CIA Copy of Taguba Report, AR 15-6 Investigation: 800th Military Police Brigade

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This report known as the "Taguba Report" covers the alleged abuse of prisoners by members of the 800th Military Police Brigade at the Abu Ghraib Prison in Baghdad. It was ordered by Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, commander of Joint Task Force 7, the senior U.S. military official in Iraq, following persistent allegations of human rights abuses at the prison.

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Investigative File
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Monday, January 13, 2014
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· . ARTICLE ·is-61NVESTIGATION. · · · . . . :. OF THE: . - " .
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·sooth ·MILITARY PoLicE . ,· ·, . . . . .
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Refet'Cilties ............... ........... ; ..•. ; .... ~ ............ ~ ........... :.~ ........ : .... 3
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.BacJCgro.und_ .................................... ·.·· .•..••.•.. : ~. ~ .••...•.••.••..•.• ~... 6
Assessment of DoD Counter-Terrorism
Inieaogation and Detention Operations .
~ l:rB.q (h(G ~«'s Assessmen.t) ..... ,. ......... ; .. ,;;·~··· o:. ........ ! ••.•• : •• ~········ ·8
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10. C.o mm.e nt.s . Qn.M. G Miiier's Ass. essment.; .... ··~·····.·······~ .. , .... , . .-.... . 8
Report OJ!. Detention and Corrections· ·. · : ·
In. Ira.. q (MG. RydCr's .R q>. art) .. .......... ~·· ..•....••.••..•.•• ., ........... ............ . 9
I. O. Comments o. n.. MG Ryder. ; a Report.: •. :, . .-.... ; ... .. :,.; •.••.••.. . : ...... ..~ .. .. ·12
Pre1imiiiary fuvestig!Uive Actions • ; .... : ...... , .. ; ........ ; .... ~ ....... ~.... ... ·12
Findings and Recommendations
Part One {Detainee Abuse) ......... . ...................................... ; .. ,, 15
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-~~ -~-~-~-·.···4·4········~···:······ .... .,.~ ............ ~:···········:· ..... ' IS
Rccom:D. ieiidat.·i o·.n s .... -..... ~· ..• t.1 ••••••.•••••••• ; •••••••• ~ • .- •••••• : •••••• ' . "20
·Part Two. (Escapes .. and Accountability) ......... ,; .• : ........ ,_. .•••.•• : .. : ..... .. . . . . . . . 22
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.· F. in. dings' .... ...•...' . •.. . -~ ...........· . .............. :. ..•. ; ............... ; ..... . ' . . .. . ~
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Recommendations. . . ....... ~············~······························•• ... 31
:Part Tliree{Command.Ciimate, Etc.!.)' ...... : .... ~ ...•...... ; .................. . -34
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Fm~".:-'"' ............_ , ...... ~·······.· ··· .. ·•····················. ···.· .. •······· 36
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R.eco~eil.d a.t ions ....... ... ~---···················~ .......... .-...........•. ' . . .' . 44
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OtbCr_Findings!ObSeryations .............. · ..... ~.~· ......•.•. · .. ~ ... :.· .•...... ~ ... , . .' 49
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Conclusion ............... ~ .............. · ............ .-.. : ..................... · ...... . :so. . : ~
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AiJ,nexes •.. : .•• ~.: ....... ~·······················•···················-···········,'···· 51.
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ReferenCes .
l. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar.-1~ A-ugUst
. 1949
2.· ~eva Convention for.the Amelioration ofthe Condition ~fthe Wounded and.
Sic.k . i n t. he~~. F~ in. ~ ~ield, i2 August 1949. ·. :. ·. , ..
3. G~eva Con~entio~ f~r the Amelioration of tho ~~dition qfthe Wounded,. sick
. ~dShipWreckod Members of Arm~ Forces .. at Sea, .12 Au~ ~~4~ . · .
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·. 4 . .'~cOnvention ProtoCol Relative to th~ Status ofRefu~~. 19~7 . . . · ·
. 5: G~~ Co~vention Rclati~ to the SpuoS ~fRofug~ !951 · .. - . ..
6, Genova Convontio~ for th,e ProteCtion orwar'vtetims,,t2 August iW9· . . . :. . :· ,' . : ...
7. ~~nvt:ntion~ve.tothehc;tectionof~.P~ons~.~o:or, ·. .
War, 12·August 1949.. .. . . . . .
8; DOD D.irecti~e 5100.69,."DOD Program for Prisoners o{War and other
:riei:ain~" 27 D~er 19'72 .. .. : · . . . .
· ·9. · poD~irCctives1oo.77~~0PLawofWarProUam." 10Juty1979 · ..
. : .. ,10. STANA.o No: 2044,P~~Iires ~ ~~ wi~ Prisoners· ~f.W ~ (P\V) (Edition. ·.. ' . .· . . . . .
· , . 5), 28 1unt)1994 . . . . .. .
· u. STm.Aq No.-203~, ~gafion· ofJ7isoii~·ofWar (PW) (Edition~; 6.
· D-ber 1994 · . · . · . · . ,· .
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12: AR 190.S, &~y P!isoliers ofWar,.Retainod PC!'SQnnol, Civili~ Inteaieos, ~
· · ..O ther DetaineeS; .1 · Octobe.r 199. 7 · . · · · · . . .
· 13. AR. 190-47, The Army Corrections System, 15 August 1996 · . · : ·
·.1~~ M t9~t4', ~ ofFlrearms and Use of Force for Law.Eilf~~en~ and ........ · .. , . ' . . . . . .
·. · .. SecurityDuti~ ~2.Maich 1?93.
. . . . . ~~ . . . .
· ·.' Is. AR 195-s; Evidence ProcedureS, 28 August -1!192 . ·
. · .. 16. AR i9~ti,'l'h~ S~tY~fAims; ~~~on ~·~~Ioslves, '12 ~ei,~ · · -· .
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. · . ,.
. 1998 ' .,
t7.AR.t90-g Military Police WqrldngDogs;30 soj,iembor 1993· •.
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18. A,R.190-13, Tho Army PhysiCal Security Program, 30 Septemb~ 199~
' 19. AR 3so.67, Pmonnel.Security Program, 9 September i988. . . ~ ~ 2o. AR. 380.~5. Department of the' Aimy Informati~ S~ty. 3 i September 2000
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· 21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearaiice of Army Uniforms and Insignia, S Septe,mber
' . . .
. . 2003
. 22. AR 19~0, Serlo~ Incident Report, 30 November 1993
23. AR 15-6, Piocedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers, .1l:May . . . . . .
'1988 . . .
. . .24. ~ .27-10,: MilitarY11JStice,. 6 SepU:mber 2002
. is.'~ 635-200, Enlisted Personnel! 1 Novem\>~ 2000
.. '26~ AR. 600-8-24, Ofli!=" Transfers and .DiscP.arges,.291une 2002 .
. . 27. AR soa-s: ~Y. Mobilizlition, 61uly.l996· . . . .
.. 28. ~ 600-io, Army Command Poli~, 13 .~Y:2oo2·. . ·
29: AR ~23~105, Officer Eval~tioil ~epo~ i Aprill998
30 • .AR 17S-9, ci>ntr&dors Accoin~anying the Fo~:2g October 1999
31. ~ 3~19.40;,Mii.i~ Police intemmimWes~~ent·9P~ons; 1 Augi.!st.200t
32. FM 3~19.1, Mmtary. Police Op~tions, 22M~ 20oi. ' · . . . ·.
33. FM 3-19.1, Mill~ Police~~· ilandb~k, 'uwch 2~~2
· 34. FM 3-0S.3o: P~l~giC!Ii Operatio~ I9I~e 2ooo . · . . . . . . . . .
3S;FM 33-1-I;Psychologicai.Operanons TecliniCU~es andProced~es; 5 May ~91)4
· 36. FM 3.+sz, rn~rug~~e rnt~tion. 2s s~~b~ 1992 ' · · · . . · · · .
·37:.FM 19-15; :Civil Dlsturpances, ~ Nov~ber 19S5 . . .
· ~8. FM ~-0. bperati~ns, t41une ~ooi ·
39. FM 101-S, Staffe>.tganjzations and Functions; 23 May 1984 ·
40. F..M J,t9.3.o ·•. , Physic8.1 . S~tY., 81anuax: y 2001'
41: FM 3-21.s, :Orin and.Ceiemonies, ?July 2003
. ~ .
. 42. ·ARm 19-546-JO M.TP, Mi~~on Tra.ining Pl~ for MllitakY P()lice Battali~n (IR}
. 43. AR~ {9-:661~30 MrP, Mis~oil Thaining p~·for Militazy.POlice. GUani'': · ,
tompm.Y ·· ·.
·44. ARTEP .19-647-30 MTP, MissionTra'ining Plan.for Military Police·lls~it Guard
Company
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45. 'STP 19~95Bl-SM, Soldier's Manual, MOS .9SB, Military Police,· Skill Levell, 6 . : . . . . ' . .
August2002
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4~. S1P 19-95Cl4:-'SM-TG, Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide for MOS 9SC
. In~ent!Resettl~ent Speclalist, Skill Levels 112/3/4,26 March 19~9 · _.
4.7.-S1P i9-95Cl-SMMOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Skill Levell, Sol~~s ·
. ManUal, 30 Septembef 2003 . . .
. .
48. ST. P i9-9SC24-SM-TGMOS 95C, Corrections Specialist, Sldll Levels 213/4, · - . . .. . . . . . .
·S .~ ld.i er's. Ma!iual and T. rainer's 9ui4~ 30 Septeniber 2903: : · ·. . · :
49. Assessment of DOD Coimier-Terrorism Iriterrogation ~Detention Operations.
· · . in Iraq, {iddoeomei.o: Miller, Co~lind~ JTF.:OTMO, Ouan~am:o· Bay._· .. . . . . . . - .
Cuba),.9 September 2003 ' · · · - . · · · ·
. so. Ass~Cnt ofDetentlon and CorreCtions qperations in Iraq, (MG Donaid i. . · .
. - Ryder; Provost Mamhal' General), 6 November 2003 . . .. . · ·.
-Sl. -~-7 FRAGO #1 fos, Subj~-in~/Udes- p~ 3,(:!.8 & ~.C.8,A.I,.Assignment ·
~f205 .~: ; . BDE CD.R Responsfu.il itles for the Baghctad Central ~.n. &ement: · ·
Facility (BCCF),.l9 November 2003 · ·
si. CrrF-7 FRAGO #749, Subject: Intelligen~ and'Evidenco-:~ Dc;tention .
· ~eratio~ R~l~g to D~tain~, 24 Ali~2o03. . · . - ·.
. . 53. . 800tb MP BDE FR.A .G a # ..8 . 9, Subji:ct: Rul. ~ of Engagement, 26. .b eecmber 2003
· ·54. co cr.rF-iMcmo:-CJ'ri?~7 Interro~on and Co~ter-Res.iStance PoHcy, 12'
: 'October2003 · ·" .·
. · ss. CG CrtF-7 Memo: Dignity and ~esp_ect whit~ Conducting C>peraiions, 13-
.. Deceriiber 200~ . .
.5 6. . • Unifo,nn.eode ofMilitazy JllStice and Manual for Courts ~at, 2002 Edition ' . . . . . ' . . . . . . ' . ..
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ARTICLE 15-6 INvESTIGATION OF THE
. · 800th MILlTARY POLICE mUGADE
·. 1.. · CoinbinC!I Joint Task Foree Seven (CJTF-7) requested that the Commander, us · · ·
. · cenirrlJ. Comm11nd; appoint tn ln.vestigating Officer (10) hi' thC 8rade ofM.fUor .
:. 'Gcneia1 (MG) or above to investigate the conduct of operations within the SOOth
· · Military Pollee ~) Brigade. LTG.S.ancliez requcstc4 an inVestiga~on of detco.tion
. and in~ent operations by the Brigade from l November 2003 to' present. LTG
· · Sanche:i cited. recent reports of dctliin~ abust\ ~capes from c0n1inetnent facilities; ·
· ·.lind ·~l!lltability lapses, which indicated systemi ,sn~ed a lack.of clcarstandarcJs, proficiency, and· leadership. LW Sanchez ·
. req!lCSted a coinprehc:Dsive and all-encoinpassing inquiiy to .make finding,'!! aild .
· · : r!:coirimcndations con 2.: M.~·i41wi-uarf:~oo3; th~Chief of stiff onis·.~.Co~d(~~i.Q.
. · ·. ·M . CQnimiuid~, Colilition Forces ~d ComP,Oneilt 'Cotnniand (CFLCC), LTG J?a.vid D.
. . .. McKiernan. cond~ct ll!l.iny~o~ into tl1e81~ detention-and-·- 6 I JAtJ O'.
· · · , .·:intCllri!lleirt o~ont~ ~t November 2003 · present: OM directed that ·
· · · .the in,vestigatic':!n should inquire intb. ill filctl! · . · S\Uro1.lndirig recent · .
. rep'o~ ofi!USPected detainee abuse in~·· It also~ that the.~~estigalion ·. ... ·
.. iilquiie intO detainee ~capes. and accountability lapses as repOrted by CJTF-1, and to ... , .
. . 'gbin a moze compl'!:b.en$ive ll!ld all-enconipassmg ~nquh)'i,nto the fitness lind
· · · · . . . . · pCrfoinla:ilce of the 800tl! MP BriglidC. (ANNEX 3). ·
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· j, {tl). On 311~ 2004, .the ~der; ¢Fr.CC: apPofuted MGAntoilio M. · .
. · Taguba;Deputy Commanding General Support. CFi:.cc. to conduct this : . .' ..
' ' .-~vi!stigati()!L MG Tagliba wils directed to coriduct an inforiqal inv~on ~
~.154 iilto t!le· ~~ MP BrlPde's d~tion and ..int~ent openitioils.: .
. : Specifically, }40 TagQba was tilsk'ed to; · · · · · ., · . : · :· · · · · . .
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: ... ·.&:; (U) In~ into all the fitcts iUid ~ces ~tinding ~allegations of
· ' .': .: detainee abuse; specifically allegatiOns of maltreatment atthe Abu·Ghnib Prison
. · . · (Bag!idad CentraJ Cop.finCijlent FaCility . b. (U) .Jnciuir'e ~to d~ee esc_apes and ~ccO~tability lapses liS reported by CJTF. 7, ·
' . speci.f ic.a lly 1\lleWions co~cemin. g these .f ?Ven.tS . ·at the Abu.G bnib ·Priso.n~ . · ·
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c. (U) Investigate the training, standards, employment, command poli~es, iiltCma! .
. procedure$, lind command climate in the SOOth MP Brigade, as a~proprlate; · .
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d. (U) Make. specific findings of fact conC!liDiD.g all ~ect/1 of the ~vCstigation, and
. . make liny J::ecOtnmendatioris for colrective action, as. appropriate. "(ANNEX 4)
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· 4. (U) LTG Sanchez'·s request to investigate the SOOth lv(P Brigade folio~ the .
initiation of a criminal investigation by the US Anny Criminal Tnv.estigation
. · C~Bild (USACIQG)into specific all!'gations of detainee !lbuSe cOmmitted by · · · · ·
members ofthe 3.72nd MP Company; 320th MP .B.atta!ion in Iraq. j'b.ese units are· · ·
part of the SOoth W Brigade. The Brig&de is an Iraq Theater asset, TACON tQ · ·
. CJTF~7, ~utOPCONtoCFLCC atthetimethisinv~gatiou.was:initiaied. In· ·.
. addition, CJTF-7 bid sev~ reports o~ detain.ee escapes from US/Coalition ·. ·
. Confinement FacilitiC!I in Iraq over the paSt sevetal months •. These inclQde Canip
· Bucca; Oimp .Ashraf; Abu Ghraio, and the ffigh Valile Dc:tainee. (HVD) · ~- .
· · ComplCx/Camp Ciopper: ~e SOOth MP Brigade operated these.Wties; :1n: · .
addition, tOur. Soldiers from the 320th MP Batfalion had been fomially chaiged under·
· . the Unifo:pn Code ofMilitazy Iwitie . . l'h~fer In~~t Fac;ility(I'lf) at .~P BucCa, Iraq. (ANNEXE~;~18,.34 ~d ...
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· 5. "(U) I began .assembling my P1vestigation t~ prior to the ac:tUai appointment br, the •
. . · CFLCC Commander. I assembled subject~ experts from the CFLCC Provost , .
. . M~.(PM) and the CFLCC Staff Iudge Advocate (SIA). I.~electecl c;DL I . La Fate, CFLCC Provost Marshal to be my Deputy fur this investi8afjon. lalso
. contacted the Provost Marshal General of the AnDy, MG Donald 1. Ryder, ·to enlist .
. thci·Buppoi1· ofi4P ~ject ·matter Cl£PCits in ~e.~ of detention and ·htt.eP,Inie.nt .
. 6peratiOJ!S~ (~S 4 and 19) · . . .
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"6. (U) The ~vestigating Team also reviewed th~ Assessment ofDoD co~-Teaoiism
· · Iilteirogation 8lld Detep.tion Operatioll$ in)raq con~_by MQ Geoftieyp. Miller, ·~ ..
· : .COmmander, Joip.t TBsk Foree Guantanamo QTF-GTMp);. Frt)m ~ 1 August ti> 9 .
s·eptem.ber; 2003, MG Miller led ~team of personnel. c:xPerien<:e in="" strategic="" .=""> . · iqtem)gation to HQ, CJTF·7 and the Iraqi Survey Grouii (ISGHo ~ew currcip.t Iraqi
. · · .Theater ability. to rapidly exploit internee$ fur actionable intelligence.. M.G Miller's. · ·
·.. team: focused oil~-areas: intelligence integration, sy~~.eb,ronlzatiOJ!. and thsiOII;
. ' interrogation:operatiotis;·and detention operations." MG Miller's team.UsedJTF-
. . GTMOprocedu.res_ !!lid .i!lterrogal:io~ authorities as baselij!~. (~ ~0). ·
1.. 'M The Inv~tiga~ Team began its hiquizy with an ~~~ ~Ysi4 ~f;~e ~ort
· on J;>etention apd Cim"ections in Iraq, dated 5 Novemti~ 2003, conducted by MG"
·Ryder and a team ofinilitarY police, legal, medical, and automation exp~: The .
CJTF~7 Commander, LTG Sanchez, had pfeviously ~ested a team o(subject
. matter experts ~ llssess, and make speCific recommendations conecniliig dctenti(ln . .
·and corrections operl!tions. Froni 13 October to 6 Nov~ber 2003, M(J RYder .
p~onally led this assessment/assiS!aDce team in Iraq. (ANNJP' 19) · .. ~ . . ,· .
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ASSESSlv.IENT OF DoD COUN'l'ER•TERRORISM INTERROGATION AND
. . DETENTION OPERAT.I ONS If'{ IRAQ (MG MILLER'S. ~.S ESSMEN'r) . . .
·1. (SINF) The principal focus ofMG Miller'~ teaio. wa.S on the sU:ategic interrogation of :
. detaineesl'mternees in Iraq. Among its c:OnclUsions in its Executive Snmmazywere
. . that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and procedures in place to affc:ct a·uilified ..
. . . strategy to detain, interrogate, and'rePort infOrmation. from d~eesrmtemees m Iraq.
The Executive Summary also stated the.( detention operations must act as an.e.ttabler
fot: interro8ation. ·(ANNEX .20) .. . ·· · : · · · . · ·
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2. · (SINF) With respect to intemiption; MG MiJler's. Team teCOmmerlded that. CJTF-7 ·
· dedicate and tlain a detention guard furce. Sl!bordiJiate to the Joint Inten:ogation ·
Debriefiitg Center {JIDC) Command!'~' tliat ~'sets the conditions fur the suc.cessful
. . ·iit~gation and exploitation 'ofintemCes/detain:~." · Riigaiding Detemion · · '
. ··operations, MG Miller's .team stated that the fim~on of Detention Operations ·is to
provide a sare. secure,.and huinane environment~ supports·fhe expeditio~ ·. . .
