. Indeed, you have advised us that the relief is almost immediate when the cloth is
remo'(ed from the nose and mout!l. In the absence of prolonged mental harm, no severe mental
pain or suffering would have been inflicted, and the use of these procedures-would not constitute
l!JriUre within themeai:Ung of the statute. ..
When 1hc:se acts are considered as a course of conduct, we are unsure whether tliese acts
may coDStitute a threat of severe physical pain or suffering. You ha've indicated to us that you
have not determined either the order i>r the precise timing for implementing these procedures. 'It
is conceivable 'that tll,es~ procedures could be used in a course of escalating conduct, moving
incrementally and rapidly from least physiCally intrusive, e.g., facial hold. to the most physical
contact, e.g., walling or the waterboard. As we understand it, based on his treatment so far,
Zubaydah has come to eXpectthjtt no physical harm will be done to him.· By using these
techniques in increasing intensity and in rapid succession, the goal would be to dislodge ihis
expectation. Based on the facts you have provided to us, we cannot say definitively_that th~ ..
entire course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to believe that he is"GeiiigThreateoea-·~
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with severe Pain or. safferirig Within the meaning of section 2340. On the other hand, however'
'Under certain ~umstances-for example, rapid escalation in the use of these techniques
culminating in the waterboard (which we acknowledge constitutes a threat of imminent death)
accompani~ by vC!bal or· either suggestions that physical violence will follow--tnight cause a
reasonable pe:cson to believe Uiafthey are faced with such aihreat. Without mot.~ infonnation,
we are wicettain whether the course of conduct would constitute a predicate act under Section
2340(2). . . . .
· Even if the couise of conduct were thought to pose a threat of physical pain or suffering,
it would nevextheless-on·the facts before u.:tr-notconstitute a violation of Section 2340A. Not
. only must the course of conduct be a predicate act, but also those who use ihe proeedure must
actually ~e prolonged mental harm. B.ased on the infonnation that you have provided to us,
indicatirig that no evidence exists that this course of conduct produces any pxolongcd mental
h3ID1, we conclude that a c:ourse of conduct using these procedures and culminating in the
. waterbliard would not violate Section 2340A.
· Specific Intent T
.inflict severe pain or suffering. Because specific inient is an element of the off en~, the absence ·
·of specific intent negates the charge of torture.· As we previously opined, to have the required
specific intent, an individual must expressly intend to cause such severe. pain or suffering. See
Section 2340A Memorandum at 3 citing Carter v. United Stales, 530 U.S. 255,267 (2000). We
have further found that if a defendant acts with the good faith belief that his actions will not
cause sui:h suffering, he has not acted with specific intent See. id. at 4 citing South At/. Lmtd
·Ptrshp: ofTenn. v. Rei.re, 218 F.3d 518, 531 (4th Cir. 2002). A defendant acts in good faith
when he~ an honest belief that his actions will not·result in·severe pain or suffering. See id.
citing Cheekv. United States, 49& U.S. 192,202 (1991). Although an honest belief need not be
reasonable, such a beliefis easier to establish where there is a reason'!hle basis for it. See id. at S.
Good faith may be established by. among other1hlngs. the reliance on the advice of experts. See
· id. at 8.
Based on the information you have provided us, we. believe that those carrying oUt these
procedures would not have !}lc specific intent to inflict severe physical pain or suffering. The
objective of these techniques is not to cause severe physical pain. First, the constant presence of
personnel with medical tra.lnfug who have thf:: authority to stop the interrogati-on should it _appear
it is medically necessary indicates that it is not your intent to cause severe physical pain. The
personnel on site have extensive experience with these specific techniqu~s as they are used in
SERE school training. Second, you have informed us that you are taking steps to ensure that
Zubaydah's injmy is not worsened or his recovery impeded by the use of these techniques.
Third, as you have deScribed them to us, the proposed techniques involving physical
contact between the interrogator and Zubaydah actually contain precautions to prevent any -··-"-
serious physical harm to Zubaydah. In "walling," a rolled hood or towel wilt' be used to prevent ·
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whiplash and he will be permitted to rebound from Cbe flexible wall to redute the likelihood of
injury. Similarly, in the "faciaa hold,"thc fingc:rlips will be kept well away from tho; hiS' eyes to
eJIS1,li'e th8t tb=·isno injury to them. The pmpose oflhatfacial hold is not injure him but to ·
hold the head immo11ile. Additionally, while the st=s positions and wall standing will
undoUbtedly result in physital discomfort by tiring the muscles, it is obvious that these positions
ate not intended to produce the killd of extreme pain required by the statute. ·
Furthermore, no speti.fic iDtent to caure sever!: mental pain or suffering appear$ to be
. present. As we Clqilaincd in our recent opinion, an il!dividual must have lhe specific intent to
ca113c prolonged mental ham! in OJ'der to have the specific intcrit to inflict severe mental pain or
suffering. See Section 2340A Memormdum·at 8. PrOlonged mental harm is substantial mental
harm of a sustained duration, e.g., hann lasting months or even years after the acts were inflicted
upon the prisoner. As we indicated above, a good faith belief tan negate this element.
