CIA OIG Emails re: OIG's investigation of CIA interrogations

<p>Emails that appear to be primarily between staff of the CIA's Office of the Inspector General, relating to the OIG's investigation of the CIA's interrogation program. The emails primarily concern the arrangment of interviews relevant to the investigation.</p>

Wednesday, July 31, 2013










02/23/04 11:59 AM 

cc: Subject: 

legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April 

Thanks again for briefing the new S —land Slast week. We received positive

feedback from them - they clearly felt that the briefings were relevant and interesting. 

We are now preparing the schedule for the next round of on 7 April. I have already reserved theSroom for that day. We would like to start with they 

-liegel brief at 1300followed by Sfrom 1400 to 1500. How does your schedule look for that day? 




.CO 6070215 



OIG Investigations Staff To:

02108/04 08:18 AM 

cc: Subject: 

1 BecauseSdid not receive the last twol inessages jb_ased on the error/failure notices). I

left him a voicernail message on L Sto advise him that and I are going to 


at the invitation of CID to do a joint interview. I left him your name and number in the event he wantsfurther information. 


CO 6070227 



3 February 2004 

cc: Subject: 1FW: Case Number 






> From: 


> Sent: 


Tuesday, February 03, 2004 3:14:23 PM 


> To: 






>CC:  , 1 

> Subject: RE: Case Numberl 

> Auto forwarded by a  






I realize that in your note below you mention you have not had a 

chance to write up your conversation with  at any


J however, did  

time provide you or anyone else with a statement or any other written

documentation? If so, can you send it to us ASAP? The version we are 


hearin from I  what 


does not support told you aboutL land the] Ipersonnel. is here at our request for


the moment, but 1 am not certain how long he will remain in our area before 

he goes back out overseas or returns to his home state. 




Original Message 


Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 7:17 AM 

To:J j 


Subject: Re: Case Numberl 













5 February 2004 


SubjectSOW: RE: Case Number 




> Sent: Thursday, February 05, 2004 7:22:03 AM 


> To 



Subject: FW: RE: Case_Numberl 

Auto forwarded by a 





> Sent: Thursday, February 05._21MA__7122:03 AM 

> To: 

> Cc: 


'>! Subject: RE: RE: Case Number 

> Auto forwarded by a 


] _] 


We would like to take you up on your offer 


to obtain a written statement 


from 1ASAP. Could you send it to us on my 


account and also


to [ j in the .event we are at



when you send it? We

ewed 1_ jand he denied witnessing or being a party to 






Could you please send us copies of the statements rendered by 1

So far we have statements rendered by 


and text


from ] but not his actual statement. Did 


render a statement? 


Tf so, we would like to get a copy of his statement as well. 

When are 


scheduled to return 


We are in contact withi 


and plan travel to[


on Monday, 9 February 2004, to interview Any chance r S 

have returned to 




Original Message 



Sent: hursday, February 05,' 2004 2:57 AM 



Subject: Rd RE: Case Number 

Importance: High 


I took a verbal statement from him. I will attach a copy of the 

report. It will. tell you what the other guys. from! shad to say

also. If you need a written statement let me know, and I will get it





Date: Tuesday, February 3, 2004 11:14 pm

Subject: RE: Case Number) 


CO 6070321 


OIG Investigations Staff 

To:03/22/04 10:57 AM 

cc: Subject: Call fromL Army CID POC 

called this morning. His main telephone number in S is 


*aid that he will try to get a cellular telephone and provide that telephone number to us because it will be easier for us to reach him on his cell. 

Ssaid he has been incommunicado because he was stuck in a tent in the desert. He returned to the iUS on 16 March 2004 and is just now trying to get back up to speed. He has read our: S messages, but said it is a lot to digest -- he will reread them and work through all of our questions. He will look into locating themeS-lpeople we want to interview, however, he said they are likely on 30 days of home leave. 

J is willing to return toL_Sfor the interviews that OIG plans to conduct. He said he should 4e through with his home leave by 12 April 2004. I told:Swe would prefer to work with him in: S given his experience and involvement in this case; however, that is a decision for his management. He said he would talk to his management. 

I toldLSthat we have tried to locate) but to date have been unsuccessful. said 7appears to be based out of S-- he is going to pursue that lead further. 

I mentioned to SI that our[ -System is not working as well as we would like, but that we would check another terminal daily to ensure we are getting his messages. His r---laddress at 

is the same as the one he used in  

Follow-up telephone call from:SAfter his initial call  called back and asked about our travel to  

I did not get specific over the unsecure telepho  , but sent him aS:message with  

more info. He said his management supports his travel te  





• ..- " -

OIG Investigations Staff 

To:03/22/04 11:29 AM 

cc: S Subject: L Search 

your convenience, could you please run the name S land let me know what his status/clearances are? He may be a current FBI body with access to CIA facilities. Thank you, 

•k X1 




To:03/22/04 02:03 PM cc . S

 Subject:  Request Submission  

The request submittec  has been successfully submitted. For more  

information, please for ow this link -›  


If the doclink provided above does not work properly, use the following link to access the database ->' 






Requester Directorate Office  DCI 01G  Phone Date  03/22/2604  















OIG Investigations Start To:

03/29/04 11:53 AM 

cc: Subject: - clearances and status of Ft. Campbell personnel 

called with the following today: 

His cell isS1 He is going on leave tomorrow (Tuesday, 3/30), but we can call him anytime. 

He will need our flight information if things work out for him to travel commercially with us. 

Ssaid his management would like a CIA r lrequest justifying with us so that he can fly 

commercial. He said this is best for a number of reasons, including the fact that if he travels on a military 

flight through Germany he may get bumped and is likely to wait days for a flight 

The should be addressed to 


I toldwe would need his clearances, including SCI accesses he miaht have. nassed to r.14 

11 calledSnumber and Sanswered. He said the request to pass any SCI accesses begins with-hirriT—H-e will get back to me to let me know if Seven has SCI. If he does, I asked---10 have the military fax the following to CIA: Name, SSN, Clearances including SCI, POC name and number (me), and dates of visit, which he said is normally one year.) 

S,said that the military personnel that returned to Ft Campbell are going on leave for a month as of 19 

April. He said they return 11 June (he probably meant 11 May, but I did not catch the discre anc at the 

time). I told him we would work through him after we return fromS said that 

Jis the Battalion Adjatant (phonetic) and POC--nevertheless, I said we work through LSj since he would likely travel to Campbell with us. 







OIG investigations Staff 


03/30/04 10:16 AM 

cc Subject Re: Changes to Flight Arrangemen sin 

I called this morning and here's the scoop: 

I gave him our current flight itinerary (as documented in your note below). 


I asked Ito reserve his flights, but hold off on paying for them until we have a green light on our end that he can fly in/out with us. 


I told hint_ _had called and 1 i had said he would make sure lean fly commercial by working through the bureaucracy on hiiand. 