· colle~Oli of intelligence. Howiwet, it also stated ':'it is eSselitiaJ that the guard foree .
·.be ~vely engaged in setting the conditions for succes.sful ~loitati9n .of the ·
internees." (ANNEX.20) · . · . . ·: · :. · ·. ; . . · ·.
3. (siNF) MG Mruer'~ - Blso con~;hid~il'tbat 'Jofui S~tegi9 In~iation 'o.PCrations
· (withinciTF-7) arebampered.bylaclCofactive c:Ontrol,oftheintemees within the
detention environment lbe.~erTeam.~o stated thilt eSia!>lisbment of the Theater
· Joint Interrogation and. Detention Cent~ (JlDC>. at J..bu G~ (B~ will · . · ·
· . consolidate both detentjon and str~~.tegic inteaogi'lti~ opetaiions and result in $lergy
·betweenMP and MI reso~ ancfan integiate(l, syn~JP,zed, lltld.~CUSC!i strategic
interrogation effort. .(~~0) , · · . · . · .
4; (~INF) MG ,Miller's tes!n als9 observi:d that the ~lication of enierging stiategi~
.. interrogation strategies and techniques cOntain new appro~es and operllliOlllil art.
. T4e Miller Team also concluded tbilt a: legal review and recommC!ldations on·jp.temee
interrogatiop. operations !;ly a dedicated Conp:Pand Judge Ad~te.is' required to ·
maximize intyrrogation· ~veness. (ANJmX 20) · · ·
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· 1. (SINF) MG Mille~~"'s team~~ thai ~Y ~ere usin,g'rrF:.oTMQ~pemtional
. . proc:CdureS and interrogiltion authorities as baselliles for ifs ol>serv¢ons and .
'recomniendatio~. There is.a strong argument 1hat tliei¢elligence·vi$JC of detaineeS ·.
held .at JTF-Guantanamo (GTMO) is different t1!8Ji tliat of the 4Ctaine;f.mtemees
held at Abu Gbraib (BCCF) and other detention fiicili~es in Iraq. Ctnrently, there are
. a large immber oflraqi criminals held at AbuGhrajb (BCCF). These are:nqt believed
to b~ international terrorists or membexs of AI Qliida, Anser AI Islam, Talib.WJ. and.
other .i nternatio. n.. al temmst organizations. (ANNEX. 20) · . · · · ·
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·2. (S/NF) The recommeildations ofMG Miller's team~ tli~? "&uard force;, be activcly
engaged in ~etting the conditiops for sUccessful exploitation of the internees would
appear to be in' ~ct with the re6ommendations ofMG Ryder'rTeam mid AR. 190- · ·
8 thiu militarY po~ce'"do il!l~ participate in military intelligence supervised
· interrogation seSsions.·~ The Ryder. Report eoricludecfthat th~ OEF template whereby
military police actively set the favora!)le conditions for subsequent interviews ru:ns ·
counter ~o tlie smo9th operation of a detention facility. ·.
·.·
REPoRT ON DETENTiON AND CORRECfiONS .
IN IRAQ ~G R)'D~'S Rlq'ORT) ·
1. · (U) MG R)111er'and his assesSment team ~ducted a comprChensi~ review of the
entire !letainee and ~ons system in Iraq and}lfOvided recammendatio.us . · ·
·. a d. d.r essmgea. ch oft he fQUowing area.s as. requested by the. Command.e r crtF,7 :
·.a.· . (U) DeWnee and~~ s);siem man~gement . .
b. (0) D~ee management, including detainee movement, segregation, and
. · ~ecountability . ' · · . · · . . ·
.. . c. · (U) Means o( ~mmimd and c:O¢.ol of the dlltention and corrections system
d. (U) Integration .of:~tmy det«=!ltion and con-ections with the Coalition
P{Ovisioiial Authority (CPA) and 'adequacy of plans for transition to an li:liqi~run
Corrections system · · · · .- · >. · · · : , ·. · · . .. .. :.
· e. (U) Detain~ medi~ care.imd health J:llimageou:.uf · · : . · . .
f. . (U) Detention ~ties. that meet requir~ hea,lth..hygiene, ui.d.Sanitatiqn.·
. ·. standards . . •. . .. . "' . . ·. . : . .
·. g. ·. (U) Court ~teirati~n and doi:ket manageJilent for~ detain~· . ·
·· h. (U)D~eelegal~· · · . . • ·
· · i, · (U) Detainee d$'bases and recol$, includhig il!tegration with law enfcm:emc:qt
· · ~d co~ de.tab~ (ANNEX 19) • · · · . . . . · · . ·. ·• · · .. ·:'· ·
. .· . . : ' . . . . .. .. . . . ~. .
· · ·. ·. 2.: cti> Many of the :tin~ and. ~eri · · sCope ·ot this investigation. However, seyeral impOitairt :tindirigs U\l. clearly r~levant · ·
. to this ~quirY lind I!RI'summarizcid below (emphasis is added in ccrtahi areas): .. : . . . . .· ...
A. (l.i}:Detainee M~agem~~tllitcluding ~ovement smegatio~ and
'acepytabilitvl · · · . · . · · · . · . · . . · · · : ·
1. ~·~~ ~ a~de varian~· in standatds: aild a~es at the varioUs cfutentl~n
· flicllitie's. Several Division/Brigade CQllection points and' US monitored Iraqi · .
p~OJl$ had flaw¢d or iDsufficiently detailed ilse offuice ~d other· standing
operating procedtires or policieS (e.g. weaporis in the faCility, illlptoperresti)lint
techniques, detamee inanagemerit, etc.)· Though. there were no mQitaiy oo!ice ·
unlts pumosely applying inaPProPriate confinemCilt practices. (ANNEX 19) . . ., . . . ..
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2. (.U) Currently, due to laCk of adequate Iraqi facilities, Ir.aqi criminals ~erally· :
· Iraqi-on-Iraqi crimes) are detl$1ed with security int~ (generally ,IrliQi-on. .
· Coalition o:ffeJ.lSes) and EPWs in the same facilities, though segregated. in· . . ·
· · different cells/coinp~Qs· (ANNEX 19) ·
. 3. (U)"The ~gemcOt of multiple 'disparate grou~s ~rcietllin~;~ple in a~~
location b:y;melllbers _of the sam!' uni~ invites confusion about bB!idUng, ·. · .·
proce.ssipg,. an4 ~~ent, and. typically facilit;rtes the biinst'er of information ..
between different.catf?gQrles ofd~= (~ ~9) .
· 4. ~-The 800th.MP (JIR) um~ ;did ~ot ~e Intemmen~~ettlom~~-Wa) ·&nd ·
corrections specific training~ their mobilization periQd. Cortections 1Jaining ·
is only on the MBTL of two MP'(JIR) Confinement Bat\alions· th:rougho~tthe . . .
. AnDy, one.curtently ~erving in.Afghanisfliu, and elomeilts oftho other:llll' at · ·. · ·
.camp.Ariijan, Kuwait. MP.units supporting!fF..qn.fbreCeivedten.®ys of .

. training in detention facility operatioi)S, to incll)de two days. ofUnann.ect self- . ·
iiefCI)Se,'~g in inte:rperS.oDal coinznunj.caiion ~. foriieci cell moves, and ..
cexredional. offi.c. e r safe.t y. (AN.. NEX .1 9) . · · ·· · :: · · · · ·
B. (U) Means· of Comm..U:d Jind. Control of tlie Detention ;md Correictio~~ Syste~
.. 1.· {U) The 8o0tll'MP Bii;e~~~y~;ganiied with·~~·MP(JIR)· .
Batta]jons consisting ofboth MP Qual:d and ~mbat Support c:omp~es,. Due to
fOrce rotation plilnS, th~ ~OOth ndeplgyed two Battalion: miCll.ln Decep1bet .
. .Z003, Ute 115thMP Bati!ilion.lind thc324thMP Battalion. JnDecombet2003,.
-the 400th MP Battlllion was J:SiiC'ied of ifs mission and ndqilo:fed in :January
.2~.; ·The 774thW. Battalion iedeployro on 11 F~ 2004.and the · ·
· ~ainder is ~uled to rCdepiQY in~ and Apri12004. :They are the 310th-·
MP Battalion; 32()tb Ml! Batta!i6n. $aOth MP Battalion.· and !744th MP Battalion.
·,The UnitS that reoiai:D. are genciraJiy.understrength, .as ~eseive COmponent units do
not have an individual p¢rs~ fe.P.lat:emeiit system to ini.tigate.mediQallosses or
. ~departUre ofindivjdual Soldiers that have ~ed 24 months ofFederal a~v~ .
· .. autyinafiv~~&rperio!L . . . . •. . ,,. -. ' i :. . . ... : . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . .. . . .
2. (U) 'l)e SOOtl:tMf Brigade (JIR) is c.urtently a CFLCC ·ass!'.t.:TACON fl? CJTF-7
1o Conduct In~ent/ReSettlement Q/R) operatio~ in Iraq. !\11 detention .
openwcins are conducted 1n the CJTF-7 AO; Camps-.Ganci;Y,:gilan~'BuCca, TS~
Whitford,'au.d a.se_ParateHigJJ. ValueDetention (HVD) site. (ANNEX·lg).
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3: (U) The SOOth MP Bri~e~ ~en~~ ~~g~·~g ~task.. . · .·
. orgllllizilt!qnal·strllcture, training, and equipnient ~oli'rees .~Ill a. unit designed
. to conduit standard BPW operations in the CO~ ~ait). Furth~, the
do~y tr!rlned ~ Soldier-to-detainee populationrati9 and.facUity ~you~
templates are predicated on a comp~ant,· self~ciplining BPW p!Jp~atioli, and
· ·not c;riminals or hi~~riSk security internees. .(ANNEX 19)
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. 10 CO~S REGAIU>ING MG RYD~'S REJ'ORT . : . . ..
1. (U) The objective ~f MG Ryder'.s Team w~ to observe detention and ,Prison . .
operations, identify poten~al systemic and htiman rights issues, lind provide near-
. term, mid-tenn, and !ong-te.rm ~mmendations to improve cn;F. 7 operations and.
. transitio~ of the Iraqi prison system from US military control/oversight tO th11 ·
Coalition Provisional Authority ~d eventually to the Iraqi Government. The ·
· Findings and Recommendations ofMG Ryder's Team ate thorough and precise and
' should be implemen~ imniediately. ·(ANNEX 19) . · .. ~ · . •. . . . . .. . . . .
2. (U) Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems· that surf~eed !J~g MG
Ryder's Team's assessment are th~·very s~e issues that are the subject of .this ..
. ~vestigation~ ·In fact; JlliiDY of the abuses suffered by: cletsin~es occurred during, ·
.· or near to, the time of that ~sessmen~ AB will be pointed out ]A detall in' . ·
sulisequeot ~o~ of this report. I disagt'lle .with the c:Onclusion ofMG Ryder's .
Te8m· in one critical aspect, that being its conclusion that the 800j:h :MP. Brigade hail ..
not been asked to c&ange.its filc;jlity procedures to set the conditlolll! for MI · ·
'interiieWs.. While clearly tl!.e SOOth MP'Brigad~ and its CODlJ!Wlders were not . ·
. taske!l til set conditions for detam.~ (or subsequent M:t interrogations;' it is
obvious from a review ·of ~~rehensive CID.lnterviews o( su5pects and .
. wi~esiles that~ was done at lower.Ievcls •• (~ 19): · ·; ·
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. 3. (U) IconcurfunyviithMG Ryder's conclusionre~the effectofAR190-8~
Military Police, thoug!i adept at passive coll~on'ofi,o.telligence within a facility,
'sbotild not p~cipate in Military fntemgence sup~ interrogation sess.ions •
. Moreover, Military Poll~ should nat be inv.olved With setting "favol'llble · .
. i:onditions"{or subse4uentinten;ie[!WS. These actions, as will be outlined in tJUs
·inv~tigation, clearly r1in counter to .the smOQth operation of a det¢zition filcility •.
'(~19) . ··.··. . , .
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1. (Uj Following our review ofMG Ryd!'lf's Reix>rt and MG' Miller's Report. .my ..
investiglitian team immediatelr began an in-depth revieW of all available doCUIIlentS
reg8nfing the SOOth MP BrigadO. · W~ revieW~ in detail the voluminOus ~ID ·
investigation regarding alleged. d~ee .abUses at detention' facilities in lraq, .
parti fifty witness statements froin militacy' police and ~tilry inre.lligence pCl'SOililel,
potential suSpects, an4 detainees •. We m?cwed il1,J!Ilero'!S photos and \lideo.s of~
detainee abuse taken by detention facility personnel, which are now in the custody
and control of the us Army Criminal Investigation Command ~.the CJTF. 7
prosecutio,n team. The photos and videos are not contain~ in thiS investig;Jtion; We
obtained copies. of the SOOth MP Brigade ~oster, rating chain, arid assorted intetll.a) ·
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. . months. (All ANNEXES Re\1ewed by Investigation. re!Uil) · ·
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2. (U) IIi addition to military police and !ega! officeill tro'm.fue CFLCC PMO. and SJA
Offices we alsO obtained the services of two individuals who are ~pertS in military
· · . ·.police detention practices and training. These were LTC Tiri:J.othy Weathersbee,·
. Coiiiiiiander, 70Sth MP Battalion, United States Disciplliwy Barraclcs, Fort
· Leavenworth, and SFC Edwald I;laldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US Army
· Military.P.olice SchoOl, Fort Leonard Wpcld. ·I also requested and received the .
. . :servi~ ofCol'(pr) l{emyNelson, a tniine4.US Air FQrce Psychiatrist assigned tO
· . ·. assist my~vestigation team.. (ANNEX 4) .· · · · · ·
·. . ' . : . . ' .. . . . . . ·.
·. · 3: ·(U) In addition to MG Ryder's and MG Miller's ~.the team: reviewed num~us ·
· · re~ce :Diaterials incl11dblg the 12 October 20.0;J CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-..
· · · Resistllnce Policy, tho AR IS~ Investigation on Riot-arid ShootingS at Abu Qbraib on
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24 N(lvcrnber 2003,111-e 20SthMI Brigade's Jnt~gati.on Rules ofEngagement ·
. · (IROB); facility stafflogs(jo~s and.numeroils recordS of AR 15-6 investiBa.fions
and Seriotis IricideDt Reports (SIRs) on detainee c:SCapesfshootings and discipliruizy ·
ma~ fton;t'the 800tb MP.Brigad!!-· (ANNEXES 5_-,20, 37, 93, lind 94) . . ·· .
' . ' . . . . . .
4. ~ ~ 2 ~ebruary20M,:ltook.m~ felun to Baghdad fo~a oncHiay ~ection of the .
. . .A;bu qbmb PrisOn (BCCF) and the Hi!Pl Value J;>etainee (HVI}) .Coinple;'in order to
become familiar wiih thosef : ColllnlaOder, 3rii'MP CriminaUnvestigatiou, Group (CID), COL Dave Quantock,
Cominaiuler, 16th MP BrigadC, COL Dave Phillips, Cf>jmnander, 89th MP BrigBde,
· and COL Bd Sannwaldt, CrrF-7 Provost Marshal; On 7 Febriuny 2004, the team
· :vis~ted the Cainp BUcca D~tion Facility to tllmi1iariZe itself with; the'f~Cility and
. · · ·operating.stttictqre. In. additiori.. on 6 and 7-Feb11lll1}t 2004, at Camp Doh.a, Kuwait,
· We CQnducted ¢tt!21Sive tiaining sessions on approved detention practic::es. We
• · continued:our preparation by fC\'ieWiilg the ong(ling CID investigation and were
briefed by the. Special Agent in Charge, CW2 Paul ArthQr •. We refreshed ourselves·
on the llpp!icable reference niateria,is within each~ meniber's area of expertise,
· and.prilctieed ~ve tecbniqlieS. I met with the team oil nUDi.erous o~ons to'
finali;U appropriate w:itil~.lists, review~ witness statements; mange · · . ..
logistics; and'eollect potential evidll!lce. We also codrdinated with CJTF-7 tO IUl'liD.Se
witness attendance, force 'protection meilsUres, and geoeral lop~ fOr the team's . ·
... move to Baghdaii O!l·B F'ebn!ary 2004 •. (ANNEXES 4 ~ :ZS) · .. . . .. . . . · . ,. . . . . . . . . . . .
· ·5. (U) Af ihil same jime, due to the T~fer of AuthoritY on i .February.2oo4·betWeen ·m
Cozps and V Corps, and the tipComing demobilization of the 800th.MP Brigade ..
. Command, i directed that s~eral critical ~tnesses who weie preparing ·to leave the
theater ~einain at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait until theY eould be interviewed (ANNEX
29). My team deployed~ Baghdad on 8 Februaij 2004 and conducted a Jeries of
interViews with a variety of Witnesses (ANNEX 30). We retuJned to .CamP. Doha,'
Kuwait on 1.3 February 2004. On 14 and 15 Feb~ we inttirvi.eW-ed a number of
· w. itnesses from tlie SOOth MP Brigade. On.17 F~. briwy w.e re.t urp.ed to Camp Bucc3,
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. Iraq to complete interViews of Witnesses at that location'. From 18 February imu 28 ·.
F~·we c:o~~ docUments, COinP,iled references, did fi?Ilci~-up iD.ten;~ Bi!.d
completed a detail~ analysis of the wlumes.ofmaterials liccum~at~l' throughout our
investigation. . On 29 February we fina.lized our executive SWDill&ry arid out-briefing·
· slides. On 9 March we Submitted th~ AR IS~ wri~ repoit with findings I!Qd · .
. rccommenqaiio~ to the CFLCC Dep_uty SJA, LTC ~k Jo~ri. far a·legal
Sufficiency revi~=W. The 9ut-briefto the ~pointing authority, LTG MCKiernan; took
p~ 9n 3 Mar!;h 2004. (A.NlltEXf.s.26.and ~5-91} · · · · ' . · . · ...
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. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
'•
·(PART~~) .
. . (U) The l,nvestigati6n. should .inquke fu.to 'ail of the facts and
circumstances sur:rouilding recent anegations of detainee
. abuse, .specific~y,:aJiegations of maltreatment at the Abu . ~
Ghi-aib Pr.ison.@aghdad CentralCoidinement Facllicy). ·. .· · . . . . . . . '
I. (U) Th~ us ~Y Criminal Jn.vestigation Command (ciD), led by COL Jt%ry · ·
Mocello; and a team• of highly trained professi~ .ligeQ.ts-have done .a sUperb Job of
·inveStigating S~Wetal cOnipici and e.xtn::mely ~ing ~?.detits of deWnllC abus~ at
the Abu Ghnu'b Prison.· Th~ i:ondui:te criminal SUSpects, and detainees. They lllso im.qovered numerous photos and vi4cos
. po~ying in graphic detail detain~ abuse by MilituY Police p~omiel on numerous
· oCca.s~ons from October to Pecember 2003. Several potential SUSpects rendered full
· ·and compli:to co:iifessio'ns regarding iheU: pa:soilal involvem.ent and the invcilvcment ·
of fellow Soldi~ in this abuse. Several pote:ntialauspects invoked their rights under
Article 3}.ofthe Uniform Co · oftheV..S . Constitution. (ANNEX2~ · · · · ,•.
2; '(U) In. additi~·tO It C()mpieb~ve and exhau.stiver~ew of~ ofth~estatemep.ts
. and'dociimentary evidence, we also interviewed numerolis o:fijcers, NCOs,. ~junior
enli$ted Solditrs in tlie SOOth MP Bri8ade. as well 8s members of f!!.e 205th Military .