Accordingly, if an individuai conducting the interrogation has a good faith belief that the
procedures he will apply, separately o~ together, would not result in prolonged mental harm, that
individual lacks the requisite specific intent. This conclusion concerning specific intent is further
. bolstered by the .due diligence that has been conducted concerning the effects of theSe
i.n terro.g ation proce.d ure. s. . ·
The mental health experts that you have tonsulted have indicated that the psychological
,impact of a course of conduct must be assessed with reference to the subject's psychological
history and current mental health status: The healthier the individual, the less likely that the use.
of any one procedure or set ofproc~ as a course of conduct wm result in prolonged mental
harm. A comprehensive psychological profile of Zubaydah bali been created. In creating this
profile, your personnel drew on direct interviews, Zubaydah's diaries, observa~on of Zubaydah
since his capture, and information from other soun:es snch as other intelligence and press reports.
You fotmd that Zubaydah has no history of mental health problems. Your profile :further
emphasizes that, in addition to his excellent mental health history, he is quite resilienL Not only
is Zubaydah resilient, but you have also fonnd that he has in place a durable support system :
through his failh, the blessings of religious lead!:I'S, and the tamaraderie he has experienced with
those who have taken up the «;aUSS with him. Based on this ~bly healthy profile, you ha:ve
concluded lbat he would not experien~.any mental hann of sustained duration from the use of
these techniques, either separately oi as a course of conduct. ·
As we indicated above, you have inforined us that your proposed interrogation methods
have; been used and continue to 9e used in SERE training. It is our understanding that these
. tecliniques are not used one by one in iSolation, but as a full course of conduct to resemble a real
·interrogation. Thus, the fufonnation derived from SERE training bears both upon the impact of
the use of 1be individual techniques and upon their ll3e as a course of conduct. You have found
that the use of these methods t6getber or separately, including the 113e of the waterboard, has not
..
resulted in any negative long-term mental health consequences: The continued use of these .
methods without mental health consequences to the trainees indicates that it is highly im~robabie'--
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thai ~h consequences would result here • .Bccall3e you have conducted the due diligC
detetmme that these procedlll'eS, either alone or in combination, do not produce prolonged mental
llllim, we believe that you do 'not meet the specific intent requirement necessary to violate
Section 2340A. · · · · ·
You have alsO infonn~d uS that you ha:ve reViewed tlie relevant literature on the Subject,
and consulted wilb outside psychologists. Your review of the literature IJilCOVeted no empirical
· data on the use oflbese procedures, with the c:xception of sleep. deprivation for which'no long·
term health .:Onscquences fesulted. The outride psychologists with whom you consulted •.
indicated were unaware of any cases where long-term problems have occurred as a result of theSe .·
techniques. · · ·
· AJ; d~Qeq. above, it appears you have conducted an .extensive inquiry to :iscerpun What
impact, if any; these procedures individually and as a COU!'J!e of conduct would have on . _
Zubaydah. You have· corisolted with ·intctrogation experts; including those with subsiantial. ·
SERE school experience, consulted With outside psychologists, completed a psychological
· . assessment and reviewed the [elevant literature on 'this topic. Based on this inquiry'. you belie-Ve
that the use oftlie procedures, including the waterboard, and as a course of ~ondilct would not
resolt in prolonged mental harm. Reliance on this information about Zubaydah and about the
effect of the usc of these techniques more generally delnonst:tatcs the presen~c of a good failb
belief that no prolonged mental barrn will resolt from using these melbods in !he interrogation of
Zubaydah. Moreover, we think !hat this represents uot only an f;tonest belief but also a:
reaSonable belief'based on the infonnation that you have supplied to us. Thus, we 'believe that
the specillc intentto inflict prolqnged rpen1al is not present,' and consequently, !here is no .
·. specific intentto inflict severe mental pain or suffering. Accordingly, we conclude that on the
facts in this case !he use of these melbods separately or a course of concluctwoold not violate
Section 2340A. ·
Based on the foregoing, and based on the facts that you have provided. we.cqncl11de that
tlie inierrogation procedures that you propose would not violate Section 2340A- We wi~h to
emphasize that this is our ·best reading of the law; however, you should be aware that thc)re are no
cases construing_ this statute, just as there have been no prosecutions brought under it. ·
Please let us know if we can be of further assistance. -4-fl:' Byb .
omey eneral ·
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· _(b)(3) NatSecAct. ___ ,
1fjF S:iCPET I) •• 4 L_ ________________ ~ --
Guidel~es on Confinement Conditions For CXA D&taineas
These Guidelines govern the· conditions of -confinement for
CIA Detainees, who are persons detained :i.n_d_e.t_ention
facilities that are under the I !control of
CIA (•Detention· Facilities~L I
(b)(1)
(b)(3) NatSecAct
1 These Gu1delines recogn1ze that
~e=n=v~1~r~o=nm==en~t=a•l-=an=~~d~o~tn~Eer conditions, as well as particularized
considerations affecting any given ·Detention Facility, will.
vary from case t_o case and location to location.
l.. MiniMums
Due provision must be taken to protect-the health and
safety of all CIA Detainees, including.basic levels of
medical care (which. need not comport with the highest
standards of me.dical care that is provided in US-based
medical facilities); food and drink which meets minimum
medically appropriate nutritional and sanitary standards;
clothing and/or a physical environment sufficient to meet
basic heal!:h needs; periods of time within which detainees
are free to engage in physical exercise (which may be
limited, for example, to exercise within the isolation cells
themselves); and sanitary facilities (which may, £or ~le,
comprise buckets for the relief of personal waste) •
Conditions of confinement at the Detention Facilities do not
have to conform with US prison or other specific or preestablished
standards.
