CIA Copy of Taguba Report: AR 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade

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U.S. Army report on Itaqi prisoner abuse
Complete text of Article IH Investigation afthe SOOth
MilitaJy Police Brigade by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba
NBC News
Updated: 05:59PM PT May04, 2004
The following is the text of the Taguba report with only the names of
some witnesses removed for the sake of privacy.
The report was
prepared by Maj. Gen.
Antonio M. Taguba on
alleged abuse of
prisonen by members
of the SOOth Milifllly
POlice Brigade at the·
Abu Gbmib Prison in
Baghdad.
It was onleled by Lt
Gen. Ricardo Sanchez,
commander of Joint
Task:Force-7, the
senior U.S. mllitaJy
official in Iraq, fbllowing persistent allegations of human rights abuses
at the prison.
Editor's note: The report includes graphic descriptiODS of events
some Raders may find objectionable.
ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800thMILI.TARY POUCB
BRIGADE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
References ......•••...•............•.•....•...........•.•..•......•.. , . .. •.. 3
Background . . • . . • • • . • • . . • . . • . • • . • • • • . • • . . • • . • . . • . • • • • • . • • • • • • . • • . • . • • • • . • • 6
Assessment ofDoD Couuter-Terrorism Interrogation
and Detention OperatiODS In Itaq
(MG Miller'~ Assessment).................................. S
IO Comments on MG Miller's Assessment.......... S
Report on Deteotion and Corrections In Itaq
(MG Ryder's Report).................................... ~
10 Comments onMG Ryder's Report ...•..••••••.•.•..
"••"~ -"-',"""' Invest.,i.-..".v e ActiO DS ••••••••••••••••••••
Findings and Recommendations
12
l2
•.
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•
Part One (I)e1ainec Abuse). •.. ..• ••. .•• •.. ... ... ... ...... 15
Findings ..••.....• ,...................................... 15
Recommendalions ..• •.. ... ••. . . . • .. .. . ... ... . .• ... 20
Part Two (Escapes and Accountability) .. . • •. .. 22
F"mdings • . • . . • • .. •.• •• . ••• ••• ••• • . • •. • •• • ••. ••• • •• •• • •• .• 22
Recollllllelldations. . .•.....•..•..•..•.... :. . . . . • • 31
Part Three (Command C!jmate, Etc .•. ). •.. . ..... 34
Findings . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • • . •. . •• • . • . . • • • . 36
RecomiDcmclaffons • •• • • • • .• • •• • ..... •• • ... ••• ••• 44
Other F"mdingsiObservationil •••.••••••••••.•••••.•••.• , 49
Omch•siou .... •• . •. . . .... • .• ... .. • ..... . . .. ... ... ... ...... .• . . •. . .. ... SO
Annexes .......•....•.••..•....•..•.•.... •.•• •..•..•.. . : .•.•..• ······ ..• ..• . 51
References
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment ofl'riso!lers of War, .12
August 1949Geneva Convention for the.Amcliomlion of the Omdilion
of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 12 August
1949
3. Geneva Convention for the Ameliomlion of the Omdition of the
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Membem of Armed Forces at Sea, 12
Augustl949
4. Geneva Convention Protocol Relative to the SllltuS of Refugees,
1967
S. Geneva Convention Relative to the Status ofRefugees, 1951
6. Geneva Convention for the Protection of War ViA:tims, 12 August
1949
Geneva Convention Relative to the ~u of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, 12 .August 1949DOD ~ve 5100.69, "DDD Progmmfor
Prisoners ofWarandolherDetainees,• 27December 1972DOD
Directive 5100.77 "DDD Law of War Program," 10 July 1979STANAG
No. 2044, ProCeduresforDealingwithPrisoncrs ofWar (PW) (Edition
5), 28 June 1994STANAG No. 2033, Intenogation ofPrisoners ofWar
(J'W) (Edition 6), 6 December 1994AR. 190-8, Bocmy Prisoners ofWar,
Retained Personnel, Civilian Jntemees, snd Other Delaineea, 1 ~ber
1997AR 190-47, The Army Comaions System, 15 August 1996
14. AR 190-14, CarryingofFireazmssndUseofForceforLaw
Enforcement snd Securlly Duties, 12 March 1993
.·.
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15. AR 195-S, Evidence Procedures, 28 August 1992
16. AR 190-11, Physical Seauity of Anns, Ammllllition and Explosives,
12 Febrwuy 1998
17. AR 190•12, Milifllly Police Worldng Dogs, 30 September 1993
18. AR 190·13, The Army Physical Securi1f Progmm, 30 Septenlber
1993
19. AR380-67,.Personne!SecurityProgram, 9 September 1988
20. AR380-5, Department of the ,Army IufonnationSecurity, 31
September 2000 ·
21. AR 670-1, Wear and Appearance of Amrt Unifoans and Insignia, 5
September 2003
22. AR 190-40, Serious Incident Report, 30.November 1993
23. AR 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of
Oflicers, 11 May 19.88 .
24. AR 27-10, Milifllly Justice, 6 September 2002
25. AR 635-200, Enlisted PCmmnel, 1 November 2000
26. AR 600-8-24, Officer Transfers and Discharges, 29 June 2002 ·
27. AR 500-5, Army Mobillzation, 6 July 1996
28. AR 600-20, Army Command Policy, 13 May 2002
29. AR 623-105, Officer Ev8!ualionReports, 1 Apri11998
30. AR 175-9, Contmctors Accompanying the Force, 29 October 1999
FM 3-19.40, Mililaly l'olke Intemmcnt/Resc!ttlement Operations, I
August 2001FM 3-19.1, Mi1itaJy Police Operations, 22 March2001FM
3-19.4, Mililaly Police Leaders' Handbook, 4 Man:h 2002 FM 3-05.30,
Psychological Op~ 19 June 2000FM33-1-l,Fsychologlcal
Operations Teclmiques and Procedures, s May 1994FM 34-52,
Intelligence Intertogation, 28 September 1992FM 19~ 15, Civil
Distuxbances, 25 November 198538. FM 3-0, operations, 14 June
2001
39. FM 101-5, Staff Organi7Jitious and Functions, 23 May 1984
40. FM 3-19.30, Physical Seauity, 8 Januruy 2001
41. FM 3-21.5, Drill and Ceremonies, 7 July 2003
42. ARTEP 19-546-30 Ml'P, Mission Trainiog Plan for Mililary Police
Battalion (IR,)
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43. AltTEP 19-667-30 MTP, Mission Trainillg Plan for Military Police
Guard Company .
44. AltTEP 19-647-30MTP, Mission Training Plan for Military Police
Escort Guard Company
45. STP 19-9SBl-sM, Soldier'sManuai,MOS 9SB,MilitaryPolice, Skill
Levell, 6 August 2002
46. STP 19-95Cl4-SM·TG, Soldier'sManuallllld Thliner's Guide for
MOS 9SC Intemment1Reset Specialist, Skill Levels 112/3/4, 26
March1999
47. STP 19-95Cl-SMMOS 9SC, Comctions Specislist, Skill Levell,
Soldiets Manual, 30 September 2003
48. STP 19·95C24-SM-TG MOS 95C, Comctions Specialist, Skill
Levels 2/3/4, Soldiets Manual and T!ainer's Guide, 30 September 2003
49. Assessment of DOD Counter-Tenorism Jnterrogalion and
Detention Opetations in haq, (MG Gcoftiey D. Miller, Commander . ·
JTF-GIMO, Gn•ntaaamQ Bay, Cuba), 9 SeptcDlber 2003
50. Assessment ofDctenlion and Conections Opcralions in haq, (MG
Donald J. Ryder, Provost Marshal General), 6 November 2003
51. CJTF·7FRAGO#ll08, Subject: includes-para 3.C.8 &3.C.8.A.l,
Assigmnent of20S MlBDE CDR Responsibilities for the Baghdad Cen!Ial
Coofinemeut Facility (BCCF), 19 November 2003
52 CJTF. 7 FRAGO #749, Subject Intelligence and Bvideuce·Led
Detention Operations Relsting to Detainees, 24 August2003
53. 8.00th MP BDE FRAGO # 89, Subject Rules of Engagement, 26
December 2003 ·
54. CG CJTF-7 Memo: CJTF· 7 Interrogation 8lld Counter-Resistance
Policy, 12 October 2003
55. CG CJTF. 7 Memo: Dignity and Respect While Conducting
Op~l3D~2003
56. Uniform Code ofMilitary Justice and Manual for Courts Martial,
2002Bdi.tion . .
ARTICLE 15-61NVESTIGATION OF THBSOOthMlLlTARYPOUCB
BRIGADE
BACKGROUND
1. (U) On 191llll1llll'Y 2004, Lieutenant GeneW (LTG) Ricardo S.
Sanchez, Commander, Combined Joint TaskForce Seven (CJTF-7)
:requested that the Commander, US Ceniial Command, appoint an
lnvestigaling Officer (IO) in the glllde of Major GeneW (MG) or above
to investigate the conduct of.opemtions within the SOOthMilitsly
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Police (MP) Brigade. LTG Sanchez requested an investigation of
detenlion and intemment operations by the Brigade from 1 November
2003 to pieSCilt LTG Sanchez cited recent tep0rts of detainee
abuse, escapes from confinement filcilities, and accountability lapses,
which indicated systemic problems within the brigade and suggested a
lack of clear standanls, proficiency, and Icadelship. LTG Sanchez
zequested a comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry to make
findings and recommendations concerning the fitness and perfOJmance
of the SOOth MP Brigade. (ANNEX 2)
2. (U) On 24 J811U8Iy 2003, the Chief of S1a1f ofUS Central Command
(CENTCOM), MG R. Steven Whifcomb, on behalf of the CBNTCOM
Commanqer, directed that the Collunander, CoalitiOn Forces Land
Compouent Command (CFLCC), LTG David D. McKicmau, conduct an
investigation into the 800thMP Brigade's detention and internment
opemtions from 1 November 2003 to preaent CENTCOM diiected that .
the investigalion sbould Inquire into all1ilcts and circumstances .
SUII'OUIIIIing recent reports of suspected detainee abuse In Iniq .. h
also directed that the investigation inquire into clminee escapes and
ac:countability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, and to gain a more
comprehensive and all-encompassing inquiry into the fitness and
performance of the 800thMPBrigade. (ANNEX 3)
3. (U) On 31 January2004, the Commander, CFLCC, appointed MG
Antonio M Taguba, Deputy C()IDD!anc!ing General Support, CFLCC, to
conduct this investigation. MG Taguba was directed to conduct an
iDformal investigation UDder AR 1.5-6 into the SOOth MP Brigade's
detention and internment opemtions. Spec:ifically, MG Taguba was
tasked to:
a (U) Jnquinl into all the 1ilcts and circumstances surrounding recent
allegations of detainee abuse, spccilicaily allegations of maltreatment
at the Abn Glmu'b PrisOn (Bagbdad Central Confinement Ficility
(BCCP));
b. (U) Inquire into detainee escapes and accountability lapses as
1ep0rted by CJTF-7, specifically allegations concerning these events
at the Abn Ghraib Prison;
c. (U) Investigate the training. standatds; employment, ccmmand
policies, internal procedures, and command climate in the SOOthMP
·Brigade, as approprinte;
d. (U) Make specific findings of fact concerning all aspects of the
investigation, and make any recommendations for eomctive action, as
appropriate. (ANNEX 4) .
4. (U) LTG Sanchez's request to investigate the SOOtb:MPBrigsde
followed the initiation of a criminal investigation by the US Army
Criminal Investigation Cornman detainee abuse committed by members ofthe 372nd MP Company,
320th MP Battalion in Iraq. These nni1s are part of the SOOthMP
Brigade. 'The Brigade is an Jraq Theater li.sset, TACON to CJTF-7, but
OPCON to CFLCC at the time this investigation was initi•Wl In
addition, CJTF-7 had sevCJal reports of detainee escapes from
US/Coalition Confinement Facilities in Jraq over the past sevCJal
. '
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months. These include Camp Bucca, Camp Ashraf; Abu Ghraib, and
. the High Value Detainee (HVD)Complex/CampCropper. The800thMP
Brigade operated these facilities. Jn addiliou, four Soldiers 1i'om the
320th MP Battalion. had been fonnally charged under the Uuifm:m Code
ofMilitlly Justice (UCMJ) with'detaincc abuse in May 2003 at the
Theater Intemment Facility (riP) at Camp Bucca, Iraq. (ANNEXBS
5-18, 34 and 3S)
S. (U) I began assembling my investigation team prior to the actual
appointment by tbe CFLCC Commander. I assembled subject matter
experts from the CFLCC ~ MaX1ba1 (PM) and the CFLCC S1a1f'
Judge Advocate (S1A). I selected COL Kinard J. La Fate, CFLCC
Provost Manhal to be myDeputyforthis investigation. I also
con1acted the Provost Marshal Genemi of the Army, MG Donald· I.
Ryder, to enlist the support ofMP subject matter experts in the areas
of detention and internment opemlions. (ANNEXES 4 and 19)
6. (U) The Jnvestigating Team also n:viewed the Assessment of DoD
Counter-Terrorism Interrogation and Detention Operations in IIaq
conducted by MG Geoffrey D. Miller, Commander, Joint TaskForce
Guantanamo (JT.F-GTMO). From31 August to 9 September2003, MG
Miller led a team of personnel experienced in attategic interrogation to
HQ, C1TF·7 and the Iraqi SUIVey Gtoup (JSG) to review cumnt Jmqi
Theater abJiity to rapidly exploit Internees for actionable intelligence.
MG Miller's team:fix:used on tbree areas: intelligence integl31ion,
synchroui2atiou, and :tilsion; interrogation operations; and detention
operations. MG Miller's team used 1I'F-GTMO procedures and
interrogation authorities as baselines. (ANNEX 20)
7. (U) The Investigating Team began its inquiiy with an in-depth
analysis of the Report OJI Detention and Corrections in Iraq, dated S
November 2003, conducted by MG Ryder and a team ofmilltaly police,
legal, medical, and automation experts. The C1TF·7 C()llllllander, LTG
Sanchez, had previously requested a team of subject matter experts
to assess, and make_specific recommendations COJJCel1ling detention
and corrections operations. From 13 October to 6 November 2003, MG
Ryder pe:rsonally led this assessmentlassistaoce team in Iraq. (ANNEX
19)
ASSESSMENT OF DoD COUNTER-TERRORISM 1NTERROGATION AND
DBTENTIONOPERATIONSINIRAQ(MGMILLER.'SASSESSMENT)
1. (SINF) The principal focus ofMG Miller's team was on the stmtegic
interrogation of detaineeslintem in Jmq. Among its conclusions in
its Executive SUIIUilal)' Were that CJTF-7 did not have authorities and
procedures in place to a1fcct a unified strategy to detaiu, interrogate,
and report inf9rmation 1i'om detaineeslintemcc in Iraq. The Executive
SUllllllaly also stated that deteDtion operations must act as an euabler
for interrogation. (ANNEX 20)
2. (SINF) With respect to interrogaticm; MG Miller's Team
recommended that CJTF-7 dedicate and train a detention guard force
subordinate to the Joint Interrogation Debriefing Center (JIDC)
Commander that "sets the conditions for the succcssfbl interrogation
and exploitation of intemees/detainees." Regarding Detention
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Operations, MG Miller's team stated that the 1imction ofDctention
Operations is. to provide a sate, secure, and humane environment that
supPorts the expeditious collection of intelligence. However, it also
stated "it is essential that the guard force be actively engaged in
setting the condilinns for suc:cessful exploitation of the intcmccs."