. 1ntelligenee .Brigade worldng !1l iii~ prlSori; 'We did n~tbelieve it ~ neeessary to re- .
intervie,W all the D~!=fOUS witnesses who had previously providCd'comp,rehc:JlSi:ve
statements to CID, and I have adopted those statemeilts for the purpOses of this · . ·
investigation. ~ 26, ~. ~$. and. 45-91). . . . ·. . . . · ...
.-· .
·. -~ARDIN~PARTONEOiq'BEINVES'I1GATION,IMAKEmE .. : . . ,.
, FOLLQWJriG SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT: ·. · · · · . ..
• • •• . . ' y. • •• •• • • • ... .• • ••
~- (U) 'fhat Forward Operuing'lbse (FOB) Abu Ghnu'b .(BCGF) ~~des security of .. :. .
· · . both criminal and seCUrity detainees at the Baghdad Central Correet\onill Facility,
· · facilitates the -ConductiDg of intenogations' for CJ'fF-1; Supports other CPA operations
at the prison', ind eohanceil the forci) protectioii/quality ~flif~ of Soldi,ers assign~ in
order to eOsilre the success of ongomg:operations to secure 'a free· J.raq.- (ANNEX 31)
• • '· 0 • • •• • •
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2. (U) ·Thilt the CoiJlDlallder, 2osth Miliuuy Intellig~~ Brigade, was desi~ by
· · CJTF-7 as the CoJ;DilWider ofFOB Abu Gliral'b (BCcF) effective 19 No~bei' . . ..
· 2003. That the 20Sth MI .Brigade conduCts operational_and strategic interrogatio~.
· lor CJTF-7. That fi::olri 19 November 2003 until Tl.IIDSt:!i.of Authority (TOA) on 6 · • • • 0 • • ,. •
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February 2004; COL Thomas M Pappas was t;he Cominander of the 205th MI
Brigade a. nd thQ Commander of FOB .Abu Ghraib (BCCF). (ANNEX 31). · . . . .
3. (U} That ihe 320tli·Militaty Police Battalion·ofthe 800:th MP BriJIK!e is responsible
for the Guard Force at Camp Ganci; Camp Vigilant; & Cellbloclc 1 ofFOB.AI?u
· Gbrat'b (BCCF). That from February 2003- to until he was SUspended fi:om his·duties .
. . on.l7 January2004, LTCJeny·PhilJabaum sen>ed !IS the Battalion Coinmanderofthe
· · 320th MP Battallon. ·That from Deceinber 2002 tintil )le was suspended fi:om his.
duties, on 1.7 January 2004; CPT DonaJd Rc:.ese served as the COmpany Commander ·
. of the 372nd MP Company, .which Wl!s in charge of guaiding detainees at FOB Abu ·
Ghrilib. ] further find that both the 32Pth MP Battalion and the 372nd MP Company
.. · were located Within .t he ponfin.e s ofFO. B Abu Ghfaib. · (ANNEXES 32 lllld 45)
4. (U} That from July ofl003 to the present, BOJ~ L Karpinski was the Cpmmll1lder . '
of the ~OOth MP Brigade. (MiNEX 45) . · · · · · . · · . . ..
. .
· s. (S)That between October and December 2003, .at the Abu Ghra).'b Coilfinement·
Facility (BCCF), numerous incidentS of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses
· were iriflicted on several detainees. This ~)'St!mic and illegal abuse of detainees was ·
intentioDany perpetrated by several members of the ~tarY Po1ice guard fclrce ·
. : (372nd Military Pol,i~ SOOth MP .. ·
Brigade}, in Tier(section} 1-A oftheAbu Ghi'!u'b PrisO~(BCc:F) .•. The allegations of
· abuse were substantiated by detailed wi~ess stlitcments (ANNEX 26) and the
discoveiy of.extremely graphic photograp~c evidence; I>u~ t9 the extreniely · ·
s~tive nature of these photographs and ~dei>s: the ongoing CID investigatiQn, !lJld · .
the potential for the i:riiDina1 prosecution of severs! ~ects, the photographic · . ·
evidence is not iilcluded in the. holy of.my investigmon. the.pictureS aiul :videos are
!l'vsilab~e from the Criinin8l InveStigative Colllii¥IIld and the CTJF-7prosecution ·
tesm. In addition to the afotcmenticined crimes,. there were also abuses committed by .
members of the 325th.MI Battalion, 205th MI Brlgsdi!, ana Joint Jriterrogation and
Debriefing Center (.JIDC). S~y. on 24 November 2003, S~C Luciana .
·Spencer, 205th MI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having him ~p 8lld .
retiu:ned tti ~naked. (~S 26 ancJ; 53}. · : · ·. ·. .. .
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6. (S} I find ·that the ip.tentional abuse of detainees by militaty poli()!l personnel includ!'d ..
: ·the following acts: . \ . · · · .. ·.. : · . , . · . · · · · '
· a. (S). f~ching, slapping, and. kiclcfug detaiJlees; juinping on their n8ked feet;
b. (S) Video~ping and photographing naked male and fenlille detainees; ·
. c, (S) Foreil;Jly airanm detainees in vari~\IS sexuallybXplicitpositions for
photograp- . . . . . . •. . ..
d. (~)Forcing detainees to remove their clothin~ and keeping them naked for several
da)ut a tini~ . . · · · ·
13- (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women • s underwellr,
f; (S) Forcing groups of male detainees to mastUrbate themselves while being
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g. (S) ~ging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them;·
li. · (S) Positio!ling a naked detaiD.ee on a MRE Box,_ with. a sandbag Qn his head, imd
att3ching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simuiate electriC tonure; ·
i. '(S) Writiilg ''I: am a.Rapesr• (sic) on the }egofa detainee alleged'to ~ye.for9ibly · ·
raped a 15-yesi old fellow detairiee, and ~en photo~bing him naked;"·.' · ·
j. (S) Placing a dog chain or slrap around a naked detain~s nec1i: and having a
female Soldier pose for a picture; .. . .. , . ·
. lc. (S) A ~e MP guard having selt ~th a female detainee; : : · . · . . .
· L (S) USing military :worldng dogs (without J;lluzzles) t'o intimidate and ftighten
· detaineeS, and in at least one ca;se biting and sCVerely ii).juripg a de~~;
m. (S) T~ photograplis of dead Iraqi detainees. . . . · . . ·. : · ' .
(ANN'Ji:XES, 25 and 26) .. ·. · .. · ·
· 7. {u) Th~?Se1initings are an:iply sUpported by~~ conf~sio~provided.by$e.v~ of
· the sUspeCts, written sta~ts provided by detainees, and witness sfatements. In .
'reaching my finding.;, I _hilvc csretblly considered the pre-existing statemcn~· of the .
foll.o wingwitnesses and suspects (ANNEX26):. · · · ~ . . .
·a. (uj·sP¢JeremySivits;372ni:t-MP Conipany-Suspe~ ....
b. (U) SPC Sabrina.Hann8n. :372nd MP· COmpl¢-y-Suq>ed
·c. . (U) SG'f Ja'val S. Davis, ~72nd MP Conipaciy- Suspect·· . . .
c.' (U) PFC LYJl:Qdie R. England, 372nd MP Compsny- Suspect .
d. (U) MelNakbla, Civilian'I'!;anslatcir, Titan Corp., Assigned. to the'205th ~:.
Brigado- Suspeet . . . . . .
e. . (t)) SPC Joseph M. Dsrby; 372nd Ml' Company . .. . . ..
f: (U) SGTNcilA..Wl!llin, J09th·AreaSupportMe,dical Battalion ..
g (U) SGr Sam.Ucl Jefferso'n P~ce, ~Q2nd MI Battalion .
· h (U)'Torin S. Nelsori, Contrlictor, Titlln Colp., Assigned to the 205tb, MI Brigade
· j.· (U) CPL Matthew Scott Bolanger, 3n.n Ic. {U) Sl'C Msthe\V C. ,W~m, 372nd MP 'Company . .
· L . (£!) SSq Reuben R. Layton; Medic,.IQ9th Medical D~~~ ·.
~. '(U) SP 8. (U)'rn addition, sevenil detsinees alsO described the following a'cis ofilbuse; which
. . · under the cirCUmstances. I find. qredi,blo bilsed on the clarity of:th~ ~CJ;Ilo.tits and
· SUJIPOrting ~dence provided by qther wiinesses (ANNEX 26): ,: : . · · · ·
. . ··.1 . .. . • • • •
a. (U) Brealdng chemical lights ~pouring the philsph~~c ·u~a. on !ietaili~;
· b. (U) 'lllreateuing detainees with a charged 9inm pistol; · . · . . .. · · . . .
c. (U) Pouring t9ld water on naked detainees; · _ ·
d: (U) Beating_ detainees _w;itJu bioom.handle and a chair; . .. .
e. · (U) Thieateningmale detainees witfuape; . · : . · . . .
f. : (U) Allowing a mllitaiy police guard to stitch the wound of a detainee who was
.· hUured after bemg slain111ed against the wallin his cell; · ·
g. (U) Sodomizing' a detainee with a chemical light a,nd perhap~ a broom sti~ · · . . . .
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him to do thiiigs, but no!:liiiag was ever in wiithlg h~ would eomplah!, (s_ie ).":
.When ~ed why the_lules in IA/IB were different than the~ of the wings; SGT
Davis stilted: "The rest of the yvfngi are regular·prboners and lAID. _are. .
Military Inte.tug~ee ~ h«!lds." When asked why he did not infotm his ~ain ·
ofeommarid about this abuse,·SGT Davis.statecl: "Because I assumed that if they
were l;lofng things out-of t,lle ordinary !Jr outside ·the guidelines~ S()~eone would .
·have said something. Also the wblg b~ongs to Ml and it appeared· Ml
PetJ~nnehpproved ofth~ abuse.!' S~T Davis aiso staled that he had hear4 MI
· insinuate tQ ~e 8IJIIltls to abuse tf1.e inmates . When asked What MI said he stated:
·"Loosen qlls_guyupfor P.s." Make.sure . liehas a !JadDlght."' "Miike_sure he
gets the ~tmeutl? He ctamied these comments. WC!'I!I made to CPLGpmier iiiJd
SSG Frederick. Finally, SGT. Davi~ stated that (sic): ~e ~staffs tO 1Df ,.
. imderstaJJ.dblg have !J~ giving ~e-: eomplimeilCS on the way he has _been
handling the Ml holds. Exampll!.being statem!lnti like, "Good;Job;·therre ·. .
· b~eilking down ie!1Hll$t. 'fb.ey answer every qu~oil._ 'The)"re giving ~ut good
· infol"Dill;tio~ ~,and ~pup the good work .• Stuff like that."··:. · . . .. . . ·.·· .....
· . c. (i:J}.sPC'Jascin Kennel,·3i2nd MP Company, wa8 Uked:ifhe werepi-eseni ~
any detaiilees were abused. ·He stated: "I saw thein nude, but Ml would ten us to .
. ~awaY. their .mattresses, sheets, and clot;hes." He coUld not recall who in'MI
~~him to do this, but co~ented that, "if they wanted in!' to do that
. .they needed to gjve me papemorlc:" He was later informed that "we col!ld no.~ do
· anything to' embamss ihe p~ers.~· · . · · . . . · · · . . ' · :.
·. d. ~ Mr.'Aifel L. N~~a. a~S civrul!ll eon~ translator. w~ ~~one~f about
· several detainees accrised of rap~ He observed (sic): ·"They (detainees) were'all
nliked. a buneJi,ofpecipie ftilm 'MI;-the MI> were there that night' and the . ·
imuatlls we.t'e 9rdered by SGTGrlllder and SGT FredenC:k ol!llered ~De g'Uys
. while questiciafllg theufto admit wJ,aat·th~y did; They made. !:he:m do stl'angeex:
erdses by sliiling on thdr stouiadi, JUD1P up and down, throw water on·the~
.~d Dwle them s"me wet, ~~ tliem.all kiiids ofull!Jles sucli as "gays~ do ·
they like to iuake love to guys, theu ,._ey handcumd thlm" handS together and
their legs With shackles and started to stack them ·on top ofeae& other by
-~~g .that ,._e lio. ~om guys 'p..e nis will touch IDe guy on to.Ps butt.'' :.
0 •
e. (p) SPC Neil A"}Vamu, 109th' Area Suppm-t Ml!di~ BattaUo~ a medic
testified that:. "C~lA was· uie4 to house high prloricy·cletai!lees ~d ~ 1B
was ·.uell to house tJae high tisk' or trouble milking detahi~~- Diuing my tour.·
at the piisoJ~I obs""~ that wh~ii the Jll!lle detaineils "r~i-e. first brough.t to the
facUity,_ sonie of them-were made to wear fe~ Ui1derwear, whi~ I tJdDk :was
to somehow break.th.emdown." · · ·
. .. .
12. · (UH ~d that prior to its cleploymeut t«!Iraq fqr Operatioil'Iraql Freedom, the
· · 320th MP Batt;aJion ·au.~ the 372nd MP Company had received no training in
deteutioil!internee operations. I also find that very little instruction oi tia.iniJlg waS · .
provi.d ed to _MP personn.e l on the applicable iules .of the Genev..a Conventio.n Rel.a.t.iv.e :
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to the Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar;·FM 27-10, AR 19~8. or FM 3-19.40 •
. 'More6ver,.I find that few, if any, eop~es 'of the Geneva Conventions were ever-made
available to MI_> persQnnel.or detainees. (ANNEXES 21-24133; and Jl;lultiple Witness
· state~ents) · · ·
13. M A;notlier ob~ous examplt~ of the Bri8acfe Leadership l).ot cOmmUnicating with its '
Soldiers or ensuring their tactical proficiency concerns the incident of d~tainee abuse.
::that occurred at Ciunp Bucca, Jrilq. oil May 12, 2003 •. Soldiers from the 223rd· MP
· . C::Oinpany reportecl"to ~e BOOth MP Brigade Command at Camp:Bucc8, that four · · .
. 1filitary Poliee Soldierli fromthe.32Q!h'MP l3a~on had abused a nuoiber of ·
· detain,eeiu:t~'inprocess~ at Camp Bucca. An eXtensiveCID investigation .
. · detertnfued that four soldiers from the 320th.MP Battalion bad.ldcked and beaten·
.. these"detainec:S ·followmg·a tnmsport missio1,1 fromTalil Air Base. (ANNExES 34
ADd 35)· - . .. . . . . . ·. · ·. · . . . ~ . . .
.. t4. (u) ~ormat cl;larges tinder the uCMJ were prefemci a~ these; soidiers wid an · ... : ·.
· . Article-32 InVestigation conducted _by:LTC Gentry;. lie ~mmimded a general·~~ ·
niarti&l.foi: the four accused, which BG Kalpinski supjlorte . ··c:to~ented al!use, th!=t"e is no eviden~ that BG Karpinski ever attempted to remind ·
·.. . . 800tli MP Soldiers of the requin:ments of the Geneva COnv¢ntions ~e~ detainee.
. · · tree.f:!IieiJ.t or took any steps to. ensUie that such abuse was not repeated. Nor ·is there·
. · anY evi!lence ~ LTC(P) PhillabaUnl, the Commander of.i:tui Soldiers involved in the ·
: Cimip Bucca abuse incident, toqk any initiative to .ensure' his Soldiers were properly
: train. ed regarding detain.e e. t rr;atm.ent. (~S·35 an~.62j. . . . . : · . . . . . .
..
. :: ,.· ':- RECO~ATIO~S .AS to PART 0~ OF~ I!ltVESTIGA'I_'IdN: ·.
· .. 1. (lJ) linmediately deploy to the Iraq Theater an inte~ multi-disciilllilie ~obile · . .·.·
· .. · .Training Team (Mfl') camp~ of subject matterexp~ in in,temmentlresettlement
· . . ·. · o~ons, ~te.tnatioilal imll operational law, inform_ation t~ology, facility
... · • llllliliigement, intcirrogation arul'intelligence gathcQn.g feehniques, chaplains;Anlb
. ·. cUituiBI ·awareness, and ~edical praCtices as:it Jle.11ains to IIR.a~vitie& ~ ~
. . . . needs. to oversee lind con4uct comp~eusiye training 'in all aspects bf detainee and
C.O ~C.i l. ,lcmt o.p .~ on, s. · · · · · . ' ~ . . . . . ·. . .. , . . . .•. . . ;_.. . . ,. . . .. · .... · . . . . . . -.
. :: .. · 2. (U) That all military police and lfiilitaiy·intelligence personnel· !nvotVea in any aspec;,; .. · : · •
·. : · ·. : · .' of deta¥Jee operations or inten:Ogation op~ollll in qrF-7, and Subordinatinuuts, · ·
.. · : · · : ·: ])e imm~:Y prQvided:with training by an intemati.onBl/operationallaw attomey on. .
· . . . : ·the ~c pn)visions cifThe Law of Land Warfare FM 27-10, specifically the· · ·
· · · . Qenevi Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners·ofW.!If, Enemy Prisoners
. · · •· · ofW!If, Retain¢ P¢Isonne1, .Civilian Intern~, and Other Petainees, ~dAR: 190.8.
. . . ·.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . .
.. . .
..
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• '3, (U) That a singie conunander in. CJTF-7 be .respo~ilile for pver~ ~ebil,liee .. ·
. · operationS tbroughout the Iraq Theater of Operations. I. also recouimend. that the
Provost M8rshal G!llleral ~fthe Army: assign a niinimwn of two (2) subjeCt matter ·
experts, one officer and one NC(), to 8$Sist q'I'F-7 in, coordinating detainee ·
opemtil)ns •. '• .
. ' • ' • . I • • ' •• ' • . . • : ' . '. ·.'·' •
4. (U). That detention facility commanders and in~gation 'facility commanders ensure
that appropri~ capies of the G~a C0nventio9. Relative tO the Treatment of · ... ·
Prisoners of.W,.j imd notipe pfprotcctions be mafle aV!Iilable In both Engli~ and th~ . ·
detainees' langwige and be prominently displayed In all getention fiu:ilitie$. .
Detainees with questions regaiding !Qeir ~tment should be given the' full . . . ·
.. opPortunitY. to·~·the ~nvention. . · : ·' · . · · · ..
S. (U) Tfiat each dete:Dtion::facili.ty commander aJi.d inteaogation facility co~ander ·
~ublish a complete and comprehensive set ofStanc!ing·Operatlng Procecl~· (SOPs)
re~ ~ent of detainees, and that all personnel be iequhCd to read the SOPs
· · and·~ ~~ent. in'diCating th8t they have read and understan~ the _S~Pil. ·
6 .. (u) -~in ~rdmce ~th therec:O~en~tio~ ofMG RYder's ~~ent iq,ort,
. ll!1d my finding$ and recommendations in this iD.Vestigati~ all tinitS in the Iraq .
.. Theater'of . slipport of Operation Iraqi F~om be QPCO~ for all puiposes, tO ·~cl~action
· underthetJCMJ.toCJTF-7 •. ·. ' . :. . . . . . ' . '. . . . . . . ..
7. (U) AppOini'the C3, CJTF 8s tlte.staffprOPonentf~~dciamec; operations ~.ihe Iniq
. Joint ~eril\ioDs M.ea (lOA).· (MG Tom MiUer, C3, qTF-7, bas b~.appqili.te'd by·
. :coM_C,frF-7) •. , · · · · · · ·
· . 8 .. (u) T,Iiat sn i.p.quily uj> AR 381~10, ·Pro~)s be conducted to' deiemiliie the :
· extent of culpllbility QfMilltstY Intelligence personnel, assignlld to 'the 20Sth.MI .