I asked if he planned to fly with a weapon. He said they normally do and they simply get 

country approvals. He said, however, that he does not have to fly with a weapon. I suggested he 

should look into getting a weapon from his folks at our destination. I told him that carrying a weapon 

on commercial flights would raise our profile, and that I could not guarantee that he could get 

transportation on the aircraft'on the last leg of our trip. 



[ lasked that, if possible, we could have our folks make his hotel reservations in and at our destination. Worst case, we need to give him the name of the hotel in ]so he can make his own reservations. He does not want to stay across town if he can stay at the same hotel. He also said that, worst case, he can find somewhere to bunk at if our folks won't accommodate him. 



said this case is very high profile for his organization and he thinks that can help in terms of 



transportation ati He said he believes there are three suburbans at which we can use in (not outside). 

He asked about body armor. I told him our folks would likely give us (Agency officers) body armor. Guess we will cross that bridge when we get there. 


He asked if we would be staying/restricted inside and I told him we did not yet know the answer to that question. 



will fly from 



on 12A ril. He will see if he can work it out to meet with us at our 

S that day. If not, we will hook up a n plenty of time before the flight to discuss 

anything that needs to get discussed before we board the plane. 


• L. asked if his clearances were going to be an issue. I said I had spoken to someone at 

who planned to fax his clearances to our organization at the Secret Level, minimum. I asked[ Jto do whatever he can to expedite that as we had not yet received that fax. 

Original Text of 






Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General To:

03/30/04 09:37 AM 

cc: S Subject: Changes to Flight Arrangements 


I'd like to let you know about some changes in some of our flight arrangements, in case you want to change yours as well. 

! booked';[ on a different flight than mine departing j, so she had a 2 hours 40 minuteslayover in 

]instead of a seven hour layover. That seemed more reasonable, so I changed my 

0610 vice 0805. iThe flight number also chap ed. As a result of arriving earlier in 

flight reservation from  to match hers.  

The riflight from  remains unchanged.  

For some reason,  ichanged the flight from]  on 19 April, and it departs at  


we were able 

to get an earlierI I flight departing 

All of this means that we are traveling as follows: 

flight departs date time arrives date time 





, 6070337 



OIG Investigations Staff . 

To:03/30/04 10:28 AM 

cc: S Subject: LSjclearances -- status per Army 


I just spoke to, 

Sj explained to him whiat_l_ S1 hadtold me about Sclearances (see note below). Ssaid thatSlismistaken and thatS

should have TS. He will talk to Sdirectly and see if they can get this mattercleared up. I asked him to impress upon L the need to fax[ Sclearances over today, ifpossible, so that we can get a cable out to the field ASAP. 

Forwarded by n 03/30/04 10:26 AM -----

OfG Investigations Staff 

To: I03/29/04 11:56 AM 

cc: S Subject: clearances -- status per Army 

I spoke to 

saidL Shad TS granted in 1998, which was good for five years. His clearances lapsed in 2003. He is cleared only to the Secret level and he has no SCI clearances. I asked S

ito pass that information official to OS via fax



 I also told him what information he needs to include (Name, SSN, dates of visit, clearances, my info as POC, etc.) He said he would likely get that done today. 








03/31/04 09:35 AM 



Subject; )9equest Submission 

The request submitted for 

has been successfully submitted. For more

information, please follow tWink -> 

If the doclink provided above does not work properly, use the following link to access the database 



CO 6070344 






Directorate DCI 

Date 03/30/2004

Office DCl/IG 








-._•  '' '


:1-: , • I. ,-




'"hoge 74­

Accompanying CIA/OIG to  

for consultations/interviews. Please reference they  sent autwithL 

 and ]clearances 

.71" F 



Comrfiknti Special Agent  Jand Agency Staff employer 

 are working/supporting . CIA/01G. Please send a Visit Certification   containing clearances for


' these two travelers 


inamed in this request. Please info OIG on the cable. Thank you. 


. 6070344 

CO 6070351 



Investigations Staff/OIG 


04/02/04 12:04 PM 

Subject. Re: CID documents re death of generalB 

Thank you. Should we come get them? 

Original Text or-


• L S 

To cc 

04/02/04 10:18 AM 

Subject Re: CID documents re death of general 

received the documents this morning. They will be hand-delivered to , you today. 

Original Text of 

Investigations StaffIOIG 


03/29/04 03:16 PM 


Subject: Re: CID documents re death of general 

Thank you. 

Original Text of 



03/29/04 02:58 PM 



Subject CID documents re death of general 

!located what may/may be the documents CID provided to S

several monthsLa_go reTating to the death of the fomer Iraqi general last November. Swill send copies back to Hqs,

then forward them to the 01G. 



CO 6070358 




0 IG Investigations Staff  

04/05/04 02:08 PM  To: cc:  S  

Subject: Cancellation of Flights  


and I have flights reserved for travel to Son 12 April (next Monday)

and return flights fromSon 19 April. Our trip has been postponed. Would you please cancel our reservations. Thank you very much, 







04/07/04 08:07 AM 

cc: Subject: legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April} 

Good morning, 

I just confirmed that the 

!Conference room is reserved for your presentations this afternoon. This morning, I will test the overhead computer projector to make sure it is functioning for your powerpoint. 

Original Text off 



02/24/04 12:43 PM 

cc: Subject: Re: legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April 

Works for me. thanks for being so accommodating. 

Original Text of — 

02/24/04 12:05 PM 

New/improved proposed schedule: 

J1200-1. 300. break for lunch 1300-1400 : 1400-1500 Is this convenient for both of you? 

Original Text of 


cc: Subject: legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April 



CO 6070361 




• To

02/24/04 08:11 AM 

cc Subject Re: IC class #14 : legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April 

hmm. Wednesday afternoons are REALLY bad for me--I skipped an r-!last week to be there at 

1300. Any chance I 

can present at noon, then take the lunch break at 1300? then I could sqush it in. If not possible,Sjust send a ologies again to the Original Text of 



02/23/04 03:05 PM  To: cc: S  

Subject: Re: IC class #14  legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 Apra  


I have put it on my calendar. Would you rather go first or second? 

Original Text of 


02/23/04 11:59 AM 

cc: Subject: IC class #14 : legal briefings schedule for Wed. 7 April 

Thanks again for briefinc last week. We received positive feedback from them - they clearly felt that the briefings were relevant and interesting. 

We are now preparing the schedule for the next round of on 7 April. I have already reserved the conf. room for that day. We would like to start with the' legal brief at 1300 followed by (from 1.400 to 1500. How does your, schedule loOk for that day? 






CO 6070389 

flight that lands around 1730 hours. 