(ANNEX20)
3. (SINF) MG Miller's team also concluded that Joint Strategic
Intcm!galion Operations (within Cli'F-7) are hampered by Jack of
active control of the Internees within the detention environment The
Miller Team also stated 1hat establisbment of the Theater Joint
nrterrogation and Detcniion Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) will
consolidate both detention and strategic lntertogation operations and
result in synergy between MP and M[ resowccs and an intcgmted,
synchronized, and focuSed strategic interrogation effort (ANNEX 20)
4. (SINF) MG Miller's team also observed that the application of
emerging strategic intenogation strategies and tcchniqncs contain
new approac11es and opcrationa1 art The Miller Team also concluded
that a legal ICView and recommendations on internee lntcmlgation
operations by • dedicated ('ommand Judge Advocate is required to
maximize intcmlgation effectiveness. (ANNEX 20)
IO COMMENTSONMG MILLER.'S ASSESSMENT
1. (SINF) MG Miller's teamrecognized that they were using ITF-GTMO
operational p!OCCdures and lntertogation authorities as baselines for
its observations andrccomiiiClJdations. There Is a strong argument
that the inlelligcncc value of detainees held at ITF-{luantanamo
(GlMO) is different than 1hat cifthe dminc•esfmternees held at Abu
Gluaib (BCCF) and other detention facilities in Iraq. Currently, there
are a large nwnber ofimql criminals held at Abu Ghraib (BCCF). These
are not belieVed to be international terrorists or members of AI Q8ida,
Anser AI Islam, Talibali, and other International temlrist organizations.
(ANNEX20)
2. (SINF) The leC('mmendations ofMG Miller's team that the "guard
force" be actively engaged in setting the conditions for successful
exploitation of the iotemees would appesrto be in conflict with the
recoJIIlllendations ofMG Ryder's Team and Alll90-8 tbatmilitaly
police "do ncit participate io militsty lntclligcnce supervised .
interrogation sessions." The Ryder Report concluded that the OEF
1emp1ate whereby militsty police actively set the favorable conditions
for subsequent intciViewa nms counter to the smooth operation of a
detention facility. (ANNEX 20)
REPORT ON DETENTION AND CORRECI'IONS
1NlRAQ (MG RYDER'S REPORT)
1. (U) MG Ryder and his assessment team conducted a
comprehensive review of the entire detainee and corrections system in
liaq and provided recommendations addressing each of the following
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areas as requested by the Commander CJTF. 7:
a. (U) Detainee aud corrections system management
b. (U) Detainee managemeo~ including detainee movement,
segregation, and accoUntability .
c. (U) Means of command aud control of the detention and
corrections system
d. (U) Integration of military detention aud conections with the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and adequacy of plans for
transition to an Itaqi-run corrections system
e. (U) Detainee medic:al care and health managemeot ·
f. · (U) Detention facilities that meet tequin:d healtb, hygieoe, aud
sanitation SlliDdards
g. (U) Court iotegration and docket management for criminal
detainees
h. (U) Detaiuee legal processing
i (U) De.taiuee database• and records, including integration with
law enfbrcemeot aud court databases (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Many of the findings and recommendations ofMG Ryder's team
are beyond tll.e scope of this inveStigation.· However, several
important findiogs are clearly relevant to this Inquiry and are
summarized below (emphasis is added io c:erlain areas):
A. (U) Detaiuee Mauagemeot (including movemen~
segregation, and accountability)
1. (U) There is a wide varlance io standards and approaches at the
various detention facilities. Seveml Division/Brigade collection points
and US monitored haqi prisons hadflilwed or iosnfliciently detailed use
. of force and other standiogopetatiogprocedures or policies (e.g.
weapons io the facility, improper restraint teebniques, detainee
managemeot, etc.) Though, there wm no mllitsry police units
pmposely applyiog ioappropriate confinement prac:tic:es. (ANNEX 19)
2. (U) Currently, due to lack of adequate Iraqi facilities, haqi crlminals
(generally Iraqi-on·Itaqi crimes) are detained with security internees
(generally Itaqi-on-Coalition offenses) aod BPWs io the same facilities,
thOugh segregated io diJferent cells/compOUDds. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) 'The management of multiple ilispamte groups of detained
. people io a single location by membets of the same unit invites
confusion about haru!!ing, processing, and matmen~ and typically
facilitates the tnmsfer of ioformation betweeo dift'erent categories of
detainees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) 'The SOOth MP (IIR) units did not receive
IntemmeotiResettlement (I/R) and conections specific training during
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their mobilization period. Comcti.ons training is only on the METL of
two MP (1/R.) Confinemmt Battalions throughout the Army, one
cmrently seJV!ng in AfghanistaD, and elemmts of the other are at
Camp AriJjan, Kuwait MP UDits supporting JTF-GI'MO received ten
days of training in detentionfilcility operations, to include two days Of
Ull8liiied self-defll!!se, training in intc1pcrsona1 communication skills,
forced cell moves, and correctional officer safely. (ANNEX 19)
B. (U) Means of Command and Control of the Detention and
. Corrections System
1. (U) The SOOth MP Brigade was origiually task organized with eight
MP(IIR.) Battalions consisling ofboth MP Guard and Combat Support
companies. Due to force rotation plans, the SOOth redeployed two
BattalionBHCs in December 2003, the llSthMPBattalion and the
324thMPBattalion. InDecember2003, the400thMPBattalion was
~:elleved of its mission and redeployed in JanWII)' 2004. The 724thMP
Battalion redeployed on 11 Febrwl!y 2004 and the remainder is
scheduled·to redeploy inMarchandApri12004. They are the 310th
MP Battaiion, 320thMP Battaiion, S30thMP Battaiion, and 744thMP
Battaiion The UDits that remain are generally UlldeJ:streDgth as
Reserve Compouent UDits do not have an individual personnel
Ieplacemcnt system to mitigate medical losses or the departure of
individual Soldiers that have reached 24 months ofFederal active duty
ina :five-year period. (ANNEX 19)
.2. (U) The SoothMP Brigade (1/R,) is cwrently a CFLCC asset, TACON
to CJTF-7 to conductl'ntemment!Resettlemcnt (IIR.) operations in
baq. All detention operations are conducted in the CJTF-7 AO; Camps
Ganci, Vigilant, Bucca, TSP Whitford, and a separate High Value
Detention (HVD) site. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) The SOOth Mi.> Brigade has experienced challenges adapting its
task orgauizational structure, tzaiDing, and equipment resources from a
UDit designed to conduct standardBPW opendions in the COMMZ
(Kuwait). Further, the doctrinally trained MP Soldier-to-detainee
population ratio and facility layout templates are predicated on a
cOmpliant. self-disciplining BPW population. and not criminals or
high-risk security intemees. (ANNEX 19)
4. (U) BPWs and Civilimi Internees should receive the full protections
of the Geneva Conventions, unless the denial of these protections is
due to speci:fically articulated mililary necessity (e.g., no visitation to
preclude the direction of insurgency operations). (ANNEXES 19 and
24) .
S. (U) AR 190-8, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian
Internees, and other Detainees, FM 3-19.40, Mili1aly Police
Internment and Resettlement Opelations, and FM 34-52, Intelligence
Jntenogations, xequire milillity police to provide lin area for
intej)igence collection efforts withinBPW :liicilities. Military Police,
though adept at passive collection of intelligence within a facility, do
not participat8 in Military Intelligence supervised interrogation
sessions. Recent intelligence collection in support of()pelation
Enduring Freedom posited a template whereby mi1i1aly police actively
set filvorable conditions for subsequent interviews. Such actions
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generally run counter to the smooth operation of a detention facili1y,
attempting to mainll!in ils population in a compliant and docile state.
The 800thMP Brigade bas not been directed to change ils facility
procedures to set the conditions for MI intmogatious, nor
participate in those Interrogations. (ANNEXES 19 and 21-23)
6. MG Ryder's Reportalsomadethefollowing, inter alia, near-term
and mid-term recommendations regarding the command and control of
detlinecs:
a (U) Align the release process for security internees with DoD
Policy. The process of screening security internees should include
intelligence findings, intem>gation results, and current threat
assessment
b. ·(U) D~ the seopc of lntelligence collection that will occur
at Camp Vigilant Refinbish the Northeast Compound to separate the
screening operation ftom the Iraqi run Baghdad Cenbal Comctioual
Faclllty. Establish procedures that define the role of military
police Soldiers securing the compound, clearly separating the
actions of the guards from those of the militlll:y intelligence
personnel
c. (U) Cimsolidate an Security Internee Operations, except the
MEl{ security missloD, under a single Military Police Brigade
Headquarters for OlF 2.
c1. (U) Insist tliat an units identified to rotate into the Iraqi ·
Theater of Operations (ITO) to conduct internment and
i:onfinement opeiations in support of OlF 2 be organic to CJTF-7.
(ANNEX19)
IO COMMBNI'SREGARDING MG RYDER'S ~RT
1. (U) The objective ofMG Ryder's Team was to cbserve detention
and prison operatious, identify potential systemic and human rights
Issues, and provide near-term, mid-term, and long"lerm
recommendatloni to improve CJTF-7 operations and tr.IDSition of the
Iraqi prison system ftom US military controllovenight to the Coalition
Provisional Authority and eventually to the Imqi Govemment. The
Findings and RecommendatiO'lS ofMG Ryder's Team are thorough and
precise and should be implemented immediately. {ANNEX 19)
2. (Uj Unfortunately, many of the systemic problems that
surfaced during MG Ryder's Team's assessment are the very
same Issues that are the Stbject oftbis investigation In fact,
many of the abuses suffered by ruitainecs occomd during. or
ncar to, the time of that assessment As will be pointed out in
. dclllil in subsequent portions oftbis report, I disagree with the
conclusion ofMG Ryder's Team in one critical aspect, that being its
conclusion that the 800thMP Brigade had not been asked to change
its facility procedures to set the condi)i.ons for MI interviews. While
clcsrly the 800thMP Brigade and ils ct>mmandcrs were not
tasked to set conditiOIIS for detainees for subsequent MI
intmogatious, it is obvious from a review of comp.rehensive C1D
interviews of suspects and willlesses that this was done at lower
JVll 1\- ~~
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levels. (ANNEX 19)
3. (U) I concur iblly with MG Ryder's conclusion regarding the effect
of AR 190-8. Mllitmy Police, though adept at passive collection of
intelligeuce. within a :tllcility, should DOt participate inMililaly
Intemgence supervised interrogation sessions. Mmeover, Mililaly
Police should DOt be involved with setting "favorable corulitions" for
subsequCDtinter:views. These actions, as will be outlined in this
investigation, clearly run counter to the smooth opei3Iion of a
detentlon1llcility. (ANNEX 19)
PRELIMINARYINVESTIGATIVEACI10NS
1. (U) Following our review ofMG Ryder'sReportandMG Miller's
Report, my investigation team Immediately begsn an in-depth review
of aU availsble documents regarding the SOOth MP Brigade. We
reVieWed in detail the voluminous CID investigation regarding alleged
detainee abuseS at detention facilities in l1aq, particularly the Abu
Ghraib (BCCF) Detention Facility. We analyzed approximately fifty
wiiness ststements from mililalypolice and mililaly inte1ligeDcc
personnel, potential suspects, and detainees. We reviewed ll\llllCtOliS
photos and videos of actual detainee abuse taken by detention facility
personnel, which are now in the custody and control of the US Army
Criminal Investigation Command and the C1fF·7 prosecution team.
~The photos and videoS are not contained in this investigation. We
obtained copies of the SOOth MP Brigade roster, rating cbain, and
aSsorted internal investigations and disciplinary actions involving that
command for the past several months. (AU. ANNEXES Reviewed by
Investigation TeaJI!)
2. (U) In addition to mililaiy police and legal aflicers from the CFLCC
PMO and SJA Offices we also obtained the services of two incli~uals
who are experts in mililaly police detention pmctices and training.
These were LTC Timothy Weathersbee. Commander, 705thMP
Battalion, United States DisciplinaryBanacks, Fort Leavenworth. and
SFC Edward Baldwin, Senior Corrections Advisor, US Army Mililaly
Police School, Fort Leonard Wood. I also requested and received the
. services of Col (Dr) Hemy Nelson, a llained US Air Force psychiatrist
assigned to assist my investigation team. (ANNEX 4) ·
3. (U) In addition to MG Ryder's and MG Miller's Reports, the team
reviewed nUDierous reference. materials including the 12 October 2003
crrF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy, the AR 15-6
Investigation on Riot and Shootings at Abu Ghraib on 24 November ·
2003, the 20SthMI Brigade's Interrogation B.ules of Engagement
(IR.OE), facility staff logs/journals and lllllllCRlUS recozds Of AR 15-6
investigations and Serious Tucideut Reports (SIRs) on detainee
escapes/shootings and clisciplinaly matters from the 800th MP
Brigade. (ANNEXES 5·20, 37, 93, and 94)
4. · (U) On 2 Febrwuy 2004, I took my team to Baghdad for a one-day
inspection of the Abu Gluaib Prison (BCCF) and the High Value
Detainee (HVD) Complex in order to become 1iuniliar with those
facilities. We also met with COL Jerry MoceUo, Commander, 3rd MP
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Criminal InveStigation Group (CJD), COL Dave Quantock, Commander,
16thMP Brigade, COL Dave Phillips, Commander, 89thMP Brigade, and
COL Ed Sannwaldt, CITF-7 Provost MalShal. On 7 February 2004, the
team visited the Camp Bucca Detention Facility to fami1iarlze itself
with the facility and operating structure. In addition, on 6 and 7
February 2004, at CampDoba, Kuwai~ we condw:ted extensive
1Iailling sessions on approved detention pzactices. We contillued our
preparation by m:iewing the ongoing CID investigation ami were ·
briefed by the Special Agcot in Charge, CW2 Paul Arthur. We
refreshed ourselves on the applicable relilrence materials within each
team member's area of expertise, and pmcliced investigative
techniques. I met with.the team on numerous oa:asions to finalize
appropriate witness lists, review existing witness statements, ammge
logisticS, and collect potential evidence.. We also cOordiDated with
C1TF-7 to arrange witness attendsnce, force protection measures.
and general logistics for the team's move to Baghdad on 8 February
2004. (ANNEXES 4 and 25)
5. · (U) At the same time, due to the Transfer of Authority on 1
February 2~ between m COJpS and v CO!pS, and the upcoming
demobilization of the. SOOth MP Brigade Command, I directed thst
sevem1 critical witnesses who were preparing to leave the theater
remain at Camp AtifjaD, Kuwait until they could be interviewed
(ANNEX 29). My team deployed to Baghdad on 8 February 2004 and
conducted a series of interviews with a variety ofwituesses (ANNEX
30). WeretumedtoCampDoba,Kuwalton13February2004. On14
and IS February we interviewed a number of witnesses from the SOOth
MP Brigade. On 17 Febniazy we returned to Camp Bucca, Trait to
complete ini!:Mews ofwitoesses atthstlocation. From 18 February
thru 28 February we collected documents, compiled references, did
follow-up interviews, and completed a detailed anslysis of the voliJilleS
of materials accumulated throughout our invesiigation. On 29
February we finalked our executive SUJiliii8Iy and out-briefing slides.