. · Biigade and. ~e Jobit Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JlDC) reg8rdip.g ab~e of
·.detainees at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). . · . ,.
·. ~. ~-~_it is ~~cal-~ the ~ilent tOr.d~ee operatic)~~ assigri~ a dedicated
. ·. S~or-J'udge Advocite, with specialized traiJ)ing and. knowledge ofintemationill and
:'. ope.r ational law, fo assist. and ildVi~e on r.natters ofd etainee operations:: . . ' . . . .. . . . .
... . ...
.. ;·
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART1WO),
. .
(U) The Jnvestiga~on inquire into d~tainee escapes and
accountabilityJapses as reported by CJTF-7, sp~cific~Iiy.
allegation.s concerning. these eve. nts. at the Abu Ghraib Prison:
. . . .
REGARDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGA'i'ION, . .
I MAKE THE FO. · LLOWING SPEC.I F.i C. .F IND. i.N GS OF F' ACf:. . . .
1. 11le 800th:Mf Brigade wa.S r-espOnsible for theater-~de ~ten)ment and Resettlement ·
. · (IIR). o .p er.a tions.. (ANNEXES .'1 5 and 95) · · · · ~ .
. 2. (U) :pie 320th MP aaitallon, SOOth MP Brigade WaS ~ed with d.etainee operations
at the Abu Ghraib Prison Complex du$,g the time period covered m this .
· · ill.vestigation. (ANNEXES 41, 45, lUid 59)· · . · · . . ·. ·; .· . .
. 3.' (U) The 31 Oth MP ·Battalion, soOili MP Brigade'was tasked with detainee o~eraiions
. · and FoiWard Operating Base (FOB) Operation! at the Camp BliCca Detention Facility
:until TOA on 26 February 2004. (~~ 41 and 52) . · , ·
· · 4. (U). The 744th.MP Battalion, SOOth MP ~ri~e was ~ked wi$ detllil;l~e ~p~tions ·
. '!Ill~ FOB Opc;rations at the HVD J?etention Facility until TOA on 4 March 2004. · ·
· · · (ANNEXEs 41 and 55) · ·
. : . '
5. . cO> The 530$ MP Battalio~ sooi:h MP ·Brigade w~ tas~ wifu detainee openitio~ . .
and FOB Operations at the~ holding..facillty until roAori 15 Man;h.2004 •.
· '(ANNEXES 41 Q.d 97) ·.: ·. · · .
. .
· 6. (U) Detain~ operations include ~111!-tability,·earC, ~il wen being ~f Enemy .. · ..
Prisoners o{\var, Retained Person; Civilian DetaineeS. and Other Detainees; ·as well
, . aa Iraqi~ pn.. · · · ' ,.
. . ' . ..~.... . .
' ·, • •I ' • ., ' •
7. · (U) The acco\llltabilityfor detainees is docirinally an MP ._task lAW FM 3-19.40 ..
. (ANNEX 22) .
8~ (U). There is' a general lack ofknowiedge,.~plemenl,ation, ~d· emphasis ofbasic ·
. legal; regulatocy, doctrinal, and command requirements Withiil the SOOth MP Brigade ·.
~~nd 'its subordinate units. (Multiple witness state1J1entS In ANNEXES 45-91) ..
·:,
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· 9. (U) The handlmg of detainees and criminal ptisonets after in-processing Was· ·
inconsistent from detention faci)it)': to detention facility, !Ximpound to compound,.
encampment to enc.ampm~t, and even shift to shift throughout tlie SOOth M.P.Brigade
A OR. (AN. NEX 37) . . · · . . . : ..
10. (U) Camp Bu~ OP.erated by the 310th MP Battil.ion, bad a ''CtimiPal De!aiiiee In~
Pro.~sing SOP~' and .a .. Training Outline'' for transferting·and releasing d~i:ainecs,
which appea,rs ~ ~ve been follow~: (~~ 38 imdSl) : ·. . · .
. 11. (U) Inooming and ~utgouig detainees are b~g dOCI!lllCnted in the Natlonai De~
Reporting System (NDRS) andBi9metric AUtomated Toolset System (BATS) .as.·. . ·
req$ed.by t;egulation Ill all detention fa,cilities. How~er, it is underutiliZed imd . ·
· ·often does not give a ":real .time" aCCPrlte picture of the detainee population due t6.
· .un~clyupda!in~ (~56) · · . · ... , .
12. (U) There W\IS ~ severe lapse in the accountabi~ty of d~tainees .at t!J:e Abu· 9kiuo
. Prison Complex. The 320th MP.Battalion used a self-created "change sheet" to
document the transfer of a detainee ftoin one loc;ation.to another. For. proper ·. ·
acc6untability,. it is iinperative that these·changc:: shee.ts be ptoc manifest be updated witliin 2;J hours of movement At Abu Ghraib, lhis.pri>cess .
. . would often take as long as 4 days to complete. This lag-time resulted in imlcCurat<:> . detainee IntC!llllUtint Serial Number (ISN) countS, gross differenceS in the detainee
· manifest ·ana the actual occUpantS of an individUal COO¥und, and sigomcarit .
Cl>nfusion of the MP Soldiex:s: The 320th Mil Battalion S-1; CPT 'IberCs;i Delbalso,
:and the .S-3., MAJ p~vid D~enna;explamed that this breakdown wail d1le.tO. the lack
of manpower to ·pro~.s change sbj:ets in a 9Inelymanner. (ANNExES·39 imd, ·98) ·
' . . . '.
13. (U) Th~ 320th Bidtalion TACSOP iequireSde~ee accountaWity at 1~4 ~es
daily at Abu Ghriu'b. HoweVer, a detailed review of their op~onal jouril,als ·
reyealed that these accounts wire often: not done or not docw:il~ by.the Un,it.
. Additionally, there is no .iildicati9ri that accounting errors or the loss of a detainee in
the accounting process triggered any immediate coitective aCtion by the Battalion · .
TOC. ·(~44) . . . . · : .
~ . . . ...
14. (U) There i.S.~~olack of standardization in the Vfay the 320th MP Battalio.n eonducted
physical counts oftbm detainees. Each Com.pound within a given encampment did
· · . their headc:Ounts differently .. Some compounds had d~ee~rlili~ up in lin~ 9f 1.0,
some had them sit in !;OWS, and S!>JD.C moved all the detainees tO o~;~e !'rid of the · ·.
compol..Jlld and counted them as they passed to .the other end of the comporinci. .
(.ANNEX SIS)· . . . . .
15. (U)FM 3-19..40 outlines the need fo~iroli calls (100%ISN band chCcks) per day .
. The 32oth MP Battalion· did this check only 2 ~es per week. Due .to the lack o{ .
· real~time upqates to the system, these checks were regula,rly inaccurate. (ANNEXES
n~~ . .
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16. (U) The SOOth MP Brigade. and subordiiiate units adopted non-doctiinat terms such as
· ''band·checks,"·''roll-ups,'' and "clill-ups," which contributed to the lapses in
accountability and confusion itt the soldier level. (ANNEXES 63, 88, and 98)
. . . '
17. (U) .Operational journals at the various compounds and the 320th BattaJion TOC
contained numerous unprofessiorial entries an4 flippant comments, whiCh highlighted
the .lack qf discipline within the unit. There was no indiciltiori that the joumals were ..
· ever reViewed by anyone in th!:ir ~;hain of command. (ANNEX37) .
· 18. (U) Accountability SOPs were not fiilly.developed and standing TACSOPs were
. widely ignored. Any SOPs that did exist were not trained on, and were never ·
distributed to the lowest level.. Most procedures were shelved at th\: ui:ut TOC, rather
t8h5a)n at the su.b 9rdinate ~t.s and guards mount sites. (A. NNEXE.S 44, 67, 71~ and

19. (li) A<:eouiltability and="" facility="" operations="" sops="" lacked="" specificity="" iriiplemen:tation=""> m'easQres, and a system of checks and b8lances to ensure compliance. (ANNll:XES
. 76 alld 82) . .
..
io. (u) Basic Army Doctrine was not Wid;ely referenced or'utillzed to devei9p the :
. . accountability practiCes throughout the SOOth MP Brigade's sub.ordinate units. Daily
. processing, accoimtabili~, and detainee care appears to have been made up as the
operations developed with reliance on, an4 ·guidarice from, jUllior members of the unit
who had civilian corrections experient;e. (ANNEX 21) . . . .
21: (U) Soldiers w~ poorlyprepared)md vntrained to ~Dduct IIR operations prior to
. 'deployment; at the mobilization site; upon arrival in thllater, and throughout theit:
· 'mis:;ion. (ANNEXES 62, 63, a~~:d 69) · · ·
· 22. (U) The d~ciwnenuition p;.ovided to this i):lvestigation identified i7 escap~ or
attempted escapeS frem the ~etention facilities throughout the SOOth MP Brigade's
AOR. Based Qn my assessment and detailed analysis of the substaiJ4ard · .
acco'unl!lbility process maintained by tl:le SOOth MP Brigade, it is highly !~ely Ulat
there w~e several more unreported cases of escape that were probably "written off'
as administrative err9n or otherwise undocumented. ·JLTI.Cwis Raeder, Platoon
.·.Lead~ •. 3.72nd ~ ~mpany, reported knowiilg abo)lt at least two itdditioJ¥11 es~es .
(one from a work' detail and one from a window) from Alni Ghrat'b (BCCF) that were
not doctimented: LTC Dennis McGlone; Commander, 744th MP Battalion, detailed
· .the escape of one detainee at the lfigh Value Detainee F.acilitywho went to the latrine
anc:l then outran the guards an4 escaped. Lastly, BG. Janis Kaipinsld, Commander, ·
SOOth MP Brigade, 'stated that there were more than 32 escapes from her holding
· facilities, which doC!! not match the number d~ved from the investigation materials.
(ANNlj:XES.S-10, 45; 55, and 71) ·
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23~ (U) The Abu Gbraib and Camp Bucca detention facilities lite significantly over their
intended maxirilum capacity while the guard force is tm.dermanned and under.
· resourced. This ~b!llance has contributed to the jloor living.conditioils, escapes, and
· . acco~ility lapses at the vl!rio.us facilities.. The overcrowding of the facilities also ·
. limits the ability to identify and ~egregate leaders in the detainee population who may
.· .be or~g es~pe5. an.d riots within the faCility. (AN'NExE!l 6, 22, and 92) . ·
. ·, . . . ,. .
. 24. (U) The s~ pl'J)cessing, and release of detainees who should not be in custody ·
takes too long and contn'butes to the overcrowding and unrest in the detention ...
. facilities; There are currently three separate release mechanisms in the theater-wide ..
. internment operations. First, the appr$.~g,)lllit.can release a deiainee if·there is a
. determination that their continued detention is not w~. Secondly, a criminal
detainee can be released after it has been deiermilied that the detainee has no . .
intelligence value, and that their release .would ncit be detrimental to society. BG
Karpinski had signature authority to releas" detainees in this second ·category •. Lastly,
detai'lees· accused of c:Ommitting "Crimes Against the Coalition;" who are held . · ·
·throughout the separate facilities in the .CJTF~t AOR, can be ~eleased upon a .
det'ermination that they are of no intelligence value and no·longer pose a sigDificant
tllrellt to Coalition .forces: The rel~c process .(or this ~egocy of detaiiiee is a
scri:iming by thtl 'oCat US Forees Magistrate Cell and a review by a Detainee Release
· Board ~nsistingofBG Karpinski, COL Marc Warren, SJA, CJTF-!, andMG
.Barbara Fast, c-2, CJTF-7. MG Fast is the ''Detainee Release Authority'' for.
~ees being held for comUrltting crimes against 'the coali#on. According to BG
· Klupinski, · t!rls category of detainll!l.makC!I up more than 60% of the.total detainee .
population, and is the fastest growing caiegory. However, MG Fast, according to BG
Karpinski, routinely dCniCd the board's reco~endatipns to release detainees in this
category who were. no longCI: d~ed a threat and clearly met the requirements for
'release. According to BG.K.arpinsl.;i; the extremely sloy.' and ineffective release ..
process has '$ignificantly eoni:p.'buted to the overcrowcling ofthe facilities.
(~S 40, 4S,:and4il) · . .
25. (U) After .AQ.ti~n RevieWs (~) are not rdutintlly b~g cqnduc~ after aQ. e8~e
· or other· serious ~cident: No.lessons leanied seem to. have been disseminated to · .
· · -subordinate units to enable corrective action at thelowest level. The Investigation
Team requested copies of AARs, and none.were pro:villed. ·(Multiple Witness
Statements) · · · ·
26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and Recommendations :fro'* vari.ous 15-6 . .
lnvestigmons concerning escapes and·accountaJ?ility lapses) -were.rubber stamped as .
appf!)ved and ordered implemented by BQ K.a!pinski, There is nc:J evidence that the
majority of her orders directing the implementation of substantive changes were ever
acted upon. Additionally, there was no follow-up by the command to verify the
corrective actions were taken. Had the findings and recommendations eontained
within their oWn investigations been analyzed and actually implemented by BG ·
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Karpinski, many of the subsequent escapes, accountability lapses, and cases of abuse
may have been prevented. (ANNEXES 5~10) ·
27. (U) The perimeter ll~ around Abu .Ohnu'b and the detention facility ai C~p
. Bucca is inadequate aiid needs to be _improved to illuminate dark areas that have
· routinely become avenueS of escape. (ANNEX 6} . · ·
28. (U) Neither the. camp roles nor the.pioVisions of the ~eva ·Conventions are posted
in English or in the language of the detainees at.ilny of the detention facilities in the
800th.MP Brigade~s AOR, even after several investigations hild I!DllOtated the llick: of
· this c;ritical requirement (Multiple Witnqs Statements aD.!i the Personal . · · ·
Observations of the ~v~tigation Team)· · · ·. · :
29. (U) The Iraqi guards at_Abu Ghia,ib ~GCF) demonstrate_questionable wO.rk'ethics ·and.
loyalties, and are a potentially dangerous eontingent within. the Har-9-Site:. These · .
guards have fumished the Irilqi ~inmates with i:ontraQ~ weapo'ns, ai1d
· information. Additionally, they have fiiCilitated the escape of at leaSt one detainee.
(ANNEX 8 'and 26-SPC Polak's gtat~D_t~~)
30. (U) In gen~, US civilian ~ntract personn~l {Titan Coxporatipli, CACI, etc ... ); third
country nati9nals, ·and local eoniiaetOrs do ~ appear to be properly sUplll'Vised ..
within the-detention facility at Abu Gbriu'b. : Diuing our on~site ilisp~tion. they
wandered about with too much unsupervised free access in the detainee lirea.. :Having .
-civilians in various outtits·(ciVilian and :Deus) in and about the detaiti.ee area causes
confusion and may have contributed.to the diffiCJJ.lties-in the accolin~ility process
and with detecting es!lBPes· (ANifmX 51, Multiple Witness ~tlltementS, and _the
Personal Obser.: v.ations of the i.n vestigatio.n: Tea. m) · ·
. 31. (U) SGMMI!rc'Emerson, oPerations SGM, 320th MP Battalion, ·eontended that the
Detainee Rules ofE.ngagement (D~OE) aD.d the general principles of the .Geneva
Convention were briefed at ·every guard mount apd shift change on Al>u Gb!:aJ'b.
However, none of pur witnesse;s, nor our personal-obSCI'VIItiollB; support his
. ·contention. Bind ~t-,SGM Emerson was not.a crech'ble witness. (ANNEXES 45,
80, and t.h e ~eisonal Ob. servations of the Investigation Team) · ' . . . . . .. ,;"
. 32. (U) s~ in~~-insist~. ~-~e. MP .and MI Soldiers at Abu ~b (DCCI? .
. l'eceived regular training on the basics of detainee operations; however, they have .
been unable to produce-any verifying_4ocumentation. sign~in ro~, or soldiers_ who
can recall the content.ofthis training. (ANNEXES 59, 8P, and the Absence of any
Trailling Records) · · . . .. . . v 33. (SINF) The yarious detention facilities. operated by the BOOth MP Brigade-have · ~
·routinely held pers'ons brought to them by Other Government Agencies (OQA!;)
without accounting for thein, knowing the.ii identities, or even the reason for their 1 \../
detention. The Joint Intc:rrogation and Debriefing Center (1IDC) at Abu Gbraib \ , (\Y
called these detainees "ghost detainees." On at J~t one occasion, the 320th MP ~\}"''
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: · Battalio~ at Abu Ghiilib held a handful of"ghost detain~" (6-8) for OGAs thal they
moved around within the facility to hide them from a Visiting International
·Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)"survey team .. This ptaneuver was deceptive,
· contrary to Arm:r poctrinC, an~. in violation of intemation'allaw. (ANNEX 53)
34. {U) 'D}e following riots, escapes, and shootings have been documented.and reported
· to 'this Investigation Team. Altltough there i~ no data from 9ther inissioll)! of similar
. size and duration to compare the' nmnber of escapes with, the most sigirliicant factorS
derived'from thes.e reports are twofold First, investigations and SIRs lack¢ critical
'data needed to evaluate the. details of each iricident Second; each investigation seems
tO have Pointed to the same.types.of deficiencies; however, little tO noailiig.was done
. to ci>rrect the problems anc~.' to iinplement the recommendations as was Qrdered by BG
Kazpinski, nor was tluire any collJ.!Illlil.d emphas~ to. ens~ theSe deJ;iciencies were ·
correCted: . · · . . · · . . . .. . · . . · ·
. a. · (U) 4 June 03· This escape was mentioned in the 15-6 Inv~stigatioJi
covering the 13 June. 03. escape, recapture, and shoo&~· of detaiJi~. at
Camp ViJPI!IIlt (320th' MP Battalion). However, no investigation or ..
· ·. additional information was provided as requested by this investigation team. ·
(ANNEX·7) . · ·. · .· ....
b. {u) 9 June 03~ root and shootings of five dewnees at .Camp' Cropper.
(11Sth :(\{}>Battalion)· Several detainees. a,llegedly rioted after a de~ee was
subd,ued by MPs ofthe'115tli MP E!attalion after ~triking a gilard in compound
B of Camp Cropper •. A 15-6 investigation by lLT f.\1ilgoW8!1 (I 15th MP
Battalion, Platoon Leader)ilQncluded ~a detainee had acted UP, imd hit an
MP. After being subdued, one of the MPs took offhis DCU.top and flexed
his mUscles to the detaiDees, which further escalated. the riot· The :Ml's were
overwhelmed and the~ fired lethal rounds to protect the life of the· . ·
compoun4 MPs, whereby.'S detainees were .wounded.' ·~ntributirig factprs
were poor commlinicationil, no clear chain of CO!iupaad, facility-obstructed
views 'ofpo~te SOP w11;5 inadequate and outdated (ANNEx S). · · · ·
. " . . ' . . . . . .. . '•
c. (U) 12 June 03-.Escap~ and recapture of detainee #8399, escape and
shooting of detaiil.ee # 7166, and attl!mpted .~cape of an ~d~tified ·
detainee fro)n Camp .Cropper Holding Area (11Sth.MP Battall~n). .
Several·detaiJ:lees allegedly made their escape .in·~ nighttime hours prior to
0300. A 1 S-6 investigaiipn by CP:r 'Wendlandt (11 Sth MP Battalion, S~2)
concluded that the detainees iillegedly escapC!l by crawling under the wife at 11. .
loc:;ation with inadequate lig!l!ing. One detainee was stopped prior to escape ..