I requested a non-smoking room for you at Government rate ($55/night). They 


did not ask which government agency we are affiliated w h so I did not 


provide that information. Safe travels and see you in 




CONF ID I • 0421 



7 04/21/04 06:35 AM 


Subject: OIG Interviews 

By now I am sure that!Shas briefed you on discussions held with concerning our need to interviewL prior to, departure from CONUS on or about 7 May. Given rS'concerns, the suggestion was made to OIG that it might be prudent fort -S1 

be move to the DC area for interviews, with taking the lead on arrangements. Do we need to meet to further discuss specifics/arrangements/timing? Please advise and thanks for your assistance, 

CONFIDE 90421 



SEC '4 • 1 A.4 



---------- 04/26/04 06:20 AM 

cc: S Subject: Re: Request for Official Personnel Files 

Super...thanks. S 

Original Text oil 

Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General 

To:04/23/04 04:18 PM 

cc: Subject: Re: Request for Official Personnel File 

as of COB on 23 April, the OPF fort had not arrived yet, but you might find it on my chairnext week, assuming thatSreceives it from HR did not find any show-stoppers in his security filethis morning. 

Forwarded byrS 

ion 04/23/04 04:15 PM -----



To: [I

04/21/04 08:06 AM 

cc: Subject: Re: Request for Official Personnel Filen 

File has been ordered. 

Original Text of r 

Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General 

To: 1

04/20/04 02:28 PM 

cc: Subject: Request for Official Personnel File 

Son an urgent basis, please obtain for me the Official Personnel File of the following CIA 





Name: SSN: AIN: EOD: 

I would like to review this file as part of our preparations for interviews related to INV case [ 

Many thanks, 





OIG Investigations Staff To:

04/05/04 12:17 PM 


Subject: Hotel Reservatioins 


Confirmation number: 

__Confirmation number: S 


We are confirmed to stay at the Sfrom 12 April through at least 16 

April. We have to check in before 6 pm on the 12th of April or. else guarantee our arrival with a credit card to hold our rooms. These are standard rooms vice "suites." I took from the reservationist that the rooms have no refrigerators, but are non-smoking. 


CO 6070446 




OIG Investigations Staff  

05/04/04 08:28 AM  To: cc:  

Subject:  interpreter  


I left L Sa message asking him to try and set up an interview withL jor Tueday afternoon, May 


If we are able to get; __Ion the calendar for an interview we would likely fly out Monday night or Tuesday 

morning and catch a flight back to VA on Wednesday morning. 



00 6070447 


01 a 1" 

(b)(1) (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(d) 

OIG Investigations Staff 

To:05/04/04 09:01 AM 

cc: Subject: 

I just got off the phone withSJ. He returns from his leave on Monday night (5/10) so he is good to travel Tuesday/Wednesday to interview L assuming! is available. He'll work the Sissue

ssue today, 

including trying to get a hold of ! S(to get!'Inumber andSI also passed along the Sinformation Sj brought back fromlSafterStold me he had had no luck reaching Sthrough his contact. 

I toldS1 you, [ 1 had sent a message to the field exploring the possibility of going to Sthe week of the 17th of May. That works for him; he will not take any action pending a response from the field. 

CONF I 0 ..0 4 

CO 6070449 



OIG Investigations Staff 


05/04/04 11:17 AM 


cc: S Subject:1 

called and said he spoke to someone atSwho is in the US and they told him they needfull name orSIto find him.S7_palledS-land left a message askin hirn to check his records; no fuck with L ! His next step is to call the woman who works forSj Staytuned.... 




CO 6070450 



To: Scott W. Muiler/STF/AGENCY@DC1

05/04/04 01:09 PM 



Subject: FYI -- Human Rights Watch Letter to Dr. Rice, May 3, 2004 




United States: End Abuse of 

Detainees in U.S. Custody 


Human Rights Watch Letter to National 

Security Advisor 


(Washington D.C., May 3, 2004) -- Human Rights Watch sent a letter today to 


U.S. National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, urging the United States to 

take nine specific steps to address the systemic problem of detainee abuse by 

the U.S. military and intelligence personnel operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, 

and other locations around the world. See letter below. 


May 3, 2004 


Dr. Condoleezza Rice 

Asst. to the President for National Security Affairs 

The White House 

Washington, DC 20504 


Dear Dr. Rice: 


It is becoming clear that the ill treatment and torture of prisoners by the 


U.S. military in Iraq were not limited to isolated incidents, but reflected, 

in the words of the U.S. army's own inquiry, "systemic and illegal abuse of 

detainees." The brazenness with which the U.S. soldiers involved conducted 

themselves suggests they thought they had nothing to hide from their 

superiors. The reported role of U.S. intelligence officers in encouraging such 

treatment to "soften up" detainees for interrogations, combined with earlier 

reports of similar abuses in Afghanistan, suggests a much wider problem that 

must be addressed. 


The acts described in the investigative report written by Maj. Gen. Antonio 

Taguba, including beatings, repeated sexual abuse and humiliation, and threats 

and simulation of rape and of torture by electric shock, violate the Geneva 

Conventions and could constitute war crimes. They clearly contradict President 

Bush's ,pledge on June 26, 2003 that the United States will neither "torture" 

terrorist suspects, nor use "cruel and unusual" treatment to interrogate them, 








as well as the more detailed policy on interrogations outlined that day by 


Defense Department General Counsel. William Haynes. It should also now be 


beyond doubt, as we have repeatedly argued, that such conduct damages the 


reputation of the United States and its ability to advance the rule of law 


around the world. 


We welcome reports that the Defense Department is now examining the 


interrogation practices of military intelligence officers at all U.S.-run 

prisons in Iraq, not just Abu Ghraib. But this does not go nearly far enough 

to reverse the extraordinary harm these abuses have caused. We strongly urge 

the administration to take the following steps: 



Launch an investigation into interrogation, practices wherever detainees are 

held around the world, whether the facilities are run by the U.S. military or 

the Central Intelligence Agency - and make the results public. The reports 

from Iraq suggest a systemic problem involving the intelligence community, not 

just the military police officers on the scene. Any inquiry that focuses 

solely on Iraq and exclusively on the practices of the U.S. military, without 

also encompassing the U.S. intelligence community as a whole, will be woefully 





Prosecute any military or intelligence personnel found to have engaged in 

or encouraged any acts amounting to torture or inhuman treatment. Some of the 

abuses described in Gen. Taguba's report clearly rise to this level. In such 

cases, administrative penalties are not enough to ensure accountability for 

serious mistreatment and to send a clear signal that such abuse will not be 





Ensure that all interrogators working for the. United States, whether 

employees of the military, intelligence agencies, or private contractors, 

understand and abide by specific guidelines consistent with the policy 

outlined by DOD General Counsel Haynes last year, which prohibited 

interrogation methods abroad that would be barred in the United States by the 

5th, 8th, and/or 14th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, as well as the 

Geneva Conventions. Such guidelines should be publicly available. They should 

prohibit some of the techniques of stress now apparently permitted by a 

reported "72-point matrix" used by U.S. interrogators, including extended 

sleep and sensory deprivation and forcing detainees to assume painful 

positions, in addition to the other forms of humiliating and degrading 

treatment that have been reported in Iraq, such as holding detainees nude. 




U.S. Army field manuals do contain prohibitions against cruel and inhuman 

treatment in interrogations, but it is unclear if CIA interrogators operate 

under any similar guidelines, or how the more specific policy outlined by DOD 

last year was communicated to personnel in the field. It is also unclear 

whether adherence to such policies is the subject of routine, frequent 

monitoring by supervisory officials. Whatever such practices may he, events in 

Iraq make clear that ongoing monitoring of interrogation and detention 

practices is inadequate. 