On 9 March we submitted the AR 15-6 written report with findings and
;recommendations to the CFLCC Deputy SJA, LTC Made Jobnson, for a
legal sufliciency review. 'lbc out-brief to the appointing authority,
LTG McKiernan, took Place on 3 Man:h 2004. (ANNEXES 26 and.
45-91)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART ONE)
(U) The investigation should inquire into all of the facts and
circumstances surrouuding recent~ of detainee abuse. .
specifically, allegations of maltreatment at the Abu Gbral"b Prison
(Baghdad Ceima1 Confinement Facility). ·
1. (tJ) The US Army Criminal Juvesti.gation Command (CJD),led by COL
Jerry Mocello, and a team ofbigbly tmined professions! agents have
done a superll job of investigating several complex and extremely
distuibing inciclents of detainee ~at the Abu Gbraib Prison. They
condw:ted over SO interviews of witnesses, potential criminal
suspects, and detainees. They also uncovered numerous photoS and
videos portraying in graphic detail detainee abuse by Mililaly Police
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peiSOliJiel on numerotiS occasions from October to December 2003.
Several potential suspects rendered full and complete confessions
regarding their persoDa! involvement and the involvement of fellow
Soldiers in thls abuse. Several potential suspects invoked their rights
1lllder Article 31 of the Unifonn Code ofMilitsry Justice (UCMJ) and the
5th Amendmcllt of' the U.S. Constitution. (ANNEX 2S)
2. (U) In addition to a comprebensiVe and exhaustive review of all of
these ststements and documentsry evidcw:e, we also interviewed.
numerous officers, NCOs, and junior CD!isted Soldiers in the SOOth MP
Brigade, as Wen as members of the 20Sth Militsry Intelligence Brigade
WOikiDg at the prison. We did not believe it was necc&IIIIIY.to
rc-interview all the numerous witnesses who had previously provided
comprehensive ststements to CID, and I have adoPted those
statements for the purposes of this investigation. (ANNEXBS 26, 34,
35, aod 45-91)
REGARDING PART ONE OF THE INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE
FOLLOWING SPECiFIC FINDINGS OF FACT:
1. (U) That Forward Op\l[aling Base (FOB) Abu Ghraib (BCCF)
provides security ofboth criminal and security detainees at the
Baghdad Centml CorrectioDa! Facility,1ilcilitales the conducting of
interrogationS for CJTF-7, supports other CPA operations at the
prison, and enJ!aoces the force protectionlquatity of life of Soldiers
assigned in orcter to ensure the success of ongoing operations to
secure a free Iraq. (ANNEX 31)
2. (U) That the Commaoder, 205th Militsry Intelligence Brigade. was
designated by CJTF-7 as the Commander ofFOB Abu Gbmib (BCCF)
effective 19 November 2003. That the 20SthMIBrigade conducts
opeialional and sttategicinterrogations for CJTF-7. 'Ibatfrlun 19
November 2003 until Transfer of Authority (TO A) on 6 FebruaiY 2004,
. COL Thomas M. Pappas was the Commaoder of the 205th MI Brigade
and the Commander ofFOB Abu Gbraib (BCCF). (ANNEX 31)
3. (U) That the 320th Militsry Police Battalion of the SOOth MP
Brigade is responsible for the Guard Force at Camp Ganci, Camp
Vigilant, & Cellblock 1 of FOB Abu Gbraib (BCCF). That from February
2003 to until be was suspended from his duties on 17 Jaouary 2004,
LTC Jeny Phillabaum served as the Battalion Commander of the 320tb
MP Batlallon That from December 2002 until be was suspended from
his duties, on 17 Jaouary 2004, CPT Donald Reese served as the
Company Commander of the 372ndMP Company, v.iJich was in charge
of guarding detainees at FOB Abu Gbraib. I 1Urther find that both the
320tb MP Battalion aod the 372ndMP Company were located within the
confines of FOB Abu Gbraib. (ANNEXES 32 aod 45)
4. (U) That from July of2003 to the present, BG Janis L. Kaipillski
was the Comxpander of the SOOth MP Brigade. (ANNEX 45)
S, (S) That between October and December 2003, at the Abu Ghraib
Confinement Facility (BCCF), numerous incideots of sadistic, blatant,
and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on several detainees. This
systemic and illegal abuse of detainees was intentionally perpetrsted
by several mell;lbers of the militsry police guard force (372nd MilitaJy
. '
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Police Company, 320tbMilitary Police Battalion, SOOth MP Brlgade), in
Tier (section) l·A of the Abu Ghmib Prison {BCCP). The allegations of
abuse were substantiated by detalled witness Slatements (ANNEX
26) and the discovety of extremely gmphic photogmphic evidence.
Due to the extremely sensitive nature of these photographs and
videos, the ongoing CID investigation, and the potenlial for the
crimiDal prosecution of sevem1 suspects, the photogmphic evidence is
not inclmled in the bcdy of my itm:stigation. The pictwes and videos
are available from the Criminal Jnvcstlgative Command and the CTJF· 7
prosecution team. rn addition to the aforementioned crimes, there
Weill also abuses committed by members of the 32SthMIBattaliou,
205th MI Brigade, and Joint Jntetrogation and Debriefing Ceoter
(JIDC). Speclfically, on 24 November 2003, SPC LuciaDa Spencer,
205thMI Brigade, sought to degrade a detainee by having him strip
and returned to cell naked. (ANNEXES 26 and 53)
6. (S) I find t)Jat the intentional abuse of detainees by military po!icc
personnel included the following acts:
a (S) Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping On their
nakedfeet; .
b. (S) Videotaping and photographing naked male and female
detainees; .
c. (S) Forcibly arranging detsinees in various sexually explicit
positions for photographing;
d. (S) Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them
naked for sevem1 days at a time;
e. (S) Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's uoderwear;
f. · (S) Forcing groups of male detsinees to mastuibate themselves
while being photographed and videoll!Ped;
g. (S) Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on
them;
h. (S) Positioning a naked detainee on a MRB Box. with a sandbag on
his head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to
simulate electric tornJre;
i. (S) Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged
to have forcibly raped a lS·year old fellow detainee, and then
photographing him naked;
j. (S) Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee's neck
and having a female Soldier pose for a pictme;
k. (S) A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee;
1. (S) Using mllltary worldng dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and
frighten detsinees, and in at least one case biting and severely
injuring a detainee;· · ·
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m. (S) Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees.
(ANNEXES 25 and 26)
7.(U) These findings are amply supported by written confessions
provided by several of the suspects, written statements provided by
detainees, and witness statements. In reaching my findings, I have
carefWly COJISidered the pre-existing Ratements of the following
witnesses and suspects (ANNEX 26):
a. (U) SPC Jeremy Sivits, 372nd MP Company· Suspect
b. (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company- Suspect
c. (U) SGT laval S. Davis, 372nd MP Company· SUspect
c. (U) PFC Lynndie R. England, 372nd MP Company • Suspect
d.. (U) Adel Nakhla, Civilian Thmslator, 1itan Corp., Assigned to the
205tb.MI Brigade- Suspect
(Names deleted)
8. (U) In addition, several detainees also described the followirig acts
of abuse, which under the circumstances, I find credible based on the
clarity of their statements and suppoiting evidence provided by other
witnesses (ANNEX 26):
a. (U) Breaking c4emicallights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on
detainees;
b. (U) Threatening delainees witb. a chsrged 9mm pistol;
c. (U) Pouring cold water on naked detainees;
d. (U) Beating detainees witb. a broom handle and a chair;
e. (U) Threatening male delainees witb. rape;
f (U) Allowing a military police guard to stitch tb.e wound of a
detainee who was injured after being slammed agsinst the wall in his
cell;
g. (U) Sodomizing a detainee witb. a chemical light and perhaps a
broom stick. ·
h. (U) Using military working dogs to frighteo and intimidate detainees
witb. threats of auack, and in one instance actually biting a detainee.
9. (U) I have carefully considered the &tatements provided by the
following delainees, which under tb.e clrcumstances I find credible
based on the clari1;y of their &tatements and supporting evidence
provided by otb.er witnesses:·
a. (U) Amjed Isai1 Waleed, Detainee# 151365
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b. (U) Hiadar Sabel Abed Miktub-Aboodi, Detainee II 13077
c. (U) Huessin Mohssein Al-2:ayiadi, Detainee # 19446
d (U) Kasim Mehaddi Hi1as, Detainee II 1Sll08
e. (U) Mobanded Juma Juma (sic), Detainee # 152307
f. (U) Mustafa Jasslm Mustafll, Detainee II 150542 .
g. (U) Shalan Said Alsharoni, Detainee, 11150422
I
h. (U) Abd Alwhab Y ouss, Detainee II 150425
i. (U).Asad HamzaHanfosh, Detainee 11152529
j. (U) Norl Samir Gunbar Al·Yasseri, Detainee 117787
k. (U) Thaar Salmait Dawod, Detainee # 150427
I. (U) Ameen Sa'eed At-sheikh, Detainee# 1Sl362
. m. (U) Abdou Hussain Saad Faleh, Detainee# 18470 (ANNEX 26).
10. (U) I find that contnuy to the provision of AR 190-8, and the
findings found in MG Ryder's Report, Mililmy Intelligence (MI)
interrogators and Other US Government ).geocy's (OGA) interrogators
actively requested that MP guards set physical and mental conditions
for favorable interrogation of witnesses. Contmy to the findings of
MGRyder'sReport, I:lind thatpersonnelmigned to the 372ndMP
Company, 800thMP Brigade were directed to change facility
procedures to "set the conditions" fur MI interrogations. I find no
direct evidence that MP persomie1 actually participated In those MI
interroi!alions. (ANNEXES 19, 21, 25, and 26).
11. (U) I reach this finding based on the actual proven abuse that I
find was inflicted on detBlnees and by the following witoess
statements (ANNEXES 2S·and 26):
a (U) SPC Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company, stated in her
swom statement regarding the incident wbere a detainee was placed
on a box with wires attached to his fingers, toes, and penis,· "that her
job was to keep detainees awake." She stated that MI was talking to
CPL Gmincr. She stated: "MI wanted to get them to talk. It is
GmiDcr and Frederick's }ob to do things for MI and OGA to get
these ~le to talk." .
b. (U) SGT Javal S. Davis, 372nd MP Company, stated in his
swom statement as follows: "I witoessed prisoners in the MI hold
sectiou, wing lA being made to do various things tluit I would
question morally. In Wing lA we were told that they had
different IU1es and different SOP for treatment I uever saw a set
of rules or SOP for thitt section just word of mouth. The Soldier in
charge of lA was Corporal Granier. He stated that the Agents
and MI Soldiers would ask him to do things, but nothing was ever
in writing he would complain (sic)." When asked why the rules in
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lA/lB were difi'erent than the rest of the wings, SGT Davis stated:
''The rest of the wings are regular prisoners and 1A/B are
Military Intelligeilcc (Ml) holds." When asked why he did liot inform
hili chain of command about this abuse, SGT Davis stated: • Because
I assumed that if they were doing things out of the ordinaly or
outside the guidelines, someone would have said something.
.AJso the wing belongs to MI and it appeared MI personnel
approved of the abuse." SGT Davis also stated that he had hemd MI
insinuate to the guards to abuse the Inmates. When asia:d what Ml
said he stated: "Loosen this guy up for 1lS. • Make sure he has a
bad night. • "Make sure he getS the treatment • He claimed these
comments were made to CPL Granier and SSG Frederick. F'mally, SGT
Davis stated that (sic): "the Ml staffs to my Ullderstandlng have
been g!v:iDg Gmnier compliments on the way he has been
banc!Ung the MI holds. Example being Fla!emmfs like, "Good
job, they're breaking down real fast. They answer evezy
question. They're giving out good information, Finally, and Keep
up the good wmk. Stuff like that •
c. (U) SPC Jason Kennel, 372nd :MP Company, waa asia:d if he·
were present when any detainees weril abused. He stated: "I saw
them nude, but MI would tell us to take away their mattressc$,
sheets, and clothes." He could not recall who inMI had instructed
him to do this, but commented that, "if they wanted me to do that
they needed to give me paperwork." He waa later informed that "we
could not do anything to embarmss the prisoners. •
d. (U) Mr. AdelL. Nakhla, a US civilian CODtract translator was
questioned about sevetal detainees accused of mpe. He observed
(sic): "They (detainees) were all naked, a bunchofpcopleftom
MI. the MP were there that.night and the imnales were ordered
by SGT Gmnier and SGT Frederick orden;d the guys while
questioning them to admit what they did. They made them do
stmnge exercises by sUding on their stomach, jump up and
down, throw water on them and made them some wet, called
them all kinds of names such as •grqs• do they tike to make love
to guys, thei1 they handcuffed their hands together and their
legs with shackles and started to stack them on top of each
other by insuring that the bottom guys penis will~ the guy
on tops butt •
e. (U) SPC Neil A WalliD, 109th Area Support Medical
Batllllion, a medic testified that "Cell 1A waa used to house high
priority detainees and celllB was used to house the high risk or
trouble making detainees. During my tour at the prison I
observed that when the male clctainees were first brought to the
facility, some of them were made to wear female UDderwear,
which I thiDk was to somehow break them down.··
12. (U) I find that prior to its deployment to J:mq for Opemtion
J:mqi Freedom, the 320th MP Batllllion and the 372nd MP
Company had =ived DO tmining in dcteotlon/intemee .
opemtions. I also find that very little instruction ortmining was
provided to MP personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva
Convention Relative to the T.reatmeot ofPriSOIICIJ ofWar, FM27-IO,
AR 190-8, or FM 3-19.40. Moreover, I find thatfew, ifaoy, copies of
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the Geneva Conventions were ever made available to MP personnel or
detainees. (ANNEXES 21·24, 33, and multiple witnesS
Sfll!en!ents)
13.(U) Another obviouS example of the Brigade Leadelship not
commwili:atingwith its Soldiers or ensuring their tactical proficiency
concems the incident of detaiDee abuse that occurred at Camp
Bucca,I!aq, on May 12, 2003. Solc1lers from the 223rd MP Company
reported to the SOOth MP Brigade Command at Camp Bucca, that four
Military Police Soldiers from the 320thMP Battalion had abused a .
number of de1ainees during inprocessing at Camp~ An extensive
ClD investigation determined that !out soldim from the 320th MP
Battalion had kicked and beaten these detainees following a transport ·
mission from Talil Air Base. (ANNEXES 34 and 35)
14. (U) Formal cbarges under the UCMJ were preferred against these
Soldiers and an Article-32 Investigation conducted by LTC Gently. He
recommended a genm1 court martial for the four accused, which BG
Kaipinsld supported. Despite this documented abuse, there is no
evidence thatBG Karpinski ever attempted to :remind SOOth MP
Soldim of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions xegarding
detainee treatment or took any steps to ensure that such abuse was
not repeated. ·Noris~anyevidencethatLTC(P)Phillabaum, the
commander of the SoldiClS involved in the Camp Bucca abuse incident,
took any iDitialive to ensure his Soldiers wexe properly tr.lined
xeganling detainee treatmeot (ANNEXES 3S and 62)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART ONE OF 'I"HE INVESTIGATION:
1. (U) Immediately deploy to the Imq Theater an integmted
multi-discipline Mobile Thlilling Team (MTI') comprised of subject
matter experts in intenuncntlresettlement operations, internaliolllll
and operational law, infoiJIISiion technology, ~ management,
interrogation and intelligence gathering techniques, chaplains, Arab
cultural awarenesS, and medical pi3l:tioes as it pertains to IIR
activities. This team needs to oversee and conduct comprehensive
training in all aspects of detainee and confinement opemtions.