An MP of the llSth M;P Battalion search team recaptured d~ee #. 8399,
and detainee# 7166 was shot. and ld)led by a Soldier during the recap~
· .pro~s. Contributing factors were overcrowding, poor lighting, and the
nature of the hardened crimina). detainees at that locatio!L I~ is of particular
note that the command was informed at least 24 hours in advance of the
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upco. escape·attempt and started doing amplified ·mmouncementS ~ ·
Arabic stating the. camp rules. The investigation pointed out thilt rul~.and
. guidelines were n~t posted in the camps in ~ detainees • r,ative languageS.
(ANNEX. 6) . . . . . . · . · .
d. (U) 13 June 0~ Escape and recapture' ofdeiamee # ~96S.'and th:!t shoo~g
· of eight dewnees at Abu Ghr!lib (BCCF) (320th MP ~attalion). · Sev'eral ·
de~ees allegedly attempted'to escape at llbout 1400 hciurs from the Camp .
Vigr11!Ilt Compound, Abu Ghraib (B!XF). A 15-6 investigatiori. by CPT ·
Wyb ( 400th MP Batta,Iion. S-1) concluded that the detainee allegedly ·. ·
~ped by sliding under the wire while the tov,:-er SU~U:d vias tinned .in the.: ·.
other direction. .This detllinee was subsequent!~ ap~ded.liy:the QRF • .' At
about 1600the .same day, 30-40 detainees rioted an4 pelted tbreeil{terlor MJ>
guardS withrOclcs. One guard was injured and the tower guards mea lethal
rounds at the rioters injurili.g 7.~~~~:d ldlliJ;tg 1 detahlee. (ANNEX 7) .' ·. · · . . ~
. e. (lJ) ;05 November 03- Escape of detainees # 9877 a~d # 10739 trom Abu
Gliraib (320th MP Battalion)., .Sevezal dCtainees allegedly, escaped af0345
from the'~l!f(I-Site, AbU Ghraib (BCCF). Ail SIR. was initiated by SPC .
Warner (320th MP ~attalion.. S~3 RTOJ. The SIR. indicated th;it 2 .~ ·
prisoners ciscaped through their cell window in tier- 3A of the H~,Site.· No
infonnlitioil on findings, contributing faetor8, or corrective action has been
providect'to this investigation team..(ANNEX'll) . ·.. .
·.
· .f. · (U) 07 November 03- Esl:!pe ofdetahiee.# 14239 from Abu G~b .(3;2-0th ·
MP Battaiion). A detainee allegc;dly escaped at 1330 from Compound~ of
the Ganci Encm:ilpment, Abu Ghnu"b (B9CF). ·Ail ~IR. was initi$!1 by SSG
Hydro (320th ~Battalion. S~3 AssL NCOIC). The SIR iD.dicate4 that a · ·•
d~ CS\2ped froin the :North end of the compound arid WaS diScOVered .
mi!t'ling·during distribution ot tlie.noon.me81, b11t $ere is no method of escape
listed in the SIR. No information on· findings, contributing fac!ors; or · ·
com:ciiv'e. action. has. been provided to this i.q ve8tigatio.n. .te.a m. (;ANNEX.l2)
g. (U) ~8 Novepilier 03- Es~:ape· of detaineeS# 115089, f# l51623; I# 1SlG14, #
116734, # 1lfi735, and# 116738 from Abu Ghraib (310th MP.BattaU9n).
· S~ detafuees allegcic!ly escaped at 2022 from Compound 8 of~. Qanci'
" encampment. Abu Obriii"b: AD. SIR was initiated by MAJ DlNi:ona (320th ~ · · ..
Battalion. 8-3). The SlRiildicated that 5•6 prisoners esc;aped :from the· North· .
end of the compound, but ther-e is no method 9f escape listed in the. SIR: No
information on findings, CQntributing factors, or correciive .. iiction haS been .
. provided to this.investigation team. (~X 13) · · ·
h. (U) 24 No~einber 03- Riot andshoo$g of 12 detaine~ # 1502~:6, #150894,
. '#153096, 153165, #153169, #116361; #153399, #10257, #150348, #152616,·
#li6H6, .and #152156.at Abu Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Several ..
detainees allegedly began to .riot at about 1300 'in all of the conipo~ds at the
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Ganci encam~ent. This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3 detainees, 9
wounded detainees, and 9 injured US Soldiers. · A 15-6 investigation by COL ..
· Bruce Flilcone (220th MP Brigade, Deputy Coinmander) concluded that the
detainees .rioted in protest of their living conditions; that the iiot turned'
:violent, the. use of non-lethal force was irieffective, and, after the 320th MP
. ·Battalion CDR ex~ed "Golden Spike," the emerge.ncy containment plan,
the use of deadly force was autborize4 .. Contributing factOrs w~ lack of
. comprehensive-training of guat&; poor or non-existent SOPs, no formal
. gUard-mount conducted prior to shift, no reheiu-sais or oligoing training, the .
mix ofless tllaillethal tounds with. lethal rounds in weapOns, no AARs being
condUcted after incidents, ROE not posted and not understOod, overcrowding,
urufOails not standardiZed, and poor cO~unication between the command
. · and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8) . . . · · .. · · ·
. i. ·(U) 24 November 03· Shooting of detain~e at Ab_u·Ghr;ub (320th MP ·
Battalion). A detainee· alleg~y had a p~tol in his cell and around 1830 an
'. extraction team shot biiD. with less than leth~ and lethal rounds in the process
of recovering the weapon. A 15-6 investigation by COL Broce Falcone (i2oth
··Brigade, DeputY CommanQe£) concb,1ded ·that one of the detainees ·in tier 1A. ·
of the Hard Site had gotten a pistol and a.couple.ofkni,v~ from im Iracii. Gw!rd
workip.g in the.en~pment. Immediately upon receipt'ofthis information, an·
ad-hoc extraCtion team COnSisting 'ofMP ani;{ MI personnel c:Ond!!CtCd what
they called a routine cell search, which r~ted in the Shooting of an MP .and
the detainee. Contributing factors were a corrupt Iraqi Guard, inadequate
SOPs, the Detention ROE in place 'at the time was ineffective due to the
numerous levels of authoriZation neede4 fonise oflethal force, poorly trained
·.MPs, unclear lanes of responsibility, arid ambiguous relatiotiship between the
MI andMP ass~; (~ 8)· ·
j. (U)-13 Decem~er 03- Sh~oting liy non-lethal means into crowd at AliU
Ghraib (320th Ml' Battalion). Several detainees allegedly got ilito a
detainee-Qn-:detainee .fight 8round 1030 in Compound 8 of the Ganci .
encampment, Abu Ghraib~ An SlR. was initiated. by SSG Matash (320th.MP
. Battalion, 'S-3 SeCtion). The SlR. indicated that there was a fight jn ~e
compound and the MPs used a non:-l¢W crowd-dispersfug round to break up
the fight, which was successful. . No infoxmation on findings, ·contributing · ·
factors, or c0i:rective action ~ been 'provided to· this investigation team.
(ANNEx14)
k. (U) 13 December 03- Shootiilg by non-lethai me&llS into crowd at Abu .
Ghraib (32~th MP BattaUqn). Several detaineeli allegedly got into a
detainee-on-detainee fight around 1120 in Compound 2 of the Ganci ·
encampment; Abu Ghraib . .Ap. SIR was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP
Battalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that there was a fight in the .
compqund apd the MPs'\!Sed two nOJ1·letha1 ~hots to disperse the crowd,
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.·which was successful. No information on fiiulin~;.contnouting fa~tois ·o~ . . ' corrective action has been provided to this. investigation team. (A.NMi;X IS)
• '• I • • ' .
· I. (U) 13 December 03.- Shooting by non-lethal nieans Into crowd at Abu .
Ghraib (320th ,MP Ba«alio~). Approximately 3o-40 detainees allegedly ·got
into a detainee-on-detainee tight around 164~ in Compouild 3 of the Ganci ·
' encampnient, Abu.Ghrailt (BqcF). An.SIR was .initiatCd by SSG MataSh ·
. (320th MP I;lattalion, S-3 Section). The SIR indieateS tluit there wa$ a fight. in
. the c:Ompound and.the MP~; used a no~~lethal ~wd-disperSing ro~d to break ·
up the tight, which was sui:cessful. No· iriformation on findings, ·contn'buting · ·
f~ots, or corrective action ~."been provided to thisinvestigatioq ~.: . . :."
(ANNE~16) ...
:in. (U) 17 December 03- Sho()~g by no~~Iechal in~Jis of detainee ~ Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). Si3vC!"al detl\inees allegcidly asSlUil~ aii MP
at 1459 i,nside .the (janci ~cainpment, Abu Ohraib (BCCF),· An SIR. was · ·
initi,ated by SSG Matash (320th MP BRIGA})E, S-3 SeCtion). The SIR · . · ·
Uidicated that tliree detain~· assaulted Bll MP i which reSuitecf mth e US!'. ofa
non-lethal shot that calmed the situaqon. Nci information on findings, . .
contributing factorS, or correctiye action has been providcid to th.il! .
iD,vi:stigation- · (~.11) · · ·
· n. (ti) 07 January .04- Escape of 4etaine~ #115032 from Camp Bu~~. (310111
MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped between the h9urs of0445 and
0640 :from Compoimd 12, of Camp Bucca. Investigation by CPT·~· . .
(31 Ot4 MP BattalionS-~) md CPT Holsomb~ (7241b MP Battalion S-3) · · .
concluded that the detaipec c:scaped through an undeteeted weakn~ in the
wire. Contnouting fllctors were ~experienced guaids, Iap,ses in · · . . ..
adcountability; · complac;Cncy, lack· of leadership presCI!CC; poor visibility, anq
laCk of c!Clir and concise. ci?imnunic:atiori between the guards and the.. . . . . .
. leaderShip. (A.NNJ!X 9) . . .·. .
o. (U) 12 January o4- Escape of Detainees #115314 and #109950. as Wt\R aS
the escape and recapture ofS un.kno~ detainees it the Camp Bucc8 . ·
Detention Facllity (310~ MP .Battalion). SeVeral detainees allegedly ·
escaped around 0300 :from.CompoJind 12, of Camp B~ An AR 15..;()":
- InveStigation by LTC Leigh COulter (SOOth :Ml' Brlgild~ OIC t;amp Ariijm: . .·
Detachinent) concluded tpat three of the detainees es~.through the, front
.holding cell during conditions of limited -visibility due to fog.· 9Jte of the .
detainees was noticed, shot with a non-lethal rowul, and returned to his .
holding.ccimpound. That SI!Dle night, 4 detainees exit~ through the wire on
the South side of the camp and were seen and app+Chended by the.QRF. .
Contributing factors were the lack of a coordinated effort for emplacement of
MPs during implementation of the fog plan, overcrowding, and poor · ·
.coriununications. · (~ 10) · ·
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p. (0) 14 January·o4- :Escape of detainee #12436 and missing .J;raqi guarcf
.from Hard-Site, Abu G!Jraib (320th MP Battalion). A ·detainee allegedly
escaped at .1~35 from the Hard Site at Abu "Ghraib (BCCF), AI!. S~ was .. :
initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalion, S-3 Asst N.COIC). ni~ SII(
indicates that an Iraqi guard assisted a detainee to e;~cape by signil!.g hiiri, out ·
on a work de~ and disappearing with him. A~ the time of.the second SIR, :
. neither m,issing person had been located. No information !)n findings, .
contnpu~g faotor8, or corrective ~cti01i has beeii provided tO this · ·
i,nvestiga!ion team._.(ANNEX 99) . . . . · ·
q. · (U) 26 January ~4-: EscaJ'~ of detainees #s 115236, 116Z7Z, an"d l519J3_".
. from .Camp Bucca (310 MP Battalion) •. Several Detainees allegecijy · . .
. escap~ betweerithe hours.o£0440 and 0700 during a p~od ofint~e fog,
Investigation, by C,PT IWres (31 Oth MP Battl!fi.on S-3) _concll!ded that the ..
detainees crawled tinder a fence when -visibility wali only·10-15 mcicri due to ·
fog. ~ntn"butillg faotom"were the limited visibility (dtu:;kness tinder:foggy. ·
conditions), lack of proper ilccolintability reporting, hiadciqu.ate ntmiber ·of
. "guards, commencement of detaiilee feeding 4uring low visJ."bility operatioi:ls,
andpo"o~ly~tedMPs. (~18) ·
36 .. (U) As I have previo~Iyfudicated, this investigation determined ,that there ~as.
virtua.Iiy a: .complete l.aciC of detailed SOPs at any' ofthl) detention tiu;ilitie8; :
· MoreOver, deSpite the faciliti.es throughout iraq (in excesS of 35), AR 15-(i Investigations follo$g. these
·escapes .were simply forgotten or ii!nored by the Brig\lde Commander wi~·no· ·
dissemination to other.facilities. After-Action Reports and Less.ons Learned, if done·
at all, renuined ~individual facilities and were not-shared anrong othe.t ¢911llllll!lders · ·
or soldiers throughout the Brigade. 'I'!le CO~d never issued stancJard ·'IJ'Ps for
handling escape incidents. (ANNEXES"S-10, MUJ~ple Witness.Stat~ments, and
the.Perionai Observations of"die.Inves~gation Team) . . . : . . .
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RECOMMENDATIONS. REGARDIN. G·PART TWO OF m:.;; i.N VEsTIGATibN:. . '• ,. . .
1. {u) ANNEX 1Q tl oft his investigation contains a detailed and referenced series of ·.. .
· recomniendalions fer improving= the detainee accountability practi¢es throughout ·,: . :-
. the OIF area of OP,etations. .. . . . . . . .
. . .. . .. ·. .
2. (iJ) ·Accountability practices thro~gbout any particular deteooon facility must be .
standardized and in accordanee with applicable regulations and international law.
· 3. (U) The NDRS and BATS accounting systems must be expand~ and" used to
their fullest extent to facilitate real time updating_ wh«?Jl detainees are moved ~4
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4. (U) ''Change sheets," or their doctrinal_equivalent must be immediately processed
and IU'datC!l into the system to ensure accurate accountability. The detainee roll . · .
call. or ISN counts must match the manifest provided to the compound guards to ·
ensure proper accountability of detainees.
5. · {U) Develop, s~· and implement comprehensive and detailed SOl's utilizing the.
lessons learned from this inv~tigation as well as any previous findings,
· · recommendatio~, and reports. · · . .
6. (U) SO~s must be written, dissetJ?inated, trained on, and understood at the lowest
level. · · · · . .
7. (U) · fraqi Criminal prisoners niust be.held in separate facilities from any other
category of~~.
8. (U) All of the compounds should be wired into the master manifest whereby MP
. Soldiers Call account for their detainees in real time and without waiting for their
. ·change sheets to be processed. This would also have the change shi:« serve liS' a.
way to check up on the accuracy of the manifest~ updated by each compound. ·
The BATS and.NDRS system ca. n' be utilized for this function. · ' . .
9. (U) Accounll!bility lapses, escapes, and di~ances within the detainment
facilities must be immediately reported thrQugh both· the operational and
administrative Chain of Command vi~ a Serious Incident Report (SIR). The.SIRs
· must then be tracked and followed by daily SITREPs until the situation is
resolved. · · ~ · · · .
. 1 0. (U) Detention Rules of Engagement (DROE), Interrogation Rules of Engagement
· · (IROE), and the pnnciples of the Geneva Conventions need to be briefed at every.
shift chatige and guard Jl!Ount. · ·
. .
11. (U) AARs must be conducted after serious inCidents. at any giVen facility. The.
observations and co~ctive actions that. develop from the AARs must be analyzed
by the respective MP Battalion S-3 section, developed into a plan cif action,
. shared with the other facilities, and implemented as a mattl)i o_fpillicy.
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12: (U)"There must be Signifi~fstrucfural improverlients at eAch oftlie· detelltion·
faciliiies. The n.eeded changes include significant .enhancement of perimeter ·
lighting, additional chain link fencing, sWdng dowri_ of all concertina wire. hard
site developl!lent, and expansion of Abu Ghraib (BCCF) . . . . .
13. (U) The Geneva Conventions and the facility rules must be prominently displayed
in English and the language of the detainees at each 1:9mpound and encampment
at every dete!ltion, facility IA WAR 190-8.
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14. (U) Further restrict US civilians and other contractorS' .aceess tbro1,1ghout ~e
facility. Contractors and civillllllS niust be in an authQrized and easily identifiable .
unifonn to be· more easily disthiguished :from the mass!lS of detainees in civilian ·
· Cloth~: · . .. . · . . .. · ..
. .
15. (U) Faciliti~ must have a stop m6vement/transfq period of ~t least l. hom prior·
to every 100% detliinee roll call and ISN counts to erisure IICC)lrate aecountabjlity.
. •' • • ' • • ,· • ' . :.I • • • ' '
16. (U) The method for do_ing head 'coun~ of detainees witl)in a !liven i;ompouild .
· :must be standardized. · · · · · ·
17. (U) Tho~ inilitary tmits conduCting J/R operations must kno~ ot; traih o~ and · · ·. ·
·const&ntly' reference.the applicable Anny Doctrine and CJ'IF co~d policies.
·The references provided in this report oover nearly every defi.ciencyJ ~ye .
enumera~ Althou&h they c:lo not, and carinot, make lip for leadership Jli!Jrtfalls,
all sol~ers. at all levels, can use them to maintain standaJ:dized .opcit:atiJ!-8. · .
procedqres and efficieilt a~uiltabi~ty practices.
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FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART.THREE) ..
(()) Investigate the training;.standards, .e~ployment; command ..
policies, internal procedures, and c~mmap.d climate in th~ , .
SOOth MP Brigade; as appropriate: · '' .
·Pursuant to· Part Three of the Investigation, ~~lect members of the .
l)l:vestigatiQn team (Primarily COL La .Fate and I) persl)nally. in,t~rviewed tl;te
following witnesses: .. . ·
1, (U) BG Janis ~fusia, CQmmander, SOOth MP Brigade ..
2. (U) COL thOmas Pappas, Coiimuinder, 205th MI B~gade ·
·3, . (U) COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advoca~, CPA ~try of Justic;e
(Interviewed by COL. Richard Gordon. CFLCC SJA} · . ·,
. )'.
4. · (U) LTC Gary W. Maddocks, S-5 and Execuqve Officer, BOOth MP Brigade
5. (U) i::fc James O'H·. are; C~mmand Jud.g ~ Ad~ca.t e, SOOth MP Brigade
· 6. (U) LTG Robert P. Walter!! Jr.;•Commander, !65th MI Battaljon (TaCtical ·
. Exploi~tion. ) .· . . · . . . .. . ·
\ · (U) LTC James D. Edwiuds, Co~der, 2b2n4 Mr Battalion.
8; (0) LTC Vincent Mont.e. i a., Com. mander, 310th.MP. B. a. t.t alion
. .
9. (U) LTC Steve Jordl¢. former Dirc:¢>r, Jqint Interrogation and Debriefing ·
Center/LNO to the 205th MI Brigade . · .
·1 0. '(U) LTC Leigh ·.f._ Coulter, Comm~der, 724th. MP ;Battallo~ and OIC Arifjan
: Detachment, .SOOth MP Brigll!ie . · ·•
1 I. (U) LTC Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion
12. (U) MAi David Hinzman, S-1, SOOth MP Brigade '• .
13. (U) MAJ William p. Proietto, Deputy CJA, SOOth MP Bpgade · ·
.14. (U) MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), 8~0th MP Brigade
15. (U) MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Battalion
.'
(APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 06-Sep-2013
16. {U) MAi ivfi~ael Sheridan, XO, 320th MP 1;3attalion .
17. {U) MAJ Anth.ony Cavallaro, S~3, SOOth l'4P Brigade
18. (U) CPT Marc C. Hale, Co~der; 670fu MP Cpmpl¢y
19. {U) CPT Doruild Reese, Co~ander, 372nd MP Con;,pany:
. •\ . . .