2. Implementing Prcced"Q:es
a .. Medical and, as appropriate, psychological
personnel shall be physically present at, or reasonably
available to, each Detention Facility. Medical personnel
shall ch~ck the physical condition of each detainee at
intervals appropriate to the circ:Umstances and shall keep
appropriate records.
ALL PORTIONS ·OF
· 'l'.t:I.L:O · DOCUMENT ARE
CLASSIFIED ~ep SEG~
(b)(3) CIAAct
(b )(3) NatSecAct
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Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA Detainees
b. Personnel directly engaged in the design and
operation of Detention Facilities will be selected, screened,
trained, and supervised by a process established and, as
appropriate, coordinated by the Director; OCI
.Col.lilterterrori.st Center. · ·
c. I
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3. :Responsible CZA Officer
·The Director, DCI Counterterrorist Center shall
ensure (a) that, at all times, a specific Agency staff
employee· (the 'Responsible CIA Officer•) is designated as
responsible for each specific Detention Facility, (b) that
each Responsible CIA Officer has been provided with a copy of
these Guidelines and has reviewed and signed the attached
Aci
· indiv.iduals detained pursuant to the Memorandum of
Notification of 17 September 2001 has been provided with a
copy of the •Guidelines on Interrogation Conducted PUrsuant
to the Presidential Memorandum of 17 September 2001• and has
reviewed and signed the Acknowledgment attached thereto.
Subject to operational and security considerations, the
Responsible CIA Officer shall be present at, or visit, each
Detention Facility at intervals appropriate to the
circumstances.
'· I
APPROVED:
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~'l"'v"'!~S'l'IBS~~;!.l~.(b) (3) N atSecAct
Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for ~LA Detainees
. I, , am the Responsible CIA Officer for the
Detention Facility known as • By 1tr:f signature
below, I acknowledge that I have :read and understand and will
comply with the "Guidelines on Confinement Conditions for CIA
Detainees • . of·. · 2003.
.ACKNOWI.BDGED:
Name Date
,...,!> t::~C'DPTfb)(3) CIAAct · ~
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Guidelines on ~te::ogations Conducted Pursuant·to the
~residential ~r&Ddum of motific~tion o£.17 September 2001
These Guidelines address the conduct of interrogations of
'persons who are detained pursuant to the authorities ·set
t.lLilLthELMemorandum of No_till.ca..tinn_of 17 se'O.t.ember_2_Q_O
(b)( 1 )
(b)(3) NatSecAct
These Guidelines complement i'nternal Directorate of
Operations guidance relating to the conduct of
inte=ogations. In the event of any inconsistency between
existing DO guidance and these Guidelines, the provisions of
these Guidelines shail control.
1. J?a>:missib1e :tnterro~Jat.ion Teclm.iques
Unless otherwise approved by Head~arters, CIA
officers and other personnel acting on behalf of CIA.may use
only Permissible Interrogation Techniques. Permissible
Interrogation Techniques cons·ist of both (a) Standard
Techniques and (b) Enhanced Techniques.
Standard Tedbniques are techniques tnat do not .
incorporate physical or substantial psychological pressure.
These techniques include, but are not limited to, all lawful
fo:r;ms f questioning employe.O. by us law enforcement and ·
military interrogation personnel. Among Standard Techniques
are the use of isolation; sleep deprivation not to exceed
72 hours, reduced caloric intake· (so long as the amount is
calculated to maintain the general health of the detainee),
deprivation of reading material, use of loud music or white
noise (at a decibel level calculated to avoid damage to the
detainee's hearing), and the use of diapers for limited
periods (generally not to exceed 72 hours, or during
transportation where appropriate) .
·ALL PORTIONS OF ·
THIS DOCOMBNT ARE
CLASSIFIED !0? SECRET
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Presidential Memorandaum of. Notification of 17 Septeml:ler· 2001
Enhanced Techniques are t.ecbiliques that do ·
incorporate physical or psychological pressure beyond
Standard Techniques. The· use of each specific Enhanced
'l'~chnique must be approved py Headquarters in advance, and
may be. ··employed only by approved. interrogators for use. with
the specific detainee, with appropriate medical and
psychological participation in the process. These techniques
are, .the attention grasp, ·walling, the facial hold, the
.facial lllap (insult slap)' the abdominal slap, cremped.
confinement, wall standing, stress positions, sleep
deprivation beyond 72 hours, the use of diapers for prolonged
periods, the use of harmless insects, the water board, and
such other techniques as may be specifically approved··
·pursuant to paragraph 4 below. The use of each Erlhanced
Technique is subject to speCific teii!Poral, .physical, and
related conditions, including a competent evaluation of the
medical and psychological state of the detainee.
2. Medical and Psychologic&l Perso=nel
Appropriate medical and psychological personnel shall
be either on site or readily available for consultation and
travel to the interrogation site during all detainee
interrogations employing Standard Techniques, and appropriate.
medical and psychological personnel must be on site during
all detainee interrogations employing Enhanced Techniques.
In each case, the medical and psychological personnel shall
suspend the interrogation if they'determine that significant
and pr.olonged physical or mental injury,' pain, or suffering
is likely .to res.u.lt i.f the interrogation is not suspended.