Grant the International Committee of the Red Cross access to all detainees 

held by the United States in the campaign against terrorism throughout the 

world, whether held in facilities run by the U.S. military or intelligence 

services, or nominally held by other governments at the behest of the United 

States. The United States should not be operating undisclosed detention 

facilities to which no independent monitors have access. 




Make public information about who is detained by occupation forces in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, and why, and enable families of detainees to visit their 

relatives. Even with internal safeguards, incommunicado detention is an 

invitation to abuse. 




UNCLAS S IFIED/ I...F-01r-) 







Videotape all interrogations and other interaction with detainees so 

responsible personnel understand that there will be a record of any abuses. 

These videotapes should be regularly reviewed by supervisory personnel to 

ensure full compliance with interrogation and detention standards in U.S. and 

international law. 




Release the results of the investigation the Defense Department conducted 

into deaths in custody of two detainees held at Bagram Air Base in 

Afghanistan. Reports we've received that criminal prosecutions have been 

foregone in lieu of quiet disciplinary action. 




Pay restitution to detainees found to be victims of torture or inhumane 





Ensure that private contractors working for the United States in military 

or intelligence roles operate under a clear legal regime so that they can be 

held criminally responsible for complicity in illegal acts. 




We hope you will agree that the revelations from Iraq call for dramatic, and 

systematic, changes in the treatment of prisoners held by the United States 

around the world, both to ensure compliance with U.S. legal obligations, and 

to repair the damage these abuses have caused to the credibility of the United 





Kenneth Roth 

Executive Director 


Tom Malinowski 

Washington Advocacy Director 


cc: Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense 

George Tenet, Director, Central Intelligence 


Related Material 


Iraq: U.S. Prisoner Abuse Sparks Concerns Over War Crimes 

Press Release, April 30, 2004 

Prisoner abuse: What about the other secret U.S. prisons? 


Commentary, May 4, 2004 



Copyright 2003, Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor New York, NY 

10118-3299 USA 




. -- ­




CO6070451 bp). (b)(6). 





05/04/04 02:13 PM 


Subject CID Contact Names and Numbers 

Per your request 'Commanding General, U.S. Army Criminal investigations Division

Major General S Command (USACIDC), S Mr.SAssistant Chief of Operations, USACIDC,L CW5 SChief of Current Operations, USACIDC CW5L SChief of Intelligence Division, USACIDC 

is aware that Mr. Helgerson will be going to the SSCI tomorrow afternoon. He is also aware that Mr. Helgerson might be calling him, 






Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General 

To:05/05/04 10:57 AM 

cc: Subject: Phone Conversation with 15 May 2004 

) I just spoke with[ Sand gave him the flight reservations for the!S'trip. He proposed coming up here the week before the trip in order to discuss trip details, the interviewees, and the interviews. He will try to fly to Dulles on Wednesday, 12 May, so that he can visit our office on the 13th and at least part of the 14th. He will fly home on the 14th. 





SECR 24 


04/30/04 04:22 PM 

• cc: 

Subject: Re: OIG Support to Army CIDI2 

The litigation team is and 

Original Text of 



--------- 04/16/04 01:01 PM 


Subject: 01G Support to Army CID 


(g) INV continues to support Army Criminal Investigation Division in investigating the death of Iraqi detainee Abid Hamad Mahawish Al-Mahalawi on 26 November 2003. An Army pathologist has ruled the death a homicide and Army CID's investigation has implicated U.S. military personnel as being_ likely 

res onsible.r 

Anticipating a likely future military legal proceeding that could draw in Agency! information, would you like to assign an attorney who we can bring up to speed on particulars? 


CO 6070858 


OIG investigations Staff 


05/17/04 11:52 AM 

cc: Subject: Request to review a security file 

I would like to review a security file on J if one exists. I understand that this individual may be in process for employment as a staff employee, IC, or as a contact employeel SI do not have his SSN or an AIN. He was born Thank you, 






OIG Investigations Staff To:

05/07/04 07:39 AM 

cc: Subject: 

I submitted a request to get S

into the HOS compound from 5/12-5/14 with a no escort" badge and general parking on the parking deck. Although he is not scheduled to come in until 5/13, I added an extra day just in case. 






Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General 

To: r

05/10/04 08:34 AM 

cc: S Subject: and Case 

(2) FYI, Called this morning to check on the status of arrangements for the imminent TDY related to 

this case. He asked if. any problems had arisen, and I said no. He asked about responses to.our cable 

last week, for example concerning hotel arrangements, and I told him that we had received a response 

affirming that we have hotel rooms. I told him that[ could come into our office as soon as 

Wednesday afternoon, and asked fi . i ,ow much we could give r to read.i—lresponded that we (Iyou, and me) could sit down with 

"investigator to investigator" and discuss his needs and preferences.}toted that 

is cleared and can read throughthe case file, butPiadded that[ 

may not want to be exposed to everything in the file because' I could be called to testify about whathe learned from the file. If jdoes not want to read the entire file, he instead could ask us r---1 youme) questions that we would answer. anticipated being able to meet with us and Thursday

morning (13 May), but he also said i 

could come into the office Wednesday afternoon if you and I wanted to meet with 'sooner than Thursday to discuss how wants to proceed with getting oriented on the case. I also told b hatr 

thinks she can visit us on Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday afternoon to learn more about the case. 







CO 1.i.• ti.401 

DC1/010 I  I  

06/08/04 11:00 AM  To: cc:  

Subject: Re: Request for Training Records  




CO 6078280 


(b)(3) (b)(6)



Status: Sent to VAC VISIT Information 

First Day of Visit in 07/29/2004 MWDD/YY format : 

Last Day of Visit if more 08/06/2004 than one day: 

-S-Parking Needed general Parkingng-P09 



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S139hsoF  on secure Phone` (n  

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Do you want to limit the viewing of this document to you, 

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Obsolete Previous Editions 



CO 6078284 



Investigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General 

To05/11/04 07:55 AM 

cc Subject FYI 9equest Submission 

Forwarded b iDn 05/11/04 07:55 AM 

To05/11/04 07:53 AM 

cc.S Subject Request Submission 

The request submitted for' has been successfully submitted. For more information, please follow this link -> Smm 

If the doclink provided above does not work properly, use the following link to access the database ->0 



of I 5/11/04 11:22 AM 



CO 6078298 




05/11/04 07:02 PM 

CC. Subject: AP: CIA Role in Abuses Not Fully Clarified' at Hearing 

Forwarded byl on 05/11/04 07:02 PM ----


05/11/04 06:51 PM 


Subject: AP: CIA Role in Abuses Not Fully Clarified' at Hearing 

"Senior officials disagree over key questions about Iraqi prisoner 


"Eft: SUBS 7th graf pvs, The Defense ..., to CORRECT to Fox News 

Radio's "Tony Snow Show," sted Fox Newsom 


With BC-Prisoner Abuse-Excerpts, BC-Abuse-Taguba-Scenes 

"AP Photos GB102-103, 107, 112, NY123‹ 


"AP Military Writer= 


WASHINGTON (AP) _ The Army general who investigated prisoner 

abuse in Iraq disagreed sharply Tuesday with a top Pentagon 

civilian about who was in charge of the Abu Ghraib complex where 

the mistreatment occurred. In a daylong hearing jolted by news of 

the beheading of an American in Iraq, the two also differed on the 

key issue of responsibility by higher-ups. 


Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba told the Senate Armed Services 

Committee that military police who acted improperly did so of 

their own volition." Several senators, however, questioned whether 

those low-ranking soldiers would have created the sexually 

humiliating scenarios by themselves. 


Indeed, the committee's chairman, John Warner, R-Va., said it 

was his understanding that some of the photos, such as one showing 

an Iraqi prisoner with women's underwear covering his-head, were to 

be shown to prisoners' families --by way of threat unless he came 

forward with some valuable information." 


The hearing unfolded less than two weeks after photos circulated 

around the world showing Iraqi prisoners forced by their American 

captors to assume sexually humiliating positions. 


It also took place on a day when an Islamic militant Web site 

showed pictures of the apparent beheading of an American civilian 

in Iraq in retaliation for the prison abuse. 


Vice President Dick Cheney questioned whether additional photos 

of prisoner abuse ought to be released to the public, declaring, 

"It's not just a matter of, sort of whetting people's appetites to 

see sensational stuff here." 


The Defense Department is going to make the material accessible 



CO 6078298 



to Congress, "but then there will have to be a decision made what 

and at what point any additional photos are released to the 

public," Cheney told Fox News Radio's "Tony Snow Show." 


Taguba said that when control of the prison was turned over to 

military intelligence officials, they had authority over the 

military police who were guarding prisoners. 


But Stephen Cambone, the Pentagon's undersecretary for 

intelligence, said that was incorrect, that authority for the 

handling of detainees had remained with the MPs. 


That difference underscored the confusion that surrounds the 

abuse controversy as military investigators attempt to determine if 

blame should be assigned to more than the 13 soldiers now 

reprimanded or charged with criminal violations. 


It also highlighted an unresolved question linked to Maj. Gen. 

Geoffrey Miller, who visited Iraqi prisons in early September, 

shortly before the reported abuses took place. The question is what 

Miller meant when he recommended, at the time, that military police 

become actively involved in "setting the conditions" for 

successful prisoner interrogations. 


Some of the seven MPs who have been charged with abusing Iraqi 

prisoners at Abu Ghraib have said they believed they were acting on 

orders from military intelligence personnel who wanted prisoners 

' -softened up" to make them more compliant in interrogations. 


Cambone told the committee that Miller meant the MPs should be 

"collaborating" with the military intelligence soldiers 

responsible for the interrogations. For example, Cambone said, the 

MPs could help by telling the interrogators what the prisoners were 

saying in their cells. 


The idea, he said, was to build teamwork between the 

interrogators and the prison guards. Miller and others made it 

clear, he said, that all prisoners were to be treated humanely. 


But Taguba said involving MPs in "setting the conditions'' for 

interrogations not only violated Army regulations, but also opened 

the door for possible misunderstanding on the part of MPs who are 

trained to keep prisoners safe and secure. 


"Senators ... are in a virtual state of shock about the 

beheading," said Warner, recalling earlier concerns that the 

prisoner abuse could lead to retaliation. 


Maj. Gen. Ronald L. Burgess, chief of intelligence for the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, told Warner "there has been an increase" in 

threats in the days since the publication of photographs. 


Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., asked Taguba whether he agreed with 

the conclusion of the International Committee of the Red Cross that 

coercive practices such as holding prisoners naked for extended 

periods had been used in a systematic way. 


"Yes, sir," Taguba replied. "Based on the evidence that was 

presented to us and what we gathered and what we reviewed, yes; 



He said that investigations, which are not yet complete, have 

identified seven MPs and as many as 17 of their supervisors 

directly or indirectly involved. 


The question of CIA involvement arose but was not fully 



Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, the Army's intelligence chief, 

testified that CIA officers -"visited the facility and talked to 

prisoners" at Abu Ghraib. He added that he knew of "no wrongdoing 

on their behalf." 


In his testimony, Taguba said the decision last November to.take 

tactical control of Abu Ghraib prison away from the 800th Military 

Police Brigade and give it to the 205th Military Intelligence 

Brigade meant the MPs believed they were taking orders from 

military intelligence. 


Cambone, however, said that move did not give military 

intelligence authority over the MPs, nor did it change the rules 

governing the activities of either the MPs or the interrogators. 


Either way, Cambone told the panel that troops in Iraq were 



CO 607 .8298 




under orders to abide by the Geneva Conventions, which dictate 

terms for humane treatment of wartime prisoners. 

An order to soften up a detainee would not be a legal order, 

would it?" asked Sen. Pat Roberts,. R-Kan. 

"No sir," replied Lt. Gen. Lance F. Smith, deputy director of 

the U.S. Central Command. 


Taguba stressed that his investigation produced no evidence that 

an MP was ordered to use inappropriate means in handling detainees. 


"I would say they were probably influenced by others but not 

necessarily directed specifically by others,“' he said. He 

suggested the MPs were in some way led to believe they could use 


more coercive methods, either by military, CIA or civilian 

contractor interrogators. 









Sen. Susan Collins, P-Maine. ''That military intelligence were 


involved or people further up the chain of command in suggesting to 


these guards specific types of abuse that were designed to break 


these prisoners." 


Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander, the top intelligence officer in the 

Army, said her logic was sound, but he added, --The difficult part 

is to find out who told whom what to do." 


A few moments later, Warner interrupted to say that he agreed 

with Collins, particularly that the poses seemed designed offend 



"These youngsters didn't understand the nuances of Muslim 

culture. ... They staged those photographs, which I understand were 

going to be shown to the prisoners' families by way of threats 

unless he came forward with some valuable information," Warner 

said. -• 


Earlier, Taguba testified'that the photographs were taken by the 

personal digital cameras of U.S. personnel: 


Stephen Cambone, undersecretary of defense for intelligence, 

told the panel that personal --photographing, filming and 

videotaping" of prisoners of war was strictly prohibited. 


Sen. Ben Nelson, D-Neb., challenged Taguba on his statement that 

Brig. Gen. Janis Karpinski of the 800th Military Police Brigade 

bore responsibility for a breakdown in discipline that led to 



Taguba testified that tactical control of the Abu Ghraib 

facility had been taken away from Karpinski and turned over to a 

military intelligence colonel. Karpinski retained control over 

other Iraqi prisons in her command, and Taguba conceded that they 

remained largely, free of abuse. 


Karpinski, a general in the Reserve, has been suspended and 

issued an official letter of admonishment in connection with the 

abuse. She has not been charged. 


Questions about ultimate responsibility for control of the 

prison also produced a disagreement between Taguba and Cambone . . 