20. . (U) CPT Dairen Hanip. to; AssiStant S-3., lZot.h M. P. Battalion. ·
21. {U).CPT JohnKaires, S-3, 310thMP Battalion . . . . . . .. .
22. {U) CPT Ed Diaman:tis,.S-2, SOOth MP Brigade
· · 23. (i:J) CPT M~c C.'H~e, Co~ander, 670th ¥P Compaily .
. 24. {U) CPT Doiuud Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company ··. ·
. . I . . .
25. (U) CPT Jam. es G. Jones, Conu:ilander, 229thMP Company ; - ' : ' .
. . . ·
26. (U) CPT Michael ~thony Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP Co~PIW-Y . -~ .
· 27. (U) CPT Lawrence Bwb, lO, SOOth MP- Bri8ade
·.·
2S .. (U) ILTLew'is c, Raeder, Platoon LCader, :n2na.MP Company'-· .
. : . ":\ . ' . :
29. (U) ~LT Elvi.s M~ry. A·. ide-..d e-camp to Brigade Commander, SOOth_MP Brigade ' . . . · ...
. 30. (U) ILT W. arren E• .F ord; ll,. Commail&r, HiiC ~20th MP. Bllftalion · . ·. . . .
31. (U) 2LT Da~d 0. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229th ~ Company · . . . . .
~2. {U) CW2 Edwiuli J, Rivas, 20Sth MI Brigitde ...
A • • - • ' • '
33. (U) CSM.Joseph.P. Anington; CommanclSergeantMajor, 320thMP Battalion . . . . . . . .
. .
34. (U) -SGM Pascual Cartagena, Acting Command Setgeant Major, .SOOthMP · :· ,.,
· · B~gade . . · · . ·. ·. . · .
. . .
35 .. {ti) CSM Timothy L.Wqodcock, ~mmand Sergeant MaJor, ~1Oth MP. Battalio~
36. {U) l.SG Da'Wn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th M.P ~patty·
'J7. (U) ·saM Mark Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion· .
' .
38. {U}MSG Brian G. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company · ·
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.39. (U) MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, Operations Sergeant, 31 Oth :MP ·Battalion · ·
4Q. (U) SFC Daryl I. Plud~, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Company
. 41. (U) SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SG. .T ; 372nd. .M . P CompiUJ.y ·.
42. (U) SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company
43.-(U) SSG. Robert Elliot; Squad Leader, 372nd lviP Company .
44, (U) SSG ·santos A. Cardon~.Army Dog Handler, 42nd MP Detachment, 16th MP ."
.· Brigade · ." · . · ·. · · .
45. (U) SGT Michael Sinith, Army Dog H~dler, 523rd MP. Detachment, 937th .
Engineer Group · · ·. · · ·
46. (U) MAl William J. Kimbro; USN Dog Handler, N}.S Sign';d iuld cruilite Unit ... ·.
47. (U) Mr. Steve St~:!tanovyicz, US civilian CQntract Interr~gator, CACI, 205th MI .
Brigade . · · · ·
48. (U) Mf.John Israel, US civilian Contract futerpreter, TitaO Corporaii9n, 205th MI .
B~gade
.· .. (~45-91)
REGAIU>ING pART THREE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE Tm: ..
... . FOLLO. WING. SPECIF.I C FI.N DIN' GS OF FAcr: . .
1. · (iJ) I find that BG Janis ~ld took co~ ofthe.800th MP Bri~ ~n 30 iune
2003 from BG Paul Hill. ·so Karpinski has remained in comniand shlce that date;
. The SOOth MP BrigadC is comprised of eight MP battalions in ili.e Iraqi TOR: I 15th
MP BattalioD, 31 Oth MP Battalion, 320th MP Battalion, 324th ~ Bllttalion, 400th
MP Battalioil, S30tb, MP B.attalion, .724th :MP Battalion, and 744tlt :MP Battali9n.· .
(~~s 41 and~~· · ·' · · ·
. . .
2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski taking·command, meinbers'ofthe 800th.MP Brigad,e_ .
believed they would be allowed to.go ho~e when all.t{le d~tainees were ieleased from
tlie Camp Bucca Theater Jniernment Facility following the cessation of major ground
·combat on 1 May 2003. At one poin~ approximately 7,000 to 8,000 detainees were
held at Camp Bucci!- Through Articlo-5 Tribunals and. a screening process, several
thousand detainees were released. Many in the command believed they would go
. :home whe!). the detainees were released. In late May-early June 2003 the BOOth MP ·
Brigade was given a new mission to manage the Iraqi penal system and several . ·
detention centers. This new missioi;J. meant Soldiers would not redeploy to CONUS . ' ..
:·.
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when anticipated. Morale suffered,· and over the next few months th!'[e did not
appear to have been any atteq1pt by the Co!JUI18.11d to mitigate this morale problem.
(ANNEXES 45 and 96) ·
3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statem~ts of numerous witnesses that soldiers
thioughout the SOOth MP Brigade were not proficient in their basic MOS slcills,
particularly regarding intemin:en~resetUement operations. Morc:over, th~ is no
evidence. that the command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted to
correct them in· any systemic manner Qth~ than ad h!lc:i training by individualS with
civilian corr~ons experience. (Multiple W.tness Statements and the Personal
· Observations.ofthe In-y:estigation Team) ·
4; (U) I fiD.d that the SOOth Ml' Brigade was not adequately trained for a mission that
·included operating a prison or penal institution at .Abu Ghraib Prison Compl!llt. As the
Ryder Assessment found, I also concur" that units of the SOOth MP Brigade did not·
. receive correctio!lll-apecific traiirlng duripg their mobilization period. MP units did
· . not rec:eive pinpoint assignments prior to mobilization and during the post .. · .
mobi~uon training, and thus could not train for apecific missions .. The training that wali aCcomplished at the mobilizatiop: sites were d~ioped and hnplemented at the
. . · company level with little or no direGticin or superyiSioii at the Battalion and Brigade
levels, and consisted primarily of common tasks 1111d Jaw enforCement training.
However, I found no eVidence that the CoiDDl.BD.d, althqugh aware ofth,is deficiency,
·ever requested spCcific corrections training from·the CQmmandant of the Military ·
Police SChool, the US Army Confinement Facility. at·MaDnheim, Geima.ny, the
Provost Marshal General of the Army, or the US Ariny Disciplinary.Barracks at Foi:t
~avenworth, Kansas: (ANNEXES 19 .and 76) · ·
. .
5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a civilian intemee detep.tion miss~ on, .
Brigade pmonllel relied heavily on individuals Within the Brigade who had civilian ·
i:oxreCtionS- experien~ including many who woxked as prison guards or corrections ·
officials in their civilian jobs;. Almost every Witness we interviewed had no
familiarity with the. provisions ofAR 190-8 or FM ~-19.40. It do.es not appear that a
Mission Essential Task list (METL) based on in-theater missions was ever develpped
.nor was a training plan unplemented throughout the Brigade. (ANNEXES ~1, 22,
~~~ . ·. ( ·.,
· 6. (U) I also find,· as dic:iMGRyder's T~.ihat.the 800thMP Brigad~ as a whole, was
understrength for the mission, for which it waS tasked. Army Doctrine ~ctates that an
1/R Brigooe can be organiW! with b~een 7 and.21 battalions, arid that the average ·
. battalion size clement should be able to handle appro]dmately 4000 detainees at a .
time. This hivestigation indicates that BG Karpinski and per staff·did ll poor job
· . allocating resources throughout .the Iraq JOA. Abu Gbraib (BCCF) normally housed
between 6000 and 7000 detainees, yet it was operated by only one battalion. In
contrast. the HVD Facility maintains only about i 00 detainees, and is also run by an
· entire bl$ilion. (ANNEXES 19, 22,'and 96) · ·
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7 •. (U) Reserve ColilpC?nent units do not liave an individual replace.ment ~tem to · . .
mitigate medical or other losses .. Over time, the SOOth MP Brigade ciearly·suffered .
from personnel $ol't!lges through release from active 'duty (REFRAD) actions,. ·· .
medical evacuation, and. demobilization. In addition to being severely undermanned,
the quality of life for S~ldiers as~gn!'ld to Ab~ Ghraib {BCCf) was eiti:en:tely poor,
There was no DFAC, PX. 'barbershop, or MWR facilities. There were n\lmerous ·
mortar attacks, I'l\lldom rifle and IU'Q at_tacks, and a seri,ouil ~t to Soldiers .and
detainees 'in the faCility. The prison complex was alSo' severely overorowded and the .
Brigade lacked !ldequate resources and personnel to resolve seriouS logistiCal · ·
problems .. Finally; because of past IISsociatioris and familiarity of Soldiers within the .
Brigade, it. appears that ftiendship·o:tteil took precedence over appropriate leader anc;l':
subordinate relationships:· .(ANNEX 1~1, Multiple Witness. Statements, and the ·
·Personal Observations of the Investigation .Team) · · .
8~ (U) With respect to t4~~o~ ~ Briiacw ~;ion~ Abu ~-.~~.:~.tfu~ ~t · : ..
there·was clear friCtion aild lack of effective communice,tion -between the ,
.. Co~d~; 20Sth MI Brlgade,·Who c.ontrolled FOB Abu GhciiJb (Bq::F) after i 9
November 2003. and the Co~~; SOOth MP Brigade, ·who.-controlled .detain~ .
operations inside the FOB •. There wa,s no clcm(delfueation commands, little caordination at the,:conimand levei;·and no inte~o!l of the -two · ·. ·
. functions~ Coordination oceuired' at the lowest Jiossible lcwe)s with little oversight by
comma. nders. (AJilNEXE.S .31, 45, ~d 46) .· : · · ·
9 •. (U) I find that this ~biguous co~drelationship was ex~ated by.a ciTF-J.
Fta&!Jlentary O~er (FRAGO) lUIS issu¢ on 19 November 2QO~. Paragraph 3.C.8,.
Assignment of205th MIBrigagc "('.pmmsnder's Responsibili~Cl! for the Baghdad
Central-Confinement Facility, f1t&tes as follows: · · ·
. . .
·. 3.C.8. A. (V) 205 MI BRIGADJ!;. . ' . . . . . . .
·3.c.s. A. 1. (U) Emct.IVE oomDIATELY COMMANJ)ER 205
· MI BlUGADE ,ASSUMES RESPONSmiLITY FOR tim .
BAGHDAD coNF!NEM:ENT FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS . . .
.APPOINTED THE ¥0B COMMANDER. UNiTs ClJRIU;NTLY AT ..
ABU GlJRAIB QJCCF) ARE TACON TO 205 MI BRIGADE FOR
"SECUlU'fY OF DETAINEE$ AND FOB "PROTECITON.'' . .
• • ' • • .: • ·: • •J) ~ . • • . •• • .. • • . • •• •• '• . : ; • •
Although not supported by BG.~~ FRAGO 1108 'made allqfthe MP tmits at .
Abu Ghraib TACON to tlie Cqmniander, 2QSth MI Bri&ade. ·ThiS ~vely' ri:iacle. an
MI Officer, rather than an MP Officer, respoDSlble ror.the MP units conducliJig . .
detamee operations at that facility; .. This is not doCiririaliy soimd due. tO the different.
miss. io. ns and agen. das assigned tC? each. of these respective .s pecia.lt.i es. (~ 31)
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io {U) 1oint Publication 0.:2, Unified Action Anned Forces (I]NAAF),IO I ply 2001
· defines Tactical.Control (T A CON) as ·the d~tailed ~on and control of
movements or maneuvers within the operational area·n~sary to ·accomplish ·
. assign~ missions· or tl!sks. (ANNEX 42) . · ·
. . .
"TACON is the eo~an~ ~:uthority ov~r ailsigned or attached forces or
commands or military capalJillty made available for tasking that is limited t.o
the detailed ·!Jirectlon and contrOl of movel!lents or maneuvers within the
operational area necessary to accomp~b. assigned missions or tasks, ·
.. TACON is inherent in. OPCON and may lie delegated to and exercised.by
conui;J.and~ at any echeioiJ. at o~ below the level of combatant cil~~Upand~.". . .
· 11. {U) Based on iill the f~ an4 circumStances ~ this investigatioD, I find that· there ·
was little, if any, recognition, of this TACON Order bythC: SOOth MP :Brigade.or the
205th MI Brigade. Furtht;r; th . ·Brigade clearly iilfonned the ·Commander, SOOth MP Brigade, and specificaliy·the
Commander, 320th MP Battalion assigned at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), on. the sp~fiq
. requir\lmehts ofthisTAC.ON relillionship. (~S 45 and 46)
12. (Uj it is clear from a comprehensive review ofWitnc:Ss Statements and persOnal · .
intervieWs that the .320th MP BatbiJiori. and 800tf\ .MP Brigade eont4tued to function.
.. ,, .
· as if they were reispOn.s.ible for the security, health and welfiiri; and overall .. security of
· d~eea within AbuGhraib (BCCF) prison, Both.BGK!p:pinsld and COL Pappas .
. ·clearly behaved as if this Wet:e.sfiU the cas.e. (ANNEXES .~5 and 46)
.. '.
·13;. {U) With respect t0 the 320th MP>Battalion, I tmd that the BattalioJ!.·!=!ommandei, .'
· LTC (P) lci:ry Phillaoaum, was an.cxtrcmely ineffeCtive commander and leader.
Numerous witnesses i:On1inn t1uit the'Battalion S-3, MAl DaVid W .. 'DiNi:nna.
baSicallyran the battalion oil aday-to-day.bll$is: Atone point, BO KaipiJ,tski sent ·
. LTC (P) Phillabaum to~ Ariijan, Kuwait fC?r approximately two weeks, .
apparently to give him some ~ieffrom the pressure heWIIS experiencing· as the 320th
'Battalion Commander •. Thlsmovement to Camp Arifjan iriunedi&tely followed a .
briefing provided by LTQ {P) Phillabaum t(! the CITF-7. Commander, LTO Sailcl;lez.
near the end of October 2.003. · BG Karpinski placed LTC RC?nald Chew,, CorpmandCF
ofthe llSthMP Battalion, in charge ofthC 320th MP,Battalionfor a period of
approxiz!lately two .~·eek& LTC Chew .was also in .co~d ofthe.ll5th MP
· · Battalioifassiglied to Ca!np .Croppet,.BIAP, Iraq. 'I ~uld find ilO orders;·~ther
suspending .or relieving LTC (P)-Phillabaum ft:om c6mmand, nor any o~m.plac~
LTC thew in COIIIlilB!Iil of the 320tQ. In addition, there was no indication. this .
removal and.search for a replacement was·comrilunicateilto the Commllli.der CI'ff,7, .
. the Commander 377th TSC, or to Soldiers in the .320th MP Battalion. Temporarily .
. rcmqving one commander and replacing him witli another serving BatWion · .
. COmmander without 8!1 order and without notifying superior or subordiriat~
commandS is :without precedent in my militarY eareer. LTC (P) Phillabaum was also
reprimanded for lapses in accoi.mtability that res:ulted in several.escapes. ·The 320th .
MP Battalion was stigm~tized as a unit due·! previous detainee abuse whi;ch.
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. - . -·
occurred in May 2003 at the Bucca Theater Internnient Facllity.(l'IF), w!lll~ rind~ the
command of LTC (P) PhiUabaum. Despite his proven peficlencies as both a .·. . .
commander and leader, BO Karpinski allowed LTC (P) PhiUabaum to Te.lllain ·in . · ·
ccimmand of her most troubled battalion guarding; by far, the larg~ nuniber of
detainees in the SOOth MP Brigade. LTC (P) ~hiUabaum was suspended from JUs
·duties by LTG Sanchez, CITF-7 Coinmanderon 17Jani:wy2()04:.(ANNEXES 43,
45, and.6t)· · · . . . . ·· . · . ·· . · ·· · · ·
14. (U) Outing tbe course of this inveStigation I co~ucted a iengthy ilitervi~ with BG
K.arpinski that lasted over four hours, and is inCluded verbatim in the inVeStigation. .
Annexes. ?G Karpinski was extremely emotiqnal during much of her testii!lony. . . ·
. What I found particularly distmbing i11.her testimony :waS her eoniplete unWillingne.Ss
to either tinderstand or accept that many of the problems inherent in the SOOth MP
Brigade :w~ caused or exaceroated by pooi: leadershlp and· the refusal oflier; . · .. :
command to both establish and enforce baSic standards and principles among' itS ...
soldiers. '(~45 and theP~nal.Observations oftli,e~terview.Teani). '·
. . . ·. ( . . . . . - . . . .
1~. (U) BG Klirp~ski alleged that she ~ved 110 help from the Civil. Aff;W:s Co.mritiuld,
. · specifically, no assistance from either BG )6bn ~em or COL Tun Reg;in;. Sh~ blames
· much of the abuse that oecuired in A,bu Ghnu'b (BCCF) on MI personnel and stated
· that"MI persorinel had given the MPs "ideas~' that led to detainee abuse. Jn addit;ion,
she blatned the 372nd Company Platoon Sergeant, $FC Snider, the C9riJpa,!1y .
Coinnuinder, CPT Reese, and·the First Sergeant, MSG Lipinski, for the abuse. She
. argued that problems in ·Abu Gbrai,b were the fault of COL Pappas aUd L'i:CJ oicbui ·
because COL Pilp~as was in·cliaqf of FOB Abu . . . . . . . . . ..
l6. (U) BG·Karpinski'also futplied .. duringhertestimonythatthe Criminal ab)JSes t:IU.:t
. occulred at Abu Gbi-aib (BCC~ might have been caused by the ultimate ·~osit;ion
. of the detiiinee abuse cases that originally occurred. at Camp Buc:Ca .in May 2003. She
_stated th8t "about the same time i;hose Jn.ci.denta were taking place out of Baghdad
. Central, the f;iecWons were made to give the guilty people ·at Buci:a plea ·: ·. · : .
bargains~ so;·the system. eommunieated to the soldier$, the worst that~s .go~
happen is, you!re gonna go home.'' I think it. important to point out that almost ·
. . every witness·testified 'that the se;rioils crlininal abuse of detain~ at Abu.~b .
(BCCF) !>¢curred'in late Octqber and early November 2003~ The photographs'and
. statements' clearly suPPort that the ~.uses OcCuned during this time period. Tlie.. . . .
· Bucca:ca.Ses were set fottri81 in I anuilry 2004 and were not finally di~sed of until.
29 December 2003 .. There is ent;irelyno eviden~ $at the decision ofnumciolis MP
personnel to intentionally abuse detainees at Abu Gbrabid (BCCF)~ influenCed in
any respect by the Camp Bucca cases:· (ANNEXES 25, 26, and 45) · ·
17. (U) Numerous ~tnesses stated that the SOOth MP Brigade S-1, MAJ Hinzman and S~
. 4; MAJ Green, were 'essentially dysfunctional, but that despite numerous complBiuts,
these officers were ·not replaced. This had a detrimental effeCt on the l;lrigade Staff's ·
effectiveness and morale .. Moreover, the Brigade Command IudgeAdvocate, LTC · ·
I ames O'Hare, appears· to lack initi~tive and W!IS: unwilling to accept responsibilitY : ·
.. . .
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·for· any ofhis actions: LTC Gary Maddocks, the Brigade XO did not properly
supervis!) the Brigade staff by failing to lay out staff priorities, iake overt corrective
action when needed, and supenise.their qaily functions .. (ANNEXES 45; 47,·48, 62,
and67) · · · · ·
18. (U) In addition to poor morale and staff inefficiencies, I find that the 800th MP
. · Brigade did not articulate or enforce clear and basic Soldier ajid Army ~tandards. I
. sp,ecifically found these ex11111opl~ of unenforced standards:
a. There was no cleat uniform standafd fur any MP Soldiers assigned detentiob.
duties. ·Despite the .fact th;lt huncjreds of former rfaqi soldiers and officers •
w.ere detainees, MP·personnet·were allowed to wear civilian clothes· in the·
FOB ~er duty hours while carrying weapons:. (.t\NNEXES Si aud .74)
b. Some Soldiers wrote poems and other sayings on tl;leir hehnef.c! and soft caps.