In any such instance, the interrogation team shall .
immediately report the facts to Headquarters for ~agement
and legal review to determine whether the interrogation may
be resumed.· ·
3. J:nte=oga.tion Peraom>e1
The Director, DCI.Counterterrorist Center shall
ensure that all personnel directly engaged in the
interrogation of perso~s detained pursuant to the authorities
set forth in the MoN have been appropriately screened (from
the medical, psychological, and security standpoints), have
.reviewed these Guidelines, have received appropriate training
in their implementation, and have completed the attached
Acknowledgment.
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Guideline on Interrogations Conducted Pursuant.to. the
Presiden~ial Memorandaum.of Notification of 17 September 2001
4 • . .1\pprovals Required
Whenever feasible; advance approval is required for
·the use of Standard Techniques by .an interrogation team. In
·all instances,· their use shall.be documented in cable
traffic. Prior approval in writing "(e.g.; by written
. memorandum or in cable traffic) from the Director,. DCI
Counterterrorist Center, with ·the· concurrence of the Chief,
CTC Legal Gro)lp,. is required for the use of any:Enbanced
Technique(s), and may.be provided only where D/CTC has
determined that (a) the specific detainee is· believed to
possess information about risks to· the citizens of the United
·states or other nations, (b) the use of the Enhanced·
Technique(s) is appropriate in order to obtain that
information, (c) appropriate medical and psychological
.Personnel have concluded that the use of the Enhanced
Technique(s) is not expected to produce •severe physical or
mental pain or suffering, • and (.d) the persoruiel authorized
to employ the Enhanced Technique.(s) have completed the
attached Acknowledgment. Nothing in these Guidelines alters
the right to act in self-defense.
5. Rec:ordkeeping
In each interrogation session. in which an. Enhanced
Technique is employed, a co~temporaneous record shall be
created setting forth the·nature and duration of each such
technique employed,- the identities of those present, and a
citation to the required Headquarters approval cable.. This
information, which may be in the fo:rm of a cable, shall be
provided to Headquarters.
APPROVED:
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I, , acknoWledge that I have read and
Understand and will col!i)ly with the "GUidelines on
·Interrogations Conducted Pursuant to the Presidential
Memorandum of Notification of 17 September 2001• of --------
2003.
ACKNOWLEDGED:
Name Date.
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DRAFT OMS GUIDELINES ON MEDICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO
DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS
. · September 4, 2003
The following guidelines offer general references for medical officers supporting
the detention of terrorists captured and turned over to the Central Intelligence Agency for
.. iriterrogation and debriefing. There are tliree different contexts in which these guidelines
m:!:Y be applied: (1) during th~'.period of initial interrogation, (2) during the more .
smtained period of· debriefing at fUl interrogation site, and (3) the permanent detention of
caf,tureci'terrorlsts in long-~ facilities. ·. · · · · . ·
. ~;
.~, . · INTERROGATION SUPPORT
.. ~
.......... "- ·'
· . ;; Captured terrorists turned over to the C.I.A. for interrogation may be subjected to
· a 'o/ide range of legally sanctioned techniques, all of which are also used on U.S. military
p~onnel in SERE training programs. These are designed to psychologically "dislocate"
the detainee, maximize his feeling of vulnerability and helplessness, and reduce or ·
eu.in inate his will to resist our .e fforts to obta. in critical intelligence.
·, Sanctioned interrogation techniques must be specifically approved in advance by
th~ Director, CTC in the case of each individual case. They include, in approximately.
ascending degree of intensity:
.,
Standard measures (i.e., without physical or substantial psychological pressure)
Shaving ·
Stripping
Diapering (generaJ;ty f~r periods not greater than 72 hours)
Hooding
Isolation
White'noise or loud music (at a decibel level that will not daniage hearing)
Continuous light or darkness
Unco~ortably cool environment .
Restricted· diet, including reduced caloric intake (sufficient to maintain
· general health) ·
Shackling in upright, sitting, or horizontal position
. Water Dousing
Sleep deprivation (up to 72 hours)
Enhanced measures (with physical or psychological pressure beyond the above)
Attention grasp
Facial hold
Insult (facial) slap
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- Abdominal Slap
Prolonged diapering
Sleep deprivation (over 72 hours)
Stress positions
~n knees, body slanted forward or backward
. -leaning with forehead on wall
Walling
Cramped confinement (Confmement boxes)
-Waterboard
- - In all instances the general goal of these techniques is a psychological impact, and
not some physical effect, with a specific ,goal of "dislocat[ing] his expectations regarding
the treatment he believes he will receive .... " The more physical techniques are
delivered in a manner carefully limited to avoid serious physical harm. The slaps for
example are'designed "to induce shock, surprise, and/or humiliation" and ''not to inflict
physical pain that iS. severe or lasting." To this end they must be delivered in a
specifically circumscribed manner, e.g., with fingers spread. Walling is only against-a
springboard designed to be loud and bouncy (and cushion the blow)~ All walling and
most attention grasps are delivered only.with the subject's.head solidly supported with a
towel to avoid extension-flexion injury.
OMS is responsible for assessing and monitoring the health of all Agency
detainees subject to "enhanced" interrogation techniques, and for determining that the
authorized administration of these techniques would not be expected to cause serious or
permanent harm} "DCI Guidelines" have been issued formalizing these fi:sponsibilities,
and these should be read directly.