2. (U) That all military police and military intelligence personnel
involved in any aspect of detainee operatious or interrogation
opCISiions in CJTF-7, and subordinate units, be immediately provided
with ttainingby an intemationalloperationallaw attorney on the
specific pnwisions ofThe Law ofl.a!ld Warfare FM 27-10, speci1ically
the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners of War,
Bnemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian !iltemees, and
Other Detainees, and AR 190-8.
3. (U) That a single commander in CJTF-7 be xesponstble for
overall detainee operations throughout the Imq 'Iheater of
Operations. I also xecommend that the Provost Matshal General of
the Army assign a miDimwn of two (2) subject matter experts. one
officer and one NCO, to assist CJTF-7 in coordinating detainee
operations.
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4. (U) That detention facility commanders and interrogation facility
COW!Ianders ensun: that appropriate copies oftbo Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment ofPrlsoners of War and notice of
prorections be made available in both English and the detainees'
language and be promincntly displayed in all detention facilities.
Detainees with questions regarding their treattneot should be given
the full opportunity to read the Convention.
S. (U) That each detention filcility commander and interrogation
facility commander publish a complete and comptebmsive set of
Stmding Operating Procedures (SOPs) regarding trealmellt Of
de~. and that all peiSOilllel. be required to read the SOPs and
si8n a document indicating that they have read and uoderstand the
SOPs.
6. (U) That in accordancc with the recommcndatious ofMG Ryder's
Assessment Report, and my findings and recommendations in this
investigation, allllllits in the liaq Theater of Operations conducting
intemmenl/confinementicletainment opcmtions in silpport of
Operatioo Jmqi Freedom be OPCON for all pwposes, to include action
under the UCMJ, to CJTF-7.
7. (U) Appoint the C3, CJTFasthe staff proponent for detainee
· opellltions in tbo liaq Joint Operations Area (JOA). (MG Tom Miller,
C3, CJTF-7, has been appointed by COMCJTF-7).
8. (U) That an inquiry UP AR 381-10, Procedure 15 be conducted to
determine the extent of culpability ofMililaiy Intelligence personnel.
assigned to the 205th M1 Brigade and the Joint Interrogation and
Debriefing Center (JIDC) regarding abuse of detainees at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF).
9. (U) That it is critical that the proponent for detainee operations is
assigned a dedicated Senior Judge Advocate, with specialized training
and knowledge of international and operational law, to assist and
advise on matters of detainee operations.
FINDINGS ~RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART TWO)
(U) The lnvestigation inquire into delainee escapes and
accountability lapses as reported by CJTF-7, specifically
allegations concerning these events at the Abu Ghraib Prison:
REGA'RDING PART TWO OF THE INVESTIGATION,
I MAKE THE FO¥-OWING SPEClFIC FINDINGS OF FACl':
1. The SOOth MP Brigade was responsible for theater-wide
Jntemment and Resettlement (IJR) operations. (ANNEXES 45 and
95)
2. (U) The 320th MP Battalion, SOOth MP Brigade was tasked with
delainee operations at the Abu Glu:aib Prison Complex during the time
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period~ in this investigation. (ANNEXES 41, 45, and 59)
3. (U) The 310th MP Batlllliau, SOOth MP Brigade was tasked with
detainee operations and Forward Operating Base (FOB) Operations at
the Camp Bucca Detention Facility un1i1 TOA an 26 Februaxy 2004.
(ANNEXES 41 and 52)
4. (U) The 744th MP Batlllliau, SOOth MP Brigade was tasked with
detainee operations and FOB Operations at the HVD Detention Facility
until TOAan 4Marcll2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 55)
S. (U) The 530th MP Batlllliau, SOOthMP Brigade was tasked with
detainee operntions and FOB Operations at the MEK holding facility
until TOA an lS Marcll2004. (ANNEXES 41 and 97)
6. (U) Detainee opmtions hiclude accountability, caic, and well
being of Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Person, Civilian Detainees,
and Other Detainees, as well as Iraqi criminal prlsonen. (ANNEX 22)
7. (U) The accountability for detainees is doctrinally an MP task
IAWFM3-19.40. (ANNEX22)
S. (U) Then: is a genemllaclc of knowledge, impJenu:ntatiou, and
emphasis ofbasic legal, regulatmy, doctrinsl, and command
nquirements within the 800th MP Brigade and its subordinate units.
(Multiple witness statementS in ANNEXES 45-91).
9. (U) The handling of detainees ~UJd criminal prisoners after
in-processing was inconsistent :from detention facility to detention
facility, compound to compound, encampment to encampment, and
ev1;11 shift to shift throughout the SOOth MP Brigade AOR (ANNEX 37)
10. (U) Camp Bucca, opemtedbythe 310thMPBattalion, had a
"Criminal Detainee In-Processing SOP" and a "Tiaining Outline" for
transferring and n:leasing detainees, which appealS to have been
followed. (ANNEXES 38 and 52)
11. (U) Incoming and outgcring detainees are being documented io the
National Detainee Reporting System (NDRS) and Biometric Automated
ToolSt facilities. However, it is Ullderutilized and often does not give a "real
time" accurate picture of the detainee population due to untimely
updatiDg. (ANNEX 56)
12. (U) There was a severe lapse in the accountability of detainees
at the Abu Glmub Prison Complex. The 320th MP Battalion used a
self-created "change sheet" to document the traosfer of a detaiJiee
from one location to another. Far proper accountability, it is
imperative tluit these change sheets be processed and the detainee
manifest be updated within 24 hours of movement. At Abu Gbralb,
this process would often take as lang as 4 days to complete. This
lag-time resulted in inaccumte detainee Jnternment Serial Number
(ISN) counts, gross dif1'erences in the detainee manifest and the
actual occupants of an individual compound, and significant confusion
of the MP Soldiers. The 320th MP Batllllion S-1, CPT Theresa
Dclhalso, and the S-3, MAJ David DiNenua, explained thai this
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breakdown was due to the lack of manpower to process change
sheets in a timely manner. (ANNEXBS 39 and 98)
13. (U) The 320th Batlalion TACSOP requires detainee accounlllbility
at least 4 times daily at Abu Ghraib. However, a detailed review of
their operatio:haljournals revealed that these accounts were often not
doDe or not documented bytbeunit Additioo•lly, there lsno
indication that accounting emns or the loss of a detainee in the
accounting process triggered any immediate com:ctive action by the
Battalion TOC. (ANNEX44)
14. (U) There is a lack of standa!dization in the way the 320th MP
·Battalion condm:ted physical counts of their. detainees. Each
compound within a given encampment did their beadcounts
differently. Some compounds had detainees line up in lines of 10,
some had. them sit in rows, and some moved all the detainees to one
end of the compound and counted them as they passed to the other
end of the compound. (ANNEX 98) ·
IS. (U) FM 3-19.40 outlines the need for 2 roll calls (100"-' ISNband
checks) per day. The 320th MP Battalion did thls check only 2 times
per week. Due to the lsck of real-time updales to the system, these
checks were regularly inaccurate. (ANNEXES 22 and 98)
16. (U) The 800thMP Brigade and subordinate units adopted
non-doctrinal terms such as "band checks," "roll-ups,• and "call-ups, •
which contributed to the lapses in accountability and confusion at the
soldier level. (Annexes 63, 88, and 98) ·
17. (U) Operational journals at the various compounds and the 320th
Battalion TOC contained numerous unprofessional entries and flippant
comments, which highlighted the lack of discipline within the unit
There was no indicatiOO:·that the joumals were ever reviewed by
anyone in their chain of command (Annex 37)
18. (U) Accounlllbility SOPs were not fully developed and standing
TACSOPs were widely ignored Any SOPs that did exist were not
ttained on, and were never distributed to the lowest level. Most
prooedures were sbelved at the unit TOC, rather than at the
subordinate units and guards mount sites. (Annexes44, 67, 71, and
85)
19. (U) Accouotsbility and facility operations SOPs lacked specificity,
implementation measures, and a system of cbecks and balances to
ensure compliance. (AnnCYES 76 and 82)
20. (U) Basic Army Doctrine was not widely referenced or utilized to
develop the accountability practices throughout the 800thMP Brigade'
s subordinate units. Daily processing, accountability, and detainee
care appears to have been mlide up as the operations developed with
reliance ou, aod guidance from, junior members of the unit who had
civilian com:ctions experience. (Annex 21)
21. (U) Soldiers were poorly prepared and unllllined to conduct I1R.
operations prior to deployment, at the mobili7ation site, upoo arrival in
theater, and throughout their missio11; (ANNEXES 62, 63, and 69)
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22. (U) The documentation Provided to this investigation identified 27
escapes or attempted escapes from the detention facilities throughout
the SOOth MP Brigade's AOR. Based on my assessment and detailed
analysis of the substandard accountability process mainlllin,ed by thO
SOOth MP Brigade, it is highly likely that there were several more
unreported cases of escape that were probably "wiitten off' as
administrative errors or otherwise undocumented. lLT Lewis Raeder,
Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company, reported knowing about at least
two additional escapes (one ftom a worlc detail and one from a
window) ftom Abu Glnllib (BCCF) that were not documentecL LTC
Dennis McGlone, Commander, 744th MP BattalioD, detailed the escape
of one detainee at the mgh Value Detainee Facillty who went to the
latrine and then outian the guards and escaped. Lastly, BG Janis
Karpinski, Commander. SOOth MP Brigade, stated that there were more
than 32 escapes ftom her holdingillcili1ies, which does not match the
number derived ftom the investigation materials. (ANNEXES 5-10,
45, SS, and 7l)
23. (U) The Abu Gluaib and Camp Bucca detention illcilities are
significantly over their intended maximum capacity while the guard
force is undermanned and underresourced. This imbalance bas
contnOutcd to the ponr Jiving conditions, escapes, and ac:countabi1ity
lapses at the various Dcilities The overcrowding of the illcilities also
limits the ability to identify and segregate leaders in the detainee
population who may be organizing escapes and riots within the illcility.
(ANNEXES 6, '22, and 92)
24. (U) The screening, processing, and release of detainees who
abou1d not be in custody takes too long and contributes to the
overcrowding and unrest in the detention mcilities. There are
cwrently three separate release meclla.oisms in the theater·wide
internment operations. First, the apprehending unit can release a
detainee if there is a detenninatio:n that their contim•ed detention is
not wananted. Secxmdly, a criminal detainee can be released after it
bas been detennined that the detainee bas no intelligence value, and
that their release would not be detrimental to society. BG Kaipinski
had signature authority to release detainees in this second category.
Lastly, detainees accused of committing "Crimes Against the
Coalition, • who are held throughnut the separate illcilities in the .
CJ'I'F-7 AOR, can be released upon a dei:ermination that they are of no
intelligence value and no longer pose a significant threat to Coalition
Forces. The release process for this category of detainee is a
screening by the local US Forces Magisttate Cell and a review by a
Detainee Release Board consisting ofBG K8Ipinski, COL Marc Warren,
SJA, CJ'I'F-7, and MG Barbara Fast, C·2, CJ'I'P·1. MG Fast is the
"Detainee Release Authority" for detainees being held for committing
ciimes against the coalition. &cording to BG Karpinski, this category
of detainee makes up more than 60".4 of the total detainee population,
and is the 1ilstest growing category. However, MG Fast, according to
BG Karpinski, routinely denied the board's rea.>!D1Dend•tions to release
detainees in this category who we~ no longer deemed a threat and
clearly met the requirements for release. kcording to BG Karpinski,
the extremely slow and ineffective release process bas significantly
contributed to the overcrowding of the illcilities. (ANNEXES 40, 45,
and4~ .
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25. (U) After Action Reviews (AARs) are not routinely being
conducted after liD escape or other serious incident No lessons
learned seem to have been disseminated to subordinate units to
enable corrective action at the lowest level. The Investigation Team
requested copies of AARs, and none were provided. (Multiple
W'llncss Statements)
26. (U) Lessons learned (i.e. Findings and IIIW!!J!mendations from
various l>iilnvestigations c:onceming escapes 81ld accountabiliey
lapses) were rubber stamped as approved 81ld ordered Implemented by
BG Kalplnski. There is no evidence tbat the IW\ioriey of her orders
directing the implementation of substantive changes were ever acted
upon. AclditioDally, there was no follow-ilp by the command to verify
the comctive lictions were talam. Had the findings 81ld
recommendations contained within their own investigations been
analyzed and actually iinplemented by BG Kiu:piJisld, many of the
subsequent escapes, accountablliey lapSes, and cases of abuse may
have been prevented. (ANNEXES S-10)
27. (U) The perimeter lighting around Abu Ghmib and the detention
fllci1ity at Camp Bucca is inadequate 81ld needs to be improved to
illuminate darlc areas tbat have routinely become avenues of escape.
(ANNBX6)
28. (U) Neither the camp rules nor the provisions of the Geoeva
Conventions are posted in English or in the language of the detainees
atanyofthe detention facilities in the 800th:MPBrigade's AOR, even
after several i1tvestigations had annotated the lack of this aitical
requirement. (Multiple Witness Statements and the Personal
Observations of the Investigation Team) ·
29. (U) The Iraqi guards at Abu Gbraib BCCF) demonstmte
questionable work ethics and loyalties, and are a potentially dangerous
contingent within the Hard.Site. These guards have tiJrDished the.
Iraqi aiminal inmates with conliaband, weapons, and infoiiiilltion.
Additionally, they have :facilitated the escape of at least one detainee.
(ANNEX 8 and 26-sPC Polak's Statement)
30. (U) In general, US civilian contract personnel (fitan Corporation,
CAcr, etc ... ), third countly nationals, and local contractors do not
appear to be properly supervised within the detention faciliey at Abu
Gbraib. During our on-site inspection, they wandered 8bout with too
much~ free access in the detainee area. Having civilians
in various outfits (civilian and DCUs) in and about the detainee area
causes confusion and may bave contributed to the difficulties in the
acoountabili.lY. process and with detecting escapes. (ANNEX Sl,
Multiple Witliess Statemcots, and the Personal Observations of
the Investigation Team)
31. (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion,
contended tbat the Detainee Rules ofBngsgement (DROB) and the
general principles of the Geneva Convention were briefed at evety
guard mount and shift change on Abu Glmub. However, none of our
witnesses, nor our personal observations, support his contention. I
. find that SGM Emerson was not a credible witness. (ANNEXES 45,
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80, and the Peisonal Obs¢rvations of the Investigation Team)
32. (U) Several interviewees insisted that the MP and MI SoldieJ:s at
Abu Ghmib (BCCF) received regular training on the basics of detainee
operations; h9wever, they have been 11118ble to produce any verifying
docwnentaliau, sign-in rosters, or soldiers who can recall the content
of this training. (Annexes 59, 80, and the Absence of any Training
Records) .