· ·(ANN.E xES 51 a.n d 74.) ·
c. In addition. nUmerous officerS imd senior NCOs have b~ · ·
. . . : rq>rlmand~discipliil.Ei4 for mis.conduct ouriD.g this period. Those disciplined
include; (A,NNEXES 43 and 102) · · ·
1). (U) BG Janis.KarpiilSk:i, Commander, 800th MP Brigade .
. . •. . Memorandum of Adnionishpient by LTG Sanchez,
· Comriuulder, CJTF-7, on 1.7 Janll!UY2004.. ·
· 2). (U) LTC (P) J~ J!hillabaum, yo~der, 320th MP Battalion
. • . QOMOR 1i;om BG Karpfuski, Commander ·8001h MP Brigade;
· · · onl 0 November 2003, for lack: of leadership and f take corrective $CCI!rity measures as ord'ered by the Brigade
Commander; filed locally . · · · · .
• Su8peildeciby BG Karpinski, Coinniander SOOth MP Br!gade;
17 Jilnuacy 2004;.Pending ~elief for CauSe, for dereliction of
d~ . . . .
\\ . . . . . . .
3). (U) LTC Qale Burtyk, Conimander, 400th MP Battalion . .
. . • ' GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800th MP Brigade,
on 20 August ~003, fOr failure to properly tr&in'his Soldiers.
(Soldier had negligent.cfisehatge ofM-16 while exiting his
vebic'e, round went into fuel tank); filed locally •.
. 4}. · (U) MAl David DiNenna; S-3, l20th MP B~on
• GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commandei'.CFLCC, on 25
May 2003, for.derelicti6n of duty for'failing to i'epoJ::t a
. Violation ofCBNTCOM General Qr.der #J by a subordinate
Field Griuie OffiCer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer,
which 'he personally opserved; returned to soldier unfiied.
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. . .
• GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Conuilandet BOOth :MP. Brigade,
on .10 Novembet 03, for failing to take coni:ctive security : .
. measures lis ordered by the Brigade Ceimmandei; fiiCd locally. . . . . .
5). (tJ) MAJ S~y Ganity, Finance Officer, SOOth MP .Brigade : .
·;, GOMOR ~LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, Qn 25.
·. May 2003, for viC?lation ofCBNTCOM: General Order #1; · .
COn.suming alcohol with iUI NCO; filed Ioc8ny; · .
6). (U) CPT LeO Merck, C()mmander', 870th :MP. Conipany : : . · ·
· · · • Colii:t-M8rti41 Charges Preferred;. for Copdtict Unbe<:qxiling> · Officer and Unauthorized Use ofG6veriunent Computer iii that
hew~ alleged to liave taken nude'pic;ures ofhis t'ea\lile · :. ·
· · Soldiem Wi~out th,ejr kqowledge; Trial date to be atuioQ)l~. . ' . . . . .·.. . ..
1); (U) CPT. Damatis Mo~es, Commander, ~7oth :MP Comp~y . · ·
· ; . • QOMORfromBG Karp~, Commander 8~MP B.?.gade,
on 20 Augo,st 200a, for failing to properly train his Soldters .
· · (Soldier had negligent discharge ofM-'i vebi . .
8). M ~M -Roy .Clement, CoD)mand sert.eant Ml\ior, SOOth M;p Brlgade
· • · GOMORand Relief for Cm.se from BG Janis ~inski, .
Commander SOOth J4P B!igade, for frat~oil and. . ·
dereliction of duty':('or fi:a;ternizing WithjUmOl' enii~ed SOldiers.
Within his w'tt; GOMOR offi~ally filed and he was remqved
fu!m the CSM list. · . . ·. . . .
..
9): (U) CS;M EdWard Stotts, Command.Sergeant Major, 400th :MP
.. . Battalion .. · · · ·. · . .
• GOMOR from BG Kaxpinski. -Coinmaiuier SOoth M.P :Bi::i~e,
on 20 August 2003, ·for fliUing to pro~ly tt~ his .~oldiem'
'(Soldier had negllgent'diScharge ofM-16 while ~tini his
• vebicle, round wept in~ fuel tank); fiJ,ed lp.cally · ·
10). (U).lSG Carlos Villanueva, First Sergeant, 770$ M.P Cc;!mpany . •. . .
. • GOMOR from BG Karp~ Commander ~OOth ~Brigade,
·'on 20.August 200~, for failing to propc;rly ~am bis·.soldiers .
. ·· (Sol~er had liegllgent dischargeBfM.t6 while exiting his · ·
. vehicle, round ~Cilt into fuel tank); filed locally. . . · .
· ·11). (U) MSG David Maffett, NBC Nco: soOth M.P Bri~ade, ·
• GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC; on 25
May ~003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, ·
<:qnsuming alcohol="" filed="" locally.="" .=""> ....._, /\~
t£\PflROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 06-Sep-2013
12) . (U) SGJY.{ Marc Emerson, Operatio~ SGM, 320th MP Battalion,
• . Two GO Letters of COncern and a verbal repnmand from BG
.Katpinsld, Co~ander BOOth MP Brigade, for failing to adhere
to _the gU:idanceidirectives given to him by BG KazPii)Sld; filed ·
locally. · ·
d. {U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not:enfurced.: LTC Robert P. ·
· Wl!liers, ·Jr., Commander of the !65th ¥ilitary Intelligenee Battalion (I'aeucal
Exploitation), testified that the saluting policy was enforced by COL Pappl!S
for ali~ personnel, and that BG Karpinski approaChed COL P~ppas to :
· reve:Q~e the saluting Jioli.cy back to a no-saluting palicy as.Previously eJcisted. ·.
(ANNEX53) . . . .
19; (U) I find thatindividual Solciler.~ Witinn the SOOth MP Brlgade lliJd.the 32Qth . :
Battalion stationed throughout h1lq h8d very little i:ontact during their tour 9f duty .
with !lither LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG Karpinski. BG .Katpinski ctainiecJ. dUring her ·
tesfiril.ony, that she paid regular visitS to the various detentio.ti facl)ities where her
Soldiers were stationed. Howev!:r; the detailed calendar ptov:ided lc>y her Aide-de- .
· Camp, ILT Mabry, . stated that they rarely saw BG Karpinski c;>r LTC (P) .J;'hillabaum; (.Multiple Witae_ss
Statements) · . · · · · ..
2(). (U) In addition I .find :that psychological. factor:,; such .8s the tfitr~ee·in culture, the
Soldiers' quality o:flife, the reid presence of mortal; danger over an extended time
. pepod, and the failure of ci>mynanders to recognize these pressilres coritnouted to .the
perverSive atmospjlere that ~at Abu Gbraib (BCCF) Dete11tion Facility and
throughout the SOOth MP Bn~. (ANNEX 1). · . . . · . ' .
. 21. As 1 have.~cumented in other parts ofthis.inv~gation, I find that there was no :
clear emphasis by BG Kmpiilsk:i to ensure that the BOOth MP Brigade Staff, · .
Commanders, and Soldiers were. trained to standard in detamee.operations and. ·
proficiency or that serious acco)llltability lapses that ocCu:rred over a. signilicai~ot .
period of time, particullirl.y at Abu Ghraib (BCCF), were coxreCted.. AR 15-6, · ·
Jn:vestigations regardirig detairiee escapes were not aCted upi>n, followed iJp with ·
correcti"!' acii.on, ·or ~C!Dimited to .Subordinate c(lllllJili.nders or ·scildi~: Brigade
and unit SOPs for de3ling with detainees if they existed at all, were not read or
understood by MP Soldiers assigned the difficult missio~ of detain~ ~tions. . ·
·Following the abuse of several detainees at Camp Bucca in May 2003~ I 09uld find no
evidence that BG Kaqiinsli ever ditectecf COIIective training foiher soldi~ oi:. . ~ ·
ensured"that MP Soldiers 1hroughout Iraq cle8rly tmderstood the requirements of the ·
Geneva Conventions relating to, the treatment of detainees; (Multiple Witness · ·
Statements and· the Personal Observations of the Investigation Teiun ~
_,.... I 1\ I
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!APPROVED FOR.RELEASE DATE: 06-Sep-2013
22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was fonnally admonished in w.riting by LTG
. Sanchez regarding the serious deficiencies in her Brigade; LTG Sanchez found that
the pert'orman()C! of the SOOth MP B~gade had not ~et the stanililrds 'set by the Army·
or by CITF-7. He found that incidents in the preceding six months had occwred that ·
· ·reflected a lack of clear standards, proficiency and leadership within the Brigade.
LTG Sanchez also cited the iecent detsinee ®tise at Abu Ghralb (BCCF) as the most·
.. ·recent example of a poor leadership climate that "permeates tbe .Brigade." I totally
concur with LTG Sanchez' opi!lion regarding the p~rmancc ofB'G Karpinski arid
. . the SOOth MP ~rigade. (ANNEX l02.and the f4!I'Sonal Observa~ons of the ·
ln'l:'estigatJng Officer) · · · ·
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART THREE OF TH. E INVESTIGATION: ··· ~ .
1. cu) That B9 Janis L. Karpinski, C~mmande!-"; SOOth.MP Brigade be Relieved
fro!ll Command anf;l given a General Officer Memorandum ofReprimand for the ...
folloWing acts which have been previously referred to in the aforementioned
filidings: . . . . .
• Failing to enswe thatMP Soldiers at th~level detention facilities ·
throughout Iraq had appropriate SOPs for d.ea!ini with detaiiiees and that
Commanders and Soldiers had read, und~d, and would adbere to ¢ese ·
SOPs. . . . . · . . . · .' . . . . . . .
• Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers'' in the SOOth MP Brigade knew, understood,
and adbered to the protei:ticms afforded jo detainees in the Geneva Convention .
Relative to the Treatment ofPrlsoners of War. . · . · · · . · ·
• Making material )irlsrepresentations to the Invqstigation Team as ·to the
frtiquency of her visits .to .her subordinate commands. . ·
• Failing to. obey an order from.the CFLCC Commander, LTG McKiernan,
regarding the withholding of disciplinary authority for Officer and, Senior
· Noncommissioned Officer misconduct : · ·
• Failing. to take appropriate action re,8¥ding the ineffectiveness CJf a
Subordinate Commander, LTC (P) Jeny Phillabaum.
• Failing to take appropriate aCtion 'regarding the ineff'ecj:iveness ofniunerous .
memt;ers ofher Brigade Staff including her XO, S-1, S-3, and S-4. . · ·
. • Failing to pioperiy ensure the results and recommendations of the .MRS and
numeroUs 15-6 Investigation reports on esc:aPes and shootings (over: a period.
of several months) were prop!ll'IY disseminated to, and understood by,
subordinate cc:immandets. · • ·
· • palling to ensure and enforce biisic Soldier standilrds throughout her
~~ . .
• Falling to establish a Brigade METL ..
• Failliig to eStablish basic proficiency in assigned tasks for Soldiets
throughout the SOOth MP Brigade. · · ·
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• · Failing to !mSUI'C thai numerous and reported accountability lapses at detention
facilities .throughout Iraq were corrected. · · ·
, ..
2. (U) That COL.Th~nw M::Pappas, C~mm~der; 20~th MI Brigade,ioe 8iv~ a
General Officer Memorailduni of Reprimand and Investigated UP Procedure 15, AR
. 3 81-10, US Army Intelligence Acti'Vities for .the fo!Jowing acts wmqh have been ·
pre'Viously ~~ to~ the aforeinentioned :findings': · · · ·
~ • ·Failing to CQSUre that Sold!~ lln4er his.direct c:Oininand w# properly
4'ained in. and folfowe:d the IR.OE. · .
io .. Failing to en.Sure that Soldiers uuder his direct cafi:!mand knew, Understood,
. and .followed th« protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva cOnvention
Relative to the ~~ent ofPrisoners ofWar. . . . . . .
• ,Failing to properly supervise his 110ldi.ers worlcing and "visiting" Tier 1 of the
Hard-Site at Abu Glir!u'b (Bt:!CF), . . . . . .
3. (U) That L 'I;C

·'Relieved frqm Command, be givmi a General Officer Memorandum ofR,c;primand,
and be re~neived from. the ColoneV0.:6 Promotion List for the followirig acts which
have been prevwuslyi:ef~ to in the lifo~e.ntioned findings: · · · ·- . . · .
• . Failing to properly CJisure the ri:su!ts, reC:omincindations; and Af,RB from
. ni!MerOUS reporl$ Oil escape{Biid sh90tings OVer a.pen'Cid of SeVeral months
· were properly disseminated to, lind understood· by, subor~e8. ·
• ·Failing to' imp1~ent the apP-ropriate recommehd.ati~ns from various 15-6
Investigations as specifically directed by BG Kmpinski. . ·: · .
• Falling to enSure tluit Soldi~ -wider his ~·commllll!i were liropeily
trairied in Iil.ternment and I&settlemen~ Operations. . · .
• · Faillilg to· erisure that Soldiers ~iir his direCt command knew and understood
thCf protectiqns afforded .to d$inee8 in the 9eneya ~onventiCin Relative to the
Treatme11:t ofPrisgneis .ofW !II'· . · · · . . · · ·
• Failing·tO properly supervise his soldiers worldng and "visiting" Tier l oftb,e
. . Hard-Site at :Ab~ Ohnu'b (BCCF). . . .
. .;. Falling. tO properly establish and c;nforce blll!ic soldi.er standards, proficiency,
. ·and accountability. . · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
. • F~ to co~duet an approprla!C ~ion Analysis ~ tp task or!anize to.
. accomplish his m. ission. . . ·. . . . . . . . ·. .. . . ' .
4. .(U) 'I'h8tLTC Steven L. JordaD, For~~r D~ector: Joint Interrogation and
j}eliriefing Center and LWso!i ()fficer tp 205th Military Intelligence Bri~ad~ be
relieved from duty and be given a General Officer M~orandum ofRq~rimand for the
following acts whl,ch haY!' been previousl:r~ferred to in the aforementione4 ~dings:
• Making materiaJ misrepresentations to the In~estigating Team; including his
leadership i:OU at Abu Gbraib (BCCF). ..
• . Failing to ensure that Sol4iers undCJ: his direct control were properlytrairied in .
. and followed the IR.OE. · · · ·

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• . Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control knew, undeistoo(l, and
followed the proteCtions afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.· · · ·
• Failing io propQ;ly· supervise soldiers imdii l!is direct aUthority working and·
''visiting" Tier l of the Hard:Site at Abu 'Ghraib (BCCF). . ·
5. · (U) That MAJ David w. DJN~a, Sr.,.S-3, 320th MP Battalion, be Relieved'from · · ·
· · hjs position as the Battalion S-3 and be given. a'General Officer Memorandum of
·.Reprimand for the :fell{ owing acts which have l:leen previously refem:d. to in the
aforementioned findinp: · · · • · · · ·
•· Receiv~ a GOMOR fiom.LTG McKi~ Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, fur dereliction of duty for f!lil.ing to repOrt a violation of CENTCOM •
GCn~al Order. #1. by a.~bordinate Field .Grade Officer and Senior
. Noncommissioned Officer, which he· personally observed; GOMOR was .
·lefumCd to Soldier .and· not filed. · ·
.• · Failing to take oorrective B:ctio~ and inipiement recommendations from·
Various 15-6 investigations ·even after receiving a GOMOR from BG ·
KarP~ Coinmander 8000,. MP Bri8ade, on! ri November 03, for fallii:tg to
····,take corrective security measures as ordered;' GqMOR was filed locally.· · .
• Failing to take appropri~® a~on and r~rt 1111: incidCn,t of detain~ abuse;
wberebyhe ·persoruilly witnessed a Soldjer throw·a detainee from the back of·
.~ . . - . . .
· ~. · (U) That ·CPT Donaid J.Rees~ Cowmander, 372114 MP Company, be Reliev~
from Commlind and be given a General Officer Memorandum: of Reprimand for the
. following acts .which have been prCviously referred to· iii the aforementioned fiz\cjings:
• Failing to ensure that Soldik under hili 'direct command knew lind understOod·
the protections· afforded to detainees l1i the Geneva ~nvll!ltion R!llative to the
Treatnient ofPris6ners r>fWat.. . . . · . . .
• · Failing to properly supervise his Sol~eci working.~d "visiting'' Tier 1 o.fthe ·
Hard-Site·at Abu. Gbraib (BCCF). ; · · · ·. .
• Failing to prppei:ly esfablish·and enforce ba.Sic soldier stsndards, proficiency,
and accountability. · · · · · · · . · · .
• FniliiiJ to ensure tb~ Soldiers under his .direct coinmand were properly · ·
trained in Intl'J.Uilllmt ~ Resettlement operatiops. . ·. . ·
• . I • . ' •
7~ (U) That ILT Lewis c. Raecler, PlatoQil Leader,.372nd M:P CompaD.y1 be Relieved· '
. :from his duties as Platoon Leader and· be given a G.e'neral Officer Memorandum of · .
_Repr!mand for the followingaC:ts which have been preVionsly referred to' in the . ·
aforementioned findings: · . . • · ·
• Failitig t6 ensure that Soldi~ under his direct oo~and knew and understood .
the protections aff9fded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relat\ve to the ·
Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar.
• Failing to p.lysupervise his soldiers working and.''visiting'' Tier l of the
Hard-Site at Abu Ghraili (BCCF). . · .
• F8iling to properly establish artd enforce basic Soldier stsndards, proficiency,
and accountability.
',•
JAPP.ROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 06-Sep-2013
... : .
• Fainng to ensure that Soldiers under his direct ccimmand were properiy .
trained iil Internment and Resettlement Operations. ·
8. (U) That SGM"Mar~ Emei&on, Oper~Uons SGM, 320th MP Battalio~ b~Rdi~ved
from his duties and given a General Officer Memorandum of Rep~ for.the · ...
following acts which have beet! previously refeaed to in the aforementioned findings: ·
• Making a material.misreprescmtation to the llives.liiati had "nev.er" been admonished ori:epJ;imanded by BG"rwpinski, when in fact.
he had been admonished for failing to obey an 'order from BG Karpin$ld to'
"stay out of the towerS" ~t the holding faCility. .
• Mak.iJig a material rili~epresentation to the Invc:Stigation Teiun sf4fil:lg .that he· : ·
had attended every shift change/guard-mount conducted at the 320t!i MP · · ·
Battalion, Bll.d thBt he personally briefed his S_oldiers on the proper treatment
of detllinees, when in fact numerous sta(ements contradict this assertion. · · ·
• Failing to ensUre that Soldiers in the 32Qt:h MP B~on imew an4 understood.
the protections afforded to 9et8inees in the Geneva COnvention R~ative'to the.
Trea.tment of Prisoners of. War.· · · ·
• Failing to propeily superVisll hiS ~ol~iers working ~d «visimg; TiCr. ~ of. the .
Hard,Site at 'Abu Ghrail:! (BCCF);· ·. : ·. · . . . · . ·. . .
• Falling to properJy~lisli l!lld enforce basic soldier standar~. proficiency, ,
and acco\Ul1ability. · . . . . · · .. .. . ·
• Falling to ensure that his SoldierS were ·properly trained in Inteniment and
Resettlenient Opllflltions. · ..
. 9. {u) That lSG Bri~ G. LipJnskft :rifrst Sergealit,'372nd MP Coinpimy,be .Reli~ed .
· . from his duties as first Sergeant oltP.e 37~d MP Company and given a Genertll
Officer Memorandum of Reprimand for the followilig acts Which have b~ . .