Whenever feasible, advance approval is required to use any measures beyond
standard measures; technique-specific advanced approval is required for all "enhanced"
measures and is conditional on on-site medical and psychological personnd confirming
from direct detainee examination that the enhanced technique(s) is not expected to ·
produce "severe physical or mental pain ot suffering." As a practical matter, the
detainee's physical-condition must be such that these interventions will not have lasting
1 The standard used by the Justice Department for "mental" harm is "prolonged mental
harin," i.e., "mental harm of some lasting duration, e:g., mental harm lasting months or years."
"In the absence of prolonged mental hann, no severe mental pain or suffering would have been
inflicted." Memorandum of August l, 2002, p. 15. ·
. ' "Psychological personnel" cail be either a clinical psychologist or a psychiatrist
Unless the waterboard is being used, the medical officer can be a physician or a PA; use of thewaterboard
requires the presence of a physician. (b)( 1)
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effect, and his psychological state strong enough that no severe psychological harm will
result
The medical implications of the DC! guidelines are discussed below.
General intake evaluation
New detainees are to have a thorough initial medical assessment, with. a complete,
documented history and physical addressing in depth any chronic or previous medical
problems. This should especially attend to cardio-yascu).ar, pulmonary, neurological and
musculo-skeletal findings. (See the section on sha.Ckling and waterboard for mere
specifics.) Vital sigus_ and weight should be recorded, and blood work drawn (''tiger" top
· [serum separating] and· lavender top tubes) for CBC, Hepatitis B and C, :mv and Chem
. panel (to include albumin and liver function tests).
DocUmented subsequent medical rechecks should be performed on a regular basis,
.the frequency being within the judgment of the medical representative and the Chief of
. Site. The recheck can be more focused on relevant factors. The content of the
documentation should be similar to what would ordinarily be recorded in a medical chart.
Although brief, the data should reflect what was checked and include neg•;)v(,.)f;Nrl;S.,. A
All assessments should be reported through approve~ ( 3 at rc ct
communications channels applicable to the site in which the detainee is nefd, and suliject
to review/release by the Chief of the site. This should include ani I A
copy of the medical fmdings should also be included in an electronic file maintained
locally on each detainee, which incorporates all medical evaluations on that ili.dividual .
. fbis file. must be available to successive medical practitioners at site.
. Medical treatment
It is important that adequate medical care be provided to detainees, even those ·
. . undergoing enhanced interrogation. Those requiring chro:iJic medications should receive
them, acute medical problems should be treated, and adequate fluids imd nutrition
provided. These medical interventions, however, should not undermine the anxiety and
dislocation that the various interroga~on techniques are designed to foster. Medical
asseSS!Jlents during periOds of enhanced interrogation, while encompassing all that is
medically necessary, should not appear overly attentive.· Follow-up evaluations during
. this period may be performed in the guise of a guard or through remote video. · All
interventions, assessments and evaluations should be coordinated with the Chief of Site
and interrogation team members to insure ·they are performed in such a way as to
rriinimize undermining interrogation aims to obtain critical intelligence.
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Medicatioil.s and nutritional supplements may be hidden in the basic food provided
(e.g. as a liquid 6r thoroughly crushed tablet). If during the initial phase of interrogation
detainees are deprived of all measurements of time (e.g., through continuous light and
variable schedules), a time-rigid admini~tration of medication (or nutrition) should be
avoided. There generally is ample latitude to allow varying treatment intervals.
The basic diet during the period of enhanced interrogation rieed not be palatilble,
but should include adequate fluids and nutrition. Actual consumption should b'e
'monitored and .recorded. Liquid Ensure (or equivalent) is a good way to assure that there
is adequate nutrition. Brief periods during which food is withheld (24-48 hours) .as an
· .adjunct to interrogation are acceptable. Individuals re:fusing adequate liquids during this
stage should have fluids administered at the earliest signs of dehydration. For :reasons of
staff safety, the rectal tube is an acceptabl!l method of delivery. If there is any question
about adequacy of fluid intake, urinary output also should be monitored and recorded.
· · Uncomfortably cool enviroiunents
Detainees can safely be placed in uncomfortably cool environments for varying
lengths of time, ranging from hours to days. The length of time will depend on multiple
factors, including age, health; extent of clothing, and freedom of movement Individual
tolerance 'and safety have to be assessed on a case by case basis, and continuously
reevaluated over time: The following guidelines and reference points are intended to
assist the medical staff in advising on acceptable lower ambient temperatures in certain
oper.ational settings. The comments assume the subject is a young, healthy, dry, lightly
cloth~d individual sheltered from wind, i.e., that they are a typical detainee.
Core body temperature falls after more than 2 hours at an ambient temperature of
l0°C/50°F. At this ·temperatUre increased metabolic rate c!llinot compensate for heat
loss. The WHO recommended minimum .indoor temperature is l8°C/64°F. The
"thermoneutral zone" where minimal compensatory activity is required to maintain core
temperature is 20°C/68°F to 30°CIB6°F. Wl\hin the. thermoneutral zone, 26°cn8°F is
·considered optimally comfortable for lightly clothed individuals and 30"C/86°F for naked
individuals. Currently, D/CIC policy stipulates 24-26°C as the detention cell and
· interrogation room temperatures, permitting variations due to season. This has proven
· more achievable in some Sites than others. · · ·
If there is any possibility that ambient temperatures are below the thermoneutral
range, they should be monitored and the actual temp!lratures documented. Occasionally,
as part of the interrogation process they are housed in ·spaces with ainbient temperatures
of between l3°C/SSop and 16°C/60°F. Unless the detainee is clothed and standing, or
sitting on a mat, this exposure should not be continued for longer than 2-3 hours.