Taguba said that control had been turned over to military 

intelligence officials. 

Cambone said that was incorrect, and it resided with the 

military police. 


In a further disagreement, Taguba said it was against Army rules 

for intelligence troops to involve MPs in setting conditions for 

interrogations. Cambone said he believed it was appropriate for the 

two groups to collaborate. 


Taguba also told the committee his 'investigation had not found 

"any order whatsoever, written or otherwise," that directed the 

military police to cooperate with intelligence forces at the 



Left unresolved was the central question of what Maj. Gen. . 

Geoffrey Miller meant in recommending, shortly before the abuses 

occurred, -that military police become involved in --setting 

conditions" for the successful interrogation of prisoners. 


Cambone insisted it meant only that MPs tell the interrogators 

what the prisoners had been saying in. confinement and otherwise 


collaborating" with the interrogators. Taguba said he believed 

it meant applying more coercive techniques to prisoners prior to 

their interrogations. 


Regardless of any disagreements, Cambone and others told the 

panel that troops in Iraq were under orders to abide by the Geneva 

Conventions, which dictate terms for, humane treatment of prisoners. 


An order to soften up a detainee would not be a legal order, 

would it?" asked Sen. Pat Roberts, R-Kansas. 


'No sir," replied Lt. Gen. Lance F. Smith, the deputy director 

of the U.S. Central Command. 


Taguba told the panel that his investigators had been told about 

participation by "other government agencies or contractors , ' in 

the abuse. 


Other government agencies is a euphemisM for the CIA. 


Cambone, too, was asked whether he had any knowledge of CIA 










involvement in the abuse at Abu Ghraib. 



There were people brought by agency personnel to that place. 

... There may have been interrogations conducted by the agency 

personnel while they were there," he said. 


The hearing took place while Senate leaders, sought access to 

photos and videos of abuse not yet made public. Officials said the 

plan was for all senators to have access to the material. 


In Geneva, the International CoMmittee of the Red Cross said 

U.S.-led coalition intelligence officers had told it that up to 90 

percent of Iraqi detainees were arrested by mistake. 


A 24-page Red Cross report also cited abuses, some --tantamount 

to torture," including brutality, forcing people to wear hoods, 

humiliation and threats of imminent execution. 


APTV 05-11-04 1701EDT‹ 



CO 6078306 



Office of Inspector General To:

05/13/04 11:26 AM cc: 


Forwarded by bn 05/13/04 11:26 AM 


05/13/04 08:57 AM cc: 



Who is John Israel? 



Who is John Israel? 

He could be one'of the secret masterminds behind the Abu Ghraib outrage 


The blithering, the blathering, the.Pontification, and the grandstanding b 

that about describes the Senate ArMed Services Committee hearings on the Abu 

Ghraib filth-fest. The Democrats were so hot to link Secretary of Defense 

Donald Rumsfeld directly to the scandal, and the Republicans were so busy 

defending their man and the war) that neither bothered much to mention the key 

culprits, as identified in the Taguba report: 

'I find that there is sufficient credible information to warrant an Inquiry UP 

Procedure 15, AR 381-10, U.S. Army Intelligence Activities, be conducted to 

determine the extent of culpability of M[ilitary) i[intelligence] personnel, 

assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing 

Center IJIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). Specifically, I suspect that COL Thomas M. 

Pappas, LTC steve L. Jordan, Mr. Steven Stephanowicz [sic), and Mr. John Israel 

were either directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib 

(BCCF) and strongly recommend immediate disciplinary action as described in the 


preceding paragraphs as well as the initiation of a Procedure 15 Inquiry to • 

determine the full extent of their culpability.' 

Even when General Taguba went up to Capitol Hill and testified, along with the 

shifty-eyed undersecretary of defense for intelligence, Stephen A. Cambone, the 

senators spent so much time listening to the sound of their own voices, and 

scoring brownie points off one another, that the subject of the "private" 

contractors and the intelligence community's involvement in all this only came 

up briefly, like lightning illuminating a cloud-clogged sky. 

It came up at the start of the hearing, but Senator John Warner, who even looks 






like a hawk b the beakish nose, the hooded eyes, the predatory glint in his 

eye b approached the subject gingerly: 

SEN. WARNER: "I ask-the same question to you. In simple laymen's language, so 

it can be understood, what do you think went wrong, in terms of the failure of 

discipline and the failure of this interrogation process to be consistent with 

known regulations, national and international? And also, to what extent do you 

have knowledge of any, participation by other than U.S. military, namely Central 

Intelligence Agency and/or contractors, in the performance of , the 


GEN. TAGUBA: "Sir, as far as your last question, I'll answer that first. The 

comments about participation of other government agencies or contractors were 

related to us through interviews that we conducted. It was related to our 

examination of written statements and, of course, some other records. With 

regards to your first question, sir, there was a failure of leadership..." 

The media has focused on thiS last phrase, probably because it not only seems 

to indict Rumsfeld but also because it's a made-to-order headline. But the 

first part of Taguba's answer is the most pertinent. Warner, obviously not 

eager to have the general go into detail in public, then answered his own 


question, referring to the over 1,000 pages of documentation submitted to the 

committee. In short, the answer to the senator's question was clearly yes, and 

the details were to be found in the classified documents that only members of 

the committee and other privileged characters would read. 

So they blithered, and they blathered, and struck poses, and not until it came 

Senator Daniel K. Akaka's turn was any further light shed on the dark corners 

of this investigation. The Hawaii Democrat looked affable enough, and he was 

smiling, but his questions, when they came, cut straight to the heart of the 



SENATOR AKAKA: "General Taguba, in your report you reference the lack of 

supervision over U.S. civilian contractor personnel, third country nationals 

and local contractors within the detention facility at Abu Ghraib. During your 

investigation, did you determine how many civilian contract personnel were 

working there? Who supervised these individuals? And can you describe what you 

observed in terms of type of access these individuals had to the detainee 


GEN. TAGUBA: 'Sir, we did not make a determination bf how many civilian 

contractors were assigned to the 205th MI Brigade and operating at Abu Ghraib. 

I personally interviewed a translator and I also personally interviewed an 

interrogator, both civilians, contractors. There was also a statement, and 

substantiated by the witnesses that we. interviewed, of another translator, a 

third-country national in fact, that was involved. And there was another third-

country national who was acting as a translator for the interrogators that was 

involved in one of the interrogation incidents where dogs were used. Their 

supervision, sir, from the best that we could determine or discern from the 

information that we gathered, was they were under the supervision of the Joint 

Interrogation and Debriefing Center, the JIDC, who is then under the 

supervision of one, a lieutenant colonel, who was alio supervised by the 


brigade commander, the MI brigade commander. That was the chain, sir.". 

Third country nationals, eh? So what third country are we talking about? 

Britain? Canada, perhaps? I guess we can probably rule out Monaco. 

The only translator identified in the Taguba report is John Israel, supposedly 

a "contract translator' employed by the Titan Corp. Mr. Israel is furthermore 

described as not having a security clearance, an unusual condition for someone 

in his position b unless, of course, he's not an American, in which case it 

would be perfectly understandable. 