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings: · . . . · · ·
• . Failing k, ei.sure that. SQldim in. ttie 3 7~nd ~ Company knew~ · .
· underSto.od the protections afforded to detainees in the Gen~ Converitio'!l
RClative to the Treatment ofPrisoners of War. · · · .
•. Failing to properly supelvise his soldierS .working and ·~sitirig'' Tier 1 of the
Hard-Site at Ao11 Ghral'b (BcpF). . . . . .
• Fa.ilin'g tO properly establish and enforce basic soldic;r standar4s, profici~cy.
and aecountaM!ity.. . . .
• .f~g to en$ure that h,is S.oldiers were proptrly trained iii Interriment and : ·
Resettlement Operations. · · · · ·
/ .. . '·
1 o; (U) That SFC Shannon K. Snider, Platoon Sergeant, 372nd MP Compimy, be·
Relieved from his duties, receive a General Officer Mempranduin of Reprimand, and
receive action under the Unifoi:m CodC of Military Justice for the following acts
which have been pfeviously referred to in the aforementioned findin~: ·
• Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platOon knew and understood the-
. protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva Convention Relativ!'l to the
Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar. . , .

t'\PP.ROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 06-Sep-2013
. · .. '
. ·'
. · • · Failing. to properly superVise his soldiers working and ''visitmg" Tier 1 of the
. · Hard-Bite at Abu Ghrpt'b (BCCF). : · . .
· • · Failing to pro~e:JY eStablish. and enfo~ basic soldier ~m:ds; proficiency, . ·
. and accountability. . : · · ·
• .. FailiDg to erisure that his Soldiers were properly ~ed ui lntemm~ wid ·
· Resettlement Operations; · · · .
~ Failing{!) repo~ a Soldier, wh.o under Iiis direct eont:rOI, abuse,f detamees by
· · stomping on their bare~ and feet in liis presence. ·. . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
· · · i 1. (U) That l\11". ~teven Stephanowfa,.Contraet US CiVruan Interrogator, CACI, .
. lOSth ·MlJitary intelli~ce Blig~de; be given an Official R.eprimlm!l to be placed in · · ·. ~s emplojJ;nent file, terxninati.on of employnient, and gCii.eraliOn ofa derogatory
·ICJIO~ W:~lce his secliritY.'clearance for the foDowin3 ai:ts .which have been
previotisly Jeferred to ii1 the atPrem~oned fin~: . · . ..
;. . . ~ Made a false siatement~ the investigation tCam re~ the lQCations ofhis
. · · ·. · · in~gations, the acti~ti~ duriilg~ intetro~!IDS.ll!ld his knowledge of
.. abl!SCS. . . . . .. . ·. . ..
li ::Allowed and/or insjructed MPs, who were not traiiled in Jnterrogal:ion . . . . · ....
techmques,. to ·facilitate intqrogillions by "setting conditions" which were .
. neither auth!>riZ~ lind. in. aCCQrdance with. applicabl«~ regulatio*Jicy. He
.. c.l early knew his ~ctions'e'quatecl to physical abuse. . . · ' . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12. (U) nat Mr. J~hn Israel, Contract us · MlJitarr Iidellfgeilee Brigade; be given an Official J,tepi:imand tO be place . ·. : . employment file 1lnd haye his security clearance reviewed by competent authority ~or '·
·i:heti:illowing'acts orcori~ wln~have been previciuslyreferred·to in. the . ·
. . . afo.r em en!•io n ed fin"' . . . ·. . . . . . . .. . .~'0&"· · : · . · ·. ·
·, · • . Dem~ ever havhig.seen ~galion procesSes in violation of the IRO!t
whith is contrary to ~eral witneSs statemc;nts. · · · · · · · · .
· . ·. ~ Dici~thave'as~tyclel!.rance.- · ·.. · ·· ··.. · ·
. . . . . . . . ; . ~\ . . . . . '~ .. ' . . . . . . . .
·. · · . 13. (U) .Z fiml'that there iS sufficient credibl.e infonn~on to )"arrant an Inquiry UP· · .
· · ~IS, 'AR 381-lO,US.ArinylntelligenceActivities, :be conducted to. .: . . · ~e the extent of cutpab.ilitY ofMl.persOJIDcl, assigned io tbli 20Sth.MIBriga.de .
...
. . .!mdthe.Ioini l'ntcaog,ationand ~~~ Ce:Q.ter (~C) atAbi:i' Gh.niib (BCCF). · · . .:
. ·. ~l:llllly, I~.fuatCOL·Tho.uuisM..-Pappas,LTC.Ste:YeL.~oi'dan,Mr. .. .. : .. · ·
. Steven Stephanowlcz, and Mr. Jo~ .Israel were either directly or indirectly . ,· . : .
resp . iliscipJinary BctiQn as descri'bed in the ~ing p&r!lgrapbs !IS well as the illi_tiatio~ ~f
· ·a·~=~ IS Inquiry to detemliil~ the full t;lttent of their culpability •. (~ 36)
.. . . . ·o1'BE.R FINDiNGS/. OBS.E RVATIONS ·
. .
.. I .. (u) Due'to the· nature and scope of this invel!tigation, I acq~ .the assis~ ofC9l
.. , (Dr.) _Henry Nelson, a USAF Psy~trist, to analyze the investigation materials frOm '
. a psyclJ.ological perspectiv~. He determined·that ~was evidence tbatthe honific
: .
JAPPROVEB FOR RELEASE DATE: 06-Sep-2013
.. '
...
. . . .. ·.... .:
. ·.·
. .
... abuses suffered by the di:l:ai!iees ~t. Abu Ghraib (BCCF) were wanio~ acts .o~ sel~ ·
sol4iers in an unsupervised and dangerous setting. There .was a complex interplay of
· mimY,psychological-filctors and ciommand in$ufficiencieS, A.n;toi-e detailed analysis· .
· is contained in ANNEX f of this inveStigation. · 2. (U) Durhi.s the-course ofthis investigation I do!iducied ~lengthy inte,rv.iew :with BG. ·
· ·. Kazpinsld ~ 1~ over four hours,' 8n4. is in_cluded verbatim hi the investigation
Aimex.es. BG ~~~as extremely emotional dUring muCh ofh_er testimony.
. , . . WhaU foun~-~~CIJlarly distQrbing in her ~ony was her complete unwillingness
to ei~ei: underst!md or BC Briga4e·were caused or exacerbated by po()r leadership and the refusal oflier .
' -·
. . ·mmaud ~ both establish and enfon;e basic standards mid principles among its · ..
. S?ldiei!l. (~ 45)_, 3.· (U) Thio~o~ the inv~gation. we.observ¢ m~yhtdivid~ SolcHers and ~'md. ·
8\iQordinate~ts;underthe 800$_MP J;mgade ~t ov~e significant ob~les, · .
.. perse:vered in .~emely poor conditions, and upheld ~e Anny Values. We .
· . discoy~ numerous examples cifSoldiers .!Uld _Sailors taking llie initiative in the :
. ·absen~·oflead,e®ip and accomplishing their ~i~ed tasks.·
( . . . .
·.;;; ·(u} The 744th ~·)3a~on. commalj4edbyLTC ~s McGlon.~ . . - .
.' ·, efficiently operated ·tl1e HVDDetention Facility at Canip CrOpPer~ met
· · . ~onreqimeni_ents with little to n!) gl!idance frOm th~ 800$ MP Brigade;
.. 'IliC unit was disciplined, pl,O:ficient, and apPeared .to understand their basic ~: . ,. '. . . . . .. . ..
·b. (U}.~~·S3QthMf ~~o~ comm~pd~ byLT~ S~heilJ.N~votn~, ·
· · ~vely JIUI.intained the MEK Detention Facility at Camp~ His
. . · .. Soldier-a were ~:ficlenfin their indiyi4ual tB$ks and adapted -well to this· -
.'.
. ·. -·higbly'uniqu~ andnoiHloetrinai_opel'at!on. · ' ·
. · :·:~ (ti) The ~ ~Sth~ Battalio~ ·~celled. hi.pro~ding pen:eter security~ .force ·
·,protection ai Abu Gbraib (BCCF). LTC·Rob~ P. Walters, ]r;; demanded._ . .'
· • · . . ·.~be ·enforeCd ~d worlced endlessly to impr9vedi$cipline throughout ..
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theFQB. · .· . . .
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4. (U) The ~dividual Sotdiers and Sailm that we observed and blilieve should'be
· favotlblynotfl!i in~e: · · · · · · · · ·
a.. (U) Mas~at-Aims First"Clilss wuliam J. Kimbro~ U$ Na\ry D~g Handler~ .
· knew bis duties and refUsed to· participa~e in improper interrogatiops. despite
. · significant~ from the MI persomiel at Abu Ghraib. . · ·· ·
. . . . . .
· b. (U} SPC Joseph M Darby, l721id MP Company disCoVered evidence of abUse
a. nd tumed it over to .m ilila!y. l aw ~. ent.. : · ·. · . . ..
c. {u) lLT David 0. Sutton, 229th MP Company~ took .immediate· action and
· :· ~an abuse, then reported the incident to the· cll8in of cOmmand: ·
.. '
.. . ... CONCLUSION
. . . . •. . \. ·. . . . .
:' . .1: (U) SjWeral Us Anny Soldiers have·co~tted egregi · hitemational·law ·at:Abu· Ghraib/BcCF and Camp Bucca, Imq •. Fiutheanoie, key
; seniorteaders in both the BOOth MP Brigade and the 205th MI Bi:i&ade Med to· ' .
· comply .with establiShed regulations, policies, and co_I!ITl!and direc::tives ·in preVenting
.detainee abuses at Abu .Ghnu'b(BCCF) and at Camp B~ during the period August
2003 to FelnuarY2oo4. . . . . .
. . . . . . ~ ' : . . . .
. .2. · (U} ApproVIili!Jld unplem~tatian of the reconimendatious of this AR tS-6
;Investigation 1111d those higl;dighted in IJil'vious assessments· are ~tial tQ. cstablis.li
. tho coilditious with the resource:rand j>crso~e' reqUired to p;went future. · · . · :
QcCurrencCs of detliinec:i abu. se. · .. .. · , · . ·
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JAPPROVEQ FOR RELEASE DATE: 06-Sep-2013
' : .
Annexes· .
I. · Psyc:hological.Assessnient .
. 2. Request for investigation from GITF· 7 to CENTCOM
3. Directive to CFLCC from CENTCOM .directing investigation
4. Appointment Memo from CFLCC CDR to .MG Taguba
5. IS-6 Investigation 9J~c 2003 .
. 6. 15-6 Investigation 12 June 2003 .
7. 15-6 Investigation 13June 2003 ·
· s .. 15-6 Investigauqn 24 November 2003
· 9. · 15-6 Investigation 71llll'Ullcy2004 .
·. ~0. 15-6'Investigation 121anuary 2004
11. SIR 5 NovCm.ber'2003 : ·
12. SIR. 7 Novem~ 20Q3 ·
· 13. SIR 8 November 2003
14.SIR.13 December2003
· 15. SIR.13 December2003
.16. SIR.l3 December2003
.JJ.'SIR.17December2003 ·
. ~.s; tomniandcr'.s rnli.Uh'Y ;261an1Jlll":Y;2004 .
19.MG Ryder'sR.epOrt, 6 ~ovember2003

io. MG Miller's Report, 9 September 2003 . . . . .
21. AR. 190-8; Enemy Prisoners ofWar, Retained Personnel, Civilian Internees, and
· .Other Defain.ees, 1. O~be;r 1997 . . · · · · · ·
· 22. FM 3·19.40, 'MiJitaxy Police !JltemmentiReslltt]ement Operations, 1 August 2001 : ·
23. FM 34-52,· Iritelligei:J.ce Intetrol:ation, 28 September 1992. . ·. · · .
24. Fourth Geneva ConveQtiqn, 12 August 1949 · . · . . ·
25. CID Report on criiniDal abuse$ at AQu Ghraib, 281anuary 2004
26 •.. CID Interviews, 10.25January 2094 · · ·
27. BOOth MP. Brigade Roster, 291anuary 20~
28. 20Sth Mi:Brigade's IR.OE.'Undated .. ·
29. TOA Order (SOOth MP Brigiulej and letter holding Wimessl:!l
· 30. Inv~on Team's wilness list ·
31~ FRAGO~llOB' . ... . · . .
32. Letters &uspcodiilg several 'key leade;i-s ·in the SOOth MP. Briiade and Rating Chain
· with.suspensioll$:annotated · · · · ·. ' · · ~·
33. FM 27-IO;Military iustiee, 6,Septeinber 2002 .
34. CID ~eport on abuse of detainees at Camp Bucca, 81J!D.e 2003 ' . .
3~. Article 32 Findings' on abuse ofd,etainees at Camp !=Iucca. 26 August 2003
~6.AR381-l0,'11ulyl984 . · . · -
37. Exetirpts from log'books, 320th MP Battalion
38. 3l0th MP Battalion's Ioprocessing SOP
.39. 320th MP Battslion's "Change Sheet''
. •.
40. 'Joint Interrogation .ilnd Dcbrieftng Center's (JIDC) Slides, Undated
41. Order of Battle Slides, 121anuary 2004 · . ·
47. J~int Publication ().;2, Unified.Actions 'Aimed Forces; 10 July 2001
!APPRovED FoR RELEAsE oft.rE: os-see-2o13
. 43 .. General Officer Me.ino~ of Reprimand
44, SOOth MP Battalion's TACSOP
45~ BG Janis KarPinski., Q>minander, $00th MP Brigade ·
46. COL Thomas Pappas, Commander, 20Stb MI Brigade .
.·. . . : ...
· · 47. COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Jut;Jge Advocate, .CPA ,Ministry of Justice
· · 48. LTC·Gary W. MaddockS, S-~ lind Executive Oflieer; BOOth Ml' Brigade
49. !,TC James O'H!II'e. Command Judge Advocate, 80Qth'MP Brigade · ·
50. LTC Rpbert P. Walt~ Jr., CoiXIlll8nder, !65th MI Battalion ('l)ctical
· .. exploitation} .. · · . · · : ·
51. LTC James D. Edward$, CommAnder, 202nd'MI Batialiori
52. LTC ~mCCI!t Montera, CommandCr 310tb MP Battalion
53, LTC Stev'c Jordan, (oiiner Director,Johit InterrogatiOn ana Debriefing ·
· CenterJLNO to· the 205tb MI Brigade" : . · .
. 54; LTC Leigh A, Coulter, Comm~n~er724thMP Ba~onarid.OIC . .Arifjim
· Dotaclunent, SOOth MP ~rigade . . . . · · '
55. LTC D!innis Mc,Glone, Commander, 744th MP Battalion·
· 56. MA1J?fvid Hinzman, S-1: Sooth MP BriJ!ade ... . · ·
. 5.1.. MAJ W'illiam D. Proietto, Dep¢Y c;JA, SOOth MP B~e
· 58. MA1 Stacy L: Gm:ity, S~l (FWD), SOOth Mr Bripde .
59. MA1 David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320thMP Battalion .
· 60.' MA1 Michael Sherid$n,' XQ, 32oth MP'J;JattSnon · ·
61; MA1 Anthony Cavallaro, S-3, soot!J'MP. Brigade : ·
· 62~ CP'J,' Marc C: Hale, Commarvler, 670tb MP Company ..
·. 63. CPT DoDald Reese, Command~; 372nd MP ~mpany
. 64: qPT Darren HB!J~Pton, Assistant S-3, 320tb MP Battalion
65. CPT Job!lKaires, S-3,310tb:Ml'. ~1!1falion. ·
. 66. CPT. :ad ·Diamailtis, S-2, 80Qtb MP Bqg8de ...
· 67. LTC Jerry L. PlJill.abaum, Commander; 320tb MP Battalion
.~8 •. CPT James G .. Jones,.. ~ander, ,22,9tli MP. Cqinpany ·.. · • .
6~; ·CPT A;fichacl A. ~gelo,J,r., <.mn mp="" company=""> 70. CPT Lawrence Bu'sh,IO, SOOth :t.fP Brigalle .
· .71. 1Lr Lewis c. R.aeder,.Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company
. 72; ti:rm~ ~.Aide-de-Camp to Brigade COmmander, SOOth MP.Brigade
.. , .. 73·.1LTW~ItFord,D.~iHHC320tb~BattaJ,ion .
. 74. 2LT David 0, Sutton, Phil9o1;1 Leader, 229th MP Company ..
:: 75. CW2 E4wai'd J •. Ri.vas, 20Sth MI Brigade ~ • .
:76. CSM JosephP. ~ Conii:nanci ~qe8ntMajar, 3.20thMP Battalion
.....
7J. SGM-Pasciual C{uUgcoa, Command Sergeant Major, SOOth MP Brigade .
7~. CSMJ'iinotliyLWoodcOck. CQmmaDd Sergean,t.Major, 310tb MP. Battalion·
.79 •. lSG Dawn 1. Rippelmeyer,.F~ Sergeant, 977tb MP Company·
80, SGM Mark an;iersQn; Operations SGM, 320tb MP Battalion
8l.MSGBriari 0. Lipinski, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company .
. ·82. MSG Andrew J. ~bardo, Operations S~eant, 310th MP Battaliop..
· 83. SFC DarylJ. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229th MP Compall.y
. 84. SFC. Shannon K. Snider, Platoon SOT, 372nd ~ Company
ss: SFC Keith A. Comer; 372nd MPpompany · . ·
C05950957
fAPPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 06-Sep-2013
. 86 .. SSG Robert Elliot, ·Squ&i Lead~, 372nd MP Company
·87. SSG Santos A. Cardona,' Army Dog Han91er . .
88. SGT Micbad Smith, Army Dog Handler . . .
89. MAl Williaiii.I. Kimbro; Us_N Dog Handler · . . ·. ·. · · .
90. Mr. Steve.Steplianowic;z, US civilian contract Interrogator, CAq, 205th MI
· . . Brigade . . · . · : . · . . . . .
· 91. Mr. John Israei,.US civilian co!ltract Interpreter; Titim:Co~poriltion, 205th MI ·
· · J;lrigaiie. · · · .- · . . · · · , . . . · : ·. · ·
. ·
. 92. FM 3-19.1; MilitUy ~olice Operations, 22 March 2001 ·· . · ·
· 93, CJTF-?'IR.OB and DROB,Undatect: . · ' . . . ..
· 94. CJTF-7 Interrog&tiori mid Counter Re.'!~ce l'olicy,.1~ OctOber 2003
. 95. 800th MP B!:iM Mobiliziltion Oiders . · . ·· · .
·: .96. Sample Dr¢8inee StatU$. Report, .13 March 2004 · ·
. . 97-. S30th MP Battalio~ Mi,ssion Brief; 1.1 Februazy 2004 . .
. . · 98. Memorandum for Record, CPT Bd l!.ay, Chief of MilitarY JustiCe, CFLcC, 9 . . MarCh 2004 . . . . .. : . ·. .' .
· 99.SIR.l4.JariU8ry 2004.: . . .
· .1 101. 2LT Michael R. Osterhout, S-2; ~ZOth MP Battalion .
·. 1Q2. -Memorandum'ofAdmODislmlen,tfromr.,T . ·Janwuy 2004 ·· · . · · . · · · : ....
· 103. Various SIRs'from the SOOth MP :Sriga4el320th MP Battalion
.104. 20Sth MI Brigade SITRBP to MGMilleri 12 DllCC!Dber 2003 ·.
: 'lOS. ·saT WilliamA.:.Cathc8rt, 372nd Ml' Company · .. · .
. '10.6 •.1 LT Micllacl A. Drayton, ~~der,. 870th MP Company . . ; . . .·. . . . . .
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