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At ambient temperatures below i8°C/640f', detainees should be mo;n_tored for the
development of hypothermia. ThiS risk is greatest in those who are naked or nearly so,
who are in substantial direct contact with a surface that conducts heat away from the
body (e.g., the floor), whose :reStraints severely limit muscle work, who have
comparatively little muscle mass, who are fatigued and sleep deprived, and are age 45 or
over.
. . Wet skin or clothing places a detafnee atm~ch greater risk for hypothermia, so-if a
. partial or complete soaking is used in conjunction with the interrogation, or even for
·bathing, the detainee must be dry before being placed in a space with· an ambient
· temperature below _26°cn8°F, ·
Signs of mild hypothermia (body temp 90..98°F) include shivering, lack of
coordination (fumbling hands, stumbling), slurred speech, memory .loss, and pale and
cold skin. Detainees exhibiting any of these signs should be allowed some combination
of increased cloihing, floor mat, more freedom of movement, and increased ambient
temperature.
-Moderate hypothermia (body temperature of 86-90°F) is present when shivering
stops, there is an inability to walk or stand, and/or the subject is confused/irrational. An
aggressive medical intervention is warranted in these cases. -
White noise or loud music
. As. a practical guide, there is no permanent hearing risk for continuous, 24-hoursa-
day exposures to sound at 82 dB or lower; at 84 dB for up to 18 hours a day; 90 dB ror
lip to 8 hours, 95 dB for 4 hours, and 100 dB for 2 hours. If necessary, instruments can
be pn;>vided to measure these ambient sound levels. In general, sound in the dB 80..99
range is experienced as loud; above 100 dB as uncomfortably loud. Common reference
points include garbage disposer (80 dB), cockpit of propeller aircraft (88 dB), shouted
t:onversation (90 dB), motorcycles at 25 feet (90 dB), inside of subway car at 35 mph (95
dB), power mower (96 dB); chain saw (110 ~).and live rock band (114 dB). Far
purposes of interrogation, D/CfC has set a policy that no white noise and no loud noise
used in the interrogation process should exceed 79 DB.
Shackling
. Shackling in non-stressful positions requires only monitoring for the development
of pressure sores with appropriate treatment and adjustment of the shackles as required.
Should shackle-related lesions develop, early intervention is important to avoid the
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development of an interrogation-limiting cellulitis. Clemling the lesion, and a slight
lposening of the shackles may be all that is required. '
If the detainee is to be shackled standing with handS at or above the head (as part
of a sleep deprivation protocol), the medical assessment should include a· pre-check for
anatomic factors that might influence how long the arms could be elevated. This would
inciude shoulder range of motion, pulses in neutral and elevated positions, a check for ·
. bruits, and assessment of the basic sensorimotor status of the upper extremities.
Assuming no medical contraindication5 are found, extended periods (up. to ;2
.· P,ours)' in a standing position can be approved if the handS are no higher than.head level
and weight is bome fully by the lower extremities. Detainees who have one foot or leg
cas.ted or who lost part. of a lower extremity to amputation should be .monitored qrefully
for the development of excessive edema in the weight-supporting leg. If edema
approaches knee level,. these individuals should be shifted to a foot-elevated,.seated or
reclining sleep-deprivation position. In the presence of a suspeeted lower limb cellulitis,
the detainee should be shlfted to a seated leg-elevated position, and antibiotics begun.
Absent other contraindications, sleep deprivation can be continued in both ·these
circumstances ..
NOTE: An occasional detainee placed in a standing stress position has developed lower
limb tenderness and erythema, in addition to an ascending edema, which initially have
not been easily distinguished from a progressive cellulitis or venous thrombosis. These
typically have been associated with pre-existing abrasions or ulcerations from shackling
at the time of initial rendition. In order to best inform future medical judgments and
recommendations, the presence of these lesions should be accurately described before the
standing stress position ~. ~mployed. In all cases approximately daily observations
should be recorded which document the length of time the detainee haS been in the stress
position, and level of any developing edema or erythema..
More stressful shackled positions may also be approved for shorter intervals, e.g.
during an interrogation session or between sessions. The arms can be elevated above the
head (elbows not locked) for roughly two hours without great concern. Reasonable
judgment should be used as to the angle of elevation of the arms.
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Perlods in this ilrms-elevated shackle position lasting between two and four hours
would merit caution, and subject should be monitored for excessive distress. The· .
detainee should never. be required to bear weight on the upper extremities, and the
utilization of thiS technique should not exceed approximately 4 hours in a 24 hour period.
If through fatigue or otherwise the detainee becomes truly incapable of supporting
himself on his feet (e.g., after 36, 48 hours, etc.}, and the detainee's weight is shifted to
the shackles, the use of overhead shackles should be discontinued.