So far, very interesting. But then- it got even more interesting: 

SEN. AKAKA: 'General Taguba, your report finds that two contractors were either 

directly or indirectly responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Were either of 

these contracted personnel supervising soldiers or in a position to direct 

soldiers Co take specific actions?" 

GEN. TAGUBA: "Sir, they were not in any way supervising any soldiers, MP or 

otherwise. However, the guards, those who were involved, looked at them as 

competent authority as in the manner by which they described them, as the MI or 

by name or by function." 

A reasonable interpretation of Taguba's somewhat garbled answer is that, yes, 

the MPs and soldiers who committed sadistic outrages against detainees acted 

under the influence and at the instigation of those they believed to be 

intelligence officers, some of whom were "third country nationals.' 

Senator Akaka follows up with a question for Secretary Cambone: "What kind of 

training,' he wanted to know, 'did the U.S: civilian contractors have prior to 

going to Iraq?' 

The look on Cambone's face made the whole dreary procedure worth it, I thought 

his eyebrows were going to fly right off. 

It is no secret that the Israelis have been "advising' the Americans on how to 

run the occupation: after all, they have so much experience in the matter, and 

are more than eager to impart their hard-won expertise. The methods employed by 

Israeli security forces are quite different from those utilized by the U.S. 


military: the use of "limited' torture is okay by them, and the Palestinians 

are no strangers to the sort of treatment meted out to the inmates at Abu 

Ghraib. So when Senator Akaka asked Cambone what kind of training the 

contractors had received, my first thought was: The very best! 






The Mossad is rightly feared throughout the Middle East, and the world, as the 

most ruthless (and daring) intelligence agency of them all. Only the KGB ever 

rivaled its reputation. That they would not hesitate to employ the sort of 

interrogation methods used to "soften up" the prisoners of Abu Ghraib is beyond 

dispute: just ask the Palestinians b and Human Rights watch. That we have 

imported them, along with their methods, into Iraq seems. altogether likely. 

But, hey, wait a minute, how is it that American soldiers were taking orders 

from civilian contractors, never mind "third country nationals'? Senator 

Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina} cleared that up when he put the question to 

Taguba pointblank: 

SEN. GRAHAM: 'Part of the defense that we're going to be hearing about in these 

court martials is that the people that we're charging are going to say this 

system that we see photographic evidence of, was at least encouraged if not 

directed by others. Do you think that's an accurate statement?" 

GEN. TAGUBA: "Sir, I would say that they were probably influenced by others 


SEN. GRAHAM: "Okay b " 

GEN. TAGUBA: " b if not necessarily directed specifically by others." 

As U.S. and, in all likelihood, Israeli intelligence officers looked on 

approvingly, Trailer-Park Lynndie and her ex-prison guard boyfriend', with the 

active collaboration of the other MPs, systematically abused and degraded the 

inmates. So much of this nightmare scenario b the hooded prisoners forced to 

engage in behavior looked on with utter horror in Muslim society b seems like 

such a gift to Osama bin Laden that the revelation of Israeli involvement gives 

the whole affair a surreal quality. 


For the role of CIA overseer, I nominate Steven Stefanowicz, the 34-year-old ex-Navy reservist, now a civilian interrogator supposedly employed by CACI International, who emigrated to Australia, before 9/11, and worked in "information technology" in the city of Adelaide, where b he says b he became engaged to be married. As detailed in my last column, Stefanowicz alleges he underwent a transformation after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and returned to the U.S. determined to get in on the fight, though in what capacity was never quite clear. Now it turns out he had bragged to his friends that he had joined the CIA, according to a piece in the Philadelphia Daily News: "The Philadelphia-area native at the center of the Iraq torture scandal has reportedly told friends he wants to get out of there right away and return to Australia, where he claimed three years ago he was joining the CIA. 'It's safe to say I've seen enough for a lifetime here in Iraq, and it's definitely time to come home,' Steve Stefanowicz reportedly said in an e-mail to a friend in the southern Australian city of Adelaide. He apparently meant Adelaide and not Telford, the Montgomery County, Pa., suburb where he was reared. "Meanwhile, another Australian friend told the Daily News in an e-mail that in fall 2001 'Steve announced to all of his friends that he was leaving Adelaide to return to America to work for the Central Intelligence Agency.'" Alas, the Australians don't seem all that eager to have him. Justice Minister Chris Ellison said Stefanowicz "would not be welcome in Australia," according to the Herald Sun newspaper: "'We do not hold Australia out as a haven for anyone who has broken the law and is trying to evade it,' Senator Ellison said. He said he was not aware of the details of the case but Australia would be prepared to help the U.S. in any investigation'into Mr. Stefanowicz. 'We would receive any request for assistance sympathetically,' he said." Yeah, well if I were Senator Ellison I wouldn't hold my breath. This is one refugee from the law that many in Washington would just as soon see the back of. The same goes for the mysterious John Israel, about whom next to nothing is known b except that, according to the London Telegraph, "Mr. Israel has left Iraq while Mr. Stefanowicz is 'on leave' pending inquiries that could lead to criminal charges being brought against chem." 

Mr. Israel has skipped town for parts unknown, and Stefanowicz is trying to get 

to Australia, where he supposedly is going to marry a woman he describes as his 

fiancC)e. Except that she isn't. This news story describes Joanna Buttfield as 

an "former girlfriend" coming to Stefanowicz's defense. Another Australian 

account also refers to their relationship in the past tense, and cites this 

very interesting tidbit from Ms. Buttfield: 

"Mr. Stefanowicz had refused to discuss details of his life as a U.S. Army 

reservist, she said. 'We both made a conscious decision not to talk about it 

because there was so much he couldn't talk about,' she said. 'It was the 


of some.frustration. He'd say, 'I can't talk about that'.' 

For a CIA guy, however, he sure sounds like a bit of a loser, and not exactly 

low-profile. His Australian friends are coming out of the woodwork, and talking 

to the newspapers; 

"'The events of 9/11 had nothing to do with his motivation to return to the 


U.S. ,' South Philadelphia native Sam Krupsky, now an executive with the Australian Rail Track Corp., wrote [to the Philadelphia Daily News). "He was out of work and out of luck, and left because he had no prospects here.' "b&Krupsky, the Australian rail-track worker who was born in Philadelphia and who moved to Adelaide in the mid-1970s to play semi-pro basketball, cast doubt on Stefanowicz's•skills. 'Steve tried hard for a couple of months to find a job 


CO 6078306 



here, but was always unsuccessful because he kept freaking out all of his 

potential employers,' Krupsky wrote. He said Stefanowicz had boasted to friends 

on his arrival in Australia that he'd turned down a job offer from the CIA." 