33. (SINF) The various detention 1ilcilities operated by the SOOthMP
Brigade have routinely held persons brought to them by Other
Govemment Agencies (OGAs) without accounting for them, knowing
their identities, or even the reason for their deteDtion. Tho Joint
Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Gbraib clilled theSe
detainees "ghost detainees.• On at least one occasion, the 320th MP
Battalion at Abu Ghraib held a handful of "ghost detainCes" (6-8) cOr
OGAs that they moved around within the :liu:ility to hide them from a
visiting International Commi~ ofthe Red Cross (ICRC) survey team.
This maneuver was deceptive. conlraly to Army Doctrine, and in
violalion of international law. (Annex 53)
34. (U) The following riots, escapes, and shootings have been
documented and reported to this Investigation Team. Although~
is no data ftom other missions of similar size and duration to compare
the number of escapes with, the most sigoificant lllctors derived ftom
these reports are twofold. First. investip1ions and SIRs lacked
critical data needed to evaluate the details of each incident Second,.
each investigation seems to have pointed to the same zypes of
deficiencies; however, little to nothing was done to correct the
problems and, to implement the reco!!l!!!!ln(Jations as was ordered by
BG Ka!pinski, nor was the!e any command emj,hasis to ensure these
deficiencies were corrected: ·
a (U) 4 June 03- This escape was meolioned in the 15-6.
Investigation covering the 13 June 03 escape, recapture, and
shootings of detainees at Camp Vigilant (320th MP Battalion).
However, no mvestigation or additional information was provided as
requested by this investigation team. (ANNEX 7)
b. (U) 9 June 03· Riot and shootings of five detaiDe.es at Camp
Cropper. (115thMP Battalion) Several detainees allegedly rioted
after a detainee was subdued by MPs of the USthMP Battalion after
striking a gUard in compouod B of Camp Cropper. A IS-6 investigation
by ILT Magowan (llSth MP Battalion, Platoon Leader) concluded that .
a detainee had acted up and hit an MP. After being subdued, one of
the MPs took off his DCU top and :flexed his muscles to the detainees,
which further escalated the riot The MPs were overwhelmed and the
guards tired letbal rounds to protect the life of the compOund MPs,
whereby 5 detainees were wounded. Contributing lllctors were ponr
· commuuications, no clear cbain of command, 1ilcility-obstructed views
of posted guards, the QRF did not have non4etbal equipmeut, and the
SOP was inadequate and ouidated. (ANNEX S)
c. (U) 121une 03-Escape and recapture ofdetainee#8399,
escape and shooting of detainee# 7166, and attempted escape
of an unidentified detainee from Camp Cropper HoldiDg Area
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(llSth MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly made their escape
in the nighttime hours prior to 0300. A 15-6 investigalion by CPT
Wendlandt (llSth MP Battalion, S·2) coDcluded tbat the detainees
allegedly escaped by crawling UDder the wire at a location with
iDadequate lighting. One detainee was stopped prior to escape. An
MP of the llSthMP Battalion search team recaptured. detainee#
8399, and detainee # 7166 was shot and killed by a Soldier during the
recapture process. Contributiog faclozs were oveiCrOWding, poor
lighling, and the ll8tunl of the hardened crimiJJal detainees at that
location. It Is ofparticulaf note tbat the c:nmmand was infonned at
least 24 hours in advauce of the upcomiDg escape attempt and
started doing amplified 8l111011JlCe1Jlts in Atabic Sl;ltiogthe camp
rules. The Investigation pointed out tbat rules and guidelines were not
posted in the l:amps in the detainees' native languageS. (ANNEX 6)
d (U) 13 June 03· Escape and recapture of detainee# 8968
and the shooting of eight detainees at Abu Gbtalll (BCCF) (320th
MP Battalion). Sevcml detainees allegedly attempted to escape at
about 1400 hours :from the camp Vigilant Compound, Abu Gluaib
(BCCF). A 1S-6lnvestigation by CPT Wyks (400thMP Battalion, S·1) ·
concluded tbat the cJetalnoe allegedly escaped by sliding under the
wire while the tower guard was turoed lri the other direction. This
detainee was subsequenti,y apprehended by the QRF. At about 1600
the same clay, 30-40 detainees rioted and pelted three interior MP
guards with rocks. One guard was injured and the tower guards fired
· lethal rounds at the rioters injuring 7 and kiUlDg 1 detainee. (ANNEX
7)
e. (U) OS November 03· Escape of detainees # 9877 and#
10739 from Abu Gbtalll (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees
allegedly escaped at 0345 from the Hani-Site, Abu Gluaib (BCCF). ·An
SIR was initiated by SPC Warner (320th MP Battalion, S·3 RTO). The
SIR indicated that 2 criminal prisonem escaped through their cell
window in tier 3A of the Han! .Site. No illfolmation on findings,
contnlluting factors, or coll'CCtive ;lction has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 11)
f. (U) 07 November 03··Escape of detainee 1114239 from Abu
Ghraib (320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly esi:aped at 1330
from Compound 2 ofl}!e Ganci Encampment, Abu Gluaib (BCCF). An
SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320thMP Battalion, S-3 Asst
NCOIC). The SIR indicated tbat a detainee escaped from the North
end of the compound and was discoven:d missing during distribution of
the noon meal. but there is no melhod of escape listed in the SIR. No
information on findiJJgs, contributingf'actors, or corrective action his
been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 12)
g. (U) 08 November 03-Bscape of detainees# 115089, #
151623, # 151624, # 116734, # 116735, and# 116738 from Abu
Gbtalo (320th MP Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped
at 2022 from Coinpound 8 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib. An
SIR was initiated by MAI DiNenna (320th MP Battalion, S·3). The SIR
indicated tbat S-6 prisonen escaPed :from the North end of the
compound, but there is no method of escape listed in the SIR. No .
information on :findings, contributing factors, or comctive action has
been provided to this investigation team. (ANNEX 13)
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h. (U) 24 November 03· Riot and shooting of 12 detainees II
150216, 11150894, 11153096, 153165, #153169, #116361,
#153399,#20257,#150348,#152616,#116146,and#152156
at Abu Ghralb(320th MP Battalion), Several detainees allegedly
began to riot at about 1300 in all of the COIIlpOIIIIds at the Ganci
encampment This resulted in the shooting deaths of 3 detainees, 9
wounded ~. and 9ll\iured US Soldiers, A 15-6 investigation
by COL Broce Falcone (220th MP Brigade, Deputy Commander)
concluded that the de1ainees rioted in protest of their l1ving
conditions, that the riot turned Violent, the use of non-lethal :force
was ineffective, and, after the 320th MP Battalion CDR executed
"Golden Spike," the emergency containment plan, the use of deadly
force was authorized. Contributing 1ilctozs were laclc of
comprehensive tmining of gwuds, poor or non-existeut SOPs, no
fonnal guard-mount conducted prior to shift, no !dlearsals or ongoing
training, the mix of less than iethsl rounds with lethal rounds in
weapons, no AARs being conducted after incidents, ROE not posted ·
and not Ullderstood, overcrowding, llllifouns not standardized, and
poor communication between the command and Soldiers. (ANNEX 8)
i. (U) 24 November 03· Shooting of detainee at Abu
Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly had a pistol in his
cell and around 1830 an extiaction team shot him with less than lethal
and lethal rounds in the process of recovering the weapon. A 15-6
investigation by COL Bruce Falcone (220th Brigade, Deputy
Commander) concluded that one of the dminees in tier lA of the
Hard Site had gotten a pi!tol and a couple ofknives :li:om an haqi
Guard working in the encampment . Immediately upon receipt of this
information, an ad·hoc extxaction team consisting ofMP and MI
. persormel conducted what. they called a routine cell search, which
resulted in the shooting of an MP and the detainee. Contributing
1ilctozs were a corrupt Iraqi Guard, Inadequate SOPs, the Detention
ROE in place at the time was ineffective due to the numerous levels of ·
authorlzation needed for use oflethsl force, poorly trained MPs,
unclear lanes ofresponst"bility, and ambiguous relationship between the
MI and MP assets. (ANNEX 8)
j. (U) 13 December 03· Shooting by non-lethal means into
crowd at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several detainees
allegedly got into a dminee-on..cJetainee fight around 1030 in
Compound 8 of the Ganci encampmP,Ill, Abu Ghmib. An SIR was
initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, 8-3 Section). The SIR
indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used a
non-lethal crowd-dispersing round to break up the fight. which was
successful. No Information on findings, contributing :factors, or
corrective actinn has been provided to tbisinvestigatinn team. (
ANNEX14)
k (U) 13 December 03· Shooting by non-tethsl means into
crowd at Abu Ghraib(320th MP Battalion). Several dminees
allegedly got into a ~-on-detainee fight around 1120 in ·
Compouud 2 pfthe Ganci encampment, Abu Ghrm'b. An SIR was
initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, 8-3 Section). The SIR
indicated that there was a fight in the compound and the MPs used
two non-lethsl shots to disperse the crowd, which was successful.
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No information on findings, contributing factors, or corrective action
has been provided to tbls investigation team. (ANNEX IS)
L (U) 13 December 03- Shooting by 11011-lethal means into
crowd at Abu Glnaib(320th MP Billlalion). Approximately 30-40 ·
detainees allegedly got into a cJetainCe-on-detainee fight around 1642
in Compound 3 of the Ganci encampment, Abu Ghraib (BCCF). An SIR
was initiated by SSG Matash (320th MP Battalion, S..3 Section). The
SIR. indicates that there was a fight in the COIIlpOUIId and the MPs
used a 11011-lethal crowd-dispersing round to bresk up the fight, which
was sua:essful. No infiu:mation OJi findings, contributing factors, or
eonective action has been provided to tbls investigation team. (
ANNBX16)
m. (U) 17December 03- Shootiogby non-lethal means of
detainee from Abu Ghr.lib(320th MP Battalion). Several
detainees allegedly assaulted anMP at 1459 inside the Ganci
Em:ampment, Abu Ghmib (BCCF). An SIR. was initiated by SSG Matash
(320thMP BRIGADE, S-3 Section). The SIR indicated that three
detainees assaulted anMP, which resulted in the use of a non-lethal
shot that calmed the situation. No infotmati.on on findings,
contributing factors, or corrective action has been provided to this
investigation team. (ANNEX 17)
n. (U) 07 January04-Escapeofdetaineel#ll5032fromCamp
Bucca(310th MP Battalion). A detainee allegedly escaped between
the hours of 0445 and 0640 from Compouod 12, of Camp Bucca.
Investigation by CPTKaircs (310thMP BattalionS-3) and CPT
Holsombeck (724th MP Battalion S-3) concluded that the detainee
escaped through an undetected weakness in the wire. C9Jttributing
factors were inexperlenced guards; lapses in accountabJlity,
complacency, lack of leadership preseuce, poor visibility, and lack of
clear and concise communication between the guards and the .
leadership. (ANNEX 9)
o. (U) 12 January 04- Escape ofDetainees 1#115314 and
1#109950 as well as the ~pe and recapture of 5 tmknown
detainees at the Camp Bucca Detention Facility (310th MP
Battalion). Several detainees allegedly escaped around 0300 from
Compound 12, of Camp Bui:ca. An AR. IS-6.JnYCStigation by LTC Leigh
Coulter (800!\lMP Brigade, OIC Camp AriJjanDelaehment) concluded
that three of the detainees escaped through the front holding cell
during conditionS of limited visibility due to fog. One of the detainees
was noticed, shot with a non-lethal round, and teturned to his holding
compound. That same night, 4 detainees exited through the wire on
the South side of the camp and were seen and apprehended by the
QRF. Contn"butingfactors were the lack of a coordinated effort for
emplacement ofMPs during implementation ofthe fug plan.
overcrowding. and poor communications: (ANNEX 10)
p. (U) 14 January 04- Escajie of detainee #12436 and missing
Iraqi guard from Hard"Site, Abu Glnaib (320th MP Battalion). A
detainee allegedly escaped at 1335 from the Hard Site at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF). An SIR was initiated by SSG Hydro (320th MP Battalio~ S-3
Asst. NCOIC). The SIR indicates that an Iraqi guard assisted a
detainee to escape by sigoing him out on a work detail and
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disappearing with him. At the time of the second SIR, neither missing
person had been located. No information on findings, contributing
factors, or conective action has been provided to this investlgalion
team (ANNEX 99)
q. (U) 26 Janwuy 04- Escape of detainees lis 115236, 116272,
and 15193~ fi:omCampBucca(310thMPBaaallon). Several
Detainees allegedly escaped between the houts of0440 and 0100
during a period of intense fog. Investigation by CPT K.aiRs (310th MP
Battalion S-3) ooncludcd that the dminees crawled under a fence
when visibility was only 10-IS meters due to fog. Contributing factOis
were the limited visibility (daxkness under foggy conditions),lack of
proper accountability reporting, inadeq1iate number of guards,
commeucemint of dMtinee feeding daring low vist'bility operations,
and poorly restedMPs. (ANNEX 18)
36. (U) As I have previously indicated, this ilMstigallon detennined
thattbere was virtually a complete lack of detailed SOPs at any of the ·
detention facilities Moreover, despite the fact that there were
numerous reported escapes at detention facilities throughout Jmq (in
excess of 35), AR 15-6 Investigations folloWing these escapes were
simply forgotten or ignored by the Brigade Commander with no
difsemination to other fac:ilities Ai\er-Aclion Reports and Lessons
Learned, jf done at all, remained at iDdiviclual faco1jties and were not
shared among other commanders or.soldiem throughout the Brigade.
The Command 1IIMll' Issued 5lliDdard 1TPs for handling escape
incideots. (AnnexES 5-10, Mulliple Witness Strtements, and the
Personal Observations of the Investigation Team)
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING PARTTWOOFTHE
INVESTIGATION: .
(U) ANNEX 100 of this investigation contsins a detailed and
referenced series of m:ommendations for improving the detainee
accountability pr.!Ctices throughout the OIF area of opemtions. (U)
Accountability pmctices throughout any particular detention faCility
must be standardized and in accordance yvilh applic:able regulations
and international law. (U) The NDRS and BATS accaunting systems
must be expanded and used to thelr 1Wiest extent to facilitate real
time updating when detainees are. moved and orttansfelred from one
location to another. (U) "Change sheeta," orthelr doctrinal cquivalcot
must be inunrAiately processed and updated into the syStem to ensure·
accurate accountability. The dMtinee ron call or ISN counts must
match the manifest provided to the compound guards to ensure proper
accountBbility of detainees .. (U) Develop, B1llfi: and impl.emeut
comprehensive and detailed SOPs utilizing the lessons leamed from
this investigation as~ as any previous findings, recommeudations,
and reports. (U) SOPs must be written, disseminated, trained on, and
understood at the lowest levei.(U) Imqi criminal ptisoncrs must be held
in separate facilities from any other category of detainee. (U) All of
the compounds should be wired into the master IIUIIIifest whereby MP
Soldiers can account for their detainees in real time and without
waiting for their change sheets to be processed. This would also bave
the change sheet serve as a way to check up on the acrumcy of the
manifest as updated by each compound. The BATS and NDRS system
can be utilized for this function.(()) Accountability lapses, escapes,
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and distmbances within the cle1ainment facilities must be jmmedlatcly
reported through both the opemtional and admiDislrative Chain of
Command ~aSerlousincldentB.eport (SIR). The SlRs muSt then be
tracked and followed by daily srrREPs UllllJ. the situation is resolved.