Sleep depriyation
Sleep 'deprivation (with or without associated stress positions) is among the most
. . . effective adjuncts to interrogation, and is the only technique with a demonstrably
cumulative effect-the longer the deprivation (to a point), the more effective the i.lX)pact. ·
The standard approval for sleep deprivation, per se (without regard to shackling position)
"is 72 hours. Extension of sleep deprivation beyond 72 continuous hours is considered an
enhaitced measure, which requires D/CfC pnor approval •. The amoillit of sleep required ·
between deprivation periods depends on the intended purpose of the sJeep deprivation. If
it is intended to be one element in the process of demonstrating helplessness in an
unpleasant environment, a short nap of two or so hours would be sufficient. Perceptual
distortion effects are not uncommon after 96 hours of sleep deprivation, but frank
psychosis is very rare. Cognitive effects, of course, !!!e common. If it is desired that the
subject be reasonably attentive, and clear-thinking during the interrogation, at least a 6
hour recovery should be allowed. Current D/CfC policy requires 4 hours sleep once the
72 hour limit has b~n met during standard interrogation measures.
NOTE: Examinations perfonned during periods of sleep deprivation should inclUde the·
current number of hours withiJut sleep; and, if only a brief rest preceded this period, the
specifics of the previous deprivation also should be recorded.
Cramped confinement (Confinement boxes)
. Detainees can be placed iri awkward boxes, specifically constructed for this
· p'urpose. These can be rectangular and just over the detainee • s height, not much wider
· than his body, and comparatively shallow·, or they can be small cubes allowing little inore
than a cross-legged sitting position. These have not proved particularly effective, as they .
may become a safehaven offering a respite from interrogation. Assuming no significant
medical conditions (e.g., cardiovascular, musculoskeletal) are present, confinement in· the
small box is allowable up to 2 hours. Confinement in the large box is limited to 8
consecutive hours, up to a total of 18 hoUrs a day.
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Waterboard
. This is by far the most traumatic of the enhanced interrogation techniques. The .
historical context here was limited knowledge of the use of the waterboard IIi SERE
training (several hundred trainees experience it every year or two). In the SERE modlil
the subject is immobilized on his back, and his forehead and eyes covered with a cloth.
A stream of water is directed at the upper lip. Resistant subjects then have.the cloth·
lowered to cover the nose and mouth, as the water continues to be .applied, fully
saturating the cloth, and precluding the passage ofair. Relatively little water enters the
mouth. The occlusion (which may be partial) laSts no more than 20 seconds. On removal
of the cloth, the subject is immediately able to breathe, but continues to have water
directed at the upper lip to prolong the effect. This process can continue for sevenil
minutes, and involve up to IS canteen cups. of water. Ostensibly the primary desired
effect derives from the sense of suffocation resulting from the wet cloth temporarily
occluding the nose and mouth, and psychological impact of the continued application of
· water afteJ; the cloth is removed. SERE trainees usually have only a single exposure to
. this technique, and never more than two; SERE trainers consider it their most effective
technique, .and deem it virtually irresistible in the training setting.
Our very limited experience with the waterboard is different The subjects were
positioned on the back but in a slightly head down (Trendelenburg) position (to protect
somewhat against aspiration). A good air seal seemingly was not easily achieved by the ·
wet cloth, and the occlusion was further compromised by the subject attempting to drink
the applied water. The result was that copious amounts of water sometimes were used-.up
to several liters of water (bottled if local water is unsafe, and with 1 tsp saltlliter if
significant swallowing takes place). The resulting occlusion was primarily from water
filling the nasopharynx; breathholdiug, and much less frequently the oropharynx being
filled-rather than the "sealing" effect of the saturated cloth. D/CTC policy set, an
occlusion limit of 40 seconds, though this was very rarely reached. Additionally, the
procedure was repeated sequentially several times, for several sessions a day, and this
process extended with varying degrees of frequency/intensity for over a week.
While SERE trainers believe that trainees are unable to maintain psychological. '
resistance to the waterboard, our exrrerlence was otherwise. Subjects unquestionably can
withstand a large number of applications; with no seeming cumulative iril.pact beyond
their strong aversion to the. experience. Whether the waterboard offers a more effective
· alternative to sleep deprivation and/or stress positions, or is an effective supplement to
these techniques is not yet known.
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' The SERE training program has aPJ?lied the waterboard technique (single . : ·
exposure) to trainees for years, and reportedly there have been thousands of applications
without significant or lasting medical complications. The procedure no11etheless carries
some risks, particularly when repeated a large number of times or when applied to an
indiVidual less :tit than a typical SERE trainee.. Several medical diniensions need to be
monitored to ensure the safety of the subject
Before employmg this technique .there needs to. be reasonable. assurance that the
subject does not ~ve serious heart or lung disease, particularly any obstructive airway
· · disease or respiratory compromise from morbid obesity. He also must have stable
·anterior dentition, no recent facial or jaw injuries, anci an intact gag reflex. Since
vomiting may be associated with these sessions, diet should be liquid during the phase of
·interrogation when use of the water board is likely, and the subject should be NPO (other
than water) for at least 4 hours before any session. The most obvious serious .
complication would be a respiratory arrest associated with laryngospasm, so the mew cal
team must be prepared to respond immediately tO this crisis; preferably the physician will
be in the treatment room. Warning sigus of this or other impending respiratory
complications include hoarseness, persisting cough, wheezing, stridor, or difficulty
clearing the airway. If'these develop, use of the water board should be discontinued for at
least 24 hours. If they recur with later applications of the water board, its use should be
stopped. Mock applications need not be limited. In all cases in which there has been a
suggestion of aspiration, the subject should be observed for signs of a subsequently
developing pneumonia.