After 9/11, did he take them up on their offer b and proceed to "freak out" 

his new employers to a degree that not even the catty Krupsky could have 


If Stefanowicz is employed by the CIA, then he certainly didn't try to keep it 

very secret. He was very visible, even prior to his notoriety, due to the 

efforts of his mother who founded a chapter of the Blue Star Mothers in their 

home town, and was featured on the Don's 'Defend America" website, 

invoking her 

son as a kind of patriotic model. In the wake of the scandal, a number of 

accounts have been published of his early history and the course of his career, 

both here and in Australia. We know he graduated from Souderton Area High 

School in 1988, and that, in 1998, he joined a Naval Reserve program. We also 

know that, for whatever reason, after 9/11 he quit his job in Australia as an 

"information technology recruiter" and went back to the U.S., where he 

volunteered for active duty. The Washington Post reports that 'he served in 


Muscat, Oman, for most of 2002, and his rank is listed as intelligence 

specialist 3rd class. Stefanowicz, who received a number of military awards, 

including a medal for meritorious service, left his last post, at Willow Grove, 

Pa., last September." Friends of the family say he became a civilian to take a 

job with CACI. Of the key role Stefanowicz played in the torture chambers of 

Abu Ghraib, the Taguba report is unequivocal. According to General Taguba, 

Stefanowicz: . 

'Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were not trained in interrogation 

techniques, to facilitate interrogations by 'setting conditions' which were 

neither authorized and in accordance with applicable regulations/policy. He 

clearly knew his instructions equated to physical abuse." 

However, the General gets a bit murky when it comes to detailing the specifics 

against John Israel, who, in addition to-not having a security clearance, is 

found to have 

'Denied ever having seen interrogation processes in violation of. the IROE, 

which is contrary to several witness statements." 

And that is it. 

While we know plenty about Stefanowicz, what's extremely odd is that nothing 

comparable has come out about the other civilian contractor named by General 

Taguba as having 'direct or indirect' responsibility for the Abu Ghraib house 

of horrors. We don't know how old "John Israel" is, where he lives, where 


was born, or what he looks like b nothing. 

We don't even know where he is. All we know is that, according to the 

Telegraph, he's flown the coop. Gee, I'll bet Army Specialist Jeremy Sivits, 

who faces court martial, a stiff jail sentence, and worldwide calumny as the 

"torturer of Abu Ghraib," wishes he could do the same. 

If the Israelis are involved in this maelstrom of evil to some extent, then the 


U.S. is taking the fall for them. Just as Sivits and the others are taking the 

fall for the intelligence officers who directed the Abu Ghraib horror show b 

and are so far getting away with reprimands, and relative anonymity. 

b Justin Raimondo 


Looks like the Israeli association to the intelligence/torture is completely 

being white- washed for Israel (read former Republican Congressman Paul 

Findley's 'They Dare to Speak Out' book to see why) as the following 



(ORLI also conveys how closely tied the US is to Israeli 'anti-terror' tactics:



Israeli link possible in US torture techniques 

By Ali Abunimah 

Special to The Daily Star 

Tuesday, May 11, 2004 


In exchange for interrogation training, did Washington award security 





Is Israel behind the orders for the tortures in Iraq?: 



CO 6078306 




Israeli lessons for the US in Iraq: 




CO 6078315 



01/29/04 02:14 PM 

cc: Subject: Interview Report for your Review 

ease review for accuracy. Make all changes in bold print. Thanks 



- -------- (b)(1) (b)(3) 

i • 

DC I/01G( 

To:06/18/04 08:57 AM 

cc: Subject: Check Out Notice For File 

Please see below. 

SForwarded by 


SJon 06/18/04 08:54 AM 

To:06/17/64 07:02 AM 

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Investigations Staff/Office of the inspector General 

To: 11

06/22/04 03:34 PM 

cc: S Subject: Tentative interviewirravel lans, as of 21 June 2004 

(Li .Fel:10j FYI, I spoke yesterday with CID Special Agent said he 

was in the process of thinking about when to conduct additional interviews 

was interested in 

knowing ifJ lhad been successful in reaching someone 


I told him that had discovered tha be out of the United States until May 2005. also discussed other potential interviewees. He said the most significant news he had was that personnel will not return 

until circa 14 July 2004; he expects that thbir first day back in their offices will be 19 July. also said that thei eople will in theory wi e available to be re-interviewed. 

On the basis of all the information available to him and his own schedule, 1 foresees the following: 

an interview Slas early la the week of 12 July as_possible, ifSIcan set one up; 



interviews of during the week of 12 July;




interviews lduring the week of 26 July. 

F—lolfered to have OIG personnel take part in some or all of these interviews. I told him that I am available but not toward the end of the week of 12 July. 


CO 6078420 






To:06/23/04 04:07 PM 

cc: Subject: Re: OIG's Tasking Memo re: Detainee Abuse AllegationsE) 

I believe that my previously provided response, included (I believe) in the General Counsel's responseL lwas complete. 

if you believe otherwise, please provide me with some indication of what you believe I have overlooked. 


CO 6078431 -S (b)(1) (b)(3) SEC 30 




06/30/04 10:35 AM 


Subject: Alleged Abuse ease


In case you want to update theSn caseS•IG,[ Slwas briefed on the case in his office 

this morning by the undersigned.S__also attended. An MFR regarding the briefing will be placed in the 

case file. 


CO 6078452 




Inv'estigations Staff/Office of the Inspector General I SI To:J

07/01/04 11:16 AM 

cc: Subject: CID SAL Evolving Plans 

(U/LEOld0) FYI, today I spoke with CID Special Agent  '  "nterviewing and travel  

jtold me that he had received a phone call from  of the 1  1  

According to  said thaiL  


personnel will return from block leave on 6 July vice 14 July. Given this change, -inow intends to visitL Sjcirca 11-14 July; he will talk with inext week (hopefully as early as the 6th)' to 

discuss the availability and willingness ofI s ersonnel to be (re)interviewed.j _ isaid he also will 

ask if the two soldiers L. an who refused to speak with us" land 

me) during our earlier trip will now make themselves available to be interviewed, either by and me, 

or without 1(This raises the question of having a second CIA/01G investigator travel with me 

should any of the military personnel decide to talk CIA but not to CID, so that there wouklbh two 

investigators in the room during any interviews.) r Sthought that some members of !might be 

willing to be (re)interviewed now, given how develo ments turned out on another matter, although he also 

said he could spin a scenario in which nobody in would want to be interviewed by anyone at all, 

given all the press attention and the looming charb apnst Army personnel at rSsaid 

that he is planning tentatively to travel during the period 25-28 July to .1 to interview 1 _end tq 1, to interview777andr *nd meet with the military 






----- --( 






Investigations Staff/Office of the inspector General 

To:07/06/04 03:18 PM 

cc: Subject: FYIF SlndP )Interviews 

(u/iFetto) CID Special Agent Sjust say that he heard from) 

officer) SJ Ssaid thatSiold him that Spersonnel indeed are back 

atj Sthis week, but they main yed elsewhere (i.e. overseas as early as next week. 


may try to travel toStherefore this week to talk with S

yry personnel before they 

mart CONUS. LSsaid he would let me know what Stells him in a follow-up phone call 

his planning 15 make tor )concerning the availability of Spersonnel.