(U) Detelllion Rules ofBngaaement (DR.OE), liltemlgation Rules of
Engagement; (IROE), and the principles ofthe need to be briefed at every shift cbange and guard mount (U) AARs
must be c:Onducted attar serious incidents at any given :filcility. The
obselvations and comctive actious that develop from the AARs must
. be amlyzed by the respective MP Battalion S-3 section, developed
into a plan of aCtion, shared with the other facilities, and implemented
as a matter of policy. (U) There must be significant SlnlCtUral
improvements at each of the detention facilities. 'Ibc needed
changes include significant eohancement of perimeter lighting,
additional chain link fencing, staking down of all concertina wire, hard
si~ development, and expansion of Abu Gbralb (BCCF) . (U) Tho
Geneva Conventions and the facllil;y ndes must be prominently
displayed In English and the language of the detainees at each
compound and encampiiiCIIt at every detention :filcility JAW AR.190-8.
(U) Further restrict US civilians and other conttactors' access
throughout the 1acilily. Contractms and civilians must be in an
authorized and easily identifiable UDiform to be more easily
distinguished from the masses of detainees in eivilian clothes. (U)
Facilities must have a stop movementhransferperlod of at least 1
hour prlor to every 100% detainee roll c:all and ISN counts to en.sme
accurate aocounlabilil¥.(U) Tho me1hod for c1oing head counts of
detainees within a given compound must be 6landardized. (U) Those
mllitaiy units conducting IIR. operatious must know at; 1Iain ou, and
CODStantly reference the applicable A!my Doctrine and CJTF command
policies. Tho references provided in Ibis report cover :oearly every
deficiency I have enumerated. Althougb they do not, and cannot,
make up for leadership sbortfillls, all soldiers, at all levels, can use
them to maintain standardized opemting procedures and efticient
accountability practices. .
FINDJNGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
(PART THREE)
(U)Jnvestigate the training, Slalldards, employment, command
policies, internal procedures, and r;ommand climate in the SOOth
MP Brigade, as appropriate:
(Names deletCd)
(ANNBXBS 45-91)
. REGARDING PART THREE OF Tim INVESTIGATION, I MAKE THE
FOU.OWING SPECIFIC FINDINGS OF FACT: ·
1. (U)I find thatBG Janis Kaipinski took coJDDiandofthe 800.thMP
Brigade on 30 June 2.003 fromBG Paul Bill. BG Katpinsld has remained
in command since that elate. The SOOth MP Brigade is comprised.of
eightMPbattalious in the liaqiTOR: 115thMPBattaliou, 310thMP
BaUaliou, 32.0th MP Battalion, 324th MP BaUalinu, 400th MP Battalion,
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530th MP BattalioD, 724th MP Battalion, and 744th MP Battalion.
(ANNEXES 41 and 45)
2. (U) Prior to BG Karpinski laking command, membem of the SOOth
MP Brigade believed they would be allowed to go home when all the
detaillees were released from the Camp Bucca Theater Internment
Facility following the cessation of llll!ior sround combat on 1 May
2003. Atcmepoiut, approximately7,000 to 8,000 detaiuees were held
at Camp Bucca. Through Article-S Tribunals and a screening process,
several thou.wtd detaiuees were released. Many in the cnmmand
believed they'would go home when the detainees were released. In
late May-early June 2003 the SOOth MPBrigade was given a new
mission to manage the Iraqi penal system and several detention
centers. This new mission mealit Soldiers would not redeploy to
CONUS when anticipated. Morale sutfered, and over the next few
months there did not appear to have been any attempt by the
. Command to mitigate this morale problem. (.ANNEXES 45 aild 96)
3. (U) There is abundant evidence in the statements of numerous
witnesses that soldiers throughout the SOOth MP Brigade were not
proficient in their basic MOS sldlls, particularly regarding
intemmentlresetemeot oper.ilions. Moreover, there is no evidence
that the command, although aware of these deficiencies, attempted
to com:ct them in any systemic llllinner other than ad hoc training by
individuals with civilian comctions experience. (Multiple Witness
Sfatements and the Personal ObSCIVations ofthb Investi.galion
Team)
4. (U) I find that the SOOth MP Brigade was not adequately trained
for a mission that included opemting a prlson or penal ins1ilution at
Abu Ghlaib Prison Complex. As the Ryder As.wsment foimd, I also
concur that uolts of the SOOth MP Brigade did not receive
correctlons-specific traiDiDg during their mobi1izotion period. MP uolts
did not receive pinpoint assignments~ to mobilization and during
the post mobilization training, and thus could not train for specific
·missions. The traiDiDg that was accomplisbed at the mobilization sites
were developed and implemented at the company 1eVc1 with little or no
direction or supervision at the Battalion and Brigade levels; and .
consisted prlmarily of common tasks and law enforcement triliniDg.
However, I :tbimd no evidence that the Command, although aware of
this deficiency, ever requested specific comctions training from the
Commandant ofthe Militmy Police Sphool, the US Army Confinemeot
Facility at Mannheim, Gennany, the Provost Marsbal Geoeml of the .
Army, or the US Army Disciplinaly Blll'l'IICks at Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. (ANNEXES 19 and 76) .
5. (U) I find that without adequate training for a civilian internee
detention mission, Brigade personnel relied heavily on individuals within
the Brigade wbo bad civilian correctlons experience, including many
wbo worked as prison guards or corrections officials in their civilian
jobs. Almost every witness we interviewed bad no familiarity with the
provisions of AR 190-8 or FM 3-19.40. It does not appear that a
Mission Essential Task List (MI!TL) based oa in-theater mi(!Sions was
ever di:veloped nor was a training plan implemellted throughout the
Brigade. (ANNEXES 21, 22, 67, and S1)
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6. (U) I also find, as did MG Ryder's Team, thai the SOOth MP Brigade
as a whole, was ~for the mission for which it was
tasked. Army Doctrine dictstes that an IIR. Brigade can be organized
with between 7 and 21 battalioos, and that the avemge ballalion size
element should be able to handle approximately 4000 detainees at a
time. This investigation indicates that BG Karpinski and her staff did a
poor job allocating resources throughout the Iraq IOA. Abu Gbraib
(BCCF) nonually housed between 6000 and 7000 defainees, yet it was
operated by only one battalion In Contrast, the HVD Facility
mainlains only about 100 de!alnees, and is also run by an entire
batlalion. (ANNEXES 19, 22, and 96)
7. (U) Reserve Component uuits do not have an individual
replacement system to mitigate medical or other losses. Over time,
the SOOth MP Brigade clearly suffered from personDC1 shortages
through release from active duty (REFRAD) actions, medical .
evacuation, and demobilization In addition to being severely
. undermanned, the quality of life for Soldiers assigned to Abn Ghmib
(BCCF) was extremely poor. There was no DFAC, PX, barbershop, or
MWR facilities. There 'WCte numerous mortar attacks, mndom rifle and
RPG attacks, and a serious threat to Soldiers snd detainees In the
facility. The prison complex was also severely overcrowded and the
Brigade lacked adequate resources and personDel to resolve serious
logistical problems. F'mally, because of past associations and
familiarity of Soldiers within the Brigade, it appean! thalfriendsbip
often took precedence over appropriate leader and subordinate
relationships. (ANNEX 101, MUltiple Witness Sfatements, and the
Personal Obsetvations of the Investigation Tesm)
8. (U) With respect to the BOOth MP Brigade mission at Abn Ghral'b
(BCCF), I find that there was clear :fiiction and lack of effective
communication between the Commsnder, 20SthMIBrigade, who
controlled FOB Abu Gbmib (BCCF) after 19 November 2003, and the
Commander, SOOth MP Brigade, who controlled detainee opemtions
inside the FOB. There was no clear delineation of responsibility
between commands, little coordination at the command level, and no
integration of the two functions. Coordilla1ion occurred at the lowest .
possible levels with little oversight by commsnders. (ANNBXES31,
4S,and46)
9. (U) I find thai this ambiguous romm8Jid relationship was
exacerbated by a CJTF-7 Fmgmentary Order (FRAGO) 1108 issued on
19 November 2003: Paragraph 3.C.8, Assignment of20Sth MI Brigade
Commander's Responsibilities for the Baghdad Ceotml Confinement
Facility, states as follows: ·
3.C.8. A. (U) 205 MIBRIGADE.
3.C.8.A.l. (U)EFFECI'IVEIMMEDIATELYCOMMANDER20SMI
BRIGADE ASSUMES RBSPONSIBILlTYFOR THE BAGHDAD
CONFINBMENl' FACILITY (BCCF) AND IS APPOIN'll!D THE FOB
COMMANDER. UNITS CURRENTLY: AT ABU GBRAIE! (BCCF) ARE
TACONT020S MIBRIGADEFOR "SECURITYOFDETAINBES AND
FOB PROTECIION."
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Although not supported by BG Karpinski, FRAOO 1108 made all of the
MP units at Abu Ghnu'b TACON to the Commander, 20Sth MI Brigade •
. This effcdively made anMI Ofticcr, rather than an MP Ofticcr,
responsible for the MP units conducting detainee operations at that
facility. This is not doctrinally sound due to the different missions
and agendas assigned to each of these respective specialties.
(ANNEX31) .
10 (U) Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), 10
July 2001 defines Tactiesl Control (TACON) as the detailed diredion
· and control of movements or lllaiiCUVCIS wilbin the operational area
n=saryto accomplish assigned missions or tasks. (ANNEX42)
"TACON is the command authority over assigned or at!liChed
forces or commands or military capability made available for
tasking that is limited to the detailed direction and control of
movements cir lllaiiCUVCIS within the operational area necessary
to accomplish aSsigned missions or tasks. TACON is inherent in
OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders
at any echelon at or below the level of combalant rommander."
11. (U) Based on all the factS aDd ~ in t1lis investigation,
Hind that there was little, if any, recognition oft!Us TACON Order by
the BOOth MP Brigade or the 20Sth MI Brigade. Further, there was no
evidence if the CQmmander, 20Sth MI Brigade clearly Informed the
COmmander, 800thMP Brigade, and specilically the Commander, 320th
MP Battalion assigned at Abu Glu:aib (BCCF), on the specific ·
requirements oft!Us TACON relationsbip. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)
12. (U) It is clear from a coritprebensive review of witness statements
and personal interviews that the 320th MP Baitalion and BOOth MP
Brigade continued to ~on as if they were responsible for the
securlty, health and welfare, and overall secwity of detalDees within
Abu Ghnu'b (BCCI.') prison. Both BG Katpinski and C()L Pappas clearly
behaved as if this were still the case. (ANNEXES 45 and 46)
13. (U) Withrespect.tothe 320thMPBattalion,Ifindthatthe
.Battalion Commander, LTC (P) Jerry Phillabaum, was an extremely
ineffective ctl!Dm•nder and leader. Nwnerous witnesses confirm that
the Battalion S-3, MAJ David W. DiNenna, basically Illll the battalion
on a day-to-day basis. At one pOint, BG KatpiDsld seot LTC (P)
Phillabaum to Camp Arifjan, Kuwait for approxiJiJately two weeks,
apparently to give him some relief :from the pressure he was
experiencing as the 320th Battalion Commander. This JllO\'CIIICill: to
Camp Arifjan immediately followed a briefing provided by LTC (P)
Phillabaum to the CJTF-7 Command .. LTG Sanch••qiearthe cud of
October 2003. BG Karpinski placedLTcRonald ~. Cmmander of
the llSth MP Baitalion, in charge of the 320th MP Battslionfora
period of approximately two weeks. LTC Cbew was also in rommand
of the 115th MP Battalion assigned to Camp Cropper, BIAP, Iraq. I
could find no orders, either suspeuding or relieving LTC (P) Pbillabamn
from command, nor any orders placing LTC Chew in command of the
320tb. In addition, there was no indication this mnoval and search
for a replacement was communicated to the Commander CJTF-7, the
Commander 377th TSC, or to Soldiers in the 320th MP Battslion.
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Tempolllrily removing one commander and replacing him with another
serving Battalion ('oounander without an order and without notifying
superior or suborclillate commands is without precedent in my militaiy
career. LTC (P) Phillabaum was also zeprimanded for lapses in
accountability that RSUlled in several escapes. The 32Qth MP
Battalion was stigmatized as aUDit due to previous detainee abuse
which o=rred in May 2003 at the Bucca Theater JJitemment Facility
(l'IF), while 1lllder the command ofLTC (P) pbillab;mm Despite his
proven deficiencies as both a commander and leader, BG Karpinski
allowed LTC (P) Phillabaum to Iemain in command of her most troubled
battalion guarding. by :tar, the lmgest number of detainees in the
SOOth MP Brigade. LTC (P) Phillabaum was suspended from his duties
by LTG SIIDCbez, CITF-7 Commander on 17 Janwuy2004. (ANNEXES
43, 45, and 61)
14. (U) During the comse of this investigation I cooducted a lengthy
interview withBG Karpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included
verbatim in the Investigation Annexes. BG Kmpinski was exiiemely
emotiODlll duringmuchofhertestimony. Whatlfoundpallicularly
disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either
llllderstand or accept that 1111111¥ of the problems inhetent in the SOOth
MP Brigade were caused or exaceibated by poor leadenhip and the
refusal of her command to both establish and enforce basic standards
and principles among its soldiers. (ANNEx 45 and the PersODlll
Observations oftheJJiteiViewTeam) ·
15. (U) BG Karpinski alleged that she zeceived no lietp from the Civil
Affairs Command, speclfically, no assistance from either BG John Kern
or COL T"un Regan. She blames much of the abuse that occurred lo
Abu Gluaib (BCCF) on MI persounel and 5lated that MI personnel bad
given the MPs "ideas" that led to detainee abuse. JJi addition, she
blamed the 372od Compaoy Platoon Sergeant, SFC Snider, "the
Company Commander, CPr Reese, and the Ftrst Sergeant, MSG
Upinski, for the abuse. She argued that problems loAbu Gluaib were
the flwlt of COL Pappas IIIld LTC Jordan because COL Pappas was in
charge ofFOB Abu Ghlaib. (ANNEX 45)
16. (U) BG Karpinski also implied during her tl:stimony that the crimloal
abuses that occurred at Abu Gluaib (BCCF) might have been caused
by the ultimate disposition of the detainee abuse cases that originally
occurred at Camp Bucx:a in May 2003. She stated that "about the
same time those Incidents were tsking place out ofBaghdad
Ceutral, the decisions were made to give the guilty people at
Bucca plea bargains. So, the system conummicaWI to the
soldiers, the worst that's gonna happen is, you'ze gonna go
home. • I think it important to Point out that almost every witness
testified that the serious criminal abuse of de1alnees at Abu Ghraib
(BCCF) ~lolate October and early November 2003. The
photographs and statements clearly support that the abuses occurred
during this time period. The Bucca cases were set for trial in Janwuy
2004 and were not :tiDally disposed ofuntil29 December 2003. Theie
is entiiely no evidence that the decision of numerous MP persoime1 to
intentionally ab'use detainees at Abu Gbrabid (BCCF) was influenced in
any respect by the Camp Bucca cases. (ANNEXES 25, 26, and 45)
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17. (U) Numerous witnesses stated tbatthe BOOthMP Brigade S·1,
MAl Hinman and S-4, MAJ GreeD, weze essentially dysfunctional, but
that despite lll1ll1erOUS complaints, these officcn weze not replaeed.
This had a detrimental elfect on the Brigade Stafi's effectiveness and
inorale. Moreover, the Brigade Command Judge Advocate, LTC James
O'Hare, appealS te laclc initiative and was unwilling to accept
responsibility for any of his actions. LTC Gm:y Maddocks, the Brigade
XO did not properly supervise the Brigade staff by 1ililillgte lay out
staff priorities, take overt correc:tive action when JJeeded, and
supervise their daily :functions. (ANNEXES 45, 47, 48, 62, and 67)
18. (U) In addition to poor morale and sta!finefliciencies, I 1ind that
the SOOth MP Brigade did not articulate or enforce clear and basic
Soldier and Army standards. I specificaliy found these examples of
unenforced standards:
a. '1'hem was no clear uniform standard for any MP Soldicn assigned
detention duties. Despite the filet that hundreds of fanner Iraqi
soldicn and ofticcn were detsinees, MP personnel were allowed te
wear civilian clothes in the FOB after duty hours whlle canying
wespons. (ANNEXBS 51 and 74)
b. Some Soldiers wrote Poems and other sayings on their helmets and
soft caps. (ANNEXES 51 and 74)
c. Jn addition, numerous afficcn and senior NCOs have been
reprimanded/diaciplined for misconduct during this period. Those
disciplined tnclude; (ANNEXES 43 and 102)
1). (U) BG Janis Katpinski, Commander, SOOthMP Brigade
MemoilUidum of Admonishment by LTG Sanchez, Comrilander,
CJTF·7, on 17 January2004.
2). (U) LTC (P) Jeny Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP Battalion ·
GOMOR from BG Kalpinsk:i, Commander SOOth MP Brigade, on 10
November 2003, for hick ofleadersbip and for tililingte take
corrective security m.e3S1m:S as ordered by the Brigade
Commander; :filed locallY
Suspended by BG Katpinski, Commander SOOth MP Brigade, 17
January 2004; Pending Relief for Cause, for dereliction of duty
3). (U) LTC Dale Burtyk, Commander, 400th MP Battalion
GOMOR from BG Kalpinsk:i, Commander SOOth MP Brigade, on 20
August 2003, for lililure to properly train his Soldiers. (Soldier
had negligent discharge ofM·16 while exiling his vehicle, round
went into 1bd tank); :filed locaiiy, ·
4). (U)MAJDavidDiNenua, S·3, 320thMPBattalion
GOMORfromLTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, for dereliction of duty for lililins to report a violation of
CENTCOM Geneia1 Order #1 by a sUbordinate Fte!d Gmde Officer
and Senior Noncommissioned Officer, which he pcnonally
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ob&eiVed; returned to soldier llllfi1ed.
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander SOOth MP Brigade, on 10
November 03, for 1lliling to take comctive security measures as
· ordered by the Brigade Commander; filed locally.
S). (U) MAJ Stacy Gmri1y, FillancC OJiicer, 800thMP Brigade
GOMORfrom LTG McKiemau,. Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, for violation ofCENTCOM General Order#!, COIISUIIIing
alcohol wiih an NCO; filed locally.
6). (U) CPT Leo Merck, Commander, 870thMP Company
Court-Martial Charges Prefened, for Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer and Unauthori2ed Usc of Govemmeot Computer in that
he was alleged to have taken nude pictUres of his fi:male
Soldiers without their lmowledge; Trial date to be announced.
7). (U) CPT Damaris Mmales, Commander, 770th MP Company
GOMORfromBG Karpinski, Commander 800thMP Brigade, on 20
August 2003, for 1lliling to properly tminhis Soldiers (Soldier
bad negligeot disch3rge ofM-16 while exiting his vehicle, louud
went into fuel tank); filed locally.
8). (U) CSMRoy Clement, Co~ SergeantMlgor, 800thMP
Brigade
GOMOR and Relief for Cause from BG Iauis KaJ:pinski. Cl>mmander
SOOth MP Brigade, for fralemlzalion and dereliction of duty for
fmlemizing Withjuninr enlisted soldiers within his unit; GOMOR
officially filed and he was removed from the CSM list
9). (U) csM Edward Stotts, Command Sergeant Major, 400thMP
Battalion .
GOMOR from BG Kaipinski, ComJMDder SOOth MP Brigade, on 20
August 20!)3, for failing to properly tmin his Soldiers (Soldier bad
negligent discharge ofM-16 while exiting his vehicle, round went
into fuel tank); filed locally.
10). (U) lSG Carlos Vlllanueva, First Sergeant, 770thMP Company
GOMOR from BG Karpinski, Commander 800thMP Brigade, on 20
August 2003, for failiqg til properly tmin his Soldiers (Soldier bad
negligeotdlscbargeofM·16 while exiling his vehicle, round went
into fuel tank); filed locally.
ll). (U) MSG David Maffett, NBC NCO, SOOth MP Brigade,
GOMORfromLTG McKienum, Commander CFLCC, on 25 May
2003, for violation of CENTCOM General Order #1, consuming
alcohol; filed locally.
12) (U) SGM Marc Emerson, Operations SGM, 320th MP Battalion,
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· • Two GO Letters of Concern and a vernal reprimand from BG
Karpinski, Commander SOOth MP Brigade, for fililing to adhere to the
guidance/directives given to him by BG KaJ:pinski; filed locally.
d. (U) Saluting of officers was sporadic and not enforced. LTC Robert
P. Walters, Jr., Commander of the 16Sth Military Jntelligenc:e Battalion
(l'actical ExplOitation), tes1i1ied that the saluting policy was enforced
by COL Pappas for all Ml pemDDel, aod that BG Karpinski approached
COL Pappas to revene the saluting policy back to a no-saluting policy
as previously existed. (ANNEX S3)
19. (U) I find that individual Soldiers within the SOOth MP Brigade aod
the 320th Battalion stationed throughout Imq had very little co111act
dwing their tour of duty with either LTC (P) Phillabaum or BG
Karpinski. BG Kaipinski claimed, dwing her testimony, that she paid
regularvisits to the various detentioniilcilities where her Soldiers
were stationed However, the detailed calelldarprovided by her
Aide-de-Camp, lLTMabzy, does not support her contention.
More!l\'Ct, numerous witnesses stated that they rarely saw BG
Karpinski or LTC (P) Phillabaum (Multiple W'IIDess Statements)
20. (U) In addition I find that psychological factors, such as the
difference in culture, the Soldiers' quality of life, the real presence of·
mortal danger over an extended time period, aod the :fililure of
commanders to recogolze these pressures contributed to the . .
perversive atmosphere that existed at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) Detention
Facility and throughout the SOOth MP Brigade. (ANNEX 1).
21. As I have documented in other parts of this investigation, I :find
that there was no clear emphasis by BG Karpinski to ensure that the
SOOth MP Brigade Staff; Commanders, aod Soldiers were trained to
standard in detainee operations and proficiency or that serious
accountability lapses that occurred over a signifiamtperlod of time,
particularly at Abu Gbraib (BCCF), were corrected. AR IS-6
Jnvestigations regsnling detainee escapes were not acted 11pOD,
foiiowed up with corrective action, or dlssemioateli to subordinate
commanders or Soldiers. Brigade aod unit SOPs for dealing with
detainees if they existed at all, were not read or understood by MP
Soldiers assigned the difl!cult mission of detainee opemtions.
Following the abuse of several detainees at Camp Bucca in May 2003,
I could find no evidence that BG Karpinski ever directed corrective
training for her soldiers or enswed that MP Soldiers throughout l!aq
cleaJiyunderstood therequiremeots ofthe Geoeva Conventions
relating to the treaunent of detainees. (Multiple Witoess
Statemeots aod the Personal Obse!vations of the Investigation
Team)
22. On 17 January 2004 BG Karpinski was formally admonished in
writing by LTG SanChez regarding the serlous deficiencies in her
Brigade. LTG SanChez found that the per1imnance of the SOOthMP
Brigade had not met the standards set by the Army or by CJTF-7. He
found that incidents in the preceding six IDOiiths had occurred that
reflected a Jack of clear standimls, proficiency aod leadersbip within
the Brigade. LTG Sanchez also cited the rec:eot detainee abuse at
Abu Ghnu'b (BCCF) as the most rec:eot example of a poor leadership
climate that "permeates the Brigade." I totally concur with LTG
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Sanchez' opinion regardiJJg the perfonnance ofBG KaJpinski and the
SOOth MP Brigade. (ANNEX 102 and the Pezsonal Observations of .
the Investigating Officer)
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO PART 1liREE OF THE INVESTIGATION:
1 .. (U) That BG Janis L. Karpinski. Cnmmander, SOOth MP Brigade
be Relieved :from Command and given a General Officer Memomndum of
Reprimand fOr the follovdng acts which have been previously referred
to in the aforementioned findings:
Failing to ensure thatMP Soldiers at theater-level detention
facilities tbrougbout Iraq bad appropriate SOPs .for dealing with
detainees and that Commanders and Soldiers bad resd,
'll!lderstood, and would adhere to these SOPs.
Failing to ensure that MP Soldiers in the SOOth MP Brigade knew,
tlllderstood, and adhered to the protections afforded to
detainees in the Geneva Convention Rela1iVe to the Treatment
ofPrisoners of War.
Making material misrepresentations to the Investigation Team as
to the frequency of her visits to her subordinate commands.
Failing to obey an order ftom the CFLCC ColliiiUIIIder, LTG
McKieman, regarding the withholding of disc:iplinaiy authOrity fOr
Officer and Senior Noncommissioned Officer misconduct.
Failing to take appropliate aelion regarding the inetrec:tiveness
of a subOrdinate Commander, LTC (P) leny Phillabaum
Failing to take appropriate aelion regarding the ineffectmness
of numerous membeiS of her Brigade Staft'including ber XO, S-1,
S-3, and S-4.
Failing to properly ensure the results and recommendations of
the AARs and llUIDCr01lS 1S-61nvestigation reports on escapes
and sltootings (over a period of several months) were properly
disseminated to, and understood by, subordinate commanders.
Failing to. ensure and eofOrce basic Soldier standards throughout
her command
Failing to ~!ish a Brigsde MB'IL.
Failing to listab1ish bssic proficiency in assigned tssks for
Soldiers throughout the 800thMP Brigade. ·
Failing to ensure that numerous and repOrted accountability
lapses at detention facilities 1broughout Jmq were corrected.
2. (U) That COL Thomas M. PappaS, ('nmmander, 205th MI
Brigade, be given a Geneml Officer MemoJandum ofReprimand and
Investigated UPProceduie lS, AR381·10, US .Amtyintelligence
Activities for the following acts which have been previously referred to
in the aforementioned fiudings:
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were
properly trained in and followed the IROE.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew,
· undeiStood, and followed the protections alforded to detainees
. in the Geneva Convention Relslive to the Treatment ofPrisoners .
· ofWar. ·
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and ''visitlng"
Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu Gbraib (BCCF).
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3. (U) That LTC (P) Jerry L. Phillabaum, Commander, 320th MP
Battalion, be Relieved from Command, be given a General Oflicer
Memomndum ofiqlrimand, and be removed from the Colonel/0-6
Promotion List fOr the following acts which have been previously
refemd to in the afoJ:eJQentioned findings:
Failing to properly ensure the results, :rec:ommenda!ions, and
AARs from numerous reports on escapes and shootings OVlll' a
period of scveml months were properly disseminated to, and
understood by, subordinates..
Failing to Implement the appropriate recommenda!ions from
various 15-6 Jnvestigalions as specifically directed by BG
Xmpinski. . .
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct=nmand were
properly trained in 1ntemment and Rcsett1ement Operations.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew
and understood the protections affimled to detainees in the
Geneva ConVention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisonen of
War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting"
Tier 1 of the Hard-site at Abu Gbraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and eoforce basic soldier standards,
proficiency, and accoua1llbili1y.
Failure to conduct an appropriate Mission Analysis lind to task
organize to accomplish his mission.
4. (U) That LTC StevenL. Jordan, Fonner Director, Joint
Interrogation and Debriefing Center and Liaison 01licer to 20Sth
Military Intelligence Brigade, be relieved fiom duty and be given a
Geneml Officer Memorandum ofReprimand fOr the following acts which
have been previously referred to in the aforeritentioned findings:
Making material mistepiesenlations to the Investigating Team,
including his leadenbip roll at Abu Gbraib (BCCF).
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control were
properly trained in and followed the IROE.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct control knew,
~ and followed the protections afforded to detainees
in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War.
Failing to properly supervise soldiers under bia direct authority
worldng and "visiting" Tier 1 of the Hard-site at Abu Gbraib
(BCCF).
S. (U)ThatMAJDavid W. DlNenna, Sr., 8-:i, 320thMPBattalion,
be Relieved from his position as the Battalion S-3 and be given a
Genem1 Officer Memmandum of Reprimand for the following acts which
have been previously referred to in the aforementioned findings:
Received a GOMOR from LTG McKiernan, Commander CFLCC, on
25 MaY 20!)3, for dereliction of duty for failing to report a
violation ofCBNTCOM: General Order #1 by a subordinate Field
Gtade Officer and Senioi Noncommissioned Oflicer, which he
personally observed; GOMOR was returned to.Soldier and not
filed. . . .
Failing to take couective action and Implement recommendations
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from various lS~ investigations even after receiving a GOMOR
fromBG Karpinski, Commander800thMPBrigade, on 10
November 03, for :fililiDgto take comctive security measures as
ordered; GOMOR was filed locally.
Failing to take appropziatc action and report an incident of
detainee apuse. whereby be personalJy witnessed a Soldier
throw a delainee from the back of a truck.
6. (U) That CPT Donald I. ~e, Commander, 372DdMP
Company, be Relieved from C()ll1mand and be given a Geoer.d Officer
Memorandum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been
previously refemd to in the afo.tementi.oned findings:
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command knew
and understood the protections a1forded to detainees in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War.
Failing to properly supervise his Soldiers worldog and "visiting"
Tier 1 of the Hard-Site at Abu G1uaib {BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and eofon:e basic soldier standards,
proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were
properly tiained in Jntemment and Resettlement Operations. .
7. (U) That 1LT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP · ·
Company, be Relieved from his dillies as Platoon Leader and be given
a Geoer.d Officer ~dwn of Reprimand for the following acts
which have been previonsly referred to in the aforementioned findings:
Failing to .:msnre that Soldiers under his direct command knew
and understood tlie protections afforded to detainees in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners of
War.
Failing to properly snpervise his soldiers worldog and "\>isiting"
Tier 1 oft\te Hard-Site at Abu Gluaib·{BCCF).
Failing to properly establish and enforce basic Soldier standards,
proficiency, and accountability.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers under his direct command were
properly tiained in Internment and Resettlement Operations.
8. (U) That SGMMarc Emerson, Opemtions S~ 320th MP
Battalion, be Relieved from his dillies and given a Geoer.d Officer
MCIIIOilllldum of Reprimand for the following acts which have been
previously referred to in the aforementioned findings"
Making a material misrepresenta1ion to the Investigation Team
staling that he had "never" been adtnonjsbed or reprimanded by
BG Karpinski, when in fact he had been admonished for 1lliliDg to
obey an order from BG Karpinski to "stay out of the towers" at
the holding1ilcility.
Making a material misrepresenta1ion to the Investigation Team
staling that he had atteoded evmy shift chsngc/guard-monnt
conducted at the 320th MP Battalion, and that he personally
briefed his Soldiers on the proper treatment of detainees, when
in fact numerous statements contradict this assertion.
Failing to ensure that Soldiers in the 320thMP Battalion knew
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and unde!'stood the protections afforded to detainees in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Trea1ment Of Prisoners of
War.
Failiug to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visitiug"
Tier l of the Hard-site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failiug to properly estlblish and enforce basic soldier staudards,
prolicicney, aud aa:ountabilli¥.
Failiug to ensure that his Soldiers were properly tliiinedin
Tntemmeut and Resettlement Operations.
9. (U) 'Ibat lSG Brian G. Lipinski, F"ust Sergeant, 372rul MP
Compauy, be Relieved from his duties as F"ust Sergeaut of the 372Dd
MP Company and given a General Oflicer Memorandmn of Reprimand
for the following acts which have beeu previously refmed to in the
aforemeutioned findings:
Failiug to. ensure that Soldiers in the 372nd MP Company knew
and understood the protections affcrded to detainees in the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment ofl'rlsone[s of
War.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers working and "visiting"
Tier 1 of the Hard-site at Abu Ghraib (BCCF).
Failing to properly estlblish imd enforce basic soldier staudards,
proficiency, and aa:oun1ilbili!y.
Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly tmincd in
Tntemmeut and Rcsett!emeot Operations.
10. (U) That SFC ShannonK. Snider, Platoon Sergeant, 372nd MP
Company, be Relieved from his duties, rcccive a General Ollicer
Memollltldum ofReprimand, andrcccivc action under the Unifonn Code
of MilitarY Justice for the following acts which have been previously
referred to in the aforemeu1ioncd findings:
Failing to ensure that Soldiers in his platoon knew and
understood the protections afforded to detainees in the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar.
Failing to properly supervise his soldiers wor1diig and "visitiug"
Tier 1 of the Hard-5jtc at Abu Ghnu"b (BCCF).
Failing to properly estlblish and enforce basic soldier staudards,
proficiency, and accountabilli¥.
Failing to ensure that his Soldiers were properly tiilined in
Intemment and Rcsett!emeot Opemtions.
Failing to report a Soldier, who under his direct control, abused
detainees by stomping on their bale hands and feet in his
presem:e.
11. (U) That Mr. Steven Stephanowicz, Con1Iact US Civilian
Interrogator, CACI, 20SthMiJitarY Inte1ligcnce Brigade, be given
au 01licial Reprimand to be placed iii his employment file, tennination
of employment, and generation of a derogatoty report to revoke his
security c1eaiance for the following acts which have been previously
refmed to in the aforementioned findings:
Made a :lillse statement to the investigation team regarding the
locations Of his interrogations, the activities during his
"interrogations, and his knoWledge of abuses.
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Allowed and/or instructed MPs, who were DOt trained in
~galion techniques, to facilitate inlcn'ogations by "setting
conditions" which were neither authorized and in accordance
with applicable regulations/policy. He clearly knew his
iDstructions equated to physical abuse.
'
12. (U) That Mr. Joho Israel, Contract us Civilian Interpreter,
CACI, 205th Military Jnt.elligence Brigade, be given an Official
Reprimand to be placed in his employment :fi1o and have his security
cleamuce reviewed by competent authority for the following acts or
. COIIl:CDIS which have been previously referred to in the
aforementioned fiudings:
Denied ever having seen inlcn'ogation processes in violation of
the lR.OE, which is CODtraly to several witness smtements.
Did not have a security cleamm:e.
13. (U) I fiDd tbat there is sufficient credible infotmation to wammt an
Jnquily UP Procedure 15, AR 381-10, US Army Intc11igence Activities,.
be conclucted to determine the extent of culpability ofMI personnel,
assigned to the 205th MI Brigade.and the Joint Jnteaogation and
Debriefing Center (JIDC) at Abu Ghmib (BCCF). Spcc1fically, I suspect
that COL Thomas M Pappas. LTC Steve L. JordatJ, Mr. Steven
Stepbanowicz, and Mr. John Ismcl were either directly or indirectly
responsible for the abuses at Abu Ghmib (BCCF) and strongly
nx:ommend immediate disciplinaly action as descn"bed in the preceding
paragraphs as well as the initiation of a Procednre 15 Inquiry to
determine the full extent of their culpability. (Annex 36) .
OTHER FINDINGS/OBSERVATIONS
1. (U) Due to the Dature and scope of this investigation, I acquired
the assistance of Col (Dr.) Hemy Nelson, a USAF Psychiatrist, to
analyze the iJlvestigation materials from a psychological perspective.
~;:::::as~~~~==actsof
select soldiers in an UDSUpeiVised and dangerous setting. There was a ·
complex interplay of many psychological factors. and command
insulliciem:les. A more detailed ll1llllysls is contained in ANNEX 1 of
this investigation.
2. (U) During the comse of this investigation I conducted a lcogthy
interview with BG Kmpinski that lasted over four hours, and is included
verbatim in the investigation Annexes. BG Karpinski was extremely
emotioDal during much of her testimony. What I found particularly
disturbing in her testimony was her complete unwillingness to either
unclemand or accept tbat many of the problems inherent in the BOOth
MP Brigade were caused or ex:acetbated by poor leadership and the
refusal of her command to both estsblisb and enforce basic standards
and principles among its Soldiers. (ANNEX 45)
3. (U) Throughout the investigation, we observed many individual
Soldiers and some subordinate units under the SOOth MP Brigade that ·
overcame significant obstacles, persevered in extmnely poor
conditions, and upheld the Army Values. We discovered JlllllleiOUS.
examples of Soldiers and Sailors taking the initiative in the absence of
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leadership and accomplishing their ljSSjgned tasks.
a. (U) The 744th MP Baltalion, commanded by LTC DCilllis McGlone,
efficiently operated the HVD Detention Facility at Camp Cropper and
met mission requirenlents with little to no guidance :from the SOOth MP
Brigade. The 1111it was disciplined, proficient, and appeared tO
undm1and their basic tasks.
b. (U) The S30th MP Battalion, mmmanded by LTC Stephen J.
Novotny, effectively maintained the MEK Detention Facility at Camp
Ashraf: His Soldiezs were proficient in their individual tasks and
adapted well to this highly unique and non-doctrinal operation.
c. (U) The 16Sth MI Bl!Uallon =elled in providing perimeter security
and fcm:e protection at Abu Gbraib (BCCF). LTC Robert P. Walters,
Jr., demandeti standards be eofim:ed and worked endlessly to improve
discipline througbout the FOB.
4. (U) The individual SoldiCIS and Sailors that we observed and
believe sbould be favorably noted include:
a. (U)MasteNit-ArmsFirst ClassW"llliamJ.Kimbro, US Navy Dog
Handler, knew hiS duties and refused to participate in iJIIproper
interrogations despite significant pressure from tbe MI pCISOnnel at
AbuGiuaib.
b. (U) SPC Joseph M Darby, 372Dd MP ComPanY discovered evidence
of abuse and turned it over to mililaly law enfurcement
c. (U) lLT David 0. Sutton, 229th MP Compaliy, took immediate
actjcin and stopped an abuse, theu reported the incldeot to the chain
of command.
CONCLUSION
1. (U) Several US Army Soldiers have committed egregious acts and
gnive breaches of international law at Abu GhraibiBCCF and camp
Bucca, Imq. Furthermore, key senior leaders in both the SOOth MP
Brigade and the 205thMI Brigade failed to comply With established
regulations, policies, and NUDmaod directives in preventing delainee
abuses at Abu Ghraib (BCCF) and at Camp Bueca during the period
August 2003 to Febrwuy 2004.
2. (U) Approval and implemeutation of the recommendations of this
AR 15-6 Investigation and those highlighted in previous assessments
are essential to establish the.conditions with the resoun:es and
persoDilcl reqUired to prevent 1irture occurrences of detainee abuse.
Psychological Assessment.R.equest for investigation :from CJTF-7 to
CENTCOMDin:ctiveto CFLCC from CENfCOM diiecting .
investigationAppoinlment Memo from CFLCC CDR to MG TagubalS-6
Investigation 9 June 200315-61nvestigation 12 June 200315-6
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Investigation 13 June 200315-6 Investigation 24 November 200315-6
Investigation 7 January 2004 15-6 Investigation 12 January 2004 SIR
S November 2003 SIR 7 November 2003SIR 8 November 2003SIR 13
December 2003 SIR 13 December 2003SIR 13 December 2003SIR 17
December 2003Commander's JnquiJ:y 26 January 2004MG Ryder's
Report, 6 November 2003MG Miller's Report, 9 September 2003AR
190-8, Enemy PrlsollCIB of War, RetainedPer$onuel, Civilian Internees,
and Other DeWDces, 1 October 1997FM 3-19.40, Military Polic:e
Intemmenti.Rcseement Operatious, 1 August 2001PM 34-52,
Intelligence Interrogation, 28 September lmFourth CleJ!eva
Convention, 12 August 1949CID Report on criminal abuses at Abu
Gbral"b, 28 January 2004CID Interviews, 10-25 January 2004SOOthMP
Brigade Roster, 29 January 2004205th Ml Brigade's IROE, Undated.TOA
Order (SOOth MP Brigade) and letter holding witucsseslnvesti.ga1ion
Team's witness listFRAGO #1108Letters suspending several key
leaders in the SOOth MP Brigade and Rating Chain with suspensions
liiiiiOtat.ed FM 27-10, MDitaiy Iustico, 6 September 2002CID Report on
abuse of detainees at Camp 13ucc:a, S June 2003Arlicle 32 Findings on
abuseofdelaineesatCampBucc:a, 26 August2003AR3Sl·l0, I July
1984Excelpts from log books, 320th MP Battalion310th MP Battalion's
Inprocessing SOP320thMP Battalion's "Change Sbeet"Joint ·
Interrogation and Debriefing Center's (11DC) Slides, UndatedO.tder of
Battle Slides, 12 January 2004JointPublication 0-2, Unified Actions
ArmedFcm:es,lOJuly2001GeuemlOilicerMemonmdumsof
Reprimand800thMP Battalipn's TACSOPBG Jauis Kalplnski, Commander,
SOOth MP Brigade
46. COL Thomas PappaS, Commander, 205th MI Brigade
47. COL Ralph Sabatino, CFLCC Judge Advocate. CPA Ministiy of
Justice
48. LTC GaryW. MaddockS, S-5andExecutiveO.fticer, 800thMP
Brigade
49. LTC James O'Hare, Command Judge Advocate, SOOth MP Brigade .
50. LTCRobertP. WaltersJr.,Comrnander,l65thMIBattalion.
(Tactical exploitation)
51. LTC James D. Edwards, Commander, 202nd MI Batlalion
52. LTC Vmcent Montera, Commander 310th MP Baualion
53: LTC Steve Jordan, fm:mer Director, Joint Interrogation Md
Debriefing Centcr/LNO to the 20Sth MI Brigade
54. LTC Leigh A. Coulter, Commander 724th MP Baualion and OIC
Ari1jan Detachmeut. 800thMP Brigade
SS. LTCDenDisMcGione, Commander, 744thMPBattalion
56. MAJDavid Hinzman, S-1, SOOthMP Brigade
51. MAI William D. Proietto, Deputy CJA, 800thMP Brigade
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58. MAJ Stacy L. Garrity, S-1 (FWD), SOOth MP Brigade
59. MAJ David W. DiNenna, S-3, 320th MP Ba!Wion
6(). MAJ Michael Sheridan, XO, 320thMP Ba!Wion
61. MAJ Anthony Cavallaro, S·3, SOOtJiMP Brigade
62. CPT Marc C. Hale, CrnnmBnder, 670th MP Company
63. CPT Domld Reese, Commander, 372nd MP Company
64. CPT Darren Hampton, Assistant S-3, 320th MP Ba!Wion
65. CPT JobD.Kaires, S·3, 310thMPBa!Wion
66. CPT Ed Diamantis, S·2, SOOth MP Brigade .
67. LTCJenyL. Phillabaum, Commander, 320thMPBatWion·
6S. CPT James G. Jones, Commander, 229th MP Company
69. CPT Michael A. Mastrangelo, Jr., Commander, 310th MP Company
70. CPT Lawrence Bush, IG, SOOth MP Brigade
71. lLT Lewis C. Raeder, Platoon Leader, 372nd MP Company
72. ILT Elvis Mabzy, Aide-de-Camp to Brigade Commander, SOOth MP
Brigade
73. lLT Warren E. Ford, ll, Commander,HHC 320thMP Ba!Wion
74. 2LT David 0. Sutton, Platoon Leader, 229thMP Company
75. CW2 Edward J. Rivas, 205th MI Brigade
76. CSMJosephP. Arrison, Command Sergeant Major, 320thMP
Ba!Wion
77. SGM Pascual Cartagena, Commatid Sergeant Major, SOOth MP
Brigade
78. CSMTimothyL. Woodcock, Command Sergeant Major, 310thMP
Ba!Wion
79. lSG Dawn J. Rippelmeyer, First Sergeant, 977th MP Company
80, SGMMadcEmerson,OpemtionsSGM,320thMPBa!Wion
81. MSG Brian G. Llplnsld, First Sergeant, 372nd MP Company
82. MSG Andrew J. Lombardo, OpmationsSergesnt, 310thMP
Batlalion
· 83. SFC Daiyl J. Plude, Platoon Sergeant, 229thMP Company
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84. SFC Sba~nM K. Snider, Platoon SGT, 372nd MP Company
85. SFC Keith A. Comer, 372nd MP Company
86. SSG Robert Elliot, Squad Leader, 372nd MP Company
87. SSG Santos A. Cardona, Army Dog Handler
88, SGT Michael Smith, Army Dog Handler
89. MAl Willlam. J. Kimbro, USN Dog Handler
90. Mr. Steve Stepbanowicz, US civilian contract Interrogator, CACJ, ·
205thMI Brigade
91. Mr. John Israel, US civilian conttact Interpreter, Titan
Co1p0mtion, 205thMI Brigade
92. FM 3-19,1, Military Police Operations, 22 March 2001
93. CJ1F-71ROE andDROE, Undated
94. CJ1F-7 Interrogation and Counter Resistance Policy, 12 October
2003
95. SOOth MP Brigade Mobilization Orders
96. Sample Detainee Status Report, 13 March 2004
97. SlOth MP Battalion Mission Briel; 11 Februaty 2004
98. MemomndwnforRecord, CPTEdRay, CbiefofMilitaryJustice,
CFLCC. 9 March 2004
99. SIR 14 January 2004
100. Accountability Plan Recommendations, 9 March 2004
101. 2LTMichaelR. Ostemout, 8-2, 320thMPBattalion
102. Memomndum of Admonishment from LTG Sanchez to BG
Karpinsld, 17
January 2004
103, Various SIRs from the 800thMP Brigade/320thMP Battalion
104. 205th MI Brigade SJ.TREp to MG Miller, 12 December 2003
105, SGT Willlam. A. Cathcsrt, 372nd MP Company
106. 1LT Michael A Drayton,. C.o mmander, 870th MP Company
C 2004 MSNBC lDtemctive
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