In our limited experience, extensive sustained use of the waterboard can introduce
new risks. Most seriously, for reasons of physical fatigue or psychological resignation,
the subject may sin).ply give up, allowing excessiv:e filling of the airways and loss of
consciousness. ·An unresponsive subject should be righted immediately, and the
interrogator should deliver a sub-xyphoid thrust to expel the water. If this fails to restore
normal breathing, aggressive medical intervention is required. Any subject who has
reached this degree of compromise is not considered an appropriate candidate for the
waterboard, and the physician on the scene can not approve further use of.the waterboard
without specific C/OMS consultation and approval.
A rigid guide to medic.ally approved use of the waterboard in essentially healthy
individuals iS not possible, as safety will depend on how the water is applied and.the
specific response each time iris used. The following general guidelines are based on
very limited knowledge, drawn from very few subjects whose experience and response
· was quite varied. These represent only the medical guidelines; legal guidelines also are
· operative and may be more restrictive.
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. A series (within a "session") of several rellitively rapid waterboard applications is
medically acceptable in all healthy subjects, so long as there is no indication of soni.e
emerging vulnerability (such aS hoarseness, wheezing, persisting cough or difficulty
clearing the airways). Several such sessions per 24 hours have been employed without
apparent medical complication. The exact number of sessions cannot-be prescribed, and
will depend on the response to each. If more than 3 sessions of S or more applications
are envisioned within a·24 hours period, a carefl!l medical reassessment must be made .
before each later session. .
By days 3-5 of an aggressive program, cumulative effects become a potential
concern. Without any hard data to quantify either this risk or the advantages. of this
·technique, we believe that beyond this point continued intense waterboard applications ·
may not be medically appropriate. Continued aggressive use of the waterboard beyond ·
this point should be reviewed by the l;!VT team in consultation with Headquarters prior to
any further aggressive use. (Absent medical contraindications, sporadic. use probably
carries little risk.) Beyond the increased medical concern (for both acute and long term ·
effects, including PTSD), there possibly would be desensitization to the technique. Sieep
deprivation is a medically less risky option, and sleep deprivation (and stress positions)
i!lso can be used to prolong the period 9f moderate use of the waterboard, by reducing the
intensity of its early use through the interposition of these other techniques.
NOTE: In order to best inform fUture medical judgments and recommendations, it is
important that fNery application of the waterboard be thoroughly documented: how long
each application (and the entire procedure) lasted, how much water was used in the
process (realizing that much splashes off), how exactly the water was applied, if a seal
was achifNed. if the naso- or oropharynx was .filled, what sort of volume was expelled,
how long was the brei:lk between applications, and how the subject looked between each
treatment.
POST-INTERROGATION DETENTION
[this section is still Ullder construction]·
OMS' responsibility for the medical and psychological well-being of detainees
does not end when detainees emerge from the interrogation phase. Documented periodic
medical and psychological re-evaluations are necessary durfug the debriefing ph.a,se
which follows interrogation, iis well as during subsequent periods of custodial detention .
Absent any specific complaint, these can pe at approximately monthly intervals. Acute
problems must be addressed at the time of presentation. As during the interrogation
phase, all asi
which the detainee is held, and subject to review/release by the Chief of that site.
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Detainee weights should be recorded op. at least. a monthly basis, and assessed for
. indications of inadequate nutrition. As a: rule. of thump, "ideal" .weight for height should
· be about 106 poimds for an individualS feet tall, and six pounds heavier for each .
additional inch of height. TerrOrists incarcerated in the Federal prison system whose
' weights fall below this level axe given nutritional supplements. Those falling ~0 90% of .
these levels who are unwilling to take nutrition orally (through hunger strikes) have ' '
forced feedings through a riaso-gastric tube. While to date this has not been an issue With
detainees, should significant weight loss develop it must be' carefully assessed. It is
· possible that a detainee will simPly be of s)ight build, but true weight loss in an already
. slight individual-especially in association with deliberately reduced intake-may require
some intervention. ·
Additionally, if there are sustained periods without exposure to sunlight, the diet
will need to be further supplemented with ca}cium and vitamin D. Simply increasing the
use of multi-vitamins will give too much of one substance but not enough of another.
The OMS recommendation for this situation is two 500 mg tables of plain calcium a day
(such as two Os-Cal500 mg tabs) with one capsule of the prescription Rocaltrol; or
alternatively two Centrum Silver tablets (slightly less than the recommendation for
vitiunin D) with an additiona1500 mg of a plain calcium table.
As the period of interrogation or intense debriefing passes, detainees may be left
alone for increasing periods of time before being transferred elsewhere. Personal hygiene
. issues likely will emerge dui'ing this time, with the possible development of signific:ant
medical problems. It is particularly important that cells be kept clean during this period
and that there be some provision for regular bathing, and dental hygiene, and that ·
. detainees be monitored to insure they are involved in self-care. ·
Psych~logical problems are more likely to emerge in those no longer in active
de briefings, especially those in prolonged, total isolation.· The loss of involvement with
the debriefmg staff should be replaced with other forms of interaction-through daily
encounters with more than one custodial staff member, and the provision of reading
materia:Is (preferably in Arabic) and other forms of mental stimulation